Illicit Financial Flows From Developing Countries 2002-2011

Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011
Dev Kar and Brian LeBlanc

December 2013

Dev Kar and Brian LeBlanc1
December 2013
Global Financial Integrity Wishes to Thank the Ford Foundation and the Financial Transparency Coalition for Supporting this Project
Financial Transparency Coalition
Dev Kar, a former Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund, is Chief Economist at Global Financial Integrity and Brian LeBlanc is a Junior Economist at GFI. Raymond Baker and other GFI staff provided helpful comments which are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are the authors responsibility.
Global Financial Integrity (GFI) is pleased to present here its analysis of Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011. We estimate that illicit financial outflows from the developing world totaled a staggering US$946.7 billion in 2011, with cumulative illicit financial outflows over the decade between 2002 and 2011 of US$5.9 trillion. This gives further evidence to the notion that illicit financial flows are the most devastating economic issue impacting the global South. Large as these numbers are, perhaps the most distressing take-away from the study is just how fast illicit financial flows are growing. Adjusted for inflation, illicit financial flows out of developing countries increased by an average of more than 10 percent per year over the decade. Left unabated, one can only expect these numbers to continue an upward trend. We hope that this report will serve as a wake-up call to world leaders on the urgency with which illicit financial flows must be addressed. Each year we strive to present the most accurate estimates of the amount of money passing illicitly out of poor countries due to crime, corruption, and tax evasion. In last years study, we introduced the Hot Money Narrow modelin place of the World Bank Residual model which we had utilized in previous studiesas a more precise method for measuring strictly illicit flows. Our team of economists led by Dr. Dev Kar continues to make advances in honing our estimates. This year we add improvements to our research methodology centered around trade misinvoicing. Previously, by utilizing aggregated bilateral trade data rather than disaggregated bilateral trade data, our methodology had a tendency to significantly understate the trade component of illicit financial outflows by inadvertently netting illicit inflows from illicit outflows between many countries. As such, this is the first GFI study to utilize disaggregated bilateral trade data for 17 of 151 countries in the study which report in the necessary detail. Moreover, our earlier estimates had the potential to overstate illicit financial flows when trade was misinvoiced between two developing countries. To adjust appropriately, this study is the first of GFIs to look at misinvoicing between developing countries and advanced economies, and then scale those findings up to account for the percent of trade conducted between developing economies. Finally, by previously omitting data from Hong Kong as a trade intermediary, our estimates had the potential to overstate illicit outflows from many Asian nations. For the first time we are able
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to incorporate trade data from the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department into our trade misinvoicing estimates, providing a more accurate estimate of this major component of illicit flows. GFIs data, however constructed, remain extremely conservative, as we still do not capture the misinvoicing of trade in services (rather than the trade in goods), same-invoice trade mispricing (such as transfer mispricing), hawala transactions, and dealings conducted in bulk cash. This means that much of the proceeds of drug trafficking, human smuggling, and other criminal activities which are often settled in cash are not included in these estimates. It also means that much of abusive transfer pricing conducted between arms of the same multinational corporation are not captured in our figures. While progress has been made by world leaders over the past year in agreeing to some improvements in measures to achieve greater global financial transparency, much of the conversation has been focused on curtailing abuses within the developed world. As this report highlights, it is urgent that developing nations be brought fully into the discussion. We thank Dev Kar and Brian LeBlanc for their excellent work in producing this analysis. The support of the Ford Foundation and the Financial Transparency Coalition is gratefully acknowledged and appreciated. Raymond W. Baker President Global Financial Integrity December 11, 2013
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Global Financial Integrity
Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 III. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 IV. Drivers of Illicit Financial Flows: Evidence from Pooled Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Appendix 1. Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix 2. A Discussion on the Trade Discrepancies Arising through Re-Exporting via Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Charts and Tables with the Report

Table 1. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Current (2013) and Previous (2012) Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chart 1. Non-Normalized vs. Normalized Illicit Financial Flows, 2002-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Table 2. Non-Normalized Illicit Financial Flows by Region, 2002-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Chart 2. Cumulative Non-Normalized Illicit Financial Flows by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Chart 3. Illicit Financial Flows vs. Illicit Financial Flows to GDP by Region, 2002-2011 . . . . . . . . . . 11 Table 3. Illicit Financial Flows to GDP, Non-Normalized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Chart 4. Heat Map of Illicit Financial Flows to GDP Ratio for Developing Countries, 2002-2011 . . . 13 Table 4. Cumulative Illicit Financial Flows from the Top Fifteen Developing Economies, 2002-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Table 5. Variance in HMN to GDP Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Table 6. Share of Real HMN in Real HMN+GER Non-Normalized, 2002-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Table 7. Results of Panel and OLS Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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Abstract
This update on illicit financial flows from developing countries, the fourth in an annual series, finds that US$946.7 billion in illicit outflows left the developing world in 2011, up from US$832.4 billion in 2010. Compared to our 2012 report, this report utilizes significant enhancements to the methodology for estimating trade misinvoicing and analyzes for the first time possible drivers of illicit flows using panel data from 55 developing countries for a ten-year period (2002-2011). The revision to the methodology of estimating trade misinvoicing (which comprises about 80 percent of illicit outflows) reduces Chinas outsized role in driving illicit financial flows, due mainly to our previous studies not specifically incorporating the use of Hong Kong as a trade entrept, without significantly impacting our total illicit financial flows figure. In that respect, this is probably the first study that has explicitly incorporated data from the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department to correct for trade distortions that arise from Hong Kongs role as a trade entrept. While regression analysis using panel data finds scant evidence that macroeconomic conditions drive illicit flows, certain regulatory measures (such as export proceeds surrender requirements) and governance-related factors (such as corruption) seem to do so. There is scope to extend this research on the drivers of illicit flows by incorporating more countries and data series and by extending the time period analyzed to twenty years or longer.
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Executive Summary
This annual update on illicit financial flows from developing countries incorporates a number of methodological enhancements and analyzes possible drivers of trade misinvoicing, by far the largest component of illicit flows. While there are no changes to the basic model used (e.g., coverage of countries, focus on gross outflows only) since the first update was published in January 2011, the current version adjusts previous estimates of trade misinvoicing by explicitly recognizing the role of Hong Kong as a trade entrept. Furthermore, we now estimate trade misinvoicing for major developing countries that report bilateral trade data based on their trade with each advanced country (i.e., on a country-by-country basis). The previous method involved estimating misinvoicing by comparing each developing countrys trade with the world in the aggregate. While the Hong Kong effect reduces our estimate of overall trade misinvoicing, the country-by-country approach increases the total amount of outflows identified; on net, these effects combine to produce a much more accurate and representative depiction of the global problem that illicit flows pose to the developing world. Nominal illicit outows from developing countries amounted to US$946.7 billion in 2011, up 13.7 percent from US$832.4 in 2010. Controlled for inflation, illicit outflows from developing countries increased in real terms by about 10.2 percent per annum. We find that the pattern of illicit outflows, trend rate of growth, and impact in terms of GDP all vary significantly among the five regions. Asia accounts for 39.6 percent of total illicit outows from developing countries compared to 61.2 percent of such outows in the 2012 IFF Update. Asias much larger share of total illicit outflows in the 2012 IFF Update resulted from an overestimation of Chinas trade misinvoicing due to the Hong Kong effect. Correcting for the Hong Kong effect sharply reduces the share of outflows from Asia. Nevertheless, Asia still has the largest share of illicit flows among the regions, and six of the top 15 exporters of illicit capital are Asian countries (China, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines). Developing Europe (21.5 percent) and the Western Hemisphere (19.6 percent) contribute almost equally to total illicit outows. While outflows from Europe are mainly driven by Russia, those from the Western Hemisphere are driven by Mexico and Brazil. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region accounts for 11.2 percent of total outows on average. MENAs share increased significantly from just 3 percent of total outflows in 2002, reaching a peak of 18.5 percent in 2009, before falling to 12 percent in 2011. In comparison, Africas share increased from just 3.9 percent in 2002, reaching a peak of 11.1 percent just before the Great Recession set in (2007), before declining to 7 percent in 2011, roughly on par with its average of 7.7 percent over the decade.
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The volume of total outflows as a share of developing countries GDP increased from 4.0 percent in 2002 to 4.6 percent in 2005. Since then, barring a few upticks, illicit outflows have generally been on a declining trend relative to GDP, and were 3.7 percent in 2011. The ranking of various regions based on their respective IFFs to GDP ratios looks quite different from the ranking based on the volume of outflows. For instance, while Africa has the smallest nominal share of regional illicit outows (7.7 percent) over the period studied, it has the highest average illicit outows to GDP ratio (5.7 percent), suggesting that the loss of capital has an outsized impact on the continent. Illicit outflows at an average of 4.5 percent of regional GDP also significantly impact developing Europe. Outflows per annum from Asia amount to an average of 4.1 percent of regional GDP, and leakages of illicit capital from MENA and the Western Hemisphere equal about 3.5 percent of regional GDP. However, in the case of MENA, outflows as percent of GDP increased significantly from 1 percent in 2002 to 6.8 percent in 2009, before declining to 3.9 percent in 2011. In contrast, barring a few upticks, outflows from the Western Hemisphere as a share of regional GDP have declined steadily from 4.1 percent in 2002 to 2.6 percent in 2011. The MENA region registered the fastest trend rate of growth in illicit outows over the period studied (31.5 percent per annum) followed by Africa (20.2 percent), developing Europe (13.6 percent), Asia (7.5 percent), and Latin America (3.1 percent). The sharply faster rate of growth in illicit outflows from the MENA region is probably related to the rise in oil prices. The 2012 IFF Update showed that certain MENA countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar can have large errors and omissions due to the incorrect or incomplete accounting of sovereign wealth fund transactions in the balance of payments. Therefore, including these countries along with other countries that do not have this issue may distort the ranking of exporters of illicit capital. If we exclude these countries, then cumulative outflows from the top fifteen exporters of illicit capital amount to US$4.2 trillion over the decade ending 2011 comprising slightly over 70 percent of total outflows. The top three exporters of illicit capital were China (US$1,076 billion), Russia (US$881 billion), and Mexico (US$462 billion). Six of the top 15 exporters of illicit capital are in Asia (China, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines), two are in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa), four are in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Serbia), two are in the Western Hemisphere (Mexico and Brazil), and one is in the MENA region (Iraq). Trade misinvoicing comprises the major portion of illicit flows (roughly 80 percent on average). Balance of payments leakages (Hot Money Narrow measure) fluctuate considerably and have generally trended upwards from just 14.2 percent of total outflows in 2002 to 19.4 percent in 2011. However, there is little reason to believe that purely statistical errors in compiling balance of payments data have trended upwards for developing countries as a whole.
The study finally focuses on possible drivers of illicit flows using a cross section of 55 developing countries for which data are available for the ten year period 2002-2011. Regression analyses using the panel data find scant evidence that macroeconomic drivers impact trade misinvoicing. Rather, we find trade misinvoicing to be driven largely by a set of four factorsthree of a regulatory nature and one governance-related. The regulatory drivers are the export proceeds surrender requirement (EPSR) and the extent of capital account openness, while the governance related driver is the state of overall governance in the country, which we represent with the World Bank Control of Corruption indicator. Although there are some serious limitations in formulating the EPSR as a dummy variable, we find that exporters seem to view it as a confiscatory measure. Hence, they seek to circumvent it by retaining funds abroad through export under-invoicing. The panel data regressions also show that an increase in corruption increases trade misinvoicing while capital account openness leads to greater export misinvoicing in both directions if openness is not accompanied by stronger governance. In fact, as the experience of developed countries show, greater openness and liberalization in an environment of weak regulatory oversight can actually generate more illicit flows.
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I. Introduction
1. The problem of illicit financial flows (IFFs) has attracted increasing attention in recent years from policymakers and international organizations. At the 10th Plenary Meeting of the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development in Madrid on February 27, 2012, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, noted that curbing illicit financial flows shows great promise as an additional and innovative revenue source to supplement official development assistance (ODA). He clearly recognized that such additional sources of revenue are among the most important necessities for future development and recommended that countries move quickly to implement policies to curtail illicit flows. At the 25th Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF in Washington, DC on April 21, 2012, Helen Clark, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, recognized that curbing illicit flows can help bridge the gap between official development assistance and the level of resources needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly at a time when fiscal pressures are hindering donor countries from expanding ODA. 2. Illicit flows constitute a major source of domestic resource leakage, which drains foreign exchange, reduces tax collections, restricts foreign investments, and worsens poverty in the poorest developing countries. Illicit flows are all unrecorded private financial outflows involving capital that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized, generally used by residents to accumulate foreign assets in contravention of applicable capital controls and regulatory frameworks. Thus, even if the funds earned are legitimate, such as the profits of a legitimate business, their transfer abroad in violation of exchange control regulations or corporate tax laws would render the capital illicit. 3. IFFs are difficult to estimate statistically due to the fact that many illicit transactions tend to be settled in cash, as parties involved in such transactions take great pains to ensure that there is no incriminating paper trail. Hence, economic methods and data sources tend to significantly understate IFFs. In order to avoid understating the problem of illicit flows, we shall always use the robust (non-normalized) estimate of IFFs rather than the conservative (or normalized) estimates (see paragraph 6). 4. The present study makes important improvements to the methodology of estimating IFFs used in previous studies, including the one published by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) in December 2012 (Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2001-2010, henceforth the 2012 IFF Update). For this reason, estimates of illicit flows provided here cannot be strictly compared to those in previous IFF updates. 5. The report is organized as follows: Section II discusses the methodology used in this report to calculate IFFs and points out the changes implemented relative to the 2012 IFF Update.
Section III describes trends in illicit financial flows over the period studied, 2002-2011. Section IV analyzes the drivers of trade misinvoicing, a key conduit for IFFs, using various panel regressions. The final section summarizes the main conclusions of this study.
II. Methodology
6. There are two broad channels through which capital can flow illicitly out of a country in a measurable manner leakages from the balance of payments and the deliberate misinvoicing of external trade. Note that we do not net out illicit inflows from illicit outflows when estimating how much capital is leaving the developing world each year. This methodology differs from academic literature on capital flight, in which inflows and outflows of capital are netted out. Our focus on gross outflows is based on the premise that illicit inflows do not provide a benefit that offsets the initial loss of capital through outflows, as they cannot be taxed or used to boost productive capacity. Instead, illicit inflows are much more likely to drive the underground economy than be invested in the official economy. Therefore, our estimates of both balance of payments leakages and trade misinvoicing are based on gross outflows only. 7. There are two methods of capturing leakages of capital from the balance of payments the World Bank Residual (WBR) method and the Hot Money Narrow (HMN) method. The reasons for excluding the WBR method based on the change in external debt (CED) were discussed at length in Section II of the 2012 IFF Update. Nevertheless, they are worth recapitulating briefly. In essence, the WBR/CED approach may not exclude legitimate financial flows that are incorrectly recorded in the balance of payments. Claessens and Naude (1992) show that the balance of payments identity (essentially, source of funds equals use of funds) and nomenclature necessarily imply that some of the gap between a countrys source of funds and use of funds may also include legitimate capital flows. As we are only concerned with the illicit portion of capital flight, the narrower HMN estimate based on the Net Errors and Omissions (NEOs) term in the balance of payments is a more suitable measure of such flows. 8. The main drawback of the HMN approach is that NEOs not only reflect unrecorded illicit flows but also errors in recording balance of payments transactions. It is impossible to disaggregate the portion of statistical errors inherent in the NEOs from illicit flows. Nevertheless, economists have used the HMN measure because its results have been consistently negative and increasing for many developing countries, representing large illicit outflows, and there is no reason to believe that errors in statistical recording have increased. In fact, the statistical capacities of developing countries have strengthened through technical assistance provided by international organizations and through better data mining and processing, suggesting that the influence of statistical errors on the HMN measure should have decreased over time. 9. Consistent with other studies on capital flight, we supplement the HMN estimates with estimates of the deliberate misinvoicing of a countrys exports and imports. Bhagwati (1964) and others have shown that trade misinvoicing is one of the key conduits through which economic agents illegally move money out of (and into) developing countries. Traders can
move money out of a country through under-invoicing exports or over-invoicing imports. Likewise, traders can move money into a country through over-invoicing exports or underinvoicing imports. Since the act of deliberately falsifying invoices is illegal in most countries, we consider our trade misinvoicing estimates to reflect completely illicit outflows. 10. Because estimates of illicit outflows are inherently imprecise, we present a lower and upper bound of such outflows. We apply a normalization process to filter out estimates that are less than or equal to 10 percent of a countrys exports. This process yields the lower bound of illicit outflows from a country or region. The 10 percent threshold was not chosen arbitrarily but was based on the findings in the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics Annual Reports. For instance, the 2012 Annual Report shows that the global good balance (exports minus imports), which should be zero as the exports of all countries must equal imports by others for the world as a whole, averages around 1.5 percent of world exports. If this discrepancy is due solely to statistical errors, then such errors are unlikely to exceed 1.5 percent of exports on average. In contrast, the filter used for normalization accepts trade misinvoicing estimates that are equal to or more than 10 percent of a countrys exports as likely due to illicit flows, providing a much more conservative estimate. Non-normalized illicit outflows that do not pass through such a filter comprise the upper bound of transfers from the country through trade misinvoicing. 11. There are two important methodological changes between this report and the 2012 IFF Update. The first involves a revision of which countries, or country groups, are used as trading partners for the basis of our Gross Excluding reversals (GER) method. The need for this change resulted from acknowledging potential complications arising through comparing trade between two developing countries, and also from problems arising through using disaggregated, versus aggregated, trade data (see paragraphs 12-14 for a detailed explanation). The second adjustment became necessary because the use of Hong Kong as a trade entrept overstated illicit outflows through trade misinvoicing (see paragraphs 1517 on the Hong Kong effect). 12. Previous IFF updates estimated trade misinvoicing for each country in relation to its exports and imports with that of the world as a group using the IMFs Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Using the world as a group understates the amount of gross outflows through trade misinvoicing because traders within a country may bring in capital illicitly from some trading partners and move capital out illicitly into others. To illustrate, consider a Country A with only two trading partners, Country B and Country C. Now, assume that a comparison of bilateral trade between Country A and Country B shows a $100 outow from Country A while comparison of the bilateral trade between Country A and Country C shows a $100 inow from Country C. If we were to estimate Country As trade misinvoicing figures based on its trade with the whole world (Country Bs trade plus Country Cs trade), it would appear as if Country
A has no trade misinvoicing. For this reason, we will now estimate trade misinvoicing by using data for countries individual trading partners instead of the world totals whenever such data is available. This has had a large impact on our IFF figures for many countries. Russias figures, for example, are more than double under the new methodology than in previous updates. 13. The underlying assumption behind all trade misinvoicing models is that many residents in weakly governed countries prefer to acquire foreign assets in an advanced economy rather than domestic assets. In contrast, if the countries on both sides of a trade transaction have serious governance issues (such as two developing countries), then a comparison of their bilateral trade data cannot reveal from which country capital is being transferred in an illicit manner (Bhagwati, 1964). Since the existence of import over-invoicing in one country is mathematically equivalent to export under-invoicing in the other (both indicative of an illicit outflow), one is never sure which side of the equation is to be believed. It is not that both parties cannot misinvoice trade at the same timethey can and sometimes do, in a phenomenon known as same-invoice fakingbut bilateral trade discrepancies cannot be the basis for estimating illicit flows if there is such a double coincidence of wants for foreign assets. Thus, we choose to calculate trade misinvoicing estimates only between developing countries and advanced economies and then proportionately scale the estimates to the developing countries total trade. This approach has also been adopted by Ndikumana and Boyce (2002) and others. 14. Furthermore, the country-by-country approach can only be applied for developing countries that consistently report their merchandise trade on a bilateral basis. However, a majority of developing countries do not do this or only report data intermittently. Of the 150 developing countries for which we estimate IFF figures, only 17 report bilateral trade data that covers the time period of this study (2002-2011). For the majority of developing countries, we are compelled to apply the previous methodology of comparing total trade against world totals. The mix of methodologies employed in this study is not problematic, however, as any inaccuracy it contributes would lead to underestimated trade misinvoicing figures. Additionally, this potential understatement is unlikely to be significant due to the fact that eight of the top eleven exporters of illicit capital report bilateral trade data. 15. The second adjustment to the methodology is necessary due to the Hong Kong effect. The revision takes into account the bilateral trade discrepancies that arise due to the re-exports of goods through Hong Kong. Interested readers should refer to Appendix 2 for a detailed discussion. In short, the use of Hong Kong as a trade entrept creates the appearance of trade misinvoicing due to the fact that goods merely passing through Hong Kong as reexports to their ultimate destination (say, the United States) are recorded differently by the country of origin (say, China) and the country of consignment (the United States). This
discrepancy between how China and the United States record the re-exported goods creates artificial, rather than actual, trade misinvoicing, thereby overstating illicit outflows from China. 16. The Hong Kong effect is most pronounced in the case of China, but not limited to Chinese goods. Over the period of 2001 to 2012, approximately $3.61 trillion worth of merchandise was re-exported through Hong Kong in this manner, 62 percent of which originated in China. A few researchers have attempted to correct for the re-exports of Chinese goods through Hong Kong when calculating trade misinvoicing estimates, but none of the existing methods account for the re-exports of any other country that uses Hong Kong as an entrept. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses actual data from the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department to correct for any artificial trade misinvoicing created by the use of Hong Kong as an entrept for all developing countries. For instance, India, the Philippines, and Thailand re-exported a total of $286 billion worth of goods through Hong Kong over the same period. 17. It is important to note, however, that our estimates only correct for re-exports through Hong Kong and not for re-exports from other trade entrepts such as Singapore and Dubai. However, Hong Kong is by far the largest re-exporter by volume of the three aforementioned trade entrepts. It is also the only entrept that records re-export data by country of origin and country of destination, which allows researchers to estimate trade misinvoicing using bilateral trade data (this data is available, for a fee, from the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department). While Singapores re-exports average 43 percent of its total trade, Hong Kongs re-exports are close to 97 percent of its total trade. Furthermore, only a fraction of Singapores re-exports involve developing countries. For this reason, we do not believe that other entrepts significantly affect our global estimates of illicit flows, although we plan to continue to incorporate new re-export data from other entrepts as it becomes available. 18. These two methodological changes tend to impact illicit outflows from developing countries in opposite directions, with the net effect varying significantly by country. On the one hand, the Hong Kong effect greatly reduces Chinas contribution to global illicit flows, driving down global totals and Asias share in illicit outflows. On the other, analyzing trade misinvoicing by developing countries with each advanced country (the country-by-country approach) increases illicit outflows from many large, weakly governed countries such as Russia and India.
III. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries

19. In this section, we begin by pointing out the differences between the 2012 IFF Update and the present study in our estimates of illicit flows. We then discuss the pattern of illicit outflows from developing countries and regions, highlighting the main trends. The section concludes with a ranking of countries based on our revised methodology for estimating trade misinvoicing, pointing out any major changes from the ranking in the 2012 IFF Update. 20. As noted in paragraph 2, estimates of illicit outflows are likely to be understated for a number of reasons. The trends and patterns of illicit flows discussed in this section are therefore based on the non-normalized (or robust) Hot Money Narrow (HMN) plus Gross Excluding Reversals (GER) estimates, although the normalized (or conservative) measure is also included for reference. Moreover, while our yearly estimates are presented in nominal terms, any discussion regarding trends will be based on real figures, adjusted for inflation to constant 2005 dollars.
A. Trends and Patterns

21. The overall differences between our estimates of total illicit flows from all developing countries under the methodologies in this report and in the 2012 IFF Update are minor (Table 1). We estimate that the average illicit outflows per year are approximately 12 percent lower using the current methodology compared to the methodology used in 2012. This difference has narrowed in recent years, however, to between 0.7 to 3.1 percent mostly through Chinas decreased use of Hong Kong as a trade entrept. The share of Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods has declined from about 61 percent in 1995 to less than 12 percent in 2008 (Ferrentino et al, 2008).
Table 1. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Current (2013) and Previous (2012) Estimates (in billions of US dollars or percent)
Year 2013 HMN+GER Non-Normalized 2012 HMN+GER Non-Normalized Nominal Difference Percent Difference 2002 270.3 299.8 -29.5 2003 301.5 359.0 -57.5 2004 384.5 490.0 -105.5 2005 498.9 615.1 -116.2 2006 511.4 588.7 -77.3 2007 594.0 669.9 -75.9 2008 789.5 871.3 -81.8 -9.4% 2009 770.3 776.0 -5.7 -0.7% 2010 832.4 858.8 -26.4 -3.1% 2011 946.7 . . . Cumulative 5899.5 5528.6 . . Average 550.3 614.3 -64.0 -12%
-9.9% -16.0% -21.5% -18.9% -13.1% -11.3%
22. The most notable changes between the 2012 IFF Update and the current one are differences in individual country figures. Correcting for the problem of re-exports from Hong Kong significantly dampened Chinas dominance of IFFs in the developing world, causing Chinas share of the total IFFs to decrease from 47 percent as presented in the 2012 IFF Update to only 19 percent in this report. The drastic reduction in Chinas IFF number was almost entirely
offset by the increases in a number of other countrys GER figures as a result of the new GER methodology, which uses individual advanced economies as the trading partner (see Section II) instead of the world as a group. The most notable change occurred in our numbers for Russia, which moved from the fifth largest cumulative exporter of illicit capital to the second, even displacing China as having the largest IFF figure in 2011. 23. The new regional breakdowns, presented below in Section III.B, are more in line with each regions respective share of developing and emerging market GDP, suggesting that the new figures are more realistic than previous years. The reduction of Chinas outsized role in driving total IFFs highlights that illicit flows are a global problem rather than merely a problem affecting mostly Asia. 24. Controlled for inflation, illicit flows from developing countries increased by 10.2 percent per annum between 2002 and 2011. The volume of total outflows as a share of developing country GDP increased from 4.0 percent in 2002 to 4.6 percent in 2005. Since then, illicit outflows have generally been on a declining trend relative to GDP, and were 3.7 percent in 2011. 25. The global economic slowdown that started at the end of 2008 had a dampening impact on illicit outflows. In real terms, illicit outflows grew at a faster rate before the recession than after, most likely due to the sputtering global recovery. The decrease in growth rates that occurred between 2008 and 2011 reversed its path in 2011, however, marking the first year illicit outflows exhibited an increasing growth pattern since the recession began.
Chart 1. Non-Normalized vs. Normalized Illicit Financial Flows, 2002-2011 (in millions of constant US dollars, base year 2005)
800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
HMN+GER Non-Normalized, Real
HMN+GER Normalized, Real
26. Regression analysis using panel data on 55 developing countries also supports the finding that growth in the official economy drives more illicit outflows (see Section IV). However, econometric models used in case studies by GFI on India, Mexico, and Russia have found mixed empirical evidence linking real GDP growth and capital flight or illicit flows. 27. In the case of India, we found that while the link between growth and broad capital flightas measured by the WBR model adjusted for trade misinvoicingwas statistically insignificant for the period as a whole (1948-2008), there was strong evidence that the much faster rates of economic growth following Indias economic liberalization in 1991 stimulated more capital flight. In the case of Mexico, on the other hand, we found real economic growth to be negatively related to broad capital flight, as estimated by the WBR method adjusted for trade misinvoicing. This is the traditionally expected result, wherein economic growth builds more confidence among economic agents to invest domestically so that the licit component of capital flight abates. In the case of Russia, we studied illicit outflows estimated by the HMN+GER method rather than broad capital flight as in the cases of India and Mexico, and found that real GDP growth was positively and significantly related to illicit outflows. In this case, economic expansion provided more opportunities to generate and transmit more illicit capital given the lack of improvements in governance. 28. Hence, our case studies show that the empirical link between economic growth and capital flight or illicit flows is mixed, suggesting that the relationship between growth and capital flight is complex. An expanding economy can stimulate growth in the underground economy by offering more opportunities to make money (through, for example, a larger number of government contracts, which can be subject to bribes and kickbacks). Alternatively, faster economic growth can foster more investor confidence, leading to a reduction in capital flight.
Table 2. Non-Normalized Illicit Financial Flows by Region, 2002-2011 (in billions of constant US dollars, base year 2005, or percent)
Region/Year Africa Asia Developing Europe MENA Western Hemisphere All Developing Countries 2002 12.5 152.8 57.3 9.7 90.7 2003 12.7 77.0 8.2 88.4 2004 19.8 79.4 24.1 99.7 2005 36.4 86.0 63.8 117.2 2006 46.6 2007 59.9 2008 61.2 2009 68.1 2010 49.8 2011 52.0 Cumulative 419.1 2,144.8 1,163.2 606.4 1,059.9 5,413.4 Average 41.9 214.5 116.3 60.6 106.0 541.3 Trend Rate of Growth 20.2% 7.5% 13.6% 31.5% 3.1% Percent of Total 7.7% 39.6% 21.5% 11.2% 19.6%
156.1 187.3 193.2 198.6 213.5 216.2 235.5 307.0 284.8 93.4 121.5 137.8 163.9 147.2 199.8 53.7 37.7 115.6 129.9 76.1 87.4 92.1 105.6 121.0 102.1 126.9 116.2
325.0 344.4 412.4 498.5 486.5 540.2 653.8 701.4 709.0 742.1
10.2% 100.0%
29. Over the period studied, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region registered by far the fastest trend rate of growth in illicit outflows (31.5 percent per annum), followed by Africa (20.2 percent), developing Europe (13.6 percent), Asia (7.5 percent), and Latin America (3.1 percent). Normalized (conservative) estimates reflect the same basic pattern of illicit outflows. 30. The substantially faster rate of growth in illicit outflows from the MENA region is probably related to the rise in oil prices. We will test the link between oil prices and illicit flows from the oil-exporting countries in Section IV. 31. Asia accounts for 39.6 percent of total illicit outflows from developing countries over the period studied, compared to 61.2 percent of such outflows as reported in the 2012 IFF Update. Asias much larger share of total illicit outflows resulted from an overestimation of trade misinvoicing by China due to the Hong Kong effect. Adjustment for re-exports through Hong Kong as discussed in Section II significantly reduces illicit outflows from China, thus driving down Asias share. Nevertheless, Asia still retains the largest share of IFFs, as indicated in Chart 2, and six of the top 15 exporters of illicit capital are Asian countries (China, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines).
Chart 2. Cumulative Non-Normalized Illicit Financial Flows by Region (in percent)
7.7% 19.6% Africa Asia 11.2% 39.6% Developing Europe MENA Western Hemisphere
21.5%
32. Developing Europe (21.5 percent) and the Western Hemisphere (19.6 percent) contribute almost equally to total illicit outflows from the developing world. Europes second largest share in total outflows is almost entirely driven by Russia, while the Western Hemispheres share is driven by Mexico and Brazil. 33. Illicit outflows from the MENA region account for 11.2 percent of total outflows on average. MENAs share has increased significantly from just 3 percent of total outflows in 2002 but decreased from its peak of 18.5 percent in 2009. Similarly, Africas share of 7.7 percent has increased from just 3.8 percent in 2002, but has decreased from its peak of over 11 percent in 2007.
10 Global Financial Integrity
40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0%
20.0 10.0 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2.0% 1.0% 0.0%
Africa Asia 80.0
Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real
Illicit Financial Flows to GDP
Africa Asia80.0
70.0 350.0 60.0 300.0 50.0 250.0 40.0 200.0 30.0 20.0 150.0 10.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 1 1 2 2
Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 9.0% 8.0% 6.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 5.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0%
9.0% 8.0% 6.0% 7.0% 5.0% 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 10 10 1.0% 0.0% 0.0%
70.0 350.0 60.0 300.0 50.0 250.0 40.0 200.0 30.0 150.0 20.0 100.0 10.0 0.0 50.0 0.0
Chart 3. Illicit Financial Flows vs. Illicit Financial Flows to GDP by Region, 2002-2011 (billions of constant US dollars, base year 2005, or in percent)
1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 Non-normalized Illicit Flows, Real 6 3 4 Financial 5 Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real Illicit lows to GDP 7 Financial F 8 9 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 0.0
Africa
Africa
Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real 3 4 5 6 Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real
Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 7 8 9 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP
Asia
9.0% 8.0% 6.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 7.0% 5.0% 4.0% 6.0% 4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 5.0% 2.0% 4.0% 2.0% 1.0%
Asia
350.0 300.0 250.0 250.0 200.0 200.0 150.0 150.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 1 1 2 2
80.0 Asia 70.0 350.0 60.0 Developing Europe 300.0 50.0 250.0 250.0 40.0 200.0 200.0 30.0 20.0 150.0 150.0 10.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 1 1 2 2
Developing Europe
6.0% 5.0% 7.0% 4.0% 6.0% 5.0% 3.0% 4.0% 2.0% 3.0% 1.0% 2.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0%
10 10
3.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0%
10 10
Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 7 8 9 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 7 8 9
Asia
10
Developing Europe
6.0% 5.0% 7.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 3.0% 5.0% 7.0% 4.0% 2.0% 6.0% 3.0% 5.0% 1.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% 3.0% 1.0% 2.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0%
Developing Europe
250.0 MENA 250.0 200.0 140.0 150.0 120.0 150.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 80.0 0.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 1
Developing Europe 300.0
350.0
Illicit Financial Flows to GDP
MENA 250.0
MENA
140.0 200.0 120.0 150.0 100.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10
7.0% 6.0% 8.0% 5.0% 7.0% 4.0% 6.0% 5.0% 3.0% 4.0% 2.0% 3.0% 1.0% 2.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0%
10
Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real 1 2 2 3 4 5 6
Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 7 8 9 10 10
1 Developing Europe 250.0 MENA 200.0 140.0
MENA
140.0 Hemisphere Western 120.0 140.0 100.0 120.0 80.0 100.0 60.0 80.0 40.0 60.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 1 1 2 2
7.0% 6.0% 8.0% 5.0% 7.0% 5.0% 4.0% 6.0% 4.5% 3.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.5% 4.0% 2.0% 3.0% 3.0% 1.0% 2.5% 2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0%
8.0% 7.0% 5.0% 6.0% 4.5% 4.0% 5.0% 3.5% 4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0%
Western Hemisphere
120.0 150.0 140.0 100.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 100.0 60.0 50.0 80.0 40.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 20.0
Western Hemisphere
Non-Normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real Illicit Financial Flows to GDP

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 Non-normalized Illicit lows, Real 6 3 4 Financial F5 Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real Illicit 7 Financial Flows 8 to GDP 9 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP
1 1 1
2 2 2
10 10 10
Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real 3 4 5 6 Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real 3 4 5 6 Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real
Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 7 8 9 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 7 8 9 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP
MENA
0.0
Western Hemisphere
8.0% 7.0% 5.0% 6.0% 4.5% 5.0% 4.0% 3.5% 4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 9 10 0.0%
140.0 Western Hemisphere 120.0 140.0 100.0 120.0 80.0 100.0 60.0 80.0 40.0 60.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 0.0
34. There are various ways of assessing the adverse impact of illicit flows on an economy, but its ratio to GDP is a widely used indicator. The ranking of various regions based on IFFs to
1 2 Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real 3 4 5 6 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 7 8 9 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP 10 Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Illicit Financial Flows to GDP
Western Hemisphere
140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0
GDP looks quite different from the ranking based on the volume of outflows. For instance,
while illicit outflows from Africa comprised just 7.7 percent of developing country outflows
5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0%
in 2011, at an average of 5.7 percent of GDP over the period studied, the loss of capital has an outsized impact on the continent. The ratio peaked at 8.1 percent of GDP in 2009 and declined to 5.3 percent of GDP in 2011, as a result of a fall in trading volumes due to the global recession rather than GDP growth. Chart 4 presents a heat map of average illicit flows
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
to GDP for all developing countries that indicates how significantly the intensity with which
Non-normalized Illicit Financial Flows, Real Illicit Financial Flows to GDP
illicit flows impact African countries varies. Elsewhere, Russia is noticeably more impacted by illicit flows than China and India.
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35. Illicit outflows also significantly impact developing Europe, averaging 4.5 percent of regional GDP and having risen from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2002 to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2011. Outflows from Asia amount to an average of 4.1 percent of regional GDP, which reflects a similarly significant impact. Leakages of illicit capital from MENA and the Western Hemisphere average about 3.5 percent of regional GDP. In the case of MENA, outflows as a percentage of GDP increased significantly from 1 percent in 2002 to 6.8 percent in 2009, before declining to 3.9 percent in 2011. In contrast, outflows from the Western Hemisphere as a share of regional GDP declined from 4.1 percent in 2002 to 2.6 percent in 2011.
Table 3. Illicit Financial Flows to GDP, Non-Normalized 1/ (in percent)

Region/Year Africa Asia Developing Europe MENA Western Hemisphere All Developing Countries 2/ 2002 3.3% 4.7% 4.3% 1.0% 4.1% 4.0% 2003 2.7% 4.5% 5.0% 0.8% 4.1% 3.9% 2004 3.7% 4.9% 4.2% 2.0% 4.2% 4.2% 2005 5.9% 4.7% 4.0% 4.7% 4.4% 4.6% 2006 7.0% 4.3% 3.8% 3.5% 3.1% 4.0% 2007 7.8% 3.9% 4.0% 2.2% 3.1% 3.7% 2008 7.6% 3.5% 4.1% 6.0% 3.4% 4.1% 2009 8.1% 3.3% 5.6% 6.8% 2.8% 4.2% 2010 5.3% 3.8% 4.6% 3.7% 3.0% 3.8% 2011 5.3% 3.2% 5.8% 3.9% 2.6% 3.7% Average 5.7% 4.1% 4.5% 3.5% 3.5% 4.0%
1/ Calculated as total IFFs from regional group over total regional GDP 2/ Calculated as IFF world total over emerging and developing economy GDP
36. Table 15 of the 2012 IFF Update showed that the net errors and omissions as a percentage of the financial account balance for ten countries with large sovereign wealth fundsChina, the United Arab Emirates, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Kuwait, China (Hong Kong), Russia, Qatar, and the United Stateswere significant. We showed that the net errors were very large relative to the financial account balance for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, possibly as a result of incomplete or incorrect recording in the balance of payments of transactions related to their sovereign wealth funds. Including these countries along with other countries that do not have this issue may distort the ranking of exporters of illicit capital. We therefore exclude Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar from the top 15 countries with the largest illicit outflows presented in Table 4, but a full ranking can be found in the Appendix. Additionally, although Costa Rica is technically the 14th largest exporter of capital according to our data, we exclude it from the ranking because its IFF to GDP ratio of 28 percent is significantly higher than the other countries on the list and could be due to statistical discrepancies. A full ranking can be found in the Appendix. 37. Cumulative illicit outflows from the top fifteen exporters of illicit capital (excluding Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Costa Rica) amount to US$4.2 trillion over the decade ending 2011, which is slightly over 70 percent of total outflows from all developing countries (Table 4). China (US$1,076 billion), Russia (US$881 billion), and Mexico (US$462 billion) lead the group. In fact, six of the top 15 exporters of illicit capital are in Asia (China, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines) while two are in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa), four are in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Serbia), two are in the Western Hemisphere (Mexico and Brazil), and one is in the MENA region (Iraq).
12 Global Financial Integrity
Chart 4. Heat Map of Average Illicit Financial Flows to GDP Ratio for Developing Countries, 2002-2011 (in percent)
Chart design by E.J. Fagan.
38. Eight of the top ten exporters of illicit capital as identified in the 2012 IFF Update are also among the top ten countries by IFFs in this study. These are China, Russia, Mexico, Malaysia, India, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Nigeria. The two countries that are not among the top ten here, the Philippines and the United Arab Emirates, are ranked numbers 11 and 13
Table 4. Cumulative Illicit Financial Flows from the Top Fifteen Developing Economies, 2002-2011 (in millions of US dollars or percent)
Rank Country 2002 26,517 19,737 7,893 8,899 14,795 . 0 4,954 1,290 4,897 2,546 1,110 5,469 74% 2003 41,304 2004 87,757 47,136 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Cumulative 1,075,566 880,960 461,859 370,381 343,932 192,692 181,827 78,778 142,274 140,877 100,732 88,870 75,085 49,393 49,367 4,232,593 72% 5,899,548 589,955 Average 107,557 88,096 46,186 37,038 34,393 19,269 18,183 15,756 14,227 14,088 10,073 8,887 7,508 4,939 4,937 28,217 1 China, Mainland 2 Russian Federation 3 Mexico 4 Malaysia 5 India 6 Brazil 7 Indonesia 8 Iraq 9 Nigeria 10 Thailand 11 South Africa 12 Philippines 13 Belarus 14 Poland 15 Serbia, Republic of Total of top 10 as percent of total Developing World Total 67,498 69,284 90,315 94,555 112,056 102,972 133,921 165,860 151,348 57,502 66,825 47,746 47,749 82,069 103,972 129,459 135,033 191,145 58,592 36,809 33,108 17,364 18,432 3,660 19,321 10,427 18,730 10,063 9,080 3,302 4,070 74% 65,151 41,123 44,645 22,174 27,319 19,668 24,188 20,550 19,787 8,021 14,976 12,161 212 67% 38,128 34,507 28,615 22,399 20,556 18,139 26,377 14,769 17,515 5,636 9,207 10,045 5,603 67% 51,954 38,094 64,511 54,184 68,383 84,933 32,289 34,095 16,842 22,282 20,787 24,238 3,858 7,200 8,365 10,462 2,655 76% 19,604 15,029 12,889 29,114 23,732 12,192 14,088 9,144 2,462 73%
35,621 38,085 40,738 10,068 12,069 16,549 . 0 6,080 0 8,256 3,154 1,961 7,409 78%
20,763 26,733 35,294 36,720 18,697 20,021 27,569 15,897 18,436 . 1,681 7,246 2,542 9,215 3,917 421 9,776 75% 16,827 10,681 13,259 16,036 . 17,867 11,987 3,387 13,412 4,144 787 6,433 68% . 19,164 11,513 9,893 9,978 5,608 0 5,278 71%
201,226 234,981 290,190 338,981 361,568 437,083 526,919 514,875 634,717 692,053 270,252 301,512 384,528 498,921 511,355 594,036 789,530 770,298 832,438 946,677
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respectively, while the new entrants to the top ten, Brazil and Thailand, are ranked numbers 6 and 9 respectively. Hence, the methodological revisions implemented in this study do not appear to have substantially disturbed the rankings.
b. Share of HMN and GER in Totals IFFs

39. Both the HMN and GER components of illicit outflows include statistical errors in the former, such errors arise in the recording of balance of payments credit and debit transactions, while in the latter, errors arise in the recording of trade statistics by reporting countries and their advancedcountry trading partners. In fact, statistical errors are inherent in the compilation of almost all economic data. The question of errors is therefore a question of degree and not incidence. 40. While both HMN and GER include statistical errors, it is impossible to separate the statistical errors from the illicit outflows captured by these indicators. However, there are two reasons why one can presume that statistical errors inherent in HMN are greater than those in GER (errors in both are on a net basis, in that positive and negative errors offset one another). First, HMN-related errors cover current account, capital account, and financial account transactions, while GER-related errors only cover trade-related errors, a significantly narrower scope. Second, HMN-related errors arise out of the recording of both visible and invisible transactions whereas trade-related transactions involve only visible merchandise, most of which is subject to taxes (such as most imports and some exports), making it both easier and far more likely to be tracked and properly recorded. 41. The Balance of Payments Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM6) notes that while the IMF cannot issue guidelines to compilers on what would constitute an acceptable or reasonable size of net errors and omissions, they can assess it in relation to items such as GDP, positions data, and gross flows (paragraph 2.26, BPM6). Accordingly, Table 5 presents the variance, a statistical indicator of how much a variable fluctuates over time, in the HMN to GDP ratio and the average share of HMN in total IFFs for each region for the sample period (2002-2011). A highly variable HMN to GDP ratio could mean that more of a countrys HMN figure is due to statistical discrepancies than to capital flight. We find that the variance of the HMN to GDP ratio is highest for Africa, followed by the MENA region, Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and developing Europe.
Table 5. Variance in HMN to GDP Ratio (in percent)

Region Africa Asia Developing Europe MENA Western Hemisphere Total Average Variance in HMN to GDP Ratio 0.324 0.219 0.048 0.252 0.062 0.188 Average Percent of HMN in Total IFF 38.1% 13.1% 15.7% 73.0% 12.7% 22.1%
14
42. The result is consistent with what we would expect; it is well-known that balance of payments statistics are less reliable for African countries. Moreover, the MENA regions relatively high variance in the HMN to GDP ratio may be due to incomplete or incorrect recording of balance of payments transactions related to sovereign wealth funds. 43. At the same time, both MENA and Africas shares of HMN in total IFFs are much higher73 percent and 38.1 percent respectivelythan other regions, which are in the 12.7 to 15.7 percent range. This implies that illicit flows from MENA and Africa may be somewhat overstated to the extent that HMN is overstated due to statistical errors. 44. We now analyze the breakdown between balance of payments leakages (HMN) and trade misinvoicing (GER) in total illicit outflows from developing countries. On average, GER comprises nearly 80 percent of total outflows, with HMN amounting to just 20.3 percent of total outflows (Table 6). While the share of HMN fluctuates considerably, it has generally trended upwards from just 14.2 percent of total outflows in 2002 to 19.4 percent in 2011. There is little reason to believe that purely statistical errors in compiling balance of payments data have increased over time for developing countries as a whole. If anything, technical assistance by multilateral institutions and on a bilateral basis, together with better training of statisticians, should have reduced errors for the group. Hence, the upward trend in HMN for developing countries would indicate that leakages of illicit capital from the balance of payments are increasing over time.
Table 6. Share of Real HMN in Real HMN+GER Non-Normalized, 2002-2011 (in millions of constant US dollars, base year 2005, or in percent)
2002 HMN GER HMN+GER Share of HMN in total 46,110 2003 46,918 2004 2005 2006 92,532 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Cumulative 1,175,130 4,241,649 5,416,779 Average 117,513 424,165 541,678 20.3% Trend Rate of Growth 20.2% 8.0% 10.2% 9.1%
36,248 125,355
92,078 170,591 214,823 207,024 143,451
278,316 296,670 376,421 373,566 396,010 449,461 484,881 486,386 502,246 597,693 324,426 343,587 412,669 498,921 488,542 541,539 655,472 701,209 709,270 741,144 14.2% 13.7% 8.8% 25.1% 18.9% 17.0% 26.0% 30.6% 29.2% 19.4%
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IV. Drivers of Illicit Financial Flows: Evidence from Pooled Data

A. General Considerations
45. One of the advantages of using panel data, which pools cross-sectional and time series data, is that we can effectively assess dynamics with a relatively short time series. Panel data also allow the researcher to control for variables that are impossible to observe or measure such as cultural factors or differences in business practices across countries. In our case, the dependent variables, import and export misinvoicing, are measured over a time series of only ten years (2002-2011). This allows us to analyze different variables that drive trade misinvoicing both between countries and over time. 46. We use trade misinvoicing rather than the broader measure of illicit flows (HMN+GER) because of the HMN components known issues with including errors in compiling balance of payments (see paragraph 8). While trade misinvoicing estimates are also subject to errors in compiling trade statistics, the extent of such errors is much smaller than in the HMN measure, suggesting that we can reasonably make assumptions from the regression analysis of trade misinvoicing using panel data. 47. Panel data can be modeled with what are known as fixed or random effects. Fixed-effects is used whenever the researcher is only interested in analyzing the impact of variables that vary over time, while random-effects is used when there is reason to believe that differences across entities have some influence on the dependent variable. Running the Hausman test on each regression found that random-effects was preferred over fixed-effects for the purpose of this study (regressions for export-misinvoicing failed the F-test using the random-effects model, so regression results are presented using regular OLS in Table 7). The regression results reported in Table 7 assess the drivers of trade misinvoicing over a short, ten-year period for a wide group of 44-55 developing countries. The developing countries included in each regression were chosen on the basis of data availability only.
B. Interpreting the Results

48. The panel data on export and import misinvoicing and potential drivers involve two groups of countries, which are listed in the Appendix. Data availability on exports and imports on a bilateral basis as well as data on the independent variables (the potential drivers) determined the coverage of countries. Panel regressions seeking to explain export misinvoicing are based on a group of 55 developing countries, while those testing the drivers of import misinvoicing cover 44 countries. Moreover, both export and import misinvoicing are estimated in two ways the extent of export and import misinvoicing as a share of exports and imports
17
(columns a and b) and the absolute value (i.e., without regard to sign) of export and import misinvoicing as a share of total exports and imports of a country. In the first method, export under-invoicing has a positive sign (representing a capital outflow) while export over-invoicing has a negative sign (representing a capital inflow). The signs are taken as they are in the panel regressions. The second method estimates the amount of export and import misinvoicing regardless of the direction of illicit flows they generate. Random effects panel regressions are carried out for import misinvoicing while regular ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions analysis is used to study the drivers of export misinvoicing. 49. Our analysis shows that a set of three common variables basically drove export misinvoicing in the 55 developing countries over the period 2002-2011 (see Table 7). Two are regulatory in natureexport proceeds surrender requirements (EPSR) and capital account openness and the third is the state of overall governance in the country. These drivers were found to be statistically significant in explaining the direction of export under- and over-invoicing. The variables, as they are listed in Table 7, are defined as follows: EPSR is the presence of export proceeds surrender requirements; Corruption is the percentile rank of the World Banks Control of Corruption index; KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito Capital Account Openness Index; Fiscaldef_gdp is the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio; ExtDebt is the percentage change in a countrys external debt position; FDI_gdp is the net foreign direct investment to GDP ratio; and Tariff is the average effective tariff rate.
Table 7: Results of Panel and OLS Regressions

Dependent Variables Independent Variables Constant EPSR Corruption KAOPEN Fiscaldef_gdp ExtDebt FDI_gdp Tariff Ygrow Rho 1/ R2 Number of Countries Number of Observations a 0.450*** 0.304** -0.008*** 0.312*** 0.002 -0.034 -0.766 0.002 0.112 55 545 b -0.088* 0.028 0.001* -0.005 0.001 -0.005 -0.198** -0.0003** -0.004*** 0.790 44 396 c 0.566*** 0.240* -0.008*** 0.263*** 0.001 -0.067 -0.900* 0.005 0.092 55 545 d 0.186*** -0.016 -0.003*** 0.010 -0.001 0.057* 0.145 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.620 44 396
a = export misinvoicing over total exports b = import misinvoicing over total imports c = absolute value of export misinvoicing over total exports d = absolute value of import misinvoicing over total imports 1/ Random-effects panel model conducted for b and d and regular OLS regression for a and b
50. The EPSR is a requirement levied on exporters in many developing countries that requires them to repatriate any foreign currency obtained through international trade in return for local currency, sometimes at a specified exchange rate (IMFs Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2006). This measure is typically implemented to
18
supply the government with a source of valuable foreign reserves that it can use to provide macroeconomic stability. EPSR leads to export under-invoicing when exporters see the repatriation requirement as a confiscatory measure. Since foreign currency, particularly US dollars or Euros, is often more stable than local currency, companies involved in exporting goods may resort to under-valuing their exports in order to avoid having to surrender their foreign currency. In the presence of a high inflation or volatile local exchange rates, as is often a problem in the developing world, companies that conduct international trade often rely on foreign reserves of capital in the same manner that governments do. Although this paper makes no recommendation as to whether EPSRs are good for developing countries or not, regression results suggest that their presence can influence exporters to under-value their exports in order to hold foreign exchange in offshore bank accounts instead of onshore in foreign currency accounts. 51. Data on the EPSR were obtained from the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange Controls and Exchange Regulations and are represented by a dummy variable (1 for countries with EPSR in force and 0 for those with no EPSR). There are some serious limitations of capturing the EPSR in this fashion. For instance, the dummy variable approach does not allow us to capture the extent of the controlsome countries may have a 50 percent surrender requirement, while others may have a 100 percent surrender requirement. The time period over which exporters may retain the foreign exchange proceeds can also vary and thus also cannot be captured by a simple dummy variable approach. Clearly, the complexities of capital account regulations and their impact on trade misinvoicing are a thorny problem for researchers, but the fact that panel regressions using even a simple indicator of the EPSR find it to be a significant driver of export misinvoicing is quite interesting. 52. We also find that de facto capital account openness (represented here by the Chinn-Ito Capital Account Openness Index). leads to greater export misinvoicing in both directions. This is possibly in contention with many studies on trade misinvoicing, however, and the results should be taken with caution. Bhagwatis seminal article on the determinants of capital flight from developing countries in 1974 suggests that the high level of de facto capital controls present in developing countries incentivizes traders to circumvent these restrictions through trade misinvoicing. Using this logic, the easing of de facto restrictions on capital movements should result in less trade misinvoicing over time since legal channels are now available for shifting capital abroad. The surprising fact, however, is that much of the developing world has gone through substantial capital account liberalization since the 1970s and the problem of trade misinvoicing has only worsened. One explanation for this may be that openness and liberalization alone cannot curtail misinvoicing if such liberalization is not accompanied by greater regulatory oversight. Rather, openness in the presence of weak governance can be a prescription for more illicit flows.
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53. The World Bank Governance Indicators capture the extent of corruption in specific countries by measuring the world percentile rank of the countrys corruption indicator an increase in the percentile rank denotes a reduction in corruption, as there are relatively fewer countries with less corruption, while a decline in the percentile rank reflects more corruption relative to other countries in the world. The panel data regressions find that if there is a decline in the percentile rank (i.e., corruption increases), export misinvoicing increases so that the coefficient is negative. 54. Regarding import misinvoicing, the most interesting finding is that the average effective tariff rate on imports (obtained from the World Trade Organization) is significantly related to import misinvoicing an increase in rates will increase import under-invoicing. At the same time, we found that higher tariff rates leads to a reduction in import over-invoicing by raising the cost of moving capital out of the country. But the relationship is complex. If importers are able to offset the higher cost through reductions in taxable profits or gains in black markets (for example by selling the imports at a higher cost without declaring the profits), then they will still over-invoice even at the higher tariff rate. 55. The EPSR, as expected, is not statistically relevant in explaining import misinvoicing. Once again, the percentile rank of the country in controlling corruption is negatively related to import misinvoicing. The statistical significance of this relationship is stronger when we measure import misinvoicing without regard to direction (99 percent confidence interval) than taking account of the direction of flows. We did not find capital account openness to be significant in explaining import misinvoicing 56. By and large, we do not find any macroeconomic factorssuch as the fiscal deficit, change in external debt, net FDI flows, etc.to be consistently significant in explaining export or import misinvoicing across all four regressions. However, we find that real GDP growth is positively and significantly related to import misinvoicing, in that growth by itself will drive rather than curtail misinvoicing if overall governance does not improve. We found a similar result in our case study on India.
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V. Conclusion
57. Illicit financial flows involve capital that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized and are unrecorded, unlike broad capital flight which consists of a mix of licit and illicit capital. Our estimates show that the developing world lost US$946.7 billion due to illicit financial flows, up 13.7 percent from US$832.4 billion in 2010. 58. We present a revised methodology for estimating trade misinvoicing given Chinas use of Hong Kong as a trade entrept. While there are other trade entrepts like Singapore and Dubai, Hong Kong is by far the largest such entrept in the world. Estimates of illicit outflows in the 2012 IFF Update are on average about 12 percent higher than those shown in this study, due mainly to the overestimation of trade misinvoicing arising from the Hong Kong effect. 59. Illicit flows from developing countries increased at a trend rate of 10.2 percent per annum in real terms over the period 2002 and 2011, with faster growth rates before the global economic slowdown than after. The volume of total illicit flows averaged approximately 4.0 percent of GDP over the period studied. 60. The study also highlights the pattern of illicit outflows from developing countries on a regional basis. We find that: The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region registered the fastest trend rate of growth in illicit outflows (31.5 percent per annum) followed by Africa (19.8 percent), developing Europe (13.6 percent), Asia (7.5 percent), and the Western Hemisphere (3.1 percent); Asia accounts for 39.6 percent of total illicit outflows from developing countries, driven by outflows from China, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, which rank among the top fifteen exporters of illicit capital from the developing world; Developing Europe (21.5 percent) and the Western Hemisphere (19.6 percent) contribute almost equally to total illicit outflows from the developing world, while outflows from the MENA region account for 11.2 percent of total outflows. Developing Europes secondlargest share of total outflows is almost entirely driven by Russia, while the Western Hemispheres share is driven by Mexico and Brazil. Oil-exporting countries dominate illicit outflows from the MENA region; and Africa leads other regions in terms of the illicit outflows to GDP measure. Analyzing illicit flows as a share of GDP allows for a better measure of the impact such outflows can have on a country. For instance, while illicit outflows from Africa comprise just 7.7 percent of developing country outflows, this loss at an average of 5.7 percent of GDP per annum has an outsized impact on the continent.
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61. Cumulative outflows from the top fifteen exporters of illicit capital (excluding Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Costa Rica) amount to US$4.2 trillion over the decade ending 2011, slightly over 70 percent of total outflows from developing countries (Table 4). China (US$1,076 billion), Russia (US$881.0 billion), and Mexico (US$461.9 billion) lead the top 15 group. Six of the top 15 exporters of illicit capital are in Asia (China, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines), two are in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa), four are in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Serbia), two are in the Western Hemisphere (Mexico and Brazil), and one is in the MENA region (Iraq). 62. We find no evidence that various macroeconomic drivers significantly impact trade misinvoicing. Regression results suggest that export misinvoicing is driven by capital account restrictionsnamely export proceeds surrender requirement (EPSR) and capital account opennessand by corruption, as measured by the World Banks Control of Corruption index. Import misinvoicing is shown to be driven by growth in real income, the corruption, and the average effective tariff rate on imports.
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Appendix 1. Tables
Table 1. Geographical Regions
Africa (48) Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Cote d'Ivoire* Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia, The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo* Uganda Zambia* Zimbabwe Asia (27) Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Brunei Darussalam Cambodia China, Mainland* Fiji India* Indonesia* Kiribati Lao PDR Malaysia* Maldives Mongolia Myanmar Nepal Pakistan Papua New Guinea Philippines* Samoa Solomon Islands Sri Lanka Thailand* Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of Tonga Vanuatu Vietnam Developing Europe (26) Albania Armenia, Republic of* Azerbaijan, Republic of Belarus* Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria* Croatia Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan Kosovo, Republic of Kyrgyz Republic Latvia* Lithuania* Macedonia, FYR Moldova Montenegro Poland Romania Russian Federation* Serbia, Republic of Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan MENA (17) Algeria Bahrain, Kingdom of Egypt Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab Republic Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen, Republic of Western Hemisphere (33) Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Aruba Bahamas, The Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil* Chile* Colombia Costa Rica Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay* Peru St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela, Rep. Bolivariana de Advanced Economies (36) Australia Austria Belgium Canada Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hong Kong Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Malta Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Taiwan, Province of China United Kingdom United States
* denotes developing countries who report bilaterally to all advanced economies Note: Advanced economies only used for conducting trade misinvoicing estimates Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
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Table 2. Country Rankings by Largest Average Non-Normalized IFF Estimates, 2002-2011 (in millions of US dollars)
Average IFF (where data is available) 107,557 88,096 46,186 37,038 34,393 26,643 19,269 18,183 15,756 14,227 14,088 11,464 10,073 8,887 8,065 7,508 6,282 4,939 4,937 4,520 4,012 3,897 3,837 3,809 3,728 3,588 3,155 2,646 2,640 2,610 2,590 2,559 2,512 2,405 2,327 2,317 2,314 Rank 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 Vietnam Ethiopia Dominican Republic Zambia Togo Guatemala Azerbaijan, Republic of Hungary Lithuania Bangladesh Croatia Bahamas, The Algeria Argentina Congo, Republic of Nicaragua Equatorial Guinea Colombia Morocco Ecuador Romania Liberia Bahrain, Kingdom of Peru El Salvador Chad Botswana Uruguay Nepal Oman Uganda Myanmar Cameroon Armenia, Republic of Ukraine Angola Country Average IFF (where data is available) 2,216 2,024 1,937 1,934 1,847 1,754 1,706 1,690 1,664 1,608 1,574 1,563 1,522 1,491 1,468 1,324 1,280 1,202 1,192 1,151 1,123 1,026 983 909 897 895 845 816 805 776 739 684 661 623 622 605
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
Country China, Mainland Russian Federation Mexico Malaysia India Saudi Arabia Brazil Indonesia Iraq Nigeria Thailand United Arab Emirates South Africa Philippines Costa Rica Belarus Qatar Poland Serbia, Republic of Chile Paraguay Venezuela, Rep. Bolivariana de Brunei Darussalam Panama Turkey Egypt Honduras Trinidad and Tobago Kazakhstan Sudan Aruba Bulgaria Kuwait Syrian Arab Republic Lebanon Latvia Cote d'Ivoire
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Rank 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 Libya Malawi Namibia Georgia Tanzania Turkmenistan Montenegro Madagascar Lao PDR
Country Macedonia, FYR
Average IFF (where data is available) 559 544 532 504 453 453 430 430 419 414 402 401 376 375 350 335 331 319 316 313 296 275 275 268 247 239 233 232 223 221 211 196 192 182 135 133
Rank 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 Mongolia Niger Belize Mauritius
Country
Average IFF (where data is available) 129 113 109 107 106 106 103 102 87 86 83 81 74 72 71 68 68 59 56 54 49 47 47 41 39 31 27 26 25 20 15 14 12 11 1
Solomon Islands Suriname Albania Pakistan Mozambique Kenya Kyrgyz Republic Dominica Burundi Maldives Sierra Leone Jordan Haiti Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Seychelles Grenada St. Lucia St. Kitts and Nevis Benin Cape Verde Tunisia Comoros Tonga Bhutan Central African Republic Sao Tome and Principe Bosnia and Herzegovina Antigua and Barbuda Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of Senegal
Congo, Democratic Republic of Jamaica Afghanistan Mali Bolivia Zimbabwe Swaziland Djibouti Ghana Guinea Burkina Faso Fiji Tajikistan Gabon Moldova Yemen, Republic of Lesotho Papua New Guinea Sri Lanka Guyana Rwanda Barbados St. Vincent and the Grenadines Vanuatu Samoa Cambodia
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Table 3. Illicit Financial Flows (HMN+GER Normalized) (in millions of US dollars)

Country Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia, Republic of Aruba Azerbaijan, Republic of Bahamas, The Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China, Mainland Colombia Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador 2002 1,512 0 0 68 40 1,890 86 805 87 772 651 349 301 2,546 73 0 . 854 0 0 8,899 2,766 1,828 128 6 280 177 19 67 1,076 2,846 67,498 0 9 576 220 2,358 1,251 638 164 13 635 317 2003 892 0 0 822 5 1,428 217 1,226 112 1,001 700 830 329 3,154 119 61 . 174 0 161 12,069 2,471 2,591 107 14 366 264 33 13 399 724 69,284 0 6 412 1,039 3,440 3,032 1,355 206 18 1,887 0 2004 668 0 0 0 19 0 219 2,189 50 1,062 1,509 840 574 3,917 90 117 . 625 0 293 15,897 1,592 2,306 287 19 448 861 5 0 499 270 87,757 1,750 15 597 3,054 4,653 2,587 1,305 229 26 981 861 2005 527 86 189 574 11 0 352 3,537 126 1,842 2,249 644 534 4,144 99 0 . 374 0 0 16,827 4,653 3,019 194 112 12 465 8 0 429 1,329 90,315 0 16 924 665 5,291 3,819 1,288 277 41 456 1,318 2006 161 107 1,962 0 11 0 386 3,708 2,462 1,330 2,304 2,648 69 5,608 84 0 0 105 0 0 0 5,786 986 198 131 72 941 27 0 734 1,526 0 0 24 567 2,151 5,377 2,645 1,722 356 46 889 0 2007 0 270 500 1,641 8 0 806 3,935 8,539 1,622 1,694 2,583 54 9,080 173 0 137 112 68 0 3,152 6,864 3,052 328 63 45 1,261 11 0 988 450 0 0 20 170 1,722 5,536 3,309 1,659 278 76 347 0 2008 0 161 3,358 1,236 4 0 1,124 4,919 845 2,086 30 179 7 14,976 152 0 0 0 74 0 22,174 8,440 4,229 396 26 45 1,540 123 0 874 8,046 0 123 21 0 2,630 6,815 2,423 2,266 399 150 1,093 4,805 2009 0 0 2,673 0 7 0 832 1,842 3,854 1,670 66 1,034 0 9,207 104 6 0 454 0 1,801 22,399 5,796 0 409 154 8 0 40 35 1,161 0 41,383 0 28 0 616 8,727 1,215 1,680 298 128 4,040 131 2010 0 0 1,265 0 0 606 1,045 125 990 2,219 0 2,191 65 8,365 72 195 0 802 0 352 32,289 0 0 381 51 29 0 89 33 1,188 498 52,936 0 27 0 1,758 17,340 1,809 921 478 124 5,201 0 2011 0 277 2,184 17 11 3,603 1,163 3,611 0 2,030 0 1,168 0 14,088 120 0 11 0 0 0 34,095 0 0 535 161 26 483 30 30 1,598 352 13,766 0 106 0 0 21,111 0 1,532 501 182 3,842 0 Cumulative 3,760 901 12,131 4,358 116 7,527 6,229 25,897 17,063 15,634 9,202 12,465 1,934 75,085 1,086 379 148 3,500 142 2,607 167,800 38,369 18,011 2,963 737 1,332 5,992 387 179 8,946 16,040 422,938 1,873 272 3,246 13,855 80,648 22,090 14,366 3,186 806 19,370 7,433 Average 376 90 1,213 436 12 753 623 2,590 1,706 1,563 920 1,246 193 7,508 109 38 25 350 14 261 16,780 3,837 1,801 296 74 133 599 39 18 895 1,604 42,294 187 27 325 1,386 8,065 2,209 1,437 319 81 1,937 743
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Country Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Fiji Gabon Gambia, The Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Kosovo, Republic of Kuwait Kyrgyz Republic Lao PDR Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Lithuania Macedonia, FYR Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives
2002 1,507 1,085 0 . 1,231 199 503 18 243 0 33 1,433 116 44 60 0 2,679 0 7,893 14,795 0 . 360 130 0 0 . . 1,869 22 130 1,061 528 309 886 0 1,309 177 122 112 19,737 156
2003 1,248 642 0 . 495 254 260 10 382 0 42 1,385 316 0 80 0 2,722 0 10,068 16,549 0 . 430 0 932 277 . . 574 0 82 1,210 0 71 814 0 1,851 281 0 212 20,763 111
2004 3,156 657 0 . 354 239 357 30 444 0 24 1,400 421 37 127 40 2,920 2,100 18,697 18,436 0 . 435 0 1,016 67 . . 0 19 0 1,943 734 128 898 0 1,101 381 756 160 26,733 68
2005 5,098 1,070 0 . 785 159 415 54 403 0 51 1,562 292 23 209 0 3,175 2,580 20,021 13,259 0 . 686 0 1,800 245 . 0 0 0 0 2,263 1,678 0 981 1,497 1,458 494 412 494 35,294 35
2006 4,483 932 0 . 1,152 408 0 30 706 0 44 920 290 13 143 87 3,355 2,744 27,569 16,036 0 . 322 206 3,128 0 . 0 0 0 516 2,474 3,191 206 1,576 0 289 305 1,596 458 36,720 72
2007 4,730 1,027 0 . 1,510 240 0 72 427 37 58 1,019 633 193 291 95 3,388 349 33,108 18,432 0 3,660 0 0 2,966 258 . 0 4,732 356 849 3,160 7,006 0 1,905 0 54 807 0 456 36,809 49
2008 6,070 882 1,970 . 1,865 391 0 64 884 374 58 969 251 5 298 120 3,294 3,373 44,645 27,319 0 19,668 894 0 5,746 0 . 0 10,049 0 588 3,286 3,049 217 648 1,753 0 1,074 636 1,010 41,123 56
2009 0 955 2,875 . 3,045 276 0 40 515 1,342 48 3,356 0 42 314 46 2,980 771 28,615 20,556 0 18,139 470 0 783 0 . 0 0 82 702 2,093 4,021 383 1,328 0 0 564 165 752 34,507 39
2010 2,145 928 2,906 . 5,643 252 0 134 312 721 60 2,402 373 74 388 61 3,479 2,194 68,383 3,501 0 22,282 162 0 0 0 . 0 0 46 402 1,614 529 0 807 2,137 0 573 108 687 64,511 62
2011 6,414 793 3,223 . 4,107 330 0 135 219 691 69 3,095 436 119 298 64 3,560 2,789 84,933 3,395 0 15,029 222 0 5,619 0 . 0 1,698 304 793 4,063 2,038 0 414 0 4,267 934 265 977 54,184 70
Cumulative 34,851 8,971 10,974 . 20,185 2,747 1,535 587 4,534 3,164 485 17,542 3,128 549 2,206 513 31,552 16,901 343,932 152,278 0 78,778 3,981 336 21,990 847 . 0 18,922 830 4,062 23,167 22,774 1,314 10,256 5,387 10,329 5,590 4,059 5,319 370,381 717
Average 3,485 897 1,097 . 2,019 275 153 59 453 316 49 1,754 313 55 221 51 3,155 1,690 34,393 15,228 0 15,756 398 34 2,199 85 . 0 1,892 83 406 2,317 2,277 131 1,026 539 1,033 559 406 532 37,038 72
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Table 3. Illicit Financial Flows (HMN+GER Normalized) (cont) (in millions of US dollars)
Country Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia, Republic of Seychelles Sierra Leone 2002 6 . 0 35,621 132 . 0 182 266 19 0 540 770 9 0 842 0 2,235 0 1,072 0 4,897 981 1,031 856 26,517 40 59 4 0 0 5,469 222 69 2003 275 . 0 38,085 228 6 0 297 0 78 89 364 625 15 0 565 44 2,414 0 1,830 0 8,256 1,961 1,260 289 41,304 29 84 5 0 0 7,409 154 95 2004 128 . 0 40,738 343 0 980 282 0 633 0 414 1,055 86 0 396 0 2,709 0 2,183 0 9,215 0 0 0 47,136 217 82 4 0 0 9,776 82 94 2005 173 . 0 47,746 244 75 925 3,487 0 604 0 503 1,019 123 17,344 851 200 3,929 0 2,756 0 13,412 787 5,568 0 57,502 73 331 11 34,459 3 6,433 75 90 2006 224 . 0 47,749 188 14 436 521 365 626 0 678 1,511 0 17,151 2,397 0 4,632 15 3,268 407 9,978 0 4,703 0 66,825 130 116 6 20,560 0 5,278 0 28 2007 184 . 0 58,592 440 212 743 0 0 336 0 574 1,222 100 14,399 0 0 5,566 0 3,851 138 10,063 3,302 0 1,320 159 144 13 15,629 0 4,070 0 63 2008 966 . 0 65,151 493 775 456 412 0 1,362 0 884 1,594 57 20,783 0 51 5,800 73 5,461 123 8,021 12,161 2,310 2,065 112 176 38 30,026 0 212 0 32 2009 323 . 306 38,128 226 0 278 2,232 0 1,010 0 1,552 1,241 0 26,377 1,031 0 5,189 479 4,769 596 5,636 10,045 21,173 1,729 383 103 15 60,754 0 5,603 0 7 2010 899 . 443 51,954 0 0 259 160 0 2,132 317 1,885 1,889 534 16,500 0 729 5,191 91 6,941 0 7,200 10,462 11,384 145 447 115 17 34,380 0 2,655 0 4 2011 530 . 0 10,732 0 76 222 243 0 0 0 651 2,315 166 7,150 1,006 0 430 896 7,993 1,020 12,192 9,144 3,738 0 191,145 518 142 32 48,178 0 2,462 0 213 Cumulative 3,709 . 749 434,497 2,294 1,158 4,299 7,816 631 6,800 406 8,045 13,242 1,090 119,704 7,089 1,024 38,095 1,554 40,125 2,284 88,870 48,843 51,167 6,404 880,960 2,106 1,352 146 243,986 3 49,367 533 695 Average 371 . 75 43,450 229 129 430 782 63 680 41 805 1,324 109 11,970 709 102 3,809 155 4,012 228 8,887 4,884 5,117 640 88,096 211 135 15 24,399 0 4,937 53 70
82,069 103,972 129,459 135,033
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Country Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa Sri Lanka St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Sudan Suriname Swaziland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela, Rep. Bolivariana de Vietnam Yemen, Republic of Zambia Zimbabwe All Developing Countries
2002 22 . 485 0 48 21 170 288 105 688 160 225 551 0 . 228 15 1,422 34 759 688 124 889 0 2,669 0 56 2,781 1,038 0 520 662
2003 34 . 0 114 15 57 153 14 75 694 0 148 340 0 . 214 27 1,576 47 0 602 324 834 800 351 0 66 795 0 0 1,005 0
2004 75 . 0 189 34 60 298 0 121 0 13,337 187 96 710 . 251 51 2,117 128 0 . 525 0 1,000 347 0 178 2,503 915 0 1,837 306
2005 88 . 0 73 41 91 374 0 117 41 137 76 704 11,987 . 952 21 2,215 28 0 . 823 0 5,500 173 0 168 13,588 397 0 2,074 357
2006 93 . 9,893 106 39 193 195 1,833 0 238 1,488 265 0 0 3 1,692 25 344 37 228 . 484 0 11,800 152 0 170 2,211 0 0 2,474 1,790
2007 135 . 18,730 165 54 28 140 4,005 0 701 746 337 0 0 9 2,884 49 2,447 37 0 . 726 458 0 790 0 286 809 578 0 3,110 0
2008 171 . 19,787 0 30 10 232 2,724 285 0 1,226 18 390 20,550 7 4,471 30 0 0 0 . 1,182 0 51,700 0 0 442 932 1,045 1,900 2,535 0
2009 90 . 17,515 0 65 5 184 4,701 19 55 747 1,439 248 0 0 4,250 33 2,923 0 0 . 1,599 0 23,500 0 0 131 3,223 9,022 0 1,875 0
2010 170 . 0 881 95 0 117 4,421 168 0 0 0 1,296 24,238 5 2,385 5 4,263 0 0 . 1,280 0 7,600 1,677 0 161 2,955 3,690 0 2,611 0
2011 186 . 23,732 707 45 0 52 6,826 77 0 5,660 0 817 29,114 42 1,140 3 7,643 0 0 0 307 0 11,700 302 0 157 3,644 5,477 0 1,302 0
Cumulative 1,063 . 90,141 2,234 466 463 1,915 24,812 966 2,417 23,501 2,695 4,441 86,599 67 18,467 259 24,951 312 987 1,290 7,373 2,182 113,600 6,461 0 1,816 33,442 22,161 1,900 19,344 3,115 4,865,157
Average 106 . 9,014 223 47 46 192 2,481 97 242 2,350 269 444 8,660 11 1,847 26 2,495 31 99 430 737 218 11,360 646 0 182 3,344 2,216 190 1,934 312 486,516
257,037 287,065 363,867 481,988 378,652 429,640 651,629 631,869 671,099 712,310
29
Table 4. Illicit Financial Flows (HMN+GER Non-Normalized) (in millions of US dollars)

Country Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia, Republic of Aruba Azerbaijan, Republic of Bahamas, The Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China, Mainland Colombia Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador 2002 1,512 1 482 68 40 2,472 86 805 87 772 651 636 301 2,546 73 0 . 854 0 66 8,899 2,766 1,828 128 6 280 276 19 67 1,076 2,846 67,498 1,016 9 576 220 2,358 1,251 995 164 13 635 618 2003 892 16 490 822 5 1,428 217 1,226 112 1,001 1,326 830 329 3,154 119 61 . 174 0 161 12,069 2,471 2,591 107 16 366 264 33 13 399 2,542 69,284 1,254 6 412 1,039 3,440 3,032 1,948 206 18 1,887 24 2004 668 13 751 0 19 954 219 2,189 50 1,062 1,509 840 574 3,917 90 117 . 625 0 465 15,897 1,592 2,306 287 19 448 861 5 6 499 2,821 87,757 1,750 15 597 3,054 4,653 2,587 1,608 229 26 981 861 2005 527 86 189 574 11 598 352 3,537 126 1,842 2,249 1,055 534 4,144 99 34 . 374 0 228 16,827 4,653 3,019 194 112 12 465 8 12 429 4,715 90,315 1,323 16 924 665 5,291 3,819 1,412 277 41 456 1,318 2006 161 107 2,259 0 11 0 386 3,708 2,462 1,330 2,304 2,648 69 5,608 84 0 0 105 0 553 10,681 5,786 2,441 198 131 72 941 27 0 734 5,046 533 24 567 2,151 5,377 2,645 1,722 356 46 889 648 2007 0 270 500 1,641 8 906 806 3,935 8,539 1,622 1,694 2,583 54 9,080 173 0 137 112 68 1,093 17,364 6,864 4,617 328 63 45 1,261 11 3 988 4,442 592 20 379 1,722 5,536 3,309 1,659 278 76 347 671 2008 0 161 3,358 1,236 4 4,345 1,124 4,919 845 2,086 30 1,086 7 14,976 152 0 0 0 74 1,079 22,174 8,440 5,367 396 26 45 1,540 123 0 874 8,046 2,727 21 0 2,630 6,815 2,423 2,266 399 150 1,093 4,805 2009 0 54 3,737 0 7 0 832 1,842 3,854 1,670 66 1,406 0 9,207 104 6 0 454 0 2,799 22,399 5,796 888 409 154 8 197 40 35 1,161 3,488 1,283 28 281 616 8,727 1,215 1,680 298 128 4,040 510 2010 0 42 1,265 1,692 0 606 1,045 125 990 2,219 0 2,191 90 8,365 72 195 0 802 0 579 32,289 0 731 381 51 29 321 89 33 1,188 5,599 0 27 285 1,758 17,340 1,809 921 478 124 5,201 703 2011 0 277 2,184 17 11 3,603 1,163 3,611 0 2,030 0 2,805 0 14,088 120 0 11 0 0 1,428 34,095 0 1,797 535 161 26 483 30 30 1,598 5,655 1,540 106 0 826 21,111 1,048 1,532 501 182 3,842 1,348 Cumulative 3,760 1,028 15,215 6,050 116 14,912 6,229 25,897 17,063 15,634 9,829 16,077 1,960 75,085 1,086 413 148 3,500 142 8,451 192,692 38,369 25,585 2,963 739 1,332 6,608 387 200 8,946 45,199 1,075,566 12,017 272 4,020 14,682 80,648 23,138 15,742 3,186 806 19,370 11,507 Average 376 103 1,522 605 12 1,491 623 2,590 1,706 1,563 983 1,608 196 7,508 109 41 25 350 14 845 19,269 3,837 2,559 296 74 133 661 39 20 895 4,520 107,557 1,202 27 402 1,468 8,065 2,314 1,574 319 81 1,937 1,151
94,555 112,056 102,972 133,921 165,860 151,348
30
2002 1,507 1,085 59 . 1,231 199 503 18 243 0 33 1,433 116 44 60 10 2,679 0 7,893 14,795 0 . 360 130 968 0 . . 2,245 22 130 1,061 528 195 886 58 1,309 177 122 112 19,737 156
2003 1,248 642 0 . 495 254 497 10 382 0 42 1,385 316 6 80 31 2,722 0 10,068 16,549 0 . 430 0 1,031 277 . . 574 0 82 1,210 0 71 814 0 1,851 281 59 212 20,763 111
2004 3,156 657 320 . 405 239 615 30 444 0 24 1,400 421 37 127 40 2,920 2,100 18,697 18,436 0 . 435 128 1,016 80 . . 65 19 6 1,943 952 55 898 0 1,101 381 756 160 26,733 68
2005 5,098 1,070 172 . 785 159 415 54 403 0 51 1,562 292 23 209 41 3,175 2,580 20,021 13,259 0 . 686 0 1,800 245 . 0 791 0 0 2,263 1,678 61 981 1,497 1,458 494 412 494 35,294 35
2006 4,483 932 355 . 1,152 408 0 30 706 0 44 920 290 13 143 87 3,355 2,744 27,569 16,036 0 . 322 206 3,128 0 . 0 960 0 516 2,474 3,191 159 1,576 0 1,142 305 1,596 458 36,720 72
2007 4,730 1,027 918 . 1,510 240 0 72 427 37 58 1,019 633 193 291 95 3,388 349 33,108 18,432 0 3,660 28 0 2,966 258 . 0 5,208 356 849 3,160 7,006 297 1,905 0 1,094 807 74 456 36,809 49
2008 6,070 882 1,970 . 1,865 391 0 64 884 374 58 969 251 7 298 120 3,294 3,373 44,645 27,319 0 19,668 894 94 5,746 0 . 0 10,049 0 588 3,286 3,049 434 648 1,753 1,935 1,074 636 1,010 41,123 56
2009 0 955 2,875 . 3,045 276 177 40 515 1,342 48 3,356 0 42 314 79 2,980 771 28,615 20,556 0 18,139 470 127 783 0 . 0 1,465 82 702 2,093 4,021 587 1,328 0 977 564 165 752 34,507 39
2010 3,173 928 2,906 . 5,643 252 327 134 312 721 60 2,402 373 74 388 61 3,479 2,194 68,383 16,842 0 22,282 162 0 747 0 . 0 0 46 478 1,614 529 66 807 2,137 1,503 573 108 687 64,511 62
2011 6,414 793 3,223 . 4,107 330 146 135 219 691 69 3,095 436 119 298 119 3,560 2,789 84,933 19,604 0 15,029 222 0 8,216 0 . 0 3,765 304 793 4,063 2,311 410 414 0 4,267 934 265 977 54,184 70
Cumulative 35,878 8,971 12,798 . 20,237 2,747 2,681 587 4,534 3,164 485 17,542 3,128 557 2,206 683 31,552 16,901 343,932 181,827 0 78,778 4,009 684 26,400 860 . 0 25,123 830 4,143 23,167 23,266 2,335 10,256 5,445 16,637 5,590 4,193 5,319 370,381 717
Average 3,588 897 1,280 . 2,024 275 268 59 453 316 49 1,754 313 56 221 68 3,155 1,690 34,393 18,183 0 15,756 401 68 2,640 86 . 0 2,512 83 414 2,317 2,327 233 1,026 544 1,664 559 419 532 37,038 72
31
Table 4. Illicit Financial Flows (HMN+GER Non-Normalized) (cont) (in millions of US dollars)
Country Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia, Republic of Seychelles Sierra Leone 2002 51 . 0 35,621 132 . 0 242 266 19 35 540 770 9 0 1,034 0 2,235 52 1,072 733 4,897 1,110 1,031 856 26,517 40 59 4 0 0 5,469 222 69 2003 275 . 107 38,085 228 6 0 554 83 114 89 364 625 15 0 929 44 2,414 119 1,830 750 8,256 1,961 1,260 289 41,304 29 84 5 0 0 7,409 154 95 2004 128 . 32 40,738 343 0 980 906 0 633 107 414 1,055 86 1,681 512 0 2,709 93 2,183 660 9,215 421 0 0 47,136 217 82 4 0 0 9,776 82 94 2005 173 . 0 47,746 244 75 925 3,487 0 604 138 503 1,019 123 17,867 851 200 3,929 0 2,756 930 13,412 787 5,568 0 57,502 73 331 11 36,393 11 6,433 75 90 2006 224 . 2 47,749 188 14 436 683 365 626 402 678 1,511 0 19,164 2,397 0 4,632 15 3,268 997 9,978 0 4,909 0 66,825 130 116 6 21,535 0 5,278 4 28 2007 184 . 0 58,592 440 212 743 600 127 336 762 574 1,222 100 19,321 0 0 5,566 33 3,851 585 10,063 3,302 261 4,173 159 144 13 16,863 0 4,070 0 63 2008 966 . 180 65,151 493 775 456 1,857 0 1,362 792 884 1,594 96 24,188 0 51 5,800 184 5,461 1,355 8,021 12,161 6,766 4,038 112 176 38 33,671 0 212 0 50 2009 323 . 306 38,128 226 0 278 2,232 0 1,010 1,018 1,552 1,241 0 26,377 1,031 0 5,189 479 4,769 2,064 5,636 10,045 21,173 1,729 383 103 15 65,419 0 5,603 0 7 2010 899 . 443 51,954 0 0 259 777 31 2,132 524 1,885 1,889 534 20,787 0 729 5,191 448 6,941 0 7,200 10,462 12,537 145 447 115 17 38,910 0 2,655 0 4 2011 530 . 0 38,094 172 76 222 577 0 0 1,169 651 2,315 166 12,889 1,006 0 430 896 7,993 1,020 12,192 9,144 9,315 0 191,145 518 142 32 53,638 0 2,462 0 213 Cumulative 3,754 . 1,070 461,859 2,466 1,158 4,299 11,916 873 6,836 5,037 8,045 13,242 1,129 142,274 7,761 1,024 38,095 2,319 40,125 9,095 88,870 49,393 62,819 11,230 880,960 2,106 1,352 146 266,429 11 49,367 537 714 Average 375 . 107 46,186 247 129 430 1,192 87 684 504 805 1,324 113 14,227 776 102 3,809 232 4,012 909 8,887 4,939 6,282 1,123 88,096 211 135 15 26,643 1 4,937 54 71
82,069 103,972 129,459 135,033
32
2002 22 . 1,290 0 48 21 170 288 105 27 160 225 551 4,954 . 228 15 1,422 34 2,507 688 143 889 0 2,669 0 56 3,336 1,038 0 520 662
2003 34 . 0 114 15 57 153 14 75 92 0 148 340 6,080 . 214 27 1,576 47 1,998 602 324 834 800 351 0 66 795 0 0 1,005 0
2004 75 . 2,542 189 34 60 298 0 121 99 13,337 187 96 7,246 . 251 51 2,117 128 0 . 525 0 1,000 347 0 178 4,518 915 0 1,837 306
2005 88 . 3,387 73 41 91 374 96 117 150 444 127 704 11,987 . 952 21 2,215 28 1,851 . 823 0 5,500 456 0 168 13,724 397 0 2,074 357
2006 93 . 9,893 106 39 193 195 1,889 33 510 1,488 265 0 11,513 3 1,692 25 966 37 1,586 . 484 0 11,800 284 0 170 2,211 0 0 2,474 1,790
2007 135 . 18,730 165 54 28 140 4,005 7 1,142 838 337 0 10,427 9 2,884 49 2,447 37 3,502 . 726 458 0 790 0 286 809 578 459 3,110 97
2008 171 . 19,787 0 30 10 232 3,127 285 366 1,226 18 390 20,550 7 4,471 30 889 0 3,343 . 1,182 137 51,700 171 0 442 932 1,045 1,900 2,535 4
2009 90 . 17,515 0 65 13 184 4,701 72 433 747 1,439 315 14,769 0 4,250 33 2,923 0 8,180 . 1,599 741 24,544 489 0 131 4,141 9,022 0 1,875 106
2010 170 . 3,858 881 95 0 117 5,154 168 71 154 0 1,313 24,238 5 2,385 5 4,263 0 4,108 . 1,280 1,008 7,600 1,677 0 161 4,000 3,690 0 2,611 25
2011 186 . 23,732 707 45 0 52 6,826 77 419 5,660 0 817 29,114 42 1,140 3 7,643 0 10,203 0 307 2,149 11,700 929 0 157 4,503 5,477 30 1,302 0
Cumulative 1,063 . 100,732 2,234 466 471 1,915 26,099 1,058 3,309 24,054 2,746 4,526 140,877 67 18,467 259 26,462 312 37,277 1,290 7,393 6,216 114,644 8,162 0 1,816 38,969 22,161 2,388 19,344 3,347 5,899,548
Average 106 . 10,073 223 47 47 192 2,610 106 331 2,405 275 453 14,088 11 1,847 26 2,646 31 3,728 430 739 622 11,464 816 0 182 3,897 2,216 239 1,934 335 589,955
270,252 301,512 384,528 498,921 511,355 594,036 789,530 770,298 832,438 946,677
33
Table 5. HMN (Balance of Payments) (in millions of US Dollars)

Country Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia, Republic of Aruba Azerbaijan, Republic of Bahamas, The Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China, Mainland Colombia Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador 2002 . 0 . 68 40 1,890 4 0 87 0 0 349 0 289 9 0 . 640 0 0 154 2,329 716 4 0 0 177 8 . . 952 0 0 . 236 220 51 26 638 0 0 139 317 2003 . 0 . 822 5 1,428 2 0 112 0 700 0 0 13 35 0 . 174 0 161 933 1,838 889 4 14 40 0 12 . . 724 0 0 . 0 116 0 888 1,355 0 0 1,568 0 2004 . 0 . 0 19 0 6 0 50 0 0 25 0 0 4 10 . 625 0 293 2,145 1,190 0 0 19 46 0 0 . . 270 0 0 . 0 93 0 0 1,305 16 0 981 0 2005 . 0 189 574 11 0 0 0 126 149 0 644 0 0 8 0 . 374 0 0 225 4,006 1,219 5 84 12 29 0 . . 1,329 0 0 . 0 0 0 57 1,288 45 0 456 0 2006 . 0 1,962 0 11 0 16 0 256 0 0 623 0 286 8 0 0 105 0 0 0 5,786 986 9 0 72 0 9 . . 1,526 0 0 . 17 0 0 38 1,722 54 0 164 0 2007 . 0 500 1,641 8 0 2 0 361 0 0 905 0 0 39 0 137 112 68 0 3,152 5,860 3,052 0 37 45 0 0 . . 450 0 0 . 170 199 0 0 1,659 0 0 0 0 2008 0 0 3,358 1,236 4 0 0 7 845 0 30 179 7 194 12 0 0 0 74 0 0 8,232 4,229 0 0 45 0 108 . . 0 0 123 . 0 . 48 44 2,266 55 0 32 1 2009 0 0 2,673 0 7 0 0 9 1,461 53 66 1,034 0 0 5 6 0 454 0 1,801 347 5,420 0 0 109 8 0 36 . . 0 41,383 0 . 0 . 0 37 1,680 0 0 216 131 2010 0 0 1,265 0 0 606 0 0 990 283 0 54 65 0 0 0 0 802 0 352 3,538 . 0 0 0 29 0 85 . . 498 52,936 0 . 0 . 144 25 921 117 6 1,140 0 2011 . 0 2,184 17 11 3,603 0 3 0 0 0 1,168 . 0 7 . 11 0 0 0 1,272 . 0 . 0 26 . 30 . . 352 13,766 0 . 0 . 221 . 1,532 63 14 0 0 Cumulative 0 0 12,131 4,358 116 7,527 29 20 4,287 485 796 4,981 71 783 126 16 148 3,286 142 2,607 11,765 34,661 11,091 23 264 324 207 289 0 0 6,100 108,085 123 0 423 627 464 1,115 14,366 350 20 4,697 449 Average 0 0 1,733 436 12 753 3 2 429 48 80 498 8 78 13 2 25 329 14 261 1,177 4,333 1,109 3 26 32 23 29 . . 610 10,808 12 . 42 105 46 124 1,437 35 2 470 45
34
2002 0 615 . . 915 135 125 . 0 0 . 65 0 3 1 0 0 0 190 1,763 . . 61 130 0 0 . . 1,869 22 130 71 0 179 . 0 0 10 0 0 391 0
2003 0 143 . . 390 47 260 0 6 0 . 61 157 0 20 0 0 0 0 3,510 . . 0 0 932 277 . . 574 0 82 13 0 71 . 0 0 33 0 27 4 0
2004 45 0 . . 354 0 357 3 0 0 . 0 0 4 43 0 0 2,100 0 3,094 . . 22 0 1,016 67 . 0 0 19 0 0 734 0 47 0 0 0 35 0 0 0
2005 2,427 449 . . 0 0 415 34 0 0 . 0 0 5 68 0 190 2,580 446 136 . 0 0 0 1,800 245 . 0 0 0 0 296 608 0 35 1,497 49 6 0 23 6,555 0
2006 0 485 . . 0 153 . 7 62 0 . 0 2 1 53 0 324 2,744 0 0 . 0 0 206 3,128 0 . 0 0 0 403 0 2,818 0 98 0 289 0 . 40 7,460 0
2007 0 0 . . 158 0 . 42 33 37 . 0 0 0 82 0 347 349 0 1,368 . 3,660 0 0 2,966 258 . 0 4,732 356 735 212 5,997 0 76 0 54 52 . 0 5,201 0
2008 2,896 0 . . 0 0 . 31 44 374 . 0 0 5 95 0 0 3,373 0 238 . 9,245 350 0 5,746 0 . 0 10,049 0 409 577 1,746 123 43 1,753 0 31 . 153 8,592 0
2009 0 0 . . 501 72 . 0 0 1,342 . 0 0 9 131 46 111 771 279 2,975 . 6,116 0 0 783 0 . 0 0 82 523 0 3,042 256 288 0 0 0 . 55 5,242 0
2010 2,145 0 . . 3,075 0 . 87 23 721 . 359 0 4 172 0 22 2,194 1,613 3,501 . 7,951 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 46 402 0 0 0 106 2,137 0 0 . 0 21,345 0
2011 2,857 238 . . 1,803 . . 98 0 691 . 225 28 . 36 64 0 2,789 1,712 3,395 . 3,269 0 0 5,619 0 . 0 1,698 304 322 103 2,038 0 27 0 0 6 . 71 9,965 0
Cumulative 10,370 1,930 0 0 7,197 407 1,157 302 169 3,164 0 709 187 31 702 110 994 16,901 4,241 19,980 0 30,240 433 336 21,990 847 0 0 18,922 830 3,005 1,271 16,982 630 720 5,387 392 137 35 369 64,754 0
Average 1,037 193 . . 720 45 289 34 17 316 . 71 19 3 70 11 99 1,690 424 1,998 . 4,320 43 34 2,199 85 . 0 1,892 83 301 127 1,698 63 90 539 39 14 9 37 6,475 0
35
Table 5. HMN (Balance of Payments) (cont) (in millions of US Dollars)

Country Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia, Republic of Seychelles Sierra Leone 2002 6 . 0 1,903 24 0 . 182 60 19 0 67 327 9 0 842 0 0 0 263 0 0 981 1,031 856 6,078 0 . 0 0 0 . 10 16 2003 0 . 0 4,411 0 6 . 297 0 78 89 0 100 15 0 565 44 0 0 41 0 898 1,961 1,260 289 9,179 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 50 2004 26 . 0 4,816 0 0 . 282 0 141 0 0 405 0 0 396 0 0 0 0 0 274 0 0 0 5,870 9 3 0 0 0 . 0 54 2005 29 . 0 4,077 0 75 . 407 0 604 0 0 63 0 17,344 851 200 358 0 211 0 1,798 787 5,568 0 7,895 0 7 0 34,459 3 . 1 58 2006 37 . 0 86 0 14 . 521 0 626 0 0 391 0 17,151 9 0 0 15 0 407 1,592 0 4,703 0 0 0 0 6 20,560 0 . 0 28 2007 0 . 0 0 0 212 231 0 0 336 0 0 50 18 14,399 0 0 474 0 505 138 2,082 3,302 0 1,320 9,732 1 2 10 15,629 0 0 0 15 2008 0 . 0 5,126 0 775 0 412 0 1,362 0 107 331 57 20,783 0 51 0 73 46 123 1,119 12,161 2,310 2,065 3,051 20 39 32 30,026 0 212 0 32 2009 74 . 0 4,395 0 0 0 521 0 1,010 0 0 44 0 26,377 1,031 0 0 0 0 596 0 10,045 2,206 1,729 6,394 0 0 6 60,754 0 76 0 7 2010 0 . 0 19,774 0 0 0 160 0 2,132 317 181 168 0 16,500 0 729 0 91 0 0 1,988 10,462 11,384 145 9,136 14 0 10 34,380 0 0 0 4 2011 . . 0 10,732 0 76 0 243 0 0 0 0 283 . 7,150 1,006 0 430 . 0 1,020 1,310 9,144 3,738 0 12,106 0 27 7 48,178 . 0 0 7 Cumulative 173 0 0 55,322 24 1,158 231 3,025 60 6,308 406 355 2,162 99 119,704 4,700 1,024 1,263 179 1,066 2,284 11,061 48,843 32,200 6,404 69,441 42 78 70 243,986 3 288 15 271 Average 19 . 0 5,532 2 116 46 302 6 631 41 36 216 11 11,970 470 102 126 20 107 228 1,106 4,884 3,220 640 6,944 4 10 7 24,399 0 58 2 27
36
2002 0 . 485 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 160 56 551 0 . 0 0 425 34 759 . 124 889 0 2,394 . 21 2,781 1,038 0 0 . 38,410
2003 0 . 0 114 0 0 0 14 0 92 0 30 340 0 . 10 14 0 47 0 . 164 834 800 0 . 22 795 0 0 169 . 41,172
2004 6 . 0 189 8 0 17 0 0 0 256 32 96 710 . 0 38 269 128 0 . 270 0 1,000 0 . 25 2,503 915 0 0 .
2005 0 . 0 73 0 15 23 0 0 41 137 76 704 0 . 0 11 553 28 0 . 450 0 5,500 173 . 17 13,588 397 0 75 .
2006 0 . 0 106 1 0 16 1,833 0 238 1,488 265 0 0 3 0 12 344 37 228 . 9 0 11,800 152 . 4 2,211 0 0 40 .
2007 0 . 0 165 10 1 0 2,851 0 701 746 337 0 0 9 0 39 345 37 0 . 7 458 0 279 . 5 809 578 0 58 .
2008 2 . 0 0 3 10 0 2,724 100 0 1,226 18 390 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 . 0 0 51,700 0 . 0 932 1,045 0 0 .
2009 0 . 804 0 19 5 0 3,077 19 55 747 0 248 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 . 273 0 23,500 0 . 37 3,223 9,022 0 108 .
2010 19 . 0 881 31 0 0 4,421 168 0 0 0 1,296 3,837 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 7,600 693 . 0 2,955 3,690 0 46 .
2011 35 . 0 707 0 0 0 2,768 77 . . 0 317 0 42 . . 1,069 0 0 . 0 0 11,700 302 . 0 3,644 5,477 0 0 .
Cumulative 62 0 1,289 2,234 72 33 56 17,688 364 1,127 4,761 814 3,942 4,547 67 10 151 3,005 312 987 0 1,297 2,182 113,600 3,994 0 130 33,442 22,161 0 496 0 1,304,248
Average 6 . 129 223 7 3 6 1,769 36 125 529 81 394 455 11 1 19 301 31 99 . 130 218 11,360 399 . 13 3,344 2,216 0 50 . 130,425
33,776 125,355
96,853 101,004 205,481 235,990 242,975 183,233
37
Table 6. GER Non-Normalized (in millions of US Dollars)

Country Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia, Republic of Aruba Azerbaijan, Republic of Bahamas, The Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China, Mainland Colombia Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador 2002 1,512 1 482 . . 582 81 805 . 772 651 286 301 2,258 64 0 . 214 0 66 8,745 437 1,112 124 6 280 98 12 67 1,076 1,894 67,498 1,016 9 340 0 2,307 1,224 356 164 13 496 300 2003 892 16 490 . . 0 216 1,226 . 1,001 627 830 329 3,141 84 61 . 0 0 0 11,136 633 1,702 103 2 326 264 21 13 399 1,818 69,284 1,254 6 412 923 3,440 2,144 592 206 18 318 24 2004 668 13 751 . . 954 214 2,189 . 1,062 1,509 815 574 3,917 87 107 . 0 0 172 13,752 402 2,306 287 0 403 861 5 6 499 2,550 87,757 1,750 15 597 2,962 4,653 2,587 303 213 26 0 861 2005 527 86 0 . . 598 352 3,537 . 1,693 2,249 411 534 4,144 91 34 . 0 0 228 16,602 647 1,800 189 28 0 436 8 12 429 3,386 90,315 1,323 16 924 665 5,291 3,761 124 232 41 0 1,318 2006 161 107 297 . . 0 370 3,708 2,206 1,330 2,304 2,024 69 5,321 76 0 . 0 0 553 10,681 0 1,455 189 131 0 941 18 0 734 3,520 533 24 549 2,151 5,377 2,607 0 302 46 725 648 2007 0 270 0 . . 906 805 3,935 8,178 1,622 1,694 1,678 54 9,080 134 0 . 0 0 1,093 14,212 1,004 1,565 328 25 0 1,261 11 3 988 3,992 592 20 209 1,523 5,536 3,309 0 278 76 347 671 2008 0 161 0 . . 4,345 1,124 4,911 0 2,086 0 907 0 14,782 140 0 . 0 0 1,079 22,174 208 1,139 396 26 0 1,540 15 0 874 8,046 2,603 21 0 2,630 6,768 2,379 0 344 150 1,060 4,804 2009 0 54 1,064 . . 0 832 1,832 2,392 1,618 0 372 0 9,207 99 0 . 0 0 998 22,052 376 888 409 46 0 197 4 35 1,161 3,488 92,538 1,283 28 281 616 8,727 1,178 0 298 128 3,824 380 2010 0 42 0 1,692 . 0 1,045 125 0 1,936 0 2,137 26 8,365 72 195 . 0 0 227 28,750 0 731 381 51 0 321 5 33 1,188 5,101 0 27 285 1,758 17,196 1,784 0 361 118 4,061 703 2011 0 277 0 0 0 0 1,163 3,607 0 2,030 0 1,637 0 14,088 113 0 . 0 0 1,428 32,824 0 1,797 535 161 0 483 0 30 1,598 5,304 1,540 106 0 826 20,890 1,048 0 438 169 3,842 1,348 Cumulative 3,760 1,028 3,084 1,692 0 7,385 6,200 25,876 12,776 15,150 9,033 11,095 1,888 74,302 960 397 . 214 0 5,844 180,927 3,707 14,494 2,940 475 1,008 6,402 99 200 8,946 39,099 967,481 11,894 272 3,598 14,054 80,184 22,023 1,376 2,836 786 14,673 11,058 Average 376 103 308 846 0 739 620 2,588 2,129 1,515 903 1,110 189 7,430 96 40 . 21 0 584 18,093 371 1,449 294 48 101 640 10 20 895 3,910 96,748 1,189 27 360 1,405 8,018 2,202 138 284 79 1,467 1,106
94,555 112,056 102,972
112,924 137,582
38
2002 1,507 470 59 . 316 64 377 18 243 0 33 1,368 116 41 59 10 2,679 0 7,703 13,033 0 . 299 0 968 0 . . 376 0 0 990 528 16 886 58 1,309 168 122 112 19,346 156
2003 1,248 499 0 . 104 207 238 10 376 0 42 1,325 159 6 60 31 2,722 0 10,068 13,039 0 . 430 0 99 0 . . 0 0 0 1,197 0 0 814 0 1,851 248 59 184 20,758 111
2004 3,110 657 320 . 51 239 258 27 444 0 24 1,400 421 33 84 40 2,920 0 18,697 15,342 0 . 413 128 0 13 . . 65 0 6 1,943 218 0 851 0 1,101 381 721 160 26,733 68
2005 2,671 621 172 . 785 159 0 20 403 0 51 1,562 292 18 140 41 2,984 0 19,575 13,123 0 . 686 0 0 0 . . 791 0 0 1,968 1,070 0 946 0 1,409 488 412 471 28,740 35
2006 4,483 448 355 . 1,152 255 0 23 644 0 44 920 289 12 90 87 3,031 0 27,569 16,036 0 . 322 0 0 0 . . 960 0 113 2,474 374 159 1,478 0 853 305 1,596 418 29,260 72
2007 4,730 1,027 918 . 1,352 240 0 30 394 0 58 1,019 633 193 209 95 3,041 0 33,108 17,063 0 . 28 0 0 0 . . 476 0 114 2,948 1,009 297 1,829 0 1,040 755 74 456 31,608 49
2008 3,174 882 1,970 . 1,865 391 0 33 839 0 58 969 251 2 202 120 3,294 0 44,645 27,080 0 10,423 544 94 0 0 . . 0 0 178 2,710 1,303 311 605 0 1,935 1,044 636 857 32,531 56
2009 0 955 2,875 . 2,544 204 177 40 515 0 48 3,356 0 32 183 33 2,869 0 28,336 17,581 0 12,023 470 127 0 0 . . 1,465 0 179 2,093 979 331 1,040 0 977 564 165 698 29,266 39
2010 1,028 928 2,906 . 2,568 252 327 47 288 0 60 2,043 373 69 216 61 3,457 0 66,770 13,341 0 14,331 162 0 747 0 . . 0 0 76 1,614 529 0 701 0 1,503 572 108 687 43,166 62
2011 3,558 555 3,223 . 2,303 330 146 36 219 0 69 2,870 408 119 262 55 3,560 0 83,221 16,208 0 11,760 222 0 2,597 0 . . 2,067 0 472 3,960 273 410 387 0 4,267 928 265 907 44,218 70
Cumulative 25,508 7,041 12,798 . 13,040 2,340 1,524 285 4,366 0 485 16,832 2,942 526 1,505 573 30,558 0 339,691 161,847 0 48,538 3,577 348 4,411 13 . . 6,200 0 1,138 21,896 6,284 1,523 9,536 58 16,245 5,452 4,158 4,950 305,626 717
Average 2,551 704 1,280 . 1,304 234 152 28 437 0 49 1,683 294 53 150 57 3,056 0 33,969 16,185 0 12,134 358 35 441 1 . . 620 0 114 2,190 628 152 954 6 1,624 545 416 495 30,563 72
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Table 6. GER Non-Normalized (cont) (in millions of US Dollars)

Country Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia, Republic of Seychelles Sierra Leone 2002 45 . 0 33,718 108 0 . 61 206 0 35 473 443 0 0 192 0 2,235 52 810 733 4,897 130 0 0 20,439 40 59 4 0 0 5,469 212 53 2003 275 . 107 33,674 228 0 . 256 83 36 0 364 525 0 0 364 0 2,414 119 1,789 750 7,358 0 0 0 32,125 29 84 5 0 0 7,409 149 45 2004 102 . 32 35,921 343 0 980 624 0 492 107 414 649 86 1,681 116 0 2,709 93 2,183 660 8,942 421 0 0 41,266 208 79 4 0 0 9,776 82 41 2005 144 . 0 43,669 244 0 925 3,080 0 0 138 503 957 123 522 0 0 3,571 0 2,545 930 11,614 0 0 0 49,606 73 324 11 1,935 8 6,433 75 32 2006 187 . 2 47,663 188 0 436 162 365 0 402 678 1,120 0 2,013 2,389 0 4,632 0 3,268 590 8,386 0 206 0 66,825 130 116 1 974 0 5,278 4 0 2007 184 . 0 58,592 440 0 512 600 127 0 762 574 1,172 82 4,922 0 0 5,092 33 3,346 447 7,981 0 261 2,853 158 142 2 1,234 0 4,070 0 48 2008 966 . 180 60,025 493 0 456 1,445 0 0 792 777 1,264 39 3,406 0 0 5,800 111 5,415 1,232 6,902 0 4,456 1,973 92 137 6 3,645 0 0 0 18 2009 249 . 306 33,733 226 0 278 1,711 0 0 1,018 1,552 1,197 0 0 0 0 5,189 479 4,769 1,467 5,636 0 18,967 0 383 103 9 4,664 0 5,527 0 0 2010 899 . 443 32,180 0 0 259 618 31 0 207 1,704 1,721 534 4,287 0 0 5,191 357 6,941 0 5,212 0 1,153 0 433 115 7 4,530 0 2,655 0 0 2011 530 . 0 27,362 172 0 222 334 0 0 1,169 651 2,032 166 5,739 0 0 0 896 7,993 0 10,882 0 5,577 0 518 116 25 5,460 0 2,462 0 206 Cumulative 3,581 . 1,070 406,537 2,442 0 4,068 8,891 813 529 4,630 7,690 11,080 1,031 22,570 3,061 0 36,832 2,141 39,059 6,810 77,809 551 30,620 4,826 811,519 2,063 1,275 75 22,443 8 49,079 521 443 Average 358 . 107 40,654 244 0 508 889 81 53 463 769 1,108 103 2,257 306 0 3,683 214 3,906 681 7,781 55 3,062 483 81,152 206 127 8 2,244 1 4,908 52 44
72,337 100,921 123,065 125,897 179,039
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2002 22 . 805 0 48 19 170 288 105 27 0 169 0 4,954 . 228 15 997 0 1,748 688 19 0 0 274 . 35 555 0 0 520 662
2003 34 . 0 0 15 57 153 0 75 92 0 118 0 6,080 . 204 13 1,576 0 1,998 602 160 0 0 351 . 45 0 0 0 835 0
2004 69 . 2,542 0 26 60 281 0 121 99 13,080 154 0 6,535 . 251 12 1,848 0 0 0 255 0 0 347 . 153 2,015 0 0 1,837 306
2005 88 . 3,387 0 41 75 351 96 117 150 307 51 0 11,987 . 952 9 1,662 0 1,851 0 374 0 0 282 . 152 135 0 0 1,999 357
2006 93 . 9,893 0 39 193 179 56 33 510 0 0 0 11,513 . 1,692 12 622 0 1,358 0 475 0 0 133 . 166 0 0 0 2,435 1,790
2007 135 . 18,730 0 43 26 139 1,154 7 1,142 92 0 0 10,427 . 2,884 9 2,102 0 3,502 0 719 0 0 511 . 281 0 0 459 3,052 97
2008 169 . 19,787 0 27 0 232 402 185 366 0 0 0 20,550 . 4,471 22 889 0 3,343 0 1,182 137 0 171 . 442 0 0 1,900 2,535 4
2009 90 . 16,710 0 46 8 184 1,624 53 433 0 1,439 67 14,769 . 4,250 6 2,923 0 8,180 0 1,325 741 1,044 489 . 93 918 0 0 1,767 106
2010 151 . 3,858 0 64 0 117 733 0 71 154 0 18 20,402 . 2,385 5 4,263 0 4,108 0 1,280 1,008 0 984 . 161 1,045 0 0 2,565 25
2011 151 . 23,732 0 45 0 52 4,058 0 419 5,660 0 500 29,114 . 1,140 3 6,574 0 10,203 0 307 2,149 0 626 . 157 859 0 30 1,302 0
Cumulative 1,001 . 99,443 0 393 438 1,859 8,411 694 3,309 19,294 1,931 584 136,330 . 18,457 107 23,457 0 36,290 1,290 6,096 4,034 1,044 4,167 . 1,686 5,527 0 2,388 18,847 3,347 4,596,244
Average 100 . 9,944 0 39 44 186 841 69 331 1,929 193 58 13,633 . 1,846 11 2,346 0 3,629 129 610 403 104 417 . 169 553 0 239 1,885 335 459,624
231,842 260,432 350,698 373,546
414,740 493,733 584,049 534,363 589,397 763,444
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Table 7. GER Normalized (in millions of US Dollars)

Country Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia, Republic of Aruba Azerbaijan, Republic of Bahamas, The Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China, Mainland Colombia Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador 2002 1,512 0 0 . . 0 81 805 . 772 651 0 301 2,258 64 0 . 214 0 0 8,745 437 1,112 124 6 280 0 12 67 1,076 1,894 67,498 0 9 340 0 2,307 1,224 0 164 13 496 0 2003 892 0 0 . . 0 216 1,226 . 1,001 0 830 329 3,141 84 61 . 0 0 0 11,136 633 1,702 103 0 326 264 21 13 399 0 69,284 0 6 412 923 3,440 2,144 0 206 18 318 0 2004 668 0 0 . . 0 214 2,189 . 1,062 1,509 815 574 3,917 87 107 . 0 0 0 13,752 402 2,306 287 0 403 861 5 0 499 0 87,757 1,750 15 597 2,962 4,653 2,587 0 213 26 0 861 2005 527 86 0 . . 0 352 3,537 . 1,693 2,249 0 534 4,144 91 0 . 0 0 0 16,602 647 1,800 189 28 0 436 8 0 429 0 90,315 0 16 924 665 5,291 3,761 0 232 41 0 1,318 2006 161 107 0 . . 0 370 3,708 2,206 1,330 2,304 2,024 69 5,321 76 0 . 0 0 553 0 0 0 189 131 0 941 18 0 734 0 0 0 24 549 2,151 5,377 2,607 0 302 46 725 0 2007 0 270 0 . . 0 805 3,935 8,178 1,622 1,694 1,678 54 9,080 134 0 . 0 0 1,093 0 1,004 0 328 25 0 1,261 11 0 988 0 0 0 20 0 1,523 5,536 3,309 0 278 76 347 0 2008 0 161 0 . . 0 1,124 4,911 0 2,086 0 0 0 14,782 140 0 . 0 0 1,079 22,174 208 0 396 26 0 1,540 15 0 874 8,046 0 0 21 0 2,630 6,768 2,379 0 344 150 1,060 4,804 2009 0 0 0 . . 0 832 1,832 2,392 1,618 0 0 0 9,207 99 0 . 0 0 998 22,052 376 0 409 46 0 0 4 35 1,161 0 0 0 28 0 616 8,727 1,178 0 298 128 3,824 0 2010 0 0 0 0 . 0 1,045 125 0 1,936 0 2,137 0 8,365 72 195 . 0 0 0 28,750 0 0 381 51 0 0 5 33 1,188 0 0 0 27 0 1,758 17,196 1,784 0 361 118 4,061 0 2011 0 277 0 0 0 0 1,163 3,607 0 2,030 0 0 0 14,088 113 0 . 0 0 1,428 32,824 0 0 535 161 0 483 0 30 1,598 0 0 0 106 0 0 20,890 0 0 438 169 3,842 0 Cumulative 3,760 901 0 0 0 0 6,200 25,876 12,776 15,150 8,407 7,483 1,863 74,302 960 363 . 214 0 5,152 156,035 3,707 6,920 2,940 473 1,008 5,785 99 179 8,946 9,940 314,853 1,750 272 2,823 13,228 80,184 20,975 0 2,836 786 14,673 6,984 Average 376 90 0 0 0 0 620 2,588 2,129 1,515 841 748 186 7,430 96 36 . 21 0 515 15,603 371 692 294 47 101 579 10 18 895 994 31,485 175 27 282 1,323 8,018 2,098 0 284 79 1,467 698
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2002 1,507 470 0 . 316 64 377 18 243 0 33 1,368 116 41 59 0 2,679 0 7,703 13,033 0 . 299 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 990 528 0 886 0 1,309 168 122 112 19,346 156
2003 1,248 499 0 . 104 207 0 10 376 0 42 1,325 159 0 60 0 2,722 0 10,068 13,039 0 . 430 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 1,197 0 0 814 0 1,851 248 0 184 20,758 111
2004 3,110 657 0 . 0 239 0 27 444 0 24 1,400 421 33 84 40 2,920 0 18,697 15,342 0 . 413 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 1,943 0 0 851 0 1,101 381 721 160 26,733 68
2005 2,671 621 0 . 785 159 0 20 403 0 51 1,562 292 18 140 0 2,984 0 19,575 13,123 0 . 686 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 1,968 1,070 0 946 0 1,409 488 412 471 28,740 35
2006 4,483 448 0 . 1,152 255 0 23 644 0 44 920 289 12 90 87 3,031 0 27,569 16,036 0 . 322 0 0 0 . . 0 0 113 2,474 374 159 1,478 0 0 305 1,596 418 29,260 72
2007 4,730 1,027 0 . 1,352 240 0 30 394 0 58 1,019 633 193 209 95 3,041 0 33,108 17,063 0 . 0 0 0 0 . . 0 0 114 2,948 1,009 297 1,829 0 0 755 0 456 31,608 49
2008 3,174 882 1,970 . 1,865 391 0 33 839 0 58 969 251 0 202 120 3,294 0 44,645 27,080 0 10,423 544 0 0 0 . . 0 0 178 2,710 1,303 311 605 0 0 1,044 636 857 32,531 56
2009 0 955 2,875 . 2,544 204 0 40 515 0 48 3,356 0 32 183 0 2,869 0 28,336 17,581 0 12,023 470 0 0 0 . . 0 0 179 2,093 979 331 1,040 0 0 564 165 698 29,266 39
2010 0 928 2,906 . 2,568 252 0 47 288 0 60 2,043 373 69 216 61 3,457 0 66,770 0 0 14,331 162 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 1,614 529 0 701 0 0 572 108 687 43,166 62
2011 3,558 555 3,223 . 2,303 330 0 36 219 0 69 2,870 408 119 262 0 3,560 0 83,221 0 0 11,760 222 0 0 0 . . 0 0 472 3,960 0 410 387 0 4,267 928 265 907 44,218 70
Cumulative 24,480 7,041 10,974 . 12,988 2,340 377 285 4,366 0 485 16,832 2,942 518 1,505 403 30,558 0 339,691 132,298 0 48,538 3,549 0 0 0 . . 0 0 1,057 21,896 5,792 1,507 9,536 0 9,937 5,452 4,024 4,950 305,626 717
Average 2,448 704 1,097 . 1,299 234 38 28 437 0 49 1,683 294 52 150 40 3,056 0 33,969 13,230 0 12,134 355 0 0 0 . . 0 0 106 2,190 579 151 954 0 994 545 402 495 30,563 72
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Table 7. GER Normalized (cont) (in millions of US Dollars)

Country Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia, Republic of Seychelles Sierra Leone 2002 0 . 0 33,718 108 0 . 0 206 0 0 473 443 0 0 0 0 2,235 0 810 0 4,897 0 0 0 20,439 40 59 4 0 0 5,469 212 53 2003 275 . 0 33,674 228 0 . 0 0 0 0 364 525 0 0 0 0 2,414 0 1,789 0 7,358 0 0 0 32,125 29 84 5 0 0 7,409 149 45 2004 102 . 0 35,921 343 0 980 0 0 492 0 414 649 86 0 0 0 2,709 0 2,183 0 8,942 0 0 0 41,266 208 79 4 0 0 9,776 82 41 2005 144 . 0 43,669 244 0 925 3,080 0 0 0 503 957 123 0 0 0 3,571 0 2,545 0 11,614 0 0 0 49,606 73 324 11 0 0 6,433 75 32 2006 187 . 0 47,663 188 0 436 0 365 0 402 678 1,120 0 0 2,389 0 4,632 0 3,268 0 8,386 0 0 0 66,825 130 116 1 0 0 5,278 0 0 2007 184 . 0 58,592 440 0 512 0 0 0 762 574 1,172 82 0 0 0 5,092 0 3,346 0 7,981 0 0 0 158 142 2 0 0 4,070 0 48 2008 966 . 0 60,025 493 0 456 0 0 0 792 777 1,264 0 0 0 0 5,800 0 5,415 0 6,902 0 0 0 92 137 6 0 0 0 0 0 2009 249 . 306 33,733 226 0 278 1,711 0 0 1,018 1,552 1,197 0 0 0 0 5,189 479 4,769 0 5,636 0 18,967 0 383 103 9 0 0 5,527 0 0 2010 899 . 443 32,180 0 0 259 0 0 0 0 1,704 1,721 534 0 0 0 5,191 0 6,941 0 5,212 0 0 0 433 115 7 0 0 2,655 0 0 2011 530 . 0 0 0 0 222 0 0 0 1,169 651 2,032 166 0 0 0 0 896 7,993 0 10,882 0 0 0 518 116 25 0 0 2,462 0 206 Cumulative 3,536 . 749 379,175 2,270 0 4,068 4,791 571 492 4,143 7,690 11,080 992 0 2,389 0 36,832 1,375 39,059 0 77,809 0 18,967 0 811,519 2,063 1,275 75 0 0 49,079 517 425 Average 354 . 75 37,918 227 0 508 479 57 49 414 769 1,108 99 0 239 0 3,683 138 3,906 0 7,781 0 1,897 0 81,152 206 127 8 0 0 4,908 52 42
72,337 100,921 123,065 125,897 179,039
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2002 22 . 0 0 48 19 170 288 105 0 0 169 0 0 . 228 15 997 0 0 688 0 0 0 274 . 35 0 0 0 520 662
2003 34 . 0 0 15 57 153 0 75 0 0 118 0 0 . 204 13 1,576 0 0 602 160 0 0 351 . 45 0 0 0 835 0
2004 69 . 0 0 26 60 281 0 121 0 13,080 154 0 0 . 251 12 1,848 0 0 0 255 0 0 347 . 153 0 0 0 1,837 306
2005 88 . 0 0 41 75 351 0 117 0 0 0 0 11,987 . 952 9 1,662 0 0 0 374 0 0 0 . 152 0 0 0 1,999 357
2006 93 . 9,893 0 39 193 179 0 0 510 0 0 0 0 . 1,692 12 0 0 0 0 475 0 0 0 . 166 0 0 0 2,435 1,790
2007 135 . 18,730 0 43 26 139 1,154 0 1,142 0 0 0 0 . 2,884 9 2,102 0 0 0 719 0 0 511 . 281 0 0 0 3,052 0
2008 169 . 19,787 0 27 0 232 0 185 366 0 0 0 20,550 . 4,471 22 0 0 0 0 1,182 0 0 0 . 442 0 0 1,900 2,535 0
2009 90 . 16,710 0 46 0 184 1,624 0 433 0 1,439 0 0 . 4,250 6 2,923 0 0 0 1,325 0 0 0 . 93 0 0 0 1,767 0
2010 151 . 0 0 64 0 117 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,402 . 2,385 5 4,263 0 0 0 1,280 0 0 984 . 161 0 0 0 2,565 0
2011 151 . 23,732 0 45 0 52 4,058 0 419 5,660 0 500 29,114 . 1,140 3 6,574 0 0 0 307 0 0 0 . 157 0 0 0 1,302 0
Cumulative 1,001 . 88,852 0 393 430 1,859 7,124 602 2,870 18,740 1,880 500 82,052 . 18,457 107 21,945 0 0 1,290 6,077 0 0 2,466 . 1,686 0 0 1,900 18,847 3,115 3,572,605
Average 100 . 8,885 0 39 43 186 712 60 287 1,874 188 50 8,205 . 1,846 11 2,195 0 0 129 608 0 0 247 . 169 0 0 190 1,885 312 357,260
217,808 245,291 329,963 356,633 283,217 331,929 448,603 398,533
428,124 532,504
45
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Appendix 2. A Discussion on the Trade Discrepancies Arising through Re-Exporting via Hong Kong
1. International trade typically involves an exchange of goods or services produced in a country against payment by users in a foreign country who consume those good or services. This bilateral exchange of goods and services against a financial settlement (rather than barter) is the basic transaction underlying all trade misinvoicing models. One way in which global trade has become more complex than the typical country A to country B bilateral trade is evident in the rise of trade entrepts like Hong Kong, Singapore, and Dubai. Increasingly, these entrepts have been intermediating trade between buyers and sellers in different markets. This intermediation is best illustrated by Chinas use of Hong Kong as a trade entrept. Failure to explicitly account for the role of trade entrepts in international trade can distort estimates of trade misinvoicing. 2. Hong Kongs long track record in international finance and trade relations makes it an excellent trade entrept to facilitate mainland Chinas trade with the rest of the world. It is often more cost-effective for a Chinese manufacturer of goods to outsource its marketing and distribution operations to Hong Kong rather than retain these functions in-house. Similarly, an interested buyer of Chinese goods who has no business connections in mainland China often finds it easier to conduct its buying operations through a firm in Hong Kong with an existing network of connections in mainland China. In this regard, Hong Kong has a comparative advantage in intermediating trade between China and the rest of the world. 3. Through this relationship, a firm in Hong Kong will import goods from a country of origin (say China) and then re-export the same goods, with a marked-up price, to a buyer somewhere else in the world (say the US). A statistical discrepancy arises in this trading relationship when the country of origin (China) reports the exported goods as ultimately destined to Hong Kong, but the country of final destination (the US) reports the goods as originating in China. 4. Since the re-exported goods, by definition, must not undergo a significant change in shape, form, or nature, the destination country records the imported good as originating in a country prior to the re-export (in this case mainland China). This is in accordance with the guidelines for compiling international trade statistics. However, due to the complex nature of entrept trade, the country of origin (mainland China) often does not know (or even care) where the goods ultimate destination will be and likely reports the good as destined for Hong Kong.
47
5. The example in Figure 1 shows a hypothetical export of $100 of goods from China to the United States via Hong Kong. The red arrows denote where the exporting country reports its exports as going to and the blue arrows denote where the importing countries reports its imports as coming from. We assume that all traders have reported the actual amount of their imports and exports to their respective customs at each step in the process in order to highlight how re-exports create articial trade misinvoicing. In accordance with Fenestra (2001), we assume that Hong Kong marks-up the price by approximately 15 percent before re-exporting the goods to the United States.
Figure 1. Re-Exports Through Hong Kong: An Example
Hong Kong
$100 $100 $115
China
$115
US
Chinas recorded exports to the United States = $0 United States recorded imports from China = $115 Trade Misinvoicing = $115
6. In the above example, China does not report any exports going to the US, but the US reports $115 (equal to the amount re-exported from Hong Kong) of imports coming from China. Thus, a failure to correct for the re-exported goods through Hong Kong will imply that China underinvoiced its exports by $115 when the trader did not do so. 7. Over the period of 2001 to 2012, approximately $3.61 trillion worth of merchandise goods was re-exported through Hong Kong, 62 percent of which originated in China. A few researchers attempted to correct for the re-exports of Chinese goods through Hong Kong in estimating trade misinvoicing but none of the existing methods can replicate the methodology for other countries that use Hong Kong as an entrept. To this extent, this is the first paper that uses actual data from the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department to correct for any artificial trade misinvoicing resulting from the use of Hong Kong as an entrept by all developing
48
countries. India, the Philippines, and Thailand alone re-exported a total of $286 billion worth of goods through Hong Kong over the same period. 8. It is important to note, however, that our estimates only correct for re-exports through Hong Kong and not for re-exports through other entrepts such as Singapore and Dubai. Hong Kong is currently the only entrept that publically disseminates a dataset detailed enough to correct for the bilateral trade discrepancies that re-exports create. Additionally, although re-exports are a growing global phenomenon in international trade, Hong Kong is by far the worlds largest re-exporter. While Singapore re-exports an average of 43 percent of its total trade, Hong Kongs re-exports account for close to 97 percent of its total exports. Furthermore, only a fraction of the 43 percent of Singapores exports that are re-exports involve developing countries. For this reason, the estimates of trade misinvoicing presented in this study are not likely to be significantly affected by re-exports through other trade entrepts. However, we plan to incorporate re-export data from other entrepts as they become available.
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References
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Board: Lord Daniel Brennan (Chair), Dr. Rafael Espada (Vice Chair), Dr. Lester A. Myers (Secretary-Treasurer), Dr. Thomas Pogge, Raymond Baker

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Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011

Dev Kar and Brian LeBlanc