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    This working paper for the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century analyses the key changes taking place in the national and international security landscape and assesses their implications for policy, examining the context within which a national security strategy must now be forged. As a result, it becomes clear that the contemporary security landscape is about much more than terrorism alone. The paper identifies five drivers of change and their effects: * Globalisation and power diffusion * Global poverty and failing states * Climate change * The growth of political Islam * Socio-economic vulnerability.

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    This working paper for the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century analyses the key changes taking place in the national and international security landscape and assesses their implications for policy, examining the context within which a national security strategy must now be forged. As a result, it becomes clear that the contemporary security landscape is about much more than terrorism alone. The paper identifies five drivers of change and their effects: * Globalisation and power diffusion * Global poverty and failing states * Climate change * The growth of political Islam * Socio-economic vulnerability.

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    118 views48 pages

    The New Front Line: Security in A Changing World

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    IPPR
    This working paper for the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century analyses the key changes taking place in the national and international security landscape and assesses their implications for policy, examining the context within which a national security strategy must now be forged. As a result, it becomes clear that the contemporary security landscape is about much more than terrorism alone. The paper identifies five drivers of change and their effects: * Globalisation and power diffusion * Global poverty and failing states * Climate change * The growth of political Islam * Socio-economic vulnerability.

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    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 48

    WWW.IPPR.

    ORG

    TheNewFrontLine:
    Securityinachangingworld
    ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity,WorkingPaperNo.1

    byIanKearnsandKenGude
    February2008
    ©ippr2008

    InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
    Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
    3 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Contents
    Aboutippr ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
    ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity ........................................................................................................................................ 4
    Abouttheauthors ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5
    Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5
    Commentsandfeedback............................................................................................................................................................. 5
    Executivesummary...................................................................................................................................................................... 6
    1.Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................ 10
    2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape .......................................................................................................... 12
    i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion....................................................................................................................................... 12
    ii)Povertyandfailingstates ................................................................................................................................................... 19
    iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity................................................................................................................................ 20
    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam ............................................................................................................................................. 23
    v)Socio-economicvulnerability.............................................................................................................................................. 25
    Driversandeffects:conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 26
    3.Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape ...................................................................................................................... 28
    Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy................................................................................................... 28
    Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach ................................................................................ 30
    Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy .............................................................................................................................. 32
    4.Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................. 37
    References .................................................................................................................................................................................. 38
    Appendix:Thenewfrontlineofnationalsecuritypolicy .......................................................................................................... 42
    4 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Aboutippr
    TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,producing
    cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.
    Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Through
    ourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepractical
    solutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
    WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,
    whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships
    andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.
    ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:info@ippr.org
    www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

    ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinFebruary2008.©ippr2008

    ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity
    ThisworkingpaperformspartoftheongoingactivitiesoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurity.
    Thisisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependentnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itis
    co-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.Thefull
    Commissionmembershipincludes:

    •Lord(Paddy)Ashdown,Co-Chair,formerleader •ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,Royal
    oftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformer UnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorof
    HighRepresentativeforBosnia. DefenceStudiesatKing’sCollegeLondon.
    •Lord(George)Robertson,Co-Chair,former •FrancescaKlug,ProfessorialResearch
    SecretaryofStateforDefenceandformer FellowattheLondonSchoolofEconomics
    SecretaryGeneralofNATO. andacommissionerontheCommissionfor
    •DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector, EqualityandHumanRights(CEHR).
    ippr. •ProfessorTariqModood:Director,University
    •SirJeremyGreenstock,DirectoroftheDitchley ofBristolResearchCentrefortheStudyof
    FoundationandformerBritishAmbassadorto EthnicityandCitizenship.
    theUnitedNations. •SenatorTomDaschle,formerMajority
    •SirDavidOmand,formersecurityand LeaderoftheUnitedStatesSenate.
    intelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOffice •ConstanzeStelzenmüller,Directorofthe
    andformerPermanentSecretaryintheHome BerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.
    Office. •DavidMepham,DirectorofPolicyatSave
    •Lord(Charles)Guthrie,formerChiefofthe theChildrenandformerlyHeadofthe
    DefenceStaff. InternationalProgrammeatippr.
    •ShamiChakrabarti,DirectorofLibertyand •ProfessorJimNorton,formerchief
    formerHomeOfficelawyer. executiveoftheRadioCommunications
    •Lord(Martin)Rees,PresidentoftheRoyal AgencyandnowattheInstituteof
    SocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege, Directors.
    Cambridge. •IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservative
    •SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableof PartyPolicyTask-forceonScience,
    NorthamptonshireandformerPresidentofthe Technology,EngineeringandMathematics,
    AssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers. ConservativeMPforEsherandWaltonand
    formerministerforScienceandTechnology
    •ProfessorMaryKaldor,CentreforGlobal
    attheDepartmentofTradeandIndustry.
    Governance,LondonSchoolofEconomics.

    TheworkingpaperserieseditorisIanKearns.
    FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security
    5 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Abouttheauthors
    IanKearns isDeputyChairoftheCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,Deputy
    DirectorofipprandiscurrentlyleadingtheInstitute’sinternationalandsecurityprogramme.Hehasa
    broadrangeofexperienceintheprivatesector,asaformerDirectorintheGlobalGovernment
    IndustrypracticeatElectronicDataSystems(EDS),andinacademia,asformerDirectorofthe
    GraduateProgrammeinInternationalStudiesandLecturerinPoliticsattheUniversityofSheffield.

    KenGude isaVisitingFellowatipprandSeniorAdvisertotheCommissiononNationalSecuirtyin
    the21stCentury.HeiscurrentlytheAssociateDirectoroftheInternationalRightsandResponsibility
    ProgramattheCenterforAmericanProgressandhaspreviouslyworkedforseveralleadingAmerican
    thinktanks,includingtheCenterforNationalSecurityStudiesandtheCouncilonForeignRelations.

    Acknowledgements
    Asisthecasewithmostprojectsofthisnature,thispaperistheproductofthelabourofmany,and
    withouttheirassistanceandsupport,weneverwouldhavebeenabletopublish.Theauthorswishto
    thanktheCommissionersoftheippr’sCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whose
    discussionsprovidedthesparkformanyoftheideaswehaveputforwardhereandallowedthis
    analysistobetestedanddebated.WewouldalsoliketothanktheincomparablestaffattheInstitute
    forPublicPolicyResearch,especiallyAlexGennieandKatiePaintinfromtheInternationaland
    SecurityProgrammeandmanyothersincludingGeorginaKyriacou,CareyOppenheimandMatt
    Jacksonwhohelpedgetustothefinishline.Finally,wewerefortunatethatmanyofourcolleagues
    andassociatesworkingoutsideipprtookthetimetoreadandreviewourworkandprovideinsight
    andguidancethatenabledustosharpenthemanuscriptandimproveourarguments.
    ipprwouldliketothankEDSandRaytheonwhoaresupportersofalltheCommission’sactivities.We
    wouldalsoliketothankthefollowingfortheirsupportforspecificstreamsofworkfeedingintothe
    Commission'sdeliberations:BoozAllenHamilton(energysecurityandprotectionofcriticalnational
    infrastructure),DeLaRue(bordersandidentitymanagement),andtheDepartmentforInternational
    DevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistry(conflictpreventionandpost-conflictreconstruction).
    Theviewsinthisworkingpaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthe
    hopeofadvancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelorthe
    viewsofanysponsoringorganisation.

    Commentsandfeedback
    Wewelcomewrittencomments onallsectionsandaspectsofthematerialpresentedhere,andthese
    shouldbesentinthefirstinstancetotheCommission’sDeputyChair,IanKearns,on
    i.kearns@ippr.org.TheCommissionwillalsoberunningaseriesoftargetedcallsforevidence
    throughout2008andmoredetailsofthesecanbefoundatwww.ippr.org/security
    6 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Executivesummary
    Thispaperanalysesthekeychangestakingplaceinthenationalandinternationalsecuritylandscape
    andassessestheirimplicationsforpolicy,examiningthecontextwithinwhichanationalsecurity
    strategymustnowbeforged.Itisasubmissiontoippr’sindependentCommissiononNational
    Securityinthe21stCentury,capturingsomeoftheearlydeliberationsoftheCommission.However,it
    shouldnotatthisstagebetakentorepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionitself.

    Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape
    Thepaperidentifiesfivedriversofchangeandtheireffects:
    i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
    ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates
    iii)Climatechange
    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
    v)Socio-economicvulnerability.
    Asaresult,itbecomesclearthatthecontemporarysecuritylandscapeisaboutmuchmorethan
    terrorismalone.
    i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
    Aglobalisation-drivendiffusionofpowerisunderwayinthreesenses.
    Thefirstisarelativediffusionofpowerwithinandamongthecommunityofstates.Thisisvisiblein
    theriseofChinaandIndia,intheemergenceofawiderangeofnewlyimportantenergystatesand
    regions(includingtheCaspianSearegion,centralAsia,Nigeria,Iran,Qatar,AlgeriaandVenezuela)
    andinthepotentialriseofnewnuclearpowers(notjustviaIranandNorthKoreabutalsothrough
    theregionalnucleararmsracestheymightprovoke).Thiselementofpowerdiffusioniscreatingnew
    centresofpower,newregionsofpotentialtensionandconflict,andraisesfundamentalquestionsover
    theextenttowhichimportantinternationalinstitutionsstillreflecttherealitiesofglobalpower.
    Thesecond dimensionofpowerdiffusionisfromstatetonon-stateactors,andtoterroristgroupsand
    organisedcrimenetworksinparticular.Thisisdrivenbyaprocessoftechnologydispersalandis
    evidentintheincreaseddestructivepotentialofsuchgroups(aparticularworrybeingthepotential
    linkbetweenterroristgroupsandaccesstoweaponsofmassdestruction)andintheiraccessto
    communicationsandencryptiontechnologieswhichamplifytheirvoice,extendtheirorganisational
    reachandincreasetheircapacityforevadinglawenforcement.Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors
    raisesquestionsoverwhatwaspreviouslyseenasastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.It
    also,particularlythroughcorruption,raisesquestionsaboutthecapacityoforganisedcrimenetworks
    tochangetheverycharacterofstates,turningsomeofthemintopariahterritories.
    Third,anunplannedincreaseininter-statepower-sharingisconsideredintheformofincreased
    securityinterdependence,bothintermsofglobalinterdependence(onissuessuchasclimatechange)
    andintermsofthespecificsoftheUK’sinterfacewiththeglobalisedworldeconomy.New
    vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedhere,onenergysecurity,ondrugsmugglingintotheUK,onthe
    vulnerabilityofkeystrategictraderoutesandonourexposuretoanewpandemic.Onalltheseissues,
    thekeypointmadeisthattheUKisreliantforitssecuritynotonlyondecisionstakenathomebuton
    decisionstakenelsewhereandbyothers.
    ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates
    Theseconddriverofchangeidentifiedrelatestotheclutchofissuesinthe‘security-development’
    nexus.Thisisthepointatwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonof
    weakandfailingstatesinteract,todevastatingeffect.Povertykillsmorepeoplethanpolitical
    violence,andisadriverofconflictandinstabilityinmanypartsofthedevelopingworld.Whilenotall
    weakandfailingstatesarepoor,manyofthemare,andpovertyisakeyfactorintheproliferationof
    ungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.Theseinturn,asAfghanistan
    7 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    andSomaliahaveshown,canbecomesafehavensforterroristandorganisedcrimeactivity.Inthis
    context,thestrongignoretheweakattheirperilandforwealthiercountriesliketheUK,moral
    imperativestoaddressglobalpovertyhavenowbeenjoinedbynarrowersecurityinterests.
    iii)Climatechange
    Evenundermid-rangeIPCCtemperatureincreasescenarios,climatechangeissettohaveanumberof
    profoundimplicationsinthenexttwotothreedecades.Chinawillfaceseverewaterstressand
    decliningfoodproductioninimportantregions,atthesametimeasfacinghugepressuretomaintain
    veryhighlevelsofeconomicgrowth.Howitrespondstothesepressurescouldbeoneofthedefining
    featuresoftheinternationalsecuritylandscapefordecadestocome.SouthAsia,particularly
    Bangladesh,willbebadlyaffectedbytheshrinkageoftheHimalayanglaciers,possiblycausinghuge
    flowsofenvironmentalrefugeesacrosstheregion’sborders,andresultinginregionalinstability.Anew
    ‘hydrologicalsecuritycomplex’maydevelopintheMiddleEastaswaterdependencyrelationships,
    particularlyforIsrael,maybecomenewsourcesoftensioninanalreadyvolatileregion.North,East
    andWestAfricawillallbebadlyaffectedbywaterstress,placingadditionalstrainonsomeweakand
    failingstatesandpossiblycausingpopulationmovementsacrosstheSaharaandintoSouthernEurope
    asaresult.
    TheUKitselfwillalsobeaffected,inareassuchasEastAngliathatwillbepronetostormsurgesand
    floods.Importantmilitaryassets,suchasnavalandRAFbases,mayalsobeatrisk,asmightoverseas
    assetssuchasthesupplyandlogisticsbaseatDiegoGarciaintheIndianOcean.
    Climatechange,inshort,islikelytoaccentuateanumberofexistingproblemsonthesecurityagenda,
    andaddnewdifficultiestothosealreadypresent.Asasecurityissue,itmayquicklycometodwarfthe
    issueofterrorism.
    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
    OurfourthdriverofchangeispoliticalIslam,whichwedefinehereasapoliticalmovementusing
    religionforcoverratherthanasareligiousmovementengagedinpolitics.Thismovement,inits
    extremeforms,dividestheworldintocategoriesofgood(thosewhobelieveintheIslamists’
    interpretationofIslam)andevil(countriessuchastheUK,theUSandFrance).Thepolitical
    programmeofgroupsthatsubscribetothisideologytendstobebasedonaccusationsofthe
    manipulationoftheMuslimworldbyboththesecountriesdirectlyandbytheapostaterulerstheyare
    saidtoimposeonpredominantlyMuslimcountries.TheIslamists’objectivesthereforefocusonthe
    removalofsuchapostaterulers,theendingofmaligninterferenceintheaffairsoftheMuslimworld,
    andeven,forsome,ontheoverthrowoftheentiresystemofliberaldemocracyintheWest.
    ThesemovementsmakeappealstothegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandtothoseinterested
    inpossibleconversiontotheIslamists’versionofIslam,andmayconnectwithconcernsoversocial
    exclusion,IslamophobiaandidentitycrisesexperiencedbysomesecondandthirdgenerationMuslims
    livingintheWest.Wearguethatunderlyingradicalisationprocessesarenotwellunderstoodand
    policyresponsesasyet,arenothighlynuancedandwelltargeted.
    v)Socio-economicvulnerability
    Theissueofsocio-economicvulnerability,ourfifthdriver,isrisingupthesecurityagenda,partlyasa
    consequenceofchangestoUKbusinesspractices(movingtoleanproduction,reducedinventories,
    justintimedelivery),partlyasaresultofstretchedglobalsupplychainsandpartlyasaconsequence
    ofsomechangestoourowndomesticinfrastructure.Theresultistheemergenceofamoretightly
    coupledsociety,increasinglyreliantonacriticalinfrastructurethathaslittlesparecapacity.This
    exposestheUKtopossiblesevereconsequencesintheeventoffailuresininfrastructurebrought
    aboutbyterrorism,accidentorsevereweatherincident,asthefloodsofsummer2007madeclear.
    Changesinownershipandcontrolstructuresinrelationtoinfrastructurealsocreategovernance
    challenges(around80percentofimportantUKinfrastructureisownedbytheprivatesector).
    Conclusions:wheredoesallthisleaveus?
    First,thelandscapedescribedisoneinwhichthepowertocontrolthesecurityenvironmentisslipping
    8 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    beyondthereachofgovernmentsactingalone.Thisistrueatthegloballevelonissueslike
    climatechangeandthegrowthofungovernedspaces,anditistrueathomeonissueslike
    protectionofacriticalnationalinfrastructurethattheGovernmentnolongerowns.
    Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,weincreasinglyliveinaworldofshareddestinies
    inwhichthegrievance,policyfailureorinsecurityofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityand
    policyproblemofothers.Inthiscontextsecuritymustbecommontoallorisunlikelytobe
    deliveredforany.
    Third,andgiventheabove,itisclearthatthecorechallengeofsecuritypolicytodayisto
    enhanceandextendourmechanismsofgovernancesuchthattheybettermapontoandreflect
    thecurrentrealitiesofglobalpowerandbetteraddressthesecurityconcernsofall.

    Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape
    Belowweaddresstheimplicationsthatflowfromthisanalysis.
    Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy
    Weneedtobroadentheterraincurrentlyclassifiedasrelevanttosecuritypolicy.Aconcernwith
    defendingtheUKagainstexternalmilitaryattackisstillimportantbutmustnowbenestedwithin
    concernformoreissues,morethreatsandrisks,awiderrangeofactors,andalsomanymorelevels
    ofanalysis(fromtheglobaltothelocal).Itisalsoarguedthatoldnotionsofthesecurityfront
    linenolongerworkandthatsomefrontlinesnowexistoverseasinplaceslikeAfghanistan,while
    somealsoexistatthelocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Manyfrontlinesinvolvethemilitary,
    butothersinvolveeconomicactors,communitygroups,andprivatesectorbusinessestoo.Thenew
    terrainofsecuritypolicyisthereforemorediverseandcomplexthantheold.
    Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach
    Arethinkinoverallstrategicapproachisalsorequired.Itisnotjustthatpowerisbeingdiffused
    morewidelyandthattherangeofchallengesisbecomingbroaderandmorecomplex,butthatthe
    requirementsofprojectinginfluenceinthesecircumstanceshavechangedtoo.
    BelowwesummarisefiveprinciplesthatunderpinUKpolicyresponsesinthesecircumstances:
    • Principle1:Adoptthenotionofintegratedpower,thatis,amoreintegrateduseofawider
    rangeofpolicyinstruments,frommilitaryandpolicinginstrumentsatoneendofthe
    spectrumtoeconomic,socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsattheother.
    • Principle2:Workinpartnershipwithothers,notjustatmultilaterallevelbutalsobetween
    differentactorswithinthesamestateandbetweenstateactorsandactorsfromtheprivate
    andvoluntarysector.Inanerainwhichpowerisbeingdiffusedacrossawiderrangeofactors,
    influencewillbemaximisedbythoseabletoorchestrateandfacilitateawidelydistributed
    response.
    • Principle3:Committolegitimacyofaction.Partnershiprequiresanagreedobjectiveand
    visionacrossmanyactors.Thisitselfcanonlybebuiltonawidelyperceivedbasisof
    legitimacy.Althoughitisnotalwayseasytoachievewidespreadagreement,itisworththe
    effortaslegitimacyactsasaninfluencemultiplier,turningpotentialinfluenceinthesecurity
    environmentintoactualinfluenceasmanymoreactorspullinthesamedirection.
    • Principle4:Movetomoreopenpolicymaking. Legitimacyisaboutprocess,notjustsubstance.
    Itcanonlybedemonstratedifallactorsfeelagenda-settingapproachesanddecision-making
    processesareopen.Officialactorsandmultilateralpartnersmustthereforelooktosharemore
    informationandtoopenupdecision-makingprocessesiftheywanttobeeffectiveincurrent
    circumstances.
    • Principle5:Beopentoinstitutionalreform.Giventheneedtothinkdifferentlyabouthowto
    influencethesecurityenvironment,acommitmenttoinstitutionalreformwillbeessential.Old
    institutionaloperatingproceduresandboundariesshouldnotbeallowedtostiflenecessary
    innovation.
    9 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy
    Anumberofapparentlypressingpolicyquestionscanbeidentifiedgiventheprecedinganalysisofthe
    securityenvironment.Onesetisrelatedtoanticipatoryactiononthesourcesoffuturepossible
    threatsandrisks,andanotherisrelatedtoareasofcurrentvulnerability.
    Anticipatoryquestionsfocuson:
    • Howbesttoreformkeyinternationalinstitutionsandhowbesttostrengthenarules-based
    internationalorder
    •Thelinkagesbetweenclimatechangeandotherelementsofthesecurityagenda,bothathome
    andabroad
    • Thestepsthatmightbenecessarytostrengthenthenuclearnon-proliferationregime
    • Thelinksbetweennationalenergystrategyandinternationalsecurity,includingonsecurityof
    energysupply,andthesecurityissuesthatmayberaisedbyaninternationalexpansionincivil
    nuclearpower
    • TherequirementsofapoliticalstrategytodefeatthechallengeofpoliticalIslam
    • Howbesttotacklethepovertyandinequalitythatarekeyfactorsinmanyfailedandweakstates
    andinmuchconflictandinstabilityinthedevelopingworld
    • Howbesttoenhanceourcapacitiesforconflictpreventionandpost-conflictinterventionin
    failedandfailingstatesandconflictzones
    • Howbesttoprepareforthedangerofanewdiseasepandemic.
    Questionsoncurrentvulnerabilitiesfocuson:
    •HowbesttoreducetheUK’ssocio-economicvulnerabilityandtobuildnationalandlocal
    resilience
    • Howbesttointegratepolicyinstrumentsinthefightagainsttransnationalorganisedcrime
    • Thesecurityofstrategictraderoutes
    • Thesecurityofglobalstocksoffissilematerial.
    Byidentifyingsuchawiderangeofquestions,thepaperhopestoframesomeoftheforwarddebate
    onthedevelopmentoftheUK’sfirstnationalsecuritystrategy.
    10 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    1.Introduction
    OverthelasttwentyyearstheUKandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthaschangeddramatically.
    TheendoftheColdWarandthehorrificattacksof9/11arebuttwodevelopmentsamongmanythat
    havesignalledthearrivalofanew21stcenturylandscape.Newprocessesanddrivers,from
    globalisationtoclimatechange,andfromthegrowthofpoliticalIslamtoamoreinfrastructure-reliant
    societyhavecometotheforeandnowchallengebothoutdatedanalyticalframeworksandoldpolicy
    prescriptions.Poweritselfisonthemove,beingdiffusedmorewidelywithinandamongthe
    communityofstatesandouttoawidergroupofactorsincludingprivatebusinesses,terroristgroups
    andorganisedcrimenetworks.Inthedevelopingworld,interactivecyclesofpoverty,conflictand
    instabilityareplaguingmanyareas,creatingungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaceswhichinturn
    becomesafehavensforthosewhowoulddousharm.Thescaleofunderlyingchangeishuge,andthe
    consequencesbecomingmoreandmoreapparent.
    Policymakersareworkinghardtoadaptandtokeepupwiththepaceofchangebutthedifficulties
    presentedaresignificantandtheprogressuneven.Asaresult,whilemanyoftheeffortsalready
    underwayaretobecommended,andtheGovernment’scommitmenttothedevelopmentand
    publicationofaUKnationalsecuritystrategyfortheveryfirsttimeistobewelcomed,now,more
    thaneverbefore,theneedforconstructiveexternalchallengeisgreat.
    TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whichhasnowmetseveraltimesunder
    theco-chairmanshipofLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon,has
    beensetuppreciselytoprovidesuchchallengethroughthedevelopmentofanindependently
    arrived-atnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.

    Purposeofthispaper
    Inthisipprdiscussionpaper,whichisasubmissiontotheCommissionfromtheDeputyChairand
    CommissionSecretaryandnotanexpressionoftheviewsoftheCommissionitself,wecapture
    someoftheemergingthemesfromtheCommission’searlydeliberations.Indoingso,wetakestockof
    thechangesoccurringandofferanaccountofthemanychallengestheynowpresent.Wealsoassess
    theimplicationsofchangebothforthescopeofsecuritypolicyitselfandforthestrategicpriorities
    thatmaynowneedtobeaddressed.Assuch,thisisnotsomuchapaperexpressingviewsonwhat
    theUK’snationalsecuritystrategyshouldnowbe,asapaperanalysingthecontextwithinwhichthe
    UK’snationalsecuritystrategyoughtnowtobeforged.

    Structureofthepaper
    Thematerialthatfollowscomesintwomainparts.InPart2 wepresentanaccountofcontemporary
    securityconditions.Weaddressshiftsintheglobaldistributionofpower,issuesrelatedtoterrorism,
    thechangingroleofbothstateandnon-stateactors,andsecurityrelevantfeaturesofeconomic
    interdependence.Wealsoexaminethelinkagesbetweenglobalpoverty,inequalityandconflictand
    thenationalsecurityimplicationsofaworldincreasinglythreatenedbyclimatechange.
    Inthispartofthepaper,ourobjectiveistoshowthattherangeandcharacteroftoday’ssecurity
    challengesincludesbutgoesbeyondatraditionalconcernforthemilitarydefenceofourhome
    territory.Indescribingamuchwiderlandscape,werelocatethedebateonsecuritypolicytonewand
    differentterrainandprovide,intheprocess,thebasisformuchneededreflectiononhowwemight
    changestrategyandpolicyinresponse.
    Thisisfollowed,inPart3,withamoredetailedassessmentoftheimplicationsoftheanalysis
    presented.Weofferanewaccountoftheterrainofsecuritypolicy,whichopensupthefieldtomany
    moreactors,issuesandlevelsofanalysisthancanbecapturedbyamoretraditionalapproach.A
    concernwithglobalpoverty,withcriticalinfrastructureprotectionandwithdomesticpublicsafety
    frompandemicdiseasesandnaturaldisastersisadded,forexample,tomoretraditionalmilitaryand
    diplomaticconcerns.Nextwesetoutourthoughtsonthecharacteroftheoverallstrategicresponse
    requiredinthenewcircumstances,beforegoingontoidentifysomeofthekeyquestionstowhichwe
    believeanyforward-lookingnationalsecuritystrategymustnowbesensitive.
    11 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Emergingthemes
    Threethemesemergeasthepaperdevelops.Thefirstisthatweneedtorethinkournotionofwhat
    doesanddoesnotconstitutethefrontlineinthebattleforsecurity.Indeed,ifthereisoneprimary
    distinguishingfeatureofthenewenvironmentfromtheolditisthattraditionalnotionsofasecurity
    frontlinenolongerapply.Todaywefacemultiplefrontlines,acrossamuchwiderrangeofissuesand
    threats,someoutsideofourownterritoryattheothersideoftheworldoratgloballevel,andothers
    downatlocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Thehighlycomplextaskofasecuritystrategyinthis
    environmentistodirectactivityinacoherentwayacrossallissues,frontsandlevelsofactionatthe
    sametime.
    Second,thepaperarguesthatpublicauthoritiesatalllevelsfromthelocaltotheglobalarefindingit
    hardertomaintainsufficientcontrolovertherapidlychangingsecurityenvironment.Poweriseither
    slipping,orinsomecaseshasalreadyslipped,beyondthem.Thekeychallengeofthetimes,therefore,
    relatestohowbesttostrengthenourgovernancemechanismssuchthattheyarebetterableto
    maintainand,wherenecessary,regaincontroloverthatenvironmentatalllevels.
    Third,thepaperspellsouttheneedforcommonsecurity,oraneedtobeinterestednotjustinour
    ownsecuritybutalsointhesecurityofothers.Thisneedisnotaltruisticbutgroundedinabeliefthat
    wenowliveinaworldofgenuinelyshareddestiniesinwhichthegrievance,insecurityorpolicyfailure
    ofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontext,acollaborative
    approachtosecuritypolicy,builtonawiderandmoreeffectivelyintegratedrangeofpolicy
    instrumentsbutalsodrawingintheeffortsofawidelydistributedrangeofactors,islikelytobethe
    keytosuccess.Here,thestressisonnationalgovernments,internationalorganisations,regional
    bodies,NGOs,communitygroups,localauthoritiesandindividualcitizensneedingtopulltogetherto
    deliverthedesiredoutcomesinacollaborativeprocess.Governmentsnolongersimplydelivernational
    securityto,oronbehalfoftherestofusinthisenvironment,butmustalsofacilitate,coordinateand
    orchestratetheactivitiesofmanyotheractorsthatarenowrelevanttopolicysuccess.Toputit
    anotherway,wearguethatanincreaseinthesocialdepthofsecuritypolicycancontributetoits
    ultimatereachandeffectiveness.

    TheCommissiongoingforward
    Theideaspresentedinthispaperareaworkinprogressandtheintentioninpublishingistostimulate,
    andtofocus,furtherdiscussion.Theviewsexpressedhere,toreiterate,capturetheflavourand
    characterofsomeoftheCommission’searlydeliberationsbutaretheviewsoftheauthorsonlyand
    nottheviewsoftheCommissionitself.TheCommissionwillpublishaninterimreportlaterin2008
    andafinalreportin2009,settingoutitsviewsandofferinganindependentlydevelopednational
    securitystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.
    12 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape
    Inthispartofthepaperwepresentouraccountofthekeydriversofthecontemporarysecurity
    environment.Wedothisthroughatreatmentoffivecorethemes.Theseare:
    i) Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
    ii) Povertyandfailingstates
    iii)Climatechange
    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
    v)Socio-economicvulnerability.
    Webelievethatindividually,eachofthesecapturesbothanimportantdriverofchangeandan
    importantsetofeffectsandthatwhentakentogethertheyamounttoavaluableframeworkfor
    thinkingaboutthesecurityenvironmentasawhole.Inthematerialthatfollows,thethemeof
    globalisationandpowerdiffusionisdealtwithatgreaterlengththaneachoftheothers(primarilyasa
    resultofitscomplexity),butall,inourview,haveequalsignificance.

    i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion
    Akeyfeatureofthesecuritylandscapetodayisanongoingprocessofpowerdiffusion.1 Power
    diffusionisoccurringlargelyasaconsequenceofglobalisationandfundamentallyislinkedtosomeof
    globalisation’sunderlyingfeatures,namelytechnologyadvanceanddispersal,improved
    communications,andreducedtransportationcosts.Itisvisibleinseveralrespects:
    • First,andperhapsmostobviously,itisvisibleinarelativeredistributionofpowerwithinand
    acrossthecommunityofstates.
    • Second,itisreflectedintheincreasedimportanceofarangeofnon-stateactorssuchasglobal
    businesses,terroristgroups,transnationalcriminalnetworksandsometransnationalpolitical
    movements.
    • Third,itisevidentintheunplannedgrowthofpower-sharingbetweenstates,suchthatthe
    securityofonenowoftendependsondecisionstakeninandbyothers.(KeohaneandNye1973)
    Wedealwitheachoftheseinturnbelow.
    Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates
    Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstatesrelatesfirsttoarelativeredistributionof
    powerfromtheAtlanticseaboardtoAsiaandthePacific.Thisisnot,intheshorttermatleast,about
    asignificantshiftinthemilitarybalance:giventhedemiseoftheSovietUnion,noonestateoreven
    collectionofstateswillrivalthemilitarypoweroftheUnitedStatesintheimmediatefuture.This
    dimensionofpowerdiffusionis,rather,economicsledandissignalledprincipallybytheriseofChina
    andIndia.
    China’sincreasedpowerisaproductoftworelateddevelopments.Thefirstisitssustainedandrapid
    economicgrowthwhich,overthelast20years,hasaveragedanannualrateofjustbelow9percent,a
    figurecomparabletoJapan’saverage10percentannualgrowthrateduringitsboomyearsof1955to
    1972.China’sGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)isnow,asaconsequence,theworld’sfourthlargest
    behindthetheUnitedStates,Japan,andGermany.2 Second,China’sincreasingeconomicpowerisa
    functionofitshugeforeigncurrencyreserveswhichhavebeenbuiltonthebackofitsseemingly
    endlesssupplyoflow-costlabour,aconsequentriseinitsmanufacturingsector,andtheunprecedented

    1.Bypowerinthiscontext,wemeantheresourcesandcapacitiesthatmaypotentiallybeusedto
    achieveinfluenceoverthesecurityenvironment.Inthissectionofthepaper,wediscusstherelative
    distributionofsuchresourcesandcapacitiesamongactorsintheinternationalsystem.InSection3we
    returntotheissueofwhichresourcesandcapacitiesarethoughtmostimportantincurrent
    circumstances,andtohowtheymightbestbecombinedformaximumeffect.
    2.ThoughinGDPpercapitaterms,in2006,itlaggedbehindLebanon,KazakhstanandArmenia.All
    figuresbasedonUSBureauofLaborStatisticsandHumanDevelopmentReport,2006.
    13 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    tradesurplusesthathavefollowed.China’sforeigncurrencyreservessoaredpastUS$1trillioninearly
    2007andkeptracinguptomorethan$1.3trillionbythemiddleoftheyear.Reservesofthisscale
    effectivelygivetheChinesegovernmentthepowertodumpdollarsonworldmarkets,forcingacrashin
    thevalueofthedollarandpotentiallyputtingtheUSandglobaleconomyintorecession.3
    India,foritspart,isalsoenjoyinganenhancedpowerpositionbasedonitsownrecentrapideconomic
    growthandonitspotentialtosustainahighgrowthratefarintothefutureduetoitsmassiveand
    youngpopulation.CurrentprojectionshaveIndia’seconomysurpassingBritain’sby2020andthenow
    famousGoldmanSachsBRICanalysispredictsthatby2050itspercapitaGDPwillhavemultiplied35
    times(GoldmanSachs2003).
    Theseareprofounddevelopments,thoughitisalsoimportanttosoundanoteofcaution.Despite
    currenteconomictrendsinbothChinaandIndia,thecontinuedriseofbothcannotandshouldnotbe
    takenforgranted.Eachcountryhasenormouschallenges.Chinamustcontinuetogrowtoliftits
    massesoutofpoverty,hastodealwithpervasiveenvironmentalproblems,andmustanswer
    fundamentalquestionsaboutthesustainabilityofCommunistPartyruleinthelongterm.Indiatoo,
    hasamassivetasktoimprovethelotofitspoor,hassignificantweaknessesinitseducationsystem(it
    hasaliteracyrateofonly60percent)andhighHIV/AIDSprevalenceincertainstates.BothChina
    andIndia,moreover,mustnavigatedifficultsecuritychallenges,ChinainrelationtoTaiwan,andIndia
    initsdisputewithPakistanoverKashmir.
    Thatsaid,evenonthebasisofthegrowthachievedtodate,itisalreadypossibletodiscerntwo
    geopoliticalconsequencesoftheriseofChinaandIndia.
    First,itispossibletoseetheriseofbothasstimulatingashiftingreatpowerrivalryfromthelargely
    Europeanstageinthelastcentury,totheglobalstageinthisone.Perhapstheclearestsignofthis
    wastherecentandcontroversialnucleardealbetweentheBushadministrationandtheIndian
    government.ThisdealeffectivelycondonedIndiandevelopmentanduseofarangeofnuclear
    technologiesoutsideofafullinternationalinspectionregimeandwasrightlycriticisedbymanyfor
    potentiallydealingaseriousblowtothenuclearnon-proliferationregime.Ithasbeenjustifiedbyits
    supportershoweverasadealdesignedtodrawIndiaclosertotheWest,helpingtobalancetheriseof
    Chinesepowerintheprocess.
    Second,whateverthefutureholdsforChinaandIndia,bothalreadynowholdpivotalpositionsin
    relationtoissuessuchasclimatechangewhich,aswillbeoutlinedlater,isanincreasinglysignificant
    driveroftheinternationalsecuritylandscape.ChinasurpassedtheUSastheworld’slargestemitterof
    greenhousegasesin2007anditisnoexaggerationtosaythatwithoutthecooperationofbothChina
    andIndia,asuccessfulresponsetothechallengeofclimatechangecannotbefound.Werewealready
    tobewitnessingthehighpointofChinaandIndia’srelativeriseatthispoint,therefore,theworld
    wouldstillbeaprofoundlychangedplace,whateveronepredictsforeachoftheminfuture.
    BeyondtheriseofChinaandIndia,afurtherbutrelatedsetofdevelopmentsdrivinganew
    distributionofpoweramongthecommunityofstatesconcernsenergy.Anewcadreofpotentially
    powerfulenergystatesandregionsisemergingonthebackofongoingchangesintheinternational
    energyorder.Ontheonehand,asChinaandIndiahavegrown,theyhavebecomemajorconsumers
    ofenergyandthishashadasignificanttighteningeffectonworldenergymarkets,drivingupprices,
    raisingthespectreofincreasedcompetitionandevenconflictoverscarceenergyresourcesinthe
    decadesahead,andplacingrenewedemphasisontheissueofenergysecurity.
    Ontheotherhand,theRussianeconomy,onthebackofitsextensivenaturalenergyresources,has
    beenonemajorbeneficiaryofthis,suchthatitisnowenjoyingannualGDPgrowthat7percent,
    currencyreservesupmorethan600percentinfouryears,exportsup,andinflationdown.Russia,as

    3.Thiswouldbeunlikely,however,becauseChina’smanufacturingbaseistiedtoconsumerdemandin
    WesterneconomiesandbecausetheChineseCommunistParty’sgriponpowerisdependenton
    continuedeconomicgrowthandrisinglivingstandardsforthemorethan400millionChineselivingin
    realpoverty(foranaccountofthisseeHutton2007).
    14 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    severalrecenteventshaveshown,isnotaversetoflexingitspoliticalandmilitarymusclesagainstthis
    newsituation.Forexample,ithastemporarilycutoffgassuppliestoUkraineandresumedlong-range
    strategicbomberpatrols.Otherstatesandregionstooareincreasinginimportanceasenergymarkets
    change,theCaspianSearegion,theformerSovietstatesofcentralAsia,Iran,Qatar,Nigeriaand
    Venezuelaamongthem.Thisallcreatesnewcentresofpowerintheinternationalsystem,new
    potentialflashpointsbetweenstatesinneedofenergysupplies,andnewareasofstrategicinterest
    andsignificanceforallthemajorpowers.
    Third,intermsoftheissueswehighlightasdriversofpowerdiffusionamongthecommunityof
    states,wecometothespreadofnuclearweaponstechnology.EventhoughIsraeldevelopeditsown
    nuclearcapabilityoutsidethenuclearnon-proliferationregime,thisregimeremainedrelativelystable
    untilthelate1990s,withthefivedeclarednuclearpowers(theUS,Britain,Russia,ChinaandFrance)
    largelymaintainingamonopolyovernuclearweaponscapabilitiesuptothatpoint.
    Thelastdecade,however,haswitnessedadisturbingtrendtowardswiderstateproliferation.Indiaand
    Pakistaneachconductedaseriesofnuclearweaponstestsin1998,bringingthetotalof
    acknowledgednuclearweaponsstatestoseven.NorthKorearesumedthereprocessingofplutonium
    in2002atafacilitythathadbeenunderInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)inspectionsince
    1994.TheNorthKoreans,whowerepreviouslybelievedtohavedevelopedenoughnuclearfuelto
    maketwobombs,nowpossessenoughmaterialtoconstructtwobombsperyear.In2006,moreover,
    NorthKoreaconductedalow-yieldnucleartest,becomingtheeighthacknowledgedmemberofthe
    nuclearclub,althoughithasnowonceagainsuspendedreprocessingactivityatitsYongbyonnuclear
    reactor.InIran,meanwhile,thegovernmentisbelievedtobepursuinganuclearweaponsprogramme,
    eventhoughitmaintainsthatitseffortsarepurelyintendedtoproducepeacefulnuclearenergy.
    Westernintelligenceagenciesandindependentanalystsbelievethatonitscurrentcourse,Iranisfrom
    twototenyearsawayfromobtaininganuclearweapon.
    ThesedevelopmentshavespurredatleastanotherelevencountriestohedgeagainstanIranianbomb
    andtoseekassistancefromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)todeveloptheirown
    nuclearenergyprograms.Egypt,Turkey,andSaudiArabia,allSunniMuslimcountriesfearfulthat
    masteryofnucleartechnologybyShiaIrancouldentrenchtheIslamicRepublicasaregional
    hegemonicpower,areleadingthisnewwaveofnucleardevelopment.Turkeyhaspledgedtobuild
    threenewreactors,Egyptfour,andSaudiArabiahaspushedthefiveothermembersoftheGulf
    CooperationCounciltopursuenucleartechnology(CirincioneandLeventner2007).Ifcurrenttrends
    arenotreversed,by2015theperpetuallyvolatileMiddleEastcouldhavetwonuclear-weaponsstates
    (IsraelandIran)andadozenothercountrieswithscoresofnuclearreactorsrequiringlargeamountsof
    nuclearfuel.Theseareprofoundshiftsaffectingthestabilityofanalreadytroubledregion.
    Evenmorefundamentally,however,theproliferationofnucleartechnologiesandweaponsrepresents
    asignificantadditionalmodificationtothewiderrelativedistributionofpoweramongstatesinthe
    internationalsystem.Whenseenincombinationwiththeotherchangesdescribedinthissection,this
    representsashifttoanewandpotentiallyfarlessstableeraofinter-staterelationsandalso,
    importantly,tooneinwhicharangeofinternationalinstitutionsandregimesfromtheUNSecurity
    CounciltotheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatynolongerappeartoreflectorcapturetherealitiesof
    globalpower.
    Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors
    Thesecondevidentdimensionofpowerdiffusionthatweobserveisthatinvolvingarelativediffusion
    ofpowerfromstatetonon-stateactors.Someofthisdiffusionhasbeendrivenbystatesthemselves
    throughuseofprivatemilitaryfirms.Muchofit,however,hasoccurredinspiteof,andnotbecauseof
    theviewsanddecisionsofstates.Terroristgroups,groupsengagedintransnationalorganisedcrime,
    andsometransnationalpoliticalmovements,particularlyintheMiddleEast,haveallbeenvisible
    beneficiariesofthiswiderprocessinrecentyears.Inthissection,wefocusprimarilyonthislatter
    groupofactors,believingtheyareofmoreimmediateandpressingsecurityconcern.
    Totaketerroristgroupsfirst,thesehaveobviouslybeenofincreasedsignificancesince9/11,thepoint
    15 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    atwhichanewformof‘super-terrorism’tookcentrestageininternationalaffairs(Freedman2002).
    Theyarealong-termandstructuralchallenge,however,whatevertheirideologicalorientation,fortwo
    underlyingreasons.
    Thefirstconcernstheirincreasinglydestructivenatureandpotential.Thisisevidencedbythefactthat
    thelevelofviolenceinactsofterrorismhasbeenincreasinginrecentdecades.Thebombingofthe
    WorldTradeCenteron26February1993tooksixlivesandinjured1,000.HugebombsattheUS
    embassiesinKenyaandTanzaniainAugust1998killed220andwounded4,000betweenthem.The
    eventsof11September2001saw2,986peoplelosetheirlivesasthreeairlinersflewintothe
    PentagoninWashingtonandbothtowersoftheWorldTradeCenterinNewYork.
    Thetrend,therefore,isclear.Itmaynotbesmoothandannualdeathtollsfromterrorismarenot
    goingupatanevenrateyearonyear,buttherecordnowstandsatnearly3,000deathsforasingle
    terroristoperationcarriedoutonasingleday.Inthiscontext,PlutaandZimmermanwererightto
    recentlyconcludethat‘fewpsychologicalbarrierstotruemass-casualtyterrorismremain’(Plutaand
    Zimmerman2006:66).Intermsoffuturepotential,moreover,thekeyworryisthatterroristgroups
    willgainaccesstoweaponsofmassdestructionandtoanuclearweaponinparticular.Some,suchas
    RobinFrostinarecentAdelphipaper,havedismissedthisasanunrealisticpossibility,arguingthat
    ‘theriskofnuclearterrorism,especiallytruenuclearterrorismemployingbombspoweredbynuclear
    fission,isoverstated’(Frost2005:7).Butthisseemsanextraordinarilycomplacentpositiontotake
    whenoneconsidersthewidercontext.
    First,weknowthatsometerroristgroupshaveaclearintenttoaccessweaponsofmassdestruction,
    includingnuclearweaponsandmaterials,ifatallpossible.ThisiscertainlytrueofAlQaeda.Drawing
    oninsideexperienceandseniorintelligencesources,formerUSAssistantSecretaryofDefenceGraham
    AllisonnotesthatOsamaBinLadentriedtoacquireHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)fromSouthAfrica
    asearlyas1992andalsothatBinLadenandotherseniorAlQaedarepresentativesmetwithsenior
    figuresfromthePakistaninuclearweaponsprogrammein2001(Allison2006).Materialsdiscoveredin
    AlQaedasafehousesinAfghanistan,moreover,showthatAlQaedaofficialsspenttimeresearching
    theprocessesrequiredtobuildanuclearweaponandalsounderstoodthepossibleshortcutsthat
    couldbetakeninbuildingacrudenucleardevice.OthergroupsbeyondAlQaeda,suchasJaish-e-
    Mohammed(JEM),agroupfocusedontheKashmirconflictbutwithreportedlinkstothePakistani
    establishment,andHezbollah,withitscloselinkstoIran,cannotberuledoutasorganisationsalso
    seekingthenuclearoption.
    Ifdemandforthisoptionexiststhensotoo,worryingly,doespotentialsupply.Thedangerherecomes
    intwoforms,namelythatterroristgroupswillillegallyacquireeitheraready-madenuclearweapon,a
    so-called‘loosenuke’,orthefissilematerialrequiredtomakeone.Controversyhasragedontheissue
    ofloosenukeseversinceAlexanderLebed,theformernationalsecurityadvisertoPresidentYeltsin,
    confidedtobothpublicandprivateaudiencesintheUnitedStatesin1997thattheRussian
    governmentcouldnotaccountfor84one-kilotonSovietsuitcasenucleardevices(Allison2006).Since
    thattime,despitesomeimprovementsinsecurityaroundRussia’snuclearfacilities,onlyjustover50
    percentofRussia’snuclearweaponsandmaterialshaveundergoneacomprehensivesecurityupgrade
    (NuclearThreatInitiative2006).
    Onthesecondthreat,thatterroristgroupswillgettheirhandsonweaponsgradefissilematerial,the
    pictureishardlymorereassuring.Toachieveanuclearexplosion,aminimumof15.9kgofHighly
    EnrichedUraniumor4.1kgofplutoniumisrequired.4 Arecentstrategicdossieronnuclearblack-
    marketsbytheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,usinghighlyconservativeestimatesdrawn
    fromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheDatabaseonNuclearSmuggling,Theft
    andOrphanRadiationSources(DSTO)statedbaldlythat:‘ThetotalamountofHEUandplutonium
    seizedinstate-confirmedandotherhighlycredibleincidentsregisteredintheperiod1991-2006is

    4.Theseamountsapplyifaberylliumreflectorisusedinthedevice.Withoutsuchareflector,more
    fissilematerialisneeded.
    16 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    roughly38kg’(IISS2007:126).Notallofthis38kgwasweaponsgradematerialbutaround8kgofit
    was,andthisrepresentsonlytherecoveredamountsofbomb-relevantmaterialfromknown attempts
    atsmugglinginrecentyears.5 Bydefinition,itdoesnottellustheamountofnuclearmaterialstolen
    butnotdetectedbylawenforcementagenciesoverthesameperiodandwecannotretrospectively
    calculatewhatthatamountmightbesincethereisnoglobalinventoryofHEUandplutoniumandit
    isnotknownexactlyhowmuchplutoniumandHEUhasbeenproducedsince1945(Plutaand
    Zimmerman2006).
    Thepointaboutallofthesedevelopmentsisthat,withoutfurthersignificantefforttoaddressthe
    trendsandchallengesdescribed,theypointtoa21stcenturyinwhichitishighlyunlikelythatstate
    actorswillretaintheirmonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.
    Aseconddevelopmentthatisenhancingtherelativepowerofterroristgroupsresidesinthe
    advantagesnowbeingbestoweduponthembydigitaltechnologyandcommunications.Thesehave
    amplifiedthevoice,extendedtheorganisationalreach,andenhancedthelawenforcementevasion
    capabilitiesofterroristgroups.Satellitecommunicationshavealsoshrunkdistanceandmadeitmuch
    easierforterroristgroupstobothmakeandsustaincross-borderconnections.TheInternethas
    becomeakeyplacefortherecruitment,radicalisationandmobilisationofmanyyoungextremistsand,
    forthoseseekingtomaketheswitchfromextremismtooperationalterrorism,akeyknowledge-
    sharingtoolandaidforattack-coordinationandplanning(Ryan2007).Strongencryptiontools,
    meanwhile,availablemorecheaplyandeasilythaneverbefore,arefacilitatingterroristuseofsuch
    communicationschannelsinasecureandsecretenvironment(MinistryofDefence2007).Thislast
    developmentinparticularrepresentsasignificantshiftinrelativepowerfromstatetonon-stateactors
    since,onlythreedecadesago,strongencryptiontoolsrequiredsuchparticularfinancialand
    computingresourcesthattheyeffectivelyremainedthepreserveofstates.
    Turningtoorganisedcrimenetworks,thesetooarebecomingmoreprominentandthreatening.
    Increasingly,theyareoperatingacrossbordersbecausedecliningtransportcosts,improvedglobal
    communicationsandtheincreasedcross-borderflowsofbothpeopleandgoodsmakesthisfareasier
    thaneverbefore.Thesheerscaleofcriminalactivityisalsoincreasing,partlybecauseoftheextended
    geographicalreachofthecriminalnetworksthemselves,partlybecauseforsome,particularlyinthe
    developingworld,criminalactivityisseenasonepotentialrouteoutofpovertyandpartlybecausein
    somepatrimonialstatesthereisnowanattitudethatnationalresourcesaretheretobeexploitedfor
    thebenefitofthecorruptfewinpower.Consequently,theUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneral’sHigh
    LevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangesrightlyidentified,inareportin2004,transnational
    organisedcrimeasoneofthemajorsecuritychallengesfacingtheworld(UnitedNations2004).
    Theillicitdrugstradeisthemostlucrativeoftheactivitiesunderway(accordingtotheUnitedNations
    OfficeonDrugsandCrime,theoverallturnoveroftheworldwideillicittradeindrugsalonenow
    standsataround$300bnannually[UNODC2006]),thoughthevarietyofcriminalactivitiesisalso
    widening.AstheUN’sAntonioMazzitellirecentlypointedout,‘criminalactivitiessuchastraffickingin
    people,stolenvehicles,naturalresources,firearmsandcontraband,counterfeitingandintellectual
    piracy,smugglingofmigrants,andcybercrimeallfeatureonthemenuofservicesoffered’(Mazzitelli
    2007:1074).
    Launderingofmoneyandcorruptionarethetwofurtheressentialfeaturesofthisactivity,thefirstto
    allowcriminalstobenefitfromtherevenuesraisedandthesecondtoreducetheriskofcapturebylaw
    enforcementagenciesandtoincreaseinfluenceoverpoliticaldecisionsincountriesofoperation.
    Transnationalorganisedcrimethereforeflourishesmostwherestateinstitutionsareopento
    corruption,whereenforcementoftheruleoflawisweakandwherebordersareporous.Evenmore
    importantlyfromthepointofviewofunderstandingthecontemporarynationalsecurityenvironment,
    criminalnetworksnotonlylocatethemselvesinareasthathavesomeofthesecharacteristics,suchas

    5.Forweaponspurposes,HEUneedstobeenrichedtoatleast80percentoraboveandmorenormally
    to90percentorabove.
    17 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    inWestAfrica,butdothemselvesalsohavethepotentialtocreateandsustainpariahstates6 which,
    nomatterwhattheirformalarrangementsofgovernanceare,actuallyserveassafehavensforcriminal
    gangsandtheiractivities.Thisisaserioussituation,bothbecausethestatesinquestioncan
    effectivelyspreadinstabilitythroughouttheregionsinwhichtheyarelocatedandbecausethereare
    alsolinksbetweencriminalnetworksandterroristgroups,withtheformeroftenprovidingmoney
    launderingandotherfinancialservicestothelatteraswellasassistingintheillicittraffickingofgoods
    thatmaybeofvaluetothem.
    Whereasterroristgroupsarechallengingastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforceandare
    increasingly,therefore,notfindingstatebordersahindrance,transnationalorganisedcrimegroupsare
    changingtheverycharacterofsomestatesintheinternationalsystem,turningthemintovehiclesfor
    privateprofitandspreadinginstabilityandmiseryintheprocess.
    Athirdandfinalsetofnon-stateactorswebelieveitimportanttohighlightarethetransnational
    politicalmovementsthathavecometoexertimportanceinfluenceoninternationalaffairsinrecent
    years.OnesuchmovementisHezbollah,aparticularlyimportantorganisationinthecontextofthe
    contemporaryMiddleEast.
    Hezbollah,anIslamistpoliticalgroupformedin1982toresistwesterncolonialisminLebanonand
    acrossthewiderregion,toengageinarmedstruggleagainstIsraelandtoworktowardsthe
    establishmentofaLebaneseIslamicRepublic,runsschools,hospitalsandmediaservices,andhas
    implementedmanydevelopmentprogrammesinareasinwhichitisoperational.Itsso-called‘Martyr’s
    Institute’givesfinancialassistancetothefamiliesofthosewhodieinconflictand,followingtheJuly
    2006waragainstIsrael,Hezbollahhasbeenextremelyactiveinthereconstructionprocess,often
    doingmoreonthisfrontthantheLebanesegovernmentitself.Hezbollah,inotherwords,anddespite
    thenarrowcoverageofitsactivitiesintheWest,paysmuchattentiontoawiderangeofsocialwelfare
    activitiesaswellastotheconflictwithIsrael(Salem2006).
    Inhighlightingthisgroup,thepointwemakeisnot,ofcourse,apoliticaloneinsupportofit.
    Hezbollahhasanobjectionablepolicyplatformonmanyissuesandislessthanfullyconstructivein
    relationtobringingpeaceandstabilitytotheMiddleEast.Thepointwemake,rather,istheanalytical
    onethatinconditionsofconflictandweak,absentorineffectualstateinstitutions,transnational
    politicalmovementssuchasHezbollahcananddoemergetofillthevacuumandtoplaysignificant
    rolesintheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Theyalsooftendosoonthebasisofacarefully
    cultivated,deep-rootedandoftenlong-termrelationshipoflegitimacywiththepopulationsthey
    claimtorepresent.Sometransnationalpoliticalactorswithsocialpower,inotherwords,havebecome
    seriousplayersininternationalpolitics.Whiletheymighthavestatebackers(inthiscaseSyriaand
    Iran)theyarenotentirelyinthepocketsoftheirbenefactors.Assuch,theycannoteasilybeby-
    passedorignoredwhenthinkingaboutpolicyresponsesand,inthiscase,theyareapopulist
    challengetothelegitimacyofmanyWest-backedstateactorsintheMiddleEast.
    Non-stateactorstoday,therefore,enjoyincreasedpowerandinfluencewhethertheyareterrorist
    groups,transnationalcriminalgangsortransnationalpoliticalmovementsactiveontheinternational
    stage.Someoftheseactorsareacquiringsomeofthepowerattributesofstates,arealteringthe
    characterofsomestatesand,farmoreeffectivelythaninthepast,areofteninfluencing,undermining,
    destabilisingandevenquestioningthelegitimacyofstates.Thisaddsanewsetofdynamicsand
    challengestotheinternationalsecurityenvironment.
    Powerdiffusionbeyondstateborders:securityinterdependence
    Thethirdandfinaldimensionofpowerdiffusionwehighlightrelatestomorepower-sharingbetween
    statesintheformofincreasedsecurityinterdependence.Thisitselfcomesintwoforms.Thefirst
    relatestoasetofchallengesthataretrulyglobalinnatureandwhereconsequentlyonlysolutionsof

    6.Bypariahstates,wemeanonesthatessentiallybehaveasoutcasts,alienatedfrommostotherstates
    andacceptednormsofinternationalbehaviour.
    18 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    globalreachandwithallthemajorpowersinvolvedwilldo.Climatechangemitigation,orattemptsat
    effectivecontrolofglobalstocksoffissilematerial,wouldbeemblematicissuesinthiscategory:there
    isastrongsenseontheseissuesthatthecommunityofstateseithersinksorswimstogether.
    Thesecondform,however,relatestothespecificthoughdifferentvulnerabilitiespresentedtoeach
    stateasaby-productofitsowneconomicinterdependencewithtoday’sglobalisedworldeconomy.In
    thecaseoftheUK,thereareatleastfoursuchvulnerabilities.
    First,intermsofenergysupplies,theUKisadvancingintoaperiodoflesssecurityofsupplythanit
    hasexperiencedinrecentdecades,asitmovesfrombeinganetenergyexportertoanetenergy
    importer.Norwayiscurrentlyourmostimportantenergypartnerasamajorsupplierofbothoiland
    gas(Norwayaccountedfor75percentofUKoilimportsin2005).However,intheyearsahead
    Russia,theCaspianSearegion,Nigeria,Algeria,andtheMiddleEast,arealllikelytobecomemore
    importantsupplierstotheUK.OurkeyEuropeantradingpartners,meanwhile,arealsowitnessing
    shiftsintheirenergysupplybase.TheInternationalEnergyAgency,forexample,‘predictsthatthe
    biggestsupplierofgastoEuropein2030willbeAfrica,followedbyRussiaandtheMiddleEast’(Bird
    2007:12;IEA2006).Thesechangesincreaseourvulnerabilitytoeventsin,andpressurefrom,awide
    rangeofsuppliercountries.
    Second,ourincreasingrelianceontrade(in2006,tradeaccountedfor60percentoftheUK’sGDP)
    makesthesecurityofkeystrategictraderoutesmoreimportantforbothBritainandtheEUthanever
    before.Onesuchstrategictraderouteofgrowingimportanceisthealreadymassiveandrapidly
    expandingmaritimefreightroutelinkingtheeconomiesofAsiatothoseofEurope(seeFinancial
    Times 2007b).Anysignificantdisruptiontothisorotherroutes,broughtonbymaritimeterrorismor
    otherevents,couldhavemassiveeconomicconsequencesfortheUKandindeedfortheEUasa
    whole(seeRichardson2004).
    Third,transnationalcrimeisamajorsourceofvulnerabilityfortheUK,comingonthebackofthe
    vastlyincreasedmovementofbothpeopleandgoodsacrossourborders.7 Wecannotandshouldnot
    ruleoutcollaborationbetweencriminalgangsactiveacrossourbordersandterroristgroupsintenton
    smugglingharmfulmaterialsintotheUK.Suchcollaborationcouldhaveveryserioussecurity
    consequences.Thepotentialeconomicimpactofsuchcriminalactivityisalsogreat,however.Tax
    revenuesattheborder,forexample,currentlyamountto£22billionperannum,oraround5percent
    ofthetotaltaxtakeofaround£420billion.Inthiscontext,successfullarge-scalecross-borderfraud
    couldhaveaseriousimpactonthepublicpurse(CabinetOffice2007).
    Anestimated25-35tonnesofheroin,meanwhile,enterstheUKannuallyalongwith35-45tonnesof
    cocaineandbothcontributetoadrugsproblemthatisestimatedtocost£15.4billionayearinthe
    formoflawenforcement,crimeandhealth-relatedcosts(ibid:22).Therearealsosocialvulnerabilities.
    Activitiessuchasdrugsmugglingimpactdirectlyonourcommunitiesintheformofsocialbreakdown
    andareducedsenseofpublicsafety.
    Fourthandlast,givenourpositionasaglobalhubforpeoplemovementinaneraofpeople
    movementonanunprecedentedscale,theUKisinanexposedpositioninrelationtothreatssuchas
    aninfluenzapandemicbroughtinfromtheoutside.Apandemicisnowconsideredabiological
    certainty,theonlyuncertaintiesbeingoverthestraininvolved,theseverityoftheoutcomeandthe
    timingoftheoutbreak.ManyexpertsbelievethatH5N1birdfluisthestraintoworryaboutandthis,
    asweknow,cankillhumanbeings(globally,therewere79fatalitiesin2006alone).IfH5N1wereto
    mutateintoavirusthatcouldbepassednotonlyfrombirdstohumansbutalsodirectlybetween
    humanbeings,thatwouldbeapotentiallycatastrophicdevelopment.Recentstudieshavesuggested
    that,‘incontrasttoseasonalinfluenza,whichprimarilyinvolveslunginfection,theH5N1virusmight

    7.Thecurrentannualflowofmorethan218millionpassengerjourneysacrossUKbordersisexpectedto
    increaseto450millionby2030.Totalfreightflowsarealsonowmassive,witharound440milliontonnes
    offreightflowingacrossourborderseachyear,afigurelikelytoincreaseto580milliontonnesby2030
    (CabinetOffice2007).
    19 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    bedisseminatedthroughoutthebodyandaffectmultipleorgansthanksinparttoaconditionofthe
    immunesystemknownasacytokinestorm.Thisisasignificantfindingsincecytokinestormshelpto
    explainwhythe1918-19pandemicwassodeadly’(Osterholm2007:50).Consequently,inassessing
    thelikelyoutcomeofapandemic,arecentstudybytheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy
    (McKibbin2006)foundthat‘wereapandemicassevereasthatof1918-19tooccur,over142million
    peoplewoulddieandtheworld’sGDPwouldsufferalossofsomeUS$4.4trillion’(McKibbinquoted
    inOsterholm2007:48).
    Ourreadinessandlevelofprotectionfromsuchaneventisinadequatebutmorethanthat,itisalso
    intricatelytiedupwithandreliantuponthepublicandanimalhealthsystemsandfreedomof
    movementstrategiesadoptedbymanyothercountriesandnotonlyonthestrategiesweputinplace
    hereintheUK.
    Infact,inalloftheformsofvulnerabilitydescribedinthissection,thekeypointtonoteisashiftin
    thepowertoaddresspolicychallengesawayfromtheindividualstatelevelandtowardseitherthe
    globallevelontheonehand(verticalshift)ortoanotherstate,orgroupofstatesontheother
    (horizontalshift).Thisappliestoclimatechange,tothesupplyofenergy,tothesecurityofourtrade
    routes,tolawenforcementactivitiesoverseasonorganisedcrimeandterrorismandtoprecautions
    takenagainstanewpandemic.Theoutcomeofsecurityinterdependence,inshort,isaworldinwhich
    thesecurityofonestateanditspeopleismoredependentthaneverbeforeondecisions,actionsand
    eventsunfoldingelsewhereinothers.

    ii)Povertyandfailingstates
    Ourseconddriverofchangeinthesecuritylandscaperelatestoglobaleconomicconditionsandtoa
    clutchofissuesaroundwhatismostoftencalledthe‘security-developmentnexus’.Thisisthepoint
    atwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonofweakandfailingstates
    interact,todevastatingeffect.
    Povertyitselfhasbeenhighontheinternationalagendainrecentyearsthanksinnosmallparttothe
    Britishgovernmentand,globally,thankstothehighprofilegiventoattemptstomeettheMillenium
    DevelopmentGoals.Therehavebeensomerealandquantifiablesuccessestoo.Thenumberofpeople
    livinginabjectpovertyonlessthanUS$1perday,forexample,hasmorethanhalved,fallingfrom
    40.1percentoftheworld’spopulationin1981to18.1percentin2004(WorldBank2007).An
    estimated135millionpeoplewerepulledoutofpovertyintheperiod1999to2004alone.Muchof
    thiseffort,however,hasbeenconcentratedintheeconomicmiraclesinChinaandotherpartsof
    rapidlydevelopingEastAsia,ratherthanbeingevenlyspread(Sachsetal 2007).Consequently,
    accordingtotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,almost50percentoftheworld’schildren
    werestilllivinginpovertyin2005.Indeed,theterm‘developingcountry’isstillamisnomerwhen
    appliedtosomeoftheworld’spoorestcountries,asmorethanthreebillionpeoplearelivingonless
    thanUS$2aday,withlittleimmediatehopeofmajorimprovement.
    Thislevelofcontinuedpovertyiscentraltoourargumentsforthreereasons.
    First,povertyisamajorthreattohumanlife.Inanygivenyearinwhichthereisanabsenceofamajor
    globalconflict,povertydirectlyaccountsformorelossofhumanlifethanpoliticalviolenceandthisin
    itselfprovidesapowerfulargumentforthinkingaboutsecurityintermsthatgowellbeyondthe
    traditionalfocusonexternalmilitaryattack.8 Whilenearly3,000peoplediedintheattacksof9/11,
    forexample,preventablediseaseinducedbypovertyclaimstentimesthatnumberofchildrenevery
    day.Bythatmeasure,oureffortstocombatpovertyhavesofarbeenadismalfailureandasaresult,
    inmoraltermsatleast,thelegitimacyofthecurrentinternationaleconomicordermustbe
    questionableatbest(Rice2007).

    8.Thisisoneofthemajorreasonsforwhichmanyanalystshavecalledfortheadoptionofa‘human
    security’perspectivewhenthinkingaboutsecuritypolicy,aperspectivethatwesupportandreturnto
    later.
    20 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Second,povertyonthisscaleisamajorconcernbecauseitisnowagrowingthreattointernational
    peaceandstability.Thereisadirectrelationshipbetweenacountry’spercapitaGDPandits
    susceptibilitytocivilconflict.Evidenceshowsthatifacountryranksinthefiftiethpercentileofper
    capitaGDP,ithasa7.5percentriskofcivilconflict,halfofthelevelforcountriesthatrankinthe
    tenthpercentile(Collieretal 2004).Povertyisalso,importantly,akeydriverofthephenomenonof
    weakandfailingstates,itselfagrowingandcorrosiveproblemontheinternationalstage.Weakstates
    lackthecapacitytopreventviolentconflict,togovernlegitimately,tomeetbasichumanneedsandto
    fostersustainableandequitableeconomicgrowth(Weinsteinetal 2004).Notallweakstatesarepoor,
    buttheentiretopteninForeignPolicymagazine’sFailedStateIndexrankinthebottomthirdof
    statesintermsofpercapitaGDP,andpovertyisclearlyakeyfactorintheseungovernedorbadly
    governedspaces(ForeignPolicy 2007).Suchspacesthemselvesserveasactiveorpassiveincubators
    ofinstabilitythatcanspilloverintoneighbouringcountriesandwholeregionsintheformof
    economicdisruption,refugeeflows,andthespreadofarmedconflictacrossinternationallyrecognised
    borders.
    Anelevatedriskofconflictis,infact,oneofthemostsignificanteffectsofweakandfailingstates
    andthisisnowalsoreflectedinchangingpatternsofconflictaroundtheworld.Ratherthantheinter-
    statewarsthatmarkedmuchofmodernhistorythroughtoWorldWarII,conflictpatternsoverthelast
    sixtyyearshavebeencharacterisedmorebyintra-stateandcivilconflict.Ninety-fivepercentofall
    conflictsarenowofthiskind(HumanSecurityCentre2005).Civilconflictslastlonger,moreover,and
    arehardertoresolvethaninter-statewars,oftenlockingcountriesintoa‘conflicttrap’ofmutually
    reinforcingpovertyandconflictleadingtoaprocessdescribedbytheWorldBankas‘developmentin
    reverse’(WorldBank2003).
    Third,thiscombinationofpovertywithweakandfailingstatesisaconcernbecauseitisnow
    providingadirectthreattoourownsecurity.PresidentJohnF.Kennedy’sstatement,inhisinaugural
    addressin1961,that‘ifafreesocietycannothelpthemanywhoarepoor,itcannotsavethefewwho
    arerich’(Kennedy1961)istruertodaythanitwasnearlyfivedecadesago.Thisisbecauseterrorist
    groupsandcriminalnetworks,bothofwhichoftenhaveglobalreach,cananddonowtakeadvantage
    ofweakandfailingstates.EvenwiththousandsofNATOtroopsnowinAfghanistan,thatcountrystill
    produced87percentoftheworld’sheroinin2005(UNODC2005).Ofcourse,drugshavenotbeen
    theonlydangerousexportemergingfromthatcountrysinceterroristsusedthesafe-havengrantedby
    theTalibantosetinmotiontheattacksof9/11.Somalia’stotallackofnationalgovernancehasalso,
    inrecenttimes,allowedthatcountrytobeusedasaprimarybaseofoperationsandshelterfor
    terroristsactivethroughoutEastAfrica.Severaloftheindividualssuspectedofinvolvementinthe
    bombingsofUSembassiesinKenyaandTanzaniain1998,forexample,arebelievedtostillbeatlarge
    inSomalia(Payne2007).
    Morality,concernsoverwiderinternationalpeaceandstability,andoverourownphysicalsecurity,
    therefore,allmakepovertyandtheattendantgrowthofweakandfailingstatesasignificantdriverof
    thecurrentinternationalsecuritylandscape.Asaresult,fordevelopedandwealthiercountriessuchas
    theUK,thelong-standingmoralimperativetotackletheissuesinthesecuritydevelopmentnexushas
    beenjoinedbyanimperativebasedonself-interest.

    iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity
    Athirdandmorerecentlyemergeddriverofchangeintheinternationalsecurityenvironmentis
    climatechange.Thisislikelytohaveamajorshapinginfluenceoninternationalaffairsinthedecades
    ahead,thoughpreciselyhowandtowhatextentwilldependonthelevelofglobalwarmingthat
    actuallyoccurs.TheFourthAssessmentReportoftheInternationalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)
    producedarangeoffuturetemperaturescenarios,basedonassumptionsaboutpopulationgrowth,
    patternsofeconomicdevelopment,andthedevelopmentandadoptionofnewenergytechnologies
    (IPCC2007).Thesescenariosshowbest-estimateprojectionsofaglobalaveragetemperatureincrease
    thiscenturyintherangeof1.8°Cto4.0°C.Inthematerialthatfollows,webaseourdiscussiononthe
    likelyimpactofthemid-rangescenario,whichsuggestsabest-estimatetemperatureincreaseof2.8°C
    duringthecourseofthecenturyandanincreaseinthenexttwodecadesof1.5°Cto2°C.Underthis
    21 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    scenario,anumberofdevelopmentsinkeyregionsfromEasttoSouthAsia,theMiddleEastandon
    throughmuchofAfricawilllikelyimpacttheinternationalsystem.
    First,theIPCCprojectsthatChina willbeatgreatriskfromclimatechange,particularlycomingunder
    pressureinrelationtowaterstress,statingthat:‘InpartsofChina,theriseintemperaturesanddecreases
    inprecipitation,alongwithincreasingwaterusehavecausedwatershortagesthatledtodryingupof
    lakesandrivers’(IPCC2007:477).China’sownfirstnationalreportonclimatechange,releasedinlate
    2006,alsoforetoldacomingfoodproductioncrisis,withasmuchasaone-thirddecreaseofkeycrop
    yieldsby2030(Li2007).Afurtherworryfortheregimemustalsobethecountry’svulnerabilitytosea
    levelrise,sincemanyofitshighlypopulatedcitiesaresituatedonthecoast.
    TheprojectedimpactsofclimatechangeonChinamayplayabigroleinshapingboththecharacter
    andstabilityofCommunistPartyruleintheyearsahead.Inthelastfewyears,concernsover
    environmentalissueshaveprovokedthousandsofChinesecitizenstodemonstrateacrossthecountry,
    andthepotentialimpactsofclimatechangearenowhighinthemindsoftheChinesepeople.A2006
    pollconductedinChinabytheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsandWorldPublicOpinion.orgfound
    80percentofrespondentsagreedthatwithintenyearsglobalwarmingcouldposeanimportant
    threattotheircountry’s‘vitalinterest’(ChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairs2006).Keyquestionsforthe
    Chineseleadershipthereforearewhetheritcanmaintainrobusteconomicgrowthwhilerespondingto
    thesedemandsforenvironmentalimprovementsandwhetheritcandosotosuchadegreeandat
    suchpaceastoavoidtheneedforrepressivemeasures.Howtheregimehandlesthesechallenges
    couldhaveaprofoundeffectalargepartofinternationalaffairsinthedecadestocome.
    Anotherarealikelytobeseriouslyaffectedbyclimatechangeinthenearandmediumtermisthe
    HimalayanregionofAsia,andthiswilllikelyimpactnearlyallofthesub-continent(IPCC2007).
    TheHimalayanglaciersarethelargestbodyoficeoutsidethePolaricecaps,occupyingapproximately
    500,000km2,andtheyarerecedingatanalarmingrate,farfasterthananyotherglacialareainthe
    world.UndercurrentIPCCprojections,thereisaveryhighchancetheycoulddisappearaltogetherby
    2035andavirtualcertaintythattheywillshrinkbyatleast80percenttocoveronly100,000km2.
    ThiswillhavetheeffectofdeprivingtheIndus,Ganges,andBrahmaputrariversystemsoftheirmain
    sourceofwater,likelymakingthoseriversseasonalandbringingmassivechangesinagriculturalfood
    production,decliningcropyields,andseverewaterstress.Atthesametime,risingsealevelswillalso
    harmfreshwaterecosystemsinthemany‘mega-deltas’intheregion,furtherstressingagricultureand
    foodsuppliesdependentonfishing.
    ItishighlylikelythatthesedevelopmentswillputstressonBangladeshtosuchanextentthatthe
    widerstabilityofSouthAsiaisthreatened.ThepopulationofBangladeshisexploding(itisprojected
    tonearlydoubleto250millionby2035)asclimatechangedestroysasignificantportionofthe
    country’salreadylimitedhabitableland,forcingmanypeopletomoveinlandandtoseekastable
    environmentwithoutregardtotheregion’smanycontestedborders(Barnett2001).India,whichwill
    alsofaceclimatestressalthoughnotassevereasitsneighbour’s,isalreadybracingitselfagainsta
    waveofBangladeshienvironmentalmigrantsbyconstructinganeight-foot-highironfencealongthe
    2,100-mileIndia-Bangladeshborder(Joehnk2007).
    TurningtotheMiddleEast,thealreadycomplexpoliticsofthatregionwillbecomplicatedfurtherby
    whatsomehavedescribedasanew‘hydrologicalsecuritycomplex’(Schultz1995).TheMiddleEast
    regionishometo6.3percentoftheworld’spopulationbutonly1.4percentoftheworld’s
    renewablefreshwater.Thewaterthatisavailable,moreover,isconcentratedinonlyafewcountries,
    namelyTurkey,Iran,IraqandSyria.Acomplexsetofwaterdependencyrelationshipsthereforeexists
    andissettogetworse,withIsraelinoneofthemostvulnerablepositionsofallstatesintheregion
    (Campbelletal 2007).Israelwillhavefewerthan500cubicmetresofwaterpercapitaby2025;1000
    cubicmetrespercapitaisconsideredtheminimumreasonableamountforadevelopedcountry
    (Homer-Dixonetal 1993).Muchofthatmeagrewatersupplyisalsolocatedinpoliticallyfraught
    territory:onethirdofitintheGolanHeightsandanotherthirdinthemountainaquiferthatunderlies
    theWestBank.Thiscouldaddfurtherflash-pointstotheIsraeli-SyrianandIsraeli-Palestinian
    relationshipsandwaterscarcityingeneralcouldbecomeasignificantnewdriveroftensionand
    22 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    conflictintheregion(Bitar2005).
    InAfrica,highertemperaturesandlesserandmoreseasonalrainfallwillalsoplaceupto250million
    moreAfricansunderseverewaterstressby2020.ThiswillaffectEast,WestandNorthAfrica,the
    lattersufferingarapidandseveredeclineinpotablewater,possiblybyasmuchas50percentupto
    2050.EastAfricawilllikelyseeupto20percentmorewinterraincausingfloodingandsoilerosion,
    whileatthesametimethesummermonthswillbesignificantlydryerresultinginseveredroughtsand
    additionalstressonagriculturalregions(Case2006).Agriculturalproductionmakesupnearlyhalfof
    EastAfrica’sGDPandemploysfouroutofeveryfiveworkersintheregion.Anylossinsovitalan
    economicsectorcouldhavedevastatingconsequencesontheregion’soveralleconomicandpolitical
    development(ibid).WestAfrica,foritspart,isalreadysufferingasevereproblemofdesertification:
    approximately1,350squaremilesofNigerianlandturnstodeserteachyear,uprootingfarmersand
    herdsmanandcausinginternalmigrationtowardscoastalareas(PodestaandOgden2007).Asa
    result,by2020,migrationintheregionwillcreateaWestAfricanurbansprawlof50million
    inhabitantsthatextendsfromAccrainGhanaacrossthebreadthoftheNigerRiverdelta,thougheven
    thisreliefwillbetemporaryforthoseconcernedsincetheentireareaisalsoatmajorriskfromsea
    levelrise(McCarthy2006,IPCC2007).
    ThissetofdevelopmentsinAfrica,insomeoftheworld’spoorestregions,maywelladdfurtherstress
    totheexistingconditionsofpovertyandconflictdescribedintheprevioussection.Climateevents
    themselvesarelikelytoclaimhumanlivesonaverysignificantscalebutmigrationflowsarealsolikely
    tobeafurtherfactoroverwhelmingthecapacityofstateauthoritiestorespondinanumberofareas.
    ThismaybeaparticularlyacuteprobleminEastAfricawheretheconcentrationofweakorfailing
    statesisalreadyhighandnumerousunresolvedpoliticaldisputescharacterisetheregion.Inshort,
    climatechangemaybeasignificantdriveroffurtherstatefailureinAfrica.
    Movingclosertohome,manyoftheclimatepressuresandimpactsdescribedabovepointto
    significantinternationalmigratorypressuresanditcannotbeassumedthattheseflowsofpeoplewill
    staywithintheregionsmostdirectlyaffected.Indeed,itishighlylikelythatsomeoftheseflowsof
    peoplewillbedirectedattheWestandattheEuropeanUnionandtheUKinparticular.British
    colonialandfamilytiestoSouthAsia,forexample,meanthatflowsfromBangladeshandthe
    surroundingareamustbeanticipated.Waterstress,massivepopulationdisplacementandtheongoing
    mixofconflictandpovertyinAfricawillalsomeanthatSouthernEuropegrowsasanEUentrypoint
    ofchoiceformanyseekingtoescapethechallengesanddifficultiesoflifeinAfrica.Thiswilllikely
    presentadditionalchallengestosocialunityintheEU,evenasEUmemberstatesturntomigrant
    labourasaresponsetotheirowndemographicandlabourmarketchallenges.
    IntheUK,therearealsolikelytobedirecteffects,asmuchoflow-lyingEastAngliainparticularislikely
    tobeatincreasedriskofflooding.Observedmeasurementshaveshownthatthesea-levelofftheEast
    Angliancoastisrisingbyanaverage4.5mmperyear,which,combinedwith1.5mmperyearofisostatic
    adjustment(groundlevelsinking),isleadingtoa6mmperyearsealevelriseintheregion(Edwards
    2005).IncreasedwindsandstormsintheNorthSeawillalsolikelycausemorepowerfulstormsurges
    thatcouldbreachcoastaldefences,floodinginlandareas.Thesechangestothephysicalenvironmentof
    theUKarelikelytobesmallrelativetosomeotherareasintheworld,butstillsignificant.
    Severalimportantmilitaryassetswillalsobeatriskfromenvironmentaldamage.Sealevelrisecould
    negativelyaffecttheSouthCoastnavalbasesatPortsmouthandDevonport.TheMinistryofDefenceis
    currentlymodellingtheimpactofclimatechangeonthesebases(Liddell2007),andalthoughno
    seriousdamageispredictedoverthenext20-25years,theIPCCpredictsthatsealevelrisealongthe
    Englishcoastlinecouldbeupto50percenthigherthantheglobalaverage,whichunderworst-case
    scenarioscouldseverelydisruptoperationsatthesebasesincurrentoperatingconditions.Increased
    floodingcouldalsojeopardiseseveralRAFbases,namelyValleyontheIsleofAngleseyoffWalesand
    twobasesinEastAngliacurrentlyusedbytheUSAirForce,LakenheathandMildenhall(Ministryof
    Defence2006).Eachofthesethreeairfieldsisonly10metresabovesealevelleavingthemhighly
    vulnerabletoflooding.AmongtheUK’soverseasmilitaryassets,thenavalstationatDiegoGarcia,a
    tinyatollintheIndianOceanonlyonemetreabovesealevelatitshighestpoint,isinmoreimmediate
    dangerfromrisingsealevels.TheCenterforNavalAnalysisintheUnitedStateswarnedina2007
    23 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    reportthatthebase,amajorforwardlogisticshubforbothBritishandAmericanforcesoperatinginthe
    PersianGulfandMiddleEastregion,couldbelosttosealevelrise(CenterforNavalAnalysis2007).
    Tore-cap,climatechangeissettohavedirectconsequencesfortheUKbothhereathomeandin
    relationtoimportantoverseasassets,islikelytoprovokenewinter-statetensionsandtogeneratenew
    sourcesandinstancesofstatefailure,particularlyinAfrica,andmayevenplayamajorroleinshaping
    thecharacterandoutlookofamajorpowerlikeChina.Itmayalsoputaddedpressureonsocialunity
    indevelopedcountriesinacontextinwhichthatunityisalreadyunderstrain.Thisallamountstoa
    verysignificantdestabilisingpressureinanumberofimportantstatesandregionsaroundtheworld
    andintermsofitssecurityconsequences,mayyetcometodwarfandover-shadowthecurrently
    high-profileissueofterrorism.

    iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam
    Thefourthandpenultimatedriverofthecontemporarysecuritylandscapethatwehighlightisthe
    growthofpoliticalIslam,orIslamism.9 Thisnowrepresentsbothanimmediatethreattopublicsafety
    andalong-termpoliticalchallengetoWesternliberaldemocracies.Thoughitsoriginscanbetraced
    backovermanycenturies,initsmodernformpoliticalIslamowesitsdevelopmenttowritersand
    thinkersactiveinthemid-20thcentury,suchasAbulAlaMaududiinSouthAsiaandSayyidQutbin
    Egypt(forathoroughanalysisoftheoriginsanddevelopmentofpoliticalIslamseeRoy2004and
    Burke2003).Themovementsthesemenspawned,Jamaat-e-IslamiandtheMuslimBrotherhood,
    werethevanguardinwhatMaududiopenlydescribedas‘arevolutionarydoctrineandsystemthat
    seekstooverthrowgovernments’(MaududiquotedinHusain2007).ModernIslamism,then,isbest
    viewedasapoliticalmovementthatutilisesaparticularinterpretationofreligionratherthanasa
    fundamentalistreligiousmovementthatattimespractisespolitics.NeitherMaududi,norQutb,nor
    othersofnotelikethem,wereeventrainedclericsortheologians.
    Intermsofitsideologicalcontent,Islamismisbasedonadivisionoftheworldintoconflictingcamps
    ofgoodandevil.Good,inthisstoryline,arethe‘true’MuslimsfullydevotedtotheIslamists’
    interpretationofIslam.Evilontheotherhand,consistsinagroupofcountriesincludingtheUnited
    States,theUnitedKingdom,France,andRussiawhicharesaidtorigtheinternationalsystemagainst
    MuslimsandtouseanetworkofapostaterulersintheIslamicworldtoplunderitsresourcesandkeep
    itscitizenssubdued.Consequently,Islamistpoliticalobjectivesrelatetotheremovalofsuchapostate
    rulersfromtheMuslimworld,totheintroductionofmoretrulyIslamic(undertheirinterpretation)
    societies,totheremovalofWesterninterferenceinMuslimaffairsandforsome,attheextreme,tothe
    completeoverthrowofWesternliberalsocietyinitsentirety.
    Inmorerecenttimesandinsomemanifestations,Islamismhasofcoursebecomeviolent,intheform
    ofAlQaedaandAlQaeda-inspirednetworks,andintheformofothergroupsnotlinkedtoAlQaeda
    inanyway.AkeyturningpointinrelationtoIslamistviolenceappearstohavebeentheSoviet
    invasionofAfghanistan.IslamistorganisationsissuedacalltoMuslimseverywheretohelpinresisting
    theSovietoccupation.Thousandsansweredthatcalland,furtherradicalisedbytheexperience,
    subsequentlyreturnedtotheirhomecountrieswiththeviewthatviolenceconstitutedalegitimate
    formofpoliticalexpression(Mamdani2005).Apsychologicalthresholdhadbeencrossedandviolence
    becameameanstoachieverevolutionarypoliticalobjectivesinplacessuchasAlgeria,Egypt,Yemen,
    Chechnya,Indonesia,andthePhilippines(BergenandReynolds2005).
    Asweknow,politicalIslamtoday,eveninitsviolentforms,hasalsonowextendeditsreachinto
    Westernliberaldemocraciesdirectly,beyondcountriesthatarepredominantlypopulatedbyMuslims.
    ItseekstotargetandtorecruitboththegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandthosenon-
    MuslimswhomaybesusceptibletoconversiontotheIslamist’sparticularinterpretationofthereligion
    ofIslam.

    9.Thereisadebatetobehadontherightlanguagetousetocapturethisphenomenon.Wearestill
    reflectingonthisbutforthepurposesofthispaper,thekeypointtonoteisthatwearedescribinga
    politicalandnotareligiousphenomenon.
    24 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Organisationallyandpolitically,politicalIslamisnothomogeneousanditsadherentscanbestbe
    describedasexistinginaseriesofconcentriccircles.Atthecentreisasmallgroupofhard-core
    radicalscommittedtoorchestratingviolentactioninfurtheranceoftheirpoliticalagenda,though
    membersofthisgrouparenotoftentheperpetratorsoftheviolencethemselves.Inthenext,larger,
    circle,arethefoot-soldiersmostlikelytocommitactsofviolence.Beyondthisgroup,inalargercircle
    still,arethemembersofthemostradicalIslamistorganisationsfromwhoseranksthefoot-soldiersof
    Islamistviolencecanmosteasilybedrawn.Then,attheouteredges,therearethemembersofmost
    otherIslamistorganisationswhopursueIslamistpoliticalobjectivesbutdosobyworkingthrough
    existingpoliticalsystemsratherthanthroughattemptstoviolentlyoverthrowthem.Finally,andat
    leastpartiallymovingbeyondthosewhocanbedescribedinanyrealsenseasbelieversintheIslamist
    politicalmessage,theremaybeatacitcircleofsupport(Saggar2006,Klausen2007).
    IntheUKcontextthistacitcircleofsupporthasbeencapturedinopinionpollquestionnaire
    responses.APopuluspollofattitudesamongBritishMuslimscarriedoutforTheTimes attheheight
    oftheDanishcartoonscontroversy,forexample,had7percentofaweightedsampleagreeingwith
    thestatementthat:‘TherearecircumstancesinwhichIwouldcondonesuicidebombingsonUKsoil’
    (Saggar2006:314).Thisfigureapproximatestoover100,000MuslimslivingintheUK.AfurtherICM
    pollshowedthatafifthofrespondents‘hadsomesympathywiththefeelingsandmotivesofthose
    whocarriedouttheLondonattacks’(ICM/SundayTelegraph2006).Finally,asurveyofMuslim
    studentsintheUK,bytheFederationofStudentIslamicSocieties,showed4percentunableto
    condemnthe7/72005attacksonLondon,afurther11percentrefusingtobackorcondemnthe
    attacksand20percentsayingthattheywouldnotreportapossiblesuicidebomberintheirranksto
    thepolice(FOSIS2005).
    DespitetheseriousnessofthissituationandoftheIslamistchallengeaswehavedescribedithere,in
    bothsecurityandpoliticalterms,policymakersstilldonothaveagoodunderstandingofwhatis
    drivingit.OnecontextualfactorthatmayhaveassisteditsgrowthinWesterncountriesisthedecline
    andcollapseofrevolutionaryleftistpoliticsinrecentdecades,whichhaseffectivelyleftpoliticalIslam
    asthepredominantrepositoryforradicalpoliticalexpression.Anotherpotentialfactoristhegenuine
    senseofpoliticalgrievancefeltbymanyMuslims.ThiscentresonWesternforeignpolicyand,tobe
    morespecific,onperceptionsofinjusticeandhumiliationinrelationtotheIsrael-Palestinequestion,
    onperceptionsofalossofeffectivecontrolofthenaturalenergyresourcesoftheMiddleEastin
    particular,andonperceptionsoftheWesternroleinthemaintenanceandsupportofoppressiveand
    autocraticregimesinseveralpredominantlyMuslimcountries.
    SomeanalystshavefurthernotedasenseofalienationamongMuslimcommunitieslivingintheWest.
    Thisappearstobeanissueamongsecond-andthird-generationMuslimcitizensinparticularandmay
    begroundednotjustinoppositiontomuchWesternforeignpolicyintheMiddleEastbutina
    complexmixoffactorsincludingperceivedsocialexclusionongroundsofraceandstrongconcerns
    overIslamophobia.AsShivMalik’srecentpieceofinvestigativejournalismintosomeofthoseinvolved
    intheattacksof7/7inLondonalsomakesclear,forsomeyoungMuslimsintheUKtheremayalso
    beaparticularlyacutecrisisofidentityinwhichneitherthedominantculturalvaluesoftheparent
    population,northemainstreamcultureofthenew‘home’countryisseenasappealing(Malik2007).
    Thetruth,however,isthatweareinsufficientlyclearaboutwhattheunderlyingcausesofthegrowth
    inpoliticalIslamare,evenatthishighlevelofgenerality.Moreover,theradicalisationprocesses,for
    thosemovingfromtacitcircleofsupporttofullacceptanceoftheIslamistworldview,andfrom
    radicalisedpoliticstoactiveengagementinpoliticalviolenceareboth,ifanything,evenlesswell
    understood.ThepersonalaccountsofthosewhohavebeeninvolvedinIslamistpoliticsandhavethen
    pulledback,suchasEdHusain(Husain2007),haveprovidedvaluableinsighthere,buttheliterature
    pointstoawiderangeofpossiblefactorsintheradicalisationprocessincludingpersonalrelationships,
    psychologicalfactors,socialgroupdynamics,andtheparticularcommunicationopportunitiesofthe
    internet,andtheoverallpictureremainsconfused.
    Makingpublicpolicyinthiscontextisnoteasy.TheIslamists’useofreligiontomaskthepolitical
    natureoftheirprojecthasputWesternliberaldemocraticregimesinadifficultpositionastheyseek
    25 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    topreserveacommitmenttotoleranceanddiversityintheirownsocietiesontheonehandwhile
    addressingtheIslamistchallengewithoutappearingtodemonisefollowersoftheIslamicfaithonthe
    other.
    Thepolicychallengeitselfisalsocomplex.Onekeychallengeforgovernmentishowbesttoprotect
    citizensfromtheIslamistthreatwithoutintroducingsecuritymeasuresthatinadvertentlyexpandthe
    outercirclesofsupportforIslamistgroupsorpushmorepeoplefromtheoutercirclesofsupport
    towardstheviolentcore.Anotherchallengeistounderstandhowbesttoproactivelyshrinktheouter
    circles,bothathomeandinternationally,tosuchanextentthatthoseintheinnercorebecomeso
    isolatedthatitisdifficultforthemtocontinueoperations.Bothareprofoundlydifficultand,without
    animprovedunderstandingoftheradicalisationprocess,almostimpossible.Onlylimitedprogressis
    likelytobemadeintheshorttermtherefore,andtheIslamistchallengeislikelytoremainakeydriver
    ofboththedomesticandinternationalsecurityagendaforalongtimetocome.

    v)Socio-economicvulnerability
    Ourfifthdriverofchangeinthesecurityenvironmentissocio-economicvulnerability.Thishasrisen
    upthesecurityagendapartlyasaresultofrecentchangesinthestructureoftheUKeconomy,partly
    asaconsequenceofchangestotheconditionofsomeelementsofourcriticalnationalinfrastructure,
    andpartlyasaconsequenceoftheincreasedthreatofterrorismand/ordisruptiveclimateevents.
    Whenitcomestothestructureofoureconomyanditsbusinesses,overthelastdecadeagreatdeal
    ofworkhasbeendonetoencourageBritishcompaniestoadoptaleanapproachtobusiness
    operations.Movingto‘justintime’manufacturing,squeezingoutstock,removingwarehousingand
    intermediaries,sheddingexcessstaff,allofthesedevelopmentshavesubstantiallyimprovedthe
    competitivenessoftheUKeconomy.Atthesametime,thesupplychainsofBritishbusinesseshave
    becomestretchedasaconsequenceofglobalisation.Thishasitselfbroughtefficiencygainsandhas
    increasedtherangeofproductsandservicesavailabletotheUKconsumer.However,asJimNorton
    haspointedout,‘thereisaghostatthisparticularfeast’(Norton2008).Runninglean,morediverse
    andstretchedsupplychainsmakesexcellentbusinesssensebutitassumesthatthebasic
    infrastructureintheUKandbeyond,inenergy,communications,andtransportation,issecureand
    reliable.Themoreefficientlyweoperate,thelessslackthereisinthesystemtocopewithmajor
    disruption.
    Sadly,theassumptionofasecureandreliableinfrastructureisnotasafeone.Justasour
    organisationshaveimprovedtheircollectiveefficiencyandthustheirdependenceonsupporting
    infrastructure,wehavemadeinfrastructuredecisionsthatincreaseourvulnerabilitytodisruption.In
    communications,forexample,therehasbeenashiftfromsecureprivatemobilesystemstoshared
    (non-resilient)publicmobilecommunicationsinsomekeysectors.Effectivecommunicationinthe
    eventofextrapressurebeingplacedonthemobilenetworkinanemergency,therefore,cannotbe
    guaranteed.
    Thereisconcern,also,overalackofstoragefacilitiesforgas,justasaccesstoourownNorthSea
    suppliesrunsdown,andanequivalentconcernoveralackofinvestmentinlocalandregional
    electricitydistribution,whichhasresultedinincreasedfailuresandthelossofsomekeyskillsandsub-
    contractors.
    Inothersectors,weoperateclosetocapacitylimitsinwaysthatcouldhavesevereconsequences.In
    theeventofaflupandemic,forexample,areasonableassumptionwouldbethatupto20percentof
    theUK’sHeavyGoodsVehicledriverswouldbeunavailable,afigurelargeenoughtocripplethe
    nationalfoodsupply,leavesupermarketshelvesempty,andpossiblycausecivilunrest.
    Weaknessesinoneareaofourinfrastructure,moreover,canleadtobreakdowninothersbecause
    severalkeyelementsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructureareinterdependent.Power,transport,
    communications,water,andbroadcastingforexample,couldallbebadlyaffectedbyalossof
    electricitysupply,thelattercausingacascadingeffectintoeachoftheothers.WhenpartsoftheUS
    andCanadasufferedthelargestelectricpoweroutageintheirhistoryon14August2003,50million
    peoplelostpower,4millionpeoplelostwater,andmanyrailroadsandairportswereshutdown(Doshi
    26 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    etal 2007).IntheUK,thesummerfloodsof2007,thoughonamuchsmallerscale,also
    demonstratedthepoint.
    Terroristorganisationsappeartohavenoticedthisvulnerabilitytoo.InMarch2004,policeraidedthe
    homeofOmarKhyam,the24-year-oldringleaderoftheso-calledOperationCreviceterroristplotand
    foundCD-ROMswithdetailedplansofBritain’selectricityandgassystems.AccordingtoaNewYork
    Times reportlaterin2006,Khyamwasalsorecordedtalkingaboutaplannedsimultaneousattackon
    Britain’sgas,electricity,andwatersystems(Wolsey2007).
    Thecascadeeffectsofalossofkeyinfrastructure,whetherbroughtonbysevereweather,terrorist
    attackorsimplemaintenancefailures,wouldobviouslyalsogofarbeyondanimpactonother
    infrastructuresectorsthemselves.FeworganisationsorservicesintheUKwouldbeabletofunction
    effectivelyforlonginsuchcircumstances.Giventhis,theCabinetOfficeCivilContingenciesSecretariat
    haspreviouslypublishedplanningguidancethataskskeyorganisationstopreparefor:
    • Lossofmainselectricitysupplyforuptothreedayslocallyor24hoursregionally
    • Lossofwatersupplyforuptothreedays
    • Lossofthepublicswitchedtelephonenetworkforuptothreedays
    •Disruptiontofuelsupplyforuptotendays
    •Significantdisruptiontotransportforuptotendays
    • Accessdeniedtomainpremisesforuptothreemonths.
    However,itisunclearhowmanyorganisationscouldreallyclaimtohaveplansinplacetocope
    withtheseguidelinesandmakingprogressinthiswholeareaisdifficultingovernanceterms.
    DavidOmand,forexample,hasnotedthat80percentoftheUK’scriticalnationalinfrastructure
    isinprivatesectorhands,notallofitevenownedbyUKcompanies.Evenwithinthesectors
    definedascorepartsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,thereremainsasignificantchallenge
    tocoordinateactivityacrossmanydifferentsectorsandthischallengeonlymultiplieswhenone
    considerstheneedtoplanforwiderbusinessandorganisationalresiliencethroughouttheentire
    economyandsociety.Giventhesecircumstances,theissuesofcriticalnationalinfrastructure
    protection,businessandorganisationalresilience,andemergencyplanningandpreparedness
    havetakenonnewsecuritypolicyprominence.

    Driversandeffects:conclusion
    Wehaveattemptedinthispartofthepapertocapturethemultipleandinteractingdrivers
    shapingthecurrentsecuritylandscape.Bothindividuallyandcollectivelyglobalisation,poverty,
    climatechange,thegrowthofpoliticalIslamandsocio-economicvulnerabilityarecreatinganew
    setofdynamicsandanewsetofchallengesforpolicymakerstodealwith.Thedistributionof
    powerbetweenstatesischangingandthismay meanmoreinstabilityandconflictintheyears
    aheadiftheprocessofchangeisnotwellmanaged.Non-stateactorsareincreasinglyimportant
    too,bothintheirownright,andduetotheircapacitytoinfluencetheverycharacterand
    behaviourofstates.
    Poverty,inequalityandconflictareinteractinginpartsofthedevelopingworldtocreate
    instabilityandagrowingproblemofungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaces.Theseinturn
    arebecomingjumping-offpointsforterroristgroupsandtransnationalcriminalgangsintenton
    exportingharmtotheUKandotherlocations.Wearewitnessingenvironmentaldamageand
    resourcestressonenergy,waterandfoodsourcesinparticularwithapotentialforsuchdamage
    andstressnotonlytobecomeindependentdriversoftensionandconflictbutalsotofuelother
    relatedbutdistinctdynamicsofinter-staterivalryandpoliticalconflictintheyearsahead.
    Comingclosertohome,wehavewitnessedtheemergenceofarangeofnewandchangedsocio-
    economicvulnerabilitieswithintheUK,partlyasaresultofourinterfacewiththeglobal
    economyandpartlyasaresultofthechangestodomesticbusinesspractices,economicsystems
    andinfrastructuresthattogethermakeupthemoretightlycoupledsocietythatwehave
    described.
    27 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Wedrawthreeconclusionsfromthisanalysis.
    First,tosomeextentandinrelativeterms,webelievewearewitnessingadowngradingoftheability
    ofstateinstitutionstocontrolthesecurityenvironmentandtoprovidepublicprotection.Powerhas
    movedtonewlocationsandthemechanismsofaccountablepubliccontrolhavenotmovedwithit.
    Thisisevidentinthepotentialendtostatemonopolisationofweaponsofmassdestruction,inthe
    reducedcapacityofindividualstatestodelivertheirownsecurityinaworldofinterdependenceandin
    theproliferationofungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.State
    actorshaveliterallylostprimarycontrolofsometerritoriesandenvironmentsastheearlierdiscussion
    offailedstates,pariahstatesandencryption-protectedpartsoftheinternetmakesclear.Onsome
    issues,moreover,suchasclimatechange,wherewehavenotyetbeenabletoconstructeffective
    multilateralgovernanceframeworks,thereisevenaquestionmarkoverthecurrentcapacityofthe
    entirecommunityofstates,actingcollectively,todeliverwhatisnecessaryforsecurity.
    Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,itfollowsthatnoindividualstateorgovernment,no
    matterhowpreponderant,hasthepowertoguaranteeitsownsecurity.Wenowliveinaworldof
    shareddestiniesinwhichinsecuritiesorpolicyfailingsinonepartofthesystemquicklygenerate
    policyproblemsandinsecuritiesinothers.Inthisenvironment,werelyoneachotherforsecurityand
    securitymustbecommontoallindividuals,communitiesandstatesorelseitwillnotlikelybe
    deliveredforany.
    Third,andagainstthisbackground,itisclearthatthecorechallengeforsecuritypolicytodayrelates
    tohowbesttoenhanceandextendourmechanismsofgovernancesuchthattheybetterreflectand
    mapontothecurrentrealitiesandlocationsofpower,bringingarenewedmeasureofinfluenceand
    controloverthesecurityenvironmentasaresult.
    InPart3ofthepaper,weaddresstheimplicationsofthisoverallanalysis.Wearguethatthereisa
    needtoarticulateandtoadoptanew,morecollaborative,approachtosecuritypolicy,andwesetout
    arangeofsubstantivequestionstowhichwebelieveanynationalsecuritystrategymustnowbe
    sensitive.First,however,weturntoaredefinitionoftheterrainofsecuritypolicyitself,suchthatit
    bettercaptureswhatis,ineffect,anewandmorecomplexfrontlineinthebattlefornationalsecurity
    andpublicsafety.
    28 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    3.Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape
    Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy
    Notsurprisingly,giventhechangeswehavedescribed,therehasbeenmuchdebateinscholarlyand
    policycirclesinrecentyearsabouttheneedtorethinktheconceptofsecurity.Sincethe1980s,in
    fact,academicshavesoughtamoreelasticdefinitionofsecuritythatcouldencompassenvironmental,
    economic,humanrightsandotherfactors.Theseattempts,thoughanalyticallyimpressiveinmany
    cases,haveforthemostpartcomeupagainstthebuffersofastillinfluentialtraditionalviewof
    nationalsecuritypolicywhichismorerestrictiveinscope.
    Thetraditionalviewstressestheprimaryroleofstates,theimportanceofstatesovereignty,inter-state
    competition,andthecentralimportanceofmilitaryissuesandmilitaryforce.Itretainsitsinfluencefor
    theobviousreasonthat,whateverelsemayberelevant,securitybetweenstatesisanecessary
    conditionforwiderhumansecurityandbecausethesecuritypressurescentraltothelogicofalargely
    anarchicinternationalstatesystemstillcastalongshadowovermuchofinternationalaffairs.States
    tooofcourse,alsoretainsomecrucialcapacityforactioninresponsetomanyofthewiderrisksand
    threatsthatwehavealreadydescribed.
    Thatsaid,webelievethatwhenseenagainstthecurrentworldsituation,therearemajorweaknesses
    withthisapproachthatmakeittimelyandnecessarytogetbeyondit.First,itlackssufficient
    descriptiveandexplanatorypowerinrelationtocontemporaryevents.Whileitisrelevanttosome
    debates,suchasthatovertheNorthKoreanandIraniannuclearprogrammesandthepossible
    regionalnucleararmsracesthatmaybeprovokedasaresultofthem,itsprivilegingofstateactors
    andtheinter-statelevelofanalysismeansitmissestherelevanceandimportanceofmanynon-state
    actorsoperatingatavarietyofdifferentlevels.Terroristgroups,privatesectorbodies,international
    organisationsandNGOsareallcasesinpoint.Second,thetraditionalviewalsoprivilegessomeissues
    (themilitary)andsomestrategicdrivers(thebalanceofpowerandinter-statecompetition)over
    othersandagain,theresultistomissmuchofimportance.Widersocialandeconomicissuesare
    underplayed,asarekeystrategicdriversofcontemporaryeventssuchasglobalisationandclimate
    change.Thetraditionalconceptionofsecuritypolicy,inshort,leavestoomuchout.
    Theseweaknessessuggestanurgentneedtoreconceptualiseandredefinetheterrainofsecurity
    policytogetbeyondtheprivilegedactors,issues,levelsofanalysis,anddriversofstrategicchange
    tiedupwiththetraditionalapproach.Thisisnottosaythetraditionalapproachshouldbeentirely
    discarded,buttosaythatitnowneedstobenestedwithinawiderviewoftherelevantterrain.
    Onewayofapproachingthisistoadoptthenotionof‘humansecurity’(HumanSecurityCentre2005,
    CommissiononHumanSecurity2003).Inanswertothecentralquestionofwhomorwhatistobe
    madesecureandfromwhatrangeofrisksandthreats,humansecurityanalystsmakepeople,not
    states,thereferentobjectofpolicyanddefineasrelevantanyrisksandthreatswithacapacitytoput
    people’ssecurityindoubt.Thishastwoeffects.First,itexpandsradicallytherangeofissuesdefined
    assecurityissues,sincepeoplesuffermenacesthatincludebutgowellbeyondthethreatofexternal
    militaryattack.Humansecurityincludesprotectionofcitizensfromenvironmentalpollution,
    transnationalterrorism,massiveandsuddenpopulationmovements,andlong-termconditionsof
    oppressionanddeprivation.Second,itexplicitlyrejectsanactor-ledapproachtodefiningtheterrain
    ofsecuritypolicyinfavourofanissue-ledapproach.Inotherwords,theterrainofnationalsecurity
    policyisnotdefinedprimarilybywhatthemilitary,thepolice,theintelligenceservicesandthekey
    security-relatedgovernmentministriesdo.Rather,itisdefinedanddelimitedbyreferencetothe
    issuesthatrepresentthemostpotentthreatsandriskstothesecurityandpublicsafetyofpeople.
    Traditionalsecurityinstitutionsareclearlycrucialtotheterrain,buttheyarenotinandofthemselves
    theembodimentofit.
    IntheAppendix,wehavecombinedthisgeneraloutlookwiththespecificsoftheanalysispresentedin
    Section2ofthepapertooffer,intabularform,anewdelimitationoftheterrainofnationalsecurity
    policytoday.Thisliststheissueswebelievetobecentral,definesmanydifferentstateandnon-state
    29 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    actorsasrelevant,anddistinguishesbetweenfivedifferentlevelsofactivityinandacrosswhichthose
    actorsmaybeactive(thesub-national,national,bi-lateral,regionalandglobal).
    Otheradvantagesofthisapproach
    Aswellasbringingtheentiresecurityagendaintooneanalyticalframework,thisapproachhasfour
    otheradvantages.
    First,itmakesclearthatweneedtorethinktraditionalnotionsofwhatandwherethefrontlineisin
    thebattleforsecurity.Ifdirectthreatstothesafetyofourcountryanditscitizenscancomeoutof
    failedorpariahstatessuchasAfghanistan,thentheactionsofBritishtroopsinplaceslikeHelmand
    Provincemustclearlystillbeseenasactionsinthefront-linedefenceoftheUnitedKingdom.If
    poverty,inequalitywithinstatesandconflictareallkeydriversoftheexistenceoffailedandpariah
    statesinthefirstplace,however,thensotoomustactionstotackleglobalpoverty,toaddress
    economicinequitiesandtoprevent,containandrecoverfromconflictsinotherpartsoftheworld
    Similarly,whiletheinter-statemilitarybalanceremainsafront-lineissueinaworldofchangetoday,it
    isjoined(inacontextwhereclimatechangeissettobecomeakeydriverofresourcecompetitionand
    inter-stateconflict),byclimatechangemitigationandadaptationmeasuresasfront-linesecurity
    issuestoo.
    Evenwithinourownsociety,wherethecounter-terroristeffortsofthepoliceandsecurityservices
    representaclearfrontlineinthedefenceofusall,ournotionofwhatandwherethefrontlineis
    mustchange.Thepoliceandsecurityservicesrelyoncitizens,localcommunityorganisationsand
    businessestobothchallengetheprocessofradicalisationinthefirstplaceandtohelpminimisethe
    extentofdisruptionintheeventofasuccessfulattack.
    Inthiscontexttheactivitiesofcitizens,localcommunitygroupsandbusinesseswithinourcountry
    andonourownterritorythemselvesconstituteactivitiesatthesecurityfrontline.Thesinglebiggest
    distinguishingfeatureofthenewfrontlinefromtheold,therefore,isthatthereisnotjustonefront
    lineandnotjustonetypeofthreattobefacedbutmany.Somethreatsandfrontlineslieoutsideof
    ourownsociety,atglobalorregionallevel,andsomewithin,atlocallevel.Somerelatetomilitary
    issuesandsometoeconomic,environmentalornaturalphenomena.Aneffectivesecuritystrategyin
    thiscontextmustbesimultaneouslysensitivetothemanyissues,frontsandlevelsofactivity,while
    seekingtobuildacoordinatedresponsefromthemanyrelevantactors,acrossall.
    Second,aswellasfacilitatinganalysisofasingleissueacrossmultiplelevels,theapproachsetoutalso
    facilitatestheanalysisofagroupofissuesatasinglelevel.Thatistosay,forexample,thatitallows
    boththeanalysisoftheterroristthreatandtheactionsrequiredtomeetitatalllevelsfromthesub-
    nationaltotheglobalbutalsoallowsUKpolicymakerstoseealltheissuesfacingthemat,say,the
    regionallevel.
    Third,andasaconsequenceofthis,theframeworkmakesiteasytogroupissuesandtostudythe
    linkagesbetweenthem,aswellastoseetherangeofactorswhosecontributiontoaneffective
    responsemightneedtobejoinedup.Onterrorismandfailedstates,togiveanexample,itmakes
    clearthatelementsofforeignpolicy,overseasinterventionanddomesticcounter-terrorismpolicy
    mightneedtobejoineduptoensurethattheformerdoesnotundermineorrenderthelatter
    ineffective.
    Finally,thisapproachcanallowustothinkaboutindividualsecurity-relatedinstitutionsand
    organisationswithinthewidestconceptionoftheirstrategicenvironment.Thismeanstherole,
    purpose,andfunctionofeachinstitutioncanbereframedandreassessedagainstthisbackground.To
    taketheroleofthemilitaryforexample,theAppendixmakesclearthatmilitaryinstitutionsnowtake
    partnotonlyintraditionalactivitiessuchasthedefenceofhometerritory,overseascombat
    operations,andaidingthecivilpowerintimeofemergency,butmustalsoplayaroleinconflict
    prevention,internationalpeacekeeping,andpost-conflictreconstructioneffortsaroundtheworld.
    Forthesereasons,webelievethetableintheAppendixdefinesanddelimitsthescopeofsecurity
    policyreasonablywell.Itisaworkinprogressbutcapturesthekeyissues,thelevelsofanalysisand
    theactorsthataremostrelevant.Thatsaid,itisimportanttobeclearaboutwhatthisissue-led
    30 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    approach,aswehavesetitout,isnot.TheAppendixmayembodyawayofdelimitingtheterrainof
    securitypolicybutitisnotatoolforprioritisingbetweentheissuesidentifiedthemselves.This
    prioritisationremainsamatterofstrategicjudgement.
    Thereis,furthermore,adebatetobehadaroundthemarginsonwhichissuesshouldandshouldnot
    beincludedintheframework.Somehumansecurityanalystsmakenodistinctionbetweensecurity
    policy,healthpolicy,developmentpolicy+andenvironmentpolicywhileothersconcentrateonlyon
    politicalviolence.Inourdelimitationoftheterrainwehaveincludedbutgonebeyondpolitical
    violencetoincludeissuessuchasglobalpoverty,thethreatofdisease,andthepotentialofclimate
    eventstodestroycriticalnationalinfrastructure.Evenwhereourfocusisonelementsofviolent
    conflict,wedescribethepolicychallengesinsuchawayastoincludeanawarenessofissueslike
    povertyandclimatechangeaskeydriversofit.Somewillarguethatthisistogotoowide,othersthat
    itisnotwideenough.Webelieveitstrikestherightbalanceofconcernwithlong-termdriversand
    short-term,pressingthreats.

    Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach
    If,aswehaveargued,weliveinaworldofshareddestinies,wherethefrontlineismadeupof
    manycomplexissues,ofmultiplerelevantactors,andofmanylevelsofaction,andifthecentral
    challengeforpolicytodayistoenhanceandtoextendourmechanismsofgovernanceoverthe
    relevantterrain,thenanumberofimplicationsflowfromthisintermsoftheoverallstrategic
    orientationnowrequired.Itisnotjustthatpoweritselfhasbecomemorewidelydiffusedamong
    actorsinthesecurityenvironmentorthattherangeofissuesanddrivershasbecomemorevaried
    andcomplex,butthatwhatisrequiredtohaveinfluenceoverthatenvironmenthasitselfchanged
    too.
    Thisisnotjustaboutawiderrangeofpolicyinstrumentsbeingrelevanttosecuritypolicytoday
    (thoughthisisclearlyoneconclusionthatdoesneedtobedrawn),butalsoaboutinfluence
    requiringadistributedandcoordinatedresponseacrossawiderangeofactors.Thisisanecessityin
    asystemthathasmanycentresofpowerandahighlevelofsecurityinterdependenceandthis
    realisationitselfimpliestheneedforacollaborativeapproachtosecuritypolicy.
    Inthissection,webrieflysetoutwhatwebelievearethecoreprinciplesofanapproachto
    policymakingthatisbothsensitivetotheuseofawiderrangeofpolicyinstrumentsand
    collaborativeinoverallapproach.
    Principle1:Adoptthenotionofintegratedpower
    Webelieveafarwiderrangeofinstrumentsmustnowbeseenasrelevanttosecuritypolicyandthat
    theseinstrumentsmustbemoreeffectivelyintegratedtoachievemaximumeffect.Therehasbeen
    anongoingdebateonthisissueinrecentyears,centringonnotionsofhardandsoftpower,where
    ‘hardpowerrefersessentiallytotheexerciseofmilitaryforceand/orthethreateneduseofsuch
    forceforpurposesofcoercivediplomacyandsoftpowerreferstoeconomicleverageandinfluence
    accruedthroughtradeandaid,diplomaticcooperationandculturalexchange’(Khana2008:378-9).
    Giventherangeandcomplexityofthesecuritychallengesweface,andthediversenatureof
    today’sfrontline,webelieveachoicebetweenthesetwoapproachesisafalseone.Thequestionis
    notsomuchwhichinstrumentsaremosteffectiveandmostrequiredperse, butwhichcombination
    ofthemwillbemostsuccessfulandinwhichcircumstances.Weneed,inotherwordstothinknotin
    termsofhardorsoftpower,butintermsofintegratedpower(CenterforAmericanProgress2006).
    Thismeans,togivejusttwoexamples,beingcommittedtoabetterlinkageofmilitary,economic,
    socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsinanyactivityfocusedonrestoringgovernancetoafailedor
    failingstateontheonehand,andbeingcommittedtobettercoordinationofintelligence,policing,
    andlocalcommunitypolicyinstrumentsusedtocombatradicalisationandterrorismathomeonthe
    other.Italsomeanssometimesintegratinginstrumentsacrossthetraditionaldomesticandforeign
    policydivide,suchthatelementsofpolicyfrombothdomainsformpartofawiderstrategic
    responsetochallengesthatdonotrespectborders,suchastransnationalorganisedcrime.
    31 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Principle2:Workinpartnershipwithothers
    Attheheartofacollaborativeapproachtosecuritypolicywillalsobeanewcommitmenttoworking
    inpartnership.Thisisclearlynecessaryatinternationallevel,throughfreshattemptsatmultilateral
    cooperationacrossawiderangeofissues.Tobesuccessful,however,weneedtomovebeyondthe
    arrangementsforgedinthepost-WorldWarIIperiod.
    Thegeniusofthemultilateralinternationalsystemthatsurvived,andsomewouldsaywon,theCold
    War,wasitsfoundationonanetworkofcapablestatesworkingtogethertocreateanalliancegreater
    thanthesumofitsparts.Thatalliancestillexiststoday,butthethreatsarrayedagainstitaremore
    diffuseandthebreadthofitscontributingmembersdoesnotmatchthescopeofthechallenge.
    Complicatingmattersfurther,thegeneraldissatisfactionwithAmericanleadershipundertheBush
    administrationmayhaveerodedthenecessarypoliticalwilltoworkcollaborativelytoaddressthe
    world’sproblems.
    However,theformulauponwhichourearliersuccesseswerebuiltisstillvalidandthesecurity
    challengeswedescribedinPart2ofthepapermustnowinspireandconsolidateanewageof
    multilateralpartnerships.AspowershiftsawayfromtheAtlanticseaboard,thesenewpartnerships
    mustreachbeyondtraditionalboundariesanddrawnewandemergingpowersintothecollaborative
    systemofcommonsecurity.
    Partnershipworking,moreover,nowneedstobeaboutmuchmorethanenhancedmultilateral
    cooperationamongstates.Dependingontheissueathand,partnershipswillberequirednotjustat
    globalandregionallevelbetweenstatesbutalsooftenbetweendifferentinstitutionsandelements
    withinthesamestate(acrosscentralandlocallevelsandacrossdifferentfunctionalresponsibilities)
    andbetweenpublicsectoractorsandprivateandvoluntarysectorbodies.Thisisanobviousnecessity
    onissuessuchasprotectionofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,wheremanyprivatesectorplayers
    areinvolved,andonissuessuchascounter-terrorism,wherethesecurityservicesandthepolicewill
    bemuchmoreeffectiveifworkinginclosepartnershipwithmembersofthecommunitiestheyare
    tryingtoserveandprotect.
    Principle3:Committolegitimacyofaction
    Suchpartnershipscanonlybesustainedthroughavoluntarycommitmenttoactionandavoluntary
    commitmenttoactionwillnotbeforthcomingfromawiderangeofactorsifdefiningproblems,
    objectivesanddecision-makingprocessesarenotseenaslegitimate.Nogovernmentcanorshouldbe
    deniedtherighttotakeunilateralactiontoprotectitscitizensfromaclearandimminentdanger,but
    thelessontodrawfromthecontextwehavedescribedisclear:establishingthewidelyperceived
    legitimacyofanyactionwillmobilisemorepartnerswithmoreresourcesandwillmoreoftenbea
    routetosecuritypolicyeffectivenessthanabarriertoit.Legitimacy,inotherwords,isamajorsource
    ofpowerandactsalmostasaforcemultiplier,turningpotentialpowerresourcesintogreateractual
    influenceovertheenvironment.
    Thatsaid,insubstantivetermswidelyperceivednotionsoflegitimacywillnotbeeasytodeliver.
    Othersclearlywillhavedifferentviewsonwhatisandisnotlegitimateanditcannotbesimply
    assumedthattherewillalwaysbewidespreadacceptancethatUKgovernmentactionsarelegitimate.
    Indeed,therearealreadysignificantchallengestothelegitimacyofcertainaspectsofaprevailing
    orderwithwhichtheUK,asawealthyandinfluentialcountry,isstillverymuchassociated.These
    stretchfromquestionsoverthemoralsustainabilityofcurrentlevelsofglobalinequalitytoquestions
    overthedistributionofdecision-makingrightsinimportantinternationalbodiesliketheUNSecurity
    Council.TheyincludeconcernsovertheapparenthypocrisyofWesterndemocraticregimesproviding
    supporttonon-democraticregimesintheMiddleEastandelsewhere,andencompassissuesrelatedto
    socialexclusion,accusationsofIslamophobia,andthelegitimacyorotherwiseofadditionalpolice
    powerstocrackdownonterroristshereathome.
    Nevertheless,despitetheserealtensionsanddifficulties,inthelongterm,ifweundervaluepolitical
    legitimacyandalienatepotentialpartnerseitherelsewhereintheinternationalcommunityorwithin
    ourownsocietyhereathome,ourcapacitytoinfluencethesecurityenvironmentandthereforeto
    32 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    deliverthesecurity,well-beingandpublicsafetyofourpeoplewillmostlikelybeeroded,not
    enhanced.Ifthepriceofadditionallegitimacyisbeingself-reflectiveandflexibleontheissues
    withoutcompromisingourbasicvalues,therefore,thisisapricewellworthpaying.
    Principle4:Movetomoreopenpolicymaking
    Legitimacy,ofcourse,isaboutprocessaswellassubstance.Ifpolicysuccessislikelytocomedownto
    thebreadthandqualityofthepartnershipsthatcanbebuiltandifpartnershipworkingrequiresa
    majorinvestmentinsharednotionsoflegitimacy,itishighlyunlikelythatanyofthiscanbeachieved
    whileoldmodelsofinformationsecrecyandcloseddecision-makingremaininplace,either
    domesticallyorinternationally.Whiletherewillalwaysbeaneedforsecretoperationsandtoprotect
    theanonymityofsomesources,andwhilethespecificsofparticularsecurityarrangementsshould
    alwaysbemanagedonastrictlyneed-to-knowbasis,muchsecuritypolicymakingtodayistooremote
    andclosedofffromthewiderrangeofactorsthatcouldnotonlyenjoybutalsocontributetoit.
    Governments,inanycase,nolongerthemselvesownandcontrolalloftherelevantandnecessary
    expertiseandassetsrequiredinthemakingofaneffectivesecuritypolicy.Fromemergencyplanning
    toclimatechangeandfromtheprotectionofcriticalnationalinfrastructuretocounter-terrorism,
    citizens,privatebusinessesandinternationalorganisationscanalladdvaluetothepolicymaking
    process.
    Thisallraisesdifficultquestionsforthoseinofficialpositions,particularlyinrelationtohowmuch
    informationtoshareandwhere,whenandhowtoopenupparticulardecision-makingprocesses.
    Again,however,theeffortshouldberewardedasmorepartnershaveagreatersenseofbuy-into
    boththeprocessandthesubstanceofpolicy,andmorepartnersactivelyplayaroleinpolicy
    implementation.Addedsocialdepthinthedecision-makingprocessshould,inotherwords,contribute
    togreaterpolicyreachandeffectiveness.
    Principle5:Beopentoinstitutionalreform
    Finally,giventheneedtothinkdifferentlyabouttherequirementsofinfluenceinthenewsecurity
    environment,theneedtointegratepolicyinstrumentstogethermoreeffectivelyandtheneedtoopen
    uppolicymakingtoawiderrangeofinfluences,itseemsclearthattheperiodaheadwillalsoneedto
    beoneofsignificantinstitutionalreform.Organisationsatalllevels(seetheAppendix)shouldalready
    beaskingquestionsabouthowtheirroleshavechanged,whethertheycurrentlyhavetherightskills
    toperformtheirnecessarytasksandwhichotherorganisationstheyshouldnowbepartneredwith.It
    isnotsimply,however,thatthesameoldinstitutionsneedtochangethewaytheybehavebutthat
    somenewinstitutionsmayalsoneedtobecreatedandoldonesscrappedintheperiodahead.Thisis
    nevereasy,butexistinginstitutionalboundariesshouldnotbeallowedtostifleandlimitthenecessary
    innovationrequiredincurrentcircumstances.
    Weareawarethatsome,asever,willsaythattheprincipleswehaveoutlinedherearemerelyliberal
    niceties,fineinwordbutimpossibletoapplyinpractice.Inourview,however,inthechangedsecurity
    landscapeoftoday,somecommitmenttotheseprinciplesisastrategicnecessity,notaliberalnicety.
    Wewouldalsostresswhatacommitmenttointegratedpowerandcollaborativesecurityisnot.Itis
    notanexcuseforinactioninthefaceofmountingthreats.Therewillstillbetimesandplaceswhen
    governmenthastotakedifficultdecisions,onbehalfofusall,toactlargelyinisolationfromothers
    whereitperceivesthethreattobeseriousenoughtojustifyit.Thepoint,however,isthatsuch
    instancesshouldbealastresortandbekepttoanabsoluteminimumsincethepricepaidintermsof
    lostlegitimacyandlostinfluenceishighandgettinghigher.

    Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy
    TheultimateobjectiveofanynationalsecuritystrategyfortheUKmustbetoclearlyprovidethe
    countryanditspeoplewiththebestprotectionpossibleagainstthefullrangeofthreatsandrisks
    facingus.Deliveringonthisrequires,asDavidOmandhaspointedout,‘(a)takinganticipatory
    actiontoinfluencedirectlythesourcesofmajorrisksfacingsocietyandatthesametime(b)taking
    stepstoreducesociety’svulnerabilitytothetypesofdisruptivephenomenathatwemayface’
    (Omand2007:1).
    33 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    Weturn,finally,toadiscussionofthepressingpolicyquestionstowhichanyforward-lookingnational
    securitystrategyoughtnowbesensitive.Wefirstexaminequestionsrelevanttoanticipatoryactionon
    futurepossiblesourcesofthreatandriskandthenmoveontotheidentificationofissuesrelevantto
    areductioninourcurrentvulnerabilities.Ourapproachthroughoutisnottoofferpolicysolutionsbut
    totablequestions.Inaworldofchangeasprofoundasthis,dwellingonthequestionsthatoughtto
    beaskedisjustasvaluableanexerciseasspeculating,nomatterhowthoughtfully,onthenatureof
    theanswersthatoughttobefound.
    Questionsrelatedtoanticipatoryaction

    Thereformofkeyinternationalinstitutions
    Ifthe21stcenturyisseeingadiffusionofrelativepowerawayfromtheAtlanticSeaboardtoAsiaand
    elsewhere,andifthisprocessitself,ifbadlymanaged,becomesasourceofinternationalinstabilityin
    future,thenapressingissueishowbesttodrawtheemergingpowersintothealreadyexisting
    structuresoftheinternationalsysteminanorderlyway.Inaworldinwhichsecuritymustbebuilt
    collaborativelyifitistobebuiltatall,thiswillbeacriticallyimportanttaskbutalsoahighlydelicate
    anddifficultone.Theemergingpowersmaynotfeelthattheirinterestshavebeenwelllookedafterin
    recentdecadesbythepreponderantpowersofthelate20thcenturyandmaynotbewelldisposedto
    lookingafterourinterestsnowthattheirownstrengthgivesthemagreatervoice.Nevertheless,the
    issuemustbeaddressed.
    Attheheartofthisisaseriesofquestionsrelatedtothereformofkeyinternationalinstitutions:
    • WhatkindofUNreformwillnotonlybestaccommodatenewlyemergingpowersbutalso,asa
    result,contributetotheincreasedeffectivenessoftheUNsystem?
    •Howshouldreformofdecision-makingstructuresintheInternationalMonetaryFundandWorld
    Bankproceedsuchthatawiderrangeofvoicesandinterestsareheardwhentheagendas,
    priorities,andapproachofsuchorganisationsarebeingshaped?
    • HowcanthemembershipoftheG8bebestopenedupanditsreachandlegitimacy
    consequentlyextended?

    Thestrengtheningofarules-basedinternationalorder
    Afurther,relatedsetofquestionsrelatestohowbesttocreatearules-basedinternationalorder.
    Thiswillbeakeyfeatureofanyattempttobuildlegitimacyofactionintotheinternationalsecurity
    arena.Thereareseveralpressingquestionsattheforefrontofthedebateonhowtobestgoabout
    this,suchas:
    • HowcanthereachandeffectivenessoftheInternationalCriminalCourtbefurtherextended?
    • Howcanthelegalframeworksthatareintendedtoprotecthumanrightsbemoredeeply
    enshrinedandmoreeffectivelyenforced?
    • WhatarethenextstepsrequiredtofurtherembedtheResponsibilitytoProtect,bothasawidely
    acceptedmodificationtomoretraditionalnotionsofstatesovereigntyandasalegitimatebasis
    uponwhichtheinternationalcommunitymayinterveneinthedomesticaffairsofastatefailing
    tofulfilitsresponsibilities?

    Climatechange
    • Athome,areforward-lookingclimatechangeimpactassessmentsbeingfullytakenintoaccount
    inplanningdecisions,particularlyastheserelatetocriticalnationalinfrastructureinvestments,
    thelocationofimportantmilitaryandsecurityassets,andfuturecommunitysafety?
    • Aresufficientprotectionsbeingputinplacetodealwithweathereventsthatalreadyappearto
    bebecomingmorevolatile?Significantquestionshavealreadybeenaskedinrelationtohow
    recentfloodingeventsimpactedonGCHQ.
    • InordertopoliticallyandsymbolicallybolstertheUK’sactivecontributiontointernationalclimate
    changemitigationdiplomacy,oughtwenowtoelevateclimatechangetothestatusofaclear
    34 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    threattonationalandinternationalsecurityandtouseourdiplomaticinfluencetoensurethat
    climatechangeanditsemergingeffectsreceivesustainedattentionwithintheUNSecurityCouncil?
    • Istheinternationalcommunityinvestingenoughindevelopingitsunderstandingofwhere
    climatechangeimpactswillbefeltfirstandhardestand,asacorollary,ofhowclimatechange
    effectswillimpactonalreadyexistingzonesofconflictandfailedorfailingstates?
    • ShouldtheUK,withitsinternationalpartners,bedoingmuchmoretostrengthenclimatechange
    adaptationcapacitiesinthecountriesandareaslikelytobemostseriouslyaffected,notjustasa
    humansolidaritymeasurebutasafront-linedefenceofinternationalstabilityandeffective
    governanceintheyearsahead?

    Nuclearnon-proliferation
    • Givenconcernsoveranewwaveofstate-basednuclearproliferation,andalackofbeliefamong
    non-nuclearweaponstatesintheseriousnessofintenttodisarmamongtheexistingnuclear
    powers,oughtwenowtobeactivelypursuingavigorousprogrammeofmultilateral
    denuclearisationamongthecurrentpossessorstates?
    • Isthelackofrealprogressandhighlevelattentiononthisissueintherecentpastundermining
    thepolitical,ifnotthelegal,legitimacyofattemptstopreventfurtherproliferationincasessuch
    asIranandNorthKorea?

    Energypolicyandinternationalsecurity
    • Giventhetighteningofinternationalenergymarkets,andthepotentialforfuturecompetition
    andevenconflictoverscarcefossilfuelresources,oughtwenowtobetakingfarstronger
    measurestocoordinateandmanageinternationalsupplyanddemandforenergy?Theexpansion
    ofrenewable,low-carbon,energysuppliesisobviouslyakeyimplicitfeatureoftheongoing
    Kyotoprocessbutoughtwenowtobeattemptingasignificantandinternationallycoordinated
    improvementinenergyefficiencytoeaseoratleastlimitcompetitivedemandforfossilfuelsin
    thedecadesahead?
    • Oughtwealsotobeactivelyseekingthecreationofaninternationalnuclearfuelbank,suchthat
    thosecountrieswishingtoadoptnuclearpowerforeitherclimatechangemitigationorsecurity
    ofenergysupplyreasonsareabletodosowithouttheresultbeingamajorinternational
    expansionanddispersalofenrichmentandreprocessingactivities?Thelatteroutcomeitself
    wouldbeaseriousnuclearproliferationriskandablowtotheNon-ProliferationTreaty.

    ThechallengeofpoliticalIslam
    Britishmilitaryandintelligenceservices,alongwiththoseofmanyofourallies,areactiveoverseas
    andourpoliceandintelligenceservicesareactivehereathomeinattemptstocontainIslamist
    violence.GiventhenatureofthepoliticalprojectbeingpursuedbytheIslamists,however,itseems
    appropriatetonowaskwhattheelementsofacoherentstrategytodefeatthempolitically,both
    overseasandathome,mightbe:
    • Shouldwebedoingmoretosupportthegrowingcallsforpoliticalandeconomicreforminsome
    predominantlyMuslimcountries,particularlyintheMiddleEast?
    • IstherelianceofmanyWesterneconomiesonoilandgasfromthatregionabarriertosupport
    forreformandifso,isashifttolessenergyrelianceonsomeoftheautocraticregimesinvolveda
    keyprerequisiteofachangedWesternrelationshipwiththeMiddleEast?
    • CanmorebedoneinthefieldofeconomiccollaborationwithMuslimcountriessuchthattheir
    economicprospectswithintheglobalisedworldeconomyimprove?
    • Shouldwebebuildingamorenuancedunderstandingoftherangeofopinionscontainedwithin
    theIslamistmovement,broadlydefined,andshouldwebeseekingoutdialoguewiththose
    Islamistscommittedtonon-violentpoliticalmethods?
    • WithintheUK,oughtwetobeconductingarootandbranchinvestigationnotjustintothe
    tacticsandmethodsofIslamistgroupsbutoftheradicalisationprocessitself,suchthatamore
    35 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    nuancedpublicpolicyresponsecanbebuiltonthebackofit?Shouldwebelookingatcloser
    integrationofintelligenceandpolicingworkwithelementsofsocialpolicy,labourmarket
    interventionsandlocalcommunitycapacity-buildingmeasurestomorecoherentlyaddresssome
    ofthesocio-economiccontextthatmayberelevanttotheradicalisationprocess?
    • Whatmoreshouldwebedoingtoensurethatnewlyarrivedimmigrantsaremoreeffectively
    integratedintoBritishsocietysuchthattheydonotbecomeisolated,alienatedandvulnerableto
    radicalisation?

    Tacklingpovertyandinequality
    • Giventheincreasinglyvisibleandmorallyindefensiblelevelofglobalpovertyandeconomic
    inequalityandthecomplexlinksbetweenpoverty,inequality,conflictandfailedstates,isitnow
    timetoseestrongermovestoafairerglobaleconomicordernotonlyasmoralimperativebutas
    animportantinvestmentininternationalstabilityandinourownlong-termsecurity?
    • Howcanaid,trade,investmentandclimatechangeadaptationassistanceinstrumentsbemore
    effectivelycombinedwithconflictpreventionandpost-conflictinterventionmeasuresto
    positivelyimpactthosecountriesmostatriskofstatefailure?
    • ShouldwenowbeseekingtostrengthenfurtherthecontributionoftheEuropeanUnionto
    effortstowidenthecircleofeconomicopportunitytoareasoftheformerSovietUnion,North
    AfricaandtheMiddleEastandifso,how?

    Pandemics
    • Givenconcernsoverapossiblenewinfluenzapandemic,andLondon’sstatusasahubforglobal
    peoplemovement,shouldwebeinvestingmore,withinternationalpartners,inthesearchfora
    universalfluvaccinethatcouldsavetensofmillionsoflives?Shouldwealsobeextendingthe
    UKfrontlineinthefightagainstapossiblepandemicbyassistingmorewithanimalhealth
    protectionmeasuresinpossiblepandemicsourceregionssuchasSouthEastAsia?

    Questionsrelatedtocurrentvulnerabilities
    Turningtotheissueofactiontoreducecurrentvulnerabilities,keyissuesandquestionsthatflowfrom
    theprecedinganalysisrelatetosocio-economicvulnerability,transnationalorganisedcrime,the
    securityofstrategictraderoutesandthesecurityofmaterialsthatmaybeofinterestandvalueto
    terrorists.

    Socio-economicvulnerability
    TheGovernmenthasalreadydonemuchtothinkaboutemergencyplanningandprotectionofthe
    criticalnationalinfrastructurebutkeyquestionsremain:
    • HowmuchoftheUK’scriticalnationalinfrastructureisconnectedto,andreliantupon,
    infrastructurebeyondourbordersandhowstrongaretheinternationalarrangementstoprotect
    suchinfrastructurefromdisruption?Shouldwebedoingmoretoaddressconcernsinthisarea?
    • Howmuchofthe80percentofUKcriticalnationalinfrastructurethatisinprivatehandsis
    ownedandoperatedbycompaniesheadquarteredoutsideoftheUKandwhat,ifany,arethe
    policyimplicationsandchallengesassociatedwiththis?
    •Whatmorecanbedonetostimulatebetterbusinesscontinuityplanning,notonlyinthecritical
    nationalinfrastructuresectors,butmorewidelyacrosssectorsandthroughoutthebusiness
    organisations,largeandsmall,thatcollectivelymakeupthelife-bloodoftheUKeconomy?
    • Whatkindsofnewpublic-privatepartnershipsarebestsuitedtodeliveringontheneedsofa
    moreresilientUKeconomyandsociety?
    • Inthelongterm,whatwouldamoreresilientsocietylooklike,intermsofthenatureand
    distributionofcriticalinfrastructureandtherolesplayedbygovernment,businessesand
    36 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    citizens?Aresomeinfrastructurestrategiesanddesignsinherentlymoreresilientthanothers?
    Shouldwe,forexample,bedevelopingamorewidelydistributedenergygeneration
    infrastructuresuchthatdisruptionstoanyonegeneratingplantwouldonlyhavelimitedimpact?
    • HowcantheGovernmentmoreeffectivelyplanforandfacilitateakeyroleforcitizensin
    emergencies?Timeandagaininemergencysituations,itisnotonlywhattheemergencyservices
    dobutwhatcitizensdoforeachotherthathasmadeanimportantdifferencetoeventual
    outcomes.

    Transnationalorganisedcrime
    • Giventhemassivescaleoftransnationalorganisedcrimeanditssignificancetointernational
    stabilityandtosecurityonourownstreets,oughtwenowtobeexploringamoremulti-layered,
    holisticstrategyinresponse?Atthelevelofforeignanddevelopmentpolicy,couldwebedoing
    moretousesofteconomicpowerinstrumentstoimpactcorruptstates,bothattheleveloftheir
    elitesandatthelevelofthepoorwhoaretemptedintoorganisedcrimeasarouteoutof
    poverty?
    • ThepromiseofEUmembership,ofaccesstoEUmarkets,andofaccesstoassociatedflowsof
    aidandinvestmenthas,forexample,beenusedtogoodeffectinsomecountriesinEastern
    Europe.Isthisamodelthatcouldbereplicatedelsewhere,andifso,throughwhichinstitutional
    vehicles?
    • ShouldwemassivelyandrapidlyexpandtheroleofJointInvestigationTeamsacrossinternational
    jurisdictionstoensurethatbordersdonoteffectivelyundermineeffortstoinvestigatecrime,to
    buildstrongcasesandtoachievesuccessfulconvictionsofthecriminalsinvolved?

    Securityofstrategictraderoutes
    TheUKgovernmenthasrecentlypublishedawelcomepaperonbordersecurity(CabinetOffice
    2007),includingthesecurityofourports.Givenourstatusasamajortradingnation,further
    questionsstillneedtobeasked:
    • Arewealertenoughtothepotentialhazardsandthreatstointernationalmaritimesecurity?
    • Shouldwebedoingmoretodiversifystrategictraderoutes,particularlyinthegrowing
    relationshipbetweenEuropeandAsia,suchthatwewouldnotbeasexposedtoanysuddenand
    massivedisruptiontothegrowingAsia-Europemaritimeroutes?Shouldwe,forexample,in
    collaborationwithourEUpartners,beassistinginthedevelopmentofthecentralAsiantransport
    infrastructure,suchthatitbetterconnectstheEUwithChinaalongwhatmightbecalledanew
    SilkRoad?

    Thesecurityoffissilematerial
    Thereisasignificantworrythatterroristgroupsareseekingtoacquireeitheranuclearweaponorthe
    fissilematerialrequiredtomakeone.TheUKiscurrentlyactiveonthisissue,ininitiativessuchasthe
    GlobalThreatReductionPartnership,throughtheG8,butfissilematerialisstillnotbeingmadesecure
    fastenough.
    • Giventhatitistheessentialingredientinanuclearbombandgiventhethreatofnuclear
    terrorism,oughtwenowtoberampingupouractivitiesinthisareaor,toparaphraseGraham
    Allison,sinceterroristorganisationsareracingtogetabomb,oughtnotweberacingtostop
    them?(Allison2006).
    37 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

    4.Conclusion
    WehavesoughtinthispapernottospelloutwhattheUK’snationalsecuritystrategyshouldbe,but
    toanalysethewidercontextwithinwhichthatstrategyoughtnowtobeforged.Insodoing,wehave
    identifiedkeydriversofchangeandtheireffectsonthesecuritylandscape,wehaveofferedaviewon
    whatthesemightmeanforthenatureanddiversityofthesecuritypolicychallengesbeingfaced
    today,andwehavesetoutanoverallstrategicapproachwhichwebelievethiswidercontextnow
    needstocallforth.Wehavealsotabledasetofpressingquestionsthat,inourview,nowneedtobe
    addressed.
    Weshouldfinally,perhaps,makenoteofthethingswehavenotdone.Wehavenotgivenanaccount
    ofthevaluesthatoughttounderpinandshapeUKpolicy,thoughourcalltoacommitmentto
    legitimacyofactioninSection3isrichinnormativeimplications.Wehavealsonotprovidedan
    accountoftheuniqueassetsandpointsofleveragethattheUKmightbeabletobringtobearonthe
    challengesdescribed.Otheromissionsincludeatreatmentofcurrentpolicyinitiativesandofthemany
    areasofactivitythattheUKanditsalliesabroadarequicklygettingbetterat.Muchlearningis
    ongoing,forexample,inareassuchasinterventioninpost-conflictzonesandonissuessuchas
    counter-measuresinrelationtoterroristfinancing.
    Thesearebigomissionsandallareissuesthatwillbeaddressedintheinterimreportoftheippr
    CommissiononNationalSecuritylaterthisyear.Wedonotbelieve,however,thattheabsenceofa
    treatmentofthemherefatallyunderminesthevalueofthematerialthatispresented.Onedoesnot
    needtobeabelieverinablueprintapproachtostrategytothinkthatanoverviewinvestigationinto
    thewidercontextofstrategicthinkingisavaluableexerciseinandofitself.Wehope,therefore,that
    asacontributioninthislatterarea,thispaperisaworthwhilecontributiontoongoingpolicydebate.
    38 ippr|TheNewFrontLine:Securityinachangingworld

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    42 ippr | The New Front Line: Security in a changing world

    Appendix: The new front line of national security policy

    Level of policy action and actors involved

    Issue Policy challenge Sub-national UK national UK bilateral relationships Euro/Atlantic regional Global

    External military attack Not an immediate threat. Armed Forces NATO Alliance; EU UN Security Council
    on the UK But obvious requirement to
    be ready for defence of
    national territory.
    Breakdown of Ensure legitimacy and Foreign and Commonwealth Permanent 5 (UK, US, EU (possible EU seat on UN Secretary General;
    international security effectiveness of key Office (FCO) France, Russia, China) plus Security Council). Security Council, other parts
    institutions institutions such as UN India and possibly Brazil. of the UN system.
    Security Council.
    Terrorism Understand challenge and Local Authorities (e.g. Preventing Home Office; Cabinet Office; United States and other allied EU counter-terrorism Interpol; G8 Counter-
    the radicalisation process. Political Extremism Pilots); Police Intelligence Services; GCHQ; countries (intelligence service strategy; Europol. EU Terrorism Cooperation.
    Create policies to win hearts Constabularies, including the Met; Serious and Organised Crime cooperation). Intelligence diplomacy on Middle East
    and minds; prevent attacks Police Community Tensions teams; Agency; Border Police; sharing relationships with Conflict; EU policy on Turkish
    on UK soil (through community and religious groups; Transport Police; countries in the Middle East. entry to the Union.
    intelligence work/ individual citizens. organisations protecting
    policing/protection of UK critical national
    borders; build domestic infrastructure; Armed Forces
    consensus around counter- as aid to civil power.
    terrorism strategy; combat
    the terrorism/organised
    crime interface.
    Failed and failing states Eliminate terrorist safe UK based development and aid FCO; Armed Forces; Ministry EU (Human Security Force?) UN Security Council; other
    havens; build governance NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the of Defence (MoD); NATO (as in Afghanistan) regional bodies, such as
    capacity in other failed and Children. Department for International African Union, acting under
    failing states through Development (DfID); Police. UN mandates; G8;
    development and climate International Monetary Fund
    change adaptation (IMF)/World Bank; World
    assistance, conflict Trade Organisation (WTO).
    prevention measures,
    peace-building, post-
    conflict reconstruction.
    Humanitarian Prevent genocide and UK based development and aid Armed Forces; MoD; DfID. EU; NATO UN Security Council
    intervention human rights abuses; NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the
    respond to emergency Children.
    situations.
    Weapons of mass Prevent proliferation of Actors and institutions securing FCO/MoD work on counter- With United States and EU nuclear exports control International Atomic Energy
    destruction proliferation nuclear, chemical, biological nuclear facilities and materials proliferation; Department for Russia, to encourage regime; EU counter- Agency; Nuclear Non-
    and radiological weapons to within the UK. Business, Enterprise & denuclearisation efforts. proliferation efforts. Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear
    either state or non-state Regulatory Reform (BERR). Suppliers Group; G8
    actors. Cooperative Threat
    Reduction Programme;
    Proliferation Security
    Initiative.
    43 ippr | The New Front Line: Security in a changing world

    Issue Policy challenge Sub-national UK national UK bilateral relationships Euro/Atlantic regional Global

    Climate change Prevention of further global Individual businesses and business Department for Environment, United States, India, China EU (Emissions Trading Kyoto Process;
    warming through post- groups; Local Authorities; energy Food and Rural Affairs Scheme) Intergovernmental Panel on
    Kyoto global agreement; consumers (DEFRA), BERR, Environment Climate Change
    adaptation to climate Agency.
    changes already inevitable,
    both for basic human
    survival and to ease
    conflict, migration and
    failed state pressures.
    Energy security Ensure security of supply, Energy companies; energy DEFRA, BERR, FCO. With supplier countries EU OPEC, International Energy
    minimum exposure to consumers. (Norway, Russia, Nigeria, Agency
    unstable regions and Algeria, Caspian Sea region
    climate change mitigation. and others).
    Global poverty Reduce it and widen the UK-based development, aid, and DfID, FCO, Treasury. EU (trade and aid policy) World Bank; IMF; WTO;
    circle of economic poverty reduction NGOs. increasingly important private
    opportunity both for its foundations.
    own sake and to remove a
    key background factor to
    conflict and failed states.
    Socio-economic Protect critical national and Local authorities; regional Cabinet Office Civil EU coordination on critical Global Corporations; UN (on
    resilience international infrastructure government offices; private sector Contingencies Secretariat; national infrastructure issues some issues, such as space
    from terrorist attacks, companies in key infrastructure Home Office; BERR; infrastructure).
    climate events and sectors and throughout economy; Confederation of British
    accidents; ensure strong community groups. Industry/Institute of
    emergency planning and Directors.
    preparedness; ensure strong
    business resilience and
    recovery.
    Disease/bio-security Prevent, contain and if Local authorities and local Cabinet Office Civil Forward activity in possible EU public health coordination World Health Organisation
    necessary eliminate serious emergency services; transport Contingencies Secretariat; source countries, such as
    disease outbreak, whether authorities; local media. Health Protection Agency. Vietnam and other countries
    occurring naturally, or as Possibly the armed forces as in South East Asia.
    result of bio-terrorism. aid to civil power. Border
    police. National media.
    Transnational organised To limit scale in overseas Local communities; Police Home Office; Cabinet Office; Arrangements with individual Europol; EU for use of wider Interpol
    crime source countries; tighten Constabularies, including the Met. Intelligence Services; Serious countries on extradition and economic policy instruments
    UK border to make and Organised Crime Agency; joint investigation teams. aimed at tackling
    penetration of UK more Border Police; Transport international corruption.
    difficult; achieve Police. FCO for assistance on
    prosecutions where source country policy (e.g. in
    possible. West Africa).

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