History of Fundamentalist Islam in Iran

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History of fundamentalist Islam in Iran

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This article addresses the roots and the developmental history of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran.
For Iranian politics and human rights issues in Iran, see: Politics of Iran and Human rights in Iran.
The history of fundamentalist Islam in Iran covers the history of Islamic revivalism and the rise of
political Islam in modern Iran. Today, there are basically three types of Islam in Iran: traditionalism,
modernism, and a variety of forms of revivalism usually brought together as fundamentalism.[1]
Neo-fundamentalists (also called neo-conservatives) in Iran are a subgroup of fundamentalists who have
also borrowed from Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism.
Contents
1 Definition
2 Background
3 Emergence
4 Viewpoints
5 Circles, schools and organizations
5.1 Fadayan-e Islam
5.2 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
5.3 Haghani school
5.4 Combatant Clergy Association
5.5 Ansar e Hezbollah
5.6 Basij
6 Theories of state based on divine legitimacy Navvab Safavi escourted by Iranian
6.1 Islamic republic versus Islamic administration police to the court
7 Exporting Islamic Revolution and Islamist diplomacy
8 Seminary-University conflicts
9 Islamist art and literature
10 Islamic-neoclassical economy
11 Islamic Republic & De-Iranianisation Policy
11.1 Iranian identity versus Religious identity
11.2 Arabic vs Persian
12 Principle-ists and Women issues
13 Tolerance and Civil rights
14 Criticism of Islamist interpretation of Islam in Iran
15 Future of fundamentalism in Iran
16 Iran as a victim of Islamic fundamentalism
17 Leaders
18 Theorists and think tanks
19 Notable victims
20 Notable figures
21 Timeline of political Islam in Iran
22 References and further reading
23 See also
24 Notes
Definition
Main article: Definition of Shi'a fundamentalism
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"Fundamentalism is the belief in absolute religious authority and the demand that this religious authority
be legally enforced. Often, fundamentalism involves the willingness to do battle for one's faith.
Fundamentalists make up only one part of any religion's followers, who usually fall along a wide spectrum
of different interpretations, beliefs and strong values."[2]
There are some major differences between Christian fundamentalism and what is called Islamic
fundamentalism. According to Bernard Lewis:[3]
"In western usage these words[Revivalism and Fundamentalism] have a rather specific
connotation; they suggest a certain type of religiosity- emotional indeed sentimental; not
intellectual, perhaps even anti intellectual; and in general apolitical and even anti-political.
Fundamentalists are against liberal theology and biblical criticism and in favor of a return to
fundamentals-i.e. to the divine inerrant text of the scriptures. For the so call fundamentalists
of Islam these are not and never have been the issues. Liberal theology have not hitherto
made much headway in Islam, and the divinity and inerrancy of the Quran are still central
dogmas of the faith ... Unlike their Christian namesakes, the Islamic fundamentalists do not
set aside but on the contrary embrace much of the post-scriptural scholastic tradition of their
faith, in both its theological and its legal aspects ."
The Islamist version of political Islam (so called neo-fundamentalism in this article) emerged in response
to the perceived shortcomings of fundamentalism. The Islamists, with their cosmopolitan backgrounds,
introduced various tools they had borrowed from the West into their organizational arsenal. Ideologically,
they drew on antimodernist philosophies that embodied Western dissatisfaction with the consequences of
industrialization and positivism. [4]
Iranian fundamentalists and conservatives, commonly describe themselves as "principalist" (also spelled
principle-ist); that is, acting politically based on Islamic and revolutionary principles.[5][6]
Background
Currently there exists three main types of Islam in Iran: traditionalists
(represented by Hossein Nasr, Yousef Sanei), modernists (represented by
Abdolkarim Soroush), fundamentalists (represented by Mohammad Taghi
Mesbah Yazdi(neoconservative), Ali Khamenei and several Grand Ayatollahs).
Subsequently, religious fundamentalism in Iran has several aspects that make it
different from Islamic fundamentalism in other parts of the world. Finally,
fundamentalism in Iran is not limited to religious fundamentalism. In fact,
Iranian secular fundamentalists can be just as dogmatic and ideological as
religious fundamentalists—-deny that any religious law or social practice can be
just or equal. The terms Iranian "conservatism", "neoconservatism",
"fundamentalism" and "neo-fundamentalism" are all subject to numerous
philosophical debates. Javad Tabatabaei and Ronald Dworkin and a few other
philosophers of law and politics have criticized the terminology and suggested
various other classifications in the context of Iranian political philosophy.
According to Bernard Lewis:[7]
"Even an appropriate vocabulary seemed to be lacking in western

languages and writers on the subjects had recourse to such words as
"revivalism", "fundamentalism" and "integrism". But most of these words
have specifically Christian connotations, and their use to denote Islamic In 1996, Ali Khamenei
religious phenomena depends at best on a very loose analogy." issued a fatwa against
music education. He
Some researchers, categorized Iranian thinkers into five classes: also claims that
"Beatle-ism" has
Anti-religious intellectuals ravaged Western youth.
Religious intellectuals
Traditionists
Traditionalists
Fundamentalists
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Traditionists who account for the majority of clerics keep themselves away from modernity and neither
accept nor criticize it. Traditionalists believe in eternal wisdom and are critics of humanism and modernity.
Traditionalists believe in a sort of religious pluralism which makes them different from Traditionists.
Fundamentalists are also against modernity. Contrary to traditionists, fundamentalists openly criticize
modernity. Moreover fundamentalists believe that for reviving the religion in the modern era and for
opposing modernity, they need to gain social and political power. This makes fundamentalists different
from traditionists and traditionalists who are not interested in gaining political power.
As an example of different views on fundamentalism, one can refer to Ruhollah Khomeini who is
considered as populist[8], fundamentalist and reformer by various observers. In July 2007 Iranian
reformist president Mohammad Khatami said that Ruhollah Khomeini was the leading "reformist" of our
time.
Emergence
The birth date of fundamentalist Islam in Iran is believed to in early 20th
century, almost a century after secular humanism and its associated art and
science entered Iran.[9] Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri and Navvab Safavi were among
pioneers of religious fundamentalism in Iran. Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri and Navvab
Safavi are today, the Islamic Republic’s foremost heroes and role models.[10]
Iran was the first country in the post-WorldWar II era in which political Islam
was the rallying cry for a successful revolution, followed by the new state
formally adopting political Islam as its ruling ideology. Leaving aside a
traditional clerical quietism, there was a diverse ideological interpretation of
Islam within the grand alliance that led to the 1979 revolution. The first three
Islamic discourses were Khomeinism, Ali Shariati’s Islamic-left ideology, and
Mehdi Bazargan’s liberal-democratic Islam. The fourth discourse was the
socialist guerrilla groups of Islamic and secular variants, and the fifth one was
secular constitutionalism in socialist and nationalist forms.[11]
Hassan Rahimpour Azghandi, explains the emergence of the fundamentalism as
follows: "It should be made clear that if fundamentalism or terrorism exist, they
are a reaction to the colonial militarism of the West in the Islamic world, from The photo depicts an
the 18th century until today. European armies occupied all of North and South Iranian mother and
America and Africa, in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, and divided them daughter, lighting a
among themselves. Then they came to the Islamic world in North Africa, Asia, candle in the memory of
and the Middle East. It is only natural that the Muslims act in accordance with those who have lost
their religious duty, just as you would defend your homes if they were loved ones in the
occupied. Why do we call resistance "terrorism"? When Hitler and the Fascists tragedy of September
rolled Europe in blood and dust - would your forefathers be called terrorists if 11th 2001 in the United
they conducted resistance?" States.
Some researchers refutes explanations of "Islamic fundamentalism" as an

anti-imperialist political force directed against Western dominance in the Islamic world. Rather, Moaddel
demonstrates that Islam has been politicised only during the second half of the twentieth century as a
discourse of opposition, not to Western domination in the state system, but to the ideas, practices, and
arbitrary political interventions of a westernizing secularist political elite. This elite has established
ideologically uniform, repressive states which have imposed a Western model and outlook in Muslim
societies by coercive means. Islamic fundamentalism thus emerged as a competing narrative contending
for state power against a secularist discourse. Its goal was to seize state power through an Islamization of
all aspects of life in a Muslim society.[12]
In May 2005, Ali Khamenei expounded the concept of reformist fundamentalism. He defined the term as
the following: "While adhering to and preserving our basic principles, we should try to constantly rectify
and improve our methods. This is the meaning of real reformism. But U.S. officials define reformism as
opposition to Islam and the Islamic system."
In January 2007, a new parliamentary fraction announced its formation. The former Osoulgaraian
("fundamentalist") fraction divided into two fractions due to "lack of consensus" on Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's policies. The new fraction was named "Fraction of creative fundamentalists" which is said
to be critical of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's neo-fundamentalist policies and to reject conservatism on such
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matters related to the government. The main leaders of the fraction are Emad Afroogh, Mohammad
Khoshchehreh, Saeed Aboutaleb and MP Sobhani.
Viewpoints
There is a lot that is unique about Iranian fundamentalism but it nonetheless
must be seen as one of the Abrahamic revivalisms of the twentieth century. [13]
As in the course of the Persian Constitutional Revolution nearly a century
earlier, the concept of justice was at the center of the ideological debates
among the followers of the three Islamic orientations during and after the
revolution. The conservatives (fundamentalists) adhered to the traditional
notion of Islamic justice, one which, much like the Aristotelian idea of justice, Saeed Hajjarian and
states that "equals should be treated alike, but unequals proportionately to Dariush Forouhar were
their relevant differences, and all with impartiality." The radicals among numerous
(neo-fundamentalists), on the other hand, gave a messianic interpretation to victims of
the concept, one that promised equal distribution of societal resources to fundamentalism
all—including the "unequals." And finally, those with a liberal orientation to
Islam understood the notion of justice in terms of the French revolutionary
slogan of egalit`e, i.e., the equality of all before the law.
While the fundamentalists (conservatives) were generally suspicious of modern ideas and resistant to
modern lifestyles at the time of the Iranian revolution, the Islamic radicals (neo-fundamentalists) were
receptive to many aspects of modernity and willing to collaborate with secular intellectuals and political
activists.[14]
Many of the so-called neo-fundamentalists, like Christian fundamentalists, pull out a verse from the
scriptures and give it a meaning quite contrary to its traditional commentary. Also, even while denouncing
modernism as the "Great Satan", many fundamentalists accept its foundations, especially science and
technology. For traditionalists, there is beauty in nature which must be preserved and beauty in every
aspect of traditional life, from chanting the Qur'an to the artisan's fashioning a bowl or everyday pot.
Many fundamentalists even seek a Qur'anic basis for modern man's domination and destruction of nature
by referring to the injunction to 'dominate the earth' -- misconstruing entirely the basic idea of
vicegerency: that man is expected to be the perfect servant of God. [9]
An example of an environmental problem is the overpopulation of the earth.
The Neo-fundamentalists's family policy is to increase the population
dramatically. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's call for increasing
Iran's population from 70 to 120 millions can be understood in the same
line.
In Mehdi Mozaffan's chapter on a comparative study of Islamism in Algeria
Naser Makarem Shirazi and Iran, he says, "I define Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism as a
and Hossein Noori militant and anti-modernist movement ... not every militant Muslim is a
Hamedani are among the fundamentalist. but an Islamic fundamentalist is necessarily a militant".
main advocates of A major difference between fundamentalism in Iran and main stream
fundamentalism in Iran Islamic fundamentalism is that the former has nothing to do with Salafism.
According to Gary Legenhausen: "The term Islamic Fundamentalism is one
that has been invented by Western journalists by analogy with Christian
Fundamentalism. It is not a very apt term, but it has gained currency. In the Sunni world it is used for
groups descended from the Salafiyyah movement, such as the Muslim Brotherhood." It is worth noting
that the concept of "Salaf" (‫ )ا‬does not exist in Shia theology in contrast to Sunni Islam as well as
Christianity (a similar concept referred to as "original Christianity").
Political Islam consists of a broad array of mass movements in the
Muslim world, which share a conviction that political power is an essential
instrument for constructing a God-fearing society. They believe that
Muslims can fulfill their religious obligations only when public law
sanctions and encourages pious behavior. To this end, the majority of
these movements work to take control of state power, whether by
Gary Legenhausen teaches
propaganda, plebiscite, or putsch.[4] A look through several generations
western philosophy in the
of clerics in seminaries shows significant differences in viewpoints and
institute founded by Mesbah
Yazdi.
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practical approaches. When young Ruhollah Khomeini urged his mentor Ayatullah Husain Borujerdi, to
oppose the Shah more openly. Broujerdi rejected his idea. He believed in the "separation" of religion
from politics, even though he was Khomeini's senior in rank.[15] However just before his death Hossein
Boroujerdi (d. 1961), expressed his opposition to the Shah’s plans for land reform and women’s
enfranchisement.[16] He also issued a fatwa for killing Ahmad Kasravi. Khomeini remained silent till his
seniors Ayatollah Haeri or Ayatolla Boroujerdi's, were alive. Then he was promoted to the status of a
Grand marja and started his activism and established his Islamic Republic eventually. Among Khomeini's
students, there were notable clerics whose ideas were not compatible with their mentor. As examples of
the prototypes of his students one can mention Morteza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti and Mohammad
Taghi Mesbah Yazdi. Criticizing Mesbah Yazdi and Haghani school Beheshti said: "Controversial and
provocative positions that are coupled with violence, in my opinion...will have the reverse effect. Such
positions remind many individuals of the wielding of threats of excommunication that you have read about
in history concerning the age of the Inquisition, the ideas of the Church, and the Middle Ages". [17]
Morteza Motahhari, the most notable student of Khomeini, was widely known as the main theoretician of
Iranian revolution (next to Ali Shariati). While Mesbah Yazdi was an advocate of expelling secular
University lecturers, Motahhari insisted that the philosophy of marxism or liberalism must be taught by a
marxist and liberal respectively. Both Motahhari and Beheshti were assassinated by terrorist groups early
after the revolution. Motahhari also introduced the concept of "dynamism of Islam".
After the triumph of the revolution in February 1979, and the subsequent liquidation of the liberal and
secular-leftist groups, two principal ideological camps became dominant in Iranian politics, the
"conservatives" (fundamentalists) and the "radicals" (neo-fundamentalists). The radicals' following of
Khomeini of the revolution rather than his incumbency of the office of the Supreme Jurist (Vali-eFaqih) or
his theocratic vision of the "Islamic Government." Today, Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi clearly rejects
Khomeini's "Islamic Republic" and supports the idea of "Islamic government" where the votes of people
has no value.[14]
Neo-fundamentalists believe that supreme leader is holy and infallible and the role of people and elections
are merely to discover the leader. However the legitimacy of the leader comes from God and not the
people, something that the ancients were made to believe like the Egyptian Pharaohs or Roman Caesars
like Nero or Caligula who viewed themselves equal to God. The advocates of this stream of Islamic
fundamentalism would ridicule Roman and Egyptian civilization as "dark ages" but would not mind in
toeing the line of some of the ancient tyrants in regarding their leaders as equal to God, while blissfully
oblivious that Islam believes in one and only God and regard all men and women on earth to be equal to
one another. Contrary to Iranian traditionalists, neo-fundamentalists as well as Iranian liberals have been
under the influence of western thinkers. The Islamic neo-fundamentalists have also borrowed from
Western countercurrents of populism, fascism, anarchism, Jacobism, and Marxism[18] without the welfare
state.
During 1990s, Akbar Ganji had discovered crucial links that connected the chain
murders of Iran to the reigning neoconservative clergymen (Ali Fallahian,
Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehei, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi) who had
issued the fatwas legitimizing assassinations of secular humanists and religious
modernists. In May 1996, Akbar Ganji presented a lecture at Shiraz University
entitled "Satan Was the First Fascist". He was charged with defaming the
Islamic Republic and tried in a closed court. His defense was later published
under the title of "Fascism is one of the Mortal Sins." (Kian, Number 40,
February 1997.)
Another important issue is the concept of "insider-outsider" introduced by Ali
Khamenei. Accordingly, in his administration outsiders have less rights Conservatives wrote
compared to insiders and cannot have any administrative posts. He stated that numerous books to
"I mean, you [to his followers] must trust an insider as a member of your spread their ideas.
clique. We must consider as insiders those persons who are sympathetic (Books by Mesbah
towards our revolution, our state and Islam. The outsiders are the ones who are Yazdi)
opposed to the principle of our state."
In another speech Ali Khamenei compared what he called "American
fundamentalism" and "Islamic fundamentalism": "We can see that in the world today there are nations
with constitutions going back 200 to 300 years. The governments of these nations, which occasionally
protest against the Islamic Republic, firmly safeguard their own constitutions. They clutch firmly to
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safeguard centuries old constitutions to protect them from harm. [...] However, when it comes to us and
as we show commitment to our constitution and values, they accuse us of fundamentalism or describe us
as reactionaries. In other words, the American fundamentalism is viewed as a positive virtue, whereas
Islamic fundamentalism - based on logic, wisdom, experience and desire for independence - is condemned
as some sort of debasement. Of course, they no longer use that term fundamentalism to describe us,
instead they refer to us as conservatives." He also made a clear distinction between what he called
"extremism" and "fundamentalism": " There may be a handful of extremists here and there, but all the
elements serving in various departments of our country are fundamentalists in essence."[19]
Iranian neoconservatives are against democracy, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and disparage the people and their views.[23] In particular
Mesbah Yazdi is an aggressive defender of the supreme leader's absolute
power, and he has long held that democracy and elections are not compatible
with Islam. He once stated that: "Democracy means if the people want
something that is against God's will, then they should forget about God and
religion ... Be careful not to be deceived. Accepting Islam is not compatible with
democracy."[24] In contrast to neo-fundamentalists, fundamentalists accepts
the ideas of democracy and UDHR. During his life time, Ayatollah Khomeini
expressed support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; in Sahifeh
Nour (Vol.2 Page 242), he states: "We would like to act according to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We would like to be free. We would like
independence." However, Iran adopted an alternative human rights declaration,
the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in 1990 (one year after
Khomeini's death), which diverges in key respects from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.[citation needed] Upon the emergence
There exists various viewpoints on practice of controversial Islamic criminal of Cinema in Iran a
codes like stoning. Ayatollah Gholamreza Rezvani states that the Quran century ago, Sheikh
sanctions stoning unequivocally and since it is the word of God, it must be Fazlollah Nouri declared
carried out in real life as if Rezvani is the Prophet on Earth tasked by God to watching films an
carry forward this message. This is in contrast to fundamentalist point of view. unpardonable sin and
In December 2002, Hashemi Shahroudi, the fundamentalist Head of Judiciary very few pious souls
ordered a ban on the practice of stoning. In 2007 the Shahrudi directive, dared go to the
Mohammad Javad Larijani called stoning "a feature of Shari'a law" , "original movies.[20] Nouri was a
and respectable punishment" and claimed that "Mr. Shahrudi is not opposed to senior cleric who was
the principle of a...verdict that is based on Islamic Sharia,". [25] He also said: later hanged for siding
"We will never surrender Islam in the face of human rights concerns … During with the absolutist
the adoption of these (human rights) laws, the world of Islam was in complete monarchy.[21] Today Ali
ignorance while liberals and secular parties formulated and imposed these laws Khamenei is against
onto the entire world ... We must elucidate punishment by stoning clearly to both Iranian and
those who denounce it. We had a revolution so that Islamic laws would be Western music.[22]
implemented ... We will never give up Islam in the face of these challenges"
(State-run news agency ILNA, May 30, 2007).
Fabrication of fake history and use of propaganda is common among neo-fundamentalist circles. A good
example is spread of superstitions over and fabricating a fake history for Jamkaran mosque, a small
ordinary mosque suddenly turned out to be the holiest place in Shia Islam. The issue has been harshly
criticized even by conservative circles. Some of Iran's ayatollahs say the legend of Jamkaran is
superstition.[26] During Khatami's presidency, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi claimed that an unnamed
former CIA chief had visited Iran with a suitcase stuffed with dollars to pay opinion-formers. "What is
dangerous is that agents of the enemy, the CIA, have infiltrated the government and the cultural
services," he was quoted as saying. On top of its official budget for Iran, the CIA had given "hundreds of
millions de dollars to our cultural officials and journalists," he added. "The former head of the CIA recently
came here as a tourist with a suitcase full of dollars for our cultural centres and certain newspapers. He
made contact with various newspaper chiefs and gave them dollars."[27][28] Nasser Pourpirar for instance
believes that a significant portion of Iranian history are baseless fabrications by Jewish orientalists and
Zionists. The whole existence of Pre-Islamic Iran is no more than a Jewish conspiracy and the most
important key for analyzing today’s world events is the analysis of ancient "Jewish genocide of Purim".[29]
Another neoconservative theorist, Mohammad Ali Ramin believes that contemporary western history (e.g.
6 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
Holocaust) are all fabrications by Jews. He also claimed that Adolf Hitler was a Jew himself.M.A. Ramin,
Hassan Abbasi, Abbas Salimi Namin, Hasan Bolkhari and others have been giving speeches about Jewish
conspiracy theory, Iranian and western history intensively all over the country since the establishment of
Ahmadinejad government in 2005.[28] Currently, Abadgaran described itself as a group of Islamic
neo-fundamentalist,[30] have the control over current Iranian government. However it lost the 2006 city
council election.
The problem with identity is at the heart of fundamentalism, no matter it is Islamic, Jewish or Christian. If
people's religious identity becomes more prominent than the national identity, fundamentalism will rise. In
other words fundamentalism can be seen as "identity-ism". Many of the religious remarks that are made
in Iran, especially from official platforms, basically rest on identity-oriented thinking and the inculcation of
an identity known as a religious identity.
Under Ahmadinejad, neo-conservative forces are determined to make the Islamic Republic more Islamic
than republican. Whether they will succeed is another matter. Power in Iran is a complicated matter, and
various factions exist even among conservatives, who run the gamut from hard-liners to pragmatists.
Some among Iran’s leadership would accept accommodation with the West in exchange for economic and
strategic concessions, while others are content to accept isolation from the West. Others favor a "Chinese
model," which in Iran would mean opening the economy to international investment while maintaining the
clergy’s dominance. It is these complex internal forces that will decide the future of Iranian politics.[31]
Circles, schools and organizations

Fadayan-e Islam
Fadayan-e Islam was founded in 1946 as an Islamic fundamentalist organization. The founder of the
group was Navab Safavi, a neo-fundamentalist cleric.[32] The group's aim was to transform Iran into an
"Islamic state". To achieve their objective, the group committed numerous terrorist acts. Notable among
these was the 1946 assassination of Ahmad Kasravi, an intellectual who had criticized the mullahs (Shia
Islamic clergy). The group also assassinated two prime ministers (Ali Razmara and Hassan Ali Mansour,
1951 and 1965) and an ex-prime minister (Hazhir, 1949).
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)

The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed in the 1960s, the
organization was an attempt in bridging Islam and Marxism to offer a
revolutionary brand of Islam. It was expelled from Iran after the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, and its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime
of Saddam Hussein starting in the late 1980s. The MEK conducted anti-Western
attacks prior to the Revolution. Since then, it has conducted terrorist attacks
against the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK
advocates the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the
group’s own leadership.[33][34]
During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military personnel and US civilians working
on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US
Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of
In 2006, Abbas-Ali
the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking
Amid Zanjani, a cleric
Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Mohammad Beheshti, President
with no University
Mohammad-Ali Rajai, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of
education was appointed
the 1980-1988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment
as the head of Tehran
and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, the MEK assisted the
Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern University, Iran`s
Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. symbol of modern
scientific and secular
April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies institutions
and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount
large-scale operations overseas. MKO is recognized as a terrorist group by both
US and EU. The MKO has a fascistic behaviour with all those who do not share its views and positions and
routinely attacks Iranian intellectuals and journalists abroad. For instance MEK agents attacked Iranian
7 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
journalist Alireza Nourizadeh and injured him seriously. [35]
Haghani school
Haghani Circle is a neo-fundamentalist school of thought in Iran founded by a group of clerics based in the
holy city of Qom and headed by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, an influential cleric and
theologian.
The school trains clerics with both a traditional and modern curriculum, including a secular education in
science, medicine, politics, and Western/non-Islamic philosophy (the topics that are not taught in
traditional schools). It was founded by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Ayatollah Dr.
Beheshti and Ayatollah Sadoughi.
Many famous theologians and influential figures in Iran's politics after the revolution were associated (as
teacher or student) with the Haghani Circle or follows its ideology.
Combatant Clergy Association

The association is composed of right wing conservative elements of Iran’s political culture, including the
nation’s foremost politicized clerics, the Friday prayer leaders in most of Iran’s metropolitan areas, the
bazaar merchants, and the Supreme Leader. Not surprisingly, members of this faction support a
continuation of the status quo, including strict limits on personal freedoms and the continued primacy of
the clergy in the nation’s day-to-day governance. Important constituents of the Militant Clergy Society
include the Islamic Coalition Society and the Coalition of Followers of the Line of the Imam.
The Combatant Clergy Association was the majority party in the 4th and 5th parliaments after the Iranian
revolution. It was founded in 1977 by a group of clerics with intentions to use cultural approach to
overthrow the Shah. Its founding members were Ali Khamenei, Motahhari, Beheshti, Bahonar, Rafsanjani
and Mohammad Mofatteh and its current members include Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ahmad Jannati,
Mahdavi Kani, Reza Akrami and Hassan Rohani.
As the foremost advocates of the Iranian status quo that has left millions disenfranchised, the Militant
Clergy Society is exceedingly unpopular among rank-and-file Iranians. [36]
Ansar e Hezbollah
Ansar-e-Hezbollah is a militant neo-fundamentalist group in Iran. Mojtaba Bigdeli is a spokesman for the
Iranian Hezbollah. Human Rights Watch strongly condemned the brutal assault on students at Tehran
University halls of residence in the early hours of Friday July 9, 1999 by members of the Ansar-e
Hezbollah.[37]
Basij
Basij is a military fundamentalist network established after the Iranian
revolution. In July 1999, Ezzat Ebrahim-Nejad was shot dead in Tehran
University dormitory by a member of Basij military force. The event
initiated a huge demonstration. In 2001, a member of the Basij, Saeed
Asgar attempted to assassinate Saeed Hajjarian a leading reformist and
political advisor to reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. Asagar
was arrested and sentenced to spend 15 years in jail, but was released
after spending only a short term in prison. Human Rights Watch informs
that the Basij belong to the "Parallel institutions" (nahad-e movazi), "the
quasi-official organs of repression that have become increasingly open in President Mohammad-Ali
crushing student protests, detaining activists, writers, and journalists in Rajai visiting Ali Khamenei in
secret prisons, and threatening pro-democracy speakers and audiences at hospital after unsuccessful
public events." Under the control of the Office of the Supreme Leader these assassination by the MKO on
groups set up arbitrary checkpoints around Tehran, uniformed police often June 27, 1981
refraining from directly confronting these plainclothes agents. "Illegal
prisons, which are outside of the oversight of the National Prisons Office,
are sites where political prisoners are abused, intimidated, and tortured with impunity."[38] On March 8
2004 the Basij issued a violent crackdown on the activists celebrating the International Women's Day in
Tehran.[39] On 13 November 2006, Tohid Ghaffarzadeh, a student at Sabzevar University was murdered
8 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
by a Basij member at the University. The murderer reportedly said that what he did was according to his
religious beliefs. Tohid Ghaffarzadeh was talking to his girlfriend when he was approached and stabbed
with a knife by the Basij member.
Basij has also become active in such nonmilitary projects as nationwide polio vaccination of children and
the distribution of millions of oral polio vaccine drops throughout the country. Basij contributed a great
deal to the success of two health programs implemented in Iran, particularly the nationwide polio and
measles vaccination schemes.[40]
Theories of state based on divine legitimacy

Various theories of state based on immediate divine legitimacy have been proposed over the years by
Iranian clerics. One can distinguish four types of theocracies. Typology of the types of government
adumbrated in Shiite jurisprudential sources can be summarized as follows (in chronological order):[41]
"Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult" in Religious Matters (Shar’iat) Along with the Monarchic
Mandate of Muslim Potentates in Secular Matters (Saltanat E Mashrou’eh )
Proponents: Mohammad Bagher Majlesi, Mirza ye Ghomi, Seyed e Kashfi, Sheikh Fadl ollah
Nouri, Ayatollah Abdolkarim Haeri Yazdi.
"General Appointed Mandate of Jurissonsults" (Velayat E Entesabi Ye Ammeh)
Proponents: Molla Ahmad Naraghi, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi (Saheb Javaher)
Ayatollahs Husain Borujerdi, Golpayegani, Khomeini, (before the revolution)
"General Appointed Mandate of the Council of the Sources of Imitation" (Velayat E Entesabi Ye
Ammeh Ye Shora Ye Marje’eh Taghlid)
Proponents: Ayatollahs: Abdollah Javadi-Amoli, Beheshti, Taheri Khorram Abadi
"Absolute Appointed Mandate of Jurisconsult" (Velayat e Entesabi ye Motlaghe ye Faghihan)
Proponent: Ayatollah Khomeini (after revolution)
Islamic republic versus Islamic administration

Since the election of pro-reform president Mohammad Khatami in 1997, there have been two basic
approaches, two outlooks, toward the achievement of reform in Iran: "Reformists" within the regime
(In-system reformers) essentially believe that the Constitution has the capacity—indeed, the positive
potential—to lead the "Revolutionary" government of Iran toward "democracy". By contrast, secularists,
who remain outside the regime, basically think that the Constitution contains impediments profound
enough to block meaningful reform.[42]
On the other hand, fundamentalists and in-system reformers on one side and neo-fundamentalists on the
other side are struggling over "Khomeini’s Islamic Republic" versus "Mesbah’s Islamic administration".
Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi and Ansar-e-Hezbollah call for a change in the Iranian constitution from a
republic to an Islamic administration.[43] They believe the institutions of the Islamic Republic such as the
Majlis (Iran's Parliament) are contradictory to Islamic government which is completely centered around
Velayat-e Faqih and total obedience to him.
Ali Khamenei, himself, has remained silent on the issue of whether Iran should
have an Islamic Republic or an Islamic Administration.[44] However he clearly
rejected the supervision of Assembly of Experts on the institutions that are
governed directly under his responsibility (e.g. Military forces, Judiciary system
and IRIB).
Neo-fundamentalists believe that supreme leader is holy and infallible and the
role of people and elections are merely to discover the leader. However the
The Iranian legitimacy of the leader comes from God and not the people. In January 2007,
parliament building as it Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who won the 2006 election for Assembly of Experts,
appeared in the winter clearly rejected this idea and emphasized on the fact that the leader and the
of 1956. cleric members of the Assembly of Experts may make wrong decisions and the
legitimacy of the leader comes from the people not the God.
Beyond these theoretical debates, elements of the "Islamic Administration" are
(in practice) slowly replacing those of the "Islamic Republic".
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Exporting Islamic Revolution and Islamist diplomacy

Upon establishment of Islamic Republic, the two factions (conservatives and radicals) differed on foreign
policy and cultural issues. The radicals (neo-cons) adamantly opposed any rapprochement with the United
States and, to a lesser extent, other Western countries, while seeking to expand Iran’s relations with the
socialist bloc countries. They advocated active support for Islamic and liberation movements , so called
"export of the revolution", throughout the world. The conservatives favored a more cautious approach to
foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of normalizing Iran’s economic relations with the rest of the world, so
long as the West’s political and cultural influence on the country could be curbed.
According to Iranian scholar Ehsan Naraghi, anti-western attitude among Iranian Islamists, has its root in
marxism and communism rather than Iranian Islam. Iran and the west have had a good relation with
mutual respects since Safavid era. However by emergence of communism in Iran, anti-western attitudes
was taken by some extremists. As Naraqi states, anti-western attitude in other parts of the Muslim word
has a different root than the one in Iran does.
The end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, pragmatists (under the leadership
of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani) normalization of Iran’s relations with other countries, particularly those in
the region, by playing down the once-popular adventurist fantasy of "exporting the Islamic revolution" to
other Muslim lands. After the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 elections and defeat of
pragmatists and reformists (under the leadership of Mohammad Khatami), neoconservative who gained
full control of both parliament and government for the first time after Iranian revolution, again recalled
the idea of exporting the revolution after years of silence.
After the Iranian Revolution, the new Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued an Islamic ideologic foreign
policy that had included creation of Hezbollah, subsidies to Hamas,[45] opposition to Israel and Zionist
leaders, and aid to Iraq's Shiite political parties.[46][47]
Fundamentalism and political realism are diplomatically incompatible. It is
believed that the most evident characteristic of diplomacy is flexibility. The
reason Iran’s diplomacy has encountered many shortcomings and lost
numerous opportunities provided by international or regional political
developments is the country’s focus on fundamental values and neglect of
national interests. Fundamentalism is always accompanied with idealism while
diplomacy always emphasizes realities. Therefore, the model of realistic
fundamentalism will not work in the diplomatic arena.[48]
In the song called
"eshgh e sor'at" (crazy
Muslim thinkers in the world generally believe in a sort of "religious
for speed), Kiosk
internationalism". Even religious modernists in Iran have still some inclinations
towards religious internationalism and the concept of nation-state is not firmly
underground music
established in their mind. These kinds of beliefs mainly rooted in traditional
band make open
thinking rather that postmodernism. There are however, some religious
political references and
intellectuals like Ahmad Zeidabadi who are against religious internationalism.
criticize Iran's foreign
policy: "Nothing for On the side, western countries have adopted various different strategies with
lunch or dinner to make, respect to fundamentalists. The attitude of these countries have been mainly
But let them eat driven by geopolitics and oil market rather than religious extremism itself.
Yellowcake, Scraped up According to Graham Fuller of the RAND Corporation and a former
the very last dime, Sent Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at CIA: "United States had
it straight to Palestine". no problem with Islam or even Islamic fundamentalism as such. [...] one of
the closest American allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, is a fundamentalist
state."[49]
Also Maryam Rajavi, the leader of an Islamist-Marxist group, has been invited several times by EU
parliament members to address the assembly. In 2004 Alejo Vidal Quadras, European Parliament’s first
Vice President, met Maryam Rajavi whose group is listed as a terrorist group by EU and USA. [50][51]
Mehdi Noorbaksh, a professor at the Center for International Studies, University of St. Thomas in Texas,
believe that the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism to world peace and security is based on
politically and ideologically motivated misinterpretation of the reformist nature of Islamic revival. The
portrayal of Iran as a radical Islamic terrorist state by the US has strengthened the extremists and
weakened democratic, reformists groups in Iran. According to Prof Noorbakhsh: "The spread of democracy
and the introduction of socio-political reforms in the Middle East, especially in Iran, will undermine US
10 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
domination over the region." [52]
Seminary-University conflicts
See also: Iran's Cultural Revolution of 1980-1987
One of the main clarion calls raised within the geography of events known as the Cultural Revolution was
the call for seminary-university unity. The original idea was a reconciliation between science and religion.
In other words the meaning of seminary-university unity was a resolution of the historical battle between
science and religion. Resolving this battle is a scholarly endeavour, not a political and practical one.
However after the revolution, since clerics came to rule over the country, the idea of seminary-university
unity, which meant understanding between seminary teachers and academics, gradually turned into
submission by academics to clerics and seminary teachers, and it lost its logical and scholarly meaning
and took on a political and practical sense. Appointment of Abbasali Amid Zanjani as the first and only
cleric president of University of Tehran in 27 December 2005 can be understood in the same line. Tehran
University is the symbol of higher education in Iran. Abbasali Amid Zanjani hold no academic degree and
was appointed by Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi, the minister of Science, Research, and Technology in
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's cabinet.
There was a journal in 1980s, by the name of "University of Revolution" which used to include some
material written by neofundamentalists. They wrote many articles to prove that science is not wild and
without a homeland, that it is not the case that it recognises no geography, and that it is therefore
possible for us to create "Islamic sciences".[53]
In 2007, Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a well-known cleric, attacked the University people calling them
the most indecent people.
Islamist art and literature

Both Iranian fundamentalism and neo fundamentaslism are associated with
their own art, cinema and literature. In cinema, the first attempts were perhaps
made by Masoud Dehnamaki. Dehnamaki, a famous neo-fundamentalist, made
his first documentary film "Poverty and Prostitution" in 2002. His next
documentary was "Which Blue, Which Red", which is about the rivalry between
the Iranian capital’s two football teams, Esteqlal and Persepolis, and their fans.
He is now making his debut feature-length film "The Outcasts".
Iranian journalist turned documentary Navvab Safavi metro
filmmaker Masud Dehnamaki, was formerly the station in Tehran
managing director and chief editor of the
weeklies "Shalamcheh" and "Jebheh", which
were closed by Tehran’s conservative Press Court. These journals were
among main neo-fundamentalist publications. The rightist newsweekly
"Shalamcheh" under the editorship of Masoud Dehnamaki, one of the
strongest opponents of President Khatami and his policies, has been
closed down by the press supervisory board of the Ministry of culture and
Islamic guidance, presumably for insulting or criticizing the late Grand
Ayatollah Kho'i, who had called the "velayat-e faqih" position unislamic,
prior to his passing away. Perhaps the most influential neo-conservative
newspaper during 1990s and 2000s was Kayhan daily. Hossein
Shariatmadari and Hossein Saffar Harandi (later become a minister of
culture) were main editor and responsible chief of the newspaper. In
2006, British ambassador to Tehran, met Hossein Shariatmadari and
acknowledged the role of Kayhan in Iran and the region.
Masoud Dehnamaki's The
Outcast is one of few Iranian To promote art and literature, Islamic Development Organization was
war movies in which the founded by Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1991, Ali Khamenei revised the
heroes are extremely flawed organization's structure and plans. The plan is to promote religious and
and shown to commit acts moral ideas through art and literature. According Minister of Culture,
often viewed as "immoral" by Hossein Saffar Harandi, the funds for Qur'anic activities will increase by
authorities in Iran. fourfold in the year 2007. "All of the ninth governments' cultural and
artistic activities should conform to the holy book," he declared.
11 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
While promoting their own art and literature, fundamentalists are against the development of art and
literature that has no "valuable content". In late 1996, following a fatwa by Ali Khamenei stating that
music education corrupts the minds of young children, many music schools were closed and music
instruction to children under the age of 16 was banned by public establishments (although private
instruction continued).[54] Khamenei and his followers believe that "Nihilism and Beatle-ism" have
ravaged Western youth. According to the renowned novelist and the first president of Iranian Association
of Writers after the revolution, Simin Daneshvar, Islamic Republic has been generally hostile toward
Iranian writers and intellectuals. This is contrary to the attitude of Pahlavi regime, Daneshvar added in an
interview with Etemaad Daily in 2007.
In 2007, Javad Shamghadri, artistic advisor to president Ahmadinejad publicly stated that: "Like many
other countries in the world, Iran too can get along without a film industry". "Only 20 percent of people go
to the cinema and their needs can be provided through the national radio and television network," he
added.[55]
Islamic-neoclassical economy
In the early times of 1979 revolution Ayatollah Khomeini declared that what mattered was Islam and not
the economy. In one of his comments, he dismissed the concerns of his first prime minister, Mehdi
Bazargan, about the economy by simply noting that "Economics is for donkeys!" [56] However Khomeini in
many occasions advised his followers about justice and giving priority to the rights of the deprived and the
oppressed members of the community.[57]
"Association of the Lecturers of Qom's Seminaries", or ALQRS (Jame'eh-ye
Modarresin-e Howzeh-ye 'Elmiyeh-ye Qom), published their authenticated
version of Islamic economy in 1984. It was based on traditional interpretation
of Islamic jurisprudence, which the ALQRS find compatible with the market
system and neoclassical economics. They emphasize economic growth against
social equity and declare the quest for profit as a legitimate Islamic motive.
According to ALQRS, attaining "maximum welfare" in a neoclassical sense is the
aim of an Islamic economic system. However the system must establish the
limits of individual rights. In accordance with this ideological-methodological
manifesto of the ALQRS, in February 1984, the council for cultural revolution
proposed a national curriculum for economics for all Iranian Universities.
The concept of "Islamic economics" appeared as a rainbow on the revolutionary D. Ashuri and A.
horizon and disappeared soon after the revolutionary heat dissipated (the end Soroush believe that
of 1980s and after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini). It disappeared from Ahmad Fardid originally
Iranian political discourse for fifteen years. In the June 2005 presidential theorized neo-
elections neither the populist-fundamentalist winning candidate, Mahmud fundamentalism in Iran.
Ahmadinejad, nor any of his reformist or conservative opponents said a word Mesbah Yazdi rejects
about Islamic economy.[58] However after the establishment of Ahmadinejad's the claim.
government, his neoconservative team opened the closed file of Islamic
economy. For instance, Vice-President Parviz Davoudi said in 2006: "On the
economic field, we are dutybound to implement an Islamic economy and not a capitalistic economy. [...]
It is a false image to think that we will make equations and attitudes based on those in a capitalistic
system".[59]
Factional conflict dominated Iranian politics under the Ayatollah Khomeini from 1979 to 1989. The two
principal factions were a statist-reformist group that favored state control of the economy and a
conservative group that favored the private sector. Both factions claimed Khomeini's support, but by 1987
he clearly had sided with the statist-reformists because he believed state capitalism to be the best way of
heading off any threat to Islam. Khomeini's death on Jun 3, 1989 left the factions without their source of
legitimation.[52]
Islamic Republic & De-Iranianisation Policy

Iranian identity versus Religious identity
Since the establishment of Islamic Republic, fundamentalists have initiated the policy of de-Iranianization
12 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
of the Iran, by replacing the notion of Iranian Identity and Nationality with Moslem Identity, both inside
and outside Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini has emphasized this goal in several of his speeches, for example, on
Dec 1980 (as published in Kayhan):
"Those who say that we want nationality, they are standing against Islam....We have no use for the
nationalists. Moslems are useful for us. Islam is against nationality...."[60]
"These issues that exist among people that we are Iranian and what we need to do for Iran are not
correct; these issues are not correct. This issue, which is perhaps being discussed everywhere,
regarding paying attention to nation and nationality is nonsense in Islam and is against Islam. One
of the things that the designers of Imperialism and their agents have promoted is the idea of nation
and nationality."[61]
Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime minister of Islamic Republic, once said: "Imam [Khomeini] wants Iran for
Islam and we want Islam for Iran." Due to the commitment to Pan-Islamism inherent in Iranian Islamic
revolutionary ideology, the Islamic Republic's attitude toward Sunni Islam is positive.
At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, one of the most-notorious clerics in
Iran, Sadeq Khalkhali known as the hanging judge,[62] who was renowned for
his brutality and mass executions in post-revolutionary Iran, tried to destroy
2500-year-old Persepolis, and after that the mausoleum of Ferdowsi. He was
stopped by the efforts of the locals.
Iranian government in several occasions constructed dams and rail roads in the
vicinity of ancient archeological sites that date back to pre-Islamic era. In
January 2007, the Minister of Energy, Parviz Fattah directly ordered the
opening of the Sivand Dam. Referring to the critics, he said: "I will make a
museum next to the dam with my own money!". Sivand dam project has been
one of the most condemned projects in post-revolution Iran due to its potential
The hanging judge
to destroy Iranian archaeological sites. Some Iranians are furious about the
and Islamist negationist
construction of the dam and argue that there is no objective in the world
Sadeq Khalkhali
worthy to justify the construction of a dam, so close to Pasargadae. Hossein
Marashi, the Iranian Vice President for Cultural Heritage and Tourism said: "We
can not sacrifice the dam for cultural and historical sites." Sivand Dam became
operational in 2007. Ahmadinejad's government, however, refused to buy the detectors needed for
monitoring humidity of the Pasargadae. Also "Karun 3 dam" was constructed during Rafsanjani's
presidency which led to destruction of ancient archeological site in Izeh.
Defaming Cyrus the Great, Islamist negationist Sadeq Khalkhali wrote an article entitled "Kourosh-e
Doroughin" (Impostor Cyrus) shortly after the revolution. In 2001, Nasser Pourpirar wrote two books
entitled "Twelve centuries of silence" and "A bridge to past", claiming that the Sassanid empire and
Parthian Empires never existed, and are the fabrications of Jewish and American orientalists. Abbas Salimi
Namin attributed Persepolis to Russian civilization. Islamist negationists Abbas Salimi Namin and Purpirar
were coworkers for the hardline "Kayhan Havaei" (a weekly review of the daily Keyhan in English) after
the revolution. Namin, a computer engineer and former member of Haghani circle is a close ally of Ali
Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic. Ignored by Iranian scholars, such figures managed to enter
and influence traditional clerical circles and the policy makers of the Islamic Republic. Interestingly several
of these Islamist negationists were formerly associated with Marxist groups before acting as agents of
Islamic Republic.
Ruling clerics sought to stamp out many traditions, like Nowruz, a celebration with some Zoroastrian links
that stretches back thousands of years to the pre-Islamic era, to mark the arrival of spring. The
celebration is considered by many here the most Iranian of holidays.[63]
Several proposals have been made by conservatists to replace or shorten Norouz celebrations but rejected
because of public protests. Ayatollah Khazali, a member of the powerful Guardians Council and the
Experts Assembly for Leadership, has proposed that the celebration of Ghadir (Shiites commemorate
these festivities as the day prophet Mohammad is recorded to have named disciple Ali to be his successor)
should replace the traditional Iranian celebration of Norouz. [64]
Ali Khamenei in many occasions attacked the Iranian fire festival Chahar Shanbeh Suri and also called for
shortening Norouz, claiming that the holidays are seriously damaging Iranian economy. Following an order
by Ali Khamenei the fire festival has been banned by the regime since it is of Zoroastrian origins and is
13 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
not Islamic. However, due to internal opposition, the government had to step back.
Arabic vs Persian
The most detailed and explicit statement about Arabic was made by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1981 in
an important Sermon linking the fate of Persian language directly to that of Persian nationality: "both shall
vanish as soon as Islamic unity is attained".
The tradition of banning names dates to the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in the early 1980s, when
Iran's conservative leaders sought to purge the country of both Western culture and its own Persian,
pre-Islamic past. Fundamentalists consider it unfortunate that Iranians used to be Zoroastrians, or that
the ancient Persian empire achieved its greatest triumphs before Islam's arrival. To that end, they
compiled a long list of forbidden names that included Zoroastrians gods and goddesses, commanders of
ancient Persian armies, and other such tainted, best-forgotten figures. Indeed, Arabic names, except for a
handful of Sunni villains, were fine. Persian ones, despite originating from the language actually spoken in
Iran, had to be checked against the official list. Along the way, other politically inconvenient realities were
fought on the baby name terrain. Wishing to quell an uprising by ethnically Kurdish Iranians in the north,
the government banned Kurdish names. [65] Street names had changed from old Persian names to Arabic
and Muslim names .This whole shift of the Iranian identity toward a more Islamic one created a kind of
crisis.[66]
Iranian society on the other hand, identify itself as Iranian. In Iran-Iraq war for example, all Iranians
irrespective of their religions and ethnic groups defended the country. Also in occasions where a conflict
between nationality and religion occurs, Iranian will not put their nationality aside. For instance when
Norouz and Ashura coincide, Shia Iranians celebrate the ancient Iranian celebration with other Iranians.
Abdolkarim Soroush, foremost Iranian religious intellectual, once suggested to adapt the religion to
Iranian culture by organizing Ashura and other Islamic festivals according to Iranian calendar instead of
Islamic calendar to avoid conflicts between Iranian identity and religion.
Principle-ists and Women issues

Fundamentalists, irrespective of their genders, support a very strict life style for
women in Iran. The women in the seventh Iranian parliament were against the
bill on Iran joining the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which the female reformists in the
sixth parliament had fought for vigorously. The women in the seventh
parliament have exhibited conservative, right wing tendencies setting them
apart from their counterparts in the preceding parliament.[67] In July 2007, Ali
Khamenei criticized Iranian women's rights activists and the Convention on the
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): "In our
country ... some activist women, and some men, have been trying to play with
Islamic rules in order to match international conventions related to women,"
Khamenei said. "This is wrong."[68] However he is positive on reinterpreting
Islamic law in a way that it is more favorable for women - but not by following
Western conventions.[69] Khamenei made these comments two day after an Javad Larijani, an
Iranian women's right activist Delaram Ali was sentenced to 34 months of jail ideologue the of Islamic
and 10 lashes by Iran's judiciary. Iranian judiciary works under the Republic, praises
responsibility of the supreme leader and is independent from the government. stoning to death as
Fundamentalists in Iran forced Islamic dress on Iranian women soon after the being an original,
revolution of 1979. Since then Iranian police which is governed under the delicate and respectable
responsibility of the Supreme leader continuously attacked women who do not law in Islam.
adhere to the dress code. Fighting such women are considered "fighting morally
corrupt people" by fundamentalists. In 2007 a national crackdown was launched
by the police in which thousands of women have been warned and hundred were arrested. Violators of the
dress code can be given lashes, fines and imprisonment.[70][71] Sae'ed Mortazavi, Tehran's public
prosecutor, made this clear when he told the Etemad newspaper: "These women who appear in public like
decadent models, endanger the security and dignity of young men". Mohammad Taqi Rahbar, a
fundamentalist MP, agreed, saying, "Men see models in the streets and ignore their own wives at home.
This weakens the pillars of family."[72]
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In October 2002, Ali Khamenei asked the Iranian women to avoid feminism and sexism in their campaign
for better female rights. "In the process of raising women issues and solving their problems, feminist
inclinations and sexism should be avoided," he told a group of female parliamentarians. [73]
Like many other Grand Ayatollahs, Ali Khamenei believes that women should be wives and mothers.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has publicly stated: "The real value of a woman is measured by
how much she makes the family environment for her husband and children like a paradise." In July 1997
Ayatollah Khamenei said that the idea of women’s equal participation in society was "negative, primitive
and childish."[74]
Fundamentalist scholars justify the different religious laws for men and women by referring to the
biological and sociological differences between men and women. For example, regarding the inheritance
law which states that women’s share of inheritance is half that of men, Ayatollah Makarim Shirazi quotes
the Imam Ali ibn Musa Al-reza who reasons that at the time of marriage man has to pay something to
woman and woman receives something, and that men are responsible for both their wives' and their own
expenses but women have no responsibility thereof.[75] Women, however, make up 27% of the Iranian
labor force and percentage of all Iranian women who are economically active has more than doubled from
6.1% in 1986 to 13.7% in 2000.[76]
In terms of health, life expectancy went up by eleven years between 1980 and 2000 for both Iranian men
and women. With respect to family planning, "levels of childbearing have declined faster than in any other
country," going from 5.6 births per woman in 1985 to 2.0 in 2000, a drop accomplished by a voluntary,
but government-sponsored, birth control program. The fact that these improvements have occurred within
an Islamic legal regime suggests that formal legal status may not be the key factor determining women’s
well-being.
Women in Iran are only allowed to sing in chorus. Also women are not allowed to attend Sport stadiums.
In 2006 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad surprisingly ordered the vice president to allocate half of Azadi Soccer
Stadium to women. Six grand ayatollahs and several MPs protested against Mr Ahmadinejad's move and
finally the supreme leader Ali Khamenei ordered the president to reconsider his order and follows the
clergy. [77]
Tolerance and Civil rights

The issue of tolerance and violence has been subject to intense debates in
Iran. A cleric and member of the conservative Islamic Coalition Party,
Hojjatoleslam Khorsand was cited by "Etemad daily" as saying that "in
cultural issues, a policy of tolerance and laxity is not acceptable."[78]
Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a member of the Assembly of
Experts, said about Islam's enemies: "They presented principles such as
tolerance and compromise as absolute values while violence was introduced
as a non-value." Mesbah-Yazdi believes that "the taboo -- that every act of
violence is bad and every act of tolerance is good -- must be broken."
Opponents of violence -- "even some of the elite" -- have been "deceived
and entrapped" by "foreign propaganda," he said. Mesbah-Yazdi believes
that "The enemies of Islam must also feel the harshness and violence of
Islam."[79] He also stated that "The culture of tolerance and indulgence Think tank of
means the disarming of society of its defense mechanism."[80] conservatives in Iran: Hassan
Bolkhari, Amir Mohebbian,
Dividing Iranians into Insider and outsider was first introduced by Ali
Hamid Parsa, Hassan
Khamenei.[17] "Kayhan" which is governed by Ali Khamenei editorialized on Rahimpour Azghandi,
5 August 1999 that an insider is "someone whose heart beats for Islam, Abdol-Hossein Khosro-Panah
the revolution and the Imam," while outsiders are those who have and Emad Afrough (left to
"separated their path from the line of the Imam, the system, and the right, up to down)
people who, by relying on citizens' rights, want to introduce themselves as
equal partners." [79]
Irreligious people in Islamic Republic of Iran are not recognized as citizens and do not enjoy any civil
rights. While Jews, Christians and other minorities have the right to take part in University entrance
exams and can become members of parliament or city councils, irreligious people are not granted even
15 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
their basic rights. Most irreligious people, however, hide their beliefs and pretend to be moslems.
Non-believers - atheists under Islam do not have "the right to life ". Non believers such as those
supporting communist ideologies have been executed purely for being non-believers. The charge against
them has been made as "corrupters on earth".[81] In an attempt to disguise the Islamic attitude to
apostasy, some Muslims often quote the Koranic verse: "There shall be no compulsion in religion". For a
Muslim wishing to leave Islam in Iran this is simply not true and is punishable by death. [82] "Any
newspaper or writer wanting to renounce the fundamental principles of Islam or questioning the
vengeance law is an apostate and liable to the death penalty," Ali Khamenei told a gathering of several
thousand troops in the northeastern town of Mashhad.[83]
In one occasion, Persian daily "Neshat" published an article[84] which called for abolishing the death
penalty, claiming that the capital punishment is no cure to maladies afflicting modern society. In reaction
to this article, conservative "Tehran times daily" stressed that writers of such articles must remember that
the Iranian Muslim nation will not only never tolerate such follies but that the apostates will be given no
opportunity to subvert the religion. Neshat's article drew severe criticism from the theologians and clerics,
particularly the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who in clear words warned that apostate journalists
will be liable to death penalty, noted the article in the opinion column of the paper adding that the
judiciary also promptly warned against any acts or words that undermine the pillars of the Islamic
revolution.[85]
In 2002, Ansar e Hezbollah, hard-line group best known for disrupting reformist gatherings and beating
up students declared a "holy war" to rid Iran of reformers who promote Western democracy and challenge
the country's supreme leader. Masoud Dehnamaki, an ideologue with the group, also said that Iranians
who try to appease Iran's enemies such as the United States "should be stopped." [86]
During Mohammd Khatami's presidency, minister Ataollah Mohajerani launched a tolerance policy
("Tasahol va Tasamoh"). This policy was criticized harshly by conservatives and ended in resignation of
the minister. [87][88]
while some conservatives like Emad Afrough support the idea of Civil society, some like Ayatollah Mesbah
Yazdi are opposed to the idea of civil rights for citizens. Emad Afrough stated: "If we do not actively seek
cultural change. our national and ethnic cultures get destroyed. We must consciously choose to answer
the questions confronting us. Today's question is civil society ... I believe we can easily reconstruct civil
society here (in Iran) based on our own values and cultural characteristics. Civil society is a necessity, and
the growing complexity of society requires it. Our historical past also supports it. In reality, in Iran, as in
elsewhere in the Middle East, the only obstacle to civil society is the state." Mesbah Yazdi, however,
stated: "It doesn’t matter what the people think. The people are ignorant sheep." [89]
In February 2004 Parliament elections, the Council of Guardians, a council of twelve members, half of
whom are appointed by Ali Khamenei, disqualified thousands of candidates, including many of the
reformist members of the parliament and all the candidates of the Islamic Iran Participation Front party
from running. It did not allow 80 members of the 6th Iranian parliament (including the deputy speaker) to
run in the election. Apart from Ali Khamenei, many conservative theorists as Emad Afrough supported the
decision of Guardian council and accused the reformist parliament members of "being liberal, secular and
with no Iranian identity". Referring to 7th parliament members, Ali Meshkini said that the list of
candidates had signed by Imam Mahdi: "...I have a special gratitude for Honorable Baqiyatullah (aj),
whom when seven months ago during the Night of Power the Divine angels presented him with the list of
the names and addresses of the members of the (new) parliament, , His Eminency signed all of them...".
In June 2007, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was criticized by some Iranian
parliament members over his remark about Christianity and Judaism.
According to Aftab News Agency, President Ahmadinejad stated: "In the
world, there are deviations from the right path: Christianity and Judaism.
Dollars have been devoted to the propagation of these deviations. There are
also false claims that these [religions] will save mankind. But Islam is the
only religion that save mankind." Some members of Iranian parliament
criticized these remarks as being fuels to religious war. However Musa
Ghorbani, a chairman at the parliament strongly supported president's
On November 11 2007,
remark, calling it "in accordance with the constitution". [90] Also Hossein Clerics and Basij
Noori Hamedani advocates fighting the Jews in order to prepare the ground paramilitary force attacked
and to hasten the advent of the Hidden Imam, the Messiah according to people of Gonabadi faith in
Borujerd. Gonabadi's
buildings and mosques
16 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
Shiite belief.[91]
In 2007, Ali Khamenei claimed that "Today, homosexuality is a major problem in the western world. They
[western nations] however ignore it. But the reality is that homosexuality has become a serious challenge,
pain and unsolvable problem for the intellectuals in the west." Ali Khamanei, however did not mention any
names of western intellectuals.
While Iran has been quick to condemn attacks on Shia mosques and Shia holy places all over the world, it
has been intolerant toward other religions. For instance in 2006, authorities in the city of Qom arrested
more than 1,000 followers of the mystical Sufi tradition of Islam. Iran's hard-line daily "Kayhan" on 14
February 2006 quoted senior clerics in Qom as saying that Sufism should be eradicated in the city, while
the Reuters news agency reported that in September one of Iran's hard-line clerics, Grand Ayatollah
Hossein Noori Hamedani, called for a clampdown on Sufis in Qom.[92][93] In 2006, Iranian president
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched a plan to suppress what he called "indecent religious associations that
work under the cover of spirituality and Sufism". Morteza Agha-Tehrani, one of the closest disciples of
Mesbah-Yazdi and moral advisor to President Ahmadinejad was the leader of raid on Sufi mosques in
Qom.
Iran does not allow a single Sunni mosque to be built in Tehran. Although President Mohammad Khatami
promised during election times to build a Sunni mosque in Tehran, he refused to do that after taking the
office. After he won the elections, he was reminded of his promise but he came up with the excuse that
the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had not agreed to the proposal. Even though shias make up
only 7.5-10 percent of the Islamic world, as compared to the 90% sunni population, they constitute of
almost 90% of Iran's population[94]
Criticism of Islamist interpretation of Islam in Iran

Islamic scholarship in Iran, has a long tradition of debate and
critique. This tradition has come to pose a challenge to the Islam in Iran
constitutional order of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a number
of seminary-trained scholars have applied their critical methods
to basic issues of state legitimacy, in particular the state’s right
to insist on interpretive closure. For example, Dr. Mehdi Ha’iri
Yazdi, the son of the late Shaykh Abdolkarim Haeri, the founding
member of the Qom Theology School, has written a book about
criticism of velayat-e faqıh. The regime has responded with force,
convening special clergy courts to silence and imprison scholars,
in violation of seminary norms of scholarly debate. These
conspicuous acts of discipline seem to have backfired, as each
History of Islam in Iran]
escalating punishment has generated new critics within.[95]
In Iran, unlike most countries, epistemological debates have Islamic conquest of Persia
political implications. Because the Islamic Republic stakes its Islamization in Iran
legitimacy on the scholarly authority of its jurist-ruler, the regime Islamic golden age
takes such debates quite seriously. Through the Special Clergy Islamic revolution
Court, the regime has tried to clamp down on relativism, calling it Islamic republic of Iran
self-defeating. The dissident seminarians, too, have distanced Notable scholars
themselves from relativism, calling themselves legitimate
religious authorities. It is unclear how the dissidents will reconcile Salman the Persian • Shaikh Saduq
the two seminary norms of open debate and scholarly authority, Shaikh Kulainy
or what political ramifications might follow from such a Hakim al-Nishaburi • Shaykh Tusi
reconciliation. It is already clear, though, that the dissidents are Ghazali • Fakhr al-Din al-Razi
creating an unprecedentedly rich documentary record of Islamic Avicenna • Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī
critique of the Islamic state.[96] Rumi • Abdul-Qadir Gilani
Suhrawardi • Mulla Sadra
Allameh Tabatabaei
Future of fundamentalism in Iran Ruhollah Khomeini
Abdolkarim Soroush, advocate of Islamic pluralism,[97] believes Sects
that fundamentalism in Iran will self-destruct as it is afflicted with
an internal contradiction, which will shatter it from within. Similar
17 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM
ideas have been put forward by Iranian scholar Saeed Hajjarian.

Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saeed Hajjarian and Twelvers • Zeidis
Seyyed Hossein Nasr are among most notable critics of Nizaris • Alavids • Sunnis
fundamentalism in Iran. Today Iranian neofundamentalists are a Sufism
very strong minority in Qom seminaries. However they enjoy Islamic Cities/Regions
supports from two Grand Marjas namely, Nasser Makarem Shirazi
and Hossein Noori Hamedani as well as direct support from Mashhad • Qom • Ray
supreme leader of Iran, Ali
Culture
Khamenei.[98][99][100][101][102][103][104]
Nizamiyya • Hawza • Shu'ubiyya
Iran as a victim of Islamic Commemoration of Ashura
fundamentalism Architecture
There was a handful of Iranian victims among the thousands of Mosques in Iran • Imam Reza shrine
innocent dead of September 11, 2001 attacks.[105] Behnaz Ziaratgah • Naqsh-i Jahan Square
Mozakka was among the victims of 7 July 2005 London Iranian architecture
bombings. Organizations
In 1943, a Saudi religious judge ordered an Iranian pilgrim
Astan Quds Razavi
beheaded for allegedly defiling the Great Mosque with excrement
This box: view • talk • edit
supposedly carried into the mosque in his pilgrim's garment.[106]
In 1987, Saudi Arabia's fundamentalist regime attacked Iranian
pilgrims who were doing a peaceful annual demonstration of Haj and
killed some 275 people. 303 people were seriously injured. For years,
Iranian pilgrims had tried to stage peaceful political demonstrations in
the Muslim holy city of Mecca during the hajj. Iran sees 1987 massacre
of Iranian pilgrims as the first major attack by Sunni extremists like
Osama bin Laden and the emerging Al-Qaeda on Shia Iranians. A few
days before the massacre of Iranian pilgrims by Saudi police, USS
Vincennes shots down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 civilians.
In March 2004 (Ashura), Al-Qaeda killed 40 Iranian pilgrims at the Shia
holy places in Iraq. Many others were injured in the blasts. Ashura Clash or dialogue? who is the
commemorates the killing of the revered Imam Hussein at the battle of winner, Khatami or Huntington?
Karbala in the seventh century AD. It is the event that gave birth to the
Shia branch of Islam which predominates in Iran. Ashura is by far the
most significant day in the Iranian religious calendar, and it is commemorated as a slaughter of innocents
by traitors and tyrants.[107]
Justifying the attack on Iran, Saddam Hussein accused Iranians of "murdering the second (Umar), third
(Uthman), and fourth (Ali) Caliphs of Islam".[108] In March 1988, Saddam Hussein killed about 20000
Iranian soldiers immediately using nerve-gas agents. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in
developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and China.[109][110][111] Iraq also targeted Iranian civilians
with chemical weapons. Many thousands were killed in attacks on populations in villages and towns, as
well as front-line hospitals. Many still suffer from the severe effects.[112] Iran therefore is a victim, at
least of one type of weapons of mass destruction. In December 2006, Sadam Hussein said he would take
responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the
1980-1988 war but he took issue with charges he ordered attacks on Iraqis. [113]
Leaders
Navvab Safavi
Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri
Ruhollah Khomeini (subject to controversies: initially populist/reformer)
Ali Khamenei
Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi
Maryam Rajavi (leader of MKO, an Islamist-Marxist group)[114]
18 of 23 1/26/2008 7:27 AM

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History of fundamentalist Islam in Iran - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=History_of_fundamentalist_Is...

"Even an appropriate vocabulary seemed to be lacking in western

Some researchers refutes explanations of "Islamic fundamentalism" as an

Circles, schools and organizations

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)

journalist Alireza Nourizadeh and injured him seriously. [35]

Combatant Clergy Association

Theories of state based on divine legitimacy

Islamic republic versus Islamic administration

Exporting Islamic Revolution and Islamist diplomacy

domination over the region." [52]

Islamist art and literature

Islamic Republic & De-Iranianisation Policy

Principle-ists and Women issues

Tolerance and Civil rights

Criticism of Islamist interpretation of Islam in Iran

ideas have been put forward by Iranian scholar Saeed Hajjarian.

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