The Middle East: The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars Avi Shlaim in Ngaire Woods, ed., Ex laining International !

elations sin"e #$%& 'Oxford: Oxford (niversit) *ress, #$$+,, -#$-%..

The Middle East has been one of the most volatile and violent subsystems of the international political systems since the end of the Second World War. Postwar history in the Middle East has been punctuated by an unusually high number of fullscale, inter-state wars. The aim of this chapter is to e plore the underlying causes of the largest category of Middle Eastern wars, namely, the !rab-"sraeli wars. Wars which are not directly related to the !rab-"sraeli conflict, li#e the $emen war of %&'%-'( and the "ran-"ra) war of %&*+-**, lie outside the scope of this chapter. Within the scope of this chapter are all seven ma,or !rab-"sraeli wars- the %&(* Palestine war, the %&.' Sue/ war, the 0une %&'1 Si -2ay War, the %&'&-1+ War of !ttrition, the 3ctober %&14 $om 5ippur War, the %&*6 7ebanon war, and the %&&% 8ulf war. "t is the origins of these wars which will be e amined here in an attempt to see whether any general patterns emerge. The /evel-of-Anal)sis *roblem "n dealing with the origins of wars, as with any other class of international events, it is important to be clear about the level of analysis. 0. 2avid Singer, in a famous article, identified the two most widely employed levels of analysis in "nternational 9elations- the international system and the national sub-systems. The first level of analysis focuses on the international system and its impact on the behaviour of states. The second focuses on domestic influences on states: behaviour vis--vis other states. The first level of analysis has the advantage of giving generali/able and parsimonious e planations of the e ternal behaviour of states whereas the second level calls for richer detail, greater depth and more intensive portrayal of the domestic roots of international events.;%< !nother well-#nown treatment of the level of analysis problem in "nternational 9elations is the boo# by 5enneth Walt/, Man, the State and War. This boo# is more directly relevant to the present in)uiry than 0.2avid Singer:s article because it deals specifically with the causes of war. Walt/ discusses the contribution which classical political theory ma#es to our understanding of the nature and causes of war. =e does so by identifying three principal themes or images of international relations- war as the conse)uence of the nature and behaviour of man, as the outcome of the internal organi/ation of states, and as the product of international anarchy.;6< "n Walt/:s analysis the state is the most important actor in international politics and the principal cause of war in the international system. !ll three images are concerned with influences that incline the state to go to war- the first image stresses the personality and beliefs of the leader as a cause of war> the second image stresses domestic political forces as the cause of war> while the third image stresses the regional and international power game as the cause of war. Walt/:s conclusion is that

the first two sets of influences are relatively unimportant whereas the third set of influences is critical. "n other words, states do not resort to war because of the personality of the leader or because of their domestic political structure or ideology but because of pressures emanating from the international environment. Walt/:s three images of international relations constitute a useful analytical framewor# for thin#ing about the causes of war. 3ne of the strengths of the framewor# lies in its universal applicability. The framewor# can be employed to analyse the causes of a single war or a series of wars in any region at any period in history. The post-%&(. Middle East is no e ception. "f applied to the outbrea# of !rab-"sraeli wars, this framewor# would suggest three lines of in)uiry- the psychological factors rooted in human nature, the organi/ational and ideological factors rooted in the domestic environment, and the systemic factors rooted in the international environment. The framewor# would also suggest that systemic factors are much more important than the other two sets of factors in e plaining the outbrea# of !rab-"sraeli wars. $et, precisely because it is so broad and all-encompassing, Walt/:s analytical framewor# is less than ideal for the purposes of this particular chapter. "n the first place, there is no ,ustification for assuming a priori that systemic factors connected with the regional and international power-game are more important than the other factors in motivating states to go to war. This is an empirical )uestion which can only be answered after reviewing the relevant empirical evidence. Secondly, the relative weight of individual, domestic, and systemic influences is li#ely to vary from one !rab-israeli war to another. Thirdly, these three sets of influences cannot always be fitted into neat and separate categories because they intermingle and shade into one another. ! different analytical framewor# is therefore proposed here, a framewor# tailored to the particular circumstances of the Middle East. This framewor# identifies three central factors that contribute to the outbrea# of wars in the Middle East- the !rab"sraeli conflict, inter-!rab relations, and the involvement of the 8reat Powers in the affairs of the region. 7i#e Walt/:s framewor#, this alternative analytical framewor# involves a three-fold division. ?ut whereas Walt/:s three levels are the individual, the state and the international system, this framewor# focuses attention on three sets of interaction between states. States are the principal unit of analysis in this framewor#. The states in )uestion are "srael, her !rab neighbours and the 8reat Powers- ?ritain, @rance, the Anited States and the Soviet Anion. These states dominated the international politics of the Middle East in the aftermath of the Second World War. !nd it is the policies and actions of these states which are assumed to be the principal cause of war in the region. ! word of e planation about the three factors that ma#e up this framewor# of analysis may therefore be in order. Israel, the Arab States and the 0reat *o1ers The conflict between "srael and the !rabs is one of the most profound and protracted conflicts of the twentieth century and the principal precipitant of wars in the Middle East. There are two ma,or dimensions to this conflict- the "sraeliPalestinian dimension and the "sraeli-!rab dimension. The origins of the conflict go bac# to the end of the nineteenth century when the Bionist movement conceived the

idea of building a national home for the 0ewish people in Palestine. This pro,ect met with bitter opposition on the part of the !rab population of the country. The upshot was a clash between two national movements for possession of Palestine. There were two peoples and one land, hence the conflict. The neighbouring !rab states became involved in this conflict on the side of the Palestinian !rabs in the %&4+s. !fter the creation of the State of "srael in %&(*, the main weight of the conflict shifted from the local or inter-communal level to the interstate level. "n %&'1 the conflict was further complicated by "srael:s capture of the West ?an# from 0ordan, the 8olan heights from syria and the Sinai peninsula from Egypt. @rom this point on, these states had a direct territorial dispute with "srael )uite apart from their commitment to the Palestinian cause. 3n the root cause of the conflict there are widely divergent views. Most !rabs maintain that the root cause of the conflict is the dispossession and dispersal of the Palestinian !rabs, an original sin which was compounded by "srael:s subse)uent territorial ac)uisitions. "n their view, "srael is an inherently aggressive and e pansionist state and the real source of violence in the region.;4< Most "sraelis, on the other hand, maintain that the root cause of the conflict is not territory but the !rab re,ection of "srael:s very right to e ist as a sovereign state in the Middle East. !ccording to this view, the basic !rab ob,ective is the li)uidation of the State of "srael while "srael acts only in self-defence and in response to the !rab challenges.;(< ?ut whatever one:s view of the origins and nature of the !rab-"sraeli conflict, there can be no doubt that this conflict has been a ma,or cause of wars in the Middle East. ! second source of tension and instability which at least on one occasion, in 0une %&'1, helped to tip the balance in favour of war, is to be found in the relations among the !rab states. "n theory all !rab states subscribe to the ideal of !rab unity but in practice inter-!rab relations are characteri/ed more by conflict than by co-operation. "srael is widely held to be one of the few solid pillars propping up !rab unity, the one issue on which all !rabs, whatever their other differences may be, can agree. 3pposition to "srael follows naturally from the belief that the inhabitants of the various !rab states, including the Palestinians, form a single nation and that "srael has grossly violated the sacred rights of this nation. ! distinction needs to be made, however, between the rhetorical and the operational levels of !rab foreign policy. Whereas at the rhetorical level the !rab states were largely united in their commitment to oppose "srael, at the operational level they remained deeply divided. The conservative states tended to advocate containment of the 0ewish state, while the radical states tended to advocate confrontation. @or this reason, the conventional wisdom on "srael:s role in inter-!rab relations is not entirely convincing. !s a number of scholars have pointed out, the conflict with "srael has imposed enormous strain on the inter-!rab system.;.< @ar from serving as a goad to unity,the )uestion of how to deal with "srael has been a serious source of dissension and discord in inter-!rab politics. ! third source of instability and war in the Middle East is the involvement of the 8reat Powers in the affairs of the region. Two features of the Middle East help to account for the interest and rivalry it has evo#ed among the 8reat Powers in the twentieth century- its geostrategic importance and its oil reserves. 8reat Power

involvement is not a uni)ue feature of the Middle East but one that affects, in varying degrees, all regions of the world. What distinguishes the Middle East is the intensity, pervasiveness and profound impact of this involvement. Co other part of the Third World has been so thoroughly and ceaselessly caught up in 8reat Power rivalries. Co other sub-system of the international political system has been as penetrated as the Middle East.;'< The dominant 8reat Powers in the Middle East were the 3ttoman Empire until its dissolution in %&%*, ?ritain and @rance until, roughly, the Sue/ war of %&.', the Anited States and the Soviet Anion from Sue/ until the dissolution of the Soviet Anion in %&&%, and the Anited states on its own since %&&%. So much stress has been laid on the role of these e ternal powers that the history of the modern Middle East, in the words of Malcolm $app, has often been written as though the local states were Ddriftwood in the sea of international affairs, their destinies shaped by the decisions of others.:;1< $et this is a false picture, popular as it is with Middle Easterners and outsiders ali#e. @rom $app:s detailed historical survey it emerges )uite clearly that the dominant feature in the relations between international and regional powers is the manipulation of the former by the latter.;*< ! perceptive survey of the period %&..%&'1 by @awa/ 8erges reaches the same conclusion- the superpowers were rarely able to impose their will on the smaller states of the Middle East.;&< !lthough the local states depended on their respective superpower patrons for diplomatic support, economic aid and the supply of arms, they managed to retain considerable freedom of action. $et no account of the origins of !rab-israeli wars would be complete if it ignored the role played by outside powers. When the role of the 8reat Powers is considered alongside the other two factors the !rab-"sraeli conflict and inter-!rab relations - we begin to get some idea as to why the international politics of the Middle East are so comple , endemically unstable, and prone to violence and war. !gainst this bac#ground what is surprising is not that seven full-scale !rab-"sraeli wars have erupted in the postwar period,but that some of the other crises in this volatile region did not end up in war. 3ur ne t tas# is to assess the relative weight of these three factors in the origins of each successive !rab-"sraeli war, bearing in mind that these factors often interact in comple and curious ways. The #$%2 *alestine War The %&(* !rab-"sraeli war was the clima of the conflict between the 0ewish and Palestinian national movements which had been three decades in the ma#ing. !s the mandatory power in Palestine, ?ritain had repeatedly tried and failed to find a solution that would reconcile the two rival communities in the country. "n @ebruary %&(1, the ?ritish cabinet decided to refer the problem to the Anited Cations and the struggle for Palestine entered its most critical phase. The Anited Cations, on 6& Covember %&(1, passed its famous resolution which proposed the partition of Palestine into two states, one 0ewish and one !rab. The 0ews accepted the partition plan> all the !rab states and the Palestinians re,ected it vehemently. The Palestinians launched a campaign of violence to frustrate partition and Palestine was engulfed by a civil war in which the 0ews eventually gained the upper hand. !t midnight on %( May %&(*, upon e piry of the ?ritish mandate, the 0ews proclaimed the establishment of an independent state which they called "srael. The following day the regular armies of

the !rab states intervened in the conflict, turning a civil war into the first full-scale !rab-"sraeli war, a war which ended in defeat for the !rabs and disaster for the Palestinians. !rab solidarity in the struggle for Palestine was more apparent then real. The !rab states, loosely organi/ed in the !rab 7eague, loudly proclaimed their solidarity with the Palestine !rabs and promised to provide money and arms. ?ut behind the rhetoric of solidarity, the reality was one of national selfishness and dynastic rivalries, notably between 5ing @arou# of Egypt and 5ing !bdullah of 0ordan. 5ing !bdullah who had reached a secret agreement with the 0ewish !gency to partition Palestine at the e pense of the Palestinians, was reluctant to play the part assigned to him in the !rab 7eague:s invasion plan. The !rab 7eague:s invasion plan was designed to prevent the creation of a 0ewish state whereas his plan was to let the 0ews have their state and anne to his #ingdom much of territory assigned by the AC to the !rab state.;%+< 2ivisions of this #ind go a long way to e plain the failure of the !rab states to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies in the battle for Palestine. 3f the 8reat Powers ?ritain was most directly involved in the lead up to the Palestine war. ?ritain:s policy during the twilight of the Palestine mandate is a sub,ect of some contention. Pro-Bionist writers have assigned to ?ritain a large share of the blame for the outbrea# of the Palestine war, claiming that ?ritain armed and encouraged her !rab allies to wade into Palestine and destroy the 0ewish state at birth. There is no evidence, however, to sustain this charge, and considerable evidence to suggest that ?ritain tried to persuade the !rabs not to resort to war.;%%< 3n the other hand, ?ritain refused to assume responsibility for implementing the AC partition plan on the grounds that the use of force would be re)uired. So the real charge against ?ritain is not that she plotted war against the infant 0ewish state but that her abdication of responsibility at the critical moment allowed Palestine to slide into chaos, violence and bloodshed. !merica played a less central but e)ually controversial role in the events surrounding the Palestine war. !merican policy was a series of swings of the pendulum between the pro-Bionist White =ouse and the pro-!rab State 2epartment. "n the fall of %&(1, against the advice of the State 2epartment, President =arry Truman decided to support partition. "n March %&(*, the State 2epartment concluded that partition was impracticable and submitted instead a proposal for a Anited Cations trusteeship over Palestine. ?oth Truman and the State 2epartment later urged the 0ews to delay their declaration of independence and underta#e on-the-spot negotiations in Palestine. ?ut when the 0ews proclaimed their state, Truman, without consulting the State 2epartment, accorded it immediate de facto recognition. "f !merica was first to accord de facto recognition to the State of "srael, the Soviet Anion was first to accord de ,ure recognition. The Soviet Anion supported partition and the creation of a 0ewish state chiefly in order to wea#en the ?ritish position in the Middle East. "n early %&(* the Soviet Anion permitted the emigration of Eastern European 0ews and sent a shipment of %+,+++ rifles and (.+ machine-guns. 2uring the summer of %&(*, in violation of the AC embargo, the 0ews received more substantial shipments of arms from the Eastern bloc which helped to tip the military balance against their opponents.

The critical factor in the outbrea# of the Palestine war was thus the dispute between the 0ews and the !rabs. The Palestinian attac# on the 0ews provo#ed the civil war while the !rab invasion in May %&(* provo#ed the official war. "nter-!rab rivalries contributed much less to the outbrea# of this war than they did to the subse)uent military defeat. Cone of the 8reat Powers wanted war in Palestine but ?ritain lost control of the situation while support from Washington and Moscow encouraged the 0ews to proceed to statehood by force of arms. The %&.' Sue/ War "f in %&(* the 8reat Powers played only a limited role on the Middle East stage, in %&.' the reverse was true. The war which bro#e out in 3ctober %&.' pitted ?ritain, @rance and "srael against Egypt. 3ne of the many parado es of this war was that ?ritain and "srael, despite the bitter legacy of the past, ,oined arms to attac# an !rab state which had long been associated with ?ritain. !nother parado was that ?ritain and @rance, old sparring partners in the Middle East, found themselves on the same side in this war. The motives which produced this unli#ely alliance are not difficult to fathom. ?ritain was the primary mover. !fter the @ree 3fficers: revolution of 0uly %&.6, ?ritain came under growing pressure to withdraw its forces from the strategically important Sue/ Eanal base. With Eolonel 8amal !bdel Casser as President, Egypt became the standard-bearer of radical pan-!rab nationalism. Prime Minister !nthony Eden regarded Casser as the chief enemy of the ?ritish presence in Egypt and as the chief threat to the entire ?ritish position in the !rab world. Eomparing Casser with =itler, Eden was convinced that the right response to this challenge was confrontation, not appeasement. @or Eden, Casser:s nationali/ation of the Sue/ Eanal in 0uly %&.' was the last straw. =e concluded that Casser would have to be removed from power if ?ritain were to maintain her position as a 8reat Power in the Middle East. The @rench also regarded Casser as an enemy, not least because of his arms supplies to the !lgerian rebels, and they too firmly set their face against appeasement. To the "sraelis Casser was a bitter and dangerous foe and they were particularly troubled by his actions in closing the 8ulf of !)aba to "sraeli shipping and in sending fedayeen units across the border into "srael. ?ut it was the E/ech arms deal of September %&.. which began to tip the balance in the "sraeli cabinet in favour of a preemptive stri#e against Egypt. Thus the three countries had their own reasons for wanting to go to war with Egypt. ?ut although their war aims were not identical, they were all united by the determination to #noc# Casser off his perch. The @rench too# the lead in mediating between "srael and ?ritain and in organising the secret meeting on 66 3ctober %&.' at which the infamous collusion too# place. !t this meeting a plan of action was agreed and embodied in what became #nown as the Protocol of S vres. The tripartite attac# on Egypt a wee# later proceeded broadly in line with this plan. Eollusion led directly to the collision at Sue/. 3ne of the distinguishing characteristics of Sue/ was that it was the result of a war plot. "ndeed, while conspiracy theories are common, especially in the Middle East, Sue/ is one of the few genuine war plots of modern history. ?ritain, @rance and "srael deliberately, carefully and secretly planned their ,oint attac# on Egypt. The !rab

world was deeply divided in the mid-%&.+s between the radical states led by Egypt and the conservative monarchies led by "ra) but this division was not a direct cause of the Sue/ war. Similarly, the Soviet Anion and the Anited States, though increasingly involved in the affairs of the Middle East, played no direct part in the events that led to war. 3nce the war bro#e out, the Soviet Anion scored some cheap propaganda points by threatening roc#et attac#s against the attac#ers while the real pressure for halting the attac# came from Washington. The crucial factor in the origins of the Sue/ war was the convergence of ?ritish, @rench and "sraeli plans to inflict a military defeat on Egypt and to bring about the downfall of Casser. The Six-3a) War Whereas the Sue/ war had been the result of deliberate planning, the !rab-"sraeli war of 0une %&'1 was the result of a crisis slide. President Casser appeared to challenge "srael to a duel but most observers agree that he neither wanted nor e pected a war to ta#e place. What he did do was to embar# on an e ercise in brin#manship which went over the brin#. 3n %4 May %&'1 Casser received a Soviet intelligence report which claimed that "srael was massing troops on Syria:s border. Casser responded by ta#ing three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable- he deployed his troops in Sinai near "srael:s border, he e pelled the Anited Cations Emergency @orce from Sinai, and, on 66 May, he closed the Straits of Tiran to "sraeli shipping. 3n . 0une "srael sei/ed the initiative and launched the short, sharp war which ended in a resounding military defeat for Egypt, Syria and 0ordan. The decisive factor in triggering the crisis that led to the Si -2ay War was inter!rab rivalries. "t may sound perverse to suggest that the war owed more to the rivalries between the !rab states than to the dispute between them and "srael, but such a view is supported by the facts. The !rab world was in a state of considerable turmoil arising out of the conflict and suspicions between the radical and the conservative regimes. ! militant ?a:th regime rose to power in Syria in @ebruary %&'' and started agitating for a war to liberate Palestine. President Casser came under growing pressure to stop hiding behind the s#irts of the Anited Cations and to come to the rescue of the embattled regime in 2amascus. Casser suspected his Syrian allies of wanting to drag him into a war with "srael while they suspected that, if push came to shove, he would leave them to face "srael on their own. Casser:s first move, the deployment of the Egyptian army in Sinai, was not intended as a prelude to an attac# on "srael but as a political manoeuvre designed to deter the "sraelis and to shore up his prestige at home and in the !rab world. This move, however, started a chain reaction which Casser was unable to control. "n early May %&'1 the old )uarrel between "srael and the !rabs seemed almost irrelevant. !s Malcolm 5err observed in The !rab Eold War, the !rabs were more preoccupied with one another than they were with "srael. Even when the "sraelis first appeared on the scene, they were merely there as a football for the !rabs, #ic#ed onto the field first by the Syrian hot-heads and then again by Casser. The "sraelis, however, too# a different view of themselves. "t became a case of the football #ic#ing the players.;%6< The superpowers did very little to prevent the slide towards war. The Soviets fed Casser with a false report about "sraeli troop concentrations and supported his

deployment of Egyptian troops in Sinai in the interest of bolstering the left-wing regime in 2amascus and in the hope of deterring "srael from moving against this regime. Their subse)uent attempts to restrain Casser had very little effect. They probably hoped to ma#e some political gains by underlining their own commitment to the !rabs and the pro-"sraeli orientation of !merican foreign policy. ?ut they seriously miscalculated the danger of war and they were swept up in a fast-moving crisis which they themselves had helped to unleash. !merica features very prominently in !rab conspiracy theories purporting to e plain the causes and outcome of the 0une war. Mohamed =ei#al, Casser:s confidant, for e ample, claims that 7yndon 0ohnson was obsessed with Casser and that he conspired with "srael to bring him down.;%4< Such e planations, however, are transparently self-serving in that they assign all the blame for the war to !merica and "srael and overloo# the part played by !rab provocations and miscalculations. "n fact, the !merican position during the upswing phase of the crisis was hesitant, wea# and ambiguous. President 0ohnson initially tried to prevent a war by restraining "srael and issuing warnings to the Egyptians and the Soviets. ?ecause these warnings had no visible effect on Casser:s conduct, some of 0ohnson:s advisers toyed with the idea of unleashing "srael against Egypt. 0ohnson himself was decidedly against giving "srael the green light to attac#. =is signals to the "sraelis amounted to what William Fuandt termed Da yellow light: but, as for most motorists, the yellow light amounted to a green light.;%(< The War of Attrition The March %&'&-!ugust %&1+ "sraeli-Egyptian War of !ttrition was a direct result of the problems created for the !rab world by the Si -2ay War. "srael had not only won a resounding military victory but ended the war in possession of large tracts of !rab land - the 8olan =eights, the West ?an# and the Sinai peninsula. AC 9esolution 6(6 of 66 Covember %&'1 called on "srael to withdraw from these occupied territories in return for peace with the !rabs but the "sraelis and the !rabs interpreted 9esolution 6(6 rather differently and "srael:s position progressively hardened. "srael became attached to the new territorial status )uo and was confident of her ability to maintain this status )uo indefinitely. =er strategy was to sit tight on the new case-fire lines until the !rabs had no alternative but to accept her terms for a settlement. @or a short period the !rabs closed ran#s against the common enemy and the bitter conse)uences of defeat but the old divisions gradually reasserted themselves. The main division was between the advocates of a political settlement and those who believed that what was ta#en by force could only be recovered by force. !t the summit conference held in 5hartoum in late !ugust %&'1, these divisions were papered over by means of a resolution which was dubbed the three Dnoes: of 5hartoum - no recognition, no negotiations and no peace with "srael. The conference demonstrated the uselessness of pan-!rabism as a framewor# for deciding a realistic policy towards "srael. The political option was re,ected even at a time when an !rab military option palpably and painfully was not available. While !rab unity was preserved at the declaratory level, at the practical level each !rab state was left to decide for itself how to go about recovering the territory it had lost.

President Casser adopted a strategy which fell into three phases- the purely defensive phase of re-e)uipping and reorgani/ing the Egyptian armed forces, leading to the second phase of active deterrence, which would be followed finally by the liberation of the territory that had been lost. Casser:s central aim after the %&'1 defeat was to lift the Middle East dispute from the local level, at which "srael had demonstrated its superiority, to the international level. =e therefore set out to involve the Soviet Anion as deeply as possible in the Middle East problem. "f a satisfactory political settlement could be reached with Soviet help, that would be fine, but if a political solution could not be found, the Soviet Anion would be under some obligation to help Egypt develop a military option against "srael.;%.< The Soviet Anion stepped up considerably its material and military support to Syria and Egypt after the %&'1 defeat and it also became deeply involved in the diplomacy of the Middle East dispute. !lthough it was opposed to the resumption of all-out war, it supported the Egyptian commando raids across the Sue/ Eanal which developed, by March %&'&, into what became #nown as the War of !ttrition. Casser decided to begin a war of attrition only after it became clear that diplomacy alone could not dislodge "srael from Sinai and after enlisting Soviet support for limited military action against "srael. The aim of the war was to bring about "srael:s withdrawal from Sinai. The strategy adopted was that of a limited but prolonged war which would e act heavy casualties, e haust "srael psychologically, and impose an intolerable burden on her economy. "srael:s aim during the run-up to the War of !ttrition and during the war itself was to preserve the territorial, political and military status )uo created by the Si -2ay War. "n all other !rab-"sraeli wars, the side that started the war did so in order to preserve the status )uo. This was true of the !rabs in %&(* and of "srael in %&.' and %&'1. "n the War of !ttrition, the side that started the war, Egypt, was not out to defend but to change the status )uo.;%'< The 4om 5i 6r War

The War of !ttrition ended in a military draw between "srael and Egypt and it was followed by a deadloc# on the diplomatic front which was not bro#en until ' 3ctober %&14 when Egypt and Syria launched their well-coordinated surprise attac# against "srael. The $om 5ippur War can be traced to three factors- the failure of all international initiatives for the resolution of the !rab-"sraeli dispute> the emergence of an !rab coalition which was able and willing to do battle with "srael> and the steady flow of arms from the superpowers to their regional clients. "nternational initiatives for the resolution of the !rab-"sraeli conflict failed largely as a result of "sraeli intransigence. !fter !nwar Sadat succeeded 8amal !bdel Casser as President in September %&1+, there was a distinct shift in Egyptian policy away from military activity towards the )uest for a political solution. Sadat:s public declaration in @ebruary %&1% of his readiness for a peaceful agreement with "srael was a significant turning-point in the generation-old conflict. ?ut the deadloc# over the implementation of AC 9esolution 6(6 could not be bro#en because "srael flatly refused to return to the lines of ( 0une %&'1. 3n ( @ebruary %&1%, Sadat put forward his own plan for an interim settlement, based on a limited "sraeli pull-bac# from the Sue/ Eanal and the reopening of the canal for international shipping, but this plan, too, was re,ected by "srael. Eontinued "sraeli stone-walling persuaded Sadat, by

Covember %&16, that a resort to force was essential in order to brea# the pattern of standstill diplomacy. @rom that point he started planning the military offensive which was code-named D3peration Spar#:. Ander the leadership of 8olda Meir, "srael #ept raising her price for a political settlement ,ust when Egypt became convinced of the need for a historic compromise. "mmobilism was the hallmar# of Mrs. Meir:s foreign policy. =olding on to the territories ac)uired in %&'1 gradually replaced the )uest for a settlement as "srael:s top priority. Mrs Meir continued to proclaim "srael:s desire for peace but this was a pious hope rather than a plan of action. =er actual strategy was to let Sadat sweat it out, with his range of options constantly narrowing, until he was left with no choice but to accept "srael:s terms for a settlement. The conse)uences of this strategy were to miss the opportunities for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and drive "srael:s opponents to launch another round of fighting. "srael:s intransigence gave the !rab states a powerful incentive to set aside their differences and formulate a ,oint strategy for the recovery of their territory. The early %&1+s were an era of rapprochement and growing co-operation in inter-!rab politics. 9elations between Egypt and Syria developed into an effective strategic partnership and the relations between Egypt and Saudi !rabia also improved after Casser:s death. 3n the !rab side, Sadat was the main mover and planner on the road to war. =is strategy was to mobili/e all the resources of the !rab world, including the use of the oil weapon, for the forthcoming confrontation with "srael. "t was he who too# the lead in forging the alliance with Syria, in setting strictly limited aims for the ,oint operation, and in provo#ing the international crisis in which the superpowers, he believed, were bound to intervene in order to secure a settlement. Soviet policy in the period %&1+-%&14 was inconsistent and contradictory. The Soviet Anion:s overall policy of detente with the Anited States led it to behave with great caution in the Middle East. "t was Moscow:s refusal to give Egypt the weapons she needed to have a viable military option against "srael that prompted Sadat, in 0uly %&16, to e pel the Soviet military advisers from his country. ?y the beginning of %&14, however,the Soviets resumed arms supplies to Egypt in the #nowledge that an offensive against "srael was being planned. The Soviets continued to urge their !rab allies to avoid war while supplying them with sufficient arms to enable them to resume hostilities.;%1< The Anited States contributed to the outbrea# of the $om 5ippur War indirectly and inadvertently by supporting the "sraeli policy of trying to maintain an untenable status )uo. 9epublican President 9ichard Ci on and his Cational Security !dviser, =enry 5issinger, approached the Middle East from a globalist perspective and sought to #eep the Soviet Anion out of the area. They perceived "srael as a strategic asset and a bastion of regional stability. They embraced the "sraeli thesis that a strong "srael was the best deterrent to war in the Middle East. "n accordance with this thesis, they provided "srael with economic and military aid on an ever growing scale while declining to put pressure on her to return to the pre-%&'1 lines. Even after Sadat e pelled the Soviet advisers, the !mericans persisted in this standstill diplomacy which eventually drove Egypt and Syria not to accept "srael:s terms for a settlement but to resort to war.

The #$2- /ebanon War The %&*6 7ebanon war was the result of the unresolved dispute, or only partially resolved dispute, between "srael and the !rabs. The origins of this war can be traced bac# to the rise to power in "srael of the right-wing 7i#ud Party headed by Menahem ?egin in %&11. "t was "srael:s invasion of 7ebanon in 0une %&*6 which started the war in 7ebanon and provo#ed the clash with the P73 and Syrian forces on 7ebanon:s territory. 3fficially the war was called D3peration Peace for the 8alilee: to suggest that its purpose was purely defensive, to secure the 8alilee against attac#s from the P73 forces stationed in southern 7ebanon. ?ut the broader aims of the war were to create a new political order in 7ebanon, to establish "sraeli hegemony in the 7evant and to pave the way to the absorption of the West ?an# in line with the 7i#ud:s nationalistic ideology of 8reater "srael. "n this sense, the "sraeli invasion of 7ebanon was only the culmination of a long process of "sraeli intervention in domestic and regional !rab politics.;%*< "nternal political divisions in 7ebanon and inter-!rab rivalries did not directly cause the war but they facilitated and encouraged "sraeli intervention. 7ebanon itself had no territorial dispute with "srael and had only half-heartedly participated in the %&(* !rab-"sraeli war. ?ut the wea#ness of the 7ebanese state and the fragmentation of 7ebanese politics not only permitted but invited intervention by outside powers, notably Syria and "srael. Palestinian presence in 7ebanon greatly added to this internal turmoil which in %&1' erupted into a civil war. Syria intervened in the civil war on the side of the Ehristian forces against the 7ebanese left and the P73. ?y maintaining a large military presence in 7ebanon, Syria became the de facto arbiter of 7ebanese politics. !nd this accentuated further the geopolitical contest between Syria and "srael for mastery in the 7evant.;%&< !nother ma,or rift in the !rab world opened up when President Sadat signed the Eamp 2avid accords with "srael in %&1* and a peace treaty in %&1&. Throughout the !rab world Sadat was denounced as a traitor and Egypt was drummed out of the !rab 7eague. President =afe/ al-!ssad was one of Sadat:s fiercest critics, arguing that the only way to negotiate with "srael is by maintaining a united !rab front. Sadat argued in self-defence that Egypt:s peace treaty with "srael was only a first step towards comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The 7i#ud government, however, e ploited Egypt:s disengagement from the conflict in order to press its strategic advantage against the rest of "srael:s !rab opponents and especially against the Palestinians. The chief architect of "srael:s war in 7ebanon was defence minister !riel Sharon. ! ruthless and cynical politician, he was also a great believer in using force to solve political problems. Sharon:s Dbig plan: had a number of ob,ectives. The first ob,ective was to destroy the military infrastructure of the P73 in southern 7ebanon and thereby to brea# the bac#bone of Palestinian resistance to the imposition of permanent "sraeli rule over the West ?an#. The second ob,ective was to help ?ashir 8emayel, leader of one of the Ehristian militias, in his bid for power so as to bring about a new political order in 7ebanon and one which was e pected to be amenable to a peace agreement with "srael. The third ob,ective was to defeat the Syrian forces in 7ebanon and to replace the Syrian protectorate of the country with an "sraeli protectorate. "n short, the idea was to use "srael:s military power in order to accomplish a politico-strategic revolution round "srael:s eastern and northern borders. "t was not the much-vaunted

"sraeli aspiration to peaceful co-e istence with the !rabs that inspired this war but Sharon:s relentless drive to assert "sraeli hegemony over the entire region.;6+< "sraeli propaganda surrounding the invasion dwelt on the security threat posed by the P73 presence in southern 7ebanon. ?ut in 0uly %&*% the Anited States had negotiated a cease-fire between the two arch-enemies, the P73 and "srael, and over the ne t year the border between 7ebanon and "srael remained )uiet. "t was not the military power of the P73 but its growing political moderation that provo#ed an iety in 0erusalem. The war party was simply waiting for a prete t to invade 7ebanon and on 4 0une %&*6 a prete t arrived in the form of an assassination attempt against the "sraeli ambassador in 7ondon. The attempt was ordered not by the P73 but by the renegade terrorist, !bu Cidal. ?ut on ' 0une, si "sraeli divisions crossed the border into 7ebanon, signalling that a full-scale war was intended rather than a small retaliatory raid. The Anited States played only a limited role in the events leading up to the war in 7ebanon while the Soviet role was negligible. Ceither superpower was particularly interested in 7ebanon but they became involved in response to promptings by their local allies. "sraeli propaganda charged the Soviet Anion with aiding and abetting the P73. ?ut Soviet policy, as usual, was confused and contradictory. "t is true that the Soviets enabled the P73 to stoc#pile large )uantities of weapons in 7ebanon but at the same time they were urging the P73 to suspend military action and to moderate its position so as to open the way to a political solution. The arms were given reluctantly to placate the P73 and enable it to negotiate from a position of relative strength. The Anited states was dragged into the 7ebanese )uagmire by her importunate "sraeli ally. 9epublican President 9onald 9eagan loo#ed at the Middle East through Eold War spectacles and held decidedly pro-"sraeli views. To secure !merican bac#ing "sraeli officials stressed that their plan would wea#en the pro-Soviet forces in the Middle East- Syria, the P73, and the radical factions in 7ebanon. !t a meeting in Washington in May %&*6, Secretary of State !le ander =aig told !riel Sharon that the Anited States would understand a military move only in response to an Dinternationally recogni/ed provocation:. Sharon chose to interpret =aig:s convoluted statement as a Dgreen light: to invade 7ebanon. While the 9eagan administration did not positively desire war in 7ebanon, it had not done enough to prevent it. 3n % September %&*6 President 9eagan belatedly announced his plan for a Palestinian homeland in association with 0ordan. "t was a good plan but, li#e so many other plans for the peaceful settlement of the !rab-"sraeli dispute, it foundered on the roc#s of "sraeli intransigence. The #$$# 06lf War "ra):s invasion and anne ation of 5uwait on 6 !ugust %&&+ provo#ed a protracted and tense international crisis which culminated in war on %' 0anuary %&&%. !ll the !rab states of the Middle East and the 8ulf, "srael, "ran, Tur#ey, and the great powers were involved, in one way or another, in the 8ulf crisis and war. ?y far the most important factor in precipitating this war, however, was the crisis in inter-!rab relations. The 8ulf war even surpassed the Si -2ay War as the nadir of pan-!rabism in the post-World War "" era.

The 8ulf war had its origins in an !rab-!rab conflict which Saddam =ussein, the President of "ra), tried, with only partial success, to turn into an !rab-"sraeli conflict and which ended up as a conflict between the Western powers and "ra) - the first ma,or conflict of the post-Eold War era. "ra):s invasion of 5uwait was the last chapter in the "ran-"ra) war. 2uring this war, which was started by "ra) in %&*+ and lasted eight years, the oil-rich 8ulf states and the Western powers helped create a monster in the shape of Saddam =ussein. Cevertheless, they e pected this monster to behave reasonably after the war, at least as far as their interests were concerned. ?ut on 6 !ugust %&&+, Saddam suddenly turned against his ma#ers by gobbling up 5uwait. Saddam accused 5uwait of stealing "ra)i oil by e tracting more than its share from the 9umaila oil field, which straddles the border between the two countries,and of inflicting massive losses in oil revenue on "ra) by e ceeding its 3PEE production )uota, thereby depressing the price. ?ut Saddam:s motives for anne ing 5uwait went well beyond this technical dispute over oil )uotas and oil prices. Saddam was a gambler playing for big sta#es. =e anne ed 5uwait for both economic and geopolitical reasons. =e was strapped for cash, so he went on a big ban# raid. ?ut he also wanted to improve "ra):s access to the Persian 8ulf and to secure her dominance over the entire region. "n %&&+, as in %&*+, he moved against a neighbouring country as part of the same drive for power, wealth, territorial e pansion, and military aggrandi/ement. The second move, however, was a considerably more serious violation of international law than the first because it was an attempt to snuff out an independent state and a member of the Anited Cations. The !rabs were so deeply divided in their response to the "ra)i invasion of 5uwait that not even the fiction of a unified !rab nation could be sustained. Sudan, South $emen and the P73 sided with "ra). Egypt and 0ordan wanted to mediate, to wor# out an !rab solution to the dispute and to forestall outside intervention. Cearly all the other !rab states denounced the "ra)i invasion and some perceived it is a threat to their own security. The merger of "ra) and 5uwait would have been a formidable combination both in economic and in geopolitical terms. "t was widely suspected that Saddam:s ne t target would be the Saudi oil-fields ,ust across the border from 5uwait. Syria was another potential target. Syria and "ra) were united by the same ?a:th ideology but divided by bitter enmity and there was a danger that "ra) would sooner or later sei/e the opportunity to settle old scores. Thus, some of the most conservative regimes in the !rab world found themselves on the same side as the more radical regimes in opposing the "ra)i invasion of 5uwait. "srael:s position in the 8ulf crisis and war was distinctly anomalous. 3n the one hand, "ra)i aggression against a fellow !rab country seemed to support the oftenrepeated "sraeli claim that much of the violence and instability in the Middle East is unrelated to the !rab-"sraeli conflict. 3n the other hand, by posing as the champion of Palestinian national rights, Saddam managed to mobili/e a significant degree of !rab popular opinion, secular as well as "slamic, on his side. 3n %+ !ugust %&&+, Saddam shrewdly proposed a possible "ra)i withdrawal from 5uwait if "srael withdrew from all occupied !rab territory. This proposal, though re,ected outright by both "srael and !merica, created some sort of a lin#age between the 8ulf crisis and the !rab-"sraeli

crisis. @or the remainder of the 8ulf crisis, "srael tried to maintain a very low profile. Even "ra)i missile attac#s on "sraeli population centres, following the outbrea# of hostilities, could not elicit military retaliation on "srael:s part. This uncharacteristic "sraeli forbearance ultimately defeated Saddam:s efforts to turn an !rab-!rab conflict into an !rab-"sraeli one. The Soviet Anion, in the final stages of disintegration, was unable to play an independent role in dealing with the crisis and !merica was left to do all the running. The "ra)i anne ation of 5uwait presented !merica with a series of challenges - to its interests in oil, to its interests in Saudi !rabia and to its prestige in the 8ulf. "t also challenged the old territorial order that ?ritain and @rance had imposed on the region after the brea#up of the 3ttoman Empire. Each of these challenges was serious enough> the combination ensured that "ra):s aggression would not go unanswered. !merica refused to negotiate, and too# the lead in sending troops to the 8ulf, building up an impressively large coalition, passing all the necessary resolutions in the Anited Cations and issuing an ultimatum to "ra). When "ra) failed to comply, !merica and her allies launched 3peration 2esert Storm. The two aims of the operation were to e,ect the "ra)i forces out of 5uwait and to restore the 5uwaiti government and these aims were )uic#ly and easily achieved. The overthrow of Saddam =ussein, the villain of the piece, was not an official war aim but his survival in power certainly too# some of the sheen off the allied victory. 7on"l6sion This brief survey of the origins of Middle East wars reveals a bewildering array of political forces operating in the region. The three factors identified at the beginning of this chapter - the !rab-"sraeli conflict, inter-!rab relations and 8reat Power involvement - are un)uestionably all important in e plaining the causes of war. $et the relative weight of each factor varies considerably from war to war. Caturally enough, in the ma,ority of Middle East wars, the most salient factor was the !rab"sraeli conflict. "nter-!rab relations were a salient factor in the outbrea# of the Si 2ay War of 0une %&'1 and the %&&% 8ulf War. 8reat Power involvement is not as salient a factor as the first two but it did contribute to the outbrea# of the Sue/ war and the 8ulf war. 5eeping in mind the three levels of analysis suggested by 5enneth Walt/ helps us to ma#e sense of the comple forces that culminated in seven full-scale !rab-"sraeli wars. @ar from leaving us with the impression of bewildering comple ity, this analytical device helps us to pinpoint the salient factors in the ma#ing of each of these wars. 3ur empirical survey, however, illustrates not only the strengths but the limitations of this analytical device. Walt/ suggests that level three Gsystemic factorsH is much more important than level two Gdomestic factorsH or level one Gpersonality factorsH in e plaining why states go to war. 3ur survey suggests that the three levels of analysis intermingle and shade into one another. While systemic factors are indeed critical in shaping foreign policy, domestic and personality factors also play a part. "t is too simplistic therefore to confine an account of the origins of a war to one level of analysis, however significant and revealing it might be. The other two levels of analysis also need to be ta#en into consideration and, ,ust as importantly, the interrelationship between the three levels needs to be e plored.

?ritain:s decision to attac# Egypt in %&.', for e ample, cannot be ade)uately e plained in terms of ?ritain:s 8reat Power interests in the region> Eden:s personal and highly sub,ective image of Casser as another =itler was a crucial ingredient in this decision. Similarly, Casser:s actions during the crisis of May-0une %&'1 were shaped much more by a desire to bolster his personal prestige at home and in the !rab world than they were by a desire to challenge "srael to a duel. @inally, "srael:s decision to invade 7ebanon in %&*6 owed much more to the 8reater "srael ideology of the 7i#ud and to !riel Sharon:s incorrigibly aggressive instincts than to any e ternal threat. To sum up, when discussing the origins of each !rab-"sraeli war, the aim should not be to single out one factor but to assess the relative weight of various factors. ?ecause there are so many factors at play, and because these factors are so closely related to one another, it is difficult to determine the precise causes of each !rab"sraeli war. ?ut difficulty should not be confused with impossibility. Notes: ;%< 0. 2avid Singer, DThe 7evel-of-!nalysis Problem in "nternational 9elations:, in 5laus 5norr and Sidney Ierba, eds., The "nternational System- Theoretical Essays GPrinceton, %&'%H, pp. 11-&6. ;6< 5enneth C. Walt/, Man, the State and War- ! Theoretical !nalysis GCew $or#, %&.&H. ;4< See, for e ample, 2avid =irst, The 8un and the 3live ?ranch- The 9oots of Iiolence in the Middle East G7ondon, %&11H. ;(< See, for e ample, $ehoshafat =ar#abi, !rab Strategies and "srael:s 9esponse GCew $or#, %&11H. ;.< Malcolm 5err, The !rab Eold War- 8amal !bd al-Casir and his 9ivals, %&.*%&1+ G7ondon, %&1%H> Michael E. =udson, !rab Politics- The Search for 7egitimacy GCew =aven, %&11H> @ouad !,ami, The !rab Predicament- !rab Political Thought and Practice since %&'1 GEambridge, updated edn. %&&6H> and Stephen M. Walt, The 3rigins of !lliances G"thaca, %&*1H. ;'< 7. Earl ?rown, "nternational Politics and the Middle East- 3ld 9ules, 2angerous 8ame GPrinceton, %&*(H, p. (. ;1< M.E. $app, The Cear East since the @irst World War G7ondon, %&&%H, p. 4. ;*< "bid., p. (4*. ;&< @awa/ !. 8erges, The Superpowers and the Middle East- 9egional and "nternational Politics, %&..-%&'1 G?oulder, %&&(H. ;%+< !vi Shlaim, Eollusion !cross the 0ordan- 5ing !bdullah, the Bionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine G3 ford, %&**H. ;%%< "lan Papp, ?ritain and the !rab-"sraeli Eonflict, %&(*-.% G7ondon, %&**H. ;%6< 5err, The !rab Eold War, p. %6'. ;%4< Mohamed =ei#al, %&'1- !l-"nfi,ar ;%&'1- The E plosion< GEairo, %&&+H, pp. 41%16. ;%(< William ?. Fuandt, Peace Process- !merican 2iplomacy and the !rab-"sraeli Eonflict since %&'1 GWashington 2.E., %&&4H, p.(*. ;%.< Mohamed =ei#al, The 9oad to 9amadan G7ondon, %&1.H, pp. (' and %'.. ;%'< $aacov ?ar-Siman-Tov, The "sraeli-Egyptian War of !ttrition, %&'&-%&1+ GCew $or#, %&*+H, p. 4.

;%1< Mohamed =ei#al, Sphin and Eommissar- The 9ise and @all of Soviet "nfluence in the !rab World G7ondon, %&1*H, pp. 6.4-.(> and 8alia 8olan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East- @rom World War "" to 8orbachev GEambridge, %&&+H, pp. *6-*.. ;%*< 5irsten E. Schul/e, DThe Politics of "ntervention- "srael and the Maronites, %&6+%&*(: G2.Phil. thesis, Aniversity of 3 ford, %&&(H. ;%&< Patric# Seale, !sad- the Struggle for the Middle East G7ondon, %&**H. ;6+< @or a fuller account see !vi Shlaim, D"sraeli "nterference in "nternal !rab Politics- The Ease of 7ebanon:, in 8iacomo 7uciani and 8hassan Salam , eds., The Politics of !rab "ntegration G7ondon, %&**H, pp. 646-... S(00ESTIONS 8O! 8(!T9E! !EA3IN0 @ouad !,ami, The !rab Predicament- !rab Political Thought and Practice since %&'1 GEambridge, updated edn. %&&6H. ! searching e amination of the changes in !rab society in the aftermath of the 0une War. Sidney 2. ?ailey, @our !rab-"sraeli Wars and the Peace Process G7ondon, %&*6H. ! detailed account of the %&(*, %&.', %&'1 and %&14 wars with an emphasis on Anited Cations Peacema#ing. "ncludes numerous appendices of AC reports and resolutions. 7. Earl ?rown, "nternational Politics and the Middle East- 3ld 9ules, 2angerous 8ame GPrinceton, %&*(H. 9eflections on international politics in the Middle East by a historian of the region. Trevor C. 2upuy, Elusive Iictory- the !rab-"sraeli Wars, %&(1-%&1( G7ondon, %&1*H. ! full and balanced account of the wars written by an !merican military historian. $air Evron, The Middle East- Cations, Superpowers and Wars G7ondon, %&1.H. !n analysis of international politics in the Middle East mainly in the period %&'1 %&14. @awa/ !. 8erges, The Superpowers and the Middle East- 9egional and "nternational Politics, %&..-%&'1 G?oulder, %&&(H. ! perceptive analysis of the relationship between superpowers and local powers and of the origins of the %&.' and %&'1 wars. 8alia 8olan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East- @rom World War "" to 8orbachev GEambridge, %&&+H. ! general account of Soviet policies in the Middle East which includes a chapter on every ma,or war. $ehoshafat =ar#abi, !rab Strategies and "srael:s 9esponse GCew $or#, %&11H. !n analysis of the aims of the two sides in the conflict by one of the leading "sraeli students of the !rab-"sraeli conflict. Mohammed =ei#al, Sphin and Eommissar- The 9ise and @all of Soviet "nfluence in the Middle East G7ondon, %&1*H. !n illuminating inside account of Soviet!rab relations, written by a prominent Egyptian ,ournalist who was close to Casser. Ehaim =er/og, The !rab-"sraeli Wars G7ondon, %&*6H. !n "sraeli view of the !rab"sraeli wars written by a former 2irector of Military "ntelligence and President of the State of "srael. l.2avid =irst, The 8un and the 3live ?ranch- The 9oots of Iiolence in the Middle East G7ondon, %&11H. !n account of the escalation of violence since the %**+s which focuses on the relations between the 0ews and the Palestinian !rabs. Cetanel 7orch, 3ne 7ong War- !rab versus 0ew since %&6+ G0erusalem, %&1'H. ! brief account of the !rab-"sraeli conflict, with a chapter on every ma,or war,

written by an "sraeli military historian. Eli/abeth Monroe, ?ritain:s Moment in the Middle East, %&%(-%&1% G7ondon, %&*%H. ! general account of ?ritish policies in the Middle East which also covers the evolution of the !rab-"sraeli conflict. 9itchie 3vendale, The 3rigins of the !rab-"sraeli Wars G7ondon, %&*(, 6nd edn., %&&6H. 9elies mainly on ?ritish official documents to trace the origins of the %&(* and %&.' wars. Iery s#etchy about subse)uent wars. William Fuandt, Peace Process- !merican 2iplomacy and the !rab-"sraeli Eonflict since %&'1 GWashington 2E, %&&4H. ! highly informative and readable account of !merican policy. Cadav Safran, "srael - the Embattled !lly GEambridge, %&1*H. !n informative account of "srael and !merica in international politics. Peter Shearman and Phil Williams Geds.H, The Superpowers, Eentral !merica and the Middle East G7ondon, %&*(H. ! collection of essays on Soviet and !merican policies towards the Middle East. !vi Shlaim, War and Peace in the Middle East- ! Eriti)ue of !merican Policy GCew $or#, %&&(H. ! brief introduction to the international politics of the Middle East since the end of the @irst World War. Steven Spiegel, The 3ther !rab-"sraeli Eonflict- Ma#ing !merica:s Middle East Policy from Truman to 9eagan GEhicago, %&*.H. ! president-by-president account of !merica:s involvement in the !rab-"sraeli conflict. M.E. $app, The Cear East since the @irst World War G7ondon, %&&%H. ! comprehensive political history with many insights on the involvement of the Middle East in international politics and a useful annotated bibliography. 79!ONO/O04 6& Cov. %&(1 AC resolution for the partition of Palestine. 2ec. %&(1-May %&(* Eivil war in Palestine. %. May %&(* Proclamation of the State of "srael and outbrea# of the Palestine war. @eb.-0uly %&(& "srael concludes armistice agreements with Egypt, 0ordan, 7ebanon and Syria. May %&.+ Tripartite 2eclaration G?ritain, @rance and the Anited StatesH on regulating the supply of arms to the Middle East. 0uly %&.6 @ree 3fficers: revolution in Egypt. @eb. %&.. The ?aghdad Pact concluded between "ra) and Tur#ey. Sept. %&.. The E/ech arms deal. Sept. %&.. Military pact between Egypt and Syria. 0uly %&.' Egypt nationali/es the Sue/ Eanal. 6& 3ct. %&.' 3utbrea# of the Sue/ war. March %&.1 "sraeli withdrawal from Sinai. @eb. %&.* Syria and Egypt merge to form the Anited !rab 9epublic GA!9H. 0uly %&.* 9evolution in "ra). 0an. %&'( The Palestine 7iberation 3rgani/ation GP73H founded on the initiative of the !rab 7eague to represent the Palestinians.

@eb. %&'' 7eft-wing coup in Syria followed by increased P73 activity against "srael. .-%+ 0une %&'1 The Si -2ay War. % Sept. %&'1 !rab 7eague summit at 5hartoum- JThe three noesJ. 66 Cov. %&'1 AC Security Eouncil resolution 6(6. March %&'&-!ug. %&1+ The "sraeli-Egyptian War of !ttrition. Sept. %&1+ 0ordanian civil war, J?lac# SeptemberJ. 6* Sept. %&1+ Casser dies and !nwar el-Sadat succeeds. @eb. %&1% "srael rebuffs Sadat:s peace overture. 0uly %&16 Sadat e pels Soviet military advisers. '-6. 3ct. %&14 The $om 5ippur War. 66 3ct.%&14 AC Security Eouncil resolution 44* calls for direct negotiations. 6% 2ec. %&14 8eneva peace conference. %* 0an. %&1( "sraeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement. 4% May %&1( "sraeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. 6'-6& 3ct. %&1( !rab 7eague summit at 9abat recogni/es P73 as Jthe sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian peopleJ. ( Sept. %&1. "sraeli-Egyptian interim agreement, Sinai "". %&1.-1' 3utbrea# of the 7ebanese civil war. 0une %&1' Syrian military intervention in 7ebanon. May %&11 7i#ud defeats 7abour in "sraeli elections. % 3ct. %&11 0oint statement by the AS and the ASS9 for reconvening the 8eneva peace conference. Cov. %&11 Sadat:s historic visit to 0erusalem. 6-. 2ec. %&11 !rab @ront of Steadfastness and 3pposition meets in Tripoli. '-%* Sept. %&1* The Eamp 2avid !ccords signed by "srael and Egypt. 6-. Cov. %&1* !rab 7eague summit at ?aghdad denounces the Eamp 2avid !ccords. @eb. %&1& The "ranian 9evolution. March %&1& Treaty of Peace between Egypt and "srael signed in White =ouse. Cov. %&1& Soviet invasion of !fghanistan. Sept. %&*+ 3utbrea# of war between "ra) and "ran. ' 3ct. %&*% Sadat is assassinated and =usni Mubara# succeeds. !pril %&*6 "sraeli withdrawal from Sinai completed. ' 0une %&*6 "srael invades 7ebanon. % Sept. %&*6 The 9eagan plan for Middle East peace. 0uly %&*. "srael withdraws from 7ebanon, but forms Jsecurity /oneJ in the south. 2ec. %&*1 The "ntifada begins. 6 !ug. %&&+ "ra) invades 5uwait %' 0an %&&% 3utbrea# of the 8ulf War 3ct %&&% Madrid Peace Eonference 0une %&&6 7abour defeats 7i#ud in "sraeli elections. %4 Sept. %&&4 "srael and the P73 sign the 3slo accord. 6' 3ct. %&&( "srael and 0ordan sign peace treaty.