The election of Ariel Sharon as Israeli prime minister has been seen by many as a turning point in the history

of Israel, and as the definitive end of the peace process. Sharon, after all, is reviled in the Arab world as the Butcher of Beirut, remembered with fear and loathing by alestinians for his part in many massacres over the past fifty years, and scorned by liberal Israelis as almost the devil incarnate. The fallacy of such an apocalyptic view, however, is apparent from the haste with which the Israeli !abour arty, prodded by "obel eace ri#e winner Shimon eres, declared its willingness to serve under Sharon in a government of national unity. As foreign minister, eres who until $ust before the election was being touted by many as the left alternative to outgoing % &hud Bara', will have the tas' of $ustifying Sharon(s policies internationally. Another !abour member, former general Binyamin Ben)&lie#er, will be defence minister, in charge of implementing Sharon(s policies in the occupied territories. According to the *erusalem ost +, %arch-, Ben)&lie#er, . . . intends to do away with the carrot and use a stic' to bring the alestinians bac' to the negotiation table. Ironically, Sharon(s will be the first government in Israel with an Arab minister . !abour(s Salah Tarif, will be minister without portfolio. In an ominous move, former general /ehavam 0e(evi, of the far)right %oledet party, whose entire policy is the transfer +ie e1pulsion- of all Arabs from Israel, will be minister of tourism. "one of this should come as any surprise. Sharon is not a radical brea' from previous Israeli prime ministers2 he is the genuine face of Israel(s political culture. And, despite much anguished hand)wringing from parts of the Israeli peace movement, it is clear that he won the election because of, not despite, his 3uestionable past. Sharon, it should be remembered, is a product of the Israeli labour movement. 4e was brought up in a semi)collective village, his earliest sponsors were !abour prime minister 5avid Ben)6urion and !abour chief)of)staff %oshe 5ayan, and his political mentor, and friend, was !abour % 7it#ha' /abin. 4is political bac'ground, li'e /abin(s, was the activist Ahdut 4a(Avoda wing of the !abour arty, associated with the pre)state almah shoc' force of the nascent Israeli army. In the early 89:;(s, he was appointed head of a new army unit charged with pursuing alestinian infiltrators across the borders and eliminating them. Among the e1ploits of this notorious <nit 8;8 was the raid on =ibya in *ordan, in which over >; civilians were murdered when their homes were blown up while they slept. <nder Sharon(s command, the unit carried out scores more raids in *ordan and &gypt, some characterised by sic'ening brutality. Sharon was also responsible for the pacification of the 6a#a refugee camps in 89>;)8. 4is troops bulldo#ed scores of homes to provide easy access for tan's, and carried out a war of assassination against suspected !? members2 an un'nown number of alestinians died as a result of his e1ploits. As an army officer, Sharon was noted for his adventurism and insubordination, and fre3uently accused of leading his troops into unnecessary danger. 5eliberately e1cluded from consideration as chief)of)staff, he entered politics, originally as a supporter of negotiations with the alestinians and the establishment of a alestinian state. This state, however, was not to be in alestine2 for Sharon, *ordan is alestine, and his strategic goal in the 89@A !ebanon war was to remove alestinians from both !ebanon and alestine, and to overthrow the 4ashemite regime, which would be replaced with a compliant alestinian state. 4e left parliament soon after he was elected, having been appointed special adviser to defence minister /abin in 89>:. Sharon(s 89@8 appointment by %enahem Begin as defence minister spar'ed a huge controversy, in the course of which one of his aides commentedB Chen +Sharon- was not appointed chief)of)staff, I said that those who did not want him as chief)of)staff would get him as defence minister. "ow I say that those who don(t want him as defence minister will get him as prime minister. 4is role during the 89@A !ebanon war is well documented, as is his subse3uent resignation after an official en3uiry found him indirectly responsible for the murder of hundreds of alestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut. All of this is, of course, well 'nown to the Israeli electorate. In electing Sharon, they have shown their disdain for international opinion and their contempt for Bara'(s political manoeuvrings. Bara' lost the election because, in the space of eighteen months, he had managed to alienate a large part of his constituency. Chen first elected, he gained 9:D of the votes of alestinian citi#ens of Israel. 4is first step was to declare that he would build a purely *ewish coalition, with no reliance on Arab members of the Enesset. !i'e all earlier %s, he failed to appoint an Arab cabinet minister. 4e permitted the police chief in 6alilee +where there is still an Arab ma$ority- to conduct a campaign of harassment against Arab political activists, in the course of which several Enesset members were threatened with prosecution for incitement. And he oversaw the pogroms against alestinian citi#ens, in the course of which 8, were 'illed with no investigation and no apology. It is no surprise that the Arab vote plummeted to a reported 8D this time. The unprecedentedly low turnout shows that many Israeli *ews, too, refused to vote for either candidate in this choice between two war)criminal generals. Bara', who had promised to bring peace, also lost much of the centre vote which he had won in 8999. 4e offered concessions which, while far from sufficient to win alestinian support, were viewed by many Israelis as too great. And his behaviour led to the uprising, driving many voters into the arms of the Israeli right. /ussian immigrants, for instance, most of whom who had bac'ed Bara' in 8999, switched in large numbers to Sharon. But Sharon(s victory was not merely a result of Bara'(s loss. Throughout the campaign, Sharon portrayed himself as the grandfatherly figure, who could ma'e peace from a position of strength. %any Israelis, tired of the violence, isolation

and economic cost of the conflict, clearly believed that Sharon would be a sort of Israeli 5e 6aulle, tal'ing tough while ma'ing an offer the alestinians couldn(t refuse. After all, they remember that it was Begin(s right wing government which brought peace with &gypt, withdrawing from the entire Sinai peninsula, and dismantling settlements in the process. This optimistic prospect, however, is no more li'ely under Sharon than it was under Bara', "etanyahu or /abin. <ntil there is a change in the %iddle &ast balance of forces, no Israeli government will be prepared to offer the sort of deal which alestinians will be able or willing to accept. Sharon, with eight !abour ministers in his cabinet, can be e1pected to continue the policies of his friends Bara' and /abin, though with his own style and approach. The combination of his *ordan is alestine views, and 0e(evi(s support for transfer are of particular immediate concern. But it would be a mista'e to view Sharon as uni3uely evil, and to focus opposition to his well)documented war crimes. Sharon(s positions are the logical development of Israel(s actions over the past fifty)two years. These, rather than the personality of Israel(s current leader, are the source of the conflict.