G.R. No. 118651 October 16, 1997 PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. and/or U!I"NO !I#, petitioner, vs. N"TION"!

!"$OR RE!"TION% CO##I%%ION, PIONEER TEXTURIZING &OR'ER% UNION and !OUR(E% ". (E E%U%, respondents. The facts are as follows: Private respondent Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners' reviser/trimmer since 19 !. As reviser/trimmer, de Jesus "ased her assi#ned wor$ on a paper note posted "% petitioners. The posted paper which contains the correspondin# price for the wor$ to "e accomplished "% a wor$er is identified "% its P.&. 'um"er. &n Au#ust 1(, 199), de Jesus wor$ed on P.&. 'o. * (* "% trimmin# the cloths' ri"s. +he thereafter su"mitted tic$ets correspondin# to the wor$ done to her supervisor. Three da%s later, de Jesus received from petitioners' personnel mana#er a memorandum re,uirin# her to e-plain wh% no disciplinar% action should "e ta$en a#ainst her for dishonest% and tamperin# of official records and documents with the intention of cheatin# as P.&. 'o. * (* alle#edl% re,uired no trimmin#. The memorandum also placed her under preventive suspension for thirt% da%s startin# from Au#ust 19, 199). .n her handwritten e-planation, de Jesus maintained that she merel% committed a mista$e in trimmin# P.&. 'o. * (* as it has the same st%le and desi#n as P.&. 'o. * )/ which has an attached price list for trimmin# the ri"s and admitted that she ma% have "een ne#li#ent in presumin# that the same wor$ was to "e done with P.&. 'o. * (*, "ut not for dishonest% or tamperin#. Petitioners' personnel department, nonetheless, terminated her from emplo%ment and sent her a notice of termination dated +eptem"er 1 , 199). &n +eptem"er )), 199), de Jesus filed a complaint for ille#al dismissal a#ainst petitioners. The La"or Ar"iter who heard the case noted that de Jesus was ampl% accorded procedural due process in her termination from service. 'evertheless, after o"servin# that de Jesus made some further trimmin# on P.&. 'o. * (* and that her dismissal was not 0ustified, the La"or Ar"iter held petitioners #uilt% of ille#al dismissal. Petitioners were accordin#l% ordered to reinstate de Jesus to her previous position without loss of seniorit% ri#hts and with full "ac$wa#es from the time of her suspension on Au#ust 19, 199). 1issatisfied with the La"or Ar"iter's decision, petitioners appealed to pu"lic respondent 'ational La"or 2elations 3ommission 4'L235. .n its Jul% )1, 199/ decision, the 'L23 1 ruled that de Jesus was ne#li#ent in presumin# that the ri"s of P.&. 'o. * (* should li$ewise "e trimmed for havin# the same st%le and desi#n as P.&. 'o. * )/, thus petitioners cannot "e entirel% faulted for dismissin# de Jesus. The 'L23 declared that the status ,uo "etween them should "e maintained and affirmed the La"or Ar"iter's order of reinstatement, "ut without "ac$wa#es. The 'L23 further 6directed petitioner to pa% de Jesus her "ac$ salaries from the date she filed her motion for e-ecution on +eptem"er )1, 199* up to the date of the promul#ation of 7the8 decision.6 ) Petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which the 'L23 denied, hence this petition anchored su"stantiall% on the alle#ed 'L23's error in holdin# that de Jesus is entitled to reinstatement and "ac$ salaries. &n 9arch :, 199:, petitioners filed its supplement to the petition amplif%in# further their ar#uments. .n a resolution dated ;e"ruar% )!, 199(, the 3ourt re,uired respondents to comment thereon. Private respondent de Jesus and the &ffice of the +olicitor <eneral, in "ehalf of pu"lic respondent 'L23, su"se,uentl% filed their comments. Thereafter, petitioners filed two re0oinders 7should "e replies8 to respondents' respective comments. 2espondents in due time filed their re0oinders. There are two interrelated and crucial issues, namel%: 415 whether or not de Jesus was ille#all% dismissed, and 4)5 whether or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ of e-ecution. Petitioners insist that the 'L23 #ravel% a"used its discretion in holdin# that de Jesus is entitled to reinstatement to her previous position for she was not ille#all% dismissed in the first place. .n support thereof, petitioners ,uote portions of the 'L23 decision which stated that 6respondents 7petitioners herein8 cannot "e entirel% faulted for dismissin# the complainant6 * and that there was 6no ille#al dismissal to spea$ of in the case at "ar6. + Petitioners further add that de Jesus "reached the trust reposed in her, hence her dismissal from service is proper on the "asis of loss of confidence, citin# as authorit% the cases of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 19= +32A /91> CocaCola Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. NLRC, 1=) +32A =(1, and Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, 51(/ +32A (!!. The ar#uments lac$ merit. The entire para#raph which comprises the #ist of the 'L23's decision from where petitioners derived and isolated the afore,uoted portions of the 'L23's o"servation reads in full as follows:

?e cannot full% su"scri"e to the complainant's claim that she trimmed the ri"s of P&* (* in the li#ht of the sworn statement of her supervisor 2e"ecca 9adarcos 4Rollo, p. :/5 that no trimmin# was necessar% "ecause the ri"s were alread% of the proper len#th. The complainant herself admitted in her sinumpaan# sala%sa% 4 Rollo, p. /(5 that 6A$in# napansin na hindi panta%@panta% an# lapad n# m#a ri"s P&* (* A mas mai#si an# na#upit $o sa m#a ri"s n# P&* (* $a%sa sa m#a ri"s n# m#a na$araan# P&'s. The complainant "ein# an e-perienced reviser/trimmer for almost twelve 41)5 %ears should have called the attention of her supervisor re#ardin# her o"servation of P&* (*. .t should "e noted that complainant was tr%in# to claim as production output //= pieces of trimmed ri"s of P&* (* which respondents insists that complainant did not do an%. +he was therefore ne#li#ent in presumin# that the ri"s of P&* (* should li$ewise "e trimmed for havin# the same st%le and desi#n as P&* )/. 3omplainant cannot pass on the "lame to her supervisor whom she claimed chec$ed the said tic$ets prior to the su"mission to the Accountin# 1epartment. As e-plained "% respondent, what the supervisor does is merel% not the su"mission of tic$ets and do some chec$in# "efore forwardin# the same to the Accountin# 1epartment. .t was never disputed that it is the Accountin# 1epartment who does the detailed chec$in# and computation of the tic$ets as has "een the compan% polic% and practice. Based on the fore#oin# and considerin# that respondent cannot "e entirel% faulted for dismissin# complainant as the complainant herself was also ne#li#ent in the performance of her 0o", ?e here"% rule that status ,uo "etween them should "e maintained as a matter of course. ?e thus affirm the decision of La"or Ar"iter reinstatin# the complainant "ut without "ac$wa#es. The award of "ac$wa#es in #eneral are #ranted on #rounds of e,uit% for earnin#s which a wor$er or emplo%ee has lost due to his ille#al dismissal. 4.ndophil Acr%lic 9f#. 3orporation vs. 'L23, <.2. 'o. 9:/ +eptem"er )=, 199*5 There "ein# no ille#al dismissal to spea$ in the case at "ar, the award for "ac$wa#es should necessaril% "e deleted. 6 ?e note that the 'L23's decision is ,uite cate#orical in findin# that de Jesus was merel% ne#li#ent in the performance of her dut%. +uch ne#li#ence, the La"or Ar"iter delineated, was "rou#ht a"out "% the petitioners' plain improvidence. Thus: After careful assessment of the alle#ations and documents availa"le on record, we are convinced that the penalt% of dismissal was not 0ustified. At the outset, it is remar$a"le that respondents did not den% nor dispute that P.&. * (* has the same st%le and desi#n as P.&. * )/> that P.&. * )/ was made as #uide for the wor$ done on P.&. * (*> and, most importantl%, that the notation correction on P.&. * )/ was made onl% after the error was discovered "% respondents' Accountin# 1epartment. Be that as it ma%, the factual issue in this case is whether or not complainant trimmed the ri"s of P.&. * (*C 2espondents maintained that she did not "ecause the record in Accountin# 1epartment alle#edl% indicates that no trimmin# is to "e done on P.&. * (*. Basicall%, this alle#ation is unsu"stantiated. .t must "e emphasiDed that in termination cases the "urden of proof rests upon the emplo%er. .n the instant case, respondents' mere alle#ation that P.&. * (* need not "e trimmed does not satisf% the proof re,uired to warrant complainant's dismissal. 'ow, #rantin# that the Accountin# record is correct, we still "elieve that complainant did some further trimmin# on P.&. * (* "ased on the followin# #rounds: ;irstl%, +upervisor 2e"ecca 9adarcos who ou#ht to $now the wor$ to "e performed "ecause she was in@char#ed of assi#nin# 0o"s, reported no anomall% when the tic$ets were su"mitted to her. .ncidentall%, supervisor 9adarcos testimon% is suspect "ecause if she could recall what she ordered the complainant to do seven 4=5 months a#o 4to revise the collars and plac$ets of shirts5 there was no reason for her not to detect the alle#ed tamperin# at the time complainant su"mitted her tic$ets, after all, that was part of her 0o", if not her main 0o".

+econdl%, she did not e-ceed her ,uota, otherwise she could have simpl% as$ed for more. That her output was remar$a"l% "i# #rantin# it is true, is well e-plained in that the parts she had trimmed were lesser compared to those which she had cut "efore. .n this connection, respondents misinterpreted the handwritten e-planation of the complainant dated )! Au#ust 199), "ecause the letter never admits that she never trimmed P.&. * (*, on the contrar% the followin# sentence, +a $atuna%an na$apa#"awas naman tala#a a$o na di $o inaasahan# inalis na pala an# pres%o n# +ec. 9 P.&. * (* na ito. is cr%stal clear that she did trim the ri"s on P.&. * (*. 7 <leaned either from the La"or Ar"iter's o"servations or from the 'L23's assessment, it distinctl% appears that petitioners' accusation of dishonest% and tamperin# of official records and documents with intention of cheatin# a#ainst de Jesus was not su"stantiated "% clear and convincin# evidence. Petitioners simpl% failed, "oth "efore the La"or Ar"iter and the 'L23, to dischar#e the "urden of proof and to validl% 0ustif% de Jesus' dismissal from service. The law, in this li#ht, directs the emplo%ers, such as herein petitioners, not to terminate the services of an emplo%ee e-cept for a 0ust or authoriDed cause under the La"el 3ode. 8 Lac$ of a 0ust cause in the dismissal from service of an emplo%ee, as in this case, renders the dismissal ille#al, despite the emplo%er's o"servance of procedural due process. 9 And while the 'L23 stated that 6there was no ille#al dismissal to spea$ of in the case at "ar6 and that petitioners cannot "e entirel% faulted therefor, said statements are inordinate pronouncements which did not remove the assailed dismissal from the realm of ille#alit%. 'either can these pronouncements preclude us from holdin# otherwise. ?e also find the imposition of the e-treme penalt% of dismissal a#ainst de Jesus as certainl% harsh and #rossl% disproportionate to the ne#li#ence committed, especiall% where said emplo%ee holds a faithful and an untarnished twelve@%ear service record. ?hile an emplo%er has the inherent ri#ht to discipline its emplo%ees, we have alwa%s held that this ri#ht must alwa%s "e e-ercised humanel%, and the penalt% it must impose should "e commensurate to the offense involved and to the de#ree of its infraction. 1, The emplo%er should "ear in mind that, in the e-ercise of such ri#ht, what is at sta$e is not onl% the emplo%ee's position "ut her livelihood as well. E,uall% unmeritorious is petitioners' assertion that the dismissal is 0ustified on the "asis of loss of confidence. ?hile loss of confidence, as correctl% ar#ued "% petitioners, is one of the valid #rounds for termination of emplo%ment, the same, however, cannot "e used as a prete-t to vindicate each and ever% instance of unwarranted dismissal. To "e a valid #round, it must "e shown that the emplo%ee concerned is responsi"le for the misconduct or infraction and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him a"solutel% unworth% of the trust and confidence demanded "% his position. 11 .n this case, petitioners were unsuccessful in esta"lishin# their accusations of dishonest% and tamperin# of records with intention of cheatin#. .ndeed, even if petitioners' alle#ations a#ainst de Jesus were true, the% 0ust the same failed to prove that her position needs the continued and unceasin# trust of her emplo%ers. The "reach of trust must "e related to the performance of the emplo%ee's functions. 1) +urel%, de Jesus who occupies the position of a reviser/trimmer does not re,uire the petitioners' perpetual and full confidence. .n this re#ard, petitioners' reliance on the cases of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. v.NLRC> Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. NLRC> and Piedad v. Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative , which when perused involve positions that re,uire the emplo%ers' full trust and confidence, is wholl% misplaced. .n Ocean Terminal Services, for instance, the dismissed emplo%ee was desi#nated as e-pediter and canvasser whose responsi"ilit% is mainl% to ma$e emer#enc% procurements of tools and e,uipments and was entrusted with the necessar% cash for "u%in# them. The case of Coca-Cola Bottlers, on the other hand, involves a sales a#ent whose 0o" e-poses him to the ever%da% financial transactions involvin# the emplo%er's #oods and funds, while that of Piedad concerns a "ill collector who essentiall% handles the emplo%er's cash collections. Fndou"tedl%, the position of a reviser/trimmer could not "e e,uated with that of a canvasser, sales a#ent, or a "ill collector. Besides, the involved emplo%ees in the three aforementioned cases were clearl% proven #uilt% of infractions unli$e private respondent in the case at "ar. Thus, petitioners dependence on these cited cases is inaccurate, to sa% the least. 9ore, whether or not de Jesus meets the da%'s ,uota of wor$ she, 0ust the same, is paid the dail% minimum wa#e.1*

3orollar% to our determination that de Jesus was ille#all% dismissed is her imperative entitlement to reinstatement and "ac$wa#es as mandated "% law. 1+ ?hence, we move to the second issue, i.e., whether or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ of e-ecution. Petitioners' theor% is that an order for reinstatement is not self@e-ecutor%. The% stress that there must "e a writ of e-ecution which ma% "e issued "% the 'L23 or "% the La"or Ar"iter motu proprio or on motion of an interested part%. The% further maintain that even if a writ of e-ecution was issued, a timel% appeal coupled "% the postin# of appropriate supersedeas "ond, which the% did in this case, effectivel% forestalled and sta%ed e-ecution of the reinstatement order of the La"or Ar"iter. As supportin# authorit%, petitioners emphaticall% cite and "an$ on the case of Marana !otel Resort Corporation "Centur# Par$ Sheraton Manila% v. NLRC, )* +32A 19!. Private respondent de Jesus, for her part, maintains that petitioners should have reinstated her immediatel% after the decision of the La"or Ar"iter orderin# her reinstatement was promul#ated since the law mandates that an order for reinstatement is immediatel% e-ecutor%. An appeal, she sa%s, could not sta% the e-ecution of a reinstatement order for she could either "e admitted "ac$ to wor$ or merel% reinstated in the pa%roll without need of a writ of e-ecution. 1e Jesus ar#ues that a writ of e-ecution is necessar% onl% for the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards which have ac,uired finalit%. .n effect, de Jesus is ur#in# the 3ourt to re@ e-amine the rulin# laid down in Marana . Article ))* of the La"or 3ode, as amended "% 2.A. 'o. :=1( which too$ effect on 9arch )1, 19 9, pertinentl% provides: Art. ))*. Appeal. A 1ecision, awards, or orders of the La"or Ar"iter are final and e-ecutor% unless appealed to the 3ommission "% an% or "oth parties within ten 41!5 calendar da%s from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. +uch appeal ma% "e entertained onl% on an% of the followin# #rounds: --- --- --.n an% event, the decision of the La"or Ar"iter reinstatin# a dismissed or separated emplo%ee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediatel% "e e-ecutor%, even pendin# appeal. The emplo%ee shall either "e admitted "ac$ to wor$ under the same terms and conditions prevailin# prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the emplo%er, merel% reinstated in the pa%roll. The postin# of a "ond "% the emplo%er shall not sta% the e-ecution for reinstatement provided herein. --- --- --?e initiall% interpreted the afore,uoted provision in Incion& v. NLRC. 15 The 3ourt 16 made this "rief comment: The decision of the La"or Ar"iter in this case was rendered on 1ecem"er 1 , 19 , or three 4*5 months "efore Article ))* of the La"or 3ode was amended "% 2epu"lic Act :=1( 4which "ecame law on 9arch )1, 19 95, providin# that a decision of the La"or Ar"iter orderin# the reinstatement of a dismissed or separated emplo%ee shall "e immediatel% e-ecutor% insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, and the postin# of an appeal "ond "% the emplo%er shall not sta% such e-ecution. +ince this new law contains no provision #ivin# it retroactive effect 4Art. /, 3ivil 3ode5, the amendment ma% not "e applied to this case. which the 3ourt adopted and applied in Callanta v. NLRC. 17 .n 'am(oan&a Cit# )ater *istrict v. Buat, 18 the 3ourt construed Article ))* to mean e-actl% what it sa%s. ?e said: Fnder the said provision of law, the decision of the La"or Ar"iter reinstatin# a dismissed or separated emplo%ee insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall "e immediatel% e-ecutor%, even pendin# appeal. The emplo%er shall reinstate the emplo%ee concerned either "%: 4a5 actuall% admittin# him "ac$ to wor$ under the same terms and conditions prevailin# prior to his dismissal or separation> or 4"5 at the option of the emplo%er, merel% reinstatin# him in the pa%roll. Immediate reinstatement is mandated and is not sta%ed "% the fact that the emplo%er has appealed, or has posted a cash or suret% "ond pendin# appeal. 19

?e e-pressed a similar view a %ear earlier in Medina v. Consolidated Broadcastin& S#stem "CBS% + *'), ), and laid down the rule that an emplo%er who fails to compl% with an order of reinstatement ma$es him lia"le for the emplo%ee's salaries. Thus: Petitioners construe the a"ove para#raph to mean that the refusal of the emplo%er to reinstate an emplo%ee as directed in an e-ecutor% order of reinstatement would ma$e it lia"le to pa% the latter's salaries. This interpretation is correct. Fnder Article ))* of the La"or 3ode, as amended, an emplo%er has two options in order for him to compl% with an order of reinstatement, which is immediatel% e-ecutor%, even pendin# appeal. ;irstl%, he can admit the dismissed emplo%ee "ac$ to wor$ under the same terms and conditions prevailin# prior to his dismissal or separation or to a su"stantiall% e,uivalent position if the former position is alread% filled up as we have ruled in -nion o. Supervisors "RB% N/Tvs. Sec. o. La(or , 1) +32A //) 719 /8> and Pedroso vs. Castro, 1/1 +32A )() 719 :8. +econdl%, he can reinstate the emplo%ee merel% in the pa%roll. ;ailin# to e-ercise an% of the a"ove options, the emplo%er can "e compelled under pain of contempt, to pa% instead the salar% of the emplo%ee. This interpretation is more in consonance with the constitutional protection to la"or 4+ection *, Art. G..., 19 = Constitution5. The ri#ht of a person to his la"or is deemed to "e propert% within the meanin# of the constitutional #uarant% that no one shall "e deprived of life, li"ert%, and propert% without due process of law. Therefore, he should "e protected a#ainst an% ar"itrar% and un0ust deprivation of his 0o" 4Bondoc vs. People's Ban$ and Trust 3o., .nc., 1!* +32A (99 719 185. The emplo%ee should not "e left without an% remed% in case the emplo%er unreasona"l% dela%s reinstatement. Therefore, we hold that the un0ustified refusal of the emplo%er to reinstate an ille#all% dismissed emplo%ee entitles the emplo%ee to pa%ment of his salaries . . . . )1 The 3ourt, however, deviated from this construction in the case of Marana . 2einterpretin# the import of Article ))* in Marana , the 3ourt )) declared that the reinstatement aspect of the La"or Ar"iter's decision needs a writ of e-ecution as it is not self@e-ecutor%, a declaration the 3ourt recentl% reiterated and adopted in /rchilles Manu.acturin& Corp. v. NLRC. )* ?e note that prior to the enactment of 2.A. 'o. :=1(, Article ))* )+ of the La"or 3ode contains no provision dealin# with the reinstatement of an ille#all% dismissed emplo%ee. The amendment introduced "% 2.A. 'o. :=1( is an innovation and a far departure from the old law indicatin# there"% the le#islature's une,uivocal intent to insert a new rule that will #overn the reinstatement aspect of a decision or resolution in an% #iven la"or dispute. .n fact, the law as now worded emplo%s the phrase 6shall immediatel% "e e-ecutor%6 without ,ualification emphasiDin# the need for prompt compliance. As a rule, 6shall6 in a statute commonl% denotes an imperative o"li#ation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion )5 and that the presumption is that the word 6shall6, when used in a statute, is mandator%. )6 An appeal or postin# of "ond, "% plain mandate of the law, could not even forestall nor sta% the e-ecutor% nature of an order of reinstatement. The law, moreover, is unam"i#uous and clear. Thus, it must "e applied accordin# to its plain and o"vious meanin#, accordin# to its e-press terms. .n 0lo(e-Mac$a# Ca(le and Radio Corporation v. NLRC, )7 we held that: Fnder the principles of statutor% construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from am"i#uit%, it must "e #iven its literal meanin# and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain@meanin# rule or ver(a le&is derived from thema1im inde1 animi sermo est 4speech is the inde- of intention5 rests on the valid presumption that the words emplo%ed "% the le#islature in a statute correctl% e-press its intent or will and preclude the court from construin# it differentl%. The le#islature is presumed to $now the meanin# of the words, to have used words advisedl%, and to have e-pressed its intent "% the use of such words as are found in the statute. 2er(a le&is non est recedendum , or from the words of a statute there should "e no departure. )8 And in conformit% with the e-ecutor% nature of the reinstatement order, 2ule H, +ection 1: 4*5 of the 'ew 2ules of Procedure of the 'L23 strictl% re,uires the La"or Ar"iter to direct the emplo%er to immediatel% reinstate the dismissed emplo%ee. Thus: .n case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, the La"or Ar"iter shall direct the emplo%er to immediatel% reinstate the dismissed or separated emplo%ee even pendin# appeal. The order of reinstatement shall indicate that the emplo%ee shall either "e admitted "ac$ to wor$ under the same terms and conditions prevailin# prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the emplo%er, merel% reinstated in the pa%roll.

.n declarin# that reinstatement order is not self@e-ecutor% and needs a writ of e-ecution, the 3ourt, in Marana , adverted to the rule provided under Article ))/. ?e said: .t must "e stressed, however, that althou#h the reinstatement aspect of the decision is immediatel# e1ecutor#, it does not follow that it is sel.e1ecutor#. There must "e a writ of e-ecution which ma% "e issued motu proprio or on motion of an interested part%. Article ))/ of the La"or 3ode provides: Art. ))/. E1ecution o. decision, orders or a ards . A 4a5 The +ecretar% of La"or and Emplo%ment or an% 2e#ional 1irector, the 3ommission or an% La"or Ar"iter, or med@ar"itter or voluntar% ar"itrator ma%, motu proprio or on motion o. an# interested part#, issue a writ of e-ecution on a 0ud#ment within five 4(5 %ears from the date it "ecomes final and e-ecutor% . . . 4emphasis supplied5 The second para#raph of +ection 1, 2ule H... of the 'ew 2ules of Procedure of the 'L23 also provides: The La"or Ar"iter, P&EA Administrator, or the 2e#ional 1irector, or his dul% authoriDed hearin# officer of ori#in shall, motu proprio or on motion o. an# interested part#, issue a writ of e-ecution on a 0ud#ment onl% within five 4(5 %ears from the date it "ecomes final and e-ecutor% . . . . 'o motion for e-ecution shall "e entertained nor a writ he issued unless the La"or Ar"iter is in possession of the records of the case which shall include an entr% of 0ud#ment. 4emphasis supplied5 --- --- --.n the a"sence then of an order for the issuance of a writ of e-ecution on the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the La"or Ar"iter, the petitioner was under no le#al o"li#ation to admit "ac$ to wor$ the private respondent under the terms and conditions prevailin# prior to her dismissal or, at the petitioner's option, to merel% reinstate her in the pa%roll. An option is a ri#ht of election to e-ercise a privile#e, and the option in Article ))* of the La"or 3ode is e-clusivel% #ranted to the emplo%er. The event that #ives rise for its e-ercise is not the reinstatement decree of a La"or Ar"iter, "ut the writ for its e-ecution commandin# the emplo%er to reinstate the emplo%ee, while the final act which compels the emplo%er to e-ercise the option is the service upon it of the writ of e-ecution when, instead of admittin# the emplo%ee "ac$ to his wor$, the emplo%er chooses to reinstate the emplo%ee in the pa%roll onl%. .f the emplo%er does not e-ercise this option, it must forthwith admit the emplo%ee "ac$ to wor$, otherwise it ma% "e punished for contempt. )9 A closer e-amination, however, shows that the necessit% for a writ of e-ecution under Article ))/ applies onl% to final and e-ecutor% decisions which are not within the covera#e of Article ))*. ;or comparison, we ,uote the material portions of the su"0ect articles: Art. ))*. Appeal. . . . .n an% event, the decision of the La"or Ar"iter reinstatin# a dismissed or separated emplo%ee, inso.ar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediatel# (e e1ecutor#, even pendin& appeal . The emplo%ee shall either "e admitted "ac$ to wor$ under the same terms and conditions prevailin# prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the emplo%er, merel% reinstated in the pa%roll. The postin& o. a (ond (# the emplo#er shall not sta# the e1ecution .or reinstatement provided herein . --- --- --Art. ))/. E-ecution of decisions, orders, or awards. A 4a5 The +ecretar% of La"or and Emplo%ment or an% 2e#ional 1irector, the 3ommission or an% La"or Ar"iter, or med@ar"iter or voluntar% ar"itrator ma%, motu propio or on motion of an% interested part%, issue a rit o. e1ecution on a 3ud&ment ithin .ive "4% #ears .rom the date it (ecomes .inal and e1ecutor#, re,uirin# a sheriff or a dul% deputiDed officer to e-ecute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the +ecretar% of La"or and Emplo%ment or re#ional director, the 3ommission, the La"or Ar"iter or med@ar"iter, or voluntar% ar"itrators. .n an% case, it shall "e the dut% of the

responsi"le officer to separatel% furnish immediatel% the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards. ;ailure to compl% with the dut% prescri"ed herein shall su"0ect such responsi"le officer to appropriate administrative sanctions. Article ))/ states that the need for a writ of e-ecution applies onl% ithin .ive "4% #ears .rom the date a decision, an order or a ard (ecomes .inal and e1ecutor# . .t can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to "e appealed or pendin# appeal which Article ))* contemplates. The provision of Article ))* is clear that an award for reinstatement shall (e immediatel# e1ecutor# even pendin& appeal and the postin& o. a (ond (# the emplo#er shall not sta# the e1ecution .or reinstatement . The le#islative intent is ,uite o"vious, i.e., to ma$e an award of reinstatement immediatel% enforcea"le, even pendin# appeal. To re,uire the application for and issuance of a writ of e-ecution as prere,uisites for the e-ecution of a reinstatement award would certainl% "etra% and run counter to the ver% o"0ect and intent of Article ))*, i.e., the immediate e-ecution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of e-ecution and its issuance could "e dela%ed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearin#, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the La"or Ar"iter or the 'L23 could easil% dela% the issuance of the writ there"% settin# at nau#ht the strict mandate and no"le purpose envisioned "% Article ))*. .n other words, if the re,uirements of Article ))/ were to #overn, as we so declared in Marana , then the e-ecutor% nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated "% Article ))* will "e undul% circumscri"ed and rendered ineffectual. .n enactin# the law, the le#islature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensi"le law, one which operates no further than ma% "e necessar% to achieve its specific purpose. +tatutes, as a rule, are to "e construed in the li#ht of the purpose to "e achieved and the evil sou#ht to "e remedied. *, And where the statute is fairl% suscepti"le of two or more constructions, that construction should "e adopted which will most tend to #ive effect to the manifest intent of the lawma$er and promote the o"0ect for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should "e re0ected which would tend to render a"ortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the o"0ect which the le#islator sou#ht to attain "% its enactment. *1 .n introducin# a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a la"or decision under 2.A. 'o. :=1(, 3on#ress should not "e considered to "e indul#in# in mere semantic e-ercise. &n appeal, however, the appellate tri"unal concerned ma% en0oin or suspend the reinstatement order in the e-ercise of its sound discretion. ;urthermore, the rule is that all dou(ts in the interpretation and implementation o. la(or la s should (e resolved in .avor o. la(or . *) .n rulin# that an order or award for reinstatement does not re,uire a writ of e-ecution the 3ourt is simpl% adherin# and #ivin# meanin# to this rule. Ienceforth, we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is self@e-ecutor%. After receipt of the decision or resolution orderin# the emplo%ee's reinstatement, the emplo%er has the ri#ht to choose whether to re@admit the emplo%ee to wor$ under the same terms and conditions prevailin# prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the emplo%ee in the pa%roll. .n either instance, the emplo%er has to inform the emplo%ee of his choice. The notification is "ased on practical considerations for without notice, the emplo%ee has no wa% of $nowin# if he has to report for wor$ or not. ?IE2E;&2E, the petition is 1E'.E1 and the decision of the La"or Ar"iter is here"% 2E.'+TATE1. 3osts a#ainst petitioner. +& &21E2E1.