1/1 Domestic issues MacDonald 11 US Institute of Peace (11, Bruce W., Testimony before the U.S.

-China Economic an
'i%itary an Ci"i% S$ace Pro(rams, $ f) In the face of this (ro#in( Chinese mi%itary s$ace cha%%en(e,

Bellarmine 2012-13 Debnil Sur

Security !e"ie# Commission on The Im$%ications of China&s

it is easy to assume the #orst about Chinese intentions. China see*s to be ab%e but they see the Unite States as mi%itari%y su$erior to them an thus #ou% be un%i*e%y to conscious%y $ro"o*e any mi%itary conf%ict. Whi%e #e shou% (uar a(ainst a #orst case, #e shou% not treat it as a (i"en. I o not be%ie"e China or the P+, is s$oi%in( for a fi(ht #ith the Unite States China has come too far to #ant to $%ace their substantia% economic achie"ements at ris* un%ess they face an e-traor inary threat to their nationa% security. In a ition, China faces serious emo(ra$hic rea%ities o"er the ne-t cou$%e of eca es, #here their ratio of #or*ers to retirees #i%% shrin* substantia%%y (the resu%t of their one- chi% $o%icy), #hich further un erscores China&s nee for stabi%ity an continue economic (ro#th for years to come. China a%so has a itiona% nee s, an "u%nerabi%ities. / 0ro#in( en"ironmenta% $rob%ems an #ater shorta(es #ith no ob"ious so%utions that are (ro#in( irritants to the $ub%ic1 / , re%ent%ess search for ne# sources of manufacturin( in$uts1 / ,n increasin(%y resti"e #or*in( c%ass that is ma*in(
to $re"ai% mi%itari%y at some $oint in the future shou% conf%ict come, ne# eman s for hi(her #a(es an $o%itica% free oms1 / , non- emocratic one-$arty system that %ea"es its senior %ea ershi$ constant%y %oo*in( o"er its shou% er at $ossib%e cha%%en(es to its authority, es$ecia%%y in the aftermath of the 2,rab S$rin(31 / im$ossib%e for the CCP to root out1 an many more. These

0ro#in( citi4en an(er a(ainst corru$tion an cronyism that seems factors are reasons #hy China is $robab%y not %oo*in( for #ar #ith the

Unite States, thou(h they a%so cou%

istraction.

ina "ertent%y become factors in China&s stumb%in( into a conf%ict they #ou% or inari%y not #ant, throu(h misca%cu%ation or

It doesnt go nuclear Mulvenon 6 5ames 'u%"enon, 6e$uty 6irector of the Center for ,sia-Pacific Po%icy at the !,76 Cor$oration, 8icePresi ent of the Inte%%i(ence 6i"ision at 6efense 0rou$ Inc. (60I), 6irector of 60I&s Center for Inte%%i(ence !esearch an ,na%ysis, 9::;, 2Chinese !es$onses to U.S. 'i%itary Transformation an Im$%ications for the 6e$artment of 6efense,3 !,76 Cor$oration, htt$.<<###.ran .or(<$ubs<mono(ra$hs<9::;<!,76='0>?:.$ f, @Ahen(B When Chinese strate(ists contem$%ate ho# to affect U.S. e$%oyments, they confront the %imitations of their current con"entiona% force, #hich oes not ha"e ran(e sufficient to inter ict U.S. faci%ities or assets beyon the 5a$anese home is%an s. 7uc%ear o$tions, #hi%e theoretica%%y a"ai%ab%e, are nonethe%ess far too esca%atory to be use so ear%y in the conf%ict. Theater missi%e systems, #hich are $ossib%y mo"in( to a mi-ture of con"entiona% an nuc%ear #arhea s, cou% be use a(ainst 5a$an or 0uam, but
uncertainties about the nature of a (i"en #arhea #ou% %i*e%y (enerate res$onses simi%ar to the nuc%ear scenario. ,ccor in( to the $re ictab%e ca re of 2true be%ie"ers,3 both of the centers of (ra"ity i entifie abo"e can be attac*e usin( com$uter net#or* o$erations (C7C). In the first case, the Chinese information o$erations (IC) community be%ie"es that C7C #i%% $%ay a usefu% $sycho%o(ica% ro%e in un erminin( the #i%% of the Tai#anese $eo$%e by attac*in( infrastructure an economic "ita%ity. In the secon case, the Chinese IC community en"isions C7C effecti"e%y eterrin( or e%ayin( U.S. inter"ention an causin( $ain sufficient to com$e% Tai$ei to ca$itu%ate before the Unite States arri"es. The remain er of this section out%ines ho# these IC theorists $ro$ose o$erationa%i4in( such a strate(y.

Relations and deterrence Art 10- Christian ,. Derter Professor of Internationa% !e%ations at Bran eis Uni"ersity an 6irector of 'ITEs Seminar FFI Pro(ram (!obert 5., 2The Unite States an the !ise of China. Im$%ications for the +on( Dau%,3 Po%itica% Science Guarter%y) The #or*in(s of these three factors shou% ma*e us cautious%y o$timistic about *ee$in( Sino-,merican re%ations on the $eacefu% rather than the #ar%i*e trac*. The $eacefu% trac* oes not, by any means, im$%y the absence of $o%itica% an economic conf%icts in Sino-,merican re%ations, nor oes it forec%ose coerci"e i$%omatic (ambits by each a(ainst the other. What it oes mean is that the con itions are in $%ace for #ar to be a %o#$robabi%ity e"ent, if $o%icyma*ers are smart in both states (see be%o#), an that an a%%-out #ar is near%y im$ossib%e to ima(ine. By the historica% stan ar s of recent ominant-risin( state ya s, this is no mean feat. In sum, there #i%% be some security i%emma ynamics at #or* in the U.S.-China re%ationshi$, both o"er Tai#an an o"er maritime su$remacy in East ,sia, shou% China eci e e"entua%%y to contest ,mericaEs maritime he(emony, an there #i%% certain%y be $o%itica% an mi%itary conf%icts, but nuc%ear #ea$ons shou% #or* to mute their se"erity because the security of each stateEs home%an #i%% ne"er be in oubt as %on( as each maintains a secon s tri*e ca$abi%ity "is-,-"is the other. If t#o states cannot conHuer one another, then the character of their re%ation an their com$etition chan(es ramatica%%y.