The Roosevelt Institution

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The Roosevelt Review

Volume 3 • Issue 1 • August 2007
Copyright 2007

Executive Director
Kai Stinchcombe, Stanford University

Editor in Chief of the Review

Kyle Atwell, University of California at Davis

Chair of the Editorial Board

Caitlin Howarth, University of Virginia

National Editorial Board

Paul Burow, University of California at Davis
Chandni Challa, University of Virginia
Kirti Datla, Rice University
Eva DuGoff, George Washington University
James Elias, George Washington University
Emily Hallet, Yale University
Robert Nelb, Yale University
Ernesto Rodriguez, George Washington University

Editorial Assistants
Patrick Burbine, Alicia Dennis,Eric Freeman, Stefanie Garcia,
Kevin Hilke,Oliver Schulze, Peter Squeri, Oliver Traldi

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The opinions expressed within the Roosevelt Review are exclusively those of the individual
authors and do not represent the views of the editorial board, the Roosevelt Institution,
or any of the organization’s chapters, centers, advisors, or affiliates.
The Roosevelt Review
 In this Issue
9
Plastic Bag Externalities and Policy in Rhode Island
Adam Akullian, Kemen Austin, and Drew Durbin
Brown University
Winner of the Roosevelt Review Outstanding Policy Award

19
The Case for Decoupling: A Policy to Promote
Energy Efficiency
Jonas Ketterle, Daniel Bachmann, Tyson Cook, Jonhyok Heo, and Jordan Shackelford
Stanford University

35
Toward Inclusion: Realizing the Civic Potential of
The Earned Income Tax Credit
Niko Karvounis, Oxford University

49
Reducing Juvenile Recidivism in the United States
Jane Wilson, Stanford University

59
Finding an Alternative Solution:
A Comparative Analysis of Drug Policies of the
United States, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Australia
Benjamin Aronson, Brown University

73
A New Mandate for UN Reform: The Charter
Andrew Baker, Oxford University

83
Bringing Dawn to Darfur
Zachary Hindin, George Washington University
R. Benjamin Nelson, Georgetown University
 Note from the Editor’s Desk

Welcome to the third volume of the Roosevelt Review, the Roosevelt Institu-
tion’s policy research journal. The release of this volume arrives as we approach the
Institution’s third anniversary, and we cannot help but reflect that both the Institu-
tion and the Review have matured significantly over these past three years.
Roosevelt Institution is not the same organization it was when two loosely af-
filiated chapters, calling themselves a student think tank, began meeting in dorm
rooms at Stanford and Yale in the fall of 2004. Armed with a vision, impressive
energy, and passion, the founding generation of leaders was driven by the belief
that students should do more than talk about better policy – they should create it
themselves.
As members of the successor generation, your editors can assure you that the
next generation of Roosevelt students has been inspired by and shares the passion
and vision of our predecessors. We believe in the power of student ideas; we believe
in the need for progressive solutions that anticipate and address tomorrow’s prob-
lems; and we are committed to taking responsibility for the state of our world today.
It is not the energy and passion of the new generation that makes our Roosevelt
Institution different from three years ago, but rather the resources that the founding
generation has bestowed upon us. We are more connected, produce more policy,
and engage more policymakers than ever before. The Roosevelt Institution of today
is focused, prolific, and effective. We have matured.
The new generation should be proud of what it is inheriting, and not forget
who created this incredible opportunity. The list of individuals who have given
innumerable sacrifices is too long to include; as Roosevelt Institution continues to
age, too many names will be forgotten as new leaders emerge. Yet we stand on the
shoulders of giants, and in particular there is one individual who will be missed.
Kai Stinchcombe has overseen the growth of the Roosevelt Institution since before
it had a name. With the release of this journal, Kai will transfer his leadership as
Executive Director to a new generation of leaders. The Roosevelt Institution will
always give thanks for his vision and stamina, which made the Roosevelt Institution
what it is today.
We hope that you find this issue of the Roosevelt Review on par with its prede-
cessors. We have been amazed by the innovation and dedication of the contributing
authors as we have worked with them to develop the following proposals over the
past year. Many of these papers have been presented at multiple Roosevelt confer-
ences and published in other formats in other Roosevelt publications. Each of these
papers goes beyond the realm of theory: all provide specific policy recommenda-
tions, and most have been presented to policy makers at both the state and federal
level, in person.
We are proud to present the finest work of the Roosevelt Institution. Working
with the authors has been a humbling and rewarding experience, and we certainly
hope you enjoy these proposals as much as we have.

Sincerely,
Kyle Atwell, Editor in Chief
Plastic Bag Externalities and
Policy in Rhode Island
Adam Akullian, Kemen Austin, and Drew Durbin, Brown University
Winner of the Roosevelt Review Outstanding Policy Award
I. Introduction
The environmental externalities as-
sociated with plastic bag production and
disposal, which include CO2 emissions,
water pollution, and solid waste, exem-
plify the classic tragedy of freedom in a
commons. Individual consumers benefit
from the use of plastic bags because they
can easily carry purchased goods without
the burden of carrying around reusable
bags, while society as a whole is harmed
by the production and disposal costs as-
sociated with plastic bags.
Rhode Island, in particular, has had
problems disposing of and properly con-
taining litter at the rapidly filling Central
Landfill, causing concern from the solid
waste management sector. While original
policy efforts focused on encouraging the
use of more biodegradable paper bags and
the recycling of plastic bags, it has become
clear in recent years that these measures
do not match the scope of the problem.
In fact, paper bags are not biodegradable
in landfills and are more environmentally
damaging than their plastic counterparts.
To address this problem, legislation
in the form of an amendment to Chap-
ter 23-18.11, “Promotion of Paper Bag
Usage,” of the Rhode Island Health and
Safety Act has been proposed. The ob-
jective is to control litter from both paper
and plastic bags by encouraging the use
of reusable options. This bill seeks to en-
courage costumers to utilize reusable bags
through a three cent retailer funded cos-
tumer rebate for each bag an individual
brings to the store.
Shifting the focus of the original bill
from promoting the choice of paper bags
to encouraging the use of reusable bags is
certainly an ideological step in the right
direction. Unfortunately, the incentive
structure of the proposed amendment is
poorly designed and does not match the
range of litter and landfill capacity is-
sues caused by plastic bag use in Rhode
Island. In fact, extensive cost/benefit
analysis suggests that the social cost of a
single one-cent bag sold in Rhode Island
is more than 11 cents. While it will be
more difficult to pass politically, Rhode
Island legislators should consider an 11
cent consumer tax on the sale of plastic
bags so as to balance the externalities of
plastic bag consumption.
II. Solid Waste Management
In Rhode Island
As owners and managers of the cen-
tral landfill, Rhode Island Resource Re-
covery Corporation (RIRRC) has an eco-
nomic incentive to reduce the plastic bag
waste stream in Rhode Island. RIRRC
is responsible for any trash blown off the
landfill to neighboring land and has re-
ceived fines from the Rhode Island De-
partment of Environmental Management
(RIDEM) for trash found on the perim-
eter of the landfill; RIRRC has paid one
million dollars for trash pickup and lit-
ter fines (Bailey, 2006). As plastic grocery
bags account for a large quantity of this
litter (192 million bags are consumed an-
nually in Rhode Island), it is in the best
interest of RIRRC to reduce the number
of plastic bags that it takes into the land-
fill (Bailey, 2006).
RIRRC has been proactive in the
past at attempting to reduce the number
of plastic bags that come into its landfill.
9
 On September 1, 2005, RIRRC along Chapter 23-18.11, “Promotion of Paper
with the Rhode Island Food Distributors Bag Usage,” of the Rhode Island Health
Administration (RIFDA) initiated a pro- and Safety Act, which sought to decrease
gram called “ReStore.” ReStore has po- plastic bag waste and litter in the state.
sitioned plastic bag receptacles at super- This act utilizes two methods for prompt-
markets across Rhode Island and recycles ing positive change. First, the bill stipu-
them into a versatile, nontoxic, composite lates that retailers must provide paper bags
product used as a wood substitute. The at equal cost to plastic bags in spite of the
ReStore project has led to the recycling higher cost of paper bags (three cents per
of 18 million plastic bags over the course bag for paper as opposed to one cent per
of the past year, a 9.2 percent plastic bag bag for plastic). Additionally, it requires
recycling rate (Bailey, 2006). However, plastic bag recycling at retail stores selling
this means that Rhode Island residents greater than eight million dollars worth of
are still sending over 170 million bags goods per year.
to the Central Landfill annually. RIRRC Contrary to the rationale behind the
and the Rhode Island legislature have re- original bill, paper bags do not easily bio-
alized that to address this issue, they must degrade in landfills. Therefore, encourag-
reduce the overall consumption of plastic ing a shift to paper bag consumption did
bags, not simply encourage recycling, to not address Rhode Island’s landfill capac-
truly internalize the disposal externalities ity problem. Furthermore, externalities at
of plastic bags. all stages of a bag’s life cycle (including air
pollution, water contamination, and solid
waste production) are less for plastic bags
III. The Evolution of Rhode Island than paper bags (See Table 1.1).
Plastic Bag Legislation
B. The Current Amendment and the
A. Analyzing the Original Legislation Future of Plastic Bag Regulation
In response to the original concerns Recognition of the externalities asso-
regarding the rapidly filling Central Land- ciated with both paper and plastic bag use
fill, the Rhode Island legislature passed prompted members of the Rhode Island

Table 1.1: Environmental Externalities of Plastic and Paper Bags Compared

Plastic Bags* Paper Bags*
Production
Energy Consumption 594 BTUs / bag 2511 BTUs /bag
Airborne Chemical Pollution 1.1 grams / bag 2.7 grams / bag
Waterborne Chemical Pollution 0.025 grams / bag 1.25 grams / bag
Materials 0.0048 gallons of oil 0.0014 trees
Transportation
Number of Trucks to Transport 1 truck 7 trucks
One Shipment of Bags
Recycling
Rate 0.6% of plastic bags 19.4% of paper bags
Energy Consumption 17 BTUs / bag 1444 BTUs / bag
Disposal
Landfill Non-biodegradable in landfill environment Non-biodegradable in landfill environment

Often blow off landfill property
Litter 1000 years to biodegrade
Capable of absorbing one million times the
concentration of toxic compounds, including PCBs
and DDE, as seawater
46,000 pieces of plastic/square mile persist in ocean
Eight times more massive than plastic bags
Readily biodegradable
Leaches toxic chemicals stemming from the heating
of wood chips to make the original bag

Plastic bags are linked to 100,000 marine deaths/yr

*All data from Franklin Associates LTD, 2004

10
 Table 1.2: Environmental Externalities of Plastic and Paper Bags Compared
Stage in Bag’s Life Cycle External Cost Borne by Society (¢ / bag)*
Production
CO2 Emissions: 0.20¢ / bag
Transportation
CO2 Emissions: unknown
Disposal
Litter: 5.20¢ / bag
Landfill: 2.92¢ / bag
Improper Recycling: 2.20¢ / bag
Total Social Cost per Bag: 10.52¢ / bag
*See Appendix B for Calculations

Litter Task Force, including Barry Schil-
ler (a representative from Sierra Club), to
propose an amendment to Chapter 23-
18.11 “Promotion of Paper Bag Usage” of
the Rhode Island Health and Safety Act
(Schiller, 2006). The primary objective
of the proposed amendment is to control
litter from retail bags by encouraging the
use of reusable bags as opposed to paper
or plastic bags. In addition to modify-
ing the title of the statute to read “The
Promotion of Paper and Reusable Bag
Usage,” the amendment seeks to reduce
retail packaging entirely by offering eco-
nomic incentives to consumers to bring
their own bags to stores (rather than rely-
ing on the retailer to provide either paper
or plastic bags). The amendment obliges
retailers to provide a three cent credit
rebate to consumers for each bag they
bring to a retail establishment for reuse in
the packaging of their purchased goods.
Rather than placing a Pigovian tax on
packaging consumption to internalize the
externalities of plastic and paper bag pro-
duction and disposal (namely, a Pigovian
tax corrects negative externalities of mar-
ket activity by disincentivizing the un-
desired action), the amendment seeks to
provide a carrot, incentivizing consumers
to provide their own bags. This thereby
promotes recycling and creates an indirect
economic disincentive for the continued
use of wasteful single-use packaging.
The amendment to the Litter Act was
introduced to the Rhode Island House
(House Bill 7001) and Senate (Senate bill
2669) in early 2006. Both the House and
Senate versions of the amendment were
sent to committees, which have since rec-
ommended that the measure be held for
further study.
IV. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Plastic
Bag Consumption
While the goal of the proposed
amendment (to address the problem of
a socially inefficient over-allocation of
plastic bags stemming from their non-
internalized environmental costs, es-
pecially litter) and the authors’ chosen
policy mechanism for promoting behav-
ioral change (mandating stores to offer a
three cent rebate to consumer’s who bring
their own bag) are clear, the question of
whether or not this policy measure is bet-
ter than the alternatives ought to be care-
fully examined.
In order to determine the socially
optimal policy solution to the plastic bag
problem, one must first identify the scope
and nature of the problem. While the
overflowing state landfill and one million
dollars in annual fines and cleanup costs
paid by RIRRC are the primary motiva-
tion for the legislature’s desire to reduce
plastic bag consumption, the external
costs of plastic bag use extend far beyond
these notable local problems. After sort-
ing through scientific articles on the envi-
ronmental damage created by plastic bags
and waste management data from cities
across the country, we were able to con-

11
 struct a table of the environmental exter-
nalities of plastic bags and then carefully
quantify the external cost of these produc-
tion, transportation, and consumption
externalities. (See Table 1.2 for estimates
of the social cost per bag and Appendix B
for the underlying calculations.)
Conservative calculations of the so-
cial cost of litter, CO2 emissions from bag
production, land filling, and improper
recycling of plastic bags reveal that each
one cent plastic bag used at a retail out-
fit in Rhode Island imposes a cost of over
10.52 cents on society as a whole. Us-
ing this number as a baseline indicator of
the magnitude of the market failure to be
addressed, the Rhode Island Litter Task
Force should reconsider and ultimately
advocate for the most efficient policy
mechanism for aligning personal incen-
tives with the social goal of reducing plas-
tic bag consumption.
V. Analyzing the Current Policy
While politically feasible, the cur-
rent policy proposal is inherently flawed
for three reasons that will prevent the
amendment from effecting much be-
havioral change and, thus creating any
significant decrease in the 192 million
plastic bags consumed annually in Rhode
Island (Bailey, 2006). First, the subsidy
is simply too small; the small amount of
the rebate (three cents) will not be suffi-
cient to change consumer behavior. Sec-
ond, the subsidy is not a true subsidy,
but a de facto three cent tax on retailers
for every consumer that brings their own
bag. Third, in its current form, the policy
is dependent on the retailers publicizing
the rebate. Plastic bags only cost one
cent for retailers to buy, and they often
pass this cost onto the consumer in the
form of higher product prices anyhow. If
retailers have to pay three cents for each
12
reusable bag that a consumer brings, then
it is clearly in each retailer’s self-interest
to do everything possible to discourage
consumers from bringing their own bags
so that they just have to spend one or zero
cents on plastic bags instead. Since the
ability of the policy to affect behavioral
change is dependent on retailers publiciz-
ing the rebate option and the incentive
structure of the statute is such that they
will be motivated to do the opposite, the
bill will have little effect on reducing plas-
tic bag consumption.
VI. Considering the Alternative
Policy Options
A. Knowledge
The most simple and publicly accept-
able option for the Rhode Island legisla-
ture to address the plastic bag problem
would be an information campaign to ex-
plain the externalities of bag consumption
and encourage the use of reusable shop-
ping bags. In essence, this program would
be an expansion of RIRRC and RIFDA’s
ReStore program to facilitate and encour-
age the recycling of plastic shopping bags.
While ReStore clearly caused behavioral
changes, the change came at an initial
investment cost of $400,000 to RIRRC.
Additionally, the program had the advan-
tage of simply encouraging consumers to
recycle their bags, rather than prompting
a more dramatic behavioral change that
would be required in shifting consumers
away from one-time bag usage.
Thus, while a legislature-initiated
campaign to implore the public to switch
to reusable bags might effect some change,
it would likely fail to adequately address
the socially inefficient over-consumption
of plastic bags. Although RIRRC might
agree to fund a portion of the program,
an information campaign would still cost
the government thousands of dollars in
funds that simply are not available to the
RIDEM (which has experienced recent
budget cuts). Even though voluntary im-
ploring strategies are publicly acceptable,
an information campaign would be poor
(even unfeasible) public policy from a fis-
cal and cost-internalizing perspective.
B. Command and Control
A much cheaper and more effective
measure for reducing plastic bag con-
sumption would be to simply ban plastic
bags altogether, as Bangladesh did in 2002
(Reusable Bags, 2006). After discover-
ing that improperly disposed plastic bags
clogged drains and led to increased flood-
ing during the monsoon season, Bangla-
desh banned polyurethane bags entirely.
This command and control policy made
sense for Bangladesh because plastic bag
externalities were particularly acute in
the nation as a result of its weather (two-
thirds of the nation flooded in both 1988
and 1998) and high litter rate (85 percent
for plastic bags) (Reusable Bags, 2006).
Considering the presence of jute bags as a
biodegradable and locally available alter-
native to plastic bags, a mandated reduc-
tion in the country’s non-biodegradable
waste stream was an economical and effi-
cient policy from both an environmental
and social perspective.
Closer to home, San Francisco’s City
Council banned disposable plastic bags in
March of 2007. For years, San Francisco’s
municipal officials had debated policies
to curb the city’s litter problem, which
council members believed were harming
the city’s tourism industry and bay ecol-
ogy (Goodyear, 2007). With plastic bags
comprising a disproportionately large frac-
tion of the city’s litter, a seventeen cent tax
on the bags was proposed to encourage a
shift to more readily biodegradable paper
bags. Ultimately, policymakers decided
on a ban on all non-biodegradable plastic
bags instead (Goodyear, 2007).
There are a few reasons that an all-out
plastic bag ban may not be the optimal
policy, however. Like the law in Bangla-
desh, San Francisco’s policy has helped to
address its litter problem, but it ignores
the larger external costs of wasteful dis-
posable paper bags that it misguidedly
seeks to promote. Despite the 11 cent ex-
ternal cost of a plastic bag, a ban on them
might lead to a socially inefficient under-
allocation of plastic bags. Although most
consumers would likely stop using bags if
forced to pay their true twelve cent cost,
there are certain applications for which
the benefit of plastic bag usage might ex-
ceed this tax. For example, plastic bags
are useful in the packaging of meat for
health and safety reasons as well as for the
bagging of unpackaged produce. Addi-
tionally, a ban might push in-state plastic
bag producers out of business and cause
undue economic harm as well as create
concentrated stakeholder opposition to a
bill with diffuse societal benefits, thereby
making it difficult to pass.
Finally, while a more general ban on
both paper and plastic disposable bags (ex-
panding on San Francisco’s policy) would
eliminate the environmental externali-
ties of these bags, it would impose a high
cost on consumers if they forget to bring
reusable bags to the store and are forced
to purchase additional reusable bags or
carry their purchases in a less convenient
manner. In fact, due to the contrasting
external circumstances in Rhode Island
and Bangladesh, this command and con-
trol policy that makes sense in one nation
would not make sense for Rhode Island as
it would push plastic bag consumption to
an opposite socially damaging extreme.
C. Tradable Permits
As a laboratory of experimentation
in the U.S. federal system, Rhode Island
could consider a marketable permit solu-
13
 tion to the plastic bag problem. Rather
than banning plastic bag consumption
entirely, Rhode Island could assign each
supermarket and retail outlet a specific
number of plastic bag credits. The total
number of bag credits could be set to the
amount that the state estimates to be the
socially optimal level. This system would
then allow supermarkets that consume a
large amount of plastic bags to trade for
credits from companies that could more
easily reduce their plastic bag consump-
tion. Although this system would ide-
ally lead to a socially efficient allocation
of plastic bags, it would involve extensive
government oversight that would be both
a drain on valuable government resources
and prohibitively expensive. Further-
more, if the government decided to lower
the amount of plastic bags below the ini-
tial ceiling, it would have to purchase a set
amount of plastic bag permits at additional
cost to the taxpayers. Additionally, while
it is possible to estimate the externalities
associated with plastic bags, it is far more
difficult to determine the number of plas-
tic bags that should be consumed annu-
ally in Rhode Island without any knowl-
edge of the demand curve for plastic bags.
Thus, although a creative application of
tradable permits, this is probably not the
best or most politically feasible approach
to solving the plastic bag problem.
D. Transfer (Subsidy)
While a store-funded rebate (as pro-
posed in the current Rhode Island amend-
ment) clearly creates a system of perverse
incentives, a true subsidy would provide
a carrot to change behavior through posi-
tive reinforcement of positive actions and
be popular with retailers at the same time
(since they would not have to bear the
cost of measure). However, a true subsidy
for reusable bags in the form of a rebate
to consumers that utilize reusable bags
would be far too expensive for the state
14
government to fund. If the government
wanted to shift demand for plastic bags
to the socially efficient level, they would
have to offer an 11 cent rebate to each
consumer that brings their own bags to
a store. Even a more moderate three cent
rebate would be politically unfeasible as it
would cost millions of dollars while creat-
ing insufficient change in consumer bag
purchasing patterns.
E. Transfer (Tax)
The final policy option the Rhode Is-
land legislature could consider is a tax, ei-
ther on the retailer or consumer. Because
a tax can be set equal to the value of the
external costs of a plastic bag, the socially
efficient number of plastic bags would
not need to be known to policy makers,
whereas it would if a bag subsidy were
to be instated. Unlike a subsidy, the tax
would cost the state little to enforce while
generating revenue that could be used to
address Rhode Island’s litter problem.
Through analyzing and contrast-
ing the plastic bag tax policies of Ireland
(which taxes consumers) and Denmark
(which taxes retailers), the socially optimal
policy for Rhode Island’s plastic bag prob-
lem is revealed. In March of 2002, Ire-
land implemented a consumer “PlasTax”
of 0.15 euros on one-time use plastic bags
(with exceptions for bags used for packag-
ing meat and produce) (Convery, 2001).
Within months, plastic bag consumption
dropped over 90 percent and litter visibly
decreased across the nation (the primary
objective in this bill as a result of the
detrimental visual effect of windblown
plastic bags in a nation highly dependent
on tourism). In the next year, plastic bag
consumption dropped from 1.2 billion
bags to 60 million bags, while 9.6 mil-
lion Euros in tax revenues were generated
to be used for environmental protection
(BBC News, 2002). After initial opposi-
tion to the tax, retailers ended up strongly
supporting the bill as the average super-
market ended up increasing reusable bag
sales while saving 50 million euros/year
from lower grocery bag stocking costs
(Convery, 2001). Finally, enforcement
costs borne by the Irish government were
minimal as the tax receipts were provided
to the government, along with revenues
from the national value-added tax.
On the other hand, Denmark taxes
retailers a similar amount as part of a gen-
eral waste tax. While this tax has reduced
plastic bag consumption 66 percent since
its implementation, the results are less
dramatic than Ireland’s because consum-
ers are often unaware of the increased cost
of the bags they are “purchasing,” as many
grocery stores simply incorporate the cost
of the tax into the price of their products
(Reusable Bags, 2006). However, this tax
does provide incentives for retailers to find
innovative ways to reduce bag consump-
tion. Overall, a Pigovian tax on plastic
bags is much more effective if placed on
consumers because the goal of the tax is
to affect consumer behavior, not raise rev-
enue from retailers.
VII. Policy Recommendation for
Rhode Island State Legislature
While it would certainly draw the
attention of anti-tax factions, the Rhode
Island legislature should push for a bag
tax of at least 11 cents on plastic bags at
the checkout counter. A Pigovian tax on
consumers is clearly the optimal policy
to internalize the quantifiable external
cost of these environmentally damaging
bags. In this case market-based policy
would operate more efficiently than its
command and control counterpart, be-
cause the external costs of plastic bags
are known while the optimal number is
unknown, due to the uncertain nature
of the demand curve. While a subsidy
would be more politically feasible than a
tax, a true subsidy would be too expensive
to fund and the proposed store-funded
rebate would be ineffective in addressing
the environmental problems as a result of
its poor incentive structure.
Following the success of the Irish
case, a Pigovian tax on consumers would
be the most effective policy to decrease lit-
ter and address the state’s landfill crunch.
For once, Rhode Island, a noted progres-
sive state, could be the leader on an im-
portant environmental issue rather than
following in the footsteps of neighboring
Massachusetts. Instead of caving to the
political pressures of anti-tax forces, the
state should form policy around the en-
vironmental and quality of life issues at
stake by passing a Pigovian tax of over 11
cents on all disposable bags.
(See next page for appendices.)
About the Authors
Drew Durbin is an environmental studies
and economics major at Brown Univer-
sity. He is the lead teaching assistant for
Introduction to Environmental Studies
and Environmental Economics. Drew is
also spearheading a project to design and
build low cost biogas stoves for installa-
tion in a refugee camp in Uganda this
winter. Outside of his environmental
work, he leads the Photo Club at Brown
and is the founder of a semesterly photog-
raphy publication, Paper&Pixel.
Drew and his business partner, Duffy Til-
leman, placed second in Brown Entrepre-
neurship Program’s Business Plan Com-
petition this spring. They won $18,000
in cash and in-kind services for their pro-
posal to create an innovative green waste
treatment operation. Currently, Drew is
interning for a global warming research
analyst at Calvert, a socially responsible
investment company based in Bethesda,
MD.
15
 VIII. Appendices
Appendix A: Plastic Bag Consumption in
Rhode Island and the United States
I. Consumption
A. 192 million plastic bags/yr in
Rhode Island (Bailey, 2006)
B. 100 billion plastic bags/yr in the
US (EPA, 2004)
C. 10 billion paper bags/yr in the
US (EPA, 2004)
II. Cost
A. Plastic Bags cost $0.01/bag sions because there is much more
(Reusable Bags, 2006)
B. Paper Bags cost $0.03/bag other chemical waste.
(Reusable Bags, 2006)
III. Disposal
A. Plastics comprise 11.3 percent of
waste stream and a disproportionate
percentage of litter (EPA, 2004).
B. RIRRC pays one million dollars
annually cleaning up plastic bags
that are blown off its property and
paying litter fines for those bags that
it is unable to collect (Bailey, 2006).
Appendix B: Cost Calculations of Plastic
Bag Externalities
I. Estimation of the Cost of the Pro-
duction Externalities/Bag
A. Social Cost of CO2 Emissions
from Production of a Bag: It takes
594 BTUs to produce a single
plastic bag. The production pro-
cess produces 6.1 kg CO2/ 210MJ
(Halweil, 2006).
6 . 1 kg CO 2 0 . 029
=
210 MJ MJ
594 BTUs MJ 0 . 029 kg
´ ´
bag 947 . 817 BTU MJ
The estimated cost of CO2 is $0.05/lb.
Thus, the social cost of 0.04 lb of emis-
sions is 0.05*0.04= $0.0020 /bag.
16
B. Social Cost of Waterborne and
Chemical Wastes/Bag: It is virtu-
ally impossible to estimate the cost
of the 1.125 grams of atmospheric
and waterborne chemical waste be-
cause there are so many different
types of chemicals in this mixture
that cause vastly different amounts
of environmental damage (Halweil,
2006). However, it is likely that
the cost of these byproducts of the
production process are less than
that of the carbon dioxide emis-
CO2 emitted by weight/bag than
II. Estimation of the Cost of Transpor-
tation Externalities/Bag:
It is very difficult to estimate the so-
cial cost associated with the trans-
port of the plastic bags from facto-
ries to retailers. First, it is difficult
to estimate the amount of exter-
nalities associated with a gallon of
gasoline to begin with. Second, the
average transport distance of plastic
bags is unknown.
III. Estimation of the Cost of Disposal
Externalities/Bag
A. Social Cost of Litter:
An estimate for the social cost
of plastic bag litter was obtained
through finding the amount of
money San Francisco paid cleaning
up plastic bags and dividing this by
the total number of bags consumed
annually.
kg CO 2
Cost of Street Cleaning:* $26,000,000/yr
Plastic Bags Percentage of Litter:* 10 percent
2 . 2 lb 0 . 04 lb of CO 2 Number of Plastic Bags Sold:* 5,000,000/yr
´ =
kg bag
$ 26 , 000 , 000 /yr 0 . 1 plastic bags 1
´ ´ = $ 0 . 052 /bag
litter 1 unit of litter 5, 000 , 000 plastic bags
 B. Social Cost of Land-Filling *All San Francisco waste data comes from
Plastic Bags: Haley, 2004.
RIRRC bears two principal costs
from proper plastic bag disposal.
The first is the processing cost of Sources
the bags. This cost is $0.024/bag.*
The second is the cost of litter pick- Bailey, Beth. “From Bags to Riches.”
Resource Recycling Feb. 2006: 16-20.
up and fines stemming from plastic Bisson, Terri. Personal interview. 15 Mar.
bags that blow off of the Central 2006.
Landfill site. This cost is one mil- Convery, Frank and Simon McDonnell.
“Applying Environmental Product
lion dollars per year. Since Rhode Taxes and Levies-Lessons from the
Islanders consume 192 million bags Experience with the Irish Plastic
per year, these cleanup costs add an Bag Levy.” Environmental Studies
Research Series: University College
additional 1/192= $0.0052/bag.* Dublin. 3 Mar. 2001.
Environmental Protection Agency.
C. Social Cost of Improper Recycling “Plastic Trash Bags.” United States
Government. 2004. < http://www.
and Composting of Plastic Bags: epa.gov/cpg/products/trashbag.
Once again, data from San Francis- htm>.
co facilities will be used to calculate Franklin Associates Ltd. “Paper Vs. Plastic
Bags.” Institute for Environmental
the social cost from plastic bags in Life Cycle Assessment. 2004. 27
the recycling stream. Apr. 2006 <http://www.ilea.org/lcas/
franklin1990.html>.
Cost of Removing Bags from Recycling Stream:* Goodyear, Charlie. “San Francisco Supes
494,000/yr
Vote to End Plastic Bags in Stores.”
The San Francisco Chronicle. 27
Cost of Clearing Machinery Jams Cause by Plastic
Mar. 2007. <http://sfgate.com/cgi-
Bags*: 100,000/yr bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/03/27/
Reduced Revenue on the Sale of Recyclables Due to BAG1ROSLSG4.DTL>
Bag Contamination*: 100,000/yr Haley, Robert. California Department
Cost of Removing Bags from Compost*: of the Environment. 17 Nov.
400,000/yr 2004. < http://www.mindfully.org/
Total: Plastic/Bans/Costs-Paper-Plastic-
$1,094,000/yr Bags17nov04.htm>.
Halweil, Brian. “Plastic Bags.” Worldwatch
$1,094,000/yr *1/5,000,000 bags = $0.022/bag Institute. 27 Apr. 2006 <http://www.
worldwatch.org/pubs/goodstuff/
plasticbags/>.
IV. Total Social Cost of a Single Plastic Bag “Irish Bag Tax Hailed Success.” BBC News.
CO2 Emissions: 20 Aug. 2002. < http://news.bbc.
$0.0020/bag co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2205419.
stm>
Litter: Reusable Bags. “Facts and Figures
$0.0520/bag Regarding the True Cost of Plastic
Landfill: Bags.” 2006. < http://www.
reusablebags.com/facts.php>.
$0/0292/bag RI Litter Task Force Meeting. Personal
Improper Recycling: observations. 12 Mar. 2006.
$0.0220/bag RI Senate Committee on Agriculture
and the Environment. Personal
Total: observations. 5 Apr. 2006.
$0.1052/bag Schiller, Barry. Telephone interview. 12
Apr. 2006.
Watson, Traci. “S.F. Consider 17-cent Tax
Thus, a low estimate of the social cost of on Grocery Bags.” USA Today. 22
a single plastic bag is 10.52 cents. Nov 2004.

17
18
The Case for Decoupling:
A Policy to Promote Energy Efficiency
Jonas Ketterle, Daniel Bachmann, Tyson Cook, Jonhyok Heo, and Jordan Shackelford
Stanford University
Executive Summary
Improving energy efficiency is the most
cost-effective method to reduce green-
house gas emissions. If the entire US
had a similar per capita energy use as
California did in 2005, it would be the
equivalent of taking 25 million cars, or
all the cars in California, off the road. In
California, utility revenues are indepen-
dent, or decoupled, from electricity sales,
which removes the economic disincentive
for utilities to promote energy efficiency.
California also has the most effective en-
ergy efficiency programs nationwide. State
policies supporting decoupled electric
markets would address global warming
by allowing utility companies to invest
in energy efficiency without sacrificing
profit. This paper analyzes the case for
decoupling. After examining the history
of decoupling, it explains the mechanics,
policy approaches, effects, and criticisms
of decoupling.
Decoupling utility revenues from
sales is an essential first step toward de-
creasing US greenhouse gas emissions.
Enacting effective decoupling policies will
require concentrated efforts at the state
level that take into account the unique
circumstances of each electricity market.
Federal support for the adoption of de-
coupling in all states would benefit the
entire nation tremendously in terms of
energy and carbon emissions saved.
“Decoupling [has been] the single most im-
portant efficiency measure in the state of Cali-
fornia.”
– Jonathan Livingston, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company1
I. Introduction
In 2006, the California (CA) State
Assembly passed and Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger signed into law the most
significant carbon policy established
to that date in the United States. Un-
der Assembly Bill 32 (AB32) California
continued its role as the frontrunner on
environmental legislation in the country,
setting an ambitious target to reduce car-
bon emissions in the state to 1990 levels
by 2020, and 80 percent of 1990 levels by
2050.2 While evaluating what these tar-
gets mean and how they will be achieved
is still an open question, it is clear that
AB32 will result in a renewed focus on
energy saving policy in California’s energy
sector, the results of which will be under
close scrutiny worldwide.
California’s leadership in energy effi-
ciency has been a result of a suite of effec-
tive policy and regulatory measures along
with investments from energy utilities
themselves. Together, these activities have
allowed California to maintain a relative-
ly constant rate of energy use per capita
since 1975, even as the gross state product
doubled over the past two decades.3 In
the 1980s, California’s successful control
of per capita energy use placed it 30 per-
cent below the national average, a mar-
gin which increased to almost 50 percent
over the past two decades (see Figure 1).
Indeed, California’s achievements in pro-
moting efficient energy use place the state
lowest in per-capita energy consumption
in the U.S.4
19
 Figure 1: Electricity Use Per Capita, Comparison of US and CA5
A look at California’s recent past
demonstrates that decoupling has been a
critical strategy, and may be an important
element of meeting the goals of AB32.
The record from the late 1970s forward
shows that California has already made
tremendous progress in controlling en-
ergy usage and carbon dioxide emissions
through effective state-wide promotion of
energy efficiency. In order to understand
why energy efficiency will be important
for future reductions in carbon dioxide
emissions in California, it is necessary to
examine the circumstances which have
fostered the State’s success in increasing
energy efficiency to date.
These energy savings correspond to
several efficiency developments in the
state, from technological breakthroughs
to legislative solutions, such as adoption
of appliance efficiency standards in 1977
and the most aggressive energy efficiency
building codes in the nation. Among the
various developments is the significant
decision to decouple revenue from sales in
the electricity industry in 1982,6 thereby
20
removing disincentives for utilities to pro-
mote efficient energy use. After an abrupt
halt following deregulation in the 1990s,
it was reinstated in 2001. This instrumen-
tal policy has set the stage for cooperation
in California between utilities and regula-
tory bodies such as the Energy Commis-
sion and the Public Utilities Commission
in planning and investing in energy effi-
ciency in the electricity sector.
The concept behind decoupling is
relatively simple. When electric utilities’
revenues are dependent upon volume of
sales, there is no economic incentive for
utilities to promote efficiency in energy
use by their customers. In other words,
if revenue is coupled to kilowatt-hours
sold, companies that are focused on profit
have no reason to decrease the amount of
kilowatt-hours sold by increasing energy
efficiency. Indeed, this structure has led to
promotion of outright wasteful energy us-
age practices in order to boost profits. The
consequences for carbon dioxide emis-
sions are great because emissions from the
energy industry account for roughly 20
percent of total greenhouse gas pollution
in California.7
An effective decoupling policy, on
the other hand, removes disincentives for
efficiency, and utilities can be encouraged
to undertake demand side management
aimed at reducing electricity consump-
tion while still meeting their bottom line.
This paper will take an in-depth look at
how decoupling works and has been insti-
tutionalized as energy policy in the state
of California, and the ways in which it
has affected energy use and carbon emis-
sions over the past 30-plus years. This
discussion begins with an historic look
at California’s energy market in order to
provide a context in which to evaluate
the effectiveness of decoupling. Possible
problems and alternatives will also be pre-
sented. Finally, this paper will discuss rec-
ommendations for the implementation of
decoupling policies in other states and at
a national level.
II. Background: What Is Decoupling?
The standard procedure for electric-
ity ratemaking in the US “is economically
inefficient because the utility does not
have the incentive to choose the least-
cost option to provide energy service to
its customers.”8 Prime examples of this
inefficiency can be found in utility poli-
cies of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the
notorious utility programs that gave away
energy guzzling light bulbs and promoted
electric stoves, water heaters, and appli-
ances to replace cleaner and more efficient
models using natural gas.
These wasteful utility policies are the
result of standard US ratemaking regula-
tion that gives utilities more profit if they
sell more electricity. This focus only on
the supply side leads utilities solely to
consider additional power plants to meet
increased electric demand. It also drives
utilities vehemently to oppose energy ef-
ficiency measures that reduce their sales,
even if it is more economically efficient to
invest in efficiency rather than new gener-
ating capacity.
Decoupling is a solution to this prob-
lematic ratemaking practice. A decoupling
policy disconnects, or “decouples,” utility
revenue from energy sales. The basic way
in which this is achieved is as follows:
Every few years, state regulators deter-
mine how much revenue utilities need to
cover certain authorized costs. They then set
electricity rates at a level that allows utilities to
recover these costs, based on a forecast of sales.
If actual sales are above or below this forecast,
then revenues are ‘trued up.’ Over-collections
are given back to consumers in the form of
reduced rates, and under-collections are elimi-
nated with modest rate increases (typically
pennies a month for the average household).9
Since revenue becomes independent
of energy sales, decoupling “removes both
the incentive to increase electricity sales
and the disincentive to run effective en-
ergy efficiency programs or invest in other
activities that may reduce load.”10 In this
way, both utilities and the customer can
benefit from the fact that electricity is a
regulated market. In a decoupled system,
“the utility will distribute less commodity
with no corresponding loss of distribu-
tion revenue, while customers will benefit
from avoiding the economic and envi-
ronmental costs of unnecessary electricity
generation.”11
Decoupling policies were first enact-
ed in California in 1982, with other states
following later to varying degrees. When
properly implemented, these policies have
been very effective in driving efficiency
gains in both the electricity and natural
gas sectors. Recognizing the importance
of decoupling, the United States Congress
modified the Public Utilities Regulatory
Act of 1978 through the National Energy
Policy Act of 1992 to state that:
21
 The rates allowed to be charged by a State
regulated electric utility shall be such that the
utility’s investment in and expenditures for en-
ergy conservation, energy efficiency resources,
and other demand side management measures
are at least as profitable, giving appropriate
consideration to income lost from reduced
sales due to investments in and expenditures
for conservation and efficiency, as its invest-
ments in and expenditures for the construc-
tion of new generation, transmission, and dis-
tribution equipment.
. . .
This objective requires that (A) regulators
link the utility’s net revenues, at least in part,
to the utility’s performance in implementing
cost-effective programs promoted by this sec-
tion; and (B) regulators ensure that, for pur-
poses of recovering fixed costs, including its
authorized return, the utility’s performance
is not affected by reductions in its retail sales
volumes.12
Although the section regarding elec-
tric utilities left open the possibilities of
using policies such as lost revenue adjust-
ments (discussed in Decoupling Alter-
natives section) as well, regulators were
clearly instructed to implement decou-
pling policies for gas utilities. Despite the
language of the act, however, these chang-
es were not mandatory. Instead, regula-
tory authorities are allowed to determine
whether to adopt the Federal standards.13
As of October 2006, only seven states
had decoupling mechanisms in place for at
least one regulated natural gas or electric
utility. These states are California, Mary-
land, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, and Utah.14 Of these states, only
California had decoupling policies in
place for electric utilities. Although these
are the only states with current decou-
pling policies, a number of other states
have also had decoupling policies in the
past and a number are currently consider-
ing new policies.
22
III. Electricity Markets History
The U.S. electricity market was born
in 1878, when Charles Brush perfected
arc lamps to light his Cleveland offices,
and shortly thereafter began providing
electricity to the city for a charge of one
dollar an hour. By the late 1880s, nearly
every city in the country had granted gen-
eral electric light franchises to competing
electric companies. In the late 1880s, J.
Pierpont Morgan, the nation’s premier
banker, shifted the structure of utility de-
velopment from competition to consoli-
dation and corporate control. His vision
was simple: there would be only one util-
ity, under his control. Through aggressive
investments as well as influence in state
legislatures, industrialists such as Morgan,
Westinghouse and Samuel Insull began to
monopolize urban lighting, power, and
trolley systems.
At the same time, grassroots action
started to demand public ownership of
power supply, and by 1888 some 53 cities
and towns established their own munici-
pal systems. Over the next hundred years,
these public systems would deliver power
more cheaply and reliably than private or
investor owned utilities (IOUs).15 Public
power advocates agreed with Morgan that
the utility business was a natural monop-
oly, but it should be the property of the
people. Nationwide from 1897 through
1907, between 60 and 120 new munici-
pal utilities were formed every year. By
1912 there were 3,659 private utilities,
and 1737 public ones.16
Utility magnate Samual Insull first
introduced the idea of regulation by util-
ity commissions to the National Electric
Light Association (NELA), of which he
was president, in 1898. He presented the
NELA with what would become the un-
derlying structure of the modern utility
business: “The best service at the lowest
possible price can only be obtained,” he
said, “by exclusive control of a given ter-
ritory being placed in the hands of one
undertaking.” In exchange for this exclu-
sive control, he proposed establishment
of utility commissions to oversee these re-
gional monopolies. Similar panels prolif-
erated throughout U.S. industries such as
railroads, food production, telecommuni-
cation, and finance. By 1921 every state
but Delaware had established a utility reg-
ulatory commission. As the commissions
obliged the interests of the large private
electricity providers, the spread of public
utilities was crippled and many munici-
pal utilities were forced to buy electricity
from IOUs.
Through the maturation of the U.S.
electricity market, investor-owned utili-
ties have become the main suppliers of
electricity. In 2005 IOUs’ generation
capacity comprised 42.6 percent of total
generation while publicly owned utilities
(POUs) only accounted for 9.7 percent
of generation.17 IOUs currently domi-
nate in terms of size and capacity despite
the fact that the number of IOUs is only
219 while there are currently over 2000
POUs.18
In California, gas and electric inter-
ests merged from the San Francisco Gas
Light Company and the Edison Light and
Power Company into the San Francisco
Gas and Electric Company (SFG&E) in
1896. In 1905, SFG&E spearheaded
the creation of Pacific Gas & Electric
from what were once over five hundred
independent companies. Today, PG&E
is the largest private utility in the United
States.19 In 2001, three big IOUs, Pacific
Gas and Electric Company, Southern
California Edison Company and San Di-
ego Gas and Electric Company comprise
74 percent of California electricity mar-
ket by retail delivery.
IV. Deregulation And Decoupling
In 1982 California became the first
state to adopt decoupling and, in so do-
ing, to remove the disincentives for utili-
ties to promote energy efficiency and
demand side management. The policies
implemented were relatively successful
in managing energy demand, but came
to a halt during the deregulation of the
late 1990s. Deregulation was proposed in
1996 by the three biggest IOUs in Cali-
fornia as a way to separate the business
of generating power from the business of
distributing it to the public. The prem-
ise was that utilities would spin off much
of their generating capacity and would
compete for customers as pure distribu-
tion companies, resulting in decreased
prices.20
With deregulation, utilities became
distributors who bought electricity on
the wholesale spot market and resold it to
their customers. As a result, “[t]hey no
longer had the responsibility to plan for
meeting their customers’ future electricity
needs by combining supply-side invest-
ments and demand-side investments in a
diversified portfolio of resources.”21 Then,
in 2001, a sequence of events led by an
unusually hot summer being followed by
a cold winter caused a major energy cri-
sis in California. However, buying power
at fixed costs, customers had little incen-
tive to conserve. As demand outstripped
cheap wholesale supply, natural-gas prices
soared and blackouts, brownouts, and
high electricity rates followed.
It was soon decided by the state as-
sembly that energy efficiency should
once again become a policy priority for
California in order to control electricity
markets. California’s legislature mandat-
ed reinstatement of decoupling in April
2001.22 Since that time, utility and
state investment in efficiency has grown
tremendously and energy savings have
23
 followed. In September 2005, the utili-
ties commission adopted an aggressive
energy-efficiency campaign under which
$2 billion would be invested in efficiency
between 2006 and 2008. This campaign
will see efficiency funding beyond the
historic levels reached under decoupling
in the early 1980s and again in the early
1990s,23 and will ensure that energy effi-
ciency will remain a priority in California
in the coming years.
V. Mechanics Of Decoupling
Under decoupling, utilities use stan-
dard rate making procedures to predict
energy sales and required revenue, from
which electricity rates are determined.
However, rather than generating revenue
from actual energy sales multiplied by the
rate, the utilities are guaranteed an “au-
thorized revenue” that includes operating
costs and a predetermined return on in-
vestment. If the income from electricity
sales is above the authorized revenue, the
utilities place excess income in a balanc-
ing account. Similarly, if the income from
electricity sales is below the authorized
revenue, the utilities draw from the bal-
ancing account to meet their authorized
revenue. Doing so insulates the utilities’
profits from the price shocks that occur
under normal market regulation. A case
study is run below in Table I to examine
Expe cted Expe cted Autho rized
Price Sal es Reven ue
($/kWh) (kW h) ($)
Yr.1Yr 0.100 1000 100.00
1
Yr.2Yr 0.100 1000 100.00
2
24
how a particular utility would fare under
a decoupled system.
Implementation of decoupling is
generally done on a case by case basis. In
California, two common techniques are
used: “(1) Using a mechanism that esca-
lates revenue requirements by inflation
minus a productivity offset every year –
and adding a factor to account for cus-
tomer growth; or (2) Using an inflation
adjustment (consumer price index) to es-
calate the revenue requirement each year
with boundaries set for a minimum and
maximum allowable escalation.”25
VI. Variations On Decoupling
Although all decoupling policies fol-
low the same basic mechanism, there have
been many different variations adopted.
The policies can differ slightly in any of
the steps involved. In initially setting the
authorized revenue, figures such as prior
or projected revenues, number of custom-
ers, or some combination thereof can be
used to help determine non-fuel costs.
Having determined authorized revenue,
prices can be corrected using a balancing
account over varying amounts of time (see
ratemaking example above). This account
can be adjusted to the full difference re-
gardless of the amount, adjusted up to a
certain percentage, or adjusted according
to an average in the balancing account
Actu al Col lected Actu al Repo rted Balan ce
Price Sal es Reven ue Reven ue +/- ($) Account
($/kWh) (kW h) ($) ($) ($)
0.100 1100 110.00 100.00 10.00 10.00
0.090 990 89.10 100.00 (10.90) (0.90)
Table 1. Decoupling Ratemaking Example24
over an extended time. The frequency of
general rate cases as well as price adjust-
ments can also vary. Decoupling policies
often also involve fuel, weather, eco-
nomic, or other adjustment clauses. All
of these variations are necessary because
no one specific policy is most appropriate
for all different scenarios. Differences in
local economic or weather patterns, prior
regulatory policies, and the utilities them-
selves are only a few of the factors that can
affect the policy considerations. A repre-
sentative few of the different policies are
those of California, New York, Oregon,
and Washington.
California: California’s decoupling
policy, known as the ‘Electric Rate Ad-
justment Mechanism,’ or ERAM, was first
implemented for Pacific Gas and Electric
in 1982, then later for all other regulated
gas and electric utilities.26 ERAM relies
on general rate cases every three years, and
a future test year to determine authorized
revenues. ERAM also includes a large set
of adjustments including factors for op-
erations and maintenance, weather, fuel,
cost-of-capital, and number of customers.
These adjustments are revisited annually.
The results of ERAM have been positive.
Utility profits were effectively decoupled
from sales with no significant effect on
rates or the allocation of risk.27 The most
common criticism of ERAM is its com-
plexity, which is not seen to provide any
benefit over the simpler mechanisms.28
New York: In 1992, New York adopt-
ed the Revenue Decoupling Mechanism
policy for Consolidated Edison. Like Cal-
ifornia’s ERAM, RDM used a three year
general rate case cycle and a future test
year for authorized revenues, as well as de-
tailed attrition adjustments. In contrast to
ERAM however, RDM held adjustments
constant throughout each general rate
cycle.29 This policy had minimal effects
on rates while encouraging considerable
investment in energy efficiency.30
Oregon: Oregon first adopted a de-
coupling policy, known as the Alternative
Form of Regulation (AFOR), for Pacifi-
corp in 1998. In AFOR, authorized rev-
enue is set according to a forecasted test
year and adjusted according to economic
indices. Rate adjustments are capped at a
percentage of current rates, and a clause
is included for “major events outside
the company’s control.”31 AFOR has
had only very small rate impacts while
significantly increasing Pacificorp’s com-
mitment to energy efficiency.32 More
recently, in 2002, Oregon also approved
a partial decoupling mechanism for the
Northwest Natural Gas Company. This
policy, known as Distribution Margin
Normalization, decouples 90 percent of
non-weather variation from revenues, and
accompanies an existing weather adjust-
ment policy.33 Oregon now has the high-
est percentage of high efficiency furnace
sales in the nation, which has been at-
tributed directly to the Northwest Natu-
ral Gas Company’s promotion programs,
incentivized by decoupling. Despite this
success, an independent study of the de-
coupling policy recommended that the
Oregon Public Utilities Commission,
“Consider adopting full decoupling. Be-
cause of its simplicity, full decoupling would
be easier for customers to understand than the
combination of DMN and WARM [weather
adjustment rate mechanism]. In addition, full
decoupling does not have some of the gaming
incentives present in DMN (which could also
be eliminated by removing the 90% factor ap-
plied to deferral calculations).”34
Washington: In 1991, Washington
applied a revenue cap along with a Pe-
riodic Rate Adjustment Mechanism to
decouple Puget Sound Energy’s revenues
from sales. PRAM was Revenue per Cus-
tomer mechanism, which coupled Puget
Sound Energy’s authorized revenues to
the size of their customer base, rather than
25
 sales volume.35 This has the advantages
of being simple and easy to understand,36
removing efficiency disincentives while
reducing incentive to distort relative
prices, and preventing the uncertain price
response that can be caused by a pure rev-
enue cap.37 Shortly after the implementa-
tion of PRAM, Puget Sound Energy’s en-
ergy savings increased drastically; the NW
Energy Coalition notes that, “[w]hile this
transformation in performance was not
entirely the result of decoupling, break-
ing the link between Puget’s revenues and
sales was a critical part of the change.”38
As previously noted, specific region-
al, economic, political, or other situa-
tions can affect the appropriateness of any
policy. However, as shown here, many
different decoupling measures have been
implemented with positive effects. As a
result, although policies must be carefully
formulated to meet specific local require-
ments, decoupling revenues from sales is
uniformly recommended.
26
VII. Efficiency And Carbon Control
Under Decoupling
California’s decoupling policies have
played a significant role in avoiding en-
ergy usage and consequent emissions of
greenhouse gases. This will be especially
important in the future, due to the state’s
aggressive plan to cut emissions as laid
out in AB 32. Here, we attempt to show
the relation between decoupling policies
and reductions in energy use and CO2
emissions in California from energy effi-
ciency programs, as quantified in a num-
ber of studies. Estimates of the carbon
impacts to date in California related to
decoupling, as well as potential impacts at
a national level are determined based on
generation and emissions data for Cali-
fornia and the United States.
Several studies show that policy and
investments in support of energy efficien-
cy have had a significant and quantifiable
impact on energy usage in the state of
California. While decoupling has clearly
played a role in these reductions, distin-
guishing the sole effects of decoupling
compared with other important measures
is virtually impossible. There are simply
too many factors affecting efficiency and
energy use to isolate benefits due to de-
coupling policies alone. Furthermore,
decoupling itself does not provide direct
incentives and investments for energy
savings. Rather it allows for successful ef-
ficiency programming and action to take
place by removing disincentives with re-
spect to demand side management on the
part of utilities. This is why decoupling
has often been referred to as a necessary
but not sufficient condition for success-
ful energy efficiency measures in Califor-
nia.39
By accounting for the effects of utili-
ty efficiency programs, and energy savings
from appliance and building standards,
several studies have estimated how much
energy consumption has been avoided in
California since the mid 1970’s. These
studies illustrate a record of effectiveness
that is related in part to a successful de-
coupling regime. Figure 2, showing cu-
mulative energy savings, illustrates how
efficiency measures have impacted energy
use through the past 30 years. By 2003,
an amount roughly equal to 40,000 GWh
of electricity was avoided due to energy
efficiency, and importantly, roughly one
half of that amount is attributed to utili-
ties’ energy efficiency programs.
Figure 2: Cumulative Energy Savings from California’s
Efficiency Programs / Standards41
Though some of these savings are a
result of mandatory utility spending in
efficiency, a large part is also a result of
voluntary investments, which are directly
related to decoupling. This is because un-
der decoupling, avoided kilowatt hours
are often more valuable to utilities than
sold kilowatt hours. This is the case in
California, where efficiency projects cur-
rently cost around 3¢ per kWh; far less
than the cost to the utility of a long term
contract for power or the cost of investing
in new generation capacity.40
While explicit links cannot be drawn
between these savings and decoupling
policies, evidence suggests that decou-
pling has created the conditions necessary
for efficiency programs to be as success-
ful as they have been. For example, of the
more than $700 million per year invested
in energy efficiency in California, around
$400 million comes from utilities’ own
investments in demand side management
to cut costs, which is encouraged by poli-
cies that decouple electricity revenue and
sales. The remaining $300 million result
from mechanisms such as the public
goods surcharge. This charge, required
by the California Public Utilities Com-
mission for efficiency programs, is placed
by investor owned utilities on customers’
electricity bills.42
The year by year results of Califor-
nia’s significant efficiency investments are
shown in Figure 3. An interesting feature
of this figure underscores the importance
of decoupling in the state’s energy sav-
ings: in the era since decoupling was first
established in California, the years with
the lowest total savings from energy ef-
ficiency were 1999 and 2000.43 These
correspond to the restructuring period
during which decoupling was temporar-
ily abandoned. During this time, utilities’
voluntary investments in efficiency prac-
tically disappeared, leaving only funds
from the mandated public goods charge
27
 Figure 3: Past and Projected Yearly Energy Savings from Efficiency in California45
to promote efficiency programs. This ob-
servation is consistent with the assertion
that decoupling is an important part of
the equation in terms of how much in-
volvement energy utilities have in en-
ergy efficiency promotion in California.
Figure 2 also shows another dip in total
reported energy efficiency savings that oc-
curs in 1987-1990. This dip is the result
of two changes in measurement metrics
that improved reporting of net program
savings. These changes disallowed utilities
to include energy efficiency investments
made by consumers outside of the util-
ity program, and it included improved
and more methodological energy savings
analysis that resulted in lower estimates of
program savings.44 Therefore, this first
dip does not reflect on the effectiveness of
decoupling as a policy.
Moving from energy savings to car-
bon dioxide emissions reductions is done
by estimating average emissions per unit
energy from greenhouse gas emitting
sources in California, and relating these
to total electricity consumption per year.
According to the Energy Information
Administration, electricity generation in
28
California was responsible for over 50
million metric tons of carbon dioxide
emissions into the atmosphere in 2005.46
Dividing this quantity by the total elec-
tric energy generated in the state in 2005
yields an average rate of 0.2 kg of carbon
dioxide emissions per kWh. Due to Cali-
fornia’s clean energy mix relative to the
rest of the U.S., this is roughly one third
the national average.47 Using this same
method for each year from 1995 through
2005, a period which was chosen due to
availability of data, an approximation of
emissions reductions due to energy sav-
ings in California can be made. As a re-
sult, we estimate that investments during
1995-2005 resulted in three million met-
ric tons of avoided carbon dioxide emis-
sions in 2005 in CA alone.48 Scaling this
analysis to a national level, it is estimated
that if the entire United States saved as
much energy as California did for the pe-
riod from 1995 to 2005, carbon dioxide
emissions in the amount of 121 million
metric tons might have been avoided in
2005 alone. This is the equivalent of
removing 25 million cars from the na-
tion’s roads that year, equivalent to get-
ting rid of all cars in California.49
A large fraction of these reductions
are related to decoupling policies. This is
because these policies fostered the invest-
ments in energy efficiency that occurred
during this time period. This study
of the energy and emissions reduction
impacts of efficiency in California iden-
tifies no single responsible factor. Rather,
it highlights the savings that have been
made in conjunction with the adoption
and implementation of decoupling poli-
cies. One cannot discount other efficiency
developments during this same time pe-
riod, but it is clearly possible to attribute
much of the effectiveness of California’s
energy management strategies to the de-
coupling policies that have allowed them
to succeed.
VIII. Market Resistance
With such enormous benefits, one
may question why decoupling in the elec-
tricity industry has not been widely ad-
opted by more states or even adopted at
the Federal level. Despite the decoupling
clause of the Energy Policy Act of 1992,
there has been no Federal push for such a
policy because the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission (FERC) has no juris-
diction over such matters, which are left
to each individual state’s Public Utility
Commission.50 At the state level, where
decoupling is a salient issue, the reasons
for a lack of adoption are more compli-
cated. It has been found that
“… despite the surging interest in regu-
latory decoupling, there are thus far relatively
few cases where such an approach has been
enacted and effectively implemented for a suf-
ficient period of time to begin to assess results.
The states of Oregon and California are the
leading examples.”51
To understand why this is the case, some
of the motives for decoupling opposition
must be examined.
Decoupling faces the same obstacle
as other policies and technologies that
are favorable to a stronger, more coherent
energy policy: entrenched utilities. Util-
ity opposition can be characterized by an
active resistance specifically to decoupling
and a general unwillingness to change. In
a survey conducted by the National Regu-
latory Research Institute (NRRI), of sixty-
five public utility commissioners, the only
ones in favor of decoupling as an approach
to improving demand side management
(DSM) were those who had already en-
acted or been previously involved with
decoupling; the rest were concerned or
uncertain about how it would affect their
profits.52 The industry operates on twen-
ty-plus year time frames with extremely
expensive capital costs — it doesn’t adopt
new policies readily. As was mentioned at
a recent Energy Crossroads conference at
Stanford University, utilities are notorious
for their resistance to change and decou-
pling is just one more change that creates
uncertainty in the minds of CEOs.53
Many in the industry question the
efficacy of decoupling by asserting that
the costs and benefits of decoupling have
not been established because they have
not been thoroughly tested or widely ad-
opted. While the volume of literature on
decoupling is perhaps smaller than other
public policies, there is still overwhelming
evidence that decoupling is almost always
effective at improving DSM and inte-
grated resource planning (IRP) in states
where it has been enacted. Companies are
profit-seeking entities. The very idea of
revenue adjustments capping profits can
be anathema to businessmen and share-
holders who would prefer to have unlim-
ited earnings potential. But what many
opponents fail to see is that decoupling
shields utilities, and by extension share-
holders, from the significant price fluc-
tuations that damage revenue streams and
make investment in the utility unattract-
29
 ive. Consumers are protected by price
fluctuations, for instance during unusual
weather, while utilities’ revenue is protect-
ed from things such as aggressive DSM or
high fuel prices. While it might be ad-
vantageous to shield both the consumer
and utility from weather fluctuations and
economic cycles, opponents are worried
that utilities are also shielded from non-
productive DSM and poor internal cost
controls.54 As the NRRI puts it, “[de-
coupling] obliterates lost revenue that
is attributable to any cause whatsoever.”
This assertion is only partially true; de-
coupling without proper rate adjustments
might behave in this manner, but the way
in which the electronic rate adjustments
mechanism (ERAM) works in California
accounts for such things as productivity,
and internal cost controls.
Critics also argue that decoupling
causes increased rate volatility. This ar-
gument is correct only in the narrowest
sense. At the end of each year, when
revenue adjustments are made, rates will
change as a result. The yearly stepwise
change in rates is actually quite small and
occurs at predetermined times—hardly a
case for volatility, especially compared to
pre-decoupling, where rates change con-
tinuously due to things like varying fuel
costs.55
The most successful argument against
decoupling, but not necessarily the most
persuasive, is the insistence that rates in-
variably increase when decoupling is en-
acted. Some even state that, “…the adop-
tion of a decoupling mechanism may
signal to investors and ratepayers alike
that the utility’s regulators are prepared to
authorize price increases for the purpose
of protecting the environment.”56 For
those who think that rate determination
should include environmental and social
costs, a small rate increase would be ac-
ceptable. To many utilities and ratepay-
ers, it would not. An abstract reasoning
30
put forth by opposition is the idea that re-
moving utility risk usually means that the
cost to the consumer will increase. This
reasoning simply does not make sense. In
cost estimation, companies charge more
when their risks are higher because they
need to be able to recover their costs in
the event that they do not sell as much as
planned. When risks are lower, compa-
nies can charge much less because they do
not have to build as much protection into
their projections.
Opponents also argue that the loss of
customers brought on by an indifference
to competition can lead to increased rates
as utilities need to charge more per cus-
tomer to pay for existing infrastructure or
capital. In other words, they get a lower
utilization rate from their previous invest-
ments. For this reason it is important
that regulators set the rates properly from
the outset and include in their adjustment
mechanisms things that will compensate
for this possibility. Opponents also ar-
gue that when DSM is more expensive
than the cost of extra supply, decoupling
raises prices. This is true, but the entire
premise of decoupling is that there are a
whole host of DSM actions that are both
cheaper and provide better service to the
customer than additional supply, which
has been proven in California (as shown
in the previous section). As long as the
cost of conserved energy is less than the
additional supply required to generate
such savings, the ratepayer should see re-
duced rates while the utility earns profit.
Decoupling turns utilities from sellers of
a least-cost commodity to a provider of
least-cost energy services.
IX. Implementation
Poor program implementation can
also make decoupling politically difficult,
but this should not be considered a fail-
ure of decoupling policy itself. This was
the case with Maine, which previously at-
tempted decoupling, but the results were
less than encouraging and they reverted
back to old programs because of ratepayer
backlash. Regulators failed to revisit the
rate case even though utilities were accu-
mulating revenue year after year during
a prolonged economic recession. As the
general economic conditions declined,
ratepayers expected that their rates should
go down as well, but they did not because
of the revenues the utility had to achieve.
Regulators should have revisited the rate
case more frequently during the econom-
ic recession to adjust rates properly and
make sure revenue streams for the utilities
balanced properly. However, failure to do
so in the early years of the recession made
it impossible for regulators to deliver the
expected lower rates during the recession,
resulting in consumer backlash.57 There-
fore, this case is seen more as an account-
ing failure on the part of the rate makers
than a failure of decoupling policy itself.
The perceived disadvantages of de-
coupling and utility resistance with regard
to changes in policy only partially explain
why it has not been more widely adopted.
The reason is quite simple. With the ex-
ception of a few states like California and
Oregon, there has been little progress be-
cause there is no core group of constitu-
ents or private entities that are responsible
and in the position to demand such ac-
tion. The utilities by no means lose under
decoupling, but they are not convinced
enough of its benefits to lobby for it them-
selves. Even though it benefits ratepayers,
citizens are not clamoring for it because it
is a complex issue few have heard of. It
makes extraordinary sense from an energy
efficiency or societal viewpoint, but is not
part of most policy discussions. Enacting
effective decoupling policy will require
substantial individual efforts at state lev-
els with consideration towards the unique
circumstances that characterize each elec-
tricity market. However, federal support
for the adoption of decoupling in all
states will greatly facilitate efforts at state
levels to educate and create demand for
decoupling through citizens, utilities, and
energy regulators.
X. Alternatives To Decoupling
Opponents of decoupling often point
to alternatives as being more desirable.
The most dominant alternative histori-
cally has been lost revenue adjustments
(LRA). LRAs are revenue adjustments for
revenue lost to DSM policies. LRAs are
favorable to utilities because they do not
cap revenue and they are easier to game.
It is exceptionally difficult to disentangle
the exact effect any given DSM policy has
on a utility, and it is made even more dif-
ficult by the fact that utilities often pro-
mote DSM that looks good but is actu-
ally intended to increase energy use. For
example, installing compact fluorescent
light bulbs is effective provided they are
replacing existing light bulbs, not when
they are being added as part of a security
system that a utility may be pushing to in-
crease electricity demand. These types of
ambiguities mean that the process is high-
ly litigious, and most utilities are quite
successful at making sure LRAs work in
their favor.58 LRAs are a bad alterna-
tive; they do not remove the disincentive
to sell more electricity.
Very recently, performance based
ratemaking (PBR) has been suggested as
a viable alternative to decoupling. This
method uses a systems benefit charge on
customers’ bills to fund efficiency and
renewable programs.59 Programs have
been recently enacted by Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Minnesota, and Nevada, and pilot pro-
grams are slated by Maryland, New Jer-
sey, North Carolina, and Ohio.6/ PBR is
31
 great because it encourages efficiency and
renewables, but PBR also does not reduce
the utility’s incentive to sell more electric-
ity. They should be seen, then, not as an
alternative to decoupling, but as comple-
mentary regulation — PBR and renew-
able portfolio standards (RPS) can ensure
that when new supply is created under
decoupling, it will come from cleaner en-
ergy sources.
XI.Recommendations And Conclusion
Current regulatory regimes and mar-
ket practice in many states strongly tie
utility profits to electricity sales levels.
As a result, there exists a strong incentive
for utilities to increase sales and a corre-
sponding disincentive for utilities to sup-
port energy efficiency programs. On the
other hand, by allowing energy efficiency
programs to succeed, decoupling policies
are a critical element for reducing energy
demand and, consequently, dangerous
greenhouse gas emissions.
Decoupling policies are preferable to
the related alternatives, such as lost rev-
enue adjustments or performance based
ratemaking alone. This is because decou-
pling policies do a better job of addressing
all potential barriers to energy efficiency,
reduce gaming incentives, and reduce vol-
atility in both consumer prices and utility
revenue. Despite some skepticism, recent
examples show that utility revenues can
be decoupled from sales without undue
stress on either customers or utilities.
However, decoupling provides only
an indirect incentive for utilities to im-
prove performance. It serves principally
only to remove existing barriers, and so
should be viewed is a necessary but not
sufficient requirement for successful en-
ergy efficiency promotion. Accordingly,
decoupling policies should be enacted
along with other programs or incentives
to promote reductions in energy use and
32
improvements energy efficiency.
Improving energy efficiency and re-
ducing energy use are the cheapest and
easiest ways in which we can reduce our
national greenhouse gas emissions. If the
whole of the United States were to achieve
proportionally the same energy efficien-
cies as California in 2005, it could remove
the equivalent of 25 million cars from the
nation’s roads, equivalent to getting rid of
all cars in California. It is our view that
decoupling utility revenues from sales is
an essential first step toward mitigating
the U.S.’s role in global climate change.
Enacting effective decoupling policy will
require substantial individual efforts at
state levels with consideration towards
the unique circumstances that character-
ize each electricity market. With federal
support for the adoption of decoupling
in all states, in keeping with the commit-
ments of the National Energy Policy Act
of 1992, the entire nation would benefit
from decreased energy consumption and
reduced carbon dioxide emissions.
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Making Renewables and Efficiency
Competitive. Energy Crossroads
Conference. Stanford University.
March 2, 2007
2. Union of Concerned Scientists
Fact Sheet. AB32: Global Warming
Solutions Act; 2007 http://www.law.
stanford.edu/program/centers/enrlp/
pdf/AB-32-fact-sheet.pdf
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and Alex Leupp Energy Efficiency
Leadership in California: Preventing
the Next Crisis. Natural Resources
Defense Council. Silicon Valley
Manufacturing Group. April 2003
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The Potential for Energy Efficiency.
Hewlett Foundation Energy Series.
2002
5. Rosenfeld, Art.
6. Canine, Craig. California Illuminates
the World. On Earth Magazine.
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7. See Appendix A for 2005 emissions
from electricity production
8. Carter, Sheryl. NRDC Follow Up
Memo to August 2001 Oregon Public
Utilities Commission Workshop.
9. http://policy.rutgers.edu/ceeep/
images/SCarter.decoupling%20
memo-1.doc
10. Canine, 2006
11. Carter, 2001
12. Carter Memo, 2001
13. United States Energy Policy Act of
1992
14. See, for example, Carroll Electric
Membership Corporation. “PURPA
Frequently Asked Questions.”
Available at http://www.cemc.com/
purpa_faqs.asp
15. Kushler, Martin; York, Dan, and Patti
Witte. “Aligning Utility Interests
With Energy Efficiency Objectives:
A Review of Recent Efforts at
Decoupling and Performance
Incentives.” American Council for
and Energy Efficient Economy.
Washington, DC October 2006.
16. Wasserman, Harvey. The Last
Energy War: The Battle over Utility
Deregulation. Seven Stories Press.
1999
17. Wasserman, 1999
18. Wasserman, Harvey. “California’s
Deregulation Disaster.” The Nation.
January 25, 2001 http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20010212/
wasserman
19. Wasserman, 2001
20. Berman, Dan and John O’Connor.
Who Owns the Sun: People, Politics,
and the Struggle for a Solar Economy.
Chelsea Green Publishing. 1996.
21. Wasserman, 2001
22. Canine, 2006
23. Carter Memo, 2001
24. Canine, 2006
25. Eto, Joseph; Stoft, Steven, and
Timothy Beldin. “The Theory and
Practice of Decoupling. Energy and
Environment Division.” Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory. University of
California. 1994
26. Kushler, 2006
27. Kushler, 2006.
28. Eto et al., 2004.
29. See, for example, Questar Gas
Company. “White Paper on
Alternative Regulatory Options.” No.
05-057-T01. 2004. http://www.psc.
utah.gov/gas/05docs/05057T01/
Tariff-G%2012-19.doc
30. Eto et al., 2004.
31. NW Energy Coalition. Testimony
on PGE and NW Natural proposals.
Before the Public Utility Commission
of Oregon, October 2001.
32. Public Utility Commission of
Oregon. Order No. 98-191, Entered
May 05, 1998.
33. Carter Memo, 2001.
34. D Hansen and S Braithwait. “A
Review of Distribution Margin
Normalization.” Christensen
Associates Energy Consulting, Mar
31, 2005.
35. Hansen, 2005.
36. Kushler, 2006.
37. Questar Gas, 2004
38. G Comnes et al. “Performance-Based
Ratemaking for Electric Utilities.”
Vol. 1. Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, Nov 1995.
39. NW Energy Coalition. Testimony
on PGE and NW Natural proposals.
Before the Public Utility Commission
of Oregon, Oct 2001.
40. Carter, Sheryl. “Breaking the
Consumption Habit: Ratemaking
for Efficient Resource Decisions,”
National Resource Defense Council.
Electricity Journal, 2001. http://www.
nrdc.org/air/energy/abreaking.asp
41. Implementing California’s Loading
Order for Electricity Resources,
California Energy Commission.
Doc.-400-2005-043, July 2005
42. Chang, Audrey B., Rosenfeld,
Arthur H., and Patrick K. McAuliffe;
Energy Efficiency in California and
the United States: Reducing Energy
Costs and Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
Draft Chapter for Climate Change
Science and Policy. 2007
43. Bachrach, 2003
44. Chang, 2007
45. Messenger, Mike: Discussion of
Proposed Energy Saving Goals For
Energy Efficiency Programs in CA.
CA Energy Commission, 2003.
46. Chang, 2007
47. See Appendix A for Energy
Information Administration statistics
on emissions and generation
48. Calculations based on Environmental
Protection Agency vehicle emissions
data: http://www.epa.gov/otaq/
consumer/f00013.htm
49. See Appendix A for statistics and
calculations
50. Based on Bureau of Transportation
Statistics information for 2004.
http://www.bts.gov/publications/
national_transportation_statistics/
html/table_01_11.html
33
 51. “About FERC.” Federal Energy Regrettably, only one appendix could be
Regulatory Commission. 11 Aug. shown, due to limited space. Please contact
2005. 2 March 2007. http://www.
ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp caitlin.howarth@rooseveltinstitution.org to
52. Kushler, 2006. obtain the original.
53. Eto, 1994
54. Byron, Jeff. CEC Commissioner.
Panel: Making Renewables and
Efficiency Competitive. Energy About the Authors
Crossroads Conference. Stanford
University. March 2, 2007
55. Graniere Robert and Anthony The case for decoupling was writ-
Cooley, Decoupling and Public ten in winter 2007 as a group project for
Utility Regulation. The National climatologist Stephen Schneider’s class
Regulatory Research Institute. called “Controlling Climate Change in
Columbus, OH. August 1994
56. Carter Memo, 2001 the 21st Century”. Danny Bachmann,
57. Graniere, 1994 Tyson Cook, Jinhyok Heo, and Jordan
58. Decoupling White Paper #1 Edward Shackelford are all recent graduates from
Bloustein Center for Energy, Stanford’s Atmosphere and Energy pro-
Environmental, and Economic gram. Jonas Ketterle is a senior in me-
Policy Presented for discussion at the
Strategic Issues Forum meeting on chanical engineering at Stanford, and a
Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2005 senior fellow at the Roosevelt Institution.
59. Prusnek, Brian C., Advisor to
Commissioner Susan P. Kennedy;
California Public Utilities
Commission. Promoting Energy
Efficiency in California. State EE/
RE Technical Forum: Decoupling
Energy Sales from Revenues and
Other Approaches to Encourage
Utility Investment in Efficiency. May
18, 2005
60. Decoupling White Paper #1.
Edward Bloustein Center for Energy,
Environmental, and Economic
Policy Presented for discussion at the
Strategic Issues Forum meeting on
Tuesday, Oct. 25, 2005
61. Kushler, 2006.
62. Based on Bureau of Transportation
Statistics information for 2004.
http://www.bts.gov/publications/ Appendix A
national_transportation_statistics/
html/table_01_11.html 1. Calculation of Cars Taken Off the
Road

distanc e traveled (miles/year) 12,000

average passen ger car emissions (lbs/ mile) 0.916 http:/ /www. epa.gov/otaq/c onsumer/f00 013.htm
conversion from lbs to kg 0.4536
average passen ger car emissions (kg/year) 4985.9712
average passen ger car emissions (metric
tons/ year) 4.9859712
emission savings from decoupling in 2005 if
nationwide 124,302,525
Cars ta ken off road in 2005 alone 24,930,454
Total Cars in US 243,023,485 http:/ /www. bts.go v/publications/na tional_trans portation_statis tics/ht ml/table_01_11.html

34
Toward Inclusion: Realizing the Civic
Potential of the Earned Income Tax Credit
Niko Karvounis, Oxford University
Executive Summary
The Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) is a highly effective poverty re-
lief resource that is designed to allow for
administrative innovation on the part of
third-party stakeholders and has an un-
tapped potential to benefit recipients in
non-economic ways. Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance (VITA) sites—free tax
preparation centers staffed by volunteers
and located in low-income communi-
ties—represent the administrative mecha-
nisms most suited for maximizing the
non-economic benefits of the EITC and
more specifically, build a foundation for
low-income civic engagement. Civic en-
gagement is the cornerstone of a healthy
democracy and is much less widespread in
low-income demographics.
VITA services (1) maximize lump-
sum claims for EITC claimants, helping
to provide a material basis for socioeco-
nomic mobility and potential civic en-
gagement; (2) offer an atmosphere of
cooperation, identification, and social
connectedness that hone important civic
skills; and (3) can serve as gatekeepers to
a wider network of developmental oppor-
tunities. In order to cultivate the benefits
of VITA sites, and help foster the EITC
into a comprehensive tool for empower-
ing low-income citizens, the following
reforms should be implemented:
• Ban Refund Anticipation Loans
(RAL), cap RAL fees, or strictly regu-
late RAL interest rates.
• Strictly regulate or ban the market-
ing of RALs on IRS e-filing sites.
• Pass the Savings for Working Fami-
lies Act of 2007 to strengthen the
foundation of Individual Develop-
ment Accounts and saving accounts
for low-income Americans.
• Speed up turn-around time for refunds.
• Simplify the tax code and EITC pro-
cess to allow for volunteers to focus a
greater proportion of time and atten-
tion to social interactions.
• Assist VITA sites in maximizing the
roles of non-technical volunteers and
instructive, educational presentations
and materials regarding the history
and political context of the EITC.
• Encourage VITA coalitions to re-
frame the EITC as an opportunity to
engage with policy and government
rather than as solely ‘free money’ in
order to stimulate a greater political
consciousness in recipients.
• Create new community positions
such as ‘community ambassador’
to maximize the social networking
around VITA sites.
• Continue to link VITA services to
work support, asset-building, and oth-
er capacity-building opportunities.
• Formally construct a collaborative
framework for Workforce Investment
Boards, Community Action Agencies,
VITA coalitions, and other local non-
profits to develop a mutually reinforc-
ing network of opportunity.
• Increase the presence of existing non-
profit and community organizations
at VITA sites, in order to pool their
existing resources and connections
into a ‘continuum of service’ made
up of ‘prosperity centers,’ rather than
holding VITA services in locations
not already dedicated to empowering
low-income residents.
• Protect VITA coalitions from budget
cuts and political obstructionism.
35
 • Increase Congressional funding for
VITA services, and provide funding
for community entrepreneurship at
the local level.
• Revise Community Services Block
Grant (CSBG) purposes to be con-
toured to the continuum of services
idea, in order to encourage a networked
approach to low-income development.
• Develop a community CARE Act in
order to establish tax incentives for
a greater contribution on the part of
coalition members and volunteers.
I. Introduction: The Earned Income
Tax Credit And Civic Engagement
The Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) stands out as both the most ef-
fective and the most broadly supported
poverty relief measure in the long history
of United States social policy. The EITC
is a refundable tax credit that offsets in-
come taxes owed by low-income workers.
If the credit exceeds the amount of taxes
owed, qualifying EITC claimants file ad-
ditional tax forms to acquire a lump-sum
payment.1 The EITC boasts an impres-
sive economic résumé: every year it lifts
4.9 million people above the poverty
line;2 studies have shown the EITC to
be the most significant contributor to the
recent decreases in welfare use and recent
increase in employment, labor supply,
and female-headed households earnings; 3
and the EITC has also been shown to off-
set some of the recent increases in income
inequality.4
It is little wonder then that the major-
ity of scholarship and analysis surround-
ing the EITC is economic in nature,
with little attention paid to operational
features that structure client experience.
Classified as a tax expenditure—an ob-
scure provision of the tax code that allows
special exclusions, deductions, and credits
36
for certain segments of the population—
the EITC lacks the administrative stan-
dardization that characterizes traditional
welfare bureaucracies. Indeed, as a benefit
paid through the tax system, the EITC
is primarily a product of the dissolution
of traditional welfarism. It is not situated
within an interlocking safety net of social
service programs through which clients
can engage in ongoing interactions with
governmental actors. Understandably, at
first glance there is little to expect from
the EITC as a framework for affecting
claimants’ lives as citizens rather than eco-
nomic beneficiaries. The policy design of
the EITC—its structured arrangements
for implementing intended provisions
through certain mechanisms—appears
to be a truly minimalist one, suggesting
that its capacity for structuring the non-
economic circumstances of EITC recipi-
ents is low.
But the flexibility of the EITC’s
policy design in fact provides novel op-
portunities for structuring the experience
of claimants in non-traditional ways—
opportunities that deserve attention. The
experience of engaging with policy affects
the political consciousness and civic po-
tential of clients by shaping their per-
ceptions of government and influencing
their personal senses of political efficacy.5
Engaging with a policy is a learning ex-
perience—clients learn where they stand
in relation to the government, glean in-
tentions and priorities from the nature of
the policy, and form a view of how gov-
ernment and politics affect their personal
lives. In the absence of an administrative
mandate or a codified method for imple-
menting the EITC, third party stakehold-
ers have intervened to implement the
credit, resulting in varied experiences for
claimants. But rather than hindering our
ability to assess policy experiences, com-
peting administrative frameworks provide
case-studies for gauging the experiential
dimension of the EITC and identifying
potentialities for maximizing its non-eco-
nomic benefits.
The vast majority of EITC claims
come in the form of lump-sum credit
claiming through paid or free tax prepara-
tion services.6 Two-thirds of EITC house-
holds pay a fee to process their tax forms
in order to receive the credit.7 While the
paid tax preparation industry is highly
fragmented—industry leaders H&R
Block and Jackson Hewitt together ac-
count for only one-third of the market—
major corporate tax preparers are poised
to rise in influence.8 The IRS has begun
working closely with major tax prepara-
tion companies to increase the number of
online filings to 80 percent of all filings by
this year (2007). This e-filing program is
assessed annually before Congress by the
Electronic Tax Administration Advisory
Committee, which includes the franchise
owner and president of H&R Block, the
senior vice president of Jackson-Hewitt,
and other paid tax preparer representa-
tives. Thus despite the diffuse market of
tax preparation, there do exist a few major
players who exert a significant influence
over the direction of the industry.
Another innovative delivery mecha-
nism has emerged as well—one that
provides an intriguing opportunity for
analyzing the politics of EITC adminis-
tration. Free tax preparation services for
EITC claimants provided through Volun-
teer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) sites
have emerged as influential entities for
promoting and administering the EITC.
VITA sites are free tax preparation centers
stationed within low-income commu-
nities, in local hubs such as community
centers, churches, or public health cen-
ters. These sites are staffed by IRS-trained
volunteers and managed by a coalition of
IRS agents, community leaders, and lo-
cal bureaucrats—whose efforts are usually
supplemented by funding and advocacy
from national think tanks, grant-making
institutions, and activist groups. Despite
their growing prominence—the percent-
age of EITC claimants who utilized VITA
services doubled from 2000 to 2004—
free tax preparation services only account
for about two percent of EITC filers. In
contrast, paid tax preparation services
processed between 65 and 70 percent of
EITC claims across that same period. The
remaining claims were self-prepared.9
For-profit preparation services and
VITA sites represent two distinct lenses
through which to analyze the policy ex-
perience of EITC claiming. In doing so,
we should pay special attention to the
potential of these mechanisms to utilize
the EITC as more than merely a financial
provision and address some of the broader
socio-political inequalities that marginal-
ize low-income citizens. There exists a
great participatory political divide across
income levels: an individual who makes
$75,000 or more a year is twice as likely
to vote or be contacted by campaigns as
someone who makes $15,000 or less. This
same affluent individual is three times as
likely to engage in informal community
activity, six times as likely to serve on local
boards, and two and a half times as likely
to be affiliated with a political organiza-
tion as a $15,000 earner.10
Such disparities are troubling. Com-
munity activity and civic engagement are
keys to a healthy democracy—they edu-
cate citizens about their societal context,
form a strong associational foundation
that allows for joint activity in the name
of the public good, and give citizens the
capacity to mobilize around their inter-
ests and articulate political preferences.11
The sphere of civic engagement, broadly
understood as participation in public life,
is the most salient sector for which the
EITC can be relevant as a tool of non-
economic empowerment.
37
 II. Central Propositions
The administrative ‘wiggle room’ pro-
vided by the EITC’s policy design allows
us to contrast and compare two methods
of implementation that make for decid-
edly different policy experiences. The cen-
tral question of this paper is: how can we
maximize the non-economic benefits of
the EITC, particularly civic engagement,
through innovations in the administrative
framework of EITC claiming? I argue that
VITA sites represent the most promising
opportunity for this maximization, be-
cause they (1) maximize lump-sum claims
for EITC claimants, helping to provide a
material basis for socioeconomic mobility
and potential civic engagement; (2) of-
fer an atmosphere of cooperation, iden-
tification, and social connectedness that
hones important civic skills; and (3) can
serve as gatekeepers to a wider network
of developmental opportunities. Each
subsequent section addresses one of these
assertions—maximized sums, civic skills,
and opportunity networks—in both illus-
trative and normative terms, delineating
(a) how VITA services provide these non-
economic benefits and (b) what concrete
reforms—be they in terms of policy, orga-
nization, or advocacy—can help cultivate
these potentialities.
It is important to keep in mind that
civic engagement is used here to imply
more than direct engagement in political
processes. Ostensibly apolitical activities
such as organizing and participating in
local meetings, joining clubs, and engag-
ing in informal community actions (such
as neighborhood watch organizations or
park clean-ups) are all civically salient ac-
tions because they deal with public issues
and hone politically relevant skills such
as writing, organizing, and articulating
preferences.12 The central non-economic
benefits that we are concerned with are
those that build community, develop
robust social connections, promote op-
38
portunity and cultivate the capacities and
skills relevant to meaningful activity in
the public sphere.
Throughout this article, multiple in-
depth interviews with organizers, coor-
dinators, and participants in the Boston
EITC coalition are used to reinforce con-
ceptual commonalities between civic en-
gagement theories in political science and
EITC administration through VITA ser-
vices. Due to limited time and resources,
the interviews are drawn from individuals
involved in EITC administration only in
Boston, Massachusetts for 2005. Inter-
viewed subjects include the Massachu-
setts IRS territory manager, the Director
of the Boston EITC Campaign, the head
of the campaign’s Volunteer Recruit-
ment & Corporate Partnership division,
the EITC director for Action for Boston
Community Development, Inc., and var-
ious VITA site directors. This is an admit-
tedly small sample, but the Boston VITA
infrastructure is indicative of the nation-
wide composition. These interviews were
informally structured, but all focused on
a few key issues: the respondents’ involve-
ment in EITC campaigns, the logistics of
VITA site administration, the political
developments underscoring advocacy ef-
forts, and assessments of the interaction
between VITA volunteers and clients.
Access to EITC recipients is diffi-
cult because their tax status is confiden-
tial. However, eight openly consenting
EITC claimants were contacted through
community networks and interviewed
directly. Interviews with these individu-
als were similarly unstructured, but re-
volved around their experiences with tax
preparation, their views on government
and politics, and their personal feelings
of political efficacy. The interviews, com-
bined with existing scholarship, highlight
intriguing alignments between the build-
ing blocks of effective citizenship and the
basic features of the VITA experience.
 It is always dangerous to point to a
sample as small as the one utilized here—
or a program as relatively under-re-
searched and politically un-established as
VITA services—as being indicative of an
emerging national trend. Few indisput-
able, systematic conclusions regarding the
guaranteed success of VITA sites as civic
gateways can be brought to bear, given
the practical limitations; rather, I hope to
highlight how the character of VITA sites
align with the logic of civic engagement.
I mean to call attention to intriguing op-
portunities and potentialities represented
by VITA coalitions and suggest a course
of action in order to maximize the poten-
tial for VITA sites as community institu-
tions.
III. The Diverse Potential of VITA Sites
As noted above, VITA sites provide
non-economic benefits in that they help
clients maximize their credit claims, al-
lowing for an increased foundation for
civic activity, expose clients to friendly,
cooperative atmospheres that help to de-
velop civic skills, and link clients into net-
works of opportunities. In this section I
address each of these benefits and reforms
that can amplify their positive impact.
3.1 Maximizing Claims
Money is not only an important
definer of needs and interests, but also
a resource for political action. Material
resources have profound implications for
political participation. Income inequali-
ties hew to other fault lines of political
division.13 Higher income is correlated
with more social mobility in that it re-
duces the costs and increases the benefits
of participation. Further, higher income
individuals have the discretionary income
to purchase education and are more likely
than poorer citizens to occupy high status
positions in social networks.14
In the most basic sense, the EITC is
an empowerment tool that enhances the
material resources of low-income indi-
viduals. Factors affecting the size of the
credit are thus important in that they ei-
ther maximize or undercut the potential
of the EITC as a material contribution to
the resources necessary for civic engage-
ment. The two primary methods of credit
claiming (paid and free tax preparation)
have important implications for both the
size and socioeconomic impact of the
credit.15
In 2000, Smeeding, Phillips, and
O’Connor looked at the application of
EITC credits from 5,000 low–income
taxpayers living in the Chicago area. They
divided the use of funds into two catego-
ries: consumption use (paying utility bills,
buying clothes, appliances, or furniture,
and personal expenses) and improving so-
cioeconomic mobility (debt repayment,
savings, tuition, and health costs). The
authors found that a once-a-year lump
benefit has greater potential for improv-
ing the investments associated with socio-
economic mobility than does incremental
credit claiming. This is because lump-sum
claiming can help families to overcome a
short–term liquidity crisis and move be-
yond current consumption to meet more
strategic long-term goals.16 That same
year, Barrow and McGranahan, using data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey,
also concluded that households use lump-
sums as a savings mechanism.17
This is because expectation of a rela-
tively large lump-sum credit allows for
more efficient planning and allocation of
resources than an incremental credit flow.
Indeed, 56 percent of Boston VITA cli-
ents in 2005—all of whom claimed the
credit lump-sum—reported that they
would put ten percent or more of their
refund in a savings account. Further, a full
78.9 percent of clients reported that they
planned to apply their refund in ways
that Smeeding, Phillips, and O’Connor
39
 categorize as socioeconomically beneficial
(paying debts, saving for a house, paying
tuition, and medical costs).18 Therefore,
the lump-payment method—achieved
through paid-tax preparation and VITA
sites—is a good first step in equipping
claimants with an initial base for modest
upward mobility.
Thus administrative mechanisms af-
fecting the amount of EITC credit de-
serve attention from those interested in
new strategies for low-income socioeco-
nomic development. Paid tax preparation
centers are increasingly marketing Re-
fund Anticipation Loans (RALs), which
are short-term cash advances against a
customer’s anticipated income tax refund.
The loans are offered at remarkably high
interest rates, ranging from 40 to over
700 percent annualized. RALs particu-
larly target low-income working families
claiming the EITC. According to IRS
data, over 56 percent of all RAL borrowers
are EITC recipients, although this group
makes up only 17 percent of taxpayers.
One out of every three EITC recipients
gets a RAL.19 Given the implications of
lump-sum claiming—a positive correla-
tion with investments that foster upward
social mobility, which in turn results in an
increased eventual likelihood of political
efficacy—it is reasonable to hypothesize
that unnecessary reductions of the credit,
such as RALs, undercut the EITC’s role as
a material contribution toward socioeco-
nomic mobility.
The most important impact that free
tax preparation can have on the material
basis for civic potential is the maximiza-
tion of lump-sum credit claims through
VITA services that incur no cost for the
client. Since the form of the credit has so-
cioeconomic implications, it is inherently
tied to participatory factors. In an indirect
but potentially significant way, free tax
preparation has positive implications for
the social mobility of EITC recipients.
40
There are many options for protect-
ing EITC claimants from RALs and en-
suring that free tax preparation becomes
a more common option for recipients.
Though some states have passed laws de-
manding fuller disclosure from prepara-
tion services, advocates have noted that
this is ultimately an ineffective ‘band-aid’
strategy.20 Instead, policymakers and
legislators should follow the example of
Connecticut, which became the first state
to regulate RAL interest rates by prohib-
iting tax preparers from brokering RALs
beyond 60 percent annualized interest.
Simply banning RALs or capping RAL
fees are also options to protect claimants
from usurious loans.
Other options should also be pur-
sued to turn opposition to RALs into an
opportunity for low-income citizens. The
Savings for Working Families Act of 2007,
introduced into the House in February
2007 and the Senate in March, seeks to
strengthen the foundation of Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs). IDAs are
tax-exempt individual savings accounts
aimed at low-income asset building. Con-
gress should pass the Savings for Work-
ing Families Act in order to help equip
low-income citizens with the means to
self-sufficiency. Simultaneously, local
advocacy groups and VITA coalitions
should make efforts to help low-income
people open more bank accounts. Sav-
ings accounts allow recipients to apply for
direct deposit of their refund—an option
that gets them their refund faster, making
RALs less appealing—and prevents them
from needing to cash checks at establish-
ments like grocery stores, which can take
a further fee from the refund. Luckily,
VITA sites are often part of national coali-
tions that are supported by private finan-
cial institutions as well as non-profit and
public groups (as will be shown in section
3.3). These partnerships could serve as the
foundation for initiatives aimed at giving
more low-income people their own bank
accounts and IDAs. Additionally, given
the appeal of RALs—a faster refund—any
effort to speed up turn-around time on
the part of the IRS would also be helpful.
Finally, the IRS should strictly regulate,
if not outright ban, the online marketing
of RALs through websites endorsed by its
e-filing system.
3.2 Civic Skills and Social Networking
Civic skills are the basic communica-
tive and organizational abilities that allow
citizens to effectively participate in po-
litical life and convey political positions.
Important civic skills include possessing a
good vocabulary, being able to articulate
preferences clearly, and ability to organize
peers effectively. Individuals are most like-
ly to learn civic skills within the context
of an institution such as church, school,
or the workplace. Civic skills are critical
to effective participation and are powerful
determinants of engagement.21
The voluntary federations of 19th-
and early 20th-century America—guilds,
federations, and religious groups—taught
people how to run meetings, handle
money, keep records, and participate in
group discussions.22 These personal en-
gagements often cut across traditional
socioeconomic lines, albeit within a
limited scope.23 The fact that privileged
elites along with low-income Americans
were active participants in voluntary fed-
erations such as fraternal and service or-
ganizations was important for a sense of
shared citizenship. Furthermore, because
parallels to U.S. rules of taxpaying, such
as dues collection, accounting, and mem-
bership criteria, were so central to the
sustainability of organizations, members
gained knowledge relevant to becoming
informed civic agents. Associations en-
couraged transpartisan mobilization—
overt associational efforts that sought to
shape public decisions—by linking its
members together through such shared
experiences and collaborative opportuni-
ties to develop civic skills.24
Similar opportunities for developing
civic skills and bridging social divisions
are less common today, particularly for
low-income groups that tend to be less
engaged in civic life.25 This is troubling,
as feelings of political efficacy—the sense
of personal influence on politics or an ex-
pectation of governmental responsiveness
vis-à-vis individual actions—increase as
citizens get face-to-face experiences that
expand their political knowledge.26 But
VITA sites raise some interesting poten-
tialities for recapturing the ‘civic class-
rooms’ of the past in that they provide
a fraternal setting where neighbors and
strangers engage in civically meaningful
interactions. Additionally, VITA sites rely
heavily on social networks for recruitment
and cultivation of a client-base.
Similar to the old procedures of dues
paying and membership processing, to-
day’s VITA services provide a means to
increase the financial literacy and admin-
istrative knowledge of EITC claimants.
Every EITC recipient interviewed stated
that the VITA volunteers informed them
of what was happening step by step and
provided a much more thorough ex-
planation of the claiming process than
commercial tax preparation employees at
H&R Block:
“The lady at the community center took good
care of me, explained things to me step by
step; at H&R Block [they] just show you “this
is what you got” and you sign, no explanations
about what is going on, about what you could
do [to better your situation].”
Another claimant stated:
“The preparer [at H&R Block] was not knowl-
edgeable; he took my information, punched
into computer, I signed papers, and he said this
is what you’re getting back, and that was it.”
41
 Familiarity with the EITC process,
learned through a friendly interaction,
is precisely the sort of ‘learning engage-
ment’ that made old voluntary organiza-
tions such a powerful force for honing
civic skills. Indeed, experiences at VITA
sites suggest an atmosphere of shared citi-
zenship resembling the vibrant bonds of
old associations. VITA sites are staffed
entirely by volunteers—70,000 across the
nation for the 2004 tax season according
to the IRS—who represent a wide spec-
trum of income and education levels. Ac-
cording to the Boston Coalition directors,
VITA volunteer staff include “patient and
understanding,” “high-level folks working
because they want to” such as professional
lawyers and accountants. Indeed, the ba-
sic premise of VITA services—communi-
ty-centered tax preparation executed by
volunteers from across various socioeco-
nomic strata—provides a built-in mecha-
nism for bridging together people from
different communities and demograph-
ics through shared experience.27 For ex-
ample, in 2005, 75 percent of a group of
106 members of the American Taxation
Association that was surveyed for a partic-
ular study did pro-bono tax work. Ninety
percent of this work was for VITA sites,
where they processed more than 30,000
federal and state tax returns.28
Volunteers appear to be invested in
their role. EITC claimants and VITA vol-
unteers cultivate a sense of identification
and connection similar to old voluntary
organizations. All EITC recipients in-
terviewed responded that the VITA sites
they attended were more comfortable and
engaging than H&R Block:
“[The VITA site] was more personal than
H&R Block—it was more of a home set-
ting. At H&R Block it was more of a service-
customer relation. Here [VITA site] you can
have a conversation. We both know the same
people. It’s more personal.”
42
Another recipient echoed this feeling:
“I knew her [the VITA volunteer] from my
community already. She was friendly and per-
sonable—very patient, all smiley and nice.”
It certainly remains to be seen wheth-
er these personal connections can be
translated into civic bonds capable of en-
couraging collective action. But civic skills
are born of seemingly banal contexts, and
are basic abilities that many educated in-
dividuals take for granted. Thus a struc-
tured environment of cooperation and
friendliness built around a social policy
represents a promising learning context.
The role of social connection also fac-
tors into the methods of VITA client out-
reach. Like old associations, VITA sites
see an outpouring of participants—both
clients and volunteers—drawn from so-
cial networks. Of the 5,836 respondents
to the 2005 Boston EITC Campaign Sur-
vey, 43.6 percent of the EITC claimants
heard about the free tax preparation sites
through social networks—friends, family,
church, or school. Thirty percent of cli-
ents had come the previous year, and the
rest had heard of the VITA site in their
neighborhood through various community
outlets such as local radio stations, newspa-
pers, or outdoor advertisements. Commu-
nity outreach is not unique to VITA sites;
but their situation in accessible and recog-
nized community institutions integrates
them into their local infrastructure.
There are three key points to address
in constructing solutions aimed at sup-
porting the potential noted in this section:
the maximization of positive learning
interactions, the possibility of bridging
social capital, and the extension of the
social networks. With regards to positive
learning interactions, the VITA training
program currently acknowledges that
volunteers should “treat all taxpayers pro-
fessionally, with courtesy and respect.”29
Still, the bulk of VITA volunteer training
focuses on mastering the arcane intrica-
cies of the tax code. The tax code, and the
mechanics of EITC requirements in par-
ticular, should be simplified in order to al-
low for a less complex set of requirements
for processing. This would allow for vol-
unteer training to focus on the interactive
elements of the experience, such as what
information to communicate to clients or
how to ensure that VITA clients’ experi-
ences are as informative as possible.
In the absence of comprehensive tax
reform to lessen the technical burdens
on volunteers, VITA sites should rethink
their administrative schema in order to
build a larger role for volunteers who
might not be directly involved in form
processing. Positions such as filers, client
intake overseers, or ‘tablers’ who could
man voter registration tables or informa-
tion booths could provide non-expert vol-
unteers with a greater role to play in the
process. Already, non-technical positions
such as greeters exist; VITA coalitions
should think creatively about expanding
the realm of primarily interactive (as op-
posed to technical) volunteer opportuni-
ties.
The creation of more non-technical
volunteer opportunities could also pro-
vide community residents an opportunity
to participate in ways that may not cur-
rently be possible, given the difficulty of
learning the ins and outs of the tax code
and the commitment to volunteer train-
ing. New positions such as ‘community
ambassador’—a designated individual or
group tasked with spreading the word
about local VITA services during tax
season—could help ensure that the so-
cial network surrounding VITA grows
through the activity of community resi-
dents. Given the high level of continuity
amongst VITA clients—73.6 percent of
EITC recipients who used Boston VITA
services in 2005 used free tax preparation
services the previous year and all inter-
viewed claimants said that they would use
the free tax preparation services again—
this position could be particularly fruit-
ful in ‘snowballing’ community involve-
ment. Similar positions could be created
for middle- or high-income volunteers.
Volunteer recruiters from diverse socio-
economic standings could be tasked with
recruiting volunteers from their peer
groups in more affluent communities—a
job significantly easier if there exist fewer
technical requirements for volunteering.
Finally, in order to translate the VITA
experience into increased political aware-
ness on the part of claimants, advocates
should reframe the EITC in order to clar-
ify VITA services as a policy experience
rather than a transaction. A considerable
hurdle to tapping into the civic poten-
tial of VITA sites is the relative obscurity
of the EITC. Unlike welfare programs
which have a persistent engagement with
the activities and needs of clients, most
claimants view the EITC is a ‘flash in the
pan’—a singular transaction with little
connection to established institutions.
One interviewee commented that,
“If the EITC were from government it would
change the way I look at government—they’re
actually thinking about the little people.
They’re looking at it from our point of view.
They’re trying to help us. But that money
comes from me!”
Community organizers confirm that
most claimants look at the EITC as a yearly
opportunity for free money as opposed to
a governmental program. The messaging of
VITA campaigns reflects this fact: the credit
is marketed as an opportunity to “put mon-
ey back in your pocket” and encourages re-
cipients to “earn it, keep it, save it.”
Marketing of the EITC—and the
scripts and interactions employed at VITA
sites—needs to make efforts at highlight-
ing the fact that the EITC is a policy, tied
to political arrangements and institutions.
43
 Simple revisions like citing the EITC as
“the government giving back,” building
a political awareness campaign around
EITC outreach, or creating informational
materials that integrate digestible bits of
history surrounding the EITC can serve
to help claimants realize that when they
claim their credit, they are engaging with
politics.
3.3 A Continuum of Opportunity
VITA sites can be portals to oppor-
tunity networks that help secure socio-
economic security for low-income clients.
According to respondents, at VITA sites
claimants are “told…about a lot of stuff
they were doing there; a lot of interesting
projects.” All recipients said that, upon
going to a VITA site, they were made
aware of other opportunities such as fuel
assistance, employment opportunities, in-
terview coaching, and language training.
One respondent noted:
“While I was waiting outside, I saw a bunch of
papers and someone came to talk to me about
English classes, computer classes, and lots of
stuff for the community.”
An immersion in the opportunities
and programs of community centers can
lead to education on public issues or at-
tainment of important skills and contacts,
especially with regards to community
projects.30 In the spirit of consolidating
self-sufficiency programs, five states have
begun to link VITA services to work sup-
port benefits such as food stamps, Head
Start, and health insurance.31 Addition-
ally, community one-stop centers formed
through the Workforce Investment Act
(WIA) of 1998—community sites that
house integrated workforce development
resources—often double as VITA sites
during tax season.
These are heartening developments.
VITA services are uniquely positioned
to serve as an initial point of access for
44
community residents because the EITC
is universally appealing—after all, it’s free
money. Emerging practices of incorporat-
ing health insurance, food stamps, Head
Start opportunities, and one-stop facili-
ties into VITA centers should continue.
VITA can expand their partnerships with
one-stop centers by working closely with
Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs),
which are regional public-private enti-
ties tasked with directing local workforce
development programs, and Community
Action Agencies (CAAs), local public-pri-
vate organizations devoted to combating
poverty.
In Miami-Dade and Broward Coun-
ty, Florida, VITA advocates have incor-
porated together nine ‘prosperity cen-
ters’—existing non-profit organizations
that focus on linking youth and family
programs, loans, civil rights, housing and
more—into a chain of VITA sites. The
example of Florida suggests the potential
of integrating VITA services with exist-
ing non-profit organizations that have
specific established missions (similar to
integrating VITA services and one-stop
centers) rather than placing VITA sites in
libraries or gymnasiums which don’t have
that built-in capacity to offer additional
services. This sort of partnership should
continue and grow because it couples
VITA services with existing service infra-
structures dedicated to empowering low-
income citizens.
VITA sites also have the benefit of
being part of a national coalition tied to-
gether by common funding and manage-
ment from non-profit organizations such
as the National Community Tax Coali-
tion. Taking a typical year of the Boston
EITC initiative, 2003, Figure 1 gives a
good picture of the diverse public and
private interests that participate in VITA
programs.
The complex web of interests drawn
together by VITA services is striking.
Equally striking is the strong connection
between local VITA coalitions and in-
fluential national political organizations.
Using LexisNexis, I found that for the
period of January 2000-January 2005, 72
percent of newspaper articles in the U.S.
that assessed the EITC as a program cited
think tanks directly involved in EITC and
VITA advocacy. Of the 206 testimonies
and committee hearings that discussed
the merits and failings of the EITC over
this period, 115 were exclusively gov-
ernmental affairs, without the involve-
ment of non-governmental groups. Of
the remaining testimonies, 53.8 percent
involved organizations directly involved
in providing materials to VITA sites, or-
ganizing VITA sites, or advocating theE-
ITC as a low-income poverty relief tool.
The fact that the EITC is an ostensibly
apolitical policy allows a broad coalition
of influential actors to mobilize around
it. This means that there are some key al-
lies whom can help foster VITA initiatives
to a position of political prominence and
can initiate cross-pollination in terms of
the EITC’s role in community develop-
ment. Given the miniscule market share,
yet consistent growth and innovation, of
VITA services, a federal push could prove
a powerful catalyst for tapping the poten-
tial noted in this article.
Thus Congress should pass a ‘con-
tinuum of service’ act that politically
legitimates the ongoing collaborative
innovations of one-stop centers local
non-profits, and VITA sites. Such an act
would: (1) in crease both state and federal
funding for VITA programs; (2) outline a
framework for local collaborative boards
such as WIBs and CAAs to undertake a
purposeful reconfiguration of their agen-
das in the order to develop a multi-faced
continuum of service consisting of multi-
ple complementary initiatives; (3) allocate
state funds to help fund entrepreneurial
Figu re 1: Par tial L ist of B oston EI T C Co alition M embers, 2003
Go vernmental, Sta te and Fe deral level:
City of Bost on
Internal Revenue Service
Federal Rese rve Bank of Bo ston
Ac tion for Bo ston Com mu nity Developme nt
Bos ton Hou sing Au thority
Federal Depos it Ins urance Co rporation
Inte rest Or ganiz ations:
Gr eater Bo ston Chamber of Comm erce
American Asso ciation of Retired Persons (AAR P)
Bos ton International Bar Ass ociation
C ommun ity D evelopment & Advocac y:
Co dm an Square Health Center
His panic Of fice of Planning and Evaluation
Jewish Vocational Services
Gr eater Bo ston Legal Services
Legal Ad vocacy Resource C enter
Non -P rofits:
Bos ton Cares
Mass achusetts Ass ociation of Com munity De velopm ent
Cor porations (MAC DC): a lliance of non-profit agencies
Ann ie E. Casey Fou ndation’s
Ma king Co nnections
Pr ivate Co mpanies:
Ern st & You ng
Sov ereign Bank
Bos ton Private B ank & Trust
Ac ademic:
Bos ton College
Nor theastern University
community experiments that originate at
the local level, such as Florida’s prosperity
centers; (4) revise the purpose of the Com-
munity Services Block Grant (CSBG) to
focus primarily on inter-organizational
collaboration between poverty-relief enti-
ties; and (5) pass the Savings for Working
Families Act of 2007 and develop a new
CARE Act to provide special tax incen-
tives for those who contribute to commu-
nity VITA programs. The original CARE
Act of 2003 was passed to provide new
incentives for deductible charitable con-
tributions. In 2006, another CARE Act,
introduced but never passed, provided
new incentives for caregiver support and
long-term assistance. The principle of
45
 these CARE Acts—that charitable con-
tribution and long-term participation in
compassionate endeavors warrant special
support—should be applied to commu-
nity development programs. A new com-
munity CARE Act could include specific
provisions for contributing laptops, facili-
ties, or resources to VITA programs or of-
fer tax incentives for extended volunteer
work on the part of citizens.
Congress and national supporters of
VITA services--think tanks like the Cen-
ter for Budget and Policy Priorities, the
Urban Institute, the Brookings Institu-
tion, the Annie E. Casey foundation, the
Association of Community Organizers for
Reform Now (ACORN), and others—
also have a critical role to play in defend-
ing free tax preparation from fiscal and
operational threats. Budget cuts continu-
ously threaten the EITC and the IRS has
been auditing claimants and investigating
VITA procedures as part of its running—
and burdensome—investigation into
misreporting of EITC claims. As recently
as February 2006, the IRS was found to
be targeting EITC claimants for audits
despite Congressional action to halt such
efforts. A vulnerable community initia-
tive like VITA services cannot thrive in an
atmosphere of overbearing suspicion. Any
success that VITA coalitions might have
in strengthening low-income communi-
ties depends on the sustainability of the
free tax preparation enterprise.
IV. Summary of Recommendations
VITA sites represent a compelling
opportunity to develop civic capaci-
ties by using the EITC as a foundation
for asset-building and upward socioeco-
nomic mobility, increasing awareness of
opportunities, cultivating social ties, and
mobilizing strong national interests to
fight for low-income issues. In this article
I have recommended many steps aimed
46
at addressing these potentialities in order
to maximize the civic potential of the
EITC to ensure that it is more than just
‘free money.’ With a little focus and work,
the EITC can provide claimants, through
VITA sites, an important entry point to
a constellation of services, networks, and
opportunities that can help them become
more engaged, informed, and self-suffi-
cient. Recommendations for policy and
organizational reforms that can best de-
velop this potential are as follows:
• Ban RALs, cap RAL fees, or strictly
regulate RAL interest rates.
• Strictly regulate or ban the market-
ing of RALs on IRS e-filing sites.
• Pass the Savings for Working Fami-
lies Act of 2007 to strengthen the
foundation of IDAs and saving ac-
counts for low-income Americans.
• Speed up turn-around time for refunds.
• Simplify the tax code and EITC pro-
cess to allow for volunteers to focus a
greater proportion of time and atten-
tion to social interactions.
• Assist VITA sites in maximizing the
roles of non-technical volunteers and
instructive, educational presentations
and materials regarding the history
and political context of the EITC.
• Encourage VITA coalitions to re-
frame the EITC as an opportunity to
engage with policy and government
rather than as solely ‘free money’ in
order to stimulate a greater political
consciousness in recipients.
• Create new community positions
such as ‘community ambassador’
to maximize the social networking
around VITA sites.
• Continue to link VITA services to
work support, asset-building, and oth-
er capacity-building opportunities.
• Formally construct a collaborative
framework for Workforce Investment
Boards, Community Action Agencies,
 VITA coalitions, and other local non-
profits to develop a mutually reinforc-
ing network of opportunity.
• Increase the presence of existing non-
profit and community organizations
at VITA sites, in order to pool their
existing resources and connections
into a ‘continuum of service’ made
up of ‘prosperity centers,’ rather than
holding VITA services in locations
not already dedicated to empowering
low-income residents.
• Protect VITA coalitions from budget
cuts and political obstructionism.
• Increase Congressional funding for
VITA services, and provide funding
for community entrepreneurship at
the local level.
• Revise Community Services Block
Grant (CSBG) purposes to be con-
toured to the continuum of services
idea, in order to encourage a net-
worked approach to low-income de-
velopment.
• Develop a community CARE Act in
order to establish tax incentives for
a greater contribution on the part of
coalition members and volunteers.
Endnotes
1. Almanac of Policy Issues, July 2006.
http://www.policyalmanac.org/social_
welfare/eitc.shtml.
2. Alan Berube, The Brookings Institution
Metropolitan Policy Program: Background
on EITC Campaign, EITC Funders
Meeting, June 21, 2004.
3. David. T. Ellwood,”The Impact of the
Earned Income Tax Credit and Social
Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage, and
Living Arrangements.” Mimeo, Kennedy
School of Government, 2000 and Jeffrey
Grogger, “The Effects of Time Limits,
the EITC, and Other Policy Changes on
Welfare Use, Work, and Income Among
Female-Headed Families,” UCLA and
NBER, Feb. 2002.
4. Jeffrey B. Liebman, “The Impact of the
Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives
and Income Distribution,” Tax Policy and
the Economy, 1998 Vol. 12, 83-119.
5. Andrea Campbell. How Policies Make
Citizens, (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2003).
6. While Advance EITC - claimed
incrementally through paychecks - is
available, only about half a percent of
EITC claimants use this method.
7. As many as two-thirds. ACORN Financial
Justice Center, Increasing Incomes &
Reducing the Rapid Refund Rip-Off,
September 2004, 10. Originally from IRS
calculations.
8. Alan Berube, Anne Kim, Benjamin
Forman, and Megan Burns, “The Price
of Paying Taxes: How Tax Preparation
and Refund Loan Fees Erode the Benefits
of the EITC,” The Brookings Institution
and the Progressive Policy Institute Survey
Series, May 2002.
9. Elizabeth Kneebone, “A Local Ladder
for Low-Income Workers: Recent Trends
in the Earned Income Tax Credit.” The
Brookings Institution Earned Income Tax
Credit Series, April 2007. http://www3.
brookings.edu/metro/pubs/200704eitc.
pdf
10. Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, Henry
Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic
Voluntarism in American Politics,
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 190.
11. Kay Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry
Brady, “Civic Participation and the
Equality Problem,” Civic Engagement in
American Democracy, ed. Theda Skocpol
and Morris Fiorina, (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 428-
429.
12. Ibid. 37-48, and Joe Soss, Unwanted
Claims: The Politics of Participation in
the U.S. Welfare System, (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: The University of Michigan
Press, 2000), 8.
13. Ibid. 290-291.
14. Andrea Campbell, How Policies Make
Citizens, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2003), 41.
15. Large lump-sum refunds are more likely to
be saved than incremental credits through
paycheck income. Jennifer Romich and
Thomas Weisner, “How Families View
and Use the EITC: Advance Payments
Over Lump-sum Delivery,” Joint Center
for Poverty Research, January 2000.
http://www.jcpr.org/wp/wpdownload.
cfm?pdflink=wpfiles/romich_EITC_
update.PDF
16. Timothy Smeeding, Katherine
Phillips, Michael O’Connor, “ The
EITC: Expectation, Knowledge, Use,
and Economic and Social Mobility,”
National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 4 Part 2
(December 2000) pp. 1187-1210.
17. Lisa Barrow and Leslie McGranahan, “The
47
 Effect of the Earned Income Credit on the
Seasonality of Household Expenditures”,
National Tax Journal, Vol. 53 no. 4 Part 2
(December 2000) pp. 1241-1242.
18. According to the 2005 Boston EITC
Campaign Taxpayer Data Report Survey
Data. http://www.cityofboston.gov/
bra/eitc/PDF/2005%20Boston%20
EITC%20Data%20Report.pdf
19. Chi Chi Wu and Jean Ann Fox, “Refund
Anticipation Loans: Updated Facts
and Figures,” Consumer Federation of
America & National Consumer Law
Center, Inc. January 17, 2006. http://
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/RAL_2006_
Early_info.pdf
20. Chi Chi Wu, Jean Ann Fox, and Patrick
Woodall, “Another Year of Loseses:
High-Priced Refund Anticipation
Loans Continue To Take a Chunk out
of Americans’ Tax Returns,” National
Consumer Law Center & Consumer
Federation of America. January 2006.
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/2006_
RAL_report.pdf
21. See Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman,
Henry Brady, Voice and Equality:
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics,
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 352 where the exercise of
civic skills was calculated to lead to an
increase in political activity of roughly
a third of a political act independent of
other engagement factors.
22. Theda Skocpol, “Presidential Address
to the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association.”August 28,
2003, Philadelphia, PA.
23. Limited in the sense that some
organizations defined group membership
through cultural or ethnic criteria which
resulted in discriminatory practices.
24. Theda Skocpol, “How Americans Became
Civic”, in Civic Engagement in American
Democracy, ed. Theda Skocpol and Morris
Fiorina, (Washington, D.C. : Brookings
Institution Press, 1999) 67-69.
25. See Steven F. Schier, By Invitation
Only: The Rise of Exclusive Politics in
the United States. (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000);
Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, Henry
Brady, “Civic Participation and the
Equality Problem,” Civic Engagement in
American Democracy, ed. Theda Skocpol
and Morris Fiorina, (Washington, D.C.
:Brookings Institution Press, 1999); and
Theda Skocpol, “How Americans Became
Civic,” in Civic Engagement in American
Democracy, ed. Theda Skocpol and Morris
Fiorina, (Washington, D.C. :Brookings
Institution Press, 1999) 67-69.
26. Jeffrey Berry, The Rebirth of Urban
48
Democracy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003), 280.
27. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The
Collapse and Revival of American
Community. (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2000) and Sjoerd Beugelsdijk
and Sjak Smulders, “Bridging and
Bonding Social Capital: Which One is
Good for Economic Growth?”. Tillburg
University working paper. http://www.eea-
esem.com/papers/eea-esem/2003/119/
EEA2003.PDF
28. Pro-Bono Tax Services Taskforce,
“Executive Summary of Survey Results.”
March 5, 2005. http://www.aaahq.org/
ata/public-interest/reports/ATA-Pro-
Bono-SurveyReport-March2005.pdf
29. IRS, “2006 VITA/TCE Volunteer Student
Guide,” Publication 678. http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-pdf/p678.pdf
30. This closely parallels Skocpol’s
illustration of old voluntary federations
in “Government Activism and the
Reorganization of American Civic
Democracy.” Unpublished paper prepared
for the Transformation of the American
Polity conference, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA, December 3-4, 2004.
31. Center for Economic Progress, “Linking
to Benefits,” 2007. http://www.tax-
coalition.org/ResourceLibraryCFM/
benefits.cfm
About the Author
Niko Karvounis is a Senior Fellow
with the Roosevelt Institution. He
graduated from Harvard University in
2005 with a B.A. in Government and
from University of Oxford in June
2007 with an MSc in Criminology.
While an undergraduate he founded
the first intercollegiate progressive
publication in the nation and a non-
profit organization dedicated to
campus advocacy. After graduating
from Harvard, he worked at National
Journal and served on the Board of
Directors for the Arlington-Alexandria
Coalition for the Homeless where
he received an award for his service.
He now works with The Century
Foundation in New York City.
Reducing Juvenile Recidivism in the
United States
Jane Wilson, Stanford University
Executive Summary
The American juvenile justice system
desperately needs reform. Some 2.4 mil-
lion juveniles are charged with offenses
annually.1 An appalling 55 percent of
juveniles released from incarceration na-
tionwide are rearrested within one year.2
In urban centers, that percentage—
referred to as the rate of recidivism—
reaches up to 76 percent.3 High recidi-
vism is associated with increases in crime,
victimization, homelessness, family de-
stabilization, and public health risks.4
Government-sponsored correctional pro-
grams cost sixty billion dollars annually.5
Most tragically, high recidivism indicates
a failure to provide meaningful rehabili-
tation for offenders. Reducing recidivism
specifically among juveniles should be of
primary importance to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Our
government’s current approach to lower-
ing recidivism emphasizes the creation
and funding of rehabilitative programs.
While these initiatives have made mar-
ginal gains, efforts have been insufficient.
Substantial progress will only come by
eliminating recidivism-fostering features
of the juvenile justice system itself.
Proposed Solution
I propose three policy reforms to re-
duce juvenile recidivism. First, eliminate
unnecessary detention of juveniles. Sec-
ond, restrict the practice of transferring
juveniles to adult criminal courts. Third,
ensure the continuation of delinquents’
Medicaid benefits upon release.
• Eliminate unnecessary detention of
juveniles. Studies show that youths
placed in detention facilities are 4.5
times more likely to recidivate than
those placed in alternate programs—
even after controlling for offense.6
To reduce unnecessary detention, re-
quire all detention centers to inform
arrested juveniles of their roles dur-
ing detention hearings and establish
stricter guidelines for determining
which juveniles should be held in de-
tention centers.
• Restrict the practice of transferring
juveniles to adult criminal courts.
Research shows that juveniles con-
victed in adult courts are 50 percent
more likely to recidivate than those
convicted in juvenile courts.7 The
transfer of juveniles to the adult sys-
tem should be an option for only the
most serious offenders. To restrict
the number of juveniles waived on to
adult court, develop a specific list of
offenses and circumstances warrant-
ing transfer.
• Ensure the continuation of delinquents’
Medicaid benefits upon release. A de-
lay in receiving healthcare benefits
is linked to a significant increase in
recidivism. To avoid such a delay,
forbid Medicaid from terminating
contracts with delinquents entering
jail. Temporarily suspend all con-
tracts while delinquents are in jail
and immediately reinstate Medicaid
benefits to juveniles upon release.
49
 I. The Problem
Recidivism
In the United States, roughly 60 to
70 percent of all adult inmates reenter-
ing the community are rearrested within
one year of release.9 Precise recidivism
rates for juveniles, however, are difficult
to obtain at the national level; recidivism
is typically measured at the county and
state levels, and few states measure re-
cidivism by the same metric. Estimates
indicate that approximately 50 to 65
percent of juvenile offenders (hereafter
delinquents) are re-arrested within one
year of release.10 In the state of Califor-
nia, 74 percent of all delinquents are re-
arrested within one year of release.11 Re-
cidivism rates in urban centers tend to be
even higher. In Manhattan, 80 percent
of delinquents are rearrested within four
years of release.12
These numbers should be treated
with some degree of caution. Recidivism
itself results in part from actions taken by
the juvenile justice system, such as arrest,
incarceration, and release; without these,
recidivism figures would be much lower.
Furthermore, a high reincarceration rate
may merely demonstrate that police are
aware of released offenders and are more
likely to incarcerate juveniles they have
seen before. While these considerations
are valid, they do not entirely negate the
usefulness of recidivism as an indica-
tor of the degree to which ex-offenders
commit additional crime. Research con-
ducted using self reported incidence of
crime (as opposed to officially reported
crime) confirms that juveniles released
from incarceration still tend to commit
further crime.13
Effects of Recidivism
The effects of recidivism in the Unit-
ed States fall into four general categories.
First, recidivism imposes tremendous
50
public safety costs on American com-
munities; high recidivism rates indicate
additional victimizations (assuming that
the crime for which the juvenile was ar-
rested was in fact committed). Second,
increased recidivism results in extremely
destructive social costs; increases in vio-
lence, crime, homelessness, family desta-
bilization, and public health risks are all
associated with high recidivism rates.14
Third, recidivism imposes a consider-
able financial burden on the U.S. De-
partment of Justice and, more generally,
on American society; our government
spends an annual sixty billion dollars on
correctional programs.15 Fourth, high
recidivism indicates a failure to provide
meaningful rehabilitation for inmates re-
entering the community; recidivist juve-
niles lose out on crucial educational, so-
cial, and personal developments that can
rarely be regained. Additionally, studies
show that recurrent offenses during teen-
age years can provide a dangerous incul-
cation leading to adult criminality.16 The
tragedy of this cycle of criminality can-
not be understated.
Benefits of Reducing Recidivism
Lowering the rate of recidivism
will generate several positive outcomes.
First, the aforementioned public safety,
social, economic, and personal costs will
decrease. Second, young people who
otherwise would have been recidivists
will become economic assets. Instead
of draining resources, individuals who
would have been recidivists could im-
prove their communities. Third, a lower
recidivism rate will allow our govern-
ment to reallocate saved dollars from
correctional programs to other financial-
ly depressed sectors, such as education.
Finally, reducing juvenile recidivism will
send an important message that our gov-
ernment deeply cares about the welfare
of its adolescents and prisoners.
 II. Current Solutions
Government-Sponsored Programs
The government’s current attempts
at reducing juvenile recidivism include
a variety of strategies, including general
programs, multisystemic therapy (MST),
residential programs, and community
supervision. Taken together, these efforts
have produced mixed success.
Examples of programs include Scared
Straight (a deterrence-based program),
Life Skills classes, interpersonal skills
courses, counseling, the Family Home
Program, targeted interventions for seri-
ous offenders, and therapeutic wilderness
and challenge programs. Programs found
to be most effective at reducing recidivism
include individualized counseling, person-
al skills training, and behavior programs.
Other programs, such as deterrence-based
challenge and vocational programs, have
been shown to be ineffective at reducing
recidivism.17
Multisystemic therapy (MST) is a
rigorous treatment program designed to
provide a family-based approach to pre-
venting crime and recidivism. It encour-
ages youth to change in their natural
environment, strengthen their peer rela-
tionships and improve their school perfor-
mance, and it also empowers parents with
the skills necessary to raise a delinquent
adolescent. Though MST has successfully
reduced crime, there is little evidence that
it has reduced recidivism. (Although pre-
ventive policies may succeed in keeping
juveniles out of custody, they do little
about the way in which delinquents are
treated once incarcerated and once re-
leased from incarceration.)18
Residential programs are overnight
programs in which juveniles frequently
engage in structured rehabilitation-ori-
ented activities (including outdoor wil-
derness programs). The effectiveness of
residential programs at reducing recidi-
vism is ambiguous: while some studies
show a clear link between residential pro-
grams and lower recidivism, others reject
the correlations entirely.19
Community supervision provides
intense professional and governmental
supervision of delinquents reentering the
community. Probation is one of the ma-
jor types of community supervision used.
Studies have found no statistically signifi-
cant relationship between community su-
pervision and decreased recidivism.20
Nonprofit Programs
In addition to these government-
sponsored efforts, several nongovernmen-
tal organizations address the issue of juve-
nile recidivism. Dozens of nonprofits have
implemented various successful preven-
tive programs (such as the Children’s De-
fense Fund’s “Cradle to Prison Pipeline”
initiative). Others provide useful reentry
resources, courses, and support groups for
released delinquents (like the Street Law
Reentry Program). Several nonprofit or-
ganizations run their own incarceration
alternatives (such as the Andrew Glover
Youth Foundation). Many of these non-
profit alternatives to incarceration have
been successful at reducing recidivism.21
Research also supports the effectiveness
of nonprofit preventive and reentry pro-
grams in lowering recidivism rates.22
Failures of the Current Model
Effective governmental and non-prof-
it programs are invaluable instruments
needed to reduce recidivism. Though
this paper does not intend to provide
guidelines for creating better programs, it
should be noted that the programs most
effective at reducing recidivism have been
those respectful of youth; family-like in
size and setting; connected to the com-
munity during and following treatment;
empathy-developing; accountability-
oriented; and marked by efforts to teach
51
 juveniles cognitive skills (such as anger
management, decision-making, etc.).23
Effective programs are certainly worth-
while and should be continued.
Yet programs alone are insufficient.
Although the aforementioned initiatives
are effective in some cases and have made
improvements, they have done little to af-
fect recidivism on a national level. Even
with government-sponsored rehabilita-
tion programs and the emergence of an
army of nonprofits, the national recidi-
vism rate has hardly changed over the past
20 years.24
Suggestions for Improvement
To make significant advances in
reducing juvenile recidivism, our gov-
ernment must reform its structural and
procedural policies. Before external pro-
grams can make a considerable difference,
the juvenile justice system must undergo
rigorous internal reform. Substantial
progress will only come by eliminating
features of the system itself that foster
recidivism. Currently, three specific ele-
ments of the justice system—detention
centers, juvenile waivers, and health insur-
ance reapplication procedures—undercut
efforts at reducing recidivism by actually
increasing the likelihood that delinquents
will recidivate. Because of their negative
effects, these three practices must be al-
tered. Government officials should adopt
the following three policies:
1. Avoid holding juvenile delinquents
in detention unless absolutely neces-
sary.
2. Restrict the practice of transferring
juveniles to the adult justice system.
3. Forbid Medicaid from requiring all
reentering delinquents to reapply for
services.
Taking these steps will significantly re-
duce recidivism without disregarding the
other goals of these three practices.
52
It should be noted that these three
policies would be implemented most
logically and most feasibly at the state
level. They could also be recommended
to state governors by the Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
and, if appropriate, made into federal law
(as an amendment to the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act, for ex-
ample).
1. Avoid Unnecessary Detention
The first proposed policy advises the
juvenile justice system to avoid holding
delinquents in detention unless absolute-
ly necessary. Because individuals placed in
detention are significantly more likely to
recidivate than their counterparts placed
elsewhere, detention must be reserved for
only those justifiably requiring it. Avoid-
ing unnecessary detention can be accom-
plished by educating juveniles about their
role in detention hearings and establish-
ing stricter guidelines detailing which de-
linquents should be detained.
Detention Hearings
After being accused of committing a
crime, delinquents can pass through up
to nine stages of case processing. First,
they are arrested and make initial con-
tact with law enforcement officers. After
taking the juveniles into custody, police
juvenile officers evaluate the delinquents
and decide whether or not they should
be sent to detention, probation intake,
home, or alternate educational and rec-
reational programs. Roughly 20 to 33
percent of all delinquents are sent into
detention, where their capacity to harm
themselves and others is supposedly de-
bilitated. Within 24 to 72 hours of being
held at the detention center, delinquents
participate in a detention hearing. Led by
a juvenile probation officer, these deten-
tion hearings determine whether or not
the juvenile should remain in detention
until adjudication. After briefly reviewing
the case, a judge decides if the juvenile
requires additional detention. If so, the
delinquent will remain in detention un-
til adjudicated, after which he or she may
be released, relocated to another facility,
or sentenced to additional time in deten-
tion. On any given day, some 27,000
adolescents are held in detention facilities
across the United States. Annually, some
600,000 delinquents will spend time in
detention.26
Detention Centers and Recidivism
Even though detention may be short
and used for less than half of delinquents,
its influence on juveniles can persist for
months and even years into their future.
Research shows that being held in deten-
tion is the number one predictor of recid-
ivism—beating out other likely predic-
tive variables such as gang membership,
gun ownership, and dysfunctional fam-
ily background.27, 28 This finding holds
true even after controlling for nature of
offense (and other potentially confound-
ing variables). A study conducted in New
York City found that the rate of recidi-
vism for juveniles sent to alternate pro-
grams ranged between 17 and 36 percent,
while their counterparts held in detention
facilities averaged 76 percent (again, even
after controlling for offense).29 As Lubow
explains, “Detention is the gateway to the
system’s deep end.”30. 31
Why is this so? Behavioral scientists
have found that grouping delinquent ju-
veniles together in a detention-like setting
can result in deleterious outcomes because
detained juveniles receive informal “peer
deviancy training.”32 Detention often ex-
poses first-time offenders to new criminal
friends, gangs, tricks, and “games.” As a
result of this exposure and learning, de-
tained juveniles are more likely than their
equivalents placed in alternate facilities
to commit future crimes, use violence,
become involved with drugs, struggle in
school, and have difficulty adjusting to
adulthood.33
Yet detention centers do serve a valu-
able purpose: they incapacitate juveniles
who otherwise would be a threat to them-
selves and those around them. Because
they serve this needed function, deten-
tion centers should not be eradicated en-
tirely. Rather, detention must be reserved
for only those delinquents who, if not
detained, present a real threat to society.
To reduce recidivism, detention must be
reserved only for those truly deserving
detention.
Inform Delinquents
First, ensure that all delinquents are
aware of their rights and role during the
detention hearing. As stated earlier, the
detention hearing is a preadjudication as-
sessment in which a judge decides where
to place a delinquent between arrest and
trial. In making their decisions, judges
review the facts of the case and act based
on their own personal judgment. Near
the end of the hearing, judges ask delin-
quents if there is any additional informa-
tion they would like to share. Unaware of
what information would be appropriate
to mention, delinquents almost always
decline to speak. Judges therefore base
their decisions solely on the facts of the
case, which rarely speak highly of delin-
quents.
Delinquents will be more apt to pro-
vide the judge with relevant information
if they are aware of what sort of informa-
tion they can and should provide during
their hearing. In this case, relevant infor-
mation might include: Do you have a
53
 job? Are you using your job to support
your family? Are you going to school?
Are you planning to graduate from high
school? What is your family situation
like? A judge understands that placing a
delinquent in detention will pull him or
her out of school for a month.
Answers to these questions could
have a marked effect on judges’ decisions.
For example, if the judge hears a delin-
quent say that he is trying to graduate,
the judge will be more likely to place him
in a non-residential program. Similarly, a
judge will likely avoid placing someone
in detention if the judge hears that delin-
quent’s job pays for 50 percent of his fam-
ily’s monthly rent.
In order to make delinquents aware
of the types of information worth shar-
ing in their detention hearing, require
detention facilities to inform all juveniles
what information is relevant. This can be
done in a simple way: distribute a single
sheet of paper to delinquents prior to
their detention hearing. This sheet should
contain an explanation of the detention
hearing; the order in which information
is presented during the hearing; possible
placement options; and various types of
information delinquents can share with
the judge. Delinquents should read the
information sheet carefully, and should be
able to receive answers to any additional
questions they might have from facility
officers. This information could also be
provided in video format.
After reading through such an infor-
mation sheet, delinquents will have a bet-
ter idea of the sorts of information that
might help judges make preadjudication
placement decisions. As juveniles under-
stand their rights and role in the deten-
tion hearing process, they will be more
likely to speak up when asked for addi-
tional information. By sharing pertinent
information with the judge, delinquents
will provide a more complete picture of
54
their situation. Their chances of receiv-
ing alternate placement will increase, and
ultimately the probability that they will
recidivate will decrease.
Establish Guidelines for Detaining
Delinquents
Second, establish stricter guidelines
for determining which juveniles should
be held in detention centers. Launch a
committee with the mandate of creating
a series of directives or rules delineating
which offenses require detainment and
which do not. A specific list of admis-
sible exceptions should be developed.
Committee members must be fully aware
of the negative effects detention has on
delinquents, and should formulate these
standards with a rehabilitative approach
in mind. Setting a clear standard of who
should be detained will eliminate the in-
dividual variance and prejudices that of-
ten result in unnecessary detention.
2. Restrict the Use of Waivers
The second policy proposal recom-
mends restricting the transfer of delin-
quents from the juvenile justice system to
the adult one. Though initially intended
only for the most serious offenders, the
waiver system is currently being used to
divert ten percent of all delinquents. Be-
cause delinquents held in adult facilities
are 50 percent more likely to recidivate
than those in juvenile facilities, only the
most severe cases should receive waivers.
The Waiver System
One of the founding tenets of the
juvenile justice system promises its occu-
pants a restraint from overly destructive
punishments. Unlike the adult court, the
juvenile court was established based on
rehabilitation-oriented principles. In sen-
tencing offenders, juvenile court judges
leave “room for reform.” The juvenile
system recognizes the biological and de-
velopmental differences between adoles-
cents and adults and, as a result, allegedly
adjudicates much less punitively than the
adult system. Juvenile judges are limited
in the extent to which they can incapaci-
tate defendants, with sentences rarely top-
ping 20 years.
With the crime surge of the 1980s
and early 1990s, however, rehabilitation
became less of a priority for communi-
ties and policymakers. The focus instead
shifted to keeping “dangerous” criminals
off the streets. In the name of public safe-
ty, legislators initiated the waiver system,
a method through which severe offenders
could be transferred from the juvenile sys-
tem to the adult one. Once in the adult
system, delinquents received longer and
harsher sentences—deserved punishment
according to victims.
Failures of the Waiver System
Since its inception, the waiver sys-
tem has been abused and has encouraged
recidivism; the use of the waiver has not
been restricted to the most severe cases.
Once the conduit between these two sys-
tems was opened, juvenile courts have ea-
gerly pushed disobedient, recidivist, and
older delinquents out of their own system
and into the adult one—regardless of the
crime they committed. Roughly ten per-
cent of all delinquents are now diverted
out of the juvenile system into the adult
one.35 The consequences for delinquents
unnecessarily placed in the adult system
have been tremendously unfortunate.
Due to their exposure with more sophisti-
cated and experienced adult criminals, de-
linquents spending time in adult facilities
are 50 percent more likely to recidivate
than those held in juvenile centers—even
after controlling for nature of offense.36
Restricting Waivers
To minimize the superfluous number
of delinquents receiving waivers, restrict
the granting of waivers to only the most
severe cases. According to the procedure’s
original design, only the most serious
offenses (such as intentional homicide)
merit transfer. Significant effort must
be spent to restrict unnecessary waivers.
Clarifying amendments should be adopt-
ed to establish firmer guidelines describ-
ing which crimes warrant transfer. Doing
so will vastly reduce the number of juve-
niles sent to the adult criminal system.
Ultimately, the likelihood of recidivism
will decrease significantly for delinquents
who otherwise would have been unneces-
sarily tried in adult courts.
3. Change Medicaid Reapplication
Requirements
The third recommended policy pro-
poses forbidding the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services from re-
quiring that all juveniles released from
jail reapply for Medicaid. Because a delay
in receiving healthcare benefits is associ-
ated with a significant increase in recidi-
vism, all Medicaid services to delinquents
should be reinstated immediately upon
release.
Health Insurance & Recidivism
Upon entering jail, delinquents fre-
quently lose their health benefits. By
federal law, the responsibility for an in-
carcerated delinquent’s health lies with
the detention facility in which he or she
is situated. Health insurance providers
therefore serve no purpose while their cli-
ent is in jail. Typically, health insurance
companies terminate their contracts with
individuals as soon their incarceration be-
gins (or as soon as their clients have been
in jail for a set period of time, such as
12 months). Once released, delinquents
must reapply for healthcare. This practice
holds true for Medicaid, the government-
sponsored healthcare plan for low-income
55
 individuals that serves a large portion of
delinquents. The reapplication process
for Medicaid often takes several months,
leaving reentering delinquents without
needed healthcare services.
Delinquents with mental health
problems are especially hard-hit by the
reapplication procedures, and often expe-
rience illness flare-ups as a result of the
delay.37 Because 70 percent of the juve-
nile delinquent population has a mental
disorder, receiving timely health services
is vital to their long-term health.38 Ad-
ditionally, orphaned delinquents some-
times wait up to a year before receiving
placement in a foster care home (a service
provided by Medicaid). In the meantime,
they must single-handedly find housing.
Confronted with these difficulties, delin-
quents often reoffend for the sole purpose
of reentering jail and receiving the health-
care services provided by incarceration
facilities. A delay in obtaining healthcare
benefits is linked to a significant increase
in recidivism.39
Recommendation
To avoid such a delay, immediately
reinstate all Medicaid benefits to juveniles
reentering the community. Medicaid
should not terminate its contracts with
incarcerated juveniles. Rather, it should
temporarily suspend benefits until the de-
linquent reenters the community. Abid-
ing by this policy will considerably lower
the probability of recidivism for portions
of the 70 percent of all delinquents with a
mental disorder.
Obstacles
Opponents of these three policy rec-
ommendations may argue that high re-
cidivism rates require longer and harsher
sentences, not rehabilitation-oriented re-
form. This argument could be based on
the fact that despite its being founded on
rehabilitative principles, the U.S. juvenile
56
justice system has an extremely high re-
cidivism rate. The rate of recidivism in
the adult justice system—an institution
not founded on rehabilitation—is also
around 65 percent. Rehabilitation has not
worked, the argument goes, and therefore
it should be abandoned in favor of a more
punitive approach, under the assumption
that longer and harsher sentences would
deter delinquents from recidivating.
This argument suffers from two main
flaws. First, it assumes that the U.S. ju-
venile justice system has been entirely
rehabilitative. As shown earlier, our gov-
ernment’s own internal procedures often
counteract its rehabilitative principles.
It is incorrect to assume that the juve-
nile justice system has been an exercise
in rehabilitation. Second, this argument
ignores the mounting evidence indicating
that punitive approaches increase recidi-
vism while rehabilitative ones decrease it.
The waiver system, for example, is entirely
punitive in nature, and has only increased
recidivism. Other deterrence- and pun-
ishment-based programs, such as Scared
Straight, have at best failed to affect re-
cidivism and at worst have increased re-
cidivism rates. Rehabilitative programs,
on the other hand, have often proven ca-
pable of reducing recidivism.40
Others may argue that decreasing the
number of delinquents held in detention
will fail to maximize full use of facilities,
thereby creating a gross economic ineffi-
ciency. The United States spends billions
of dollars erecting incarceration centers;
discouraging their filling would waste
valuable already-spent tax dollars. Reduc-
ing the number of occupants in a deten-
tion facility certainly would be a failure
to use the building to its full potential.
However, unfilled detention facilities can
easily be put to alternate use (for example,
detention wings can be turned into class-
rooms). In any event, the real economic
inefficiency in this case is recidivism, not
underutilized buildings. The purpose of
detention facilities is not to reach maxi-
mum capacity, but to provide a location
for the juvenile justice system to carry out
its mission.
A third counterargument points out
that restricting waivers will increase the
caseload of an already overburdened ju-
venile justice system. Confronted with
more cases than it can handle, the system
risks making administrative mistakes as
a result of the overload. This concern is
valid: juvenile courts can expect to see
an increase in the number of cases pro-
cessed once transfers to the adult system
are limited. In the long run, however, the
juvenile court caseload will decrease sig-
nificantly as recidivism decreases.
Conclusion
The statistics and policies presented
in this paper only narrowly describe the
issues facing America’s recidivist juveniles.
An unacceptable depth of heartache and
suffering plagues our delinquents, and
without significant effort these youth are
more likely to enter a pattern of criminal-
ity that hurts society as a whole. Vigorous
reformative efforts—including the rec-
ommendations herein outlined—must be
taken immediately before another genera-
tion of youth deteriorates beyond repair.
The awful realities of juvenile recidivism
demand those efforts.
Endnotes
1. Synder, Howard, Juvenile Arrests
2000 (Washington D.C.: Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Programs, 2002).
2. Synder, Howard, and Melissa
Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and
Victims: 2006 National Report
(Washington D.C.: Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Programs,
2006).
3. Calvin, Elizabeth, Legal Strategies to
Reduce the Unnecessary Detention
of Children (Washington D.C.:
National Juvenile Defender Center,
2004).
4. Travis, J. and A. L. Solomon, From
Prison to Home: The Dimensions
and Consequences of Prisoner
Reentry (Washington D.C.: The
Urban Institute, 2001).
5. Schuetz, Pam, “Employment for
Former Prisoners: Community,
Family and Individual Salvation?”
CELCEE Digest, (2005): http://
www.celcee.edu/publications/digest/
Dig05-07.html.
6. Calvin, Sims, Barbara, and Pamela
Preston, eds., Handbook of Juvenile
Justice Theory and Practice (Boca
Raton: Taylor & Francis Group,
2006).
7. “Appropriations Approves Bill
to Reduce Juvenile Recidivism
and Homelessness,” News from
the Twelfth Assembly District,
May 24, 2006, http://democrats.
assembly.ca.gov/members/a12/press/
p122006062.htm.
8. Various.
9. Various.
10. Bailey, Brandon, and Griff Palmer,
“High Rearrest Rate,” The Mercury
News, October 17, 2004.
11. Gerwitz, Marian, “Recidivism
Among Juvenile Offenders in New
York City,” New York City Criminal
Justice Agency, Inc., (2007):
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/
jorecid0407.pdf.
12. Hewitt, John D. and Robert M.
Regoli, Delinquency in Society (New
York: McGraw Hill, 2006).
13. Travis and Solomon.
14. Schuetz.
15. Dunham, Warren, and Chaitin
Mildred, “The Juvenile Court in Its
Relationship to Adult Criminality,”
Social Forces (1966): 114-119.
16. MacKenzie, Doris Layton, What
Works in Corrections: Reducing the
Criminal Activities of Offenders and
Delinquents (New York: Cambridge
University press, 2006).
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Pozen, David, “The Private,
Nonprofit Prison,” Boston Globe,
February 21, 2006.
21. See the websites of NGOs mentioned
(such as AGYF and CDF).
22. Various. Special thanks to Professor
Richard Johnson for compiling this
list.
23. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
57
 Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice About the Author
Statistics, Reentry Trends in the U.S.,
October 25, 2002, http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism. Jane Wilson is a senior at Stanford
htm. University and majors in Political Sci-
24. Roberts. ence. Over the past several years, Jane has
25. Lubow, Bart, “Reducing
Inappropriate Detention: A Focus worked with inmates as a GED tutor, lit-
on the Role of Defense Attorneys,” eracy coach, and Life Skills instructor. She
Juvenile Justice Update 11, no. 4 has also worked with underprivileged ju-
(2005): 1-2, 14-16.
26. Ibid. veniles as a truancy counselor, ESL tutor,
27. Hollman, Barry, and Jason mediator, and music teacher. As Stanford’s
Ziedenberg, “The Dangers Strauss Scholar, she is currently develop-
of Detention: The Impact of
Incarcerating Youth in Detention ing educational programs for inmates in
and Other Secure Facilities,” Justice New York City, Chicago, San Diego, Salt
Policy Institute (2006). Lake City, and St. Louis. Jane intends to
28. Calvin.
29. Lubow pursue a law degree and eventually work
30. Dominguez, David, Personal in correctional legislation.
Interview, October 23, 2006.
31. Hollman and Ziedenberg.
32. Dominguez.
33. Zimring, Franklin E, American
Juvenile Justice, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
34. Coalition for Juvenile Justice,
Trying and Sentencing Youth in
Adult Criminal Court, http://www.
juvjustice.org/resources/fs008.html.
35. Sims and Preston.
36. Cuellar, Alison, Kelly Kelleher,
Jennifer Rolls, and Kathleen Pajer,
“Medicaid Insurance Policy for
Youths Involved in the Criminal
Justice System,” Public Health
Consequences of Imprisonment 95,
no. 10 (2005): 1707-1711.
37. “News from the Twelfth Assembly
District.”
38. Ibid.
39. Calvin.

58
Finding an Alternative Solution:
A Comparative Analysis of Drug Policies
Benjamin Aronson, Brown University
“The essential nature of the US drug enforce-
ment has an alien tinge to it, more suited to
an intrusive totalitarian society than to the
democratic…culture that evolved…here in
the United States”
-Arnold Trebach, 19931
I. Introduction
For almost a century, the United
States has followed an increasingly strict
drug control policy. While state and local
governments have played major roles in
drug enforcement throughout US history,
the federal government has been the driv-
ing force behind the nation’s drug policy
since 1914.2 Punishments for drug use
and drug trafficking became extremely
harsh after World War II. In the 1950s,
the government implemented a series of
laws including mandatory minimum sen-
tences, life imprisonment, and even the
death penalty for certain drug crimes.3
Although the more tolerant political mi-
lieu of the 1960s forced some of the previ-
ous decade’s repressive policies to give way
to more lenient ones, by the 1970s Presi-
dent Nixon’s declared “War on Drugs”
propelled the reintroduction of severe
drug laws and further US involvement in
drug enforcement.4 In 1986 President
Reagan proposed a new “War on Drugs,”
one that would take an even harder line
on drug offenders. Since then, the poli-
cies of the US government have changed
only slightly. Abstinence has been the
primary goal; domestic law enforcement
is the most heavily funded drug-related
initiative; and the need to reduce the drug
supply—rather than the drug demand—
has generally dominated policy thinking.
The first half of this paper analyzes US
domestic drug policy and policy outcomes
since the beginning of the Reagan admin-
istration’s war on drugs. The second half
of the paper focuses on Swedish, Dutch,
and Australian approaches to drug con-
trol. Sweden’s drug policies are the most
restrictive of the three; the Netherlands’
approach is more liberal; and Australia’s
is moderate. These examples will show
that restrictive policies, regardless of their
orientation, do not necessarily work; even
the once highly praised Swedish model of
drug repression is now undercut by signs
of rising illicit drug use. They will also
highlight the benefits and reduced soci-
etal costs of progressive, heath-oriented
policies, as compared to enforcement-
based policies.
Australia’s more moderate approach
is a politically viable model for the Unit-
ed States. Given the history of repressive
drug policies and the political strength of
social conservatives, the Australian bal-
ance between enforcement and harm re-
duction could be an effective and feasible
step toward a health-based drug policy.
US Drug-Control Budget
As mentioned above, Ronald Rea-
gan’s presidency marked the beginning of
a renewed, strengthened, and sustained
attack against drug use and drug traffick-
ing. Drugs, especially cocaine, became
the focus of government attention. The
US drug-control budget illustrates the
rising importance of drugs in federal
policymaking. Between 1981 and 1989,
federal expenditure on drug control grew
by roughly $5.1 billion.5 The new funds
59
 were not distributed equally among the
five major components of the drug-con-
trol effort: international activities and
source country control, interdiction, do-
mestic law enforcement, prevention, and
treatment. Instead, the lion’s share of the
money was allocated to enforcement.6
By 1989 prevention and treatment ex-
penditures combined made up less than
30 percent of the federal drug budget,7
continuing a downward trend that had
begun in 1973 under Nixon.8 In the
past two decades alone, federal spending
on enforcement has risen tenfold.9
Since the 1980s, the trends with
regard to enforcement, treatment, and
prevention spending have remained es-
sentially the same. As the drug-control
budget has soared to over $18 billion,
enforcement initiatives have taken prece-
dence over all other areas of drug control.
Combined with international programs,
enforcement spending has consistently
accounted for more than two-thirds of the
entire budget.10 Moreover, some experts
believe the reported federal budget over-
estimates the proportion of money spent
on treatment and prevention.11 Irrespec-
tive of these discrepancies, what is clear
from even a cursory examination of the
budget is that enforcement, not treatment
or prevention, accounts for the majority
of federal funds.
State and local governments also
spend a considerable amount of funding
on drug-control expenditures. And while
the data on state and local expenditures
are not as plentiful or up to date as data
on federal drug expenses, the available
information that does exist demonstrates
a similar—if not greater—propensity to-
ward law enforcement over prevention
and treatment.12
US Drug-Control Strategy
An understanding of the major goals
in combating drugs is essential to explain-
60
ing these relatively unbalanced budget
allocations. As David Boyum and Peter
Reuter point out, the primary objective of
federal drug strategy from the late 1980s
has been to reduce the number of drug
users. Former Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) director Wil-
liam Bennett explained that “the highest
priority of our drug policy… must be a
stubborn determination further to reduce
the overall level of drug use nationwide—
experimental first use, ‘casual’ use, regular
use, and addiction alike.” Such a concep-
tion of the drug problem inevitably gives
precedence to enforcement. That is, if
the policy’s goal is to reduce drug use,
then treatment programs, which focus on
helping a small group of chronic heavy
drug users reduce drug addiction rather
than encouraging a large group of casual
users to abstain from drug use, are going
to be ill-funded.13
Likewise, government officials have
found secondary and tertiary prevention
efforts that help to lower the damage as-
sociated with drug use (e.g. needle ex-
changes, methadone clinics)—otherwise
known as harm reduction measures—
similarly unappealing as they too do not
necessarily encourage abstinence. Thus,
harm reductionism policies are both min-
imally funded and considerably restricted.
Methadone maintenance, for example, is
strictly limited to federally licensed pro-
grams, even though some research shows
that primary care clinics produce similar
patient success rates.14 Needle exchange
is also underdeveloped, with only 134
needle exchange programs distributing a
total of 17.5 million syringes per year.15
According to a recent survey by the Jour-
nal of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndromes and Human Retrovirology,
it is estimated that between 920 million
and 1.7 billion injections take place each
year in the country. There is a large gap
between the need for and availability of
sterile syringes.16 The lack of syringe ac-
cess is partly attributable to state govern-
ments as well, as studies in the last decade
have shown harsh legal restrictions on
these types of programs.
Nevertheless, the federal government
itself has made little effort to help the
cause of reducing the damage attributable
to drug use (i.e. harm reduction). The
claim of the current director of the OND-
CP, John Walters, that “the very name [of
harm reduction] is a lie,”17 illustrates the
level of government support for harm
reduction. Aiming instead to curb drug
prevalence, Walters pushed the focus of
US policy from hard drugs to marijuana,
the illicit drug with the highest rate of use
in the country.18 Recent studies show that
the government supports Walters’ call for
serious marijuana enforcement, with 44
percent of all drug related arrests in 2004
resulting from marijuana violations, and
39 percent simply from marijuana pos-
session.19 Similarly, the National Youth
Anti-Drug Media Campaign sponsored
by the ONDCP overwhelmingly focuses
on marijuana use prevention for at-risk
non-users and occasional users.20
The consequences of a severe enforce-
ment policy coupled with inadequate pro-
vision of treatment and negligent support
of harm reduction methods are staggering.
First, individuals’ civil liberties have been
threatened. In 1985, the US Supreme
Court upheld the right of US customs of-
ficials to detain anyone who entered the
US until they submitted a stool sample for
examination to prove they were not traf-
ficking drugs. This policy showed a suc-
cess rate of less than 20 percent.21 While
this policy may be effective in some cases,
it is extremely demoralizing for those
subjected to it. Similar trespasses against
basic rights can be seen in the forfeiture
laws of the 1980s allowing officers to seize
the assets of suspected traffickers without
criminal conviction.22
Second, incarceration rates have rap-
idly escalated, marking both a loss of hu-
man productivity and high costs to tax-
payers, while leaving many families and
children helpless.23 Prison sentences have
been equally harsh, with a 1992 report by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics showing
an average sentence of six years for drug-
related criminals.24 Failure to provide
clean needles throughout the last two
decades has also led to unnecessary rates
of HIV, with approximately 30 percent of
HIV cases being related to injection drug
use, according to the CDC.25 African
American and Latino communities have
been hit the hardest by US policies, with
higher rates of incarceration and HIV/
AIDS among drug users.26
In addition to the costs, these policies
have few tangible benefits. Drug use has
fluctuated irrespective of a consistently
harsh US drug policy since the first period
of escalation in the 1980s,27 while drug
prices are steadily decreasing.28 Crime
also appears to be unaffected by some of
the policies, which is not surprising con-
sidering that chronic substance abusers
who carry out most of the crime are not
the focus of US drug policy.29
The problems are clear. The costs at
which we pursue our policies are much
too high to continue with a prohibition-
ist approach based on severe enforcement
and little help to the drug user. Should
we seek a different form of repression (i.e.
the Swedish model), extreme liberaliza-
tion (i.e. the Netherlands), or the middle
road (i.e. Australia)? Which policies pro-
vide the best model for future drug law?
Which policies are politically viable? It
is with these questions that we move to
61
 the next component of this discussion,
an analysis of three forms of drug-control
policies currently employed within the in-
ternational community.
II. The Swedish Model:
From “Success” to Futility
Before beginning a more lengthy
discussion of the progressive models of
drug-control policies, it is important to
establish that the problems inherent in
the repressive US drug-control policy are
not limited to the United States. Sweden,
which for years championed a consump-
tion-oriented repressive drug policy as a
highly effective and superior model, has
similar problems.
Like the US, Sweden has sought a
drug-free society. However, unlike the
US, which has attempted to disrupt drug
markets and curb drug use by focusing on
supply (i.e. interdiction, local and trans-
state trafficking, source country produc-
tion), Sweden has sought to crack down
on demand. As the former Minister for
Health and Social Affairs, Bengt Wester-
berg, noted, “Consumption is the motor
of the whole drug carousel.”30
While education and prevention ef-
forts dominated the attack on consump-
tion in the 1970s, a sensationalized en-
forcement process became the primary
drug-control strategy by the 1980s. With
policymakers guiding the public to believe
that drugs threatened the very nature, sta-
bility, and exceptionalism of Swedish so-
ciety, the Swedish government led a new
offensive on drugs.31 In 1988, drug use,
regardless of the drug, became a fineable
offence. By 1993 drug use became an
imprisonable transgression. One effort
operating under this new infrastructure
was the Rave Commission developed in
the 1990s. This governmental initiative
instituted the right to subject club-goers
to urine testing and random arrest with-
62
in the nightlife setting. This set a harsh
precedent paving the way for drug test-
ing practices that exceeded governmen-
tal minimums; by 1997, one-third of all
large firms were habitually testing their
workers.32
One of the essential components of
Swedish policy has been the idea that eu-
phoria is the basis for consumption. Such
a notion, developed by Nils Bejerot, who
helped found Swedish drug policy, partly
explains why consumption was chosen as
the center-point of Swedish drug policy.
It also explains why Sweden has opted to
put such little attention toward treatment
mechanisms. That is, if euphoria is the
root of consumption, then making the life
of the drug user as unbearable as possible
will help drug users choose the abstinence
alternative.33 Not surprisingly, treatment
funds were cut in the 1990s, and these
funds now only account for one quarter
of drug-related spending today.34
The Swedish government also
staunchly opposed harm reduction mea-
sures, seeing them as both a contradiction
in the search for a drug free society and
a threat to society in and of themselves.
All of the methadone clinics in Sweden
were geared toward getting drug users to
abstain from drugs rather than helping
them live healthy, productive lives with-
out illicit substances.35 The few needle
exchange programs that existed were also
not dubbed as harm reduction policies.
Doing so would support drug use and
thus pose a danger to the stability of soci-
ety. As Arthur Gould explains, “whereas
in countries like the Netherlands and
Britain, it had been accepted that the
spread of HIV and AIDS was greater
than the threat from drug use, in Sweden
it was argued that the threats were equally
great.”36
What has been the result of these
increasingly repressive, anti-harm reduc-
tion laws? First, as in the US, the pro-
hibitionist policies in Sweden have led to
gross violations of civil liberties, as seen
for example in the power of the Rave
Commission mentioned above to de-
mand drug tests from anyone believed to
be under the influence. Furthermore, like
the US, Sweden has had rapidly increas-
ing incarceration and conviction rates.
Between 1986 and 1997, the number
of people found guilty almost doubled
(from 6,400 to 11,400), with 2,000 re-
ceiving sentences of six months or less
and 270 receiving sentences of more than
two years.37 Second, drug use has fluctu-
ated without any clear relation to changes
in Swedish policy. While the Swedish
model was praised as a success in the
1980s for lowering recreational drug con-
sumption, drug consumption at the time
of the restrictive policy formation was
already on the decline (at least since the
mid 1970s), thus putting into question
the real effectiveness of Swedish policy.38
Moreover, from 1979 to 1992, there was
a substantial increase in the number of
heavy drug users from 12,000 to 17,000,
and between 1992 and 1998, an increase
in the number of heavy drug users by 37
percent.39 Additionally, despite the con-
tinuation of a strict prohibitionist policy
to deter consumption throughout the
1990s, recreational and teenage drug use
grew considerably in that decade.40 The
number of documented overdoses also
went up, rising from 99 in 1995 to over
400 in 2002 and 2003.41 It is important
to note that regardless of these increases
in consumption, Swedish drug consump-
tion is lower than that of the rest of Eu-
rope. But this is likely due to the fact that
Sweden is a successful welfare state with
a low unemployment rate.42 Again, the
focus of this analysis is on policy effective-
ness, not simply use prevalence.43
Surprisingly, the repressive anti-harm
reduction attributes of Swedish drug-con-
trol are changing slightly. Policymakers
are putting more emphasis on treatment
and “caring” for patients instead of simply
“curing” them.44 Officials are also more
supportive of harm reduction measures,
as seen in 2004 when the government
made two experimental needle exchange
programs permanent and the National
Drug Policy Coordinator recommended
that similar needle exchange programs
be permitted throughout the country.45
In general, there has been a growing re-
alization that former drug policies have
been ineffective in curbing drug use, and
benefits can be derived–without societal
costs—from harm reduction.
In this way, the once highly-praised
Swedish model, like the American para-
digm, shows that drug use can rise in spite
of repressive policies. In fact, studies have
shown that drug-control policy is only a
minor component in drug abuse rates and
thus not an effective deterrent of drug
use. Therefore, given the futility of this
policy and that abstinence-based, anti-
harm-reduction drug policies ignore the
great costs associated both with drug use
and the excessive drug-control policing,
it seems necessary to find an alternative
solution that avoids the problems associ-
ated with repressive regimes. It also seems
necessary to shift the focus of policy from
prevalence—proven to fluctuate indepen-
dently of drug policies—to something
that is more controllable and generally
beneficial to society (i.e. harm reduction).
It is with this alternative framework in
mind that I shift discussion to perhaps
the most progressive example of alternate
drug-control models: the Netherlands.
III. The Netherlands:
The Liberal Experiment
In 1967 and 1968, after over a de-
cade of repressive Dutch drug policies,
two independent commissions—one pri-
vate and one state—began researching al-
ternative solutions to what was becoming
63
 a clearly ineffective national drug policy.
The privately-funded Hulsman Com-
mission began investigations first and, to
a certain degree, spurred the creation of
the second, state-funded working group
known as the Baan Commission. Both
commissions came to similar conclusions
and advised the government to shift away
from the prohibitionist approach, espe-
cially regarding cannabis use. The devel-
opment of these commissions marked a
radical change in drug-control philoso-
phy. The extent to which these two com-
missions actually influenced policy mak-
ers is debated. Some have proposed that
the two commissions were in fact to the
political right of legislators and thus did
not have much of an impact on govern-
mental thinking.46 Regardless of wheth-
er change was inevitable, the propositions
put forth by the Hulsman and the Baan
commissions were generally accepted, and
in 1976, official policy changed with a re-
vision to the 1928 Dutch Opium Act.47
The key change in Dutch policy was
the legal distinction between List I and
List II drugs. List II drugs were cannabis
products, while List I drugs were essen-
tially everything else (cocaine, heroine,
amphetamines, LSD etc.). The reasoning
behind the change was two-fold. First,
policy makers wanted to make a legal
distinction between what they considered
unacceptably dangerous “hard” drugs and
less dangerous “soft drugs” (i.e. cannabis
products). Second, it was hoped that the
legal separation between List I and List
II drugs would prevent cannabis users
from interacting in an underground black
market. More specifically, if cannabis be-
came legally accepted, it was envisioned
that cannabis users would be less likely to
move onto hard drugs (i.e. the gateway ef-
fect) or involve themselves in the dangers
of an underground black market. The
latter element of reasoning identifies
most notably with the theory of harm
reduction.
64
The recent Dutch experiment in
harm reduction is clearly the focal point
of efforts to liberalize international drug
policy norms. Since its inception in
1976, the policy has taken four major ob-
jectives: 1) “prevention of drug use and
treatment and rehabilitation of addicts,”
2) “reduction of harm to drug users,” 3)
“diminishing public nuisance caused by
drug users,” and 4) “combating the pro-
duction and trafficking of drugs.”48 As
is illustrated above, the key concepts of
Dutch drug-control policy are based on
harm reduction, public heath, and toler-
ance with regard to drug use. It is un-
derstood that while drug use should be
discouraged, those who do use drugs
should not be abandoned. In line with
the concept of normalization that arose in
the 1980s, drug use is seen as a common
social issue and thus should be treated
similar to alcoholism.49 It is important to
note that the term normalization does not
by definition assume drug use to be nor-
mal. Instead, it assumes that deviant be-
havior, such as drug and alcohol abuse, is
a normal part of society.50 Also assumed
in the Dutch policy is that policing drug
use can often be more harmful than drug
use itself. Nevertheless, the objectives
show that while drug use is somewhat tol-
erated, drug production and trafficking is
certainly not. Surprisingly, like the U.S,
two-thirds of federal drug spending goes
to enforcement, partly due to US and in-
ternational pressure.51 Where the Dutch
model differs, however, is in its approach.
Even though three government ministries
are active in drug-control decision-mak-
ing (Health, Interior, Justice), the Health
Ministry acts as the coordinator between
the three and is of foremost importance
in the process.52 Thus, although most
of the money goes toward supply inter-
diction, the drug control strategy is es-
sentially geared toward health principles
above all else.
 Now that the policies have been pre-
sented, it is relevant to disclose the man-
ner in which they have been carried out.
Following the idea of normalization, it is
essentially understood that small quanti-
ties of drugs—hard or soft—for personal
possession are decriminalized. The Chief
Prosecutor has set standards for the limits
of personal possession: five grams (previ-
ously 30 grams) of cannabis, .5 grams of
heroin and cocaine, and one tablet for
pill drugs such as ecstasy.53 Moreover,
prosecutors can implement the Dutch
expediency rule, allowing prosecutors to
throw away cases if they feel the prosecu-
tion acts against the public interest (e.g.
if possession of cannabis does not exceed
five grams, previously 30 grams). Thus,
in a sense, while experimental drug use is
not formally allowed or encouraged, it is
somewhat accepted and seen as a mini-
mal problem. Such thinking is in accor-
dance with the Libertarian thinking of
John Stuart Mill. According to Mill, the
state should “refrain as much as possible
from behaviours that have consequences
for the individual alone.”54 Following
such a policy, it is only when drug users
cause trouble to bystanders (e.g. crime)
that Dutch officers intervene.55 Even
low-level street dealing sometimes goes
unpunished.56
Discussion of the Dutch drug policy
would not be complete without mention
of the state-approved coffee shops. In
line with the Dutch distinction between
List I and List II drugs, and in accordance
with the administrative attempt to sepa-
rate cannabis from the black market, cof-
fee shops are locations that are allowed to
sell small quantities of ‘soft drugs’ (e.g. 30
grams or less of cannabis products). In
accordance with the major component
of Dutch strategy that seeks to stop large
scale trafficking, however, coffee shops are
theoretically not allowed to buy drugs,
a discrepancy known as the ‘front door-
back door problem’. Coffee shops are also
not allowed to advertise, sell to minors,
or operate within 500 meters of a school.
Although in principle the idea of the cof-
fee shop makes sense, the Netherlands has
faced international criticism for its ultra-
liberal policies in allowing drugs to be
sold. Despite some cutbacks in the num-
bers of coffee shops, approximately 900
still remain in the country. The reduction
in coffee shops has been accompanied
with the rise of ‘smart shops’ in which
usually legal, mostly plant-based, psy-
choactive drugs are sold. As one reporter
explains, “While the psychoactive com-
pounds in mushrooms are illegal, fresh
mushrooms are not…[T]he designer drug
chemists [however] stay one step ahead of
lawmakers by tweaking their products to
confound legal descriptions.”57
As the purpose of this paper is to
search for alternative solutions to the US
drug policy, it is necessary to examine
both the costs and benefits of the Neth-
erlands’ drug policy. First, let us consider
the benefits. The approach taken by the
Netherlands has avoided many of the
problems associated with US drug policy
without incurring high rates of drug use
relative to Europe or the United States.
The government, for example, has been
able to pursue extensive treatment pro-
grams providing methadone maintenance
and needle exchanges, with services reach-
ing approximately 70 percent of heroin
users.58 Meanwhile, health services such
as the needle exchange programs have
contributed to the relatively low HIV/
AIDS prevalence among intravenous
drug users (IDUs) in the Netherlands.
Only 10.5 percent of HIV/AIDS victims
are IDUs,59 significantly lower than the
European average of 39.2 percent.60 Also
beneficial in the Dutch program is the
health education system, with appropri-
ate sex education and welfare support to
drug users.61 Surprisingly, despite the
65
 treatment of heroin users, crime among
IDUs has not decreased; but there does
not seem to be any indication that it has
increased either.62
Perhaps the most important benefit
of the Dutch system is the openness with
which policy makers approach the drug
problem. The Dutch system has helped
IDUs come out of the shadows and
move away from the often harmful con-
sequences of displacement (e.g. increased
risk of overdose because bystanders are
not around to give assistance) and covert,
rushed injection processes (often leading
to accidental needle sharing or non-sterile
forms of injection). In doing so, the sys-
tem has a greater societal benefit, as the
visibility of drug addicts has led to a de-
glamorization of drug use and served as a
useful prevention measure.63 Likewise,
Dutch administrators can more accurately
trace the problem of drug addiction in the
country. Exemplary of the openness in
Dutch policy was the temporary effort to
screen more harmful illicit drugs among
a user’s stash of illicit drugs. Although
recently shut down partially in response
to international criticism, clinics arose in
light of increased ecstasy use to test for
look-alike pills that could be potentially
more dangerous than the intended drug
of choice.64 Such progressive thinking is
at the heart of Dutch policy-making and
has allowed for fundamental changes with
successful results in the area of harm re-
duction.
The policy changes themselves have
not seemed to increase substance abuse.
As found by Korf (1995) with regard
to cannabis, “the overall picture indi-
cates that no significant changes in can-
nabis use have occurred since statutory
decriminalization.”65 Rather, it was only
several years after the passage of this drug
policy that cannabis use increased, an in-
crease that was in conjunction with trends
in most European countries.66 Still, de-
66
spite the increase, cannabis use in the
Netherlands is relatively low. According
to a 1999 study by Abraham et al., only
15.6 percent of the Dutch population re-
ported ever using cannabis.67 It is inter-
esting to note as well that Dutch trends in
cannabis use between 1970 and 1990 are
remarkably similar to those of Germany,
despite Germany’s prohibition of cannabis
during the two decades.68 In comparison
to the US, lifetime use of cannabis is also
considerably lower in the Netherlands, as
US figures are more than double those of
the Netherlands.69 Furthermore, in spite
of relatively relaxed drug laws, Dutch rec-
reational use of drugs such as cannabis,
cocaine, amphetamines, and ecstasy is
moderate when compared to the rest of
Europe, while problematic drug use is ac-
tually the lowest among EU countries.70
According to a 2001 report by the Euro-
pean Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
Drug Addiction, in the Netherlands there
were only 2.6 problem users per 1000
inhabitants aged 15-64.71 Drug-related
deaths are relatively low when compared
to other European countries as well.72
Recent data also suggest that the average
age of heroin users has been increasing
yearly, suggesting that fewer members of
the young generation are resorting to use
of heroin.73
Despite the profound benefits of
Dutch drug policy and general approval
of most of its harm reduction methods
throughout Europe, some conservative
prohibitionists, especially American drug-
control policy makers, have perceived the
Netherlands’ experiment on drug-control
as a failure. As argued by Collins in 1999,
the policy of tolerance has indirectly led
to a “coffee shop mentality” that attracts
international drug traffickers.74 Like-
wise, former director of the ONDCP,
Barry McCaffrey, saw the Netherlands as
a poor model and a good example of why
the prohibitionist model of American
drug policy is superior.75 Such criticisms
are likely linked to two major factors.
First, the Netherlands’ drug policy is seen
as a great paradox, with conflicting poli-
cies that allow the consumption, albeit
limited, of illicit drugs that are expressly
banned. Second, the Netherlands has be-
come a major location for drug tourism,
drug traffickers, and drug production.
With regard to the portrayal of
Dutch policy as a paradox, I would argue
that the policy should be characterized
by sophistication rather than contradic-
tion. Although some individuals have
been able to circumvent and take ad-
vantage of Dutch policy (e.g. in the case
of smart shops), the drug policy of the
Netherlands has effectively minimized
the gateway effect. Moreover, while the
rise of drug tourism (i.e. visiting the
country to do illicit drugs) seems unques-
tionably tied to the Netherlands’ liberal
drug policies, I refute the notion that this
can be an argument against liberalizing
international drug-control norms. The
problem, it seems, is more a unilateral
issue than anything else, as the Nether-
lands was the first country to shift away
from the repressive drug-control model.
If instead the Netherlands had moved to-
ward liberalization in coordination with
other countries, it seems highly unlikely
that the effects of drug tourism would be
significant at all. Given the US’s ability
to strongly influence the drug policies of
foreign nations,76 a multilateral initiative
could likely take shape if the US sought
one, especially with the new wave of drug
liberalization in the EU.77
With regard to the rise of drug traf-
ficking and drug production in the
Netherlands, the extent to which these
developments are a result of liberal and
lenient drug policy is highly debatable.
The high levels of drug trafficking, for
example, appear to be a consequence of
the Netherlands’ geography and major
role as a transit country.78 Home to the
world’s biggest seaport at Rotterdam and
acting as the main distributor to Europe,
the Netherlands is an ideal location for
any drug trafficking enterprise, regardless
of its drug policies. As one study inter-
viewing Columbian cocaine smugglers
found, the Netherlands is used as a smug-
gling center because of “the huge volumes
transported through both airports and
seaports, the infrastructure, its central lo-
cation in Europe, a good business climate
as well as financial and banking being well
represented, and finally the attractiveness
of Amsterdam as an international meeting
point.”79 Likewise, the large production
of synthetic drugs is largely attributable
to the fact that the country has legitimate
major chemical industries (DSM, Akzo)
that have inadvertently helped to supply
the ingredients for synthetic drug produc-
ers.80
Realizing that substance abuse is in-
evitable in society, the Dutch government
has successfully reduced the harm caused
by drug abuse while attempting to stop
the drug trade. And while the Dutch
model has its contradictions, these ap-
parent discrepancies reveal a tremendous
amount of sophistication and pragmatism
that is lacking in the US model. While
both the US AIDS/HIV rate attribut-
able to intravenous drug use and the drug
abuse prevalence in the total population
have remained above average, the Neth-
erlands has been able to better temper the
effects of both of these problems through
liberal minded policies.
There are, however, certain consider-
ations one must make before applying the
Dutch drug-control system to the United
States. First, the Netherlands is consider-
ably smaller than the US and thus easier
to manage. Second, the country lacked a
conservative opposition party at the time
when the more liberal drug policies were
put into place.81 Third, there exists a phi-
67
 losophy of gedogen (the acceptance of il-
legal activities for practical considerations)
and a culture of tolerance in the country
that might not be easily replicated in the
US.82 Fourth, “there has never been a
strong sense of the direction in which so-
ciety should move” nor an association of
drugs with certain marginalized groups
“in contrast to countries like Sweden and
the United States, where such nationalist
imagery has fostered negative feelings to-
ward so-called deviant groups, including
drug users.”83 Fifth, the US government
has been unresponsive to academic com-
missions suggesting harm reduction.84
Despite these disparities between the
sizes, cultures, and political ideologies of
the US and the Netherlands, the evident
societal costs that the liberal Dutch policy
has avoided should suggest to US politi-
cians that alternative solutions are neces-
sary to avoid the current problems the
country now faces. Whether such a shift
in policy thinking will happen in the near
future is unlikely, however, and perhaps
the country will have to follow a more
gradual approach to drug control than
did the Dutch.
IV. Australia:
A More Viable Solution?
The case of Australia illustrates a more
moderate, yet still progressive attempt to
liberalize drug-control policies. Like the
Netherlands, it too has pursued harm re-
duction measures. Moreover, Australia
has coupled its treatment programs with
significant efforts at enforcing drug-con-
trol policies. The government, however,
has taken considerable efforts to make
these drug-control policies humane. In
doing so, Australia provides a more prac-
tical model for US drug policy, as it is un-
likely that domestic law enforcement will
be as lax as the Netherlands.
In 1985, while the US was on the eve
68
of declaring its newest “War on Drugs”,
Australian policy was moving in a dif-
ferent direction. Under the auspices of
the newly conceived National Campaign
against Drug Abuse, harm minimization
became the major tenant of Australian
drug-control philosophy. As explained
in the 1998 Ministerial Council on Drug
Strategy,
“[State] governments [in Australia] do not
support illegal or risky behaviours such as in-
jecting drug use, but they do acknowledge that
these behaviours occur. They have a responsi-
bility to develop and implement public health
and law-enforcement measures designed to re-
duce the harm that such behavoiurs can cause,
both to individuals and the community.”85
This general acceptance of harm re-
duction philosophy legitimized new treat-
ment initiatives other than abstinence.
Needle and syringe programs became
more prevalent in a number of states,86
methadone was studied more seriously
and made more universally available,87
and funding and activity in research and
education rose considerably.88 In general,
while spending is just as lopsided toward
enforcement and interdiction as in the
US, Sweden, and the Netherlands, policy
has focused on heath above all else, with
the approach aimed primarily at “mini-
mizing or limiting the harms and hazards
of drug use for both the community and
the individual without necessarily elimi-
nating use.”89
Like the case of the Netherlands,
harm reduction in Australia has shown
positive results. HIV/AIDS infection
prevalence among IDUs is only about
two percent (compared to about .1 per-
cent of the overall population)90 and only
eight percent of all HIV cases are related
to intravenous drug use.91 Moreover,
rates of needle sharing for a one-month
interval fell from 31 percent in 1995 to
18 percent in 1998.92 Meanwhile, there
seems to be no significant evidence of ris-
ing drug use as a result of the program.93
In coordination with these policies,
the government has adopted a “tough
on drugs” stance, a policy that is gener-
ally followed by all the states to varying
degrees. What is more pronounced in
all the states is a clear attempt to not suc-
cumb to ‘soft on drugs’ policies. Despite
this seemingly repressive rhetoric, drug
policies have become increasingly more
humane in Australia. While the former
“saturation and specific drug blitz opera-
tions still occur… there is a move toward
policing that might better be described
as moderating or regulating the drug
marketplace.”94
The clearest example of the new
push toward a harm-reduction style of
enforcement in the country is in the vari-
ous cannabis liberalization acts that have
taken place in the majority of Australian
jurisdictions. Acting somewhat indepen-
dently of what has generally been a more
conservative national government, most
of the states and territories have favored
expiation of cannabis offenses with pay-
ments of fines or infringement notices.
Of the eight jurisdictions under the Aus-
tralian Commonwealth, South Australia,
the Australian Capital Territory, and the
Northern Territory have all resorted to
prohibition with civil penalties (e.g. in-
fringement notice systems), while Victoria
and Tasmania have opted for prohibition
with cautioning. Only Western Austra-
lia, New South Wales, and Queensland
maintain that cannabis unquestionably
warrants a criminal offense charge, and
there have been signs that these states will
also soon change cannabis policy toward
diversion mechanisms that force cannabis
offenders to attend treatment centers.95
Like the Netherlands’ approach, the
new revolution of cannabis liberalization
policy that began with South Australia
in 1987 is based on the assumption that
cannabis-enforcement public health costs
often exceeded the health costs of the drug
itself. In opposition to the Netherlands,
where police officials ignore cannabis,
cannabis law liberalization in Australia
has actually led to an increasing number
of people charged with the use of canna-
bis.96 It is important to note that this
was not the result of an increase in use,
rather a decrease in effort by drug users
to conceal their behaviors.97 Also, while
Australia’s new laws may not necessarily
have deterred drug use, they have done
as good a job of deterrence as prohibi-
tion. Before touting the Australian model
further, it is necessary to realize that the
“nature of required treatment regimes is
yet to be established and the longer-term
consequences of these programs, espe-
cially the potential for net widening or
the introduction of people into the law
enforcement system who would not oth-
erwise attract the active interest of police
are potential concerns.”98
That being said, the Australian initia-
tive has produced enormous social health
benefits without incurring an increase in
drug abuse. Police officers in most states
have implemented humane and mild en-
forcement with substantial success but
without the severe punishment, losses in
productivity, and threats to civil liberties
that result from the prohibitionist Ameri-
can model. The policy seems to have had
some effect on incarceration levels, as only
ten percent of the 2005 prison population
was indicted for illicit drug offenses.99
Moreover, only 112 per 100,000 people
in the population are in prison (compared
to 702 per 100,000 in the US).100 More-
over, a wide range of harm reduction
measures such as needle sharing facilities
have helped keep the HIV/AIDS preva-
lence low without leading to an escalation
of substance use.
Such a balance between enforcement
and treatment (with the inclusion of
69
 harm reduction treatment) offers a more
neutral model for US policy makers to
agree upon. The Netherlands has taken
great strides in producing humane and
sophisticated drug-control policies, but
given the animosity that US drug poli-
cymakers have toward the policy of the
Netherlands, it seems unlikely America
is prepared to base its drug system on lax
enforcement while condoning the sale of
cannabis, drug use, and minor drug traf-
ficking.
Australia, however, provides a more
balanced proposition, as well as a similar
historical and structural background to
that of the United States. Like the US—
but in contrast to the Netherlands—Aus-
tralia has a conservative party. Like the
US, the Australian government is built
upon a variant of the states rights system.
And while I have primarily discussed fed-
eral policy throughout the paper, I do not
by any means underestimate the power of
states to counter, as happened in Austra-
lia, a generally conservative government
and implement more progressive policies
unilaterally. Alaska was the first state to
do so in the United States, and ten other
states have followed suit in moderate can-
nabis liberalization. But the potentially
slow process that would be needed in the
US to liberalize drug-control laws through
state action, both in reducing the penal-
ties of enforcement and helping the drug
user live a healthy productive life, should
not be necessary.
The US history of failed drug-con-
trol policies and the case of Sweden have
shown us that repressive policies, whether
they focus on supply or demand, gener-
ally do not have a major role in curbing
drug use—and if they have been at all
successful, that success comes at too high
a cost. Incarceration levels are extraordi-
narily high, HIV/AIDS rates attributable
to intravenous drug use are high above
the rates in most western countries, and
70
the civil liberties of numerous citizens are
constantly being threatened.
V. Conclusion
The Netherlands and Australia, along
with a host of other countries, have dem-
onstrated that drug enforcement need not
be so severe nor harm reduction so feared.
Moreover, it is not only the level of spend-
ing on drug policies that matters, but the
general approach as well. The US should
base its policy on effectiveness rather than
vague moralistic ideologies. The current
US approach of a “war on drugs” is too
narrow-minded, as it fails to account for
the serious problems associated with en-
forcement and drug abuse, and the com-
plexity of the drug problem. The benefits
of a more progressive approach have been
ignored, while the costs of current failed
drug policies are too high. We must find
an alternative solution.
Endnotes
1. Warren K. Bickel and Richard
DeGrandpre. Drug Policy Human
Nature: Psychological Perspectives on
the Prevention, Management, and
Treatment of Illicit Drug Abuse. (New
York: Plenum Press, 1996), 259.
2. David Boyum and Peter Reuter. An
Analytic Assessment of US Drug Policy.
(Washington, D.C.: AEI Press,
2005), 5.
3. Bickel and DeGrandpre, 260.
4. Ibid.
5. Boyum and Reuter, 7.
6. Edward Shepard and Paul R.
Blackley. 2004. “US Drug Control
Policies: Federal Spending on Law
Enforcement Versus Treatment in
Public Health Outcomes.” Journal of
Drug Issues. 34, 4:771-786.
7. Boyum and Reuter, 7.
8. Ibid. 30.
9. Shepard and Blackely, 771-786.
10. Ibid.
11. Boyum and Reuter, 41.
12. Ibid., 10, 14,; Shepard and Blackely,
771-786.
13. Boyum and Reuter, 10-11.
14. Ibid., 88-89
15. Scott Burris et al. 2000. “Physician
 Prescribing of Sterile Injection
Equipment To Prevent HIV
Infection: Time for Action” Annals of
Internal Medicine, 133: 218-226.
16. Lurie, Peter and Jones, TS and Foley,
J. 1998. “A sterile syringe for every
drug user injection: how many
injections take place annually, and
how might pharmacists contribute
to syringe distribution?” Journal
of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndromes and Human Retrovirology,
18 Suppl 1:S45-51.
17. Fish, Jefferson M. Drugs and Society:
US Public Policy. (Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 14.
18. Ibid.
19. “Marijuana.” 9 Feb 2006, http://
www.drugwarfacts.org/marijuan.pdf,
(28 Apr 2006).
20. 4 May 2006, http://www.
mediacampaign.org/ (28 April
2006).
21. Bickel and DeGrandpre, 260.
22. Ibid.
23. After the introduction of mandatory
minimum sentencing,, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons budget increased
by more than 1,350 percent, from
$220 million in 1986 to about $3.19
billion in 1997. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office,
1997), p. 20.
24. Bickel and DeGrandpre, 262.
25. “HIV/AIDS & Injection Drug
Use” 25 Jan. 2006. http://www.
drugwarfacts.org/hivaids.htm (April
28 2006).
26. “Race, HIV/AIDS, and the Drug
War” 25 Jan 2006. http://www.
drugwarfacts.org/racehiv.htm (April
28 2006).
27. “Summary of Findings from the
1998 National Household Survey
on Drug Abuse” http://www.
drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/
nhsda/98SummHtml/TOC.htm (2
May 2006)
28. “The Price and Purity of Illicit Drugs:
1981 Through the Second Quarter
of 2003.” Office of National Drug
Control Policy. Washington DC:
Executive Office of the President,
Nov 2004, Publication Number NCJ
207768, vii.
29. See, for example, “Mandatory
Minimums” 9 Jan 2006. http://www.
drugwarfacts.org/mandator.htm (2
May 2006).
30. Arthur Gould. Developments in
Swedish Social Policy: Resisting
Dionysus. (New York: Palgrave,
2001), 165.
31. Tim Boekhout van Solinge. Dealing
with Drugs in Europe: An Investigation
of European Drug Control Experiences:
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
(The Hague: BJu Legal Publishers,
2004), 181.
32. Gould, 167.
33. Ted Goldberg. “The Evolution of
Swedish Drug Policy,” Journal of
Drug Issues, 34 (3): 551-576.
34. Mats Ramstedt. “What drug
policies cost. Estimating drug policy
expenditures in Sweden, 2002: work
in progress,” 101: 330-338.
35. Goldberg, 551-576.
36. Gould, 164.
37. Ibid., 173.
38. Ibid., 172.
39. Ibid., 172; Goldberg, 551-576.
40. Gould, 172; Boekhout van Solinge,
143.
41. Boekhout van Solinge, 184-185.
42. Gould, 172.
43. Unfortunately, there seems to be
relatively little available data on HIV
rates among IDUs.
44. Goldberg, 551-576.
45. Boekhout van Solinge, 148.
46. Justus Uitermark. 2004. “The Origins
and Future of the Dutch Approach
Towards Drugs.” Journal of Drug
Issues. 34(3): 511-532.
47. It is interesting to note that a similar
commission at the time arose in
the U.S (Shafer Commission) also
advocating harm reduction. As
shown above, the commission had
minimal impact.
48. Fish, 13.
49. Boekhout van Solinge, 108.
50. Ibid.
51. Henk Rigter. 2005. “What drug
policies cost. Drug policy spending
in the Netherlands in 2003.” Society
for the Study of Addiction. 101: 323-
329.
52. Boekhout van Solinge, 108.
53. Ibid., 107.
54. Ibid., 132.
55. Dirk J. Korf, and Heleen Riper and
Bruce Bullington. 1999. “Windmills
in their Minds? Drug Policy and Drug
Research in the Netherlands.” Journal
of Drug Issues. 29(3): 451-472.
56. Boekhout van Solinge, 139
57. Swagel, Will. Legalize it — the Dutch
example: Marijuana is ‘no problem’ as
part of a pioneering social policy. The
Anchorage Press. 16-22 July 1998.
71
 58. Boekhout van Solinge, 140.
59. “The Netherlands” http://
www.unaids.org/en/
Regions%5FCountries/Countries/
(28 April 2006)
60. Fish, 168.
61. Fish, 13.
62. Cherry, Andrew. “The Netherlands.”
Eds. Cherry, Andrew and Dillon,
Mary E., and Rugh, Douglas.
Substance Abuse: A Global View.
(Westport: Greenwood Press,
2002),156.
63. Boekhout van Solinge, 140.
64. Justus Uitermark and Peter Cohen.
2005 “A Clash of Policy Approaches:
The Rise (And Fall?) of Dutch Harm
Reduction Policies Towards Ecstasy
Consumption.” International Journal
of Drug Policy. 16:65-72.
65. Dirk J. Korf, and Heleen Riper and
Bruce Bullington., 451-472.
66. Marcel De Kort and Ton Cramer.
1999. “Pragmatism Versus Ideology:
Dutch Drug Policy Continued”
Journal of Drug Issues, 29(3), 473-
492.
67. Manja Abraham. 1999. “Illicit Drug
Use, Urbanization, and Lifestyle in
the Netherlands.” Journal of Drug
Issues 29(3), 565-586.
68. Boekhout van Solinge, 108.
69. Abraham, 565-586.
70. Boekhout van Solinge, 107.
71. Ibid.
72. Ineke Haen Marshall and Henk
van de Bunt, “Exporting the Drug
war to the Netherlands and Dutch
Alternatives.” Eds. Gerber, Jurg and
Jensen, Eric L. Drug War, American
Style: The Internationalization of Failed
Policy and Its Alternatives. (New York:
Garland Publishing, 2001), 202.
73. Boekhout van Solinge, 140.
74. Collins, L. 1999. “Holland’s Half-
Baked Drug Experiment.” Foreign
Affairs 78(3): 82-98.
75. Marshal and van de Bunt, 197.
76. See Eds. Gerber, Jurg and Jensen,
Eric L. Drug War, American Style:
The Internationalization of Failed
Policy and Its Alternatives. (New York:
Garland Publishing, 2001).
77. Billington, Bruce and Bollinger,
Lorenz, and Shelley, Tara. 1999.
“Trends in European Drug Policies:
A New Beginning or More of the
Same?” Journal of Drug Issues 34(3):
481-490.
78. Rigter, 2005.
79. Boekhout van Solinge, 135.
80. Ibid.
72
81. Ibid., 124.
82. Uitermark, 2004.
83. Ibid.
84. See drugwarfacts.com for example
85. Wellbourne-Wood. 1999
86. Loxley, W. 2000. “Doing the possible:
harm reduction, injecting drug use
and blood borne viral infections in
Australia.” International Journal of
Drug Policy 11(6): 407-416.
87. Hamilton, Margaret. “Drug Policy
in Australia—Our Own?” Eds.
Gerber, Jurg and Jensen, Eric
L. Drug War, American Style: The
Internationalization of Failed Policy
and Its Alternatives. (New York:
Garland Publishing, 2001), 111.
88. Loxley, 2000.
89. Ibid.
90. “Australia” http://www.unaids.
org/en/Regions%5FCountries/
Countries/ (28 April 2006)
91. Loxley, 2000.
92. Ibid.
93. “Illicit Drug Use“ www.aihw.gov.
au/publications/phe/sdua02/sdua02-
c04.pdf (28 April 2006).
94. Hamilton, 106.
95. Lenton, Simon et al. 1999. “Laws
Applying to Minor Cannabis
Offences in Australia and Their
Evaluation” International Journal of
Drug Policy. 10:299-303.
96. Ibid.; Hamilton, 108
97. Lenton, 1999; Hamilton, 108.
98. Hamilton, 110.
99. “Australia Bureau of Statistics:
Prisoners in Australia” www.ausstats.
abs.gov.au/Ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0
/0D2231601F85888BCA2570D80
01B8DDB/$File/45170_2005.pdf
(28 April 2006)
100. Ibid.
About the Author
Benjamin Aronson recently
graduated magna cum laude and Phi
Beta Kappa from Brown University
in May, 2007, receiving an A.B. in
International Relations. As a student
at Brown, he worked to rebuild the
school’s Habitat for Humanity campus
chapter, leading efforts that raised over
$24,000 to aid New Orleans in its
reconstruction efforts after Hurricane
Katrina. He is now in Buenos Aires,
Argentina working for the Buenos Aires
Herald, the city’s English newspaper.
He plans to apply to law school in the
fall.
A New Mandate for UN Reform:
The Charter
Andrew Baker, Oxford University
Executive Summary
United Nations Reform is now stalled
for a variety of reasons:
• The gap between the rhetoric and the
reality of reform continues to widen.
On the one hand, the aggressive pur-
suit of reform by John Bolton and
others like him has alienated many
states and statesmen. On the other
hand, pronouncements about mas-
sive Security Council reform and the
end of sovereignty have created an
unrealistic climate of expectation.
• The UN’s failure to implement rela-
tively simple reforms led all sides
in the debate to raise the rhetorical
stakes. Positions became entrenched
by mid-2006, and the UN budget
was voted on over the opposition of
the US, Japan, Canada and Australia.
By the end of the year, the reform
agenda was in shreds.
Reform may be more feasible if efforts
turn toward the functional utilisation of
the existing UN Charter and away from
any notion of a revolution within the in-
ternational system or the UN. A key part
of the UN Charter, which has never been
utilised as envisaged by its founders, is the
Military Staff Committee. This essay ex-
amines the history of this committee and
how it was intended to work in service of
global collective security. Reviving this
committee may promote reform on sev-
eral fronts:
• A revived committee would be
charged with negotiating ‘security
agreements’ with any member state
willing to enter into such a commit-
ment with the UN (Article 43). This
would begin to provide the UN with
clear security commitments from
members.
• As the committee finalised security
agreements, it would begin to for-
mulate joint plans and conduct joint
exercises (Article 46; Article 47, para-
graph 3). This would help to redress
two clear operational weaknesses of
the UN, namely, the scratch charac-
ter of many missions, and the ‘grab
bag’ character of many of the military
forces assigned to those missions.
• Finally, the committee would pro-
vide a structure of integrated military
command to UN missions, in line
with functional principles (Article
47, paragraph 2). The membership
of the committee would change to
account for member-states partici-
pating in Security Council actions.
While states retained control of their
own contingents, they would do so
within a single institution.
Although the G77 is suspicious of reform,
a tiny minority of spoiler states can hold
the General Assembly hostage, and the
Secretariat sometimes seems paralytic, it
may be possible to find a new mandate for
reform within the UN Charter itself.
I. Introduction
The United Nations has weathered
many crises in its history, but nothing
threatens the organization like the grow-
ing fissure between the rhetoric and re-
ality of reform. United Nations reform
necessarily addresses the functional as-
pects of the organization: developing
73
 good practice and oversight; addressing
the troubled relationship between the
Secretariat, the Security Council, and the
General Assembly; and improving the
capacity of the organisation, particularly
the Security Council, to back pronounce-
ments on global affairs with action. The
rhetoric of reform, on the other hand,
has been heavy with announcements of
the redefinition of sovereignty, a revolu-
tion in collective security, or an overhaul
of the Security Council. United Nations
reform must be about the art of the pos-
sible; grandiose pronouncements under-
mine the effectiveness of the institution
and dilute its legitimacy.
Reforming the United Nations is cru-
cial to the future of world order, yet UN
reform is illusive for precisely the same
reasons that it is necessary. The end of the
Cold War and the collapse of Soviet power
abruptly closed down the competing net-
works of far-flung client states propped up
by superpowers. The UN stepped into the
resulting vacuum. Its commitments have
expanded exponentially, making the UN
one of the principal guarantors of world
order and overstretching the organization
at a moment when great power relations
are deteriorating. The United States and
Russia have scrapped important arms con-
trol agreements over the past seven years;
Russia has explicitly linked the future of
breakaway regions like Transdniestria and
Abkhazia to European and US actions in
Kosovo; Russian competition with the
US in Central Asia is manifest in its poli-
cy toward Iran; and Chinese competition
with the US across the Indian Ocean is
manifest in its policy toward the Sudan.
Finally, the predominance of the US and
the global dominance of a handful of rich
‘northern’ states have substantially nar-
rowed the range of policy options open
to weaker, developing states. If the UN
is to continue to fulfil its role as a collec-
tive security organisation, it must address
74
these tensions. It must be an effective
peacekeeper, to address the breakdown
of order and security; it must effectively
balance the interests of powerful states,
to help prevent against a major war; and
it must consider the political needs and
aspirations of weaker states and provide
them with a voice.
If the UN fails to reform, the organi-
sation may break under the combined
pressure of the collapse of failed states,
the divergence of the strongest states, and
the frustrated aspirations of those in be-
tween. This essay argues that one means
of accomplishing this objective is already
written into the UN Charter: the Military
Staff Committee (MSC). The MSC, as
originally devised, was to be a fluid, func-
tional body capable of advising the Se-
curity Council, planning and sustaining
UN operations worldwide, and changing
its membership and composition accord-
ing to which states were involved in a giv-
en Security Council operation. In other
words, the MSC was to provide the link
between the high politics of the Security
Council and events on the ground. It was
meant to improve Security Council coop-
eration, to make UN operations effective
and efficient, and to balance the positive
security contributions of every state with
a share in decision-making. This essay
draws on the words of UN founders to
illustrate how the MSC might be made
to work today. At a moment when the
rhetoric of reform has overwhelmed the
reality and UN reform has stalled in the
General Assembly, it may be time to shift
the reform agenda to smaller, functional,
and more achievable objectives.
II. Rhetoric And Reform
Kofi Annan’s reform agenda emerged,
phoenix-like, from the flame of scandal.
The report of Annan’s High-level Panel,
“A More Secure World: Our Shared Re-
sponsibility,” and his own report, “In
Larger Freedom,” were published be-
tween December 2004 and March 2005
in the midst of widening allegations of
sexual abuse, harassment, mismanage-
ment, influence peddling, espionage, and
corruption. The High-level Panel report
trumpeted the need for a “new compre-
hensive collective security system;”1 An-
nan’s report called for “a new security
consensus.”2 The Dean of Princeton’s
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, after reviewing these
reports, proclaimed that they represented
a ‘sea change’ in sovereignty and the state
system.3
At the very moment these reports
were due for debate in September 2005,
Paul Volcker published his own damn-
ing indictment of UN corruption in the
Oil for Food Program.4 Annan blandly
asserted that he did not anticipate any
resignations over the Volcker Report. At
the same time, the US’s colorful recess ap-
pointee to the UN, John Bolton, sought
a wide range of revisions to the reform
program. This initiative, sound in its
own right, nevertheless opened the floor
to states such as Venezuela, Cuba, and
Egypt, who had no interest at all in re-
form.5 Annan’s reform agenda was shred-
ded, and those scraps that survived, like
the new Human Rights Council, were
watered down.
Then, on April 28 2006, budgetary
reforms in line with the Volcker Report
were defeated in the Budget Committee of
the General Assembly. Bolton promised
to block authorisation of the UN budget
if more were not done. Little more than a
week later, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Russia
and Saudi Arabia were all elected to the
new Human Rights Council, to the dis-
may of organizations like Human Rights
Watch and the Geneva-based UN Watch;
the United States abstained from the new
Council.6
The Council more than lived up to
pessimistic expectations: its strongest
statement on Darfur was ‘deep concern,’
and in nine months it criticised only one
state, Israel, nine times. On 26 March
2007, the Council passed a resolution,
proposed by Pakistan, against the ‘defa-
mation of religion;’ it called for the ‘re-
sponsible’ exercise of free speech, subject
to the limits of security, health, order,
morals, and respect for religions.7 Unsur-
prisingly, Human Rights Watch and Free-
dom House expressed dismay and alarm.8
In less than a year, the Human Rights
Council managed to undermine the very
notion of ‘human’ rights in favor of ill-
defined communitarian prerogatives.
By mid-2006, the UN was reeling
from a string of disasters and the reform
agenda had united a number of ‘spoiler’
states. Some of these states sought to
defend their own socially regressive or
fundamentalist policies (e.g. Pakistan),
to advance their own global agendas (e.g.
Cuba, Venezuela), or to protect them-
selves against potential intervention (e.g.
Sudan, Iran). Whereas spoiler states were
united in their object, reformers had nu-
merous objectives and platforms, which
they pursued to the rhetorical extreme.
Tony Blair called for a massive overhaul
of the Security Council and its expansion
to include Japan, India and Germany.9
Mark Malloch Brown, the Deputy Sec-
retary General, lashed out at the United
States, telling an audience of Democrats
in New York that “the UN’s role is in
effect a secret in Middle America,” and
calling for “no more ‘take it or leave it,’
red-line demands thrown in without de-
bate and engagement.”10 Kofi Annan,
supporting his deputy, argued that dis-
empowered states were wrecking reforms
in response to US bullying; echoing Blair,
Annan went on to call for total structural
reform, saying that “even these current re-
forms are only a small down-payment on
75
 what must follow.”11 As in wonderland,
the UN had to run faster in order to stand
still.
Over the second half of 2006, the
rhetoric intensified: the United Nations
adopted a siege mentality, and not with-
out reason, as Bolton’s tactics resembled
a siege. Having already withheld US
support for the admittedly flawed Hu-
man Rights Council and threatened
budget chaos over the failure of budget-
ary reforms, Bolton threatened budget
cuts, unless there was a public apology
for Malloch Brown’s slur against Middle
America. “It is illegitimate,” he fumed,
“for an international civil servant to criti-
cise what he thinks are the inadequacies
of citizens of a member government.”12
From Bolton’s perspective, the battle for
reform was across not one, but two fronts:
against the intransigence of those states
opposed, for one reason or another, to re-
form, and against the privileged, paternal-
istic elite of the UN Secretariat. For the
former, there is much to suggest that the
reform process has unified and radicalised
the G77, whose support, particularly in
the Administrative and Budget Commit-
tee, is important.13 Moreover, in an echo
of the Cold War, Russia and China have
been happy to utilise this discontent as a
means of checking US and British foreign
policy; it is noticeable that, despite their
own horrendous treatment of religious
minorities, those two states were happy to
support Pakistan’s resolution in the Hu-
man Rights Council.
On the issue of elitism, it must be
admitted that Malloch Brown, well-con-
nected, Cambridge-educated, a onetime
socialist, embodies much that Middle
America finds suspicious about the UN.14
The irony is that Malloch Brown had al-
ready alienated many in the Secretariat
by his aggressive stance on reform.15 He
ought to have been Bolton’s natural ally;
instead, when Bolton announced he was
stepping down, Malloch Brown smiled
76
and remarked, “no comment.”16
Unfortunately, there is little to smile
about. The 2006-2007 UN budget, vot-
ed on 30 June, was passed over the op-
position of the US, Australia, Canada and
Japan. The very occurance of such a di-
lemma—between shutting the UN down
on 1 July, or defying the US—testifies to
just how badly polarised the reform pro-
cess has become. The Administrative and
Budget Committee followed its action on
30 June by passing a weak resolution on
reform, adopted by the General Assembly
on 7 July, which established the post of
Chief Information Technology Officer
while also authorizing a very limited ex-
periment in mandate, oversight and bud-
get reform.17
UN reform has since lost much of
its prominence: Bolton, Annan and Mal-
loch Brown have departed, and the diplo-
macy of the new Secretary General, Ban
Ki-moon, is less public than that of his
predecessor. Nevertheless, the reform
agenda remains important. In February,
Ban proposed restructuring the Depart-
ment of Peacekeeping Operations, trans-
ferring some of its responsibilities to a
new Department of Field Support. He
also proposed replacing the Department
of Disarmament Affairs with an Office for
Disarmament Affairs. The General As-
sembly cautiously endorsed these propos-
als, subject to further study and debate,
on 15 March.18 The UN is more deeply
committed to global stability than ever
before, with 100,000 people (including
75,000 soldiers) engaged in peacekeeping
operations, and every prospect that com-
mitments are going to expand. With that
level of engagement, the reform agenda
will not go away: it will either follow from
prudent politics, or from a new catastro-
phe.
The next stage of UN reform must be
based on functional principles rather than
revolutionary ones. The empty, grandiose
pronouncements for a total overhaul of
the UN, for a redefinition of sovereignty,
and for a revolution in international af-
fairs of one kind or another have been
worse than useless. These competing pro-
nouncements became rhetoric, rhetoric
became hard-line positions, and hard-line
positions became incomprehensible, until
the UN itself nearly foundered.
If the world has changed, the fact
remains that the UN Charter is still a
powerful tool for meeting new chal-
lenges. However, the Charter can only
be effective if reform debate turns away
from the rhetorical cosmos and toward
mundane reality. Imbuing the UN with
properties it does not and cannot possess
creates a climate of false expectation and
overblown idealism that is every bit as
damaging as clumsy efforts to discredit
it. Effective use of the Charter demands
acknowledgement of a less-than-revolu-
tionary idea: states are still the centre of
the international system, and power still
matters. With this in mind, there is an
institution, mandated by the Charter,
whose time may have come: the Military
Staff Committee.
III. San Francisco, The Military Staff
Committee And The Cold War
The debate between rhetoric and real-
ity is nothing new to the United Nations.
The San Francisco Conference was rife
with conflict between different approach-
es to post-war security. The South Afri-
can statesman, Jan Smuts, concluded that
the veto made the Charter “a complete
washout;”19 Canadians, led by Mackenzie
King, consistently argued that the distinc-
tion between great and small powers arbi-
trarily ignored the crucial role of “middle
powers;”20 still others, like Peter Fraser,
argued that the UN Charter failed in any
meaningful defence of territorial integrity
and collective security. What was there
to prevent New Zealand from losing her
North Island? “I have often thought,” the
diplomat J.V. Wilson wrote dryly, “this
could be represented as a statesmanlike
compromise.”21
There are essential conflicts within
the Charter: between what states can do
and what they will do; between the desire
to bind the great powers and the necessity
of securing their consent in order to do so;
between the sovereign equality of all states
and the fact that state capabilities differ
radically. Yet these conflicts were tied, at
San Francisco, to a functional question:
what sort of action will the UN be able
to take, against whom, and with what
materials? This question is as pertinent
today as it was then, because it pertains
not to the global order we would like to
have, but to managing the global order we
actually have.
At San Francisco, a young British
statesman answered that question. Glad-
wyn Jebb (later Lord Gladwyn) applied
himself to what collective security would
look like after the war. He proposed the
creation of the Military Staff Commit-
tee (MSC) so as to provide a functional,
continuous link between state militaries
and the Security Council. There were a
number of important considerations: as
military advice had to be based upon real-
istic assessments of what would be done,
military representatives were supposed to
remain linked with their respective servic-
es; in addition to the core representation
of the permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council, the MSC was also to include
representatives of those states contribut-
ing forces to a given action; in peace-
time, the MSC was meant to function as
a conventional chiefs of staff, preparing
plans, supervising garrison or occupation
forces, and organizing joint training and
exercises. The MSC was to supervise the
bilateral agreements between the Security
Council and member states regarding the
77
 precise nature of their military contribu-
tions to the UN, as well as to tender ad-
vice, prepare plans, and run operations.
In this way, the UN was to be provided
with a clear notion of global problems
and of the military materials at its dispos-
al, as well as the organizational capacity
to maximise those materials through con-
sidered planning and joint training. Jebb
thereby sought,
“An acceptable middle way between imprac-
ticable proposals for a completely interna-
tionalised police force… and proposals which
would, in fact, amount to doing nothing at
all beyond organising… what Mr. Lippmann
calls ‘nuclear alliances.’”
In principle, the MSC helped balance
the weight of the permanent members on
the Security Council. Since the MSC
would extend a share of decision-making
power to those states willing to contrib-
ute soldiers or resources to a mission, it
admitted equality among states willing
to make functional contributions to the
success of the UN, without diluting or
paralysing the Security Council with too
many members. As the MSC was to keep
track of national assets earmarked for
potential deployment through the UN,
as well as to plan joint exercises, it was
meant to indicate what the UN could do
with the forces and material that states
would permit it, which in turn would in-
form advance planning.
The MSC was supposed to play a vital
role alongside the Security Council. Why
did it fail? In part, 1946 was a bad year:
the great powers were heavily engaged and
jockeying for competitive positions all over
the world. The MSC was not well-regard-
ed by any power, including Britain, whose
Chiefs of Staff argued that the develop-
ment of nuclear alliances was inevitable.23
From the very first meeting of the MSC,
on 1 February 1946, it was bogged down,
with the Soviets attempting to embarrass
78
Britain over her commitments in Greece
and Indonesia and Britain attempting to
embarrass the Soviets over her high levels
of mobilisation in Eastern Europe.24 By
the end of 1946, as the US sought British
assistance in planning a ‘Dunkirk-style’
evacuation of Germany in the event of a
Soviet attack, the MSC was moribund.25
By mid-1947, the MSC accepted that it
was deadlocked.26
The MSC thus became a victim of
the Cold War. Strangely, it still exists and
meets in the twilight zone of UN bureau-
cracy. It is impossible to say what it does,
exactly, as it lacks so much as a website.
Certainly, it does not function as laid
down in the Charter. In its place, a range
of ad hoc arrangements was made through
the UN Secretariat, beginning with truce
supervision in 1948. The Secretariat, a
civilian bureaucracy, has become a mili-
tary planning staff when designing UN
missions, a diplomatic negotiator when
attempting to secure commitments from
member states, and a temporary Chiefs of
Staff when distributing resources and in-
structing UN forces on the ground (and
national contingents continue to answer
to their respective staff systems). As com-
mitments have multiplied over the last
sixteen years, it is unsurprising that the
Secretariat has been unable to cope ad-
equately with the existing load, let alone
anticipate future developments in world
politics. It was never meant to do either
of those things.
IV. A Military Staff Committee For
The Twenty-First Century
As we search for solutions to the
global problems of instability, insecurity,
disease, crime, and terrorism, it may be
tempting to argue that sovereignty is out-
moded. Yet sovereign states remain the
gold standard for effective organisation,
and the Charter was framed as a collective
security system for states. It will be easier
to utilise the Charter to strengthen co-
operation among states than it will be to
convince states to surrender more power
and authority, particularly as the UN does
not currently look like the best guardian of
said power and authority. In this respect,
the MSC has an advantage: it is already
in the Charter, states have already agreed
to it (in theory), and so there would be a
powerful mandate for making that part of
the Charter fully operational. Moreover,
as the MSC is a Security Council organ,
initial negotiations on its revival would
bypass those states who have been consis-
tently opposed to reform; such negotia-
tion might also help the P-5 to define and
settle some of their security rivalries.
The MSC could potentially solve sev-
eral of the major problems recently iden-
tified in UN operations. Lakhdar Bra-
himi’s report of August 2000 suggested
a number of important reforms: that the
Secretariat develop reasonable (as opposed
to ‘best-case scenario’) guidelines for UN
forces; that states help to provide UN
forces with up-to-date intelligence; that
the Secretariat provide realistic informa-
tion and refrain from telling the Security
Council “what it wants to hear;” that the
UN develop new information-gathering
and analysis capabilities. These were roles
originally mandated to the MSC, yet Bra-
himi’s structure of implementation builds
upon the ad hoc warren constructed in
the Secretariat over the last sixty years:
the use of Article 29 to create new ad hoc
organs of the Security Council in form-
ing peace missions; the development of
a ‘short list’ of potential special repre-
sentatives; and allowing states to retain
the initiative in deciding what forces or
resources they will earmark for potential
UN deployment. The recommendations
are all excellent, but for implementation,
the Brahimi Report simply (if pragmati-
cally) offered more of the same.27
Far from arid debates in New York,
the need for operational reform is very
clear. With the exception of disturbing,
systematic sexual abuse in the case of
the former, UN failings in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2005
bear an uncanny resemblance to those in
Rwanda in 1994. At the most basic level,
problems include:
• Tremendously complex lines of com-
munication and responsibility be-
tween national capitals, the Security
Council, the Secretariat, and local
UN representatives;
• The poor training and lack of equip-
ment which plagues some national
contingents;
• A lack of structured military com-
mand;
• The shady, informal provision of in-
formation to peacekeepers by various
intelligence organisations;
• The inability or unwillingness of ci-
vilian staff to follow essentially good
military advice.28
Even small catastrophes, such as the
recent deaths of four unarmed peace-
keepers in a UN observation post on the
Lebanese-Israeli border, call into question
the operational effectiveness of the UN.
The so-called ceasefire that peacekeepers
were observing had descended into war,
they had warned that Hezbollah was us-
ing their post as a shield, and they should
have been withdrawn.29 Reviving the
MSC could rectify some of these opera-
tional failings.
First, the MSC could be charged
with negotiating a round of definite
agreements between member states and
the Security Council (Article 43), with
a view to providing an understanding of
the nature of the forces at the Council’s
disposal. This approach, mandated by
the Charter, would avoid the problems
79
 associated with multilateral negotiations,
in which consensus is the hostage of the
lowest common denominator. Definite
military commitments, moreover, would
put an end to ad hoc UN planning and
intervention. Another major advantage
of using the MSC in this fashion is that
it would move UN military operations,
a Security Council responsibility, out of
the Secretariat, which is responsible to the
General Assembly. This, in turn, would
undercut states that systematically oppose
global advances on human rights, terror-
ism, or the responsibility to protect.
Second, the MSC could organise
joint planning and exercises (Article 46;
Article 47, paragraph 3). In the case
of planning, the MSC would be free to
shape responses to agreed threats like
crime or terror. Furthermore, the MSC
could be charged with planning for the
regulation of armaments, or of disarma-
ment (Article 47, paragraph 1). In the
case of exercises, the MSC would provide
an important arena for states, particularly
those in the developing world (e.g. Ban-
gladesh), to improve their peace-keeping
capabilities in conjunction with forces in
the developed world (e.g. Canada). This
would alleviate the current scratch nature
of UN military planning, as well as miti-
gating the “grab bag” character of many
UN forces. The question of adequate
force-readiness, mentioned in the Bra-
himi Report, could then be assessed (and
improved) by military, rather than civil-
ian, staff. At the same time, joint exercises
would foster ground-level understanding
between different national armed forces
and would provide an incentive for states
to negotiate robust Security Agreements.
Third, the MSC could extend par-
ticipation in Security Council decision-
making on a functional basis (Article 47,
paragraph 2). According to the Charter,
states not permanently represented on
the Security Council shall be “invited” to
80
sit on the MSC when the “efficient dis-
charge” of its responsibilities so require.
This provision was made in 1944 at the
behest of Lester Pearson, the Canadian
statesman, in conjunction with Gladwyn
Jebb, Alexander Cadogan (UK) and Jack
Hickerson (US).30 At the time, it was
supposed to mean that MSC membership
and decision-making would be extended
to those states making military contribu-
tions to a Chapter VI or Chapter VII ac-
tion. The composition of the MSC was
thus meant to be relatively fluid, changing
in response to different threats, missions,
and initiatives. This was meant to provide
another incentive for the negotiation of
robust security agreements between states
and the Security Council, as it would pro-
vide a way for states to retain control over
their own forces within the context of a
more unified command structure.
The MSC is supposed to provide a de-
cision-making role to states making func-
tional contributions to UN success. Here-
tofore, the debate about Security Council
expansion has been predicated on regional
distribution, economic power, and popu-
lation. Yet the Security Council is about
military capability. It may be that Japan,
Brazil and Germany deserve permanent
membership, but based on participation
in UN interventions over the last fifteen
years, Canada, Ghana, or Jordan also have
strong claims to membership by virtue of
a consistent commitment to internation-
alism. And of all the states enthusiasti-
cally endorsed as potential candidates for
permanent seats on the Security Council,
only India possesses a solid track record
of participation in UN missions. Surely
such a track record should be as legitimate
a measure of the Security Council as the
size or geographical distribution of the
states sitting on it. The MSC, by extend-
ing a decision-making role to those will-
ing to make definite contributions, could
increase the legitimacy of Security Coun-
cil decisions while reserving pride of place
to those states willing to make a serious
commitment to global order.
V. Conclusion
William Durch et al., in an exhaus-
tive study of the Brahimi Report and the
future of UN peacekeeping operations, in
2003, noted that,
“The United Nations has no single, co-located
team dedicated to managing information,
tracking multiple crisis and conflict trends,
recommending preventive action based on
those trends or anticipating international
UN requirements for either peacekeeping or
peacebuilding. Repeated efforts to create such
a capacity have been resisted by UN member
states.”31
The Charter provided that capability. The
MSC failed in the Cold War, its role was
adopted piecemeal by the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, and ‘”n Larger
Freedom” classed it as an anachronism
(alongside trusteeship) to be erased from
the Charter.
Yet the Charter, through the MSC,
provided the UN with a military capa-
bility in excess of anything it has ever
employed and in line with the sort of in-
ternal and external reforms currently on
the table. That capability was wasted in
the context of the ideological conflicts of
the Cold War. While recent divergence
between the great powers is alarming, the
conflict between them is nowhere near as
rigid as it was two decades ago. The door
has not shut on the reform agenda; within
the context of a limited, pragmatic pro-
gramme of reform, it might be possible to
revive the MSC. At a moment when UN
reform is stalled in the Secretariat and in
the General Assembly, it may be time to
move the site of reform to the Security
Council, and to develop the organs en-
visaged by the Charter as residing there.
Undoubtedly, it will require imagination
to develop an effective MSC, but such
an initiative would be backed by a pow-
erful existing mandate. Defending his
proposed reforms to the United Nations,
Kofi Annan called for a “San Francisco
moment.” After examining the Charter
adopted at San Francisco, I could not
agree more.
Endnotes
1. Report of the High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change:
“A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility.” UN Document
A/59/565, 2.12.04. Page 21. available
at: <http://www.un.org/secureworld/
report.pdf>.
2. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All,” UN
Document A/59.2005, 21.3.05.
Paragraph 81. available at: <http://
w w w. u n . o r g / l a r g e r f r e e d o m /
contents.htm>.
3. Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Security,
Solidarity and Sovereignty: The
Grand Themes of UN Reform,’ The
American Journal of International
Law, 99/3 (July 2005), page 623.
4. Independent Inquiry Committee,
‘The Management of the United
Nations Oil for Food Program,’
7.9.05, available at: <http://www.iic-
offp.org/documents.htm>.
5. James Traub, The Best Intentions:
Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era
of American World Power (London:
Bloomsbury, 2006), pages 373-376.
6. Steven Edwards, ‘New Rights Body
Same as Old,’ The National Post,
10.5.06, page A15.
7. United Nations Human Rights
Council, Resolution A/HRC/4/L.12,
26.3.07, page 4, available at: <http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/gmainec.
aspx>.
8. The Economist, vol. 383, ‘Bad
Counsel,’ 7.4.07 (no. 8,523), pages
67-8.
9. Financial Times, ‘Blair’s UN
Proposals,’ 29.5.06, page 12.
10. Mark Malloch Brown, ‘UN needs
US, US needs UN to face challenges,’
6.6.06 (published 7.6.06), available
at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2006/dsgsm287.doc.htm>.
11. Kofi Annan, ‘A Moment of Truth
81
 for the United Nations,’ Financial
Times, 12.6.06, page 19.
12. James Bone & Richard Beeston,
‘Apologise or We’ll Cut Your
Funding,’ The Times, 9.6.06, page
43.
13. The Economist, vol. 381, ‘Bolton
Resigns: His UN-doing,’ 9.12.06 (no.
8,507), page 52. The Administrative
and Budget Committee is the fifth
committee of the UN General
Assembly.
14. Jasper Gerard, ‘To Save the World,
First Save the UN,’ The Sunday Times,
11.6.06, page 8.
15. Traub, op. cit. pages 331.
16. Warren Hoge, ‘At the UN, a Mixed
View of Bolton’s Tenure,’ The New
York Times, 5.12.06, page 17.
17. United Nations General Assembly,
Resolution 60/283 (document A/
Res/60/283), 17.8.06, available at:
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/
resguide/r60.htm>.
18. United Nations General Assembly,
Resolution 61/256 (document A/
Res/61/256), 15.3.07. United
Nations General Assembly,
Resolution 61/257 (document A/
Res/61/257), 15.3.07. Both available
at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/
resguide/r61.htm>.
19. J.C. Smuts, diary, 28.5.45. South
Africa National Archive: Smuts
Papers, vol. 316/1, folios 207-208.
20. Mackenzie King, Ottawa, to Lord
Cranborne, 2.8.44. National
Archives of Canada: King Papers,
vol. J4/H-1524/338, folios 232,871-
232,874.
21. J.V. Wilson, Liverpool, to C.A.
Berendsen, 17.8.44. Archives New
Zealand: accession EA W2619, vol.
111/1/1, part 1.
22. Gladwyn Jebb, ‘The Military
Aspect of Any Post-War Security
Organisation,’ PHP (43) 24a (final),
3.2.44. Public Record Office: CAB
81/41, folios 238-40.
23. Gladwyn Jebb, minute (to Richard
Law & Alexander Cadogan),
19.2.44. Public Record Office: FO
371/40740, file U1751/748/70.
Also see: Julian Lewis, Changing
Directions: British Military Planning
for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-
1947, 2nd ed. (London, 2003), pages
39-40 & 72-73.
24. Ernest Bevin, London, to Clement
Attlee, 10.46. Public Record
Office: FO 800/508. Bevin told the
Commonwealth that ‘he was not
82
prepared to be put into the dock’
over British troop commitments.
Commonwealth Delegate Meeting,
25.11.46. Public Record Office: DO
35/1892, file W.R. 208/5/29.
25. General Ismay, London, to Clement
Attlee, 5.7.46. Public Record Office:
PREM 8/171.
26. Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations:
Variants of Collective Security,’
in Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining
International Relations Since 1945
(Oxford, 1996), pages 318-9.
27. Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations, United
Nations Document A55/305-
S/2000/809, 21.8.00, available at:
<http://www.un.org/peace/reports/
peace_operations/>, pages viii-xv.
28. For the DRC, see: Traub, op. cit.,
pages 339-358. For Rwanda, see:
Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, Shake
Hands with the Devil: The Failure
of Humanity in Rwanda (London,
2004).
29. Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, ‘Kofi
Annan’s Hasty Rush to Judgment,’
The Globe and Mail, 27.7.06, page
A15.
30. Lester Pearson, Washington, to
Mackenzie King, 1.9.44; Lester
Pearson, Washington, to Norman
Robertson, 2.9.44; and Lester
Pearson, Washington, to Mackenzie
King, 6.9.44. National Archives
of Canada: accession RG25, vol.
5708/7-V(s), part 3.
31. William J. Durch et al., ‘The Brahimi
Report and the Future of UN Peace
Operations,’ The Henry L. Stimson
Centre (2003), page xix.
About the Author
Andrew Baker is an American who is
finishing his doctorate in international
relations at the University of Oxford.
He studies post-war order, particularly
the United Nations. He lectures at
the University of Buckingham.
Bringing Dawn to Darfur
Zachary Hindin, George Washington University
R. Benjamin Nelson, Georgetown University
Executive Summary
This paper addresses the systemic
problems that have led to instability in Su-
dan for decades, most recently manifested
in the ongoing genocide in Darfur, and
works to clarify the misconceptions about
Sudan that have been propagated by the
mainstream international media. In ad-
dition, both domestic and international
policy recommendations are provided to
address the stimuli of this conflict.
This paper includes:
• An historical and demographic over-
view of the socio-political climate in
Sudan.
• An analysis of the colonial legacy in
Sudan and its polarizing effects to-
day.
• An examination of how Sudanese
ethnic, racial, religious, and social
identity contribute to violence in the
country.
• A diagnosis of the problems with the
current African Union peacekeeping
operation in Sudan with recommen-
dations for an effective peacekeeping
force in the future, including:
• An increase in the number of
troops,
• More sophisticated equipment with
regards to communications-, intel-
ligence-, and aerial-technology
• A more comprehensive mandate
for troops, and
• Stringent multilateral, targeted
sanctions on Sudan, accompanied
by a joint divestment campaign
aimed at companies who do busi-
ness with Sudan’s National Con-
gress party
• A discussion of possible punitive
measures to be taken against the gov-
ernment of Sudan with a focus on
international sanctions.
• A review of the peace process that
ended Sudan’s most recent civil war.
• Policy recommendations using the
aforementioned peace process as a
model for mediation in Darfur that
would stipulate:
• A limit on executive power in Su-
dan’s governmental structure,
• The means for a robust civil soci-
ety to emerge,
• The just distribution of resources,
• An African Union-monitored
campaign led by the Sudanese
government to end the Janja-
weed’s paramilitary operations.
I. Introduction
For nearly four years, the govern-
ment of Sudan (Khartoum) has spon-
sored a genocide in Darfur, Sudan. The
largely incalculable death toll has been
estimated to be as high as 400,000 with
2.89 million displaced.1 Even the United
Nations (UN), notorious for conserva-
tive casualty-estimates in conflicts with
political repercussions, reports that Dar-
fur has been “the scene of hundreds of
thousands of civilian deaths, mass rape,
massive forced displacement and other
abuses during the past three years.”2 At
the state level, responsibility for interven-
tion was passed from global superpowers
to the United Nations. Regrettably, po-
litical roadblocks within the UN Secu-
rity Council have stymied any concrete,
effective security measures in Darfur.
83
 The ill-equipped, under-funded African
Union (AU) has shouldered the task of
halting the killings. As millions of in-
nocent people continue to suffer the ef-
fects of the 21st century’s first genocide,
it is imperative that the conflict and all
its elements be assessed. This assessment
is necessary not only for the scholarly en-
deavor of developing a conceptual model
of contemporary intrastate conflict and
serving academia concerned with future
conflict-prevention, -management, and
-resolution strategies—but more press-
ingly to prescribe actions that will build a
lasting peace in Darfur.
II. Background: Country & Conflict
Sudan became an independent state
in 1956, is the largest country in Africa,
and borders nine other countries. It is lo-
cated in northeastern Africa, just south of
Egypt. Since gaining its independence,
Sudan has only seen eleven years of peace.
The collisions of culture, race and religion
have been the traditional scapegoats for
Sudan’s civil unrest. About 70 percent of
the Sudanese people are Muslim, while
approximately 30 percent are Christians
and animists. Fifty-two percent of Suda-
nese are ‘black’ and 39 percent are ‘Arab.’
Decades of interethnic amalgamation,
however, have rendered such demograph-
ics less than precise. In Sudan, Arabic
is the official language.3 Composed of
approximately six million people and
200,000 square miles of sandy plains,
Darfur is located in western Sudan. Its size
is comparable to that of Texas or France.
Systemic structural inequality, cou-
pled with political opportunism and en-
vironmental disaster, has produced the
conflict in Darfur today. In its time as
a British colony, Sudan’s Nile Valley (lo-
cated in eastern Sudan) enjoyed the lion’s
share of foreign investment and political
favor, an inequity that marginalized the
84
western Darfur region. In 2000, a dev-
astating drought besieged the Nile River
Basin, causing those affected to move into
Darfur, the area of Sudan with the most
water. Upset that Khartoum endorsed
such inequitable competition over the al-
ready sparse resource, Darfuris petitioned
for recompense. For three years, Darfuris
waited for government action, but to no
avail.
The first incident of physical violence
occurred in February 2003 when a para-
military group calling itself the Darfur
Liberation Front attacked a government
headquarters in the Jebel Marra district
of Darfur. Soon thereafter, the Darfur
Liberation Front bisected, forming what
are now the two main active opposi-
tion groups: the Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA) and the Justice and Equality Move-
ment (JEM).4 The two groups attacked
a number of government outposts, police
stations, and military convoys. With its
troops stretched thinly along the south-
ern and eastern borders, Khartoum could
not afford to relocate its forces to Dar-
fur. In order to quell the SLA and JEM,
Khartoum armed unemployed, impover-
ished army irregulars, bandits and even
released-prisoners to form the Janjaweed.5
In 2004, the Janjaweed militias attacked
villagers in western Darfur, leaving hun-
dreds of thousands of people dead and
displacing millions.6
On May 5, 2006, a faction of the
SLA, led by Minni Arkou Minawi, signed
an accord with Khartoum. The agree-
ment was dismissed by the rest of the SLA
and the whole of the JEM.7 Khartoum
preyed upon the fractioned resistance
movements in a campaign of internation-
al public diplomacy aimed at denouncing
the SLA and JEM as terrorist organiza-
tions. It should be noted that this tactic
(appeasing a small camp within govern-
ment opposition groups in order to con-
demn the bulk of its political adversaries
as wanton violence-mongers) was previ-
ously employed by the government in its
handling of the Sudan People’s Libera-
tion Army, their main opposition in the
Second Sudanese Civil War. Khartoum’s
affinity for subversive disinformation is
characteristic of manipulation by the elite
in the world’s most fragile states.
The Sudan Liberation Army
One of two core rebel groups fight-
ing against Khartoum and their proxy—
the Janjaweed militia—is the SLA. The
SLA has recently splintered into factions,
largely due to the agreement that Khar-
toum signed with Minawi, the leader of
its largest faction and now considered
an ally of Khartoum. This has alienated
the people of Darfur and even his own
tribe, the Zaghawa. Moreover, the larg-
est tribe in Sudan, the Fur, has rejected
the agreement. These dissidents comprise
the remainder of the SLA, whose aim is
to overthrow the national government in
Khartoum and “create a united, demo-
cratic Sudan.”8 The two most prominent
leaders within the movement are Ahmed
Abdulshafi Bassey and the immensely
popular Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nur.
The SLA boasts membership to the um-
brella opposition organization in Sudan,
the National Democratic Alliance.
According to German Sudan ana-
lyst, Uwe Friescecke, the government
of Uganda is a major arms supplier for
the SLA. Uganda’s public support of the
late Sudanese secessionist, John Garang,
and Khartoum’s support of the Lord’s
Resistance Army, a paramilitary group
that terrorizes northern Uganda, gives
plausible credence to Friesceke’s claim.9
In addition, credible third-party observ-
ers, including the International Crisis
Group and the United Nations, have
documented arms deliveries from Chad,
Eritrea, and Libya to the SLA.10
The Justice and Equality Movement
Led by Khalil Ibrahim, the JEM
draws upon “The Black Book: Imbalance
of Power and Wealth in the Sudan” as a
charter for its fundamental principles.
(Commonly abbreviated as “The Black
Book,” this should not be confused with
“The Black Book of Communism,” a
book of controversial acclaim published
in France in 1997.) “The Black Book,”
published in 2000, discusses the various
forms of structural violence that victim-
ize the people of Darfur, characterized
mostly by inequity in resource distribu-
tion and political representation. The
JEM champions Islamist ideology and
finds favor with the fundamentalist wing
of opposition parties in Sudan. Khartoum
has linked the JEM to formerly jailed Su-
danese religious and political leader, Dr.
Hassan al-Turabi. Turabi has denied the
alleged ties to the JEM. The JEM is also
an acknowledged affiliate of the Eastern
Front, a rebel group concentrated along
the Eritrean border (eastern Sudan), sub-
stantiating Khartoum’s accusations that
Eritrea has “instigated, financed…sup-
plied arms to, and set up training camps”
for the JEM.11 In addition, captured JEM
operatives have been found with Chadian
identification.12 Chad, another accused
supporter of opposition groups in Darfur,
denies its ties to the group and claims that
Khartoum is attempting to “export geno-
cide” from Darfur.13
The Government of Sudan
Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan al-
Bashir, has ruled over an authoritarian
republic since he led the military coup
that placed him in power in June 1989.
Immediately assuming the positions of
Chief of State, Prime Minister, Chief of
the Armed Forces and Minister of De-
fense, al-Bashir suspended the Sudanese
Parliament indefinitely, expelled the po-
litical party system, and stifled the na-
85
 tional press. He was appointed president
in what was considered a fixed election in
1993. His regime is characterized by the
markings of fanatical authoritarianism.
In 1991 al-Bashir created a domestic se-
curity apparatus, the “Public Order Po-
lice,” to enforce the laws (predominantly
drawn from shari’a law) that his newly
appointed judges (exclusively Muslim)
handed down. While domestic political
opposition to al-Bashir’s regime is given
quasi-freedom to associate, their capabil-
ity to effect change in Sudan’s politics is
insubstantial.
Furthermore, al-Bashir has been ac-
cused of maintaining close ties with Is-
lamic extremists, most notably Osama
Bin Laden. The President’s cabinet con-
sists of senior members of the National
Congress, Sudan’s official political party
(previously called the National Islamic
Front). Among these individuals is
Ahmed Haroun, the recent recipient of
an indictment by the International Crim-
inal Court, which charges him with 51
counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.14 Al-Bashir, the poster-child
and the single most powerful component
of the regime in Khartoum, rules Sudan
in conjunction with his cabinet and a
shadowy inner-ring of advisors made up
of the likes of Mr. Haroun.
With regards to the conflict in Dar-
fur, President al-Bashir has downplayed
the violence, even directly accusing the
United States of “exaggerating” the situ-
ation in Darfur, and claiming that Darfur
is “quite calm.”15 This does not bode well
for the legitimacy of Sudanese channels of
conflict management or post-conflict rec-
ompense. Al-Bashir has remained stead-
fast in his opposition to the proposed
UN peacekeeping force that would secure
Darfur. Al-Bashir defends his position
by likening a breach of Sudanese national
sovereignty by an international peace-
keeping force to the situation ensuing
86
Operation Iraqi Freedom.16 Regardless
of the different political quandaries the
authoritarian faces, President al-Bashir
seems to craft policy with only one prior-
ity: the preservation and expansion of his
own power.
The Janjaweed
The Janjaweed are often referred to as
a ‘militia’, though they are far from an or-
ganized and trained unit of civilian mili-
tary servicemen. While the Janjaweed
most recently fell under the media’s spot-
light for its role in the ethnic cleansing of
Darfur, its origins date back two decades.
Beginning in 1987, violent battles broke
out in Darfur between the herders (pre-
dominantly Arab) and the farmers (pre-
dominantly non-Arab) over land claims.
The Janjaweed draws its membership
from the ‘herder-class’; however, it should
be understood that the Janjaweed do
not rally around any common ideology.
What little public diplomacy they have
engaged in is inundated by racist rhetoric
that finds no root in any sound political
conviction.
While Janjaweed fighters supposedly
share a “pure Arab origin,” they are more
united by the charter, given to them by
Khartoum, to rape, pillage, and plunder
Darfur with absolute impunity. Under
international pressure, Khartoum has
renounced any ties to the Janjaweed, al-
though innumerable pieces of evidence
speak to the contrary. By early 2006,
many of the Janjaweed militiamen were
assimilated into the Sudanese Armed
Forces, virtually guaranteeing their re-
prieve from indictment in any court of
law.
III. The Sudanese Identity:
A Frayed Patchwork
Just as an audience must be acquaint-
ed not only with the actors on a stage, but
the setting in which their roles play out,
those seeking a thorough understanding
of any intra-state conflict must assess the
identities of the actors involved within
the context of an overarching national
identity. With reference to the Sudanese
conflict, this task is not just a perfunc-
tory chore of conflict analysis. Rather,
understanding the identities of the dif-
ferent groups and subgroups involved in
any one of a number of antagonisms is, in
itself, a most onerous one. The concept
of identity in Sudan is convoluted beyond
belief for those of us who can describe
ourselves in terms of our national borders,
our religious beliefs, and our race. History
has blurred these factors for the Sudanese.
Thus, a comprehensive understanding
of the nature of the political conflict be-
tween the rebel movement (comprised of
the SLA, JEM, and a number of splinter
groups) and Khartoum (vis-à-vis the Jan-
jaweed) necessitates an exploration of the
identity conflict that is part and parcel of
Sudan’s social landscape.
As Amir Idris argues in Conflict
and Politics of Identity in Sudan: “…the
history of nationalism in the Sudan has
been the history of competing political
claims over the identity of the postcolo-
nial state.”17 In colonial Sudan, concepts
of nationalism were born out of social
movements that derived their legitimacy
from regional distribution of different so-
cial strata. These notions of Sudanese na-
tionalism were more legitimate since they
were, for the most part, representative of
the groups that bolstered them. However,
these movements (the products of a colo-
nial state in which one section of society
systemically enslaved the other) consis-
tently excluded certain groups of people
from the arena of identity formation. As
a result, when Sudan was declared inde-
pendent, those who were excluded from
the token rite of determining a national
identity inadvertently assimilated their
colonial identities, effectively substantiat-
ing the racial and ethnic barriers that mar-
ginalized them for more than a century.
The reverberations of this colonial legacy
were manifested throughout the decades
that followed the inaugural raising of the
Sudanese flag. The institutionalized ani-
mosity between the peoples of Sudaokn’s
North and South, unfoundedly based in
historical inter-ethnic grievance, is a pris-
tine example of this tragic inheritance.
The ethnic identity of the Sudan’s
population, and specifically of the Dar-
fur region, is an extraordinarily complex
mosaic. As in most African countries,
one’s particular tribe constituted the most
basic macro-societal unit in pre-colonial
Sudan. The more prominent tribes in Su-
dan include the Dinka, Fur, Masalit, and
Zaghawa.18 Today, these same people are
often portrayed in the media as ‘Blacks’
or ‘Arabs.’ The truth is that the popula-
tion of Darfur, and Sudan in general, is
an interwoven mesh of people who are
simultaneously Black and Arab. This
confusion is exacerbated by the fact that
some ‘Blacks’ (those descended from the
ancient region of Nubia) have lost their
language and adopted Arabic, while oth-
ers with whom they share a common
lineage practice forms of established hy-
brid-languages (referred to as ‘entrenched
diglossia’), while still others have retained
their original tongue.19
Contrary to what most mainstream
media outlets report, race is politically
obsolete in Sudan. In terms of pigmen-
tation, all Sudanese are black. However,
racist terminology has surfaced through
intercultural animosities, distinguishing
the “zurug” (a racial pejorative for Arabic)
from the “Arab.” Differences are crudely
distinguished by facial features includ-
ing the shape of one’s nose and/or the
thickness of their lips.20 In his account
of the ethnic make-up of Darfur, Gerard
Prunier, renowned ethnographer and Af-
87
 rica analyst, notes, “…this perception is
influenced by what the observer knows
of the ethnic background of the person s/
he is confronting. Thus a very Negroid
Rizzeyqat will remain an “Arab” while a
pale and thin-featured Zaghawa will be
an “African.”21 For the sake of political
correctness, any discussion of race in Su-
dan is presently carried out in the context
of a country that is now homogenously
pigmented as a result of intermarriage,
concubinage, and other gradual processes
of racial integration.
In terms of religion, more than half
of Sudan’s total population is Muslim,
most living in the north where Muslims
constitute at least 75 percent of the popu-
lation. The relatively few Christians tend
to live in the south alongside a sizeable
minority of animists.22 This distribution
is often portrayed as having a demarcating
line of division between an antagonistic
‘Muslim North’ and a victimized ‘Chris-
tian South.’ The most fleeting glance at
the demographic makeup of Darfur re-
veals that it is both Muslim and north-
ern. “Yet,” as Idris points out, “like the
people of the Southern Sudan, [Darfuris]
have been oppressed, deprived, and are
the least developed economically due to
the century-old colonial subjugation and
relentless exploitation.”23
The current violence in Darfur proves
that the adoption of a majoritarian Islam
could not counter the impact of a his-
torical colonial legacy that superficially
emphasized the importance of “an Arab
origin.” Therefore, it is evident in the case
of Darfur that geographical, religious,
and ethnic differences work to exacerbate
problems stemming from a colonial lega-
cy that utilized irrational hatreds to divide
and conquer a people.
While Khartoum’s violent incursions
into Darfur (via the Janjaweed) have been
portrayed as a result of the government’s
Islamist-leaning disposition, one could
88
look to the case of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi
for contrary evidence. Despite the fact
that al-Turabi was a pivotal figure in the
movement to force shari’a (Islamic law)
upon Sudan’s non-Muslims, Khartoum
has labeled him an enemy of the state. In-
deed Khartoum’s campaign prioritizes the
extraction and inequitable distribution of
resources in lieu of some theocratic cru-
sade (as implied by the depiction of the
conflict as an eruption between Christian
Blacks and Muslim Arabs). Utilizing eth-
nic identity markers in language to paint
ethnicity, itself, as the cause of conflict is
tantamount to a dangerously flawed syllo-
gism. Mainstream news agencies’ overuse
of such language represents their failure to
accurately portray the situation in Darfur
and, furthermore, impedes the reparative
process of establishing a self-sustained cli-
mate of social justice in Sudan.
IV. Darfur in Context
Within Sudan, wealth is dispropor-
tionately concentrated in Khartoum. The
razed shanty villages that once comprised
Darfur and the general paucity of South
Sudan sharply contrast with the grandeur
of Khartoum. Speculators see Khartoum
emerging as “a new Dubai.”24 With one
of the fastest growing economies in Af-
rica, Khartoum is in the process of build-
ing, among myriad development projects,
a multi-billion-dollar complex of “gleam-
ing offices, duplexes and golf courses that
will turn Khartoum, it is hoped, into the
commercial and financial hub of Islamist
East Africa.”25 With billions of dollars in
oil-revenues, President al-Bashir’s osten-
tatious hyper-development of Khartoum
is emblematic of the structural inequity
that keeps Darfuris shackled to poverty.
In the wake of its destruction, Darfur will
be hard-pressed to resuscitate its modest
economy, primarily based on subsistence
farming. Khartoum is a drain to which
the entirety of Sudan’s resources are being look at the diplomatic process that ended
siphoned, quite literally leaving periph- a half-century of civil war in Sudan will
eral Darfur out to dry. be interpreted to extrapolate the designs
Through an African lens of analysis, for what a sustainable and just Darfuri
Darfur is merely a pawn in regional power peace process ought to look like. Up to
politics. The grim conditions in Darfur now, this article has attempted to map the
provide Sudan’s neighbors with an excel- conflict in Darfur diagnostically. Here-
lent opportunity to proliferate anti-Khar- after, a more prescriptive lens of analysis
toum propaganda, all too often diverting will address the issues outlined thus far, in
attention away from their own corrup- addition to several new ones raised in the
tion. Chadian President Idriss Déby em- following pages.
bodies this regrettable trend: It is com-
mon knowledge that Déby presides over V. An AMIS Amiss:
one of the single most corrupt regimes in The Politics of Peacekeeping in Sudan
the world today. Déby has shown no hesi-
On August 31, 2006, the UN Secu-
tation in lining his pockets with World
rity Council approved Resolution 1706,
Bank loans intended for Chad’s poor.
which called for the linking of the current
Unfortunately, with international atten-
UN mission in southern Sudan (UNMIS)
tion skewed toward Darfur, Déby remains
with a major operational front in Darfur.
largely unthreatened. The government
Specifically, the resolution authorized the
elite in a relatively less unstable Chad
deployment of 22,500 UN troops and ci-
continue to prey upon national resourc-
vilian police to Darfur. The force was to
es while thousands of Chadians remain
be endowed with a robust mandate for
crippled by abject destitution. Moreover,
civilian protection and humanitarian re-
Darfur is a prime opportunity for Sudan’s
lief. Tragically, on account of the United
less amicable neighbors to settle old scores
Nation’s vulnerability to diplomatic chi-
with Khartoum without having to pledge
canery, UNSCR 1706 was never real-
troops. By continuing to supply cash,
ized beyond the chambers of its Security
arms, and training to rebel movements in
Council. Seven and a half months later,
Darfur, Sudan’s regional adversaries (most
on April 15th, 2007, the Sudanese gov-
notably Libya, Chad, the Central African
ernment accepted a UN deployment of
Republic, Uganda, and Eritrea) can attack
3,000 peacekeepers with a squadron of at-
Khartoum without the inconveniences of
tack helicopters, ending months of resis-
waging a conventional offensive.
tance to the United Nation’s contribution
Having identified both the underly-
to the largely impotent African Union’s
ing issues spurring genocide in Sudan and
peacekeeping mission in Sudan (AMIS).26
the major political players associated with
Though Khartoum’s most recent conces-
it, further analysis will take a more criti-
sion does represent an important transfor-
cal approach to assessing the situation in
mation in its relationship with the United
Darfur through three intellectual frame-
Nations, the international community
works. First, policy recommendations
would be wrong to celebrate it as a water-
will be drawn from an evaluative review
shed victory. While Khartoum baits its
of the peacekeeping mission in Sudan
courting diplomats with incremental (if
and the obstacles it faces. Subsequently,
not trivial) compromises, the situation in
different punitive measures that could be
Darfur still reflects the direst case of hu-
taken against the Sudanese government
man plight in the twenty-first century.
will be considered. Finally, an in-depth
89
 Khartoum has decried proposed
schemes of international intervention in
Darfur, evoking its inviolable sovereignty.
President Omar al-Bashir’s administra-
tion is at best willfully negligent, and at
worst overtly predatory. Insofar as one
can respect the sanctity of Khartoum’s
perverse rule, it is telling to look at ulteri-
or motives that Khartoum would have for
rejecting the magnitude of intervention
called for by UNSCR 1706. There is no
debate about the operational tenability of
AMIS; due to its insufficient size, lack of
modern technology, and feeble mandate,
it has been written off as clearly ineffec-
tive.27 Thus far, the West has refrained
from staging any kind of military inter-
vention in Sudan, the president of which
has declared his country “a graveyard for
any foreign troops.”28 While implement-
ing multilateral, targeted economic sanc-
tions may effectively strong-arm Khar-
toum into accepting a substantial UN
force, more direct and immediate mea-
sures should be taken to buttress AMIS
and slow the rate of civilian death. Before
any diplomatically coercive measures are
discussed, a look at the structural prob-
lems AMIS has been facing on the ground
in Darfur is in order.
Insufficient Size
Strategists use two determinant ratios
to project the necessary size of a peace-
keeping force. A peacekeeping force
can be based on the proportion either of
“peacekeeping troops to population” or of
“peacekeeping troops to hostile forces.”
Calculated either way, the AMIS force is
less than a third of what is required.29 By
that logic, AMIS should be comprised of
at least 20,000 troops, albeit even this es-
timate would err on the conservative side.
Currently, there are 6,171 AMIS troops
serving with 1,560 civilian police who
now operate alongside the 3,000-strong
supplemental UN force.30 With the ex-
90
pansive conflict-zones in Darfur stretch-
ing 256,000 square-kilometers, the cur-
rent troop count leaves one peacekeeper
for every 26 square kilometers. Thinly
stretched as it is, AMIS is forced to con-
centrate in certain locations, ignoring ci-
vilian populations in others.31
Inadequate Equipment
From the beginning, AMIS has been
hampered by sub-standard equipment.
Until 2005, their best maps came from
1942 Soviet intelligence. The maps were
in Russian and at a scale of 1:200,000.32
Lacking an infrastructure-oriented global
positioning system, the troops are forced
to rely on local guides to lead them to the
villages they are supposed to be protecting
from the Janjaweed. The group of guides
is comprised of indigenous peoples who
are extremely familiar with Sudan’s large-
ly unnavigable terrain. The mission also
lacks communications equipment and an
intelligence-gathering apparatus. For the
most part, commanders have to archai-
cally relay information to units via radio
or written messages.33 A 2005 Brook-
ings Institution report on AMIS bluntly
states:
“Lack of planning and establishing an in-
telligence infrastructure within AMIS meant
that there was no routine way to gather and
analyze intelligence on either the government
forces and their militias or the various rebel
groups...AMIS force headquarters is blind
when it comes to intelligence…”34
In order to improve AMIS dispatch
capabilities, troops need to be linked
through a satellite-based communications
network and supplied with more and fast-
er transport vehicles. A report released by
the Center for Technology and National
Security Policy describes this network
as necessary to forming a ‘net-capable
force’:
“The principal building-blocks of net-capable
combat forces are: high-quality combat and
special operations forces; deployable sensors
and other intelligence sensors; high-speed data
links to fuse and disseminate intelligence prod-
ucts; command and control nodes; ground
mobility; logistics support for small/light forc-
es; rotary- and fixed-wing air[craft] for mobil-
ity and strike; and precision weapons.”35
Essentially, what the above describes is
tantamount to a highly advanced combat
unit with acute knowledge of the battle-
field in the style of the American or Brit-
ish Special Forces.
Lack of Aerial Support
Moreover, in order to hinder Khar-
toum’s firebombing of villages, the no-fly
zone called for by UNSCR 1591 urgently
needs to be implemented. The Janja-
weed’s capabilities on the ground will be
severely checked without air cover. The
UN Security Council, collectively, needs
to begin planning the logistics of imple-
menting a no-fly zone or, at the very least,
introducing radar-jamming balloons that
would make Darfur’s skies un-flyable.
France currently maintains limited air
capacity in Chad (including four Mirage
F1 fighter planes, two Transall C160 lo-
gistics and in-flight refueling planes, and
a non-permanent KC 135 supply plane)
and a military base in Djibouti.36 In ad-
dition, Djbouti hosts the only American
military base on the African continent.37
Given their respective postures, France
and the United States are primed to pro-
vide the foundation for the kind of un-
dertaking called for by UNSCR 1591.38
The closest that the United Nations has
come to initiating this kind of mission
is including attack helicopters in its sup-
port package to the African Union. These
aircraft, however, will be subject to the
same toothless mandate that UN and AU
troops serve under.
Impotent Mandate
The African Union’s mandate in Dar-
fur allows troops to use force to protect
civilians but not to conduct an offensive.
The presence of AMIS forces has success-
fully deterred attacks from the Janjaweed,
who have proven unwilling to confront
any armed personnel, and instead focus
solely on unarmed civilians.39 Pursuing
an exclusively defensive strategy however,
is not in AMIS’s best interest. As men-
tioned earlier, with such a small number
of troops only a few villages can be pro-
tected at any given time. In order to make
the best use of its forces, troops need to
be able to move from village to village,
actively engaging the haphazard, inexpe-
rienced Janjaweed militia.
VI. Building Leverage with Punitive
Measures
By refusing to cooperate with the
international community, Sudan has re-
peatedly bought itself time to continue its
assault on Darfuris. In January 2006 and
then again in September, a panel of ex-
perts commissioned by the UN Security
Council identified sixty-eight individuals
deserving to be sanctioned as they were
deemed a detriment to regional stability.40
Because of diplomatic impasses within the
United Nations, the petition fell on deaf
ears. UNSCR 1706 was the first instance
in which the international community
had established and passed a cogent strat-
egy for dealing with Khartoum. And yet,
upon its predictable rejection by Khar-
toum, it too has floundered. Such timid
behavior on behalf of the United Nations
is all too reminiscent of the League of Na-
tions’ failure to deliver on its promise of
collective security.
However, by enacting specific puni-
tive measures against Sudan, the interna-
tional community can build the leverage
necessary to pressure Khartoum into ac-
cepting an international presence. Such
measures should include:
91
 • Spotlighting individuals in the Su-
danese leadership who are guilty of
war-crimes/crimes against humanity
(the reports released by the Interna-
tional Crisis Group serve as exem-
plary models of this).
• Targeted sanctions that would freeze
the assets of high-ranking officials
within the Sudanese government.
• Divestment campaigns targeting
companies and banking institutions
that do business with Sudan’s nation-
alized companies.
• International embargoes on Suda-
nese oil.
• Capital market sanctions (i.e. de-list-
ing companies that do business with
Sudan from the Stock Exchange).
• International Criminal Court in-
dictments (while the arrest warrants
issued in May 2007 against for-
mer state interior minister Ahmed
Haroun and militia commander Ali
Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman
are not likely to materialize anytime
soon, their diplomatic signals are
undeniable).41
These methods have a history of strong
influence on dealings with Khartoum.
For example, the reasonably successful
divestment campaign allowed China to
buy up divested stock. However, this ex-
posed the degree to which Chinese profi-
teers are effectively bankrolling genocide,
pressuring China to persuade Khartoum
into a greater degree of compliance with
the international community.42 While a
full discussion of all of the listed tactics is
beyond the scope of this work, a consid-
eration of sanctions is important, as they
have been shown to be particularly useful
in dealing with Sudan.
When the United States enacted uni-
lateral sanctions in 1997 against Sudan,
the Sudanese government expelled Osa-
ma Bin Laden and his fellow al-Qaeda
92
operatives. Four years later, when the
United States made several not-so-subtle
diplomatic overtures to Khartoum, hint-
ing at sanctions and even a possible at-
tack, Sudan cozied up to American rheto-
ric, bolstering its domestic anti-terrorism
campaign in an unprecedented partner-
ship with the West.43 In these instances,
the Sudanese government did not face
the empty threats of the international
community, but rather a choice in which
defection would culminate in material
penalties from an authoritative super-
power. With this history in mind, the
international community should pursue
more aggressive action against Sudan, lev-
eling targeted multilateral sanctions and
freezing the international bank accounts
of individuals like those identified in the
United Nations’ 2006 report.
These punitive measures ought to be
targeted at companies who do business
with Sudan’s National Congress Party
(NCP). There are three different groups
of companies involved with the National
Congress Party. The first is comprised of
companies owned by party loyalists. These
companies, sharing interlocking boards
of directors, are financial puppets used
by NCP officials to cache their financial
holdings. The second tier of companies
includes those run by Sudan’s National
Security Agency. The third group involves
companies that are tied to Islamic charities
as a façade to hide organizations actually
answering to the political agenda of the
Sudanese government.44 The appropriate
international response to these entities is
clear: they need to be indicted, subpoe-
naed for comprehensive audits conducted
by an international forensic accounting
firm, and consequently prosecuted to the
fullest extent of the law.
Moreover, there are a number of
Western companies that support Sudan’s
petroleum sector (the economic life-
blood of the country’s governing elite).
Among the more prominent are Sweden’s an independent country, its history leaves
Lundin Oil, France’s Total, and Austria’s prospective peacemakers shorthanded for
OMV Aktiengesellschaft.45 The Europe- case-studies of what does and does not
an Union should deter these companies work in a Sudanese peace process. The
from continuing operations in Sudan by mediation that ended Sudan’s civil war is
encouraging member governments to en- the only historical model by which one
act strict prohibitive laws. As Sudanese oil can draw conclusions about what a peace
only accounts for about half of one per- process that would end the violence in
cent of the global supply, the internation- Darfur should look like.
al oil trade would easily absorb the shock
to Sudan’s oil market. Unfortunately, in VII. From Aboud to Abuja: The Peace
order to adequately impact Sudan’s oil Process that Ended Sudan’s Civil War
revenues, countries outside of a compli-
In his address before the 18th Gen-
ant Europe would have to agree to this
eral Assembly of the United Nations, for-
course of action.
mer President John F. Kennedy remarked
China is, by far, the largest importer
that, “Peace does not rest in the charters
of Sudanese oil with a 40 percent stake
and covenants alone. It lies in the hearts
in the Greater Nile Petroleum Com-
and minds of the people.”47 The forty-
pany (GNPOC), the country’s main
year peace process that put an end to two
consortium.46 However, even short of
periods of Sudanese civil war corroborates
a full-blown boycott, minor cuts in con-
Kennedy’s portentous words. From start
sumption on behalf of major stakeholder
to finish, the peace process included a
countries (e.g. China, India & Malaysia)
host of individual protocols, agreements,
would send a clear message to Khartoum
and ‘memoranda of understanding,’ most
that it has a choice to either acquiesce to
of which one signatory or the other later
the international community’s demands
backed out of. In the last twenty years
or face exclusion from its markets, some-
alone, eighteen separate accords have been
thing this predominantly landlocked
brokered between Khartoum and the Su-
country has reason to fear. Measures
dan People’s Liberation Army/Movement
like these would reflect a commanding
(SPLA/M).48 From the ideological fac-
and self-confident international body of
tors obstructing peace to the divisive rhet-
consensus that genocide will not be toler-
oric of the Sudanese government, paral-
ated.
lels between the civil war and the conflict
By working to strengthen AMIS and
in Darfur are striking. For the purpose of
by implementing targeted sanctions, the
discussing the efficacy of a peace process
international community could look for-
to end the violence in Darfur, this work
ward to improved conditions in Darfur.
will focus on what is deemed the most
Moreover, international pressure would
crucial agreements signed during the civil
make Khartoum more malleable, effec-
war, extrapolating their lessons to an ad-
tively coercing it to accept the installation
visable resolution.
of a UN force. In discussing the pros-
The first independent government
pects of a Sudanese peace, it is important
in Sudan was led by Prime Minister Is-
to look not only at what can be done in
mail al-Azhari, who enjoyed his office for
terms of third-party intervention, but also
two years before his Chief of Staff, Gen-
the capacity to which opposing groups
eral Ibrahim Aboud, led a coup d’état in
within Sudan can broker a lasting peace.
1958. Oddly, it is the “October Revolu-
Given Sudan’s relatively short lifespan as
93
 tion” that removed Aboud’s pariah mili-
tary regime on October 21, 1964 that is
viewed as the first of many steps toward a
peace agreement.49 One year later, Egypt,
Uganda, Kenya, Algiers, Nigeria, Ghana,
Tanzania, the Sudanese political parties,
and various community leaders formed
the “Commission of Twelve” at what
would become known as “The Round
Table Conferences.” The Commission
engaged in unprecedented cooperation,
formally submitting its recommendations
to the Sudanese government for a new
constitution that would address the griev-
ances of both the government and the
SPLA/M. Unfortunately, inter-party dis-
putes between the Sudanese government
and its opposition made the adoption of
a new constitution unworkable. Both the
government and the SPLA/M blinked on
May 3, 1972, when in coordination with
one another, they signed the Addis Abba
Agreement.50 This bought the people of
Sudan a temporary peace until May 1983
when the SPLA/M emerged with new is-
sues denouncing the Addis Abba agree-
ment. Again, the prospect of a Sudanese
peace ebbed, and a new tide of violence
swept through the country, signaling the
beginning of the “Second Sudanese Civil
War.”
The Abuja Conference, held in Nige-
ria in March 1990, is credited as the first
major breakthrough in the peace process.
The conference affirmed several major
areas of agreement that, four years later,
would be formally inscribed in the Dec-
laration of Principles at Nairobi, Kenya.
In addition to the agreed-upon criteria set
down at the Abuja Conference, the Dec-
laration of Principles hailed South Sudan’s
right to self-determination—this conten-
tion led the government to reject the Dec-
laration’s legitimacy. The negotiations
turned in favor of the government on
April 21, 1997 when six splinter groups,
accounting for 70 percent of the SPLA/
94
M’s senior field commanders, signed the
Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA). This
was a comprehensive framework agree-
ment partisan to the government. The
contention that surrounded the KPA
corroborated the government’s deceitful
claims that the SPLA/M’s fragile solidar-
ity made it not just an irrelevant party to
negotiations, but moreover a stumbling
block on the path to peace.51 The gov-
ernment preyed upon this fragility in an
unscrupulous propaganda campaign that
denounced those factions of the SPLA/M
that refused to acquiesce to the slanted
agreement.
Here, it is prudent to note that Khar-
toum has employed this same ‘divide-
and-denounce’ tactic again with regards
to the recent (and equally skewed) Darfur
Peace Agreement. In an effort to publicly
de-legitimize the now-defunct Justice and
Equality Movement when a faction of
their counterpart, the Sudanese Libera-
tion Army agreed to peace-talks (ostensi-
bly in hopes of ending the government-
sponsored violence in Darfur), Khartoum
publicly named the remaining opposition
to the Darfur Peace Agreement an ob-
struction to peace in Darfur, neglecting
the murderous Janjaweed altogether.
The Machakos Agreement, taking
place on July 20, 2002, signified the begin-
ning of the end of the Sudanese civil war.
In essence, this agreement was a more eq-
uitable version of the KPA. According to
Hassan E. El-Talib, Deputy Head of the
Sudanese Embassy in South Africa, the
significance of the Machakos agreement
“emanates from the powerful parties from
outside the African continent who sup-
ported and encouraged [negotiations].”52
The Machakos Agreement paved the way
for a final peace treaty to be signed on
January 9, 2005.
Darfur’s Peace Process In Perspective:
The Spoiler Problem
Stephen John Stedman, Professor of
African Studies and Comparative Politics
at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, outlines a helpful
typology of ‘spoilers,’ whom he defines
as:
“…[those] leaders and parties who believe
that peace emerging from negotiations
threatens their power, worldview, and
interests, and use violence to undermine
attempts to achieve [peace].”
For each kind of spoiler Stedman
outlines specific methods of manage-
ment. Under Stedman’s typology, the
Al-Bashir regime is dynamic; it is a total
spoiler, or one that pursues total power,
exclusive recognition of authority, and
holds immutable preferences. Yet, it also
bears the traits of a greedy spoiler, one
that holds goals that expand or contract
based on calculations of cost and risk. For
total spoilers, Stedman recommends two
options. The first calls for an uncompro-
mising use of force to eliminate the total
spoiler from the peace process altogether.
A more moderate proposal recommends
labeling the spoiler’s behavior as illegiti-
mate and subsequently asserting that the
peace process will go forward regardless of
whether the spoiler (in this case, the Su-
danese government) joins or not. As for
the ‘greedy’ element of the spoiler posed
by the government, Stedman advises a
long-term process of socialization, effec-
tively changing the behavior of the spoiler
to adhere to a set of established norms (in
this case, international law and basic hu-
man rights).
In the interest of even-handed anal-
ysis, one could fairly look at the other
parties involved (the SLA and JEM) as
limited spoilers. These spoilers live up
to their name, espousing limited goals.
They are often against certain aspects of
an agreement but not against the prin-
ciple of agreement, itself. This typology
is substantiated by the case of the Darfur
Peace Agreement and the cleavages it in-
cised across the two movements. Natu-
rally, the only way to deal with a limited
spoiler is to use specific inducements to
compromise. Unfortunately, this is com-
plicated by the fact that the other parties
in the peace process inherently limit the
spectrum of bargaining inducements.
The truth, as it is with any peace process,
is that while typologies like Stedman’s are
helpful in developing broad frameworks
for political strategy, they are not one-
size-fits-all. The approach to dealing with
Sudan’s government and opposition par-
ties will have to be more nuanced than
the pure strategies discussed here. In any
case, Stedman’s policy-recommendations
provide, if nothing else, a sobering place
to start.
The Darfur Peace Agreement
Signed on May 5, 2006 by Sudan’s
government and the faction of the SLA
led by Minni Arkou Minawi, the Dar-
fur Peace Agreement (DPA) has come
under fire from parties directly involved
in peace negotiations as well as sidelined
spectators. Two of the three rebel del-
egations present in peace negotiations
refuse to sign the agreement. The SLA
faction of Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nur
demands more direct SLA participation
in the implementation of security ar-
rangements. Nur’s faction of the SLA and
the JEM share strong dissatisfaction with
the DPA’s provisions for political wealth-
and power sharing. This government-
endorsed structural inequality is remi-
niscent of the very kind that sparked the
rebel campaigns in 2003. The real success
of the DPA hinges on the willingness of
parties involved in the peace process to
bolster security provisions, augment de-
signs to return displaced peoples to their
95
 homes and follow through on a credible
victim-compensation program.
The Risk in Negotiation
The history of peace building it-
self poses a central policy dilemma for
peace-builders in Sudan. Between 1943
and 1995, 19 percent of identity-driven
civil wars worldwide that were ended by
military victory were followed by popular
genocides. No serious post-conflict vio-
lence occurred in those that ended with
negotiation. On the other hand, in ac-
cordance with the Wagner hypothesis, a
peace accorded by negotiation is inher-
ently much less likely to be upheld. The
data gathered by Roy Licklider, Rutgers
University Professor of Political Science,
supports the Wagner hypothesis, finding
a 50 percent success-rate of negotiated
settlement to conflict. Indeed, Sudan’s
relapse into a second civil war in 1983
echoes these findings.
With Rwanda’s genocide fresh in the
minds of African peace-builders, such
considerations in the approach to ‘solv-
ing’ Darfur should be weighed heavily.
All parties involved in the peace process
will have to be resolute and decisive, while
dually remaining flexible and amenable
to a greater peace in Darfur. Outside
the realm of academic theory and policy-
speculation, the real-life implications of a
failed peace agreement in Darfur leave the
region open to a devastation the poten-
tial magnitude of which could dwarf the
memory of the senseless bloodletting in
Rwanda. Bearing this in mind, political
leaders ought to work cautiously, being
sure to move forward and, more impor-
tantly, together.
Peace in Darfur:
The Long Road Ahead
When the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) convened in 2001, a profound
96
change in its discourse resulted. Once
revolving around a potential “right to in-
tervene,” the language of interventional
peacemaking was thereafter defined by a
solemn “responsibility to protect.” Look-
ing to the obstinacy of Khartoum in mak-
ing any valuable progressive developments
in Darfur, the intervention of third-party
countries, especially global superpow-
ers (preferably under a UN banner), will
be necessary to build an environment in
which a lasting peace may be objectively
brokered. The international community
must transcend Prunier’s assertion that
“…the post-historical world no longer
has any reasons beyond its media-driven
humanitarianism for seriously interven-
ing in obscure distant conflicts.” Such
a sentiment underpins the cautionary
words of the International Crisis Group’s
Senior Adviser, John Prendergast, when
he states that “Sudan’s government and
its militia proxies will not stop terrorizing
Darfur unless they fully understand that
serious consequences will follow.”
Applying the lessons learned from
the long and arduous peace process that
ended Sudan’s civil war to a hypothetical
peace process in Darfur today is hardly
an exact science. For one thing, Khar-
toum maintains that it is engaging in a
defensive “counter-insurgency” while
the rest of the international community
has described the nature of its actions as
genocidal. Furthermore, the current gov-
ernment in Sudan is much less willing
to make concessions to the demands of
those whom they deem rebels than were
previous administrations in dealing with
the SPLA/M. Taking the principles of the
peace agreement that ended the civil war
into account, the following criteria must
be present in any accord for a successful
transition to peace in Darfur:
• It will be absolutely necessary for
Khartoum to permanently limit the
 executive power of the state and curb
the political autonomy enjoyed by its
military.
• Potent civil society institutions will
need to be implemented with the
charge of protecting freedom through
an impartial rule of law.
• Resources must be fairly distributed
and utilized in order to promote de-
velopment and reduce the propensity
of conflict.
• Khartoum will need to vanquish
their purportedly estranged maraud-
ing militias who continue to terror-
ize the people of Darfur. Without
any political convictions outside the
realm of personal gain, the Janja-
weed’s continued presence is a scar
upon the face of the Sudanese gov-
ernment.
Any effort to restore one iota of legitima-
cy to the government in Khartoum will
be meaningless without a concerted effort
to meet these preconditions for peace and
stability.
There is an African proverb that as-
sures us that “No matter how long the
night, the dawn will eventually break.”
For years, the people of Darfur have suf-
fered a ruthless campaign of violence per-
petrated by a group of mindless mercenar-
ies who know no limits to their cruelty.
In a world where silence is consent, the
government of Sudan must be held ac-
countable for its blatant neglect and ma-
nipulative diplomatic tactics in eschewing
responsibility for reigning in these butch-
ers. Only when the international com-
munity fulfills its promise to never again
turn a blind eye to the extermination of
a people can Darfuris hope to enjoy an
enduring and indomitable peace.
Endnotes
1. Alex de Waal, “Counter-Insurgency
on the Cheap,” London Review of
Books, Vol. 26, No. 15, 5 August
2004; “Darfur’s Real Death Toll,”
Washington Post, Sunday April 24,
2005, p. B06.
2. UN News Center, “UN Human
Rights Council to send high-level
mission to Darfur,”
3. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=20968&Cr=sudan&Cr1,
(accessed December 19, 2006).
4. PBS, “Sudan: The Quick and The
Terrible,” Frontline World, http://
www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/
sudan/facts.lhtml (accessed October
5, 2006).
5. “African Paramilitary Groups:
Sudan.” GlobalSecurity. 28 Feb.
2007. <http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/para/darfur.
htm>.
6. Justin Michael Zorn, personal
interview, Fall 2006.
7. Coalition For International Justice,
“Chronology of Reporting on
Events Concerning The Conflict
in Darfur, Sudan,” http://www.cij.
org/publications/CIJ_Complete_
DarfurChronology.pdf (accessed
November 14, 2006).
8. “Main parties sign Darfur accord”,
BBC News, 2006, May 5
9. African Paramilitary Groups.
10. Hennig, Rainer. “Eritrea, Chad
accused of aiding Sudan rebels.”
afrol News 7 Sept. 2006. 28 Feb.
2007 <http://www.afrol.com/
articles/13898>.
11. United Nations. “UN experts urge
key governments to crack down
on arms smuggling to Sudan.” UN
NewsCentre 8 Feb. 2006. 28 Feb.
2007 <http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=17436&Cr
=Darfur&Cr1>.
12. Hennig.
13. African Paramilitary Groups.
14. “Contaminating the Neighbors.” The
Economist. 9 Nov. 2006: 54.
15. Marquand, Robert. “World court’s
big move on Darfur.” The Christian
Science Monitor 28 Feb. 2007. <http://
www.csmonitor.com/2007/0228/
p01s02-woaf.html?s=t5>.
16. “Sudan’s President Accuses US of
Exaggerating Darfur Troubles.”
Sudanese Media Center 25 Feb.
2007. 28 Feb. 2007 <http://
w w w. s m c . s d / e n / a r t o p i c .
97
 asp?artID=25174&aCK=EA>.
17. Curry, Ann. “Sudan’s al-Bashir denies
role in Darfur violence.” MSNBC 20
March 2007. <http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/17691868/>.
18. Amir H. Idris, Conflict and Politics
of Identity in Sudan, (Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 44.
19. Library of Congress, “Society.” A
Country Study: Sudan, June 1991,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sd0006
(accessed October 16, 2006).
20. Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The
Ambiguous Genocide, (London: C.
Hurst & Co., 2005), 4.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 5.
23. Library of Congress, “Society.”
24. Amir H. Idris, Conflict and Politics of
Identity in Sudan, 1-2.
25. “Glittering Towers in a Warzone.”
The Economist 7 Dec. 2006
26. Ibid.
27. Lederer, Edith M. “Sudan Accepts
U.N. Force in Darfur.” Forbes 16
Apr. 2007. 5 May 2007 <http://www.
forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/04/16/
ap3617579.html>.
28. Rupiya, Martin. “African Union
Extends Darfur Troops Mandate
to 31 Decmber 2006.” Institute
for Security Studies. 4 Oct. 2006.
5 May 2007 <http://www.issafrica.
org/index.php?link_id=5&slink_
id=3681&link_type=12&slink_
type=12&tmpl_id=3>.
29. International Crisis Group, “Getting
the UN into Darfur,” Africa Briefing
No. 43, (Nairobi and Brussels:
October 12, 2006), 3.
30. Reeves, Eric. “Ghosts of Rwanda:
The Failure of the African Union
in Darfur.” SudanReeves. 20 Nov.
2005. 5 May 2007 <http://www.
s u d a n re e ve s . o r g / Se c t i o n s - re q -
viewarticle-artid-534-allpages-1-
theme-Printer.html>.
31. African Union Mission in Sudan.
Apr. 2007. African Union. 5 May
2007 <http://www.amis-sudan.org/
index.html>.
32. Paul D. Williams, “Military
Responses to Mass Killing: The
African Union Mission in Sudan,”
International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2
(2006): 177.
33. Ken Bacon, Shannon Meehan, and
Eileen Shields-West, “Sudan: African
Union Peace Monitors Creating
Pockets of Security in Darfur.”
Refugees International, (Washington:
98
February 25, 2005), 3.
34. International Crisis Group, “The
AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging
the Gaps,” Africa Briefing No. 28,
(Nairobi and Brussels: July 6, 2005),
7
35. Brookings Institution/Bern
University, “The Protecting of Two
Million Internally Displaced: The
Successes and Shortcomings of the
African Union in Darfur,” (November
2005, http://www.brookings.edu/
fp/projects/idp/200511_au_darfur.
pdf ), 37.
36. David C. Gompert, Courtney
Richardson, Richard L. Kugler, and
Clifford H. Bernath, “Learning From
Darfur: Building a Net-Capable
African Force to Stop Mass Killing,”
Center for Technology and National
Security Policy, (Washington: July
2005), v. International Crisis Group,
“Getting the UN into Darfur,”
Africa Briefing No. 43, (Nairobi and
Brussels: October 12, 2006) 11.
37. United States Agency for International
Development, “USAID/Djibouti
Annual Report 2005” (Silver Spring,
MD: June 16, 2005), 4.
38. International Crisis Group, “Getting
the UN into Darfur,” 11.
39. Gompert, et al, 15.
40. International Crisis Group, “Getting
the UN into Darfur,” 3-6.
41. Reuters. “No evidence against ICC
Darfur suspect - Sudan.” Sudan
Tribune 4 May 2007. 5 May 2007.
<http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article21701>.
42. ChinaDaily. “China to continue
efforts to bring peace to Darfur.” AP/
ChinaDaily 19 July 2007
43. h t t p : / / w w. c h i n a d a i l y. c o m /
cn/china/2007-07/19/
content_5439172.htm
44. International Crisis Group, “Getting
the UN into Darfur,” 6.
45. Ibid., 5-8.
46. European Commission on Oil in
Sudan, “List of Companies,”
http://www.ecosonline.org/index.cf
m?event=showcompanies&page=co
mpanies, (accessed April 27, 2007).
47. International Crisis Group, “Getting
the UN into Darfur,” 8.
48. President John F. Kennedy, “Address
Before the 18th General Assembly
of the United Nations,” United
Nations, (New York: September 20,
1963). John F. Kennedy Presidential
Library & Museum, “Historical
Resources,” http://www.jfklibrary.
 org/Historical+Resources/Archives/
Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003P
OF03_18thGeneralAssembly09201
963.htm, (accessed May 5, 2007).
49. Korwa G. Adar, John G. Nyuot Yoh,
and Eddy Maloka, “Sudan Peace
Process” (Pretoria: African Century
Publications, 2004), 191-284.
50. Ibid, 191
51. Ibid., 25.
52. Ibid., 29.
53. Ibid., 21.
54. Stedman, Stephen John. “Spoiler
Problems in Peace Processes.”
International Security 22.2 (Fall
1997): 5-53.
55. International Crisis Group. “Darfur’s
Fragile Peace Agreement.” Policy
Briefing. June 2006.
56. 6 May 2007 <http://www.crisisgroup.
org/home/index.cfm?id=4179>.
57. Licklider, Roy. “The Consequences
of Negotiated Settlements in Civil
Wars, 1945-1993.” The American
Political Science Review 89.3 (Sept.
1995): 687.
58. Ibid, 685.
59. Williams, Paul D., Dr. “Intervention.”
Introduction to Conflict Resolution,
Spring 2007.
60. Elliot School of International Affairs.
27 Mar. 2007.
61. Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The
Ambiguous Genocide, 159.
62. “Will they be rescued?” The Economist,
September 23, 2006, 51-52.
About the Authors
Zachary Hindin is a rising sophomore at
the George Washington University’s El-
liot School of International Affairs, where
he concentrates on the dynamics of Peace
and Conflict. He now serves on the Ex-
ecutive Board of Directors for Banaa: The
Sudan Educational Empowerment Net-
work, a grassroots movement initiated
at the George Washington University to
offer students from the most oppressed
populations of Sudan the chance to at-
tend American universities, coordinate
with Sudanese exiles, and organize with
NGOs throughout the world. Zachary
hails from Wellington, Florida.
R. Benjamin Nelson, from Chicago, Illi-
nois is a sophomore at Georgetown Uni-
versity. In 2010, he will graduate with a
major in government and a minor in Ara-
bic. Between high school and college, he
worked in France, studied in Spain, and
continues to maintain a strong interest in
international affairs. This past summer, he
interned with Senator Barack Obama on
Capitol Hill.
99
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