MITIGATED AMBITION

MITIGATION OUTOME OF THE WARSAW CLIMATE CONFERENCE

9 December 2013, Ver. 2 Naoyuki Yamagishi1 WWF Japan

SUMMARY
The main forum for mitigation negotiation at the Warsaw Climate Conference was the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). For Workstream 1 and 2 (WS1 and WS2) under ADP, below are the main issues and their results. This paper starts with WS2 because we put more emphasis on WS2 during this COP.

Workstream 2

AOSIS proposal survived: One focus of WWF was AOSIS proposal in relation to raising ambition through a technical process on renewables and energy efficiency. Due to some parties concerns about focus on particular sectors (notably by Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)), the language was weakened and the final COP decision and ADP conclusions established a technical process with a special focus on actions with high mitigation potential. Specifically, ADP managed to establish technical expert meetings for ADP intersessionals in 2014, call for further submission and updates to the technical paper. This was not exactly all we hoped for and certainly has a risk of becoming just another round of technical discussion. Nonetheless, it still has possibility to become a better process, if we play right. General call for increasing ambition: The final COP decision text has some paragraphs urging Parties to increase their ambition in targets/actions. On developed country Party side, one paragraph urges each developed country Party to revisit their targets. Another paragraph also

This document was prepared in personal capacity and do not necessarily represent WWFs view.

urges each developed country Party to increase technology, finance and capacity-building support. One developing country Party side, one paragraph urges each developing country Party to, where appropriate, consider further action, recognizing support is needed.

Workstream 1

Timeline for Paris got blurred: This was the most contentious issue in the ADP text. The paragraph in the COP decision text invites (not a strong word) Parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparation of their intended nationally determined contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, and it is to be communicated well in advance to COP21. The word contributions became commitments at one point but got changed back to contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature at the end, due to the strong opposition from BASIC/LMDCs against the use of the word commitments for developing countries. The phrase nationally determined was often used throughout the negotiations this year but the word intended was inserted to reflect an argument that those contributions should be initial proposals in their nature before getting legally inscribed. The timing was blurred as well in advance; no specific month and year was identified. The text says by the first quarter of 2015 by those Parties ready to do so in parentheses but this is weak in its timing itself. In addition, a reference to the Ban Ki-moon Summit became a nearly notes, separated from a paragraph referring to political engagement of Ministerial meeting in June. Lost review process: At one point, Co-chairs draft decision text had a paragraph to have parties define a process for the consideration of the contributions by the first half of 2014. Together with a paragraph to have a workshop on adequacy and equity, these paragraphs were expected to be a basis for adequacy and equity review. The equity part was inserted largely due to African Groups argument. However, this paragraph was opposed by India on behalf of LMDCs and it disappeared from the final decision text. This is a big loss.

Murky template: Before the conference, a few parties proposed to have a template (e.g. NZ) for mitigation offers. The idea was captured in a subtle way in decision text and the final text now requests ADP by COP20 to identify the information that Parties will provide when putting forward their contributions. Informal elements: According to COP18 decision, elements of the 2015 deal is scheduled to be considered in COP20 for preparing a draft negotiation text by May 2015. The dispute occurred about how to capture the progress of 2

discussion so far on paper at this COP. Co-chairs original draft decision text included an indicative list of elements as an annex to COP decision. This was opposed by both developed country parties and LMDCs. The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) were the ones who tried to capture the list in an official document but, eventually, they lost. The annex disappeared in its entirety and it will probably be included in Co-chairs informal note. There are two broad areas of further work for WWF based on the above results. One is to enhance the technical process on actions with high mitigation potential to lead to concrete results which eventually raise ambition of parties in a significant way. Currently, the established process is still very vague with respect of expected outcomes. One task during the intersessionals in 2014 would be to make them concrete and to find ways to get them implemented in a urgent manner. The other area of work is to have a better timeline for Paris, especially in respect of review of mitigation offers. The fact that the review did not get into the decision text this time does not mean the window of opportunity to have review process got closed completely. It will be crucial to, at COP20, set up proper review process for equity and adequacy for its immediate implementation thereafter. Hence preparatory discussion for that has to be pushed hard in intersessionals in the course of 2014.

INTRODUCTION
The atmosphere around mitigation was not well prepared in Warsaw. The Poland presidency gave a negative context by setting up a coal summit in parallel to the COP and Japan and Australia lowered their ambition during the first week when more ambition was urgently needed. Issues related to mitigation were mainly discussed under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). There were two workstreams; one for the 2015 deal (post-2020) and the other is pre-2020 ambition. Broadly speaking, there were three main issues. The first was how to raise pre-2020 ambition. The second was timeline of negotiations for Paris, especially the timing of so-called mitigation offers. The third was the "elements" of the 2015 deal. The first was discussed under Workstream 2 (WS2) and the latter two issues were discussed under Workstream 1 (WS1) of ADP.

The discussion under ADP produced two documents. One is a COP decision2 and the other is ADP conclusions.3 The report below covers both documents.

1. WORKSTEAM 2
1-1. Raising ambition through renewables and energy efficiency
The 2013 edition of the UNEP Emission Gap Report states that "[e]ven if pledges are fully implemented, the emissions gap in 2020 will be 812 GtCO2e per year"4 Taking concrete steps for closing the gigaton gap was one of the crucial tasks for the Warsaw Conference. Generally speaking, there were two ways to do this. One is to do so by increasing parties emission reduction targets (actions). Possible options include moving up to the higher end of the target if the target was expressed in a range and simply increasing the target. The other way is often called as International Cooperative Initiatives (ICIs).5 They are not directly about targets but can contribute to closing the gap in one way or another. Examples include reduction of HFC emissions, slashing fossil fuel subsidies, reduction of short-lived climate forcers, additional actions on international bunkers, etc. Although it is desirable to achieve ambition increase through targets, this route has been hindered by severe political difficulty and often gets stuck in deadlocks. Hence WWF has put its emphasis on one particular item in ICIs, namely, launching technical process with focus on renewables and energy efficiency. The idea was originally proposed by AOSIS during the intersessionals in Bonn early 2013. WWF adopted the idea, developed it further and made its own submission.6

As of writing, the official report of COP is not yet available but the COP decision text is available as Further advancing the Durban Platform at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_adp.pdf.

Conclusions as adopted by the ADP available at http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp_conclusions_as_adopted.pdf.

3 4 5 6

UNEP (2013) The Emission Gap Report 2013. UNEP. Some would prefer complementary initiatives.

WWF (2013) WWF Submission on Increasing pre-2020 Mitigation Ambition through scaled up Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Initiatives. Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/smsn/ngo/369.pdf

The gist of the AOSIS proposal was to launch a technical process under UNFCCC with focus on RE and EE in order to gather best practices and facilitate implementation of ambitious RE and EE initiatives across countries further. Preferably, we hoped to have parties to agree to voluntarily enhance their RE and EE targets and actions (with financial and technological support in case of developing countries) but, in our conversation with delegates, we refrain from starting conversation with delegates with talking about RE and EE targets because this seemed to be scaring them off unnecessarily. The original intension of the AOSIS was to bypass the political deadlocks that conversation on targets typically falls into and then actually facilitate actions that lead to raising ambition on the ground. At the beginning of the Warsaw Conference, AOSIS laid out their proposal once again to establish a technical process to identify opportunities in renewable and energy efficiency. Many developed countries liked the AOSIS proposal, probably because it was vague enough. In the meantime, LMDCs showed uncomfortableness with the proposal. There seemed to be a couple of reasons for this. One is that a few countries, such as Saudi Arabia, did not like the focus on renewable energy. The other was that they thought it would lead to shifting burden of raising ambition from developed countries to developing countries. As a result, the language got weakened. Paragraph 5(a) of the COP decision established a process for the technical examination of opportunities for actions with high mitigation potential, including those with adaptation and sustainable development co-benefits. In addition to this COP decision, ADP conclusions specified the process a bit further: Call for submission by 30 March 2014. Technical expert meetings at the intersessionals of the ADP in 2014 to share policies, practices and technologies and address the necessary finance, technology and capacity-building, with a special focus on actions with high mitigation potential, with the participation of Parties, civil society, the private sector and cities and other subnational authorities, where appropriate Regular updates to the technical paper (FCCC/TP/2013/8 and Add.1 and 2.), including information on actions with high mitigation potential

These were not exactly all we hoped for and certainly have a risk of becoming just another round of technical discussion and technical papers. Particularly, it is worrying in respect of having no concrete envisaged outcomes of the process itself.

Nonetheless, it still has possibility to become a better process, if we can utilize the process effectively in the course of 2014. Civil society is also invited to the expert meetings, where appropriate. This will be discussed in the end of this paper.

1-2. The US proposal: Sharing experiences of cities?

One additional interesting portion is the US proposal for having a forum for subnational actions. This was proposed during the first week of the Warsaw Conference. India and China showed concerns about this proposal by arguing that NAMAs already include subnational actors and this process should be about parties. A few developed country Parties like Canada and Australia supported the proposal. Despite the opposition, the US proposal also managed to stay in the final text in a weakened form. It was originally proposed as a forum to allow subnational actors like cities to share experiences and best practices. However, the language was weakened and Paragraph 5(b) now reads sharing experiences was limited to among Parties not directly among cities or other subnational actors. Nonetheless, together with the AOSIS proposal, it might be usable to catalyse actions on renewable and energy efficiency on the ground, which eventually leading up to raising ambition.

1-3. General call for increasing ambition

Developing countries argued developed countries must raise ambition, not just in relation to mitigation but also in relation to finance, technology and capacity building support. This comprehensive approach (dubbed by China) to cover all aspects of Paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CP.17 was one of the paramount asks by LMDCs/BASIC countries at this COP. China also said that the ambition gap would have not existed if developed countries had pledged ambitious targets from the beginning. LMDC collectively argued that the COP decision should include references to 40% reduction compared to 1990 by 2020 by developed country parties for mitigation and 70 billion USD by 2017 as a pathway towards the long-term finance goal of 100 billion USD by 2020. By contrast, the Umbrella Group developed countries argued that there were about 100 parties which had not submitted their pledges under the Cancun agreements yet and such countries include some middle-income developing countries. Hence, they should be encouraged to do so for closing the gap.

Reflecting these disputes, the final COP decision text has some paragraphs urging Parties to increase their ambition in targets/actions both for developed country parties and developing country parties. On developed country Party side, Paragraph 4(c) of the COP decision urges each developed country Party to revisit their targets. Paragraph 4(e) also urges each developed country Party to increase technology, finance and capacity-building support, but without any specific timelines or target figures. On developing country Party side, Paragraph 4(a) urges each developing country Party to, where appropriate, consider further action, recognizing support is needed. The lack of specificity on developed country side (e.g. 40% for an aggregated target / 70bn by 2017 for finance) was a major reason why LMDC were not happy and took negative stances elsewhere, particularly in WS1 issues.

1-4. HFC Declaration?

EU has been advocating for sending political signals to the Montreal Protocol process so that the Montreal Protocol can work on phase down of production and consumption of Hydrofluorocarbons(HFCs).7 The Montreal Protocol is about reducing Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) and HFCs were originally developed as an alternative to ODS (CFCs). However, HFCs also happen to be very strong greenhouse gases and they need to be reduced from climate change perspective. It was decided to cover HFCs as one of the GHGs. UNEP stated that annual emissions of HFCs are projected to rise to about 3.5 to 8.8 GtCO2eq in 2050.8 Because HFCs are similar to CFCs in their production and usage, some started to argue that the Montreal Protocol has been better situated to reduce production and consumption of HFCs.9 Since the Montreal Protocol does not require measuring emissions of HFCs, it would still be necessary for the climate regime to deal with the emission (e.g. monitoring and bank issues) but, at least, reduction can be accelerated by the Montreal Protocol. To let the Montreal Protocol to work on the substance that is

7 EU (2013) A Proposed Decision Relating to Phasing Down of Hydrofluorocarbons under the Montreal Protocol. Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_eu_workstre am_2_20130527.pdf . 8

UNEP (2011) HFCs: A Critical Link in Protecting Climate and the Ozone Layer. UNEP.

9 Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) (2013) A Call to Action on HFCs. EIA. Retrieved from http://www.eia-international.org/a-call-to-action-on-hfcs.

not under its original mandate, it was considered necessary for the climate regime to send political signals to the Montreal side. At the beginning, Co-chairs draft decision included a paragraph referring to this issue. However, this was opposed by LMDC, most notably by India, and the reference disappeared towards the end of the conference. Their major concerns were availability of safe and economically and technologically feasible alternatives and necessity for support for technology transfer. They also emphasized that HFC should be treated under UNFCCC with the convention principles (e.g. common but differentiated responsibility) applied. The opposition by India was already known as of the June session and hence EU was planning to have a joint declaration on HFC by ministers who gathered at this conference as sort of a back-up plan. Technically speaking, it would be possible to issue a declaration signed by ministers as long as those ministers agree to it. EU seemed have actually proposed a draft declaration text to other parties but, eventually, they seem to have given it up at least for this COP.

2. WORKSTREAM 1
2-2. Timeline and review towards Paris
The Doha Conference in 2012 laid out a rough roadmap towards Paris. 2/CP.18 states two things: Elements for a draft negotiation text will be considered no later than at COP20 in 2014. A negotiation text will be made available before May 2015.

The Warsaw Conference was expected to add further details to the schedule as well as making progress on discussion on substances. Throughout the course of this year, one issue came up, which was a timing of mitigation offers. It seemed generally accepted that Parties have to present their intended mitigation targets (often called as nationally determined targets/actions) before those targets are actually fixed and inscribed in the new 2015 agreement and to set up time for getting clarity and discussing those targets. The idea of having ex-ante clarity of targets before official COP21 originally came from USA but now it gained support from almost all developed countries and some

developing countries. This logically requires Parties to present their mitigation offers some time before COP21. The question was exactly when. There were three components in this issue as follows.

2-1-1. Timeline for Paris got blurred

Paragraph 2(b) of the COP decision turned out to be the most contentious paragraph under the ADP discussion. In the agreed text, the paragraph invites Parties (not a strong wording compared to requests, urges, or Parties decided) to initiate or intensify domestic preparation of their intended nationally determined contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, and it is to be communicated well in advance to COP21. There are three things that should be noted in relation to this paragraph. First is about timing of mitigation offers. The wording well in advance is not really clear in terms of exactly when Parties need to present their mitigation offers. The text also says by the first quarter of 2015 by those Parties ready to do so in parentheses but this is very weak in its timing itself and weak in the way it is written. The specific time line was supported by Dominican Republic, AILAC, LDCs, Canada, US and EU, though they seemed to differ by when they prefer to have commitments (e.g. COP20 for some and by early 2015 for others) and it was opposed by LMDCs / BASIC. Second is about the wording contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions. This represents a dispute on differentiation of countries. Developed countries generally preferred the word commitments and some developing countries, especially LMDCs (towards the end of negotiation, the voice was represented by BASIC), preferred actions. This is because there is no differentiation between Annex I and Non-Annex I in the paragraph. LMDC/BASIC argued for keeping the AI/NAI differentiation and using the same word commitments was not acceptable to them. For example, LMDC stated in their submission during the session that [m]itigation contributions should be determined nationally for Non-Annex I parties.10 For developed countries, it was crucial to have the same language without the AI/NAI differentiation and thus they preferred commitments. The word contributions was a compromised wording and the additional reservation phrase without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions was produced in the huddle during the last hour of negotiations. Although some parties wanted to have
10 Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (2013) LMDC views on identification of elements in ADP Workstream 1 (18 November 2013) Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2-3_lmdc_wo rkstream_1_20131118.pdf

more clear language, the phrase nationally determined was adopted and not disputed much. However, the word intended was inserted to signal its initial nature of the contributions. Third is about the scope of the contributions. In Co-chairs original draft decision text, the scope of commitments/contributions covered mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, i.e. all the aspects of Paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CP.17. This comprehensive approach was preferred by developing country Parties but it was opposed by developed country Parties. The final text dropped the reference to specific areas and it now reads in the context of adopting a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2. The first part is a carbon-copy of the Durban agreement language but it is likely that Parties will have different interpretations of the last bit of this sentence after towards. The original wording was towards achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention but it was changed by BASICs suggestion to delete ultimate. It was probably because the ultimate objective of the Convention is basically about stabilization of GHG concentrations, and they might have thought it would be easier to cover all the aspects by just saying objective. Developed country Parties will probably try to limit the interpretation to mitigation commitments (contributions) but LMDCs/BASIC will probably interpret this part as including all aspects of Paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CP.17. In addition to the paragraph about the timeline, there was also a paragraph in Co-chairs initial draft text that calls upon parties to intensify high-level engagement towards the Ban Ki-moon Summit and ministerial dialogues in June and December. The idea behind this was to use the Ban Ki-moon leaders summit as either place for mitigation offer presentation or political push for accelerating domestic processes for preparing mitigation commitments. Several parties showed concerns about this and the language got significantly weakened. In the final text, Paragraph 6 merely notes the summit while Paragraph 7 calls upon Parties to intensify high-level engagement for June and December ministerial dialogues.

2-1-2. Review process got lost

In relation to having an ex-ante clarity process before COP21, Co-chairs second draft decision text on November 20th had a paragraph to have parties define a process for the consideration of the contributions by the first half of 2014. It also said it was to be done individually and in aggregate, guided by the principles of the Convention.

10

In addition, there were also one paragraph in Co-chairs proposal for draft conclusions of ADP to organize a workshop to consider the methodological issues of equity and adequacy. This was largely due to African Groups proposal during the session. These two components, consideration of the contributions and equity and adequacy workshop, could be a basis for equity and adequacy review process of Parties offers on commitments. However, strangely enough, this paragraph was strongly opposed by India on behalf of LMDCs and it disappeared from the final COP decision text and ADP conclusion text. The exact reason for smashing review process is not known but there seemed to be four major reasons for LMDCs reluctance to this issue. First is the imbalance of progress in respect of WS1 and WS2. WS2 have not produced any concrete outcome in terms of increasing ambition of developed countries yet. There seems to be a general fear on developing countries side that the burden derived from the lack of ambition in developed countries for 2020 will be shifted to developing countries in the form of commitments in the 2015 agreement. This general fear translates into general reluctance to have too many details in the process on the 2015 deal at this point, let alone the review process. Second, BASIC countries have put particular emphasis on historical responsibility before and during the conference.11 They might have thought the general discussion on equity and adequacy could lead to diversion from historical responsibility.12 Third, there is still uncertainty about whether large developing countries can make official mitigation offers by 2015. For example, Chinese leadership changed in November 2012 (officially in March 2013) and a new set of policies are still in making. It is simply uncertain if China can set up concrete targets for post-2020, even if the country wants to. Forth, there is a general opposition to the need for review process on developing countries actions. In their submission during the session, LMDCs stated:
11 Third World Network (2013) Warsaw Climate Conference should be about implementation of decisions say BASIC (TWN Info Service on Climate Change (Oct13/12), 30 October 2013), retrieved from http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate131012.htm and BASIC (2013) Statement by China on behalf of Brazil, India, South Africa and China at the opening plenary of the Durban Platform (12 November 2013), retrieved from http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2.3_basic_20 131112.pdf

Indrajit Bose and Uthra Radhakrishnan (2013) Power Game. Down To Earth. Retrieved from http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/world-gets-yellow-card?page=0,1 .

12

11

We do not see any role for a two-step process in the ex-ante process for review of efforts of developing countries. Any framework which seeks to determine for developing countries what they should contribute in any future regime is ab initio not acceptable and goes against the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities based on historical responsibility.13

In any case, this is a big loss in a sense that we lose a process to check if parties collective and individual efforts are enough as well as if they are equitable and fair. This means the process now has a risk of becoming a pure pledge only process without any assessment. This is not the final verdict, though. There is a very small hook left in the text of Paragraph 2(b) of the COP decision text. It says Parties are to communicate their contributions well in advance of COP21 in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended contributions. This is obviously not enough but is better than nothing. What is more, technically speaking, it is still possible to have a review process after COP20 if Parties are willing to do so and have decisions on it at COP20.

2-1-3. Murky template

Before the conference, a few parties proposed to have a template (e.g. NZ) for mitigation offers. The proposal was to list up key items for mitigation offers (e.g. base year, target year, coverage of GHGs, use of LULUCF, etc) that would help comparison and aggregation in the review process. The idea was captured in a subtle way in decision text and the final text now requests ADP by COP20 to identify the information that Parties will provide when putting forward their contributions. The term information sounds less formal than template but it can be strengthened in COP20 if Parties are willing to so. This is important in a sense to get clarity of what Parties targets (contributions) actually mean in reality in a timely manner. Without clarity, it is not possible to get what those targets mean in aggregate for the atmosphere and what they mean to each other in terms of equity and fairness. Another problematic implication this has is that, if the identification only happens by COP20, this logically means that presentations of mitigation offers by Parties only come later COP20, i.e. 2015.

13

Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (2013) op cit.

12

Based on the above results from Warsaw, the timeline towards Paris now looks like the following.

2-2. "Elements" of the 2015 Agreement

Another big issue was elements. According to COP18 decision, elements of the 2015 deal is scheduled to be considered in COP20 for preparing a draft negotiation text by May 2015.14 Hence the Warsaw conference was expected to have initial conversation on possible elements. There was general tension on the focus of the 2015 deal between developed and developing countries. Developed countries want to make the 2015 deal mitigation-centric while developing countries want to include all the major elements, not just mitigation but also adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building, in the main part of the 2015. It is not that developed countries oppose to the inclusion of those issues in the overall package of the 2015 deal but they want to exclude them from the core legal part (e.g. a protocol) and to put them in COP decisions. In Warsaw, the big fight was about whether having a preliminary list of issues in the official document or not. Initially, Co-chairs draft decision text included an indicative list of issues to be considered. This was opposed by LMDCs and
14

Decision 2/CP18.

13

developed countries because they believe the list is too premature to include. The ones who fought for its inclusion were AILAC and LDCs. They argued that Parties need to capture the progress in an official document The list of issues was first proposed as an annex to COP decision in Co-chairs first draft but then it was downgraded to an annex to ADP conclusions. Finally, it disappeared in the last hours of the negotiations. LMDCs suggested to include the list in reflection notes of ADP Co-chairs, which was not opposed by developed countries either. Hence, it will be probably included in Co-chairs informal note or something similar in status.

TOWARDS COP20 IN LIMA

There are two broad areas of further work for WWF based on the above results. One is to enhance the technical process on actions with high mitigation potential to lead to concrete results which eventually raise ambition of parties in a significant way. Currently, the established process is still very vague with respect of expected outcomes. One task during the intersessionals in 2014 would be to make them concrete. For example, we can ask for making it a task for the technical expert meetings to identify a list of a certain number of RE and EE initiatives that are particularly relevant for enhancing targets and actions for pre-2020 as well as to identify how finance and technology mechanisms can help implementation of them. The identification of specific additional needs for finance and technological support could also be a task. The other area of work is to have a better timeline for Paris, especially with respect to review of mitigation offers. The fact that the review did not get into the decision text this time does not mean the window of opportunity to have it got closed completely. It will be crucial to, at COP20, set up proper review process for equity and adequacy for its immediate implementation thereafter. It should be noted that getting mere ex-ante clarity is not enough; it has to come with a process of giving parties guidance or encouragement to change their targets based on the assessment of targets in terms of equity and adequacy. Preparatory discussion for that has to be pushed hard in intersessionals in the course of 2014 so that the review process can be done immediately after Parties present their contributions.

14