Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In The
In re
____________
and
Lance Stott
Attorney for Applicant
SB# 00797818
812 San Antonio, Suite 403
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 472-0557 telephone
(512) 472-9908 facsimile
1
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Lance Stott, Petitioner and attorney for ____________, makes this Petition for
would show the Court that the Texas law "Improper Photography" is unconstitutional,
because it violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the
no law, and is void, it may not be made the basis for the prosecution of any person, nor
may any person be held to bond, or otherwise be deprived of liberty, on the basis of
such a law.
For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the Petitioner's Brief in
Support of this Petition, Petitioner prays for relief. Specifically, Petitioner prays for an
Order from this Court requiring the State of Texas to dismiss its prosecution of
Applicant, and for the reason that Texas Penal Code §21.15(b)(1) is unconstitutional.
Respectfully Submitted,
________________________
Lance Stott
Attorney for Applicant
SB# 00797818
812 San Antonio, Suite 403
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 472-0557 telephone
(512) 472-9907 facsimile
2
Petitioner's Oath
"On my Oath, I hereby state that the allegations contained within my "Petition for
_______________________
Lance Stott, Petitioner
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that the attached Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Brief
was served on the District Attorney's Office of Williamson County, this the ___ day of
June, 2009.
______________________
Lance Stott,
Attorney for Applicant
3
Cause Number ____________
ORDER
CAME TO BE HEARD, this, the ____ day of _______, 2009 the foregoing
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the cause referenced above, and having heard the
________________________
Judge Presiding
4
Index of Authorities
5
Issue Presented
Photography," violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Statement of Facts
bail.1 He is alleged to have transmitted images without consent and with the intent to
arouse.
1 This is a pretrial, facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute. "The mere fact that appellant relied upon the
evidence at trial shows that his complaint is not a facial attack because that type of attack can and must be made
without reference to evidence. It is an attack upon the face of the statute in isolation. Once it does or must refer
to specific evidence it has passed out of the "facial attack" arena and has become something else. Karenev v.
Texas, ___ 3d ___ Ct.Crim.App. (2009). Cochran, J., concurring.
6
Summary of the Argument
criminalizes speech based on its content, it "abridges" the freedom of speech within the
meaning of the US Constitution, and "curtails the liberty of speech" within the meaning
of the Constitution of the State of Texas. While Texas jurisprudence2 regarding Article I,
§8 is limited, the US Supreme Court has developed a substantial body of law explaining
• First, when the government abridges speech, it loses the presumption that it is
acting constitutionally. A law that limits speech is presumed unconstitutional.
• Second, the burden of proof shifts from the person whose speech is burdened to
the government. When the government restricts speech it is the government that
must prove it's acting constitutionally.
• Third, the government may restrict speech only when it has a compelling interest.
It is up to the State to show it has a compelling interest, and to demonstrate that
the restriction advances that interest.
• Fourth, the state may only limit as much speech as necessary to achieve its
purpose. Even if the government has a compelling reason for restricting speech,
if legislation restricts speech that is unrelated to that purpose, it is
unconstitutional. Legislation must be "narrowly tailored" to limit as little speech
as possible.
• Fifth, if there is a less restrictive way to achieve its purpose, the state must use
that method.
more speech than necessary, and alternative means are readily available, which would
2 In 1992, the Supreme Court of Texas found that the Texas Constitution offered additional protection to subjects
of gag orders, beyond that which is offered by the First Amendment. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 SW2d 4, Tex.
(1992). More recently, however, Texas Courts have followed a more conservative approach. Typically, Article I
rights are found to be coextensive with those of the US Constitution.
7
Argument
invalidity of Section 21.15(b) of the Texas Penal Code.3 The law, "Improper
Photography," violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech..."4 And it violates
Article I of the Texas Constitution, §8: "No law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty
The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy to be used when someone is illegally
restrained in his liberty.6 A person is restrained in his liberty when he is held to bond.7 A
statute alleged to violate the Constitution may be challenged through application for a
3 "[W]hat is the difference between a facial challenge and an 'as applied' challenge to the constitutionality of a
penal statute...? A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute considers only the text of the
measure itself, and not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual. A party asserting a facial
challenge to a statute seeks to vindicate not only his own rights, but also those of others who may also be
adversely impacted by the statute in question. Karenev v. State, ___ SW3d ___ Tex.Crim.App. (2009).
4 The First Amendment has been made applicable to the states through the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
5 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,376 (1879). "An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. An offense
created by it is not a crime. A conviction under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and cannot be a
legal cause of imprisonment."
6 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 11.01.
7 Ex parte James Mattox, 883 SW2d 93, 95 Tex.App.-Austin (1984). See also Ex Parte Weise, "[Defendant] was
restrained of his liberty within the meaning of 11.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure when he was
charged with illegal dumping and released on bond to await trial."
8 Ibid. See also Ex parte Ellis, 275 SW3d 74, 78 Tex.Ct.App - Austin (2008), and Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617,
620 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). "We have long held that when there is a valid statute or ordinance under which a
prosecution may be brought, habeas corpus is generally not available before trial to test the sufficiency of the
complaint, information, or indictment. But we have recognized certain exceptions to this rule. One exception is
8
"Improper Photography,"
impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the
§21.15(b)(1) prohibits five activities, three of which involve creating images, and
broadcasting; and photography and videography are simply ways of recording visual
when the applicant alleges that the statute under which he or she is prosecuted is unconstitutional on its face;
consequently, there is no valid statute and the charging instrument is void."
9 Applicant omits the fourth element, "at a location that is not a bathroom or private dressing room," for the sake
of concision, and because the element is irrelevant.
9
It is important to recognize that each provision operates independently.
"Improper Photography" can be committed in either one of two different ways; either by
recording, or by transmitting. The fact that an image was recorded legally (with
consent) does not relieve anyone of the obligation to obtain consent before transmitting
it. A person must obtain permission, in other words, both to send an image, and to
transmitting images are all forms of speech. "The First Amendment literally forbids the
abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not
end at the spoken or written word.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). "[W]e
conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech
and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Burstyn, Inc. v.
The right of Free Speech, of course, is not unlimited. "The freedom of speech
has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation,
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children." Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 US 234 (2002). Other categories of unprotected speech include
"Improper Photography," however, does not fall within any of these categories, or
any other category the Supreme Court has recognized as unprotected.10 Rather, the
10 "The Supreme Court has not recognized a new category of speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment in
over twenty-five years." United States v. Stevens, 071808 FED3, 05-2497, (3d. Cir. 2008).
10
conduct §21.15b)(1) prohibits has been explicitly identified as protected speech.
"Motion pictures are within the ambit of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 US 184 (1964). "Photography,
expressive activities." Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 590 (1989). The law, in
Nor does the fact that the law requires a sexual purpose (an "intent to arouse")
take it out from under the purview of the First Amendment. "Sexual expression which is
Similarly, lack of consent does not put §21.15(b)(1) beyond the reach of the First
from some specific torts - invasion of privacy, commercial misappropriation, and false
light, the First Amendment protects photographers not only from criminal prosecution,
image of a student's genitalia, which were exposed during a football game. When the
student sued, the newspaper was granted summary judgment. On appeal, the court
said, "We hold that because the published photograph accurately depicts a public,
11
newsworthy event, the First Amendment provides the Newspaper with immunity from
1991).
Square, without their knowledge or consent, and sold them at a gallery.13 Nussenzweig,
a Hasidic Jew, said DiCorcia's actions violated the tenets of his religion. The Court
13 10 prints of the photo were sold, for $20,000 to $30,000 each. Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, 11 Misc 3d 1051,
Supreme Court, New York County (2006).
12
In Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) the Supreme Court said,
"The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve
of political expression or comment upon public affairs,
essential as those are to healthy government. One need only
pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast
range of published matter which exposes persons to public
view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of
the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in
a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary
value on freedom of speech and of press. "
While there are no similar cases where penal laws were struck down for
attempted to criminalize taking pictures without consent, the most reasonable inference
is that there are no other laws that criminalize taking pictures without consent. That lack
of consent, in other words, is not a constitutional basis for criminalizing photography has
When considering laws that restrict free speech, the Supreme Court uses a two-
tier approach. When speech is restricted because of its content, the Court applies
"strict scrutiny." When speech is restricted incidentally, or as part of a "time, place, and
manner," regulation, the Court uses a less exacting standard, sometimes called
"intermediate scrutiny."
matter neutral. Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Barber, 111 SW3d 86, 93 (Tex.2003). To be
subject-matter neutral, a regulation must not be based on the speech's topic. Carey v.
13
certain locations (private homes and schools, for example), zoning restrictions,
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781 (1989), for example, the
Respondent challenged New York City's attempt to regulate the volume of amplified
music at a bandshell in Central Park. The Court found that while music is a form of
protected speech, the regulation was nevertheless "a reasonable regulation of the place
In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained, "Our cases make clear that...
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
intrusion into residential areas and other areas of the park" - had nothing to do with the
content of the music being regulated, merely its volume. Ward, 792.
6am to 10pm;14 COPA, a federal law that would have criminalized posting sexual
material on the Internet without first taking affirmative steps to prevent children from
seeing it;15 a Minnesota canon of judicial conduct that would have prohibited judicial
candidates from announcing their views on certain political issues16; and New York's
14
"Son of Sam" law, which would have redirected funds owed to authors of books about
These cases stand for the proposition that when the government selects out a
(Republican Party) or crime (Simon & Schuster) - the restriction will be subjected to
strict scrutiny. "This Court has held that the First Amendment's hostility to content-
based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a
197 (1992).
"without reference to the content of the regulated speech." Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). It singles out speech on a particular topic,19 and
criminalizes speech on the basis of it's content - on the basis of whether it's sexually
arousing.20
15
of St. Paul, 505 US 377, 382 (1992).
Coalition v. City of Austin (Tex. App. - Austin), 141 S.W.3d 282, 298 (2004).
"When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of
constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people. To
guard against that threat the Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on
speech be presumed invalid, and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality." Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
justifying the challenged restriction.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
If the State's interest is privacy, there can be little doubt that privacy is a
Indeed, the right to privacy is derived from the penumbras and emanations of the
First Amendment itself. "[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is
16
protected from governmental intrusion." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional significance of the right to privacy in
Lawrence v. Texas. "The Petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives... The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual." 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
This is because §21.15(b)(1), by its own terms, limits itself only to a small fraction
of the instances in which privacy rights might be implicated, while addressing itself to a
§21.15(b)(1) concerns itself only with violations of privacy that are done with the
intent to arouse. Any violation that is conducted for any other reason - to humiliate, to
embarrass, for the sake of spite, or for revenge, for the purpose of blackmail, extortion,
privacy. Anyone who takes a picture of someone with the wrong intent is subject to
anyone who transmits a photograph without consent is subject to prosecution, even if,
at the time the photograph was taken, privacy concerns were wholly absent - or, for that
little to advance it, particularly in light of the wide range of speech the law attempts to
criminalize.
17
The State Must Prove "Improper Photography" is Narrowly Tailored.
In addition to identifying a compelling State interest, the State must also show
that the legislation is "narrowly tailored" to further that interest. "For even the most
be subjected to exacting scrutiny: the State must show that the regulation is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end...
To survive strict scrutiny... a State must do more than assert a compelling state interest
-- it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest... [W]e
readily acknowledge that a law rarely survives such scrutiny." Burson v. Freeman, 504
When Simon & Schuster challenged New York's "Son of Sam" law, the Supreme
Court noted that the State has "an undisputed compelling interest in ensuring that
criminals do not profit from their crimes." Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime
Victims Board, 502 US 105, 119 (1991). The Court nevertheless struck down the law
18
which Thoreau acknowledges his refusal to pay taxes and
recalls his experience in jail; and even the Confessions of
Saint Augustine, in which the author laments "my past
foulness and the carnal corruptions of my soul," one instance
of which involved the theft of pears from a neighboring
vineyard." (Simon & Schuster, at 121).
protect anyone's privacy. If it were narrowly tailored, it would distinguish on the basis of
was arousing.
When the government burdens speech, it must do so in the least restrictive way
possible. If another, less restrictive method is available, the more restrictive method is
unconstitutional.
the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the
"A statute that "effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have
that the statute was enacted to serve." Reno, 521 U.S., at 874.
addressing situations in which an actual privacy interest was at stake. In other words, a
statute that criminalized taking pictures of people who had a reasonable expectation of
19
privacy, and had not consented, would be less restrictive than §21.15(b)(1).
18 USC Sec. 1801, for example, prohibits a person from capturing the image of a
private area of another individual, without consent, "under circumstances in which the
body that is covered with clothing and "for which the person has a reasonable
readily available.
21 "Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, has the intent to capture an
image of a private area of an individual without their consent, and knowingly does so under circumstances in
which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both."
22 Crime of video voyeurism (Ark. 5-16-101):
(a)It is unlawful to use any camera, videotape, photo-optical, photoelectric, or any other image recording device
for the purpose of secretly observing, viewing, photographing, filming, or videotaping a person present in a
residence, place of business, school, or other structure, or any room or particular location within that structure, if
that person:
(1)Is in a private area out of public view;
(2)Has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
(3)Has not consented to the observation.
(b)It is unlawful to knowingly use a camcorder, motion picture camera, photographic camera of any type, or
other equipment that is concealed or disguised to secretly or surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, record,
or view by electronic means a person:
(1)For the purpose of viewing any portion of the person's body that is covered with clothing and for
which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy;
(2)Without the knowledge or consent of the person being videotaped, filmed, photographed, recorded,
or viewed by electronic means; and
(3)Under circumstances in which the person being videotaped, filmed, photographed, recorded, or
viewed by electronic means has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
20
While most, if not all, states prohibit voyeurism and similar invasions of privacy,
Texas is the only state that attempts to do so while dispensing with the requirement that
someone's privacy is actually being invaded. Any law, therefore, that did not dispense
with that requirement that someone's privacy was being invaded would be less
of Penal Code 42.09, which prohibited flag burning. In response to the State's
argument that the statute served the compelling interest of preventing breaches of the
peace, the Court noted that the statute was "so broad that it may be used to punish
The Court noted another statute, 42.01, "Disorderly Conduct," more specifically
conduct that "tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Texas Penal Code
§42.01.
"The existence of a statutory scheme other than section 42.09," the Court said,
"which addresses the same basic interest in a less restrictive manner indicates that the
42.09. Section 42.01... proves that the challenged statute, as it relates to breaches of
the peace, is too broad for First Amendment purposes. " Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d
21
"Improper Photography" is Vague.
"Improper Photography" is not vague in the ordinary sense of the word - it is not
ambiguous. It prohibits recording images without consent and with the intent to arouse,
and it prohibits transmitting images without consent and with the intent to arouse. The
A law may be permissibly vague, however, in three different ways. First, it's
know what is prohibited. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108 (1972).
Second, it's vague if it "delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application." ibid. Finally, where a statute "abut[s] upon sensitive
exercise of those freedoms." A vague law will "inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider
of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
because "intent" cannot be directly observed, and must be, and is, inferred from the act
itself. In the case of "Improper Photography," that means it will be inferred from the
For example, in In 2005 Louis Vogel23 was arrested in Tarrant County. Police
23 DFW News, Fort Worth, October 15th, 2005. Other arrests include Baldemar Vela, arrested for taking a picture
of a fully clothed woman at a WalMart in Round Rock; Robert Earl Thompson, arrested for taking pictures of
cheerleaders at a football game; and Phu V. Nguyen, arrested for taking pictures of women sunbathing on Lake
22
said they'd observed him taking suspicious photographs at an Octoberfest celebration.
"He had a camera with him," said Southlake Police Lt. Ashleigh Douglas, "It was
obvious he was taking photographs." During their investigation, police determined the
"You're committing an offense," said Lt. Douglas, "if, a) you're taking a picture of
a person who hasn't given you consent to do so, and b) that picture is for the sexual
Two weeks later prosecutors dismissed the charges. "A lot of the photographs
frankly are crowd scenes," said Kurt Stallings, Tarrant County Prosecutor. "Some of
them are artistic photographs. There's a little series of photographs of a table and a
balloon."
The point is not that the prosecutor was right, or that the police were wrong.
Whether a "crowd scene" is arousing, presumably, depends on who is in the crowd, and
it is inevitable, when charged with enforcing a vague law that reasonable people will
disagree about the purpose of a photograph, and the intent of a photographer. What
seems innocent to one person will seem "improper" to someone else.24 The point is that
it's an inherently subjective judgment. The law is vague in the sense that it is
cannot know ahead of time how prudish or intolerant an arresting officer - judge, for that
images, and to those who transmit them. The law chills speech because while a person
may know his own intent, it is impossible to know how it will be judged by others.. A
Travis.
24 Often, the interpretation of a photograph says more about the person interpreting it than it does about the intent
of the photographer.
23
photographer, aware of this law, will steer far clear of the danger zone in order to avoid
the serious consequences that flow from an arrest or conviction of a felony sex crime.
In Reno v. ACLU, the Court noted the special concern with which it reviews
When the consequences are particularly severe, the risks associated with
drafting and clarity of purpose are essential. Erznoznik v Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 217
(1975).
24
In 1945 street photographer Alfred Eisenstaedt took a picture of a man and
woman in Times Square. The photo was sold to a national magazine, and has been
republished and retransmitted countless times since, but never with permission.
Eisenstaedt never asked permission, and in fact, the identities of the man and the
26 In 1980, Life Magazine asked the man in the photograph to come forward. 11 men claimed to be the sailor, and
3 women claimed to be the nurse. "Who is the Kissing Sailor?" Life Magazine, Oct. 1980.
25
construed as, a violation, even uncertainty about the law's application demonstrates the
imposes "may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even
speech suppression." Ashcroft v. Free Speech. Where First Amendment freedoms are
"Substantial Overbreadth"
"unprotected behavior," and "pure speech." Overbreadth analysis, the Court said, was
not appropriate where a law's affect on speech was incidental. An otherwise legitimate
"To put the matter another way," the Court wrote, "particularly where conduct and
not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
speech. Photography, broadcasting, and recording images are all protected conduct;
§21.15(b)(1) does not implicate speech incidentally, but directly, and specifically.
26
valid criminal law" that is "capable of some unconstitutional applications." It is an
Chicago v. Morales, where the Court said, "The city of Chicago may be able validly to
apply some other law to the defendants in light of their conduct. But the city of Chicago
may no more apply this law to the defendants, no matter how they behaved, than it
could apply an (imaginary) statute that said, "It is a crime to do wrong," even to the
Unlike the law in Broadrick, §21.15(b)(1) does not have a "plainly legitimate
sweep" because it does not address any unprotected conduct. It prohibits only speech.
Some of that speech could be prohibited under a different law, for example, one that
was narrowly tailored to protect privacy. "Improper Photography," however, does not
punish invasions of privacy; instead it criminalizes every instance where someone either
transmits or records another person's image, without consent, and with the intent to
arouse. The the extent the law punishes some - but not all - invasions of privacy, it does
applications is enormous.
For example, there are at least 7,460,000 images of Britney Spears available on
the World Wide Web. Many of these images (perhaps most of them) are intended to
arouse.
27 See also, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant
to the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to
validate it").
27
While most - but not all - of these images were recorded with Britney's consent,
few - if any - are transmitted with it. "Improper Photography," of course, prohibits not
without consent, and with the intent to arouse, the overbreadth of the statute is, in fact,
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, for example, the Court struck down a canon of
judicial conduct that prohibited candidates for judicial office from announcing their views
on certain issues. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Court struck a city ordinance
that required owners of drive-in theaters to shield films with nudity from public streets.
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, a Federal law was struck that required
28
cable networks to either broadcast adult channels at night, or to fully scramble them. In
the Court struck a law that limited the amount of money a political party could spend,
and in Johnson v. Texas, and Texas v. Johnson, both the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and the US Supreme Court, respectively, struck a law that prohibited flag
burning.
What these cases show is that where a statute is aimed squarely at restricting
protected speech, and particularly where the speech is restricted on the basis of its
content, the illegitimate sweep of the statute is, necessarily, "substantial." Where there
substantial in comparison.
Vasquez v. State
conclude appellant has not met his burden regarding his claim of unconstitutional
challenges.
the statute is valid and the legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in
29
This is not, however, the rule that applies when the government restricts speech.
invalid, and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality."
The opinion states, "The burden rests on the party challenging the statute to
Again, this is not the rule that applies when the Government restricts speech.
"When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving
the constitutionality of its actions." United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529
The opinion goes on to say, "A statute that prohibits intentional conduct is rarely
subject to a facial overbreadth challenge," citing Sullivan v. State, 986 SW2d 708, 712
speech.28 "Improper Photography" does not involve "intentional conduct" in the Sullivan
The Vasquez opinion recites the State's argument that §21.15(b)(1) is narrowly
tailored because it reaches only recordings that are "made with the non-constitutionally
protected intent of gaining sexual arousal or gratification." The intent to gain sexual
arousal or gratification, however, is not an exception to the First Amendment. There are
a number of kinds of speech that are not protected - defamation, incitement, obscenity,
child pornography - but intent to gain sexual gratification is not one of them. Indeed, the
28 The Court may have meant to suggest that Improper Photography punishes conduct. Recording, transmitting,
and broadcasting images are all forms of speech, however.
29 No First Amendment challenge was made or argued in Sullivan. "[A]ppellant has not argued that the First
Amendment or other fundamental interest protected his conduct." Sullivan, at 712.
30
Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the mere fact that speech is erotic is not reason
to suppress it. "In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly
clear that sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment." Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 US 844, 874 (1997).
The Vasquez Court goes on to find the examples presented by the appellant of
the statute. (See below, "Examples of Prohibited Speech Which Are Protected.")
"Further, and pivotal," the Court continues, "is that the statute requires both
specific "intent" and "lack of consent" by the complainant. In order for one to commit the
proscribed conduct under section 21.15(b)(1), one must have the specific intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 21.15(b)(1)(B).
challenge. Sullivan, 986 S.W.2d at 712. Further, the statute requires the lack of consent
by the complainant. See Tex. Pen. Code. Ann § 21.15(b)(1)(A). The plain language of
the statute narrows the proscribed conduct, and therefore, does not reach a substantial
` The plain language of §21.15(b)(1), however, does not, "narrow the proscribed
conduct." To say that it requires both "intent" and "lack of consent" is merely to restate
the elements of the offense. By this standard, any criminal law is "narrow" if it contains
31
It bears repeating that Sullivan, which the Vasquez Court repeated quotes, is an
appeal from a conviction for "Indecency with a Child." While it may be true, as the
Sullivan court decided, that the intentional conduct of touching a child "with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person" is not subject to a facial overbreadth
is constitutional.
or otherwise.
unconstitutionally, restrict.
In Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board, for example, the
Court considered books which had not been written, in coming to its conclusion that the
Following are examples of real images §21.15(b)(1) prohibits, despite the fact
they are innocuous, in terms of harming any state interest, and are constitutionally
protected. The examples are illustrative only; they're not meant to be exhaustive.31
30 "These two provisions combine to encompass a potentially large number of works... A list of prominent figures
whose autobiographies would be subject to the statute if written is not difficult to construct: The list could
include Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason after a dubiously conducted 1603 trial; Jesse Jackson,
who was arrested in 1963 for trespass and resisting arrest after attempting to be served at a lunch counter in
North Carolina; and Bertrand Russell, who was jailed for seven days at the age of 89 for participating in a sit-
down protest against nuclear weapons..." Simon & Schuster, 122.
31 It would be impossible to make an exhaustive list of all "Improper Photography's" unconstitutional applications.
§21.15(b)(1) could be unconstitutionally applied to a limitless number of situations.
32
Spring Break
Every year thousands of students come to Texas for Spring Break. Activities
include dance competitions, wet T-shirt contests, and bikini exhibitions, among other
things.
"Jessie Kowalski from San Antonio, Texas, won the women's dance contest held at Coca-Cola beach
behind the Radisson Resort on South Padre Island, Texas."
Many "Spring Breakers" bring their cameras, in order to record what they see,
and to show the pictures to their friends when they get back home. MTV broadcasts a
cable show from the island. News organizations report on what happens there. Taking
a picture of someone on South Padre, with the intent to arouse, and without consent, is
33
34
Sally Mann
Sally Mann is an artist whose works are included in the permanent collections of
the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Whitney Museum of New York City, and the
Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. Among her most controversial works are a series of
photographs of her own children, which have been attacked for, among other things,
protected by the First Amendment, even though some people, apparently, believe the
35
PETA
the treatment of animals. It is famous - or notorious - for its use of sexually provocative
imagery.
While PETA undoubtedly obtains permission from its models to publish their
images, other organizations and individuals routinely republish them without obtaining
permission first. While they're entitled to do that under copyright law, there is no "fair
36
Cheerleaders
transmits their images with the intent to arouse, and without their permission, commits a
37
38
Street Photography
They work in public places such as streets, parks, malls, and beaches.
39
What seems arousing to one person, may seem innocuous to someone else.
40
Marilyn Monroe
Norma Jean Baker, born in 1926 to a single mother, and raised in foster care,
changed her name to Marilyn Monroe, and became one of America's most successful
Hollywood celebrities.
There are at least two million images of Marilyn Monroe currently circulating on
the Internet, according to one popular Internet search engine company. Each image
Many of Monroe's images are sexual, and are made and transmitted with the intent to
arouse. None of those transmissions are done with Marilyn Monroe's consent.
41
Marilyn Monroe, 1949. Hugh Hefner used this image to launch "Playboy" magazine in 1953.
Prohibiting transmissions of Ms. Monroe's image, without consent and with the
42
Sports Illustrated
The images are designed to appeal to the sexual desires of men. SI certainly has
permission from Anna Kournikova to publish her image, but the same cannot be said of
those who are not publishers or agents of "Sports Illustrated." If they transmit Anna
Kournikova's image, without her permission, they risk prosecution for a felony,
according to §21.15(b)(1).
43
Paparazzi
Paparazzi are journalists who make a living photographing stars for magazines
like "Star" and "People." Sometimes the Paparazzi shoot stars looking the way they
want to look, sometimes not. Either way, so long as they're in public, they don't have to
44
Public photos of celebrities, while tacky, are nevertheless protected.
45
Lady Godiva
Lady Godiva was an 11th Century Countess whose husband is said to have
imposed a punishing tax on his people. According to legend, in protest, she rode
A portrait is a "visual image," so transmitting it without consent and with the intent
unconstitutional overbreadth.
46
Conclusion
that interest is privacy - is a compelling one, but the statute is not narrowly tailored. It
prohibits more speech than is necessary, and much of the speech it prohibits is
innocuous. In other words, the conduct it proscribes does not harm any legitimate state
interest. Statutes that a.) protect privacy more effectively, and b.) don't trample on the
Improper Photography is both over and under inclusive. It would, for example,
not penalize taking an "upskirt" photograph, if it was done for some reason other than
sexual arousal. But it would penalize taking a photo of a fully clothed person, if it was
done with the intent to arouse. It would operate differently depending on the gender
and sexual orientation of the person taking the picture. A straight man taking a picture
ad hoc judgments about protected speech, and it forces photographers and others to
censor themselves unnecessarily, if they wish to avoid the risk associated with
on its face.
47