The sources of social power VOLUME IT The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914 MICHAEL MANN Univeraty of Californie, Loe Angles CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS3 A theory of the modern state Chapter 1 distinguishes learly between military and p ‘Yet modesn states seem (0 merge the «wo, since they for polize the means of military violence. This did nor end the autonomy of military power organization, as Chapters 12 and 21 make clear, but it redirected it through organizations that were formally the state's Hence this chapter treats military power within a broader discussion of political power review five current theories of of Max Weber begin with an “ins ‘Then I seek analysis, offering 2 polymorphous view of state functions. ystallized” (over the area covered ng 10 the other three sources of soeial power, points on (wo continua, one “representative,” running in this pe from autocratie monarchy to party democracy; the other “national from centralized nation-state 10 a loosely coniederal regime. Most tloely, they also das patriarchal, regulating gendar and fami discuss whether we can detect relations of hierarchy among these, s0 that one or more crystallizations may ultimately determine the overati character of the state Five theories of the state thas become common to distinguish theee theories of the state: class, pluralist, and elitist (sometimes called statism or managerialism) (Alford ‘and Friedland, 1985), Because el discuss the twa together. But I di ow of state autonomy. "T also add a ich I label cack-up oF foul-up utignal st led to reduce states nal for modes of ons theory, implied by many empirical studies, theory. I borrow from all five, espe “Most class theories have been Mtxist. Marx te to economic power relations. States are funct “4 A theory of the modern stale 45 economic production and for classes. Modern states have been det ed class struggle, between feudal en between bourgeoisie aad teenth century were already or rapidly bec vice of class theory is to rogard this as their only True, Marx sometimes wro the state. T discuss the rather property as if other powers might be lodged in ted autonomies he ‘only reistive autor ly states service capi and class. ce Marxists add “historical eo, “eonjunctures,” but these are rarely theorized ~ is-contingency indicates more empirical vensitivity than class alone, it does not transform the theory. Most Marzists deny allegation of economic reductionism, but when they define the state they give the game away. Povlantzas (1978. 18-22), Jessop (1982), and Offe and Ronge (1982; 1-2) claim that s! specific modes of production ~ are possible concep, in general. Those who do define the “st do so only in terms of class relations: “The ‘state’ is a concept for the concentrated and erganized means of legitimate class domination, Says Zeithin (1980: 15), In #80¢n: years some Marnists have become more hesitant, Jessop (1990) now ery ingency’* sn politics, arguing that the Marxian aotion of state “relative autonomy offers 001 pursues the “value form ects (28 I also emphasize in hegemonic projects” for which they may organize crose-class even sometimes for noneconomic purposes Such as enhancing power or morality. But he ‘lasses, Despite relative autonomy, conjunctures, oF contingenc ically reductionist views of the state, This 0 do beter. Ihave becom pessimistic about the chances for a proletarian revolution and advance mal” or “structural views of the capitalist state. Either modern state personnel are the direct instrument of the capitalist class (Miliband 1948), oF they function strveturally t0 reproduce capi (Poutantzas 1973). It is extraordinary ¢46 The rise of classes and nation-states A theory of the moder state " ticipation remained very limited, its history is more extieal in my arty democracy." For imately defining the “Miliband-Poulanteas debate” as being & significant controversy in debate was over such nerrow area when viewed present period. I term Dahl's contest ther way the stae helps Pluraliss, @ broadening party democracy is the Cxystalization of most modeen Western states ‘Through pany democracy, states ulinately represent the interests of individual citizens. Classes may be seen a5 the most important interest groups behind parties (as for Lipset 1959) of as merely one .ong many types of countervailing interest groups whose composi ; is whose sectional interests frustrate the in general (there are many disputations on such point Jessop 1977, 1982). These functions “required” 9 vast expa Althusser (1971: 123-73) termed “repressive and ideolog! apparatuses” ~ police, welfare agencies, education, mass media, : and the and class “fractions” or (Zeitlin 1980; 1984) organize. ‘Actually, states are both place and actor 55 theorists who retain more optimism emphasize that capi still contains contradictions and class struggle, which is politicized and displaced onto the state a5 che “fiscal crisis of the state" (O'Connor 1973), “legitimation cris” (Habermas 1976), or (Offe 1972, 1974; Offe and Ronge 1982). Offe dist ‘he state has also become an actor, leading 0 a party democracy assert that Western liberal democracy gener Participation t0 produce govern: 1ot government by sing | smequalities are not cumulative 196k: 85-6; 1977). Ph ines the importance of party demaeracy in Western history (though perhaps it exaggernies. how ultimately fae programs and the dynamic of capitalist accumula. “democratic” modern states are). He also recognizes that there is more ually seeks to subvert this and reduce state expendi. to society than clases. But it makes ovo mistakes, Fisst, though it ture, Class theory has also generated an empiricist radical school, | _sggests a more complex state, like class theory it i ultimately reduc with C. Wright Mills (19 | tionist and functionalist. 11 credits the state with no autonomous 5 as less unified, composed cf diverse inst power — the state is still «place, not an actor party and pressure group ized by power eftes. and class: fractions. polities radiate inward to control the state. Second, jt sees classes. from these radicals, most class theorists treat the stat a Sectors, religions, regions, and so forth, as analogous and systemic in aanizary: Ie is their competition with one another. Again, like class theory, the state the center of je unitary and systemic. Rel ‘modes of eco terest groups form a de system groups have powers in propo in the last instance, been defined by These som up t0 a st. ) Feflects “society” and Which secks to explain all states, pluralist modern democratic ones. Pl liberal democracy's (especially American democracy’) view of ise. | Modernization shifted political power “from kings t people” (as Bendix's 1978 tile suggests). Dahl noted that this consisted of wo | processes: (1) the emergence of institutonalized “contestation” be- | tween parties and pressure groups representing a plurality of interest | groups ia society and (2) the widening scope of “participation” by the | people in this contestation. Combined, contestation and Participation fenerate genuine democracy (which Dahl calls “polyaceh”), Since, as Daht observes, contestation appeared early in the West, while par- | igh competition Ing and responsive ‘or dominant class. Power dispersed, says Dah! (1986: 333; reproduces their cohesion and modern Western state, thus, h these words tener ward Nothing whatever flows from choosing one wan any other: I use the shortest one, state pluralists use they agree with the substance of Powlaiczas’s functionalist Statement: The state is the “factor af cohesion” in society. Only the int view of sociecy differs from his. As we shall see, neither state ally that cohesive,