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Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

The multiple pressure tube rupture (MPTR) issue

in RBMK safety technology
F. D’Auria a,∗ , B. Gabaraev b , O. Novoselsky b , V. Radkevich b , V.N. Filinov b , D. Mazzini a ,
F. Moretti a , F. Pierro a , A. Vigni a , L. Parafilo b , D. Kryuchkov c
a DIMNP, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
b NIKIET, Moscow, Russia
c PhEI, Obninsk, Russia

Received 22 September 2006; received in revised form 24 February 2007; accepted 1 March 2007

Abstract
The RBMK core is constituted by more than one-thousand pressurized channels housed into stacked graphite blocks and connected at the bottom
and at the top by small diameter (D) and long length (L) pipes (less than 0.01 and more than 10 m, respectively) that end up into headers and
drum separators. Control valves are installed in the bottom lines. Due to the large L/D value and to the presence of valves and other geometric
discontinuities along the lines connecting with the pressure channels, the Fuel Channel Blockage (FCB) event is possible and already occurred in
two documented NPP events. Pressure tube rupture occurred in a third NPP event not originated by FCB. Previous investigations, have shown the
relevance of these events for the safety technology, and the availability of proper computational technique for the analysis, see the first and the
third companion paper in this journal issue, respectively.
The occurrence of the FCB event remains undetected for a few tens of seconds because of the lack of full monitoring for the individual channels,
fourth companion paper in this journal issue. Therefore, fission power continues to be produced in the absence of cooling. This brings in subsequent
times to fuel rod overheating, pressure tube failure, damage of the neighbouring graphite brick and ejection of damaged fuel.
Following the pressure tube rupture, reactor cavity pressurization, radioactivity release into the same area and change of fluid properties occur
that allow the detection of the event and cause the reactor scram at a time of a few tens of seconds depending upon the channel working conditions
and the severity of the blockage.
Notwithstanding the [delayed] scram and the full capability of the reactor designed safety features to keep cooled the core, the multiple pressure
tube rupture (MPTR) issue is raised. The question to be answered is whether the ‘explosion’ of the blocked pressure tube damages not only the
neighbour graphite bricks but propagates to other channels causing the potential for several channel failure.
In order to address the MPTR issue fuel channel thermal-hydraulics and three-dimensional (3D) neutron kinetics analyses have been performed,
as well structural mechanics calculations for the graphite bricks and rings (graphite rings surround the pressure tube to accommodate for thermal
and radiation induced expansions).
The bases for the analysis and the results of the study are presented. The conclusion, not reported within a licensing based format, is that the
MPTR consequences are not expected to be relevant for the safety of the RBMK installations. This is supported by the analysis of experiments
performed at the TKR facility available at the EREC research Centre near Moscow.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction assembled in groups of 18 to constitute pressurized Fuel Chan-

The RBMK (Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kipyashiy) is a
boiling light water cooled, graphite moderated thermal reactor.
Slightly enriched uranium fuel is adopted for fuel rods that are
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: dauria@ing.unipi.it (F. D’Auria).
nels (FC). A zirconium–niobium tube envelopes the channel
to sustain the coolant pressure and is embedded into square-
cross-section graphite blocks. More than 1600 graphite stacks
with embedded fuel channel constitute the core that is bounded
by a steel tank enclosed into a pressure resistant reactor cav-
ity.
Established fundamental principles, already valid in the 50s,
are at the basis of the design of the reactor system that nowadays,

0029-5493/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.nucengdes.2007.03.002
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
following an experience of around 360 reactor-years, shows suit-
able operational and safety records with the noticeable exception
of the Chernobyl unit 4 event in 1986.
The detailed knowledge of the RBMK system configuration
was not spread in the Western world till the 1986 event. After-
wards, “information batches” of RBMK technology became
available and were unavoidably evaluated in the light of the
Chernobyl event. This caused a search for and a characteriza-
tion of inadequacies not counterbalanced by the identification
of the acceptable safety features, ending-up in an overall neg-
ative judgement from the reactor safety viewpoint. The lack or
the inadequacy of a comprehensive safety related documenta-
tion from the Soviet Union, also connected with the uses of
the reactor, contributed to this judgement. Furthermore, geo-
metric and material features of the reactor and primarily of
the core, were not consistent with capabilities or with the val-
idation domain of computational tools adopted in the Western
world to assess the fulfilment of standard safety requirements,
actually preventing a sound and (Russian) independent evalua-
tion.
The results of recently completed project sponsored by
European Commission (EC), with the participation of RBMK
designers in Russia and the supervision of the national utility
and the regulatory authority (D’Auria et al., 2005), allow to give
an idea of RBMK current safety characteristics.
The project has been made possible owing to the avail-
ability of sophisticate computational tools developed and
qualified in the last decade. These include powerful com-
puters, advanced numerical solution methods, techniques for
developing input decks and for proving the qualification
level.
The general subject of the project is the deterministic accident
analysis where emphasis is given to the phenomena occurring
during the expected transient scenarios rather than to the rigor
needed within a nuclear reactor licensing process. Following
the identification and the characterization of bounding scenarios
assuming to envelope all accident conditions relevant to RBMK
safety technology, two main chains of codes have been set-up
and utilized to perform safety analyses.
The main achievements from the project are critically
reviewed in the set of six companion papers including the
present one and are supported by recent literature documents,
e.g., Sorokin et al. (2006) and Uspuras and Kaliatka (2006).
The objectives of the series of six papers can be summarized as
follows:
(1) To present numerical techniques and computational tools,
including qualification levels and results from the applica-
tions, suitable for deterministic safety analysis of RBMK.
(2) To demonstrate the results of computational analyses, which
allow making conclusions about the current safety charac-
teristics of the plants with RBMK reactors.
The former objective is primarily pursued in the present paper
and in the papers by D’Auria et al. (2008b,c,d, e) (see also
D’Auria et al., 2005) that constitute the support for the con-
clusions that are derived in the first paper of the series, e.g.,
1027
D’Auria et al. (2008a). The content of those papers can be sum-
marized as follows with ‘qualification of computational tools’
constituting a common issue:
• overall perspective and status for deterministic accident anal-
ysis in RBMK (D’Auria et al., 2008a),
• thermal-hydraulic performance of the primary system of
RBMK following selected accidents (D’Auria et al., 2008b),
• thermal-hydraulic performance of confinement system of
RBMK, following selected accidents (D’Auria et al., 2008c),
• the use and the relevance of 3D neutron kinetics coupled with
thermal-hydraulics in RBMK accident analysis (D’Auria et
al., 2008d),
• addressing the multiple pressure tube rupture (MPTR) issue,
present paper,
• the proposal for the individual channel monitoring (ICM) sys-
tem to prevent pressure tube rupture following FC blockage
(D’Auria et al., 2008e).
The latter objective is pursued primarily in the paper by
D’Auria et al. (2008a) that makes use of results documented
in the remaining five companion papers. The background and
the rationale for achieving the selected objectives are also part
of that paper. This also includes an arbitrarily defined list of
topics derived from a spot-based investigation within the safety
domain of water cooled reactors including RBMK. It must also
be premised that well established Probabilistic Safety Assess-
ment (PSA) results have been used, but no investigation has
been carried out to demonstrate the validity or the quality of
those results.
Data, analyses and conclusions in the six companion papers
are related to the current configuration of the Smolensk-3
NPP (some reported analyses also relate to Ignalina-2 NPP)
and no effort is made to provide any evaluation of safety for
RBMK where the innovation or modernisation feedbacks for
the Smolensk-3 plant are not applicable.
The configuration of the RBMK core with more than 1600
pressurized Fuel Channels (FC) make the designers aware of the
problem connected with the rupture of one single tube. This may
happen owing to a technological defect (even though the proba-
bility of such event could be negligible as discussed by D’Auria
et al., 2008a), or due to the coolant blockage at the channel
inlet, or due to power excursion (this event has been documented
two times in existing reactors originated by coolant blockage,
D’Auria et al., 2005, see also below). The consequences of the
break of a single FC are handled by the overall protection sys-
tem of the reactor with radiological consequences within the
acceptance limits prescribed by the Regulatory Authority (see
D’Auria et al., 2008a,b,c,d). However, in such conditions, i.e.
after the FC break,
(a) overheated fuel is ejected from the channel, and
(b) the FC neighbouring the broken channel are loaded by
hydraulic forces to an extent that can cause the failure thus
triggering, through a domino type effect, the potential catas-
trophic failure of the core.
1028 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

The last item, commonly known with the terms multiple

pressure tube rupture (MPTR), constitutes the main topic of
this paper. The RBMK designers were aware of the issue and
finalized the core design to prevent the MPTR occurrence. The
recently available safety technology software and recent exper-
iments, e.g., Medvedeva et al. (2004a), made it possible to
substantiate the safety margins of the RBMK in relation to the
MPTR according to the modern exigencies in the domain of
nuclear reactor safety. The issue has been thoroughly studied in
the past, e.g., NIKIET (1983, 1998) and constituted the subject
of international conferences, e.g., Simonov et al. (1994), and of
projects supported by the European Commission, e.g., Sureau
et al. (1996) and TACIS (1996).
Therefore, the objective of the present paper is two-fold:
on the one hand to present the capabilities of computational
tools and to outline the results of experiments dealing with the
MPTR, on the other hand to show results from the application
of those tools that bring (preliminary results have been obtained
within the present framework that need further qualification) to
the exclusion of the possibility of MPTR in currently operating
RBMK NPP.

2. The boundary conditions for the MPTR issue

The overall framework for the study can be found in D’Auria
et al. (2008a), with more details given in D’Auria et al. (2005). In
the present paper the attention is focused toward the accident sce-
nario originated by the fuel channel blockage (FC-BLOCKAGE
by D’Auria et al., 2008b,d) making reference to boundary con-
ditions in the Smolensk-3 NPP unit.
The key elements for achieving the objectives assigned for
the paper can be found in chapters 4–6. Hereafter, chapters 2 and
3, the background for addressing the multidisciplinary problem
arising from the FC-BLOCKAGE and the MPTR issues is intro-
duced. This includes the presentation of following aspects: (a)
sketches of components and zones of the RBMK core region to
make clear the concerned accident scenario, (b) the characteriza-
tion of the steady state operation of the reference RBMK boiling
channel, (c) the experience from the pressure tube (PT) rupture
events in RBMK NPP, (d) the phenomenological evolution of
the transient, (e) the differences between the FC-BLOCKAGE
and the FC-LOCA scenarios and (f) the licensing environment.
2.1. Elements of the RBMK core layout relevant to the
MPTR
The overall RBMK system, the primary loop, the confinement
including the reactor cavity and the core region are described in
the companion papers by D’Auria et al. (2008a,b,c,d), respec-
tively. More details can be found in taken from the references
Almenas et al. (1998), Uspuras and Kaliatka (2006) and D’Auria
et al. (2005). A few elements are reported below that are relevant
for the present study.
2.1.1. The overall core configuration
Referring to the Smolensk-3 plant data the reactor core is
composed by 2488 graphite columns or stacks, Fig. 1, of which:
Fig. 1. Radial cross-section of RBMK core (Smolensk-3 NPP). ‘White’ (or
empty) squares are the (1570) fuel channels.
(a) 1570 fuel channel columns, Fig. 2, (b) 314 non-fuel channels
columns (211 are control rods channels, part of the Control and
Protection System, CPS, regularly distributed over the core lat-
tice) and (c) 604 radial reflector channels. The following should
be noted (relevant aspects for the present context):
• ‘Hot’ and ‘cold’ graphite stacks are part of the core. A typical
cell consisting of one CPS channel and of five fuel channels is
illustrated in Fig. 3 (top). In the same figure (bottom) typical
temperature values in one fuel channel ‘graphite cell’ during
nominal core operation are reported (Parafilo et al., 2000).
In all channels thermal power is generated in the graphite
due to the neutron moderation process and is transferred to
the central cooled channel (either FC or CPS channel, thick
arrows in Fig. 3). Furthermore, graphite blocks enveloping
FC are warmer than graphite blocks enveloping CPS channels,
thus heat transfer occurs across gaps (narrow arrows in Fig. 3)
as discussed by Uspuras and Kaliatka (2004). Coolant in the
CPS is kept below the boiling point by suitable circulation
flow.
• Temperature of graphite is not only a function of the radial
coordinates (above bullet) but also of the axial coordinate with
lower average temperature at the bottom and at the top of the
core (see results of steady-state analyses, for instance Fig. 18c
in D’Auria et al., 2008b). Therefore, axial heat transfer occurs
between ‘piled-up’ graphite blocks to a lower extent than
radial heat transfer owing to smaller temperature differences.
• The thickness of the gaps between adjacent graphite blocks,
Fig. 3, depends upon temperature differences, not uniform all
over the core, and upon neutron fluence: irradiation causes
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
Fig. 2. Fuel channel and fuel rod of a RBMK.
Fig. 3. Graphite stacks in RBMK: (a) ‘module’ including five fuel channels and
one CPS channel (red circle); arrows indicate the versus of the heat transfer;
(b) typical graphite temperatures during nominal operation. (For interpretation
of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of the article.)
1029
changes in the geometric dimensions of graphite blocks other
than in material properties, e.g., IAEA (2000).
• Other gaps exist between pressure tubes and graphite rings and
between graphite rings and graphite stacks (Fig. 4). The gap
dimensions are largely a function of neutron fluence, pressure
and temperature, e.g., operating conditions and core life.
• The gas, helium or nitrogen or a mixture helium–nitrogen,
circulates inside the gaps among graphite stacks (see also the
devoted paragraph below). Its main roles for the safety and
operation of RBMK are: (a) detection of high radioactivity or
humidity in the reactor cavity (irrelevant for the present con-
text of analysis); (b) transferring thermal power from graphite
to pressure tube; (c) transferring thermal power between adja-
cent graphite columns, i.e. heat transferred by the gas removal
system is negligible compared with the heat passing from
‘hot’ stacks to ‘cold’ stacks.
• Mechanical, thermal and neutron related properties of mate-
rials constituting the core are largely a function of core life
(neutron fluence) and of operating temperature, e.g., IAEA
(2000). This must be considered in the analyses.
• The deformation characteristic of the fuel channels and asso-
ciated graphite column depend upon the type of load (uniform,
punctual, etc.) and upon the location. Furthermore, other than
the pressure tube that constitutes the most resistant part of
the ensemble, the graphite blocks, the fuel bundles and the
central bar contribute to the overall stiffness.
2.1.2. The reactor cavity and the hydraulic connections
Phenomena occurring in the confinement including the reac-
tor cavity (RC), are discussed by D’Auria et al. (2008c). The
sketch of the RC of the Smolensk-3 NPP with main hydraulic
connections is given in Fig. 5. The connection of both the RC
and the accident localisation system (ALS) with the environment
should be noted.
1030 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
Fig. 4. Graphite block, graphite ring and pressure tube of the RBMK core and main geometric dimensions.
2.1.3. The ensemble of graphite columns, the enveloping
tank and the structural constraints
About 2500 graphite stacks constitute the core, with about
1500 fuel channels as described above. Each stack, composed
of several blocks (one block shown in Fig. 4), is centred over a
thick-walled, pressure resistant, zirconium (plus 2.5% niobium)
tube. Each tube is constrained at the top and at the bottom in
a complex way as given in Fig. 6a where possible constraint
modelling is also shown.
The ensemble of stacks is surrounded by a cylindrical steel
tank (“KZh” structure in Fig. 6b; internal diameter 14.50 m,
thickness 0.016 m and height 9.75 m), that together with the top
and bottom metal structures (“E” and “OR” in Fig. 6b) forms
the sealed region for the reactor cavity. In order to compensate
for axial thermal expansion, the tank is provided with a bellows
compensator. The tank is designed to resist to relatively small
pressures (in the order of 0.6 MPa), and not to local loads due
to the hard contact with bending columns. Nevertheless, in the
case that a peripheral column is pushed against the tank, this
is expected to hinder further displacements of the columns and
thus to play a role in mitigating the deformation of the involved
stack ensemble.
2.1.4. The gas removal system
The gas removal system has already been introduced in the
paper by D’Auria et al. (2008c) because of its role in confinement
analyses. The related sketch is given in Fig. 7. The main goal for
the system design is to prevent graphite oxidation and to con-
trol pressure tubes sealed condition. Performing a best estimate
analysis for this specific scenario, and for similar ones within
the RBMK safety technology, may imply the consideration of
the gas removal system.
2.2. The reference quantity values
A variety of data is needed to calculate the complex scenario
arising as a consequence of the fuel channel blockage. An idea
of the parameters that characterize the transient performance
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061 1031

Fig. 5. Sketch of the reactor cavity of the Smolensk-3 RBMK NPP with related
main hydraulic connections.

of a fuel channel can be derived from Table 1. These include

parameters relevant to:

• thermal-hydraulics (related to primary system and confine-

ment),
• structural mechanics,
• neutron kinetics. Fig. 6. Structural configuration of the RBMK core: (a) pressure tube constraints;
(b) mechanically resistant elements.

Material properties and dependencies of some of the

selected parameters upon temperature and fluence consti-
tute additional sets of parameters needed for performing the
analyses.

2.3. Experience from the occurred PT rupture events in

RBMK NPP

The individual channel flow blockage accidents happened

and have been documented in the following RBMK NPP (year
also reported):

• Chernobyl-1 (1982),
• Leningrad-3 (1992).

A third pressure tube rupture event occurred in Leningrad-

1 (1975) and was initiated by local power excursion because
the additional scram system (denominated ‘LAR-LAZ’), now
installed in all RBMK NPP, was absent. During this event,
although the mismatch between the flow rate and the increased
power was experienced by more than one fuel channel, only one
pressure tube failed. Fig. 7. Sketch of the gas removal system from the RBMK reactor cavity.
1032 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

Table 1
Key quantities relevant for the analysis of the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario in RBMK
No. Item Unit Value Notes

1 Fuel generated power 2.01 Typical value. Maximum allowed value is 1.6 times
MW larger
2 Power coming from graphite blocks 0.12
3 Power removed by the gas cooling system per fuel <0.001
bundle
4 Fuel bundle active length m 7.0 See Fig. 1. Two fuel bundles are inserted into the
channel
5 No. of fuel rods per bundle – 18
6 Diameter of the pressure tube 0.08
7 Thickness of pressure tube m 0.004
8 Edge of the square graphite block 0.25 Equivalent cylinder radius (for modelling purposes)
is 0.141 m
9 FC inlet flow-rate kg/s 6.1 Average value
10 FC inlet sub-cooling K 25
11 FC inlet pressure MPa 7.8
12 FC outlet quality/void fraction −/− 0.15/0.8
13 FC total pressure drop MPa 0.65
14 Mass of coolant in one FC kg ∼8
15 Ratio flow-rate/power kg/MW ∼3
16 Thickness of the gap between graphite blocks m 0.0015 Affected by irradiation and by thermal expansion
17 Young module of pressure tube 75.4 90.4 at 80 ◦ C
18 Young module of central bar MPa × 103
19 Young module of fuel bundle at
20 Young module of graphite stack 300 ◦ C 145.0 160.0 at 80 ◦ C
21 Mass of UO2 in one FC 141.8
22 Mass of zirconium in fuel assembly 29.2
23 Mass of zirconium in FC wall kg 53.0
24 Producible H2 in one FC 0.95 and 1.7 For fuel bundle and tube
25 Mass of graphite associated to FC 743.
26 Reactivity associated with the FC voiding +0.3 Assuming β = 0.007. Calculation by MCNP
$
27 Reactivity associated with the increase of 200 K for −0.44 Assuming β = 0.007. Calculation by MCNP. In case
average fuel temperature in the bundle of 300 K the value is −0.65
28 Pressure in reactor cavity 0.1 Nominal operation
MPa
29 Overpressure for scram in reactor cavity 0.0075 Case of Leningrad-3 NPP
30 Average gas temperature in reactor cavity K 823
31 Fuel enrichment % 2.0 and 2.4
32 Burn-up (with above enrichment) MWd/t 10000 Average value
33 Axial and radial temperature distribution for the K * *See Fig. 3 above and Fig. 18c in D’Auria et al.
graphite (2008b)
34 Beginning and end-of-life gas pressure in the fuel MPa 1.6 and 1.9
pin-hot condition
35 Radioactivity in one FC, fuel ∼57000 See also Table 6
Ci
36 Radioactivity in one FC, gap ∼250
37 Yield stress for zirconium tube 380–430 Typical range given, affected by temperature and
MPa
fluence
38 Yield stress for graphite 6–9

The first of the above listed events, Chernobyl-1 (1982), was a
consequence of erroneous actions of the operator who, in adjust-
ing the flow rates in the fuel channels, fully closed the control
and isolation valve (CIV) of one FC. The designers responded to
this event by equipping all CIV at all power units with restrainers
of the CIV stem travel in order to prevent FC flow rate reduction
during adjustment below the permissible minimum.
The scenario for the second of the above listed events,
Leningrad-3 NPP, is discussed below, see NIKIET (1992) and
Fedosov et al. (1994).
Status of the plant before the event: nominal operating con-
ditions, 3150 MW. The blocked channel is characterized by the
coordinates 52-16, located in the left upper part of the reactor
map.
On 24 March 1992 at 2 h 34 min 45 s (event start), a pressure
increase signal from the reactor cavity activated the fast act-
ing emergency protection system and the reactor was scrammed
by rod insertion within 2.5 s. This time (with an error of about
2 s) can be considered the time of the pressure tube rup-
ture. Because of the time lag of 40 s between two recorded
point from the flow-rate transducers the time of the flow-
rate reduction occurrence is known with an error of 40 s. A
suitable number of withdrawn control rods was available for
scram.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
The signal for shut-down system activation is triggered when
the cavity pressure increases by 0.075 bar. Two seconds after the
scram the relative pressure in the cavity reached 0.13 bar and
subsequently decreased to the value of 0.1 bar after 5 s. After-
wards the pressure again started to rise with a slower rate and
reached a peak of 0.19 bar 23–25 s after the event start. Then the
cavity pressure steadily decreased.
The cause for the accident was the flow decrease at the inlet
originated by the failure of the control valve. In particular, a
throttling device of the valve was partially destroyed and closed
the flow area. The resulting abrupt flow rate decrease led to
critical heat flux and then, subsequently, to fuel, clad and pres-
sure tube overheating. The loss of strength of the pressure tube
material caused the rupture. After the rupture flow reversal flow
from the steam drum to the broken channel occurred causing
the cooling of the upper part of the fuel channel and the further
pressurization of the reactor cavity.
About 14 h after the event, it was attempted to remove the
broken channel. Only the hanger and a 0.54 m long part of the
central supporting tube could be removed. The remaining part of
the fuel assembly remained in the channel. Further investigation
showed that the channel had ruptured in the upper part of the core
approximately 6 m above the bottom. The graphite rings around
the rupture location were partially destroyed and the graphite
blocks were damaged. The fuel rods were mechanically bowed
in the direction of the breach.
On 28 March the extraction of the channel following the nor-
mal procedure began. Only the top part of the channel, with
length of 4945 mm, was extracted. Based on the visual analysis
of the broken channel the picture in Fig. 8 has been created. The
graphite block and the fuel assembly were destroyed.
However, the neighbouring fuel channels were not subject to
any damages and were left in operation without any restrictions.
Post accident examination (performed at Paul Scherrer Institute
in Switzerland) showed that the pressure tube rupture occurred
Fig. 8. Leningrad-3 RBMK NPP: sketch of the damaged fuel channel following the 1992 accident.
1033
when the tube temperature was in the range 797–847 ◦ C (i.e.
quite larger than the current licensing limit of 650 ◦ C).
2.4. The licensing environment
The licensing environment for accident analysis in RBMK
has been discussed in the companion papers (D’Auria et al.,
2008a,b,c,d), pointing out aspects related to the overall system,
to the confinement and to the fuel. Therefore the attention is
focused here on the following key topics:
• The consideration of the FC-BLOCKAGE within the licens-
ing framework.
• The pressure tube rupture curve.
• The phenomena based list of scenarios relevant for RBMK
safety analysis.
2.4.1. The FC-BLOCKAGE event and the licensing
framework
From the licensing point view, the following statements apply
to the accident scenario in RBMK originated by blockage in one
fuel channel:
(a) The probability of occurrence, if one considers only the
events documented in existing NPP, is of the order of
10−2 per reactor-year. Because of this, the event should be
classified as design basis accident (DBA).
(b) The event implies the severe damage of substantial amount of
fuel, even though this is limited to one fuel channel therefore
to an order of magnitude that is a fraction less than 1/1000
of the fuel mass in the core. Because of this the event should
be classified as Beyond DBA (BDBA).
(c) The event is not explicitly mentioned in the ‘list of events’
proposed by the IAEA (IAEA, 2005), that reflects the level
of knowledge and agreement among specialists at the date,
1034 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

even though the event ‘break of a channel tube within the

reactor cavity’ is a classified DBA (more details given in
Section 3.2 below).
(d) Following Uspuras (1999), the event ‘reduction or loss of
flow in one fuel channel’ is ‘. . . one accidents initiated by
equipment failure [that] should be also analysed . . .’ accord-
ing to GAN (1987).
(e) During the event, the DBA thresholds defined for RBMK
accident analysis, e.g., fuel temperature below 1200 ◦ C,
IAEA (2005) (see also D’Auria et al., 2008a,b), are over-
passed.
(f) The acronym Ultimate DBA (UDBA) is used for RBMK
accident analysis, e.g., Lillington et al. (1997), but not in
relation to the fuel channel blockage event.

Therefore, if the fuel channel blockage event is not considered

a DBA, a contradiction with item (a) might be envisaged. If
the event is considered a DBA a contradiction raises in relation
to item (e). In this case, the leakage of damaged nuclear fuel
outside the pressure boundary brings an important difference Fig. 9. Simplified approach for establishing the acceptability thresholds for the
between accident evolutions in RBMK related to other water integrity of pressure tubes of RBMK.
cooled reactors as already pointed out by D’Auria et al. (2008a).
The recommendation from the present study is to consider
the flow blockage event in a RBMK fuel channel as a DBA and
to offer measures capable to reduce probability of the event, for • The licensing rupture criterion, T < 650 ◦ C, is conservative,
instance see D’Auria et al. (2008e). primarily at low differential pressures.

2.4.2. The acceptability limits for pressure tube
The pressure tube failure constitutes the most important
occurrence during the event: on the one side it allows the detec-
tion of the event, on the other side it causes the release of
radioactive material outside the pressure barrier, but also it brings
to the possibility of cooling for the damaged channel and causes
the potential for the MPTR.
The failure of the pressure tube and of the associated graphite
rings and graphite blocks is the result of a complex mechanical,
thermo-hydraulic interaction process that is discussed into detail
in chapter 3 below. Several quantities contribute to the process
making the process itself a multidimensional problem. Com-
bined criteria are strictly necessary to demonstrate the pressure
tube rupture in a best estimate way, as discussed by Novoselsky
and Filinov (1997a,b,c) (see also D’Auria et al., 2005).
A synthesis (simplified and conservative) approach for the
pressure tube rupture ‘continuous’ acceptability threshold is
based on the diagram in Fig. 9. The pressure tube temperature
at which the rupture is expected is reported as a function of the
differential pressure across the tube walls. Any working condi-
tion below the dashed region is ‘safe’, while rupture is expected
above the dashed region. The following should be noted:
• CANDU and RBMK pressure tubes behave in a similar way.
• The rupture is affected by the gradient of temperature rise
and occurs ‘earlier’, i.e. at lower temperatures at low gradient
compared with the higher gradient.
• Graphite bounded tube have a slightly higher resistance than
bare tubes.
2.4.3. The FC-BLOCKAGE and the phenomena based list
of relevant scenarios
A phenomena based list of events has been proposed for the
deterministic safety analysis of RBMK by D’Auria et al. (2005),
also reported in D’Auria et al. (2008a). This is given in Table 2,
where the FC-BLOCKAGE and its key role within the context
of RBMK safety technology is underlined.
Each of the letters ‘A’ to ‘F’ in the first column in Table 2,
identifies classes of accidents characterized by bounding phys-
ical phenomena suitable to assess capabilities of computational
tools.
The class ‘D’, of concern within the present paper, deals with
the class ‘FC rupture and MPTR’ and related phenomena are
described in chapter 3 below. Key differences between the two
scenarios in class ‘D’ (FC-BLOCKAGE and FC-LOCA) are also
addressed in chapter 3.
3. The multidisciplinary problem associated with the
FC-BLOCKAGE scenario
An overview is given below of the phenomenological aspects
associated with the scenario originated by the blockage of
one fuel channel in the RBMK NPP (i.e. FC-BLOCKAGE
event). To this aim, phenomena are identified that characterize
the progression of the event together with differences between
the concerned scenario and the FC-LOCA (Sections 3.1 and
3.2, respectively). The failure map for RBMK pressure tubes
and the probable position for break elevation following FC-
BLOCKAGE are described in Section 3.3.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061 1035

Table 2
Phenomena based list of accident scenarios suitable for deterministic accident analysis in RBMK (D’Auria et al., 2008a)
Identification Codes adopted for achieving results Reasons for the selection
documented in the present paper
No.a Acronym explanation

A1 LOCA-PH-FIGDH: LOCA in pressure Largest primary system break with single

header with failure to isolate GDH failure. Challenging core cooling and the
Relap5
ECCS design
A2 LOCA-SL: LOCA originated by a break in Highest depressurization rate. Challenging
steam line core cooling and the ECCS design
A3 LOOP-ATWS: loss of on site power with the Challenging core cooling and the neutron
ATWS condition kinetics model of the thermal-hydraulic
system codes
A4 GDH-BLOCKAGE: full blockage of the Check of the capability of the ‘ECCS
GDH bypass’ to cool the core
B1 GDH-BLOCKAGE-SA: Full blockage of the Cocosys & Relap5 Challenging the venting capability of the
GDH with the ‘Severe Accident’ assumption reactor cavity (part of the confinement)
of no bypass line available
B2 LOCA-PH-FIGDH: see A1 Contain & Relap5 Challenging the ALS (part of the
confinement) structural resistance (same as
A1)
B3 LOCA-SL: see A2 Contain Challenging the reactor building (part of the
confinement) venting capability (same as
A2)
C1 FC-BLOCKAGE: full blockage of one fuel Relap5- Challenging the calculation of the local
channel 3D©/Nestle fission power generation (same as D1)
C2 GDH-BLOCKAGE: see A4 To assess and to understand the local core
response (same as A4)
C3 CR-G-WITHDRAWAL: continued Korsar-Bars Challenging RIA (Reactivity Initiated
withdrawal of a CR bank (or group) Accident) scenario for core integrity
C4 CPS-LOCA: voiding (or LOCA) of the CPS Relap5-3D©/Nestle
D1 FC-BLOCKAGE: see C1 Relap5-Ansys Katran-U Stack Driving accident for the study. Challenging
various phenomenological areas and codes
D2b FC-LOCA: rupture of one FC Contain & Relap5 Fluent-Ansys Korsar-Rapta To assess the ballooning model in the fuel
pin mechanics area
E1 FC-BLOCKAGE: see C1 Cocosys To assess the hydrogen and the fission
Mel- products source term and transport (same as
cor D1)
E2 GDH-BLOCKAGE-SA: see B1 To assess the hydrogen and the fission
products source term and transport in one
extreme conditions (same as B1)
F1 FC-BLOCKAGE: see C1 Relap5 To formulate the ICM proposal (same as D1)
a See Table 3 in D’Auria et al. (2008a). In particular, ‘A’ to ‘F’ identify classes of accidents characterized by bounding phenomena.
b The class of accidents ‘D’, of concern for the present paper, deals with ‘FC rupture and MPTR’.

The multidisciplinary nature and the demonstration of com-
plexity for the concerned scenario constitute important outcomes
from the description.
3.1. Expected phenomena
The main phenomena expected following the FC-
BLOCKAGE event and the qualitative time succession can be
derived from the diagram in Fig. 10, main arrow at the top. Other
horizontal arrows in the diagram indicate technological sub-
jects relevant during the concerned time frame. The two vertical
arrows indicate:
(1) The potential role of the individual channel monitoring
(ICM) system in preventing the progression of the accident
(see D’Auria et al., 2008e).
(2) The assessed role of the tank (see chapter 5) in contributing
to limit the possibility of MPTR.
Thermal-hydraulic phenomena are relevant at the beginning
of the transient, like dry-out, and counter-current flow limita-
tion at the outlet of the channel that prevents water from the
stem drum to enter the blocked channel. Neutron kinetics phe-
nomena are also relevant since the beginning because of the
reactivity coefficient associated with coolant void formation and
(consequent) temperature increase of the fuel.
Phenomena associated with fuel performance become
important because of the unavoidable high temperatures and
consequent metal water reaction, clad collapse and substantial
rod deformation. Radiation heat transfer is also relevant at this
point in time.
Break of the pressure tube and of the neighbouring graphite
blocks occur by ductile and fragile mechanisms, respectively. At
1036 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
Fig. 10. Main phenomena and qualitative time evolution expected following the FC-BLOCKAGE event in RBMK NPP.
(nearly) the same time of the pressure tube rupture event, two-
phase critical flow occurs at the break together with flow reversal
at channel top and ejection of damaged fuel and possible chem-
ical reactions between the damaged fuel and the surrounding
graphite. The ejection of fuel is caused by hydraulic forces at
the break caused by pressure wave propagation at first (tenths of
a second time-scale) and to the high fluid speed later on.
Pressurization of reactor cavity occurs as well as mixing of
steam and non-condensable gas, therefore confinement thermal-
hydraulics is relevant. Mechanical stresses are generated occur
upon neighbouring graphite stacks causing elastic and plastic
and deformation for the associated fuel channels (potential pre-
cursor phenomena for the MPTR). The rupture of pressure tubes
causes heavily damaged fuel to enter the reactor cavity, thus
making relevant the area of fission products transport.
A detailed list of phenomena is provided in Table 3 , where
codes suitable for the evaluation of those phenomena are identi-
fied, too. The codes have been used within the project described
by D’Auria et al. (2005). In the case a quality proof is available
to the authors in relation to the concerned phenomenon, the letter
<Q> is added to in the fourth column of Table 3.
3.2. The difference between FC-BLOCKAGE and
FC-LOCA
In order to better focus on selected important phenom-
ena, differences between FC-LOCA and FC-BLOCKAGE, e.g.,
scenarios D1 and D2 in Table 2, are discussed hereafter.
The discussion should also aim at presenting the FC-LOCA
scenario even though with a level of detail lower than the
FC-BLOCKAGE (same level of detail would also cause an
un-necessary longer paper).
By FC-LOCA the scenario is meant here originated by the
sudden break of one pressure tube inside the graphite stacks.
Therefore, the FC-LOCA acronym is not an indication of:
• A break in the pressure tube inside the reactor cavity in the
region outside the graphite blocks (i.e. inside the free space
of the reactor cavity).
• A break in the pipelines connecting the pressure tube with
the Group Distribution Header (channel inlet region) of the
steam drum (channel outlet region).
Both of these set of events are relevant in the safety assess-
ment of RBMK and are part of the list of DBA according to
IAEA (2005) (see also D’Auria et al., 2008a). In the above
cases scram is generated early during the transient with a sit-
uation of undamaged fuel and good cooling conditions can
be kept, by the existing emergency safety features during the
entire course of the transient (i.e. till the full recovery of the
NPP).
The origin of a FC-LOCA is typically a defect of the pres-
sure tube in the active region. The related probability has been
estimated as negligible in the recent paper by Lee et al. (2006)
(see also D’Auria et al., 2008a), but it should be investigated as
a DBA according to the document at reference IAEA (2005).
The similarity between FC-LOCA and FC-BLOCKAGE lies
in the fact that in both cases a pressure tube is broken, thus
implying the damage of the graphite block(s) close to the rupture
region. The following differences exist between FC-LOCA and
FC-BLOCKAGE:
• In the case of FC-LOCA the scram occurs at a time when
the fuel is not overheated (originated by the same signal as in
Table 3
List of expected phenomena following the FC-BLOCKAGE event in RBMK NPP and suitable codes for the evaluation
No. Event Key phenomena Codesa Notes

1 Flow-rate decrease Korsar & Relap5 <Q> The blockage may be partial or total
2 Void increase in the FC
3 Blockage at channel inlet Change in pressure drop distribution along the
FC axis
4 Flooding (and possible CCFL) at FC outlet
5 Neutron kinetics feedback due to loss of coolant Bars & Nestle <Q> Coolant is an absorber, see Fig. 17 in D’Auria et al.
(2008d)
6 Rod surface temperature excursion Korsar & Relap5 <Q>

F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

7 Steam superheating generation and transport Relevant to ICM design
8 Dry-out Neutron kinetics feedback due to Doppler effect Bars & Nestle <Q> See Fig. 17 in D’Auria et al. (this issue-d)
9 Flooding (and possible CCFL) at FC outlet Korsar & Relap5 <Q> Phenomena at rows 2 and 3 also apply
10 Change in fission power generation Bars & Nestle <Q> Owing to phenomena at rows 5 and 8
11 Clad collapse Rapta & Frap <Q> Loss of integrity expected for the fuel rod
12 Releases of gaseous FP Refp & Melcor <Q>
Over-passing the threshold for clad integrity
13 Change of bundle geometry and of cooling Relap5 Minor effect
characteristics
14 Radiation heat transfer Relap5 Relevant during later phases, too
15 Clad damage Rapta & Frap <Q>
16 Melcor Phenomena associated with ‘severe accidents’ start
Over-passing the threshold for significant H2 production in the fuel region (e.g., candling corium oxidation,
etc.)
17 Fuel bundle damage (loss of geometric integrity)
18 Temperature increase in PT Korsar & Relap5 <Q>
19 Creep of the PT U Stackb & Ansys <Q> Owing to the phenomenon at the row above
20 Mechanical interaction of PT with graphite rings Axial location of the creeping region depending
and with graphite blocks in the region of creep upon BIC like % of FC blockage
21 Flow-rate (reversal) from steam drum Korsar & Relap5 <Q>
established
22 Rupture of the PT Cooling of the bundle region at an elevation Owing to the phenomenon at the row above
higher than the break
23 Simultaneous break of PT, graphite rings and U Stack & Ansys <Q> Ductile and fragile mechanisms for PT and graphite,
blocks in the creeping region respectively
24 TPCF at the break and at a top location of the Korsar & Relap5 <Q>
affected FC
25 Hydraulic loads on thermally damaged fuel Fluent
bundle
26 Loss of damaged fuel from the break Fluent & Melcor Large radioactivity release to RC
27 Chemical interaction between molten-damaged – High temperature chemical interactions not
fuel and graphite investigated
28 Continuous H2 generation Korsar & Relap5 <Q> From claddings and possibly from PT walls
29 Pressurization of the RC Cocosys & Relap5 <Q> Because of the high pressure in the reactor cavity
30 Pressurization of reactor cavity and scram occurrence Cooling (quench) of both halves of fuel bundles Korsar & Relap5 <Q> Liquid penetration possible owing to the stop of
separated by the break power generation. Stop of H2 production
31 Heat transfer through graphite gaps Cocosys & Relap5 Relevant during later phases, too

1037
Table 3 (Continued)

1038
No. Event Key phenomena Codesa Notes

32 Mechanical load due to displacement of the Ansys & U Stack Limited by the displacement associated with the
broken blocks creep deformation before rupture for the broken PT
33 Dynamic forces associated to the pressure wave Relap5 <Q> Situation of no propagation of the rupture (no
propagation MPTR)
34 Deformation of neighboring graphite stacks Dynamic forces associated with flashing Negligible in case of superheated steam in the FC
34 Differential pressurization of the graphite gaps U Stack & Relap5 <Q>
on opposite faces of neighboring graphite blocks
36 Elasto-plastic deformation of several FC Ansys & U Stack <Q> This constitutes a constraint to the propagation of
the PT rupture
37 Touching of fuel stacks and tank Possible. The tank may contribute to increase the
constraint to the propagation of the PT rupture
38 Transport of H2 from broken FC to graphite Relap5 & Melcor <Q> Risk of deflagration negligible in case of functioning

F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

gaps and to RC free space of the gas cooling system
39 Transport of FP from broken FC to graphite gaps Melcor Various chemical and physical processes relevant.
and to RC free space H2 (see above) and FP may enter the pool and finish
into the ALS
40 Cooling (including quench) of graphite blocks U Stack & Relap5 Potential interaction with dissociated O2 not
by water coming from the break and flooding of investigated
RC

ALS = accident localisation system (part of the RBMK confinement), BIC = boundary and initial conditions, CCFL = counter current flow limitation, FC = fuel channel, FP = fission products, ICM = individual channel
monitoring, PT = pressure tube, <Q> = qualification evaluated within the present context, RC = reactor cavity and TPCF = two phase critical flow-rate.
a Adopted codes within the present framework, D’Auria et al. (2008a), see also D’Auria et al. (2005).
b Katran code is embedded into U Stack.
• In the case of significant delay in scram signal, overheating

• Because of the above, no dry-out condition is expected in FC-

• In the case of FC-LOCA after the break occurrence, the fuel

clad radius calculated by Korsar-Rapta; (b) gap size calculated by Relap5-Frap.

Fig. 11. Differences between FC-LOCA and FC-BLOCKAGE scenarios: (a)
time) calculated by Relap5/Frap code is given in Fig. 11b and
the decrease in gap size versus time (100 s is the transient start
pressure nearly constant and decreasing external pressure); (b)
the increasing pressure difference across the clad (rod internal
by Korsar-Rapta code is given in Fig. 11a and is caused by
radius versus time (500 s is the transient start time) calculated
couples of [coupled] codes are shown: (a) the increase in clad
event. This is illustrated in Fig. 11, where results from two
FC-BLOCKAGE and occurs before the pressure tube rupture
case of FC-LOCA, and is the ‘collapse’ in the case of the
The mechanism for clad damage is the ‘ballooning’ in the
of fuel clad is expected after the pressure tube rupture event.

the stated safety limit.

clad surface temperatures of the fuel rods remain well below
LOCA after the break occurrence: despite their increase the

channel top is available in the case of FC-BLOCKAGE).

bottom and the top of the channel (only flow reversal from
is immediately cooled by high velocity fluid coming from the

reactor cavity).
the case of FC-BLOCKAGE, i.e. over-pressurization of the
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
is caused by the increasing clad temperature (with pressure
differential across the clad remaining nearly constant during
the calculated transient period). The fuel rods can be dam-
aged by hydraulic loads caused by the high speed flow at the
break. Accordingly, radioactivity source term inside the reac-
tor cavity can be larger in case of FC-LOCA compared with
FC-BLOCKAGE.
• The break flow is greater in the case of FC-LOCA compared
with FLOW-BLOCKAGE. Energy outflow from the break
can also be greater in the former case: this difference has
been found to have a negligible effect in case of evaluations
for possible MPTR.
3.3. The failure-map and the break location for RBMK
channels
Once the fuel channel blockage event triggers, the following
system parameters or occurrences are relevant for determining
the scenario:
(a) nominal operating power of the affected channel,
(b) axial power shape and/or linear power peaking factor of the
affected channel,
(c) percentage of the blockage,
(d) axial and azimuthal position of the break,
(e) area of the break.
The nominal channel power and the percentage of blockage
values are linked by the ‘FC failure map’ and the axial power
shape and the power peak factor contribute to the calculation of
the break axial position, both of these discussed below.
The azimuthal position of the break has a role in the estima-
tion of the possibility of MPTR, but it is a statistic quantity with
uniform distribution (i.e. as a function of the angle identified by
the break axis in the horizontal plane and any reference radius
in the same plane centred on the axis of the fuel bundle).
Fig. 12. Failure map for RBMK fuel channels following the FC-BLOCKAGE event (D’Auria et al., 2005).
1039
The area of the break has been found to have a minor role
upon the long term overall scenario progression, provided it
is (much) larger than the flow area associated with the mini-
mum cross-section at the top of the fuel channel. In this case,
critical flow establishes at the top of the affected fuel channel
and rupture area is irrelevant for the mass and energy release
from the break. However, break area is relevant for the estima-
tion of ‘prompt’ hydraulic loads upon the fuel bundle and the
neighbouring channels and related graphite stacks. The ‘prompt’
hydraulic loads including pressure wave propagation vanishes
in tenths of a second.
All the parameters (a) to (e) are considered in the analyses dis-
cussed in chapter 5 In addition, both the RBMK channel failure
map and the characterization of the axial break position follow-
ing FC-BLOCKAGE constitute significant results (see chapter
5) from the application of the computational tools presented in
chapter 4. These are discussed hereafter in advance, in order
to complete the phenomenological picture of the fuel channel
blockage scenario.
3.3.1. The failure map for RBMK fuel channels
A fuel channel failure map has been derived as a signif-
icant by-product of the analysis conducted in relation to the
FC-BLOCKAGE (D’Auria et al., 2005). The FC failure map is
given in Fig. 12 and shows the boundaries for pressure tube and
clad damage. The following should be noted:
• The map is derived based on the results from ‘discrete’ cal-
culations of pressure tube failure in the domain fuel channel
initial power versus the percentage of blockage of the channel
inlet pipe. The percentage of blockage is defined in terms of
% blocked free flow area.
• Overheating of the clad is a prerequisite for the occurrence
of the pressure tube failure, but not in all cases fuel rod over-
heating implies pressure tube rupture.
1040 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

• The blue region represents the space of un-failed non-

overheated rods. Three different colours are used to
characterize the damage area for rods only (all three regions)
or for pressure tube and rods (the two regions on the extreme
right of the diagram).
• Oxidation is the reason for failure in the extreme right region
of the map, oxidation and collapse occur in the central damage
region and collapse occurs in the left region of the damage
area. In addition, hydraulic loads are at the origin of further
pin failure (or of the ‘increase’ in the fuel pin damage level)
in the two right regions of the damage area.

The map has been derived by a dozen code runs. Therefore

the boundaries among the various zones are approximate. More
valuable is the procedure adopted to derive the map and the
embedded qualitative information.

3.3.2. The characterization of the elevation of the break

along the fuel channel axis
The full channel blockage causes a fast voiding in the chan-
nel, i.e. the order of magnitude for the channel emptying times
is one second. Therefore, all zones of the fuel bundle remain
early in the transient without cooling and fuel and rod surface
temperature growths are faster where linear power is higher.
This typically happens in the central region of the bundle
along the axis. High rod temperatures imply high tempera-
tures for pressure tube owing to radiation and contact heat
transfer and consequent trigger of creep mechanism for tube
rupture.
Partial channel blockage is expected to cause dry-out owing
to liquid film depletion earlier in the upper region of the bundle
with bottom region partially cooled. In this situation, high tem-
peratures with rods and, subsequently, tube wall damage occur
in the upper part of the bundle.
The overall phenomenological picture related to the possi-
ble elevation of the break along the fuel channel axis and the
discussion above are summarized in the sketch of Fig. 13.
Fig. 13. Sketch to illustrate the parameters affecting the break location along
the fuel channel axis.
4. The computational tools and the qualification level to
calculate the FC-BLOCKAGE
The variety of computational tools necessary to calculate
the scenario consequent to the blockage of one RBMK fuel
channel can be derived from the previous chapter. In particular,
the numerical codes that have been adopted within the present
context are listed in Table 3. An outline of the main features
of adopted codes and nodalizations is given below. Additional
details related to codes can be found in D’Auria et al. (2005).
4.1. The codes
The numerical codes adopted within the present framework
(Table 3) are distinguished in Table 4 according to the techno-
logical areas discussed by D’Auria et al. (2008a) and a short

Table 4
Classification of codes adopted for the analysis of the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario in RBMK according to technological areas relevant in nuclear reactor safety
No. Technological safety area Codes Notes

1 Primary System Relap5, Korsar Also includes H2

System Thermal-Hydraulics generation and transport
2 Fuel Frap, Rapta
3 Confinement Cocosys, Relap5
4 Computational Fluid Dynamics Fluent
5 Structural Mechanics Katran, Ansys (U Stack)a The MPTR issue is
addressed by the U Stack
code and by a procedure
(given in chapter 6)
6 Generation of average parameters Njoy, Unk, Helios
Neutron Kinetics
(e.g., macroscopic cross-sections or
‘λ-functions’)
7 3D transient neutron flux Bars, Nestle
8 Generation Refp, Melcor
Fission Products
9 Transport Cocosys, Melcor
a U Stack code has capabilities to handle technological safety areas 1, 2, 3 and 5.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
description is provided hereafter in relation to codes not dis-
cussed in companion papers (D’Auria et al., 2008a,b,c,d). It shall
be noted that all technological areas identified as characterizing
the deterministic analysis sector within the nuclear reactor safety
are relevant for evaluating the consequences of the fuel channel
blockage scenario in RBMK.
4.1.1. System Thermal-Hydraulics: primary system
Relap5 and Korsar codes are adopted to calculate the thermal-
hydraulic parameters following the FC-BLOCKAGE event in
the Main Coolant Circuit of the RBMK. Relap5 is the widely
known and diffused code developed by Idaho National Labo-
ratory in the US already available since the end of 70s. Korsar
is based on the same principles and equations at the basis of
Relap5 and was developed and qualified in the last few years at
the St Petersburg Institute NITI in Russia. Information can be
found in D’Auria et al. (2008b).
4.1.2. System Thermal-Hydraulics: fuel
Rapta and Frap codes are adopted to calculate the fuel per-
formance parameters including rod deformation following the
FC-BLOCKAGE event in the RBMK fuel bundle.
The code Rapta, includes basic models of processes and phe-
nomena inherent to behaviour of fuel rods with oxide fuel and
cladding made of zirconium alloy in various transient and emer-
gency regimes of RBMK reactor. Thermo-mechanical modules
were developed making reference to one single-equivalent (i.e.
the most loaded in terms of thermal power) fuel rod. The code
is qualified against experimental data, e.g., Goncharov et al.
(2005).
The code Frap is a well established international code devel-
oped at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in the US aiming
at the evaluation of fuel rod performance. Two main modules are
part of the code: Frapcon, e.g., Lanning et al. (1997), and Frap-
tran e.g., Cunningham et al. (2003), that calculate the steady
state and the transient performance, respectively. The qualifica-
tion level can be recognized from the references of the above
documents. The code is embedded into the Relap5 code.
4.1.3. System Thermal-Hydraulics: confinement
Cocosys and Relap5 codes are adopted to calculate the
thermal-hydraulic parameters in the RBMK confinement follow-
ing the FC-BLOCKAGE event. Relap5 code has already been
mentioned above. Cocosys code has been developed and qual-
ified in the last few years at the GRS in Germany. Information
about the codes and their qualification level in the concerned
area can be found in D’Auria et al. (2008c) (information about
Cocosys as a fission product transport code is also given below).
4.1.4. Computational fluid dynamics
Fluent code has been adopted to calculate hydraulic loads
acting upon the fuel rods following the rupture of the pressure
tube occurring during the FC-BLOCKAGE event. Fluent is a
commercial ‘finite volume’ based code, e.g., Fluent Inc. (2003),
for modelling fluid flow and heat transfer in complex systems.
It can be used for (not an exhaustive list) the analysis of: (a)
1041
incompressible or compressible, steady-state or transient, in-
viscid, laminar, and turbulent flows; (b) flows with Newtonian
as well as non-Newtonian rheology; (c) convective, natural and
forced, coupled conduction-convective-radiation heat transfer;
(d) moving reference frames, including sliding mesh interfaces
and mixing planes; (e) flows of chemical species, mixing and
reaction, including combustion and surface deposition reac-
tions; (f) flows with arbitrary volumetric sources of heat, mass,
momentum and turbulence; (g) two-phase flows, including cav-
itation.
4.1.5. Neutron kinetics: generation of average parameters
Njoy code is used to extract information from material related
libraries for microscopic cross-sections functions of energy
(e.g., ENDF). Helios and Unk codes are used to derive macro-
scopic cross-sections or ‘␭-matrices’, respectively that are used
as input by 3D neutron kinetics codes (see below). Information
about Njoy, Helios and Unk codes can be found in D’Auria et
al. (2008c).
4.1.6. Neutron kinetics: 3D transient neutron flux
Nestle and Bars codes respectively coupled to Relap5 and
Korsar codes are adopted to calculate the neutron kinetics param-
eters in the individual fuel channel and associated graphite stack
following the FC-BLOCKAGE event. Both Nestle and Bars are
widely used and qualified codes within US and Russia, respec-
tively, in the area of their application, i.e. the transient neutron
kinetics in water cooled nuclear reactors. Information can be
found in D’Auria et al. (2008c).
4.1.7. Structural mechanics and the MPTR issue
Katran and Ansys codes have been adopted to calculate
stresses and strains in the pressure tube and in the graphite blocks
following the rupture of the pressure tube occurring during the
FC-BLOCKAGE event.
Katran is a special code developed within the RBMK design
technology, e.g., Parafilo et al. (2000) and Soloviev et al. (2003).
The code models a spatial axis symmetric problem of viscous-
plastic deformation of the pressure tube loaded with internal
pressure that is uniform along the azimuthal angle and vari-
able together with temperature along the height. Anisotropy of
the tube material properties is taken into account. Calculation
of deformations is made for any axial section according to the
profile of temperature. At a certain stage of the deformation pro-
cess, the interaction of a pressure tube with the graphite column
is taken into account. After the occurrence of extended contact
between a tube and the graphite, the blocks of graphite column
are loaded with internal pressure minus the “resistant reaction”
of the tube. The occurrence of a critical pressure for the graphite
block causes the formation of cracks under the simultaneous
occurrence of pressure tube ballooning. The full loss of integrity
for the graphite blocks occurs when the cracks cover the entire
cross-section. After the destruction of graphite blocks the further
deformation of a tube before break is calculated. The estimation
of the integrity of pressure tubes is carried out by considering
temperatures, deformations, force and power failure criteria.
1042 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
Ansys is a commercial ‘finite element’ based code, e.g.,
Ansys Inc. (2002), for performing static and dynamic analyses
of linear and non-linear problems (due to materials proper-
ties, geometry, contact between surfaces, etc.) in many fields of
application (structural, thermal, electromagnetic, fluid-dynamic,
etc.). It is possible to solve coupled problems in the areas of
fluid-structure and thermal–mechanical interactions.
The MPTR related analysis is performed (as mentioned in
Table 4) by the U-Stack code and, independently, by a proce-
dure making use of different codes as described in chapter 6.
The 3D U Stack code, Baldin et al. (2004) and Parafilo et al.
(2004), developed by PhEI and NIKIET Institutions in Russia,
is an integrated computational tool used for the simulation of
processes taking place in the graphite stack, the reactor cav-
ity, the gas circuit and the main circulation circuit of a RBMK
in case of a pressure tube leakage. The capabilities of Katran
as well as of a thermal-hydraulic system code like Relap 5 are
embedded into the U Stack. This code is capable of assessing
the venting system efficiency of the reactor cavity in dealing
with small leakages. In case of large breaks of pressure tubes
with coolant discharge leading to graphite stack deformation,
the code allows the evaluation of the stack deformation and the
assessment of the possibility of propagation of the rupture top
intact fuel channels.
4.1.8. Fission products: generation
Refp code is used to calculate the source term associated with
the operation of a fuel channel of the RBMK, i.e. the amount
of radioactivity that is released during the progression of the
FC-BLOCKAGE event. The program simulate the behaviour
of five isotopes of radioiodine, two isotopes of caesium and
five noble gases. It provides a step by step calculations of: (a)
the releases from fuel and coolant including the sub-division
between gaseous and liquid volumes inside the confinement, (b)
the changes of chemistry and of physical form of iodine, (c) the
removal from the confinement atmosphere and the absorption
on the walls and (d) the revolatilization and adsorption of iodine
and leakage outside the confinement (Moskalev and Jankowski,
2004). However, the last capabilities of the code are not exploited
within the present framework and related analyses are carried
out by Cocosys and Melcor, as described in the next paragraph.
4.1.9. Fission products: transport
Cocosys and Melcor codes are used to calculate the transport
of the fission products generated as a consequence of the melting
and the damage of a RBMK fuel bundle during the progression
of the FC-BLOCKAGE event. Fission products are transported
inside the primary circuit and, to the largest extent, from the
break region to the reactor cavity, to the pool, to the Accident
Localization System and to the environment (flow paths dis-
cussed in D’Auria et al., 2008c). Cocosys and Melcor, developed
and qualified at GRS in Germany (already mentioned) and at
Sandia National Laboratory in US, respectively, are well estab-
lished codes widely used by the international community. The
qualification level in the area of interest is demonstrated in the
papers by Ahrens et al. (2003) and by Nagasaka et al. (1998),
for Cocosys and Melcor codes, respectively.
4.2. The nodalisations
Nodalizations or input decks have been developed and qual-
ified (as far as possible) for each of the code listed in Table 4.
In some cases different input decks for the same code were pre-
pared to address specific objectives of the analysis (e.g., the
mechanical resistance of the bare pressure tube, of the pressure
tube plus the graphite rings and graphite blocks, with different
assumptions for the constraints, etc.). At the end, more than 20
input decks were prepared and used to obtain a comprehensive
view of the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario.
A detailed description of all of these can be found in D’Auria
et al. (2005) and is far beyond the scope of the journal paper.
However, selected sketches representative of input decks devel-
oped in relation to the areas mentioned in Section 4.1 are outlined
hereafter. Approximate dimensions of nodalizations, e.g., num-
ber of nodes or of elements for the various cases, are given in
D’Auria et al. (2008a) and are not repeated here. Notes about
the qualification level of the nodalizations are given below not
in a systematic way.
4.2.1. The TH input decks covering the areas ‘System
Thermal-Hydraulics: Primary System And Confinement’
The thermal-hydraulic nodalization for the overall RBMK
system, main coolant circuit and confinement are discussed by
D’Auria et al. (2008b,c), respectively. The fuel channel nodal-
ization with the connected portion of the reactor cavity is given
in Fig. 14. The same level of qualification applicable for the
overall core model, i.e. above papers, is valid here.
Several valves are part of the input deck and are ‘installed’
perpendicular to the channel axis. Each valve opening control
takes input from the pressure difference across the tube walls
and from the wall temperature in the region where the valve is
installed. The curve in Fig. 9 is modelled and the (simplified)
approach described in Section 2.4 is used to determine the con-
ditions for valve opening. Once opened the valve does never
close. The implemented logic is such to allow the calculation of
the break location (location of the valve along the axis) and the
break area (number of valves open). Several studies have been
done to optimize the input deck also aimed at identifying the
best value for the individual valve area.
The two ‘columns’ on the left of the figure represent the
reactor cavity gaps. Namely, the gap around the affected chan-
nel and the overall gap area (and volume) associated with eight
neighbouring channels, as shown in the sketch on the top right
of the figure, are simulated. This allows the calculation of the
differential pressure across the neighbouring channel stack.
The first column on the left represents the remaining space in
the reactor cavity and allows, together with the simulated upper,
lower and side cavity free volume, the calculation of the absolute
pressure in the cavity.
4.2.2. The FU input decks covering the area ‘System
Thermal-Hydraulics: Fuel’
The fuel in RBMK does not differ from the fuel in other
types of water cooled reactors, including the material properties
of interest. Therefore, ‘well established’ (limited independent
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061 1043

Fig. 14. The TH input deck covering the areas ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Primary System and Confinement’ to model the FC-BLOCKAGE in RBMK: Relap5
code used to model the affected channel and two rows of neighbouring graphite stacks in the confinement.

Fig. 15. The FU input deck covering the area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Fuel’ to model the FC-BLOCKAGE in RBMK: Rapta and Frap codes nodalizations (left
and right, respectively) of the fuel rod.
1044 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

4.2.4. The NK input decks covering the areas ‘Neutron

Kinetics: Generation of Average Parameters and 3D
Transient Neutron Flux’
The neutron kinetics nodalizations suitable for the gener-
ation of macroscopic cross-section and ‘λ-functions’ (needed
for Nestle and Bars code) and for performing transient coupled
3D neutron kinetics thermal-hydraulic analyses (by Relap5/3D-
Nestle and Korsar-Bars) are described by D’Auria et al. (2008d).
The NK nodalization is used, as described in the above-
mentioned paper, to calculate the actual fission power in the
bundle affected by the FC-BLOCKAGE event considering the
counterfeiting effect of voiding (positive reactivity) and of
Doppler (negative reactivity).

4.2.5. The SM input deck covering the area ‘Structural

Mechanics’
As in the case of the FU input deck discussed above, a ‘well
established’ (limited independent qualification needed) nodal-
ization with suitable level of detail has been developed suitable
for the Ansys code. The input deck includes the pressure tube
and the associated graphite ring and bricks, as shown in Fig. 17.
Extensive validation was conducted and documented in the
mentioned report mainly in relation to the creep model and to the

Fig. 16. The CFD input deck covering the area ‘Computational Fluid Dynamics’
to model the FC-BLOCKAGE in RBMK: Fluent model of affected region of
the pressure tube to calculate hydraulic loads acting upon the fuel bundle.

qualification needed) nodalizations with suitable level of detail

are used for Rapta and Frap as shown in the sketches of Fig. 15.
The nodalizations are used to determine temperature and
pressure (for the internal gas) transients inside the fuel rods and
the deformation of the clad till the possible rupture event. The
timing of such occurrences are also calculated. Results obtained
by Rapta have already been shown in Fig. 11.

4.2.3. The CFD input deck covering the area

‘Computational Fluid Dynamics’
A region of the fuel bundle of the RBMK fuel channel
enclosed by two horizontal planes (orthogonal to the channel
axis) has been modelled for the application of the Fluent code,
including a simplified form for the break (consequence of the
FC-BLOCKAGE event). The sketch of the nodalization is given
in Fig. 16. Convergence analyses were carried out for the num-
ber of nodes as well as sensitivity studies related to the choice
of the turbulence model and the assumed free area for the break.
Single phase flow (gas) is used to simulated the superheated
steam exiting the break. The gas speed causes forces (nearly) per-
pendicular to the rod axis and resulting hydraulic forces. These
are applied to the individual rods in the bundle and, based upon
the related constraints (i.e. grids), the material properties and the Fig. 17. The SM input deck covering the area ‘Structural Mechanics’ to model
actual temperature values, the conditions are calculated for rod the FC-BLOCKAGE in RBMK: Ansys model of the break region of the pressure
disruption (caused by hydraulic loads). tube plus graphite ring plus graphite block.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
optimum number of meshes. Sensitivity studies were performed
in relation to the effects of fluence, gap thicknesses (across the
graphite ring), graphite average temperature, heating rate and
hardening of the pressure tube.
The nodalization was used to determine the loads (primarily
internal pressure for the zirconium tube) and the conditions (pri-
marily wall temperature for the pressure tube) under which the
compound formed by the pressure tube, the ring and the graphite
brick fail. Information about the azimuthal location of the break
could also be attained.
4.2.6. The MPTR input deck covering the area ‘MPTR’
In order to address the MPTR issue, two independent ways
have been pursued as already mentioned: (1) use of a procedure
based on the application of nodalizations described above; (2)
use of the U Stack code. The procedure at item (1) is discussed
in chapter 6 and the U Stack nodalization, item (2), is outlined
below.
The geometric arrangement of the core, the thermal-hydraulic
conditions of the primary loop and of the confinement, the
configuration of the constraints and the material properties con-
stitute the main input dataset necessary to develop a suitable
U-Stack nodalization. A simplified sketch is given in Fig. 18.
Fig. 18. The MPTR input deck covering the area ‘MPTR’ to model the FC-
BLOCKAGE in RBMK: U-Stack model of a portion of the core. ‘Crack
propagation valves’ can be seen in the upper diagram and arrow indicating flow
paths across graphite stacks in the lower diagram.
1045
Typical relevant aspects of the MPTR scenario that are consid-
ered in the nodalization, giving an idea of the complexity of the
problem are:
• Translational movements of graphite bricks affected by: (a)
inertia of the brick, pressure on lateral edges, (b) contact forces
from neighbouring stacks, (c) deformation of the pressure
tube and (d) friction in the contact between adjacent bricks.
• Rotational movements of graphite bricks affected by: (a)
moment of inertia, (b) torque caused by non-uniform pressure
distribution and (c) torque from contact and friction forces.
• Various cases of contact between pressure tube and graphite
stack include: (a) no contact, (b) one contact region, (c) two or
three contact regions and (d) contact along the entire surface
of the tube.
The U-Stack nodalization could benefit of the qualification
based on the experiments performed in various versions of the
TKR facility installed at Electrogorsk (Ru), e.g., Medvedeva
et al. (2004b). The qualification domain for the U Stack code
and nodalization also included the simulation of the event in
Leningrad-3 NPP described above, NIKIET and PhEI (2006).
4.2.7. The FP input decks covering the areas ‘Fission
Products: Generation and Transport’
The main path for the fission product release, including the
phenomena of generation and transport, is inside the confine-
ment. Therefore, the adopted input decks are those outlined
in D’Auria et al. (2008c) specifically related to Cocosys and
Relap5. In addition, the developed Melcor nodalization for the
RBMK NPP includes features that are similar to the Cocosys
nodalization.
The FP nodalizations are used to calculate the fission product
transport throughout the confinement and the source term to the
environment. The main output is constituted by the radioactivity
amount in each region of the confinement and in the environ-
ment. The source term to environment is characterized by timing
and elevation of the release and is suitable for providing input
to the environmental impact codes.
5. The FC-BLOCKAGE predicted scenario
Results related to the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, according
to the information available from Table 2 has been given by
D’Auria et al. (2008a,b,c,d) with all transients outlined in the
former case and with focus put on 3D neutron kinetics in the
latter case. Hereafter a complete picture of the scenario is given,
considering the technological safety areas already defined and
adopted in chapter 4.
5.1.1. Boundary and initial conditions
The nominal operating conditions for Smolensk-3 RBMK
are assumed (see D’Auria et al., 2008a) as boundary and ini-
tial conditions for the analysis. The considered blocked channel
has vertical and horizontal coordinates 27–32 e.g., Fig. 10 in
D’Auria et al. (2008d), with axial power distribution assumed
1046 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

as the core average power distribution, Fig. 11 of the same paper.
The channel is characterized by an initial power of 2.1 MWth
and by a ‘flow-rate/power’ ratio equal to 3 kg/MW s. Other input
data, namely, inlet and outlet pressure, inlet sub-cooling, pres-
sure of the reactor cavity, axial and radial distribution for the
graphite temperature are given in Table 1.
As an exception, the results for the area ‘System Thermal-
Hydraulics, Confinement’, obtained by the U Stack and Cocosys
codes relate, respectively:
• to the blocked channel with coordinates 52–16 of the
Leningrad-3 core where the initial power is 2.0 MWth and
the ‘flow-rate/power’ ratio is to 3.8 kg/MW-s; in this case the
flow-blockage event brings the core inlet flow-rate from 7.5
to 0.25 kg/s.
• to the maximum power channel of Smolensk-3 characterized
by an initial power of 2.9 MWth.
Boundary and initial condition values for quantities not
reported in the above two dashed items coincide with the values
described in the previous paragraph.
6. Results
The resulting sequence of main events (Smolensk-3 chan-
nel with coordinates 27–32) is given in Table 5. Reference is
made to the safety technology area identified below and to the
phenomena listed in Table 3. It shall be noted that for some
events or related quantities, like evaluation of hydraulic loads
acting upon the fuel rods following the break of the pressure

Table 5
Resulting sequence of main events and related key-quantities values for the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario considering the various technological areas relevant for the
safety analysis
No. Event Time (s)a Notes

1 Full blockage occurrence 0

2 Full blockage completed 0.1
3 Dry-out occurrence 1–40 Range given for the various axial locations
4 10 K superheated steam appears at the channel 3 Relevant to ICM design (D’Auria et al., 2008e)
outlet
5 Fission power attains 90% of its initial value ∼10 3D coupled NK TH analysis
6 Only steam present in the channel 12
7 Clad surface temperature achieves 700 ◦ C 20–70 Clad collapse occurs, Fig. 11b. Range given for the various
axial locations
8 Pressure tube heating rate before break (K/s) 10–12 Relevant for calculating tube rupture time
9 The pressure tube temperature achieves 700 ◦ C 71 Start of creep mechanism
10 ‘Prompt’ radioactivity release to MCC (Ci) 250 Fission gases release
11 Clad achieves 1204 ◦ C 65 Start of significant H2 production
12 Occurrence of the ‘first’ break 74 (tB )
13 Elevation of the first break (m) 5 Starting from the bottom of the active fuel
14 Overall break area (m2 ) ** **Value > > than flow area of outlet pipe
15 Break opening time 0.05 Based on creep analysis
16 Flow reversal occurs at channel outlet tB + 0.5
17 Time of maximum load acting upon tB + 2
neighboring graphite stack
18 Value of the maximum load on neighboring 22 Including dynamic load. See also Fig. 34b
graphite stack (t)
19 Scram occurrence tB + 2.2 Pressure increase in RC = 0.075 MPa
20 Quench of wall temperatures above break axis tB + 5
21 Max pressurization rate in gas-gap (MPa/s) ∼0.6
22 Pressurization rate in reactor cavity (MPa/s) 0.04 Average value for 5 s after the break start
23 Maximum hydraulic load acting upon (still) 2.8 This causes rupture of eventually intact rods at the location of
intact rods (kN) break occurrence
24 Maximum stress in graphite before crack 6.6 The value largely depends on parameters like fluence
propagation (MPa)
25 Value of fission power before the scram (%) ∼85 % of initial value.
26 Quantity of damaged fuel (%) due to thermal ∼40 % of initial value at 5 s after scram. This corresponds to about
loads and hydraulic loads 50 kg
27 Maximum pressure in the reactor cavity (MPa) <0.13 Free space region
28 Quantity of H2 produced (kg) 0.06 During the predicted transient duration
29 Radioactivity in the reactor cavity 200 s after 4.1e3/5.7e−3 Radioactivity values are derived from radioisotopes
the break occurrence (Ci/kg) masses. H2 to the environment has not been calculated.
30 Radioactivity in the ALS 200 s after the break 2.9e3/5e−3
occurrence (Ci/kg)
31 Radioactivity to the environment 200 s after the 1.0
break occurrence (Ci)
32 Quench of wall temperatures below break axis ∼tB + 300
a Or value of the specified quantity.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
Fig. 19. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Primary
System’, Relap5 results for the affected channel, short term: (a) flow-rates at
the inlet and at the outlet; (b) pressure in different positions along the axis; (c)
flow-rates across the ‘break’ simulation valves.
tube, the ‘nearly’ steady-state assumption has been made. There-
fore, timing is related to the connected event that is the result
of the ‘dynamic’ calculation (in this case the rupture opening
time).
6.1.1. Area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Primary System’
Results for quantities related to the area ‘System Thermal-
Hydraulics, Primary System’ obtained by the application of the
Relap5 code are given in Figs. 19–21.
1047
Fig. 20. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Primary
System’, Relap5 temperature results for the affected channel, long term: (a) rod
surface; (b) fluid; (c) pressure tube.
In the channel inlet region, Fig. 19a, the flow-rate vanishes
at the transient start owing to the blockage. Immediately after,
following the vaporization of the existing coolant mass in the
channel, flow-rate at the channel outlet also vanishes. However,
flow reversal occurs after the rupture occurrence in the upper
part of the channel as identified by the horizontal part of the
break.
The pressure in the channel changes two times during the
transient, Fig. 19b: (1) soon after the blockage, pressure drop
redistribution occurs; (2) after the tube rupture occurrence pres-
sure in the lower part of the channel and in the region of the break
achieve the reactor cavity pressure (or very close to it) and pres-
1048 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

Fig. 21. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Primary System’, Relap5 results for the affected channel: (a) overall channel power and void
fraction along the axis; (b) trajectory (bold dotted line) to determine the pressure tube rupture time.

sure in the upper region is determined by pressure drops along
the flow path from the steam drum (where pressure remains at
the initial value) and the break.
The opening of three break simulators can be seen in Fig. 19c.
The result show that conditions for channel rupture are reached
simultaneously in different parts of the channel along the axis.
However, the rupture at one level immediately releases the pres-
sure at other levels and the overall break area calculated in
this way is consistent with the experimental values (Baldin et
al., 2004; Medvedeva et al., 2004b) and with the values mea-
sured in post-accident examination of Chernobyl-1 (1982) and
Leningrad-3 (1992) events, e.g., NIKIET (1983, 1992), respec-
tively. In particular, the predicted value for the ‘equivalent break
length’ along the channel axis is 0.7 m approximately and the
break area is roughly 10 times the value of the cross-section area
of the fuel channel outlet pipeline. Therefore, the overall mass
flow-rate is only affected by the cross-section of the channel
outlet pipeline (i.e. not by the break area itself). The horizon-
tal break axis is centred around the elevation of 5 m starting
from the bottom of the active fuel. The sum of the flows though
the breaks in Fig. 19c equals the amount of flow reversal in
Fig. 19a.
Rod surface, fluid and pressure tube temperatures at different
axial elevations are reported in Fig. 20a–c. The following should
be noted (see also Table 5):
• Dry-out phenomenon and superheated steam at the channel
outlet are calculated immediately after the blockage event.
• In a few tens of seconds, after the blockage event, temper-
atures for rod damage (clad collapse mechanism), pressure
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061 1049

tube damage (break opening) and significant H2 production

occur.
• The occurrence of the break event causes, in about one second,
‘turnaround’ of all temperatures in the channel region above
the break axis.
• After the break occurrence, quenching of metal temperatures
in the region above the break axis is completed in a few sec-
onds, while quenching of the bottom part of the channel is
completed in a few hundreds seconds.

The time for channel emptying can be derived from Fig. 21a,
as well as the “assigned” power curve. The curve can be distin-
guished into three periods: (a) the steady state nominal imposed
value for the channel, i.e. till t = 0 s, (b) the transient till the
scram, determined by the coupled 3D neutron kinetics thermal-
hydraulic analysis derived from results in D’Auria et al. (2008d)
and (c) the decay power period, fixed after the estimation of the
scram time.
The graphical support for estimating the break occurrence
time can be found in Fig. 21b. For the considered scenario,
a nearly vertical trajectory is calculated (pressure difference
across the tube wall remains constant with increasing tempera-
ture) that ‘hits’ the available threshold curve when break time is
predicted.

6.1.2. Area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Fuel’

Results for quantities related to the area ‘System Thermal-

Hydraulics, Fuel’ obtained by the application of the Relap5/Frap
code are similar to results already discussed in relation to
Fig. 11b: the clad rupture is caused by the collapse mecha-
nism with constant overpressure acting across the clad wall and
increasing rod surface temperature (thus, decreasing material
strength conditions).
In performing the fuel performance analysis including the
mechanical deformation of the clad by the Frap code, it has
been ensured that the thermal transient (e.g., rod surface data
provided in Fig. 20a and fuel pellet temperatures) during the
‘period of un-deformed rod’, produced the same results by
Relap5 and Frap codes (documentation available in D’Auria et
al., 2005).
Fig. 22. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Confine-
ment’, U Stack results for pressure evolutions in the reactor cavity: (a) along
the axis of the affected channel including ‘free-space’; (b) in different gas-gaps
at 6.4 m elevation.
The pressure peak of the open space of the cavity (needed to
assess the integrity of the cavity walls) remains below 0.16 MPa.
The difference between pressures in Fig. 22b give are needed
to calculate the mechanical load acting upon the neighbouring
channels (i.e. to estimate the MPTR possibility).

6.1.3. Area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Confinement’

Results for quantities related to the area ‘System Thermal-

Hydraulics, Confinement’, obtained by the application of the
U Stack and Cocosys codes are given in Figs. 22 and 23, respec-
tively. In relation to both the analyses, time ‘t = 0 s’ corresponds
to the rupture opening time.
Pressure evolutions in different positions along the axis are
given in Fig. 22a including the ‘open’ region of the reactor cavity
and pressure evolutions at same elevation in different radial posi-
tions (i.e. in different gas-graphite gaps) are given in Fig. 22b.
The following can be observed:
A ‘quasi-static’ pressure peak as high as 0.6 MPa is cal-
culated in the gas graphite gap adjacent top the broken Fig. 23. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Confine-
channel. ment’, Cocosys results for pressure evolutions in affected confinement regions.
1050 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

The pressure time trends of the various involved zones of
the confinement can be derived from Fig. 23 for the long-term
transient evolution. The reference nodalization is presented in
Fig. 4 of D’Auria et al. (2008c). An average pressure is calculated
for the affected channel (gas) gap region in this case, red curve in
Fig. 23. In the long term period of the transient, i.e. after about
2 h since the transient start, the predicted pressure increase is
less than 0.03 MPa.
6.1.4. Area ‘Computational Fluid Dynamics’
Results for quantities related to the area ‘Computational Fluid
Dynamics’ obtained by the application of the Fluent code are
given in Fig. 24. By adopting the input deck outlined in Fig. 16,
the velocity and the pressure fields are derived at first, follow-
ing the break occurrence. Then, three constraint assumptions
are considered to model the spacer grids (schemes A, B and C

Fig. 24. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘Computational Fluid Dynamics’, Fluent results for mechanical loads acting on fuel rods in the neighborhoods of the break
axis.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
in Fig. 24). This allowed the evaluation of the hydraulic load
acting upon the selected region of the rod. Allowable load (or
‘critical load’, last row of the table in Fig. 24), was determined
independently considering geometry and material properties.
The result is given in the bottom part of Fig. 24, related to
the overall bundle section: hydraulic loads are such to cause the
rupture of at least 5 (over 18) rods, whereas nine rods appear
‘safe’ and the status of four remaining rods needs more accurate
specification of boundary and initial conditions in order to be
evaluated.
The documented one is the result of a ‘static’ analysis with
constant fluid speed, set at the maximum value corresponding to
the critical flow that establishes at the break. The allowable load
is connected with the actual temperatures of the fuel rods thus
allowing the connection with the ‘dynamic’ transient calculation
documented in the previous paragraphs.
6.1.5. Area ‘Neutron Kinetics, 3D Transient Neutron Flux’
The key result from the area ‘Neutron Kinetics, 3D Transient
Neutron Flux’, obtained by the 3D coupled code Relap5/3D-
Nestle, has already been given in Fig. 20a, initial 74 s of the
transient. Besides, it is shown that the fission power produced
in the affected channel decreases following the blockage event:
Fig. 25. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘Neutron Kinetics, 3D Transient Neu-
tron Flux’, Relap5/3D-Nestle results for non-dimensional fission power: (a)
selected axial regions of the affected fuel channel; (b) axial distribution at
different times.
1051
this constitutes an input for the analysis performed within the
framework of the present paper.
The decrease in power production is of the order of 10%
of the initial power and occurs mostly in the initial 5 s of the
transient, caused by the Doppler effect. Compared with the case
of constant power, the consideration of the actual power brings
to a delay of about 25 s in the prediction of the occurrence for
pressure tube rupture.
Additional results related to the application of the coupled 3D
neutron kinetics code to the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario can be
found in the companion paper by D’Auria et al. (2008d), includ-
ing the background for the derivation of the mentioned result
(e.g., cross-section derivation, power in neighbouring channels,
etc.). The power change in non-dimensional form associated to
each individual axial node of the affected channel is reported
in Fig. 25 together with the axial power distribution at different
times. As expected, in some regions, e.g., bottom regions, the
power increases after the blockages event. However, the overall
effect for the overall bundle is a decrease in generated fission
power.
Fig. 26. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘Structural Mechanics’, Katran-
U Stack results for pressure tube quantities, related to a tube close to the broken
one, along the axis, at the time 23 s after the rupture: (a) bend stresses; (b)
deformation of tube surface.
1052 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

The neutron kinetics response associated with geometry
change are not considered in the present study. In the course of
an accident, these are expected to occur on the first time, when
the threshold for clad damage (collapse in this case) is over-
passed. Thereafter (i.e. with the predicted event progression),
possibly, rods bowing, contact(s) with pressure tube, violent oxi-
dization connected with the H2 production and, possibly clad
and/or rods disruption due to thermal and hydraulic loads occur.
Each of these event can be associated with change in neutron
properties, i.e. ‘λ-matrices’ or macroscopic cross-sections, and
create an additional feedback upon fission power. The available
coupled 3D neutron kinetics thermal-hydraulic computational
tools, namely Korsar-Bars, are ready to account for geometry
changes (D’Auria et al., 2005). However, such feedback was
not considered within the present framework.
6.1.6. Area ‘Structural Mechanics’
Results for quantities related to the area ‘Structural Mechan-
ics’ obtained by the application of the U-Stack and Ansys codes
are given in Figs. 26 and 27. The use of those codes implies
neglecting (case of Ansys) the consideration of the tube rupture
criterion given in Fig. 9 (see also Fig. 21b for its application) and
the use of more sophisticate criteria (case of Katran-U Stack)
or of the material properties (case of Ansys). In the case of
application of these codes, a relevant the input is constituted by

Fig. 27. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘Structural Mechanics’, Ansys results: (a) sensitivity of maximum principal stress to fluence and temperature of graphite;
(b) sensitivity of maximum principal stress to pressure tube temperature increase rate; (c) plane distribution of maximum principal stress before crack propagation.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061 1053

the temperatures predicted by the thermal-hydraulic code, e.g.,

pressure tube and graphite, and the output are the stresses and
the strains for the system under consideration as a function of
time, i.e. the zirconium tube, the graphite ring and the graphite
stack. The rupture location and the occurring time is also an
output from the analysis (and may differ from the result shown
in Fig. 21b).
The Katran-U Stack (Katran can be classified as one-
dimensional code) coupled code is capable of calculating, among
the other things, the deformation and the shape change of
pressure tube along the axis as a function of time. The axial
distribution of bend stresses and of deformation after the break
event for a tube close to the broken one, is given in Fig. 26. The
break occurrence causes a bend deformation (in the reported
case, maximum at around 5.5 m from the bottom of active fuel) Fig. 28. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘Fission Products, Generation and
for about 14 cm, Fig. 26b (see also the right sketch in Fig. 6a). Transport’, Melcor result for H2 transport in the primary system and in the
This implies the displacement and/or the break of at least two confinement.
graphite blocks, to accommodate for the movement of the metal
pressure tube (see chapter 6). from Fig. 27b. As the graphite temperature increases, the actual
The use of the Ansys code implies (in addition to what men- gap to be filled by the creeping pressure tube becomes larger
tioned above): due to the increased graphite thermal deformation. The effect is
the same as having a larger initial cold gap.
(a) The need to model with suitable level of detail (i.e. by finite The stress intensification phenomenon at the edge of the
elements) each of the three components of the system under graphite ring causes in the location of the contact with the
consideration. Convergence should be demonstrated when graphite brick the most probable point for the propagation of
decreasing the mesh size. the crack, the inside the graphite brick, as evidenced in Fig. 27c
(b) The knowledge from the user or the user assumption in (red ellipse in the bottom diagram).
relation to parameters like friction between adjacent com-
ponents (e.g., ‘zirconium tube versus graphite rings’, or 6.1.7. Area ‘Fission Products, Generation and Transport’
‘graphite brick versus graphite brick’), gap thicknesses and
local material properties, both affected by the life in the core Within the safety technology area ‘Fission Products, Gen-
and by the fluence. eration and Transport’ the H2 transport is considered at first
(c) The need to perform a variety of sensitivity studies. These hereafter, even though this is a possible (typical) output of the
included: ‘graphite ring-graphite brick’ thickness, fluence areas ‘System Thermal-Hydraulics, Primary System and Con-
and related hardening for graphite and pressure tube, average finement’.
graphite temperature, pressure tube heating rate and number The amount of H2 produced and transported inside the pri-
of meshes. mary system (MCC in the figure) and in the confinement, reactor
cavity and accident localisation system (RC and ALS in the fig-
Sample Ansys results, given in Fig. 27, relate to sensitivity
studies (Fig. 27a and b) and to the spatial distribution of max-
imum principal stress in a horizontal plane, Fig. 27c at a time Table 6
just before the crack propagation start. Refp calculation of the fission product inventory in one Smolensk-3 RBMK NPP
fuel channel with average burn-up of approximately of 7500 MWd/t
As expected, the rate of temperature increase of the pressure
tube has a large influence upon the time of the break occurrence, Nuclide Activity in the lower Activity in the upper
Fig. 27a (Relap5 calculated values for such parameter are given fuel element (Ci) fuel element (Ci)
in Table 5). The smaller is the heating rate, the greater is the delay Fuel Gap Fuel Gap
before the onset of contact. In the case of gap equal to 0.7 mm 131 I 2163 21.2 2037 18.4
and fluence equal to 22 × 1021 n/cm2 , the contact always occurs 132 I 3051 38.3 2874 33.2
133 I
when the pressure tube temperature reaches about 1050 K, so 4370 15.4 4120 13.4
134 I 5297 7.2 4992 6.3
the mentioned delay is inversely proportional to the heating rate 135 I 4178 7.6 3936 6.6
(consistently with the information provided by the diagram in 85m Kr 938 1.8 887 1.6
Fig. 9). 87 Kr 1678 1.6 1587 1.4
One effect of irradiation on the graphite is the decrease of 88 Kr 2339 2.1 2211 1.8
133 Xe
the thermal conductivity that leads to an increase of the graphite 4537 30.4 4274 26.4
135 Xe 713 3.2 671 2.8
operating temperature. The effect of such increase on the time 134 Cs 25.6 0.87 24.4 0.76
history of the maximum principal stress, assuming an initial gap 137 Cs 88.4 3.1 83.5 2.7
completely closed and two different fluence values can be seen
1054 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

ure, respectively) can be seen in Fig. 28, as calculated by the
Melcor code. The following should be observed:
• Time 100 s is the start of the FC-BLOCKAGE event and,
as expected, H2 production starts immediately after the
event.
• The total amount of H2 produced and transported is much
lower than the amount theoretically producible in one fuel
channel, i.e. of the order of 1%, see Table 1.
• The break occurrence time is predicted at about 50 s instead
of 74 s as given in Fig. 21. This is due to the consideration
of constant full power in the period before the pressure tube

Fig. 29. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘Fission Products, Generation and Transport’, Cocosys results for fission products transport in the confinement: (a) release
of xenon; (b) deposition of iodine mass at 3 h after the rupture and (c) release of Cesium aerosol in the form CSOH.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061 1055

Fig. 30. Sketch dealing with the MPTR issue. One broken channel may cause failure of adjacent channels. In the right side, the worst conditions for rupture
propagation are given.

rupture (e.g., the power decrease calculated by the coupled 7. The MPTR related results
3D neutron kinetics analysis was not taken into account in
the present study). The consequences of the FC-BLOCKAGE event for the
affected blocked channel and for the confinement and the envi-
The amount of fission products leaving the rupture and ronment have been evaluated and discussed in the previous
transported inside various zones of the confinement and chapter. The problem here is to estimate the possibility that the
to the environment (confinement zones and flow-path to rupture of one channel (unavoidable for the considered event)
the environment given in Fig. 5, more details available by triggers a domino effect including the rupture of other channels
D’Auria et al., 2008c) can be seen in Fig. 29 as cal- (i.e. dealing with the MPTR issue).
culated by the Cocosys code. The following should be The MPTR scenario can be triggered by events other than the
observed: FC-BLOCKAGE, like the fuel channel Loss of Coolant Acci-
dent, or the group distribution header blockage (e.g., FC-LOCA
and GDH-BLOCKAGE, see the list in Table 2), or a variety of
• The total amount of fission products ‘stored’ in one fuel chan-
Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) and/or Reactivity
nel is given in Table 6 as calculated by the Refp code. Based
on the performed investigation, all radioactivity in the gap
(third and fifth columns in Table 6) is released to the main
cooling circuit and primarily to the confinement at the time
of the rupture opening.
• Time 0 s in the Fig. 29a and c is the opening time of the
pressure tube rupture.
• Releases to the environment occur more than 1 h after the
FC-BLOCKAGE event start.
• The amount of releases to the environment constitutes a frac-
tion for around 4–8 orders of magnitude lower than the overall
release in terms of mass of the isotopes (more details, includ-
ing a comprehensive list of released isotopes is available from
D’Auria et al., 2005).
• The release of fission products is assumed to be caused
only by thermal damage of the fuel. Releases caused by
hydraulic loads including the impact of already thermal dam-
aged pieces of fuel with solid surfaces (e.g., graphite bricks) is
neglected.
• Based on the post-accident examination of the events in
Chernobyl-1 (1982) and Leningrad-3 (1992) (NIKIET, 1983,
1992) and the supporting analyses performed within the
present framework, it can be estimated that about 50 kg of
fuel looses its integrity and its design configuration following Fig. 31. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘MPTR’: directions of spatial decom-
the FC-BLOCKAGE event. position for graphite block motion considered by U Stack code.
1056 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

Initiated Accidents (RIA), other than the notorious Chernobyl-
4 event (1986). Although the Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) has not been part of the present investigation, as already
mentioned, and although MPTR analyses have been conducted
for transients other than the individual fuel channel blockage,
e.g., Novoselsky and Filinov (2000), the present investigation
shows that the only “realistic” origin of MPTR to be considered
in Safety Analysis Report is the FC-BLOCKAGE event.
Two independent studies have been conducted within the
present framework, using the U-Stack code and a MPTR pro-
cedure detailed in the following. For both cases, the sketch in
Fig. 30 applies, with assumptions adopted for the procedure
given in the right side. The results discussed in chapter 5 con-
stituted the basis for deriving the conclusion about the MPTR
issue.
8. Results from U Stack
Considering the ‘initial failure location’ as shown in Fig. 30,
the U Stack uses the ‘spatial decomposition method’ to calcu-
late the motion of graphite blocks along the axes X, Y and Z as
depicted in Fig. 31 and the rotation around the axes X, Y and
Z.
The key results from the application of the U-Stack code
are given in Fig. 32 in a pictorial form and are supported by the
diagrams in Figs. 22 and 26. Furthermore, nodalization sketches
in Figs. 6 and 18 and related description should be considered
(together with sketches in Figs. 30 and 31 above mentioned).
A comprehensive documentation of the results can be found in
NIKIET (2004) (see also D’Auria et al., 2005). The following
aspects are relevant:

Fig. 32. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘MPTR’, U Stack results related to the Leningrad-3 (1992) NPP event: (a) tube deformation process after the blockage
event; (b) ‘stabilized’ situation at the end of the analysis.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061 1057

• The blockage event causes pressure tube overheating and

creep deformation as shown in the upper right part of Fig. 32
related to the affected tube.
• The deformation of the tube can be observed in the upper left
part of Fig. 32 where the profile of the tube is reported at
different times before the break.
• The time of break occurrence and the axial location of the
break can also be deducted from the upper left diagram in
Fig. 32.
• After the break opening, graphite gaps are pressurized and a
full map of the pressure in the gaps is calculated by the code,
e.g., Fig. 22.
• The strongly asymmetric radial and axial pressure distribu-
tion, with pressure peaks in the break region, constitutes the
main source of load for neighbouring fuel channels with addi-
tional contribution given by dynamic loads in the vicinity of
the break.
• Hydraulic loads produce deformation and stresses in individ-
ual pressure tubes and graphite stacks as depicted in Fig. 26
Fig. 33. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘MPTR’: characterization of break
in relation to pressure tubes. location inside the cross-section map of the RBMK core needed for the MPTR
• Actual deformation and stresses for pressure tube and graphite procedure (the blue triangle shows ‘cold fuel elements).
bricks are compared with (limit) allowable values.
• The final result is given in the bottom part of the Fig. 32:
The key approximations adopted in the procedure are: (a)
five graphite bricks are predicted to be damaged and several
no feedback is considered between structural mechanics and
bricks are displaced from their original position. A few chan-
thermal-hydraulics calculations; (b) no consideration is given
nels around the broken one are calculated to have undergone
to plasticity in any place; (c) no explicit dynamic analysis
plastic deformation.
is performed involving the consideration of vibrations, pres-
sure waves and fluid-structure interaction (see the third step
Definitely, the rupture causes displacement of stacks neigh-
below).
bouring the broken channel, but no propagation of the rupture is
The first step for applying the procedure consists in the geo-
calculated. This is in accordance with the evidence from the NPP
metric characterization of the break location that includes (the
event (NIKIET, 1992) and from recent experiments performed
break area has minor influence as already discussed):
in the TKR full size (related to a group of individual channels)
experimental facility, e.g., Medvedeva et al. (2004b).
• The position of the affected fuel channel in the horizontal
8.1. Results from the procedure cross-section map of the RBMK core (Fig. 33).
• The axial location of the break, calculated according to the
The proposed MPTR procedure basically reflects the archi- discussion provided in relation to Fig. 13.
tecture of the U-Stack code, as described into detail by D’Auria • The azimuthal location of the break, corner-wise or side-wise,
et al. (2005). The procedure is based on the adoption of different right side of Fig. 30. Only side-wise breaks are considered,
codes and different assumptions. The following three elements though the probability of occurrence of side-wise break is
of the procedure are distinguished: low: once a break is predicted at a given axial location there
is a probability around 10−2 that the azimuthal break axis
I. Calculation of admissible loads: structural analyses are coincide with the centred orthogonal axis of neighbouring
performed with the aim of determining the maximum channels. In this situation, a lower number of stacks constitute
admissible loads on the columns surrounding the initiating an active constraint for the propagation of the rupture, assum-
failure, depending on the failure location over the reac- ing no friction among sliding graphite bricks. The side-wise
tor core. An elasto-static model, based on the Ansys finite break position constitutes a conservative assumption.
element code, was developed to perform such analyses. • The distance from the tank of the affected row of channels and
II. Calculation of applicable (or actual) loads: thermal- the number of ‘cold’ channels between the broken channel and
hydraulic analyses are performed by means of the Relap5 the tanks wall, see the sketch in Fig. 33. In facts the Young
code, with the aim of estimating the actual loads acting on module of ‘cold’ channels is about 1.2 times larger than the
the columns surrounding a failed channel. Young module of ‘hot’ channels.
III. Comparison between admissible and applicable loads: the
results of the previous two steps are compared so as to iden- The second step for applying the procedure addresses the
tify those initiating failure locations, which could determine element ‘I.’ above. A map of admissible loads for each fuel
a rupture propagation. channel of the concerned RBMK core is created according to: (a)
1058 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061

the number of stacks that separate the concerned stack from the The third step for applying the procedure addresses the ele-
tank, also including the number of ‘cold’ stacks, (b) the distance ment ‘II.’ above. The differential pressure distribution acting
of the last stack from the tank and (c) the axial elevation of the along the axis of the closest stack is calculated as a function of
break. time following the break occurrence.

Fig. 34. FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, area ‘MPTR’, results from the special procedure related to the Smolensk-3 calculation: (a) second step, allowable loads; (b) third
step actual load; (c) fourth step channels prone to rupture propagation.
 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
The fourth step for applying the procedure addresses the ele-
ment ‘III.’ above and allows the ‘straightforward’ identification
in the map of the fuel channels that are prone to the propagation
of the rupture.
The results from the second to the fourth step are given in
Fig. 34. The following should be noted:
• The red colour in Fig. 34a identifies the weakest fuel channels.
Various maps have been derived in D’Auria et al. (2005),
depending upon the load axial distribution, i.e. concentrated,
uniform and peaked, and upon the consideration or not of the
tank as resistant element. The data shown in the figure relate
to the peaked load and to the presence of the tank.
• The diagram in Fig. 34b is the result of ‘static’ pressure dif-
ference acting upon the opposite sides of the concerned fuel
stack. The consideration along the axis of time evolutions like
those shown in Fig. 22 (in the present case obtained by Relap5,
see also D’Auria et al., 2008c) allows the achievement of the
diagram in Fig. 34b. The integral under the curve is the load
that has the ‘peaked shape’ already considered for the results
in Fig. 34a. The dynamic loads expected at the beginning of
the transient (e.g., pressure wave and jet forces acting dur-
ing a few seconds after the break occurrence) are added to
the loads in the form of ‘static’ pressure difference. The sum
constitutes the ‘actual’ load considered for the fourth step.
• The diagram in Fig. 34c shows the fuel channels that are prone
to the propagation of the rupture: for those channels, the actual
load is larger than the ‘resistant’ force and the channels may
get plastic condition as a consequence of a rupture occurring
in the neighbouring position.
The obtained results show that about 2% of the RBMK core
channels, in the case of the Smolensk-3 NPP, may reach limit-
ing condition, i.e. beginning of plastic deformation. However,
two key conservative assumptions have been considered: (1)
side-wise break configuration when calculating the ‘actual’ load
(even in such condition the ‘actual’ load is slightly larger than
the ‘admissible’ load); (2) no plasticity when calculating the
‘admissible’ loads.
It is concluded that the MPTR issue is irrelevant for the safety
of the RBMK in the case of the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario, in
accordance with the conclusions achieved in section 6.1 by the
application of the U-Stack code.
8.2. Conclusions
Results from best-estimate, coupled 3D structural mechanics,
CFD, thermal-hydraulics and neutron kinetics calculations for
RBMK core performance following the blockage of one channel
are discussed in the paper. The study requested also the use
of ‘severe-accident’ computational tools for the prediction of
hydrogen and fission products transport inside the confinement
and to the environment.
The analyses are not supported by uncertainty evaluation
and should not be considered to the level of a licensing study.
The main achieved purposes were to demonstrate that no unac-
ceptable situation is predicted during the considered accident
1059
evolutions (e.g., radioactivity release to the environment below
the threshold of acceptability) and to demonstrate the availability
and the suitability of sophisticate coupled computational tools.
The adopted coupled thermal-hydraulic neutron kinetics
codes, namely Relap5/3D-Nestle and Korsar-Bars, were coupled
with structural mechanics codes, e.g., Ansys and Katran-
U Stack and with the codes suitable for predicting fission
product transport, e.g., Melcor and Cocosys, respectively.
The main conclusions from the analysis of the FC-
BLOCKAGE scenario can be summarized as follows:
• The scenario puts an enormous challenge to the codes: all
key technological areas relevant to the deterministic reactor
safety are involved. About 40 phenomena have been identified
as characterizing the scenario and related computational tools
have been evaluated.
• The key output data from the analysis are (the Smolensk-3
RBMK NPP is considered):
• Affected bundle power decreases soon after the blockage
event owing to Doppler effect (negative) typically larger
than the positive reactivity effect induced by the channel
voiding.
• One fuel bundle destroyed (composed of two parts).
• About 50 kg of irradiated fuel loose their geometric and
structural integrity and (potentially) escape the pressure
boundary of the Main Cooling Circuit, but are collected
inside the reactor cavity.
• No challenge put to the structural integrity of the reactor
cavity or to any other region of the confinement.
• No danger predicted that is originated by H2 deflagration.
• The amount of radioactivity release to the environment,
starting about one hour after the event occurrence, is within
the regulatory allowed limits.
• A few graphite bricks belonging to the affected fuel channel
are damaged with bricks of surrounding column remaining
intact.
• The possibility for the occurrence of the multiple pressure
tube rupture (MPTR) was excluded.
The qualification level of the U-Stack code in addressing the
MPTR issue as well as of an independent procedure based on
the use of different computational tools has been demonstrated
and brought to the conclusion at the last bullet above.
It seems to be expedient to consider the offer related to a
monitoring system to prevent the pressure tube rupture of the
affected channel, see D’Auria et al. (2008e).
Acknowledgements
The present paper is devoted to the memory of the eminent
Russian researcher and technologist Dr. Yuri Cherkashov who
passed away in May 2006. He contributed to the crucial effort of
designing the fuel channel of the RBMK and was decorated and
granted a State award for his services. Around fifty researchers
at NIKIET and University of Pisa took part in the EC (Euro-
pean Commission) Project activities that were at the origin of
the present one plus five companion papers in this journal issue.
1060 F. D’Auria et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 238 (2008) 1026–1061
Most of their names appear as co-authors of the papers or of
the references. Their contribution is gratefully acknowledged. A
number of persons provided a managerial support to the activi-
ties; among them, we wish to recall V. Shandra and C. Sollima.
The work would not have been possible without the contribu-
tion and the willingness of the Russian Beneficiary Institution
Rosenergoatom to cooperate and to supervise the activities. Spe-
cial thanks are due to Dr. E. Hicken and Dr. R.B. Duffey who
took the charge of evaluating all this material and to Profs. M.
Mazzini and G. Petrangeli for their continuous supervision of
the activities. Neither the EC nor any person acting on behalf of
the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made
of the information in the paper and the views expressed are the
sole responsibility of the authors and not necessarily reflect the
views of EC.
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