G.R. No. 27484 ANGEL LORENZO vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH

September 1, 1927 MALCOLM, J.:

Facts: The petitioner and appellant, Angel Lorenzo is a leprous person and is confined in the San Lazaro Hospital in the City of Manila. He made an appeal to induce the court to set aside the judgment of the Court of the First Instance of Manila sustaining the law authorizing the segregation of lepers. Lorenzo alleged that his confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital was in violation of Constitutional rights and alleged that leprosy is not an infectious disease. The return of the writ stated that the leper was confined in the San Lazaro Hospital in conformity with the provisions of section 1058 of the Administrative Code. Article XV of chapter 37 of the Administrative Code empowers the Director of Health and his authorized agents "to cause to be apprehended, and detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous persons in the Philippine Islands. "In amplification of this portion of the law are found provisions relating to arrest of suspected lepers, medical inspection and diagnostic procedure, confirmation of diagnosis by bacteriological methods, establishment of hospitals, detention camps, and a leper colony, etc. Issue: 1. Whether or Not Section 1058 of Article XV of the Administrative Code imposes a valid exercise of police power. 2. Whether or not it is unconstitutional. Held: Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate exercise of the police power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave health problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. The assumption must be that if evidence was required to establish the necessity for the law, that it was before the legislature when the act was passed. Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be shunned and excluded from society, and that compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of the disease of supported by high scientific authority. G.R. No. L-54958 ANGLO-FIL TRADING CORPORATION, et al vs.HON. ALFREDO LAZARO, et al September 2, 1983 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts: 23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services, Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana Stevedoring Corporation, Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service, Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (members of the Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc. [PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expired when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by Presidential Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by Presidential Decree 857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the strength of temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May 1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration, Management and

Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs' policy of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A which, among other things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all recognized cargo handling contractors and port-related service operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by the President's memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18 April 1980, directing submission of a report on the integration of the stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing the need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA in order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the committee submitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive contract for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified among the existing contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to the President, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the recommendation to award an exclusive management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980, PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract which provided, among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoring services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On 23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of gross stevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction with preliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, the CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980, the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders "in view of the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the countervailing public interest involved." On 1 September 1980, the CFI dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudice to the Court's resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a letter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing him that due to the lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was withdrawing PIPSI's holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at South Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI, therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations implemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is an unlawful deprivation of property rights. Held: From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the temporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte. Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the CFI heard the parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after hearing the parties' evidence and arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of discretion when a court dissolves exparte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were operating merely on "hold-over" permits, which were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over permits were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSI's and AngloFil et.al.'s authorities may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due process because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no

vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and to findings of fact. G.R. No. L-5060 THE UNITED STATES vs. LUIS TORIBIO January 26, 1910 CARSON, J.:

Facts: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be unfit for agricultural work which result ed to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered. Issue: Whether or Not the provision under Act No. 1147 is valid. Held: The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passersby; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs.Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,

tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."