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Purpose Theories Magno vs CA Facts Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41) Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41) The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41) The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads: 1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations. This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17) As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank. To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43). Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43) Held: Acquitted For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society. Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11) Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31). Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner. Constitutional Limitations Romualdez vs COMELEC On 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos.42454095 and 07902952, respectively. On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol filed a ComplaintAffidavit with the COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section 261 (y)(2) and Section 261 (y) (5) of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189.Respondent alleged petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blankspaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. Issue: Vagueness of Section 45 (j) of the Voter's Registration Act as it does not referto a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute anelection offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14 (1) 25 and Section 14(2), 26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Held: Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense. We are not convinced. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus: In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are

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invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied) "To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness. Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words: "[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided." For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.) At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory. We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial challenge:38 Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held: It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further: The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. Xxx xxx xxx And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted. Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40 As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague. Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument. This Court reasoned: The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law." Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and

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lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.43 The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mere embellishment. There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth in the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voters application form for registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate. It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged. It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional. Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.48 We hold that petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same. A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners. Dissenting opinion: I wish to digest the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio below: 1. Petitioners constitutional attack on Section 45(j) under the due process clause puts in issue two other requirements for the validity of a penal statute. First, a penal statute must prescribe an ascertainable standard of guilt to guide courts in adjudication. Second, a penal statute must confine law enforcers within well-defined boundaries to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the law. 2. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Section 45(j) as applied to them in a live case under which they face prosecution. This is the traditional as applied approach in challenging the constitutionality of any statute. In an as applied challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground - whether absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. 3. The as applied approach embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 4. A petitioner may mount a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute. To mount a facial challenge, a petitioner has only to show violation under the assailed statute of the rights of third parties not before the court. This exception allowing facial challenges, however, applies only to statutes involving free speech. The rationale for this exception allowing a facial challenge is to counter the chilling effect on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply refuse to speak to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law chills him into silence.

The third exception to the prohibition against third-party standing is termed the overbreadth doctrine. A person generally can argue that a statute is unconstitutional as it is applied to him or her; the individual cannot argue that a statute is unconstitutional as it is applied to third parties not before the court. For example, a defendant in a criminal trial can challenge the constitutionality of the law that is the basis for the prosecution solely on the claim that the statute unconstitutionally abridges his or her constitutional rights. The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the prohibition against third-party standing. It permits a person to challenge a statute on the ground that it violates the First Amendment (free speech) rights of third parties not before the court, even though the law is constitutional as applied to that defendant. In other words, the overbreadth doctrine provides that: Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.

5. The overbreadth doctrine is closely related to the vagueness doctrine. Both doctrines are often simultaneously invoked to mount facial challenges to statutes violating free speech. The doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness, as devices to mount facial challenges to penal or non -penal statutes violating free speech, are not applicable to the present petition for two reasons. First, petitioners here assert a violation of their own constitutional rights, not the rights of third-parties. Second, the challenged statute - Section 45(j) of RA No. 8189, does not involve free speech. Thus, any invocation of the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness to mount a facial challenge in the present case is grossly misplaced. 6. As conduct not speech is its object, the challenged provision must be examined only as applied to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness [under a facial challenge].

7. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. We must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech. 8. The present petition indisputably involves an as applied challenge to the constitutionality of Section 45(j) of RA No. 8189. As an as applied challenge, petitioners may raise any constitutional ground to strike down Section 45(j). In this as applied challenge, petitioners may invoke the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to test the constitutionality of Section 45(j).

9. The threshold issue on the constitutionality of Section 45(j) now turns on three tests: First, does Section 45(j) give fair notice or warning to ordinary citizens as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct? Put differently, is Section 45(j) so vague that ordinary citizens must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application? Second, is Section 45(j) so vague that it prescribes no ascertainable standard of guilt to guide courts in judging those charged of its violation? Third, is Section 45(j) so vague that law enforcers - the police and prosecutors - can arbitrarily or selectively enforce it? If Section 45(j) meets all the three tests, it complies with the due process clause and is therefore constitutional. If it fails any one

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of the three tests, then it is unconstitutional and the two Informations against petitioners based on Section 45(j) should be quashed. penalized as such, are crimes. Acts not expressly declared unlawful or prohibited can never give rise to criminal liability. Any ambiguity in the law whether an act constitutes a crime is resolved in favor of the accused.

10. RA No. 8189 contains 52 sections and some 235 sentences, 149 paragraphs, and 7,831 words. Section 45(j) of RA No. 8189 makes violation of any of the provisions of RA No. 8189 a criminal offense, in addition to violations expressly specified in Section 45(a) to (i). The ordinary citizen has no way of knowing which provisions of RA No. 8189 are covered by Section 45(j) even if he has before him a copy of RA No. 8189. Even Judges and Justices will differ as to which provisions of RA No. 8189 fall under Section 45(j). The prosecution office of the Comelec has not specified which provisions of RA No. 8189 fall under Section 45(j). There is no legal textbook writer who has attempted to enumerate the provisions of RA No. 8189 that fall under Section 45(j). Members of the Commission on Elections will certainly dispute that failure by the Commission to reconstitute lost or destroyed registration records constitutes a crime on their part.

17. To punish as crimes acts not expressly declared unlawful or prohibited by law violates the Bill of Rights. First, the Constitution provides that [N]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Due process requires that the law expressly declares unlawful, and punishes as such, the act for which the accused is held criminally liable. The void for vagueness doctrine is aimed precisely to enforce this fundamental constitutional right. Second, the Constitution provides that [I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This right of the accused requires that the Information states the particular act the accused committed in violation of a specific provision of a law defining such act a crime.

11. Under RA No. 8189, law enforcement officers have wide latitude to choose which provisions of the law to consider a crime since there is no specific enumeration of provisions falling under Section 45(j). Prosecutors can choose to prosecute only those who violate certain provisions of RA No. 8189. Judges trying violators of the law have no ascertainable standard to determine the guilt of a person accused of violating Section 45(j). There is no certainty which provisions of RA No. 8189 fall under Section 45(j). Section 45(j) makes a blanket, unconditional declaration that violation of any of the provisions of RA No. 8189 constitutes a crime. Certainly, the lawmaker did not intend that trivial and harmless violations, or omissions for cause, should constitute a crime under Section 45(j). Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing with certainty what these trivial and harmless violations or omissions are. Everyone will have to guess as to what provisions fall under Section 45(j), and their guesses will most likely differ from each other.

18. A blanket and unconditional declaration that any violation of an elaborate and detailed law is a crime is too imprecise and indefinite, and fails to define with certitude and clarity what acts the law punishes as crimes. Such a shotgun approach to criminalizing human conduct is exactly what the void for vagueness doctrine outlaws.That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a wellrecognized requirement, consonant alike with the ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.

12. A provision in an elaborate and detailed law that contains a catch-all provision making it a crime to violate any provision of such law does not give fair notice to the ordinary citizen on what constitutes prohibited conduct or permitted conduct under such law. Section 45(j) does not draw reasonably clear lines between lawful and unlawful conduct such that the ordinary citizen has no way of finding out what conduct is a prohibited act. The ordinary citizen will have to guess which provisions of RA No. 8189, other than those mentioned in Section 45(a) to (i), carry a penal sanction.

19. The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful conduct cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue.

13. If Section 45(j) had enumerated the specific provisions within its coverage, then reasonable clear lines would guide the ordinary citizen as to what acts are prohibited. Section 45(j) does not specify those provisions and thus fails to draw reasonable clear lines. If Section 45(j) is strictly applied, the ordinary citizen may simply decline to exercise his right of suffrage to avoid unintentionally committing a crime. Section 45(j) is a trap even to the most educated citizen.

20. Section 45(j) is a penal statute. Penal statutes are construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. The purpose is not to allow a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of the prohibited act. To constitute a crime, an act must come clearly within the spirit and letter of the penal statute. Otherwise, the act is outside the coverage of the penal statute. An act is not a crime unless clearly made so by express provision of law. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute.

14. A penal law void for vagueness is not made valid by a specification in the Information correcting the vagueness in the law. No court of law has adopted a doctrine that the prosecutor has the power to correct a vagueness in a penal law. Whether a law is void for vagueness under an as applied challenge must be tested under the provisions of the law as found in the statute books, and not as interpreted by the prosecutor in the Information.

21. Section 45(j) does not specify what provisions of RA No. 8189, if violated, carry a penal sanction. Section 45(j) merely states that violation of any of the provisions of RA No. 8189 is a crime. In addition to the provisions covered by Section 45(a) to (i), there are many other provisions of RA No. 8189 that are susceptible of violation. Section 45(j), however, does not specify which of these other provisions carry a penal sanction if violated. Thus, Section 45(j) fails to satisfy the requirement that for an act to be a crime it must clearly be made a crime by express provision of law. May I also digest the dissenting opinion of Justice Tinga: 1. A vague criminal statute at its core violates due process, as it deprives fair notice and standards to all the citizens, the law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The due process clause makes legally operative our democratic rights, as it establishes freedom and free will as the normative human conditions which the State is bound to respect. Any legislated restrictions imposed by the State on life, liberty or property must be in accordance with due process of law. The scope of due process encompasses values ascribed to justice such as equity, prudence, humaneness and fairness. 2. Section 45(j) is vague. It does not provides fair notice to the citizentry, as well as the standards for enforcement and adjudication. Thus, the section violates the due process clause and thus deserves to be struck down.

15. There is no basis in the claim that any discussion on the possible provisions of RA No. 8189 that may fall within the coverage of Section 45(j) constitutes a facial challenge on such provisions of RA No. 8189. This is gross error. What is void for vagueness is the provision violation of any of the provisions of this Act, and not any of the unnamed provisions that may be violated. No other provision in RA No. 8189 is being challenged as unconstitutional, only Section 45(j). The provisions possibly falling within the coverage of Section 45(j) must be discussed to illustrate that the ordinary citizen has no way of knowing with certitude what provisions of RA No. 8189 fall within the coverage of Section 45(j). The discussion shows that the ordinary citizen has no fair notice that these are the provisions falling within the coverage of Section 45(j). What is being challenged is the constitutionality of Section 45(j), which is so vague that it could cover any of the provisions discussed above. 16. This Court must revisit Gatchalians holding that makes a crime not only those (acts) expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law. Unlike the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act after which our Republic Act No. 602 was patterned, RA 602 does not specify the provisions of the law the violation of which is declared unlawful. This Court must categorically rule that only acts expressly declared unlawful or prohibited by law, and

3. Substantive due process guarantees against the arbitrary exercise of state power, while procedural due process is a guarantee of procedural fairness.

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Substantive and procedural due process are equally sacrosanct in the constitutional order, and a law that is infirm in either regard is wholly infirm. those needs, the due process requirements of definiteness are designed to fill the latter two.

4. A statute violates due process, and thus repugnant to the Constitution, if it fails to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice o f the conduct to avoid. Such flaw is one characteristic of a vague statute, the other being that it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Both attributes earmark a statute as vague, the generally accepted definition of a vague statute being one that lacks comprehensible standards that people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 5. Even though the fair notice rule is integral to due process itself, it finds realization in still another provision of our Bill of Rights. Section 14(2), Article III assures that an accused is to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This constitutional right extends not only to the criminal information against the accused, but also to the language of the statute under which prosecution is pursued. Yet our own jurisprudence has yet to expressly link the fair notice requirement with Section 14(2), Article III, though this need not be a contestable point since the due process clause under Section 1, Article III already embodies the fair notice requirement.

12. A criminal statute should be definite enough to give notice of required conduct to those who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its application and the attorney defending those charged with its violation. The rules must be definite enough to enable the judge to make rulings of law which are so closely referable to the statute as to assure consistency of application. In addition, the statute must serve the individual as a guide to his future conduct, and it is said to be too indefinite if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. If the statute does not provide adequate standards for adjudication, by which guilt or innocence may be determined, it will be struck down.

6. A penal statute that violates the fair notice requirement is marked by vagueness because it leaves its subjects to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. What has emerged as the most contentious issue in the deliberations over this petition is whether such vagueness may lead to the nullification of a penal law. Our 2004 ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan states: It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. The time has come to reconsider that statement. Rooted in unyielding formalism and deprived of guidance from basic constitutional tenets, that dicta disenchants the rights of free people, diminishing as it does, the basic right to due process. 7. The vagueness doctrine is a specie of unconstitutional uncertainty, which may involve procedural due process uncertainty cases and substantive due process uncertainty cases. Procedural due process uncertainty involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are void -forvagueness.

13. The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.

14. It is clear that a criminal statute may be nullified on the ground of voidfor-vagueness. What are the requisites that must obtain before a suit predicated on such ground may be brought before the courts? Assuming that the suit successfully demonstrates the vagueness of the statute or provision of law, what remedy can the courts apply? There are orthodox precepts in Philippine law that may find application in the resolution of void-forvagueness cases. Long established in our jurisprudence are the four requisites for judicial inquiry: an actual case or controversy; the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. These requisites would accommodate instances such as those in the present case, where the constitutional challenge to the penal law is raised by the very persons who are charged under the questioned statute or provision.

8. Void-for-vagueness derives from the basic tenet of criminal law that conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it has been so defined by an authority having the institutional competence to do so before it has taken place. It requires that a legislative crime definition be meaningfully precise. 9. The inquiry into whether a criminal statute is meaningfully precise requires the affirmative satisfaction of two criteria. First, does the statute fairly give notice to those it seeks to bind of its strictures? Second, is the statute precise enough that it does not invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by law enforcement authorities? Unless both criteria are satisfied, the statute is void for vagueness.

15. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights, imposes no duties, affords no protection, creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. At the same time, there are doctrines in statutory construction that authorize the courts to allow the survival of the challenged statute or provision of law. It is a well-settled rule that a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. Where a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, that construction in favor of its constitutionality shall be adopted while the construction that renders it invalid rejected.

16. In the case of overbroad statutes, it is necessary to inquire into the potential applications of the legislation in order to determine whether it can be unconstitutionally applied. In contrast, the constitutional flaws attached to a vague statute are evident on its face, as the textual language in itself is insufficient in defining the proscribed conduct. 17. Justice Carpio offers his own analysis of facial challenge and as applied challenge. His submission discusses both concepts from the perspective of standing, contending that the present suit cannot be considered as a facial challenge, or a challenge against the constitutionality of a statute that is filed where the petitioner claims no actual violation of his own rights under the assailed statute, but relies instead on the potential violation of his or other persons rights. Instead, according to Justice Carpio, the present suit may be considered as an as -applied challenge, the traditional approach where the petitioner raises the violation of his constitutional rights irrespective of the constitutional grounds cited.

10. There are three concerns animating the vagueness doctrine. First, courts are rightly concerned that citizens be fairly warned of what behavior is being outlawed; second, courts are concerned because vague laws provide opportunities for arbitrary enforcement and put the enforcement decisions in the hands of police officers and prosecutors instead of legislatures; finally, where vague statutes regulate behavior that is even close to constitutionally protected, courts fear a chilling effect will impinge on constitutional rights. These three interests have been deemed by the U.S. Supreme Court as important enough to justify total invalidation of a statute, such invalidation warranted unless there is some intervening act that has eliminated the threat to those interests.

11. It is clear that some substantial degree of definiteness should be required of penal statutes, for if a person is to be charged with knowledge of all his rights and duties under a statute regardless of whether he has read or understood it, fundamental fairness requires that he be given at least the opportunity to discover its existence, its applicability, and its meaning. While the due process requirements of publication are designed to fill the first of

18. The ability of a petitioner to bring forth a suit challenging the constitutionality of an enactment or provisions thereof, even if the petitioner has yet not been directly injured by the application of the law in question, is referred to as a facial challenge.

19. The ability of a petitioner to judicially challenge a law or provision of law that has been specifically applied against the petitioner is referred to as an as-applied challenge.

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20. The nullification on constitutional grounds by the courts of a provision of law, or even of the entire statute altogether, is referred to as facial invalidation. void-for-vagueness would make the legislature think twice before employing such terminology in the laws that it passes. The problem is less obvious if the law in question contains only a few provisions, where any person can be reasonably expected to ascertain with ease what particular acts are made criminal. However, in more extensive laws such as Rep. Act No. 8189 or the especially long codes, such expectation could not be reasonably met. I am aware that compliance with the requisites for the publication of laws is considered legally sufficient for the purposes of notice to the public, but I submit that a measure of reason should be appreciated in evaluating that requirement. If a law runs 400 pages long, with each sentence detailing an act that is made criminal in nature, the doctrine ignorance of the law excuses no one should not be made a ready and convenient excuse, especially if, as in Rep. Act 8189, the act is made criminal only by implication of a provision such as Section 45(j). 27. We should think of the public good that would prevail if the Court makes the stand that Congress cannot criminalize a whole range of behavior by simply adding a multi-purpose, catch-all provision such as Section 45(j). Congress will be forced to deliberate which precise activities should be made criminal. Such deliberate thought leads to definitive laws that do not suffer the vice of void-for-vagueness. These definite laws will undoubtedly inform the people which acts are criminalized, a prospect wholly consonant with constitutional guarantees of fair notice and due process. 28. Sad to say, the majoritys ruling today is beyond comprehension. No good will come out of it. For one, it opens a Pandoras box of all sorts of malicious wholesale prosecutions of innocent voters at the instance of political partisans desirous to abuse the law for electoral gain. It emboldens Congress to continue incorporating exactly the same provision in the laws it enacts, no matter how many hundreds of acts or provisions are contained in the particular statute. For that matter, it signals that vague penal laws are acceptable in this jurisdiction. Left unabated, the doctrine will be reflexively parroted by judges, lawyers and law students memorizing for their bar exams until it is accepted as the entrenched rule, even though it simply makes no sense. Bad folk wisdom handed down through the generations is soon regarded as gospel truth. I sincerely hope the same mistake is not made with the lamentable doctrine affirmed by the majority today. Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-Terrorism Council Issue: which involved the issue of constitutionality of the HUMAN SECURITY ACT (anti-terrorism law), the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions questioning the constitutionality of the said law on the basis of the following doctrinal pronouncements Held: A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism46 under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-forvagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-forvagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute. Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48 The Court clarifies. At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51 While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense53 under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.54

21. The invalidation of the application of a provision of law or a statute only insofar as it applies to the petitioner and others similarly situated, without need to nullify the law or provision thereof, is referred to as as-applied invalidation.

22. The Court, this time and through this case, should reassert that the vagueness challenge is viable against penal statutes. The vagueness challenge is a critical defense to all persons against criminal laws that are arbitrarily drawn, formulated without thoughtful deliberation, or designed to yield to the law enforcer the determination whether an offense has been committed. Section 45(j) of Rep. Act 8189 is indeed a textbook example of a vague penal clause. The ponencia submits that Section 45(j) does not suffer from the infirmity as it ostensibly establishes that violation of any provision of Rep. Act No. 8189 is an election offense. I cannot accept the proposition that the violation of just any provision of Rep. Act No. 8189, as Section 45(j) declares with minimal fanfare, constitutes an election offense punishable with up to six (6) years of imprisonment. Section 45(j) categorizes the violation of any provision of Rep. Act 8189 as an election offense, thus effectively criminalizing such violations. Following Section 46 of the same law, any person found guilty of an election offense shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years. Virtually all of the 52 provisions of Rep. Act 8189 define an act, establishes a policy, or imposes a duty or obligation on a voter, election officer or a subdivision of government. Virtually all of these provisions are susceptible to violation, the only qualifier being that they incorporate a verb.

23. Our Philippine criminal laws are predicated on crimes that have precisely defined elements, and the task of the judge is to determine whether these elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. For the most part, each crime currently defined in our penal laws consist of only a handful of elements, providing the judge a clearly defined standard for conviction or acquittal. That is not the case for a penal provision predicated on any violation of this Act. A legislative enactment can consist of 100 provisions. Each provision may describe just one act, right, duty or prohibition, or there could be several contained in just one provision. The catch-all penal provision ostensibly criminalizes the violation of any one right, duty, or prohibition, of which there could be hundreds in just one statute. Just any one of these possibly hundreds of acts mentioned in the law is an element of the consummated crime under the catch-all provision such as Section 45(j), thus greatly increasing the risk for conviction under such a provision. There could be literally hundreds of ways that a catch-all provision in just one law could become the source of imprisonment.

24. Obviously, broader standards lead to broader discretion on the part of judges. Some judges may tend towards a narrow application of a provision such as Section 45(j), while others might be inclined towards its broad application. What is certain is that no consistent trend will emerge in criminal prosecutions for violations of provisions such as Section 45(j), a development that will not bode well for the fair and consistent administration of justice. Provisions such as Section 45(j) do nothing for the efficient administration of justice. Since such a provision is laced with unconstitutional infirmity, I submit it is the task of the Court to say so, in order that the courts will need not be confronted with this hydra of statutory indeterminacy. 25. The very vagueness of Section 45(j) makes it an ideal vehicle for political harassment. The election season will undoubtedly see a rise in the partisan political temperature, where competing candidates and their camps will employ every possible legal tactic to gain an advantage over the opponents. Among these possible tactics would be the disenfranchisement of voters who may be perceived as supporters of the other side; or the disqualification of election officers perceived as either biased or impartial enough to hamper a candidate with ill-motives. The disenfranchisement of voters or the disqualification of election officers could be accomplished through prosecutions for election offenses. Even if these prosecutions do not see fruition, the mere filing of such charges could be enough to dampen enthusiasm in voting, or strike fear in conducting honest and orderly elections. 26. In recent years, Congress has chosen to employ phraseology similar to Section 45(j) in a number of laws, such as the Cooperative Code, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, and the Retail Trade Liberalization Act. I know from my own experience that this is the product of a legislative predilection to utilize a standard template in the crafting of bills. I have come to believe that this standard phraseology constitutes a dangerous trend, and a clear stand from this Court that Section 45(j) is unconstitutional for being

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The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the AntiPlunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder. The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "asapplied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads: A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.) The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights). To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.58 As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.59 A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.60 Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63 The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64 [T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

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The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.) In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."71 Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."73 American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity." For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty under law."75 In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible. [I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied) Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1 IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety. In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the preenforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief." As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct

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is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit. ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN Issues: 1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense. Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit People vs Dacuycuy Facts: Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power. Issue: W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid. Held: Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. 2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which

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We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the constitutionality of the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the adjudication of the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition. 1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides: That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive." We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in question should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the lattter were the legislative department of the government." Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power. It is contended that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed. Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice and the application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously overlooked is his own reference to penalties "between designated limits." In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote: .. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari." 20 An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. 21 So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. 22 In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied). Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court. Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision on the specific term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of punishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional. The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. In every case where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 15 It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that the imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and should be rejected. We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here: The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16 The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the crime. The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoista, 17 where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a recommendation for executive clemency, thus: ... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty...

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It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other. 24 2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 25 With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said law should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte. Minucher vs Scalzo Facts: Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in UP in 1974 and was appointed Labor Attache for the Iranian Embasies in Tokyo and Manila; he continued to stay in the Philippines when the Shah of Iran was deposed by Khomeini, he became a refugee of the UN and he headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines. On the other hand, Scalzo was a special agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He conducts surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make the actual arrest. Minucher and one Abbas Torabian was charged for a violation of Act. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the Pasig RTC, such criminal charge was followed by a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents to which Scalzo was a witness for the prosecution. They were acquitted. Later on, Minucher filed a complaint for damages against Scalzo. It was said that Minucher and Scalzo came to know of each other thru Jose Iigo; they conducted some business i.e. the former sold to the latter some caviar and Persian carpets. Scalzo then represented himself as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, DOJ of US. Minucher expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for him and his Abbass wife. Scalzo told him that he could help him for a $2,000 fee per visa. After a series of business transactions between the two, when Scalzo came to deliver the visas to Minuchers house, he told the latter that he would be leaving the Philippines soon and requested him to come out of the house so he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in the cab. To his surprise, 30-40 armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him. In his complaint for damages, he said that some of his properties were missing like Persian carpets, a painting together with his TV and betamax sets. There was nothing left in his house. He averred that his arrest as a heroine trafficker was well publicized and that when we got arrested, he was not given any food or water for 3 days. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that it was recognized by the US Government pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thru its Executive Department and DFA. The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the ground that as a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. Hence, the present recourse of Minucher. Issue: WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity Held: Yes. whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. 3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991; 4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and 5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988. 6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court); 7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and 8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court.5 The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzos diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel6 to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action.3 Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation "It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity."4 Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents 1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990; 2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;

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diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary international law.8 Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9 The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attach belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government.14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank. In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz: "While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. "x x x x x x x x x "And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed. "x x x x x x x x x "There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary." A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence. Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,15 the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.16 The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category.19 But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay

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the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.23 In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled "While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts."25 This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals26 elaborates: "It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. "x x x x x x x x x "(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27 A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. "It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction." Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity. Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary. Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation to his official functions as a senior economist. People vs. Lacson All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit. Liang vs People Case: JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865) Date: March 26, 2001 Ponente: J. Ynares- Santiago Facts: Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City. The MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal informations against him. The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTCs dismissal. Hence, Liang filed a petition for review before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present MR. Issue: WON Liang is immune from suit Held: No. Ratio: The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision. The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. The issue of whether or not Liangs utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine J. Punos concurring opinion: Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a political question. It is solely within the prerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of international organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such organizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The exception allegedly has no application to the case at bar.

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Facts: Before the court is the petitioners motion of reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23, 2002, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant. Issues: 1. WON the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases a. Was express consent given by the respondent? b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the victims? Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal, 2) offended party notified, 3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally, 4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims. 2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively. Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice. Held: Motion granted Go vs. Dimagiba Facts: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed. Subqequentl y, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes, approved on April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended party the amount he owed plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the said court after hearing the case. Issue: Whether or not SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive application. Held: NO, Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty.30 It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody.31 It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained.32 The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.33 However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.34 In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ. However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration35 of the MTCCs Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.36 Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC. In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum. The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of BP 22 The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.37 SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,38 established a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties.39 When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.40 The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only.41 Should the judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.42 SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.43 Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000 Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a "first time offender."44 This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.45 It is the trial courts discretion to impos e any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus: "x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x x. It is, therefore, understood that: xxxxxxxxx

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"2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;" The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.46 On this point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly situated.47 The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,48 has been expanded in certain instances to cover special laws.49 The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City,50 which we quote: "Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis. "First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. "Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed."51 Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment. The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the accused.52 That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory. In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus. The doctrine of equal protection of laws53 does not apply for the same reasons as those on retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his contention.54 Modification of Final Judgment Not Warranted The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,55 in which the final judgment of conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case proceeded from an "Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event,"56 not from an unmeritorious petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of justice or by supervening events.57 The supervening event in that case was the petitioners urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have been equivalent to a death sentence.58 The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondents supposed "unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension," cited by the RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order,59 is totally bereft of substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did not make any such allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and Comment submitted to this Court. Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.60 Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,61 he theorizes that answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the settlement of the debt. Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that convicting the accused who, two years prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks originated) was contrary to the basic principles of fairness and justice.62 Obviously, that situation is not attendant here. The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated with his conviction.63 Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty. At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.64 What is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.65 The Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized: "The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order."66 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondents Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence. US vs. Bull Facts: H.N. Bull was master of steamship Standard, which transported 677 cattle and carabaos on 2 Dec 1909 without proper means of securing them or bedding, thus, a number were cruelly torn (ropes were tied on nose rings), bruised, and killed. Ship route: Formosa-Phils. Issue: WON Phil. laws apply, as there is no information regarding where this occurred. Held: Yes; this was ongoing as the ship entered the Phil. territory, therefore, Phil. laws apply. People vs. Wong Cheng Facts: Wong Cheng smoked opium while aboard merchant vessel Changsa, anchored in Manila Bay 2.5 miles from shore. Issue: WON Philippines has jurisdiction over Merchant ships in its territory? Held: Yes; smoking within territory allows substance to produce pernicious effects, which is against public order. It is also an act of defiance of authority. US vs. Look Chaw Facts: Mrs. Jacks and Milliron found sacks of contraband substance opium on steamship Errol on 18 August 1910 in, around 11-12 am. 3 sacks were found containing 49, 80 packs, (4) packs each; total = 129 packs to be sold, 4 for personal consumption. The 129 were supposedly going to be sold in Mexico and Vera Cruz. Issue: Was Look Chaw accountable, as he didnt bring down the opium from the ship and did not intend to sell within Philippines? Held: Yes; investigation showed that he did sell to a secret service agent while in the port. US vs. Lol-lo and Saraw Facts: 2 Dutch boats left Matuta on 30 June 1920, headed for Peta. First boat had 1 person aboard and the second had 11 men, women and children. After a few days, at 7pm, the second boat arrived between the isles of Buang and Bukid and was stopped by 6 vintas with 24 men, all armed. They asked for food, took cargo, hurt men, and raped women. Then, 2 women were taken, the rest were put back on boat made to sink. Lol-lo raped one of the women on the way to Maruro, where both women escaped.

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Issue: Given that piracy is punishable in all jurisdictions, does Art. 153 still apply since is still says Spain instead of Philippines etc? Held: Yes; all laws still applicable in Philippines until so changed or repealed. US vs. Ah Chong Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in mess hall at Fort McKinley (now Fort Bonifacio) and stayed there at Bldg. 27. One night, he woke up to the sound of someone trying to force his way into the room. There was no way to know who it was as it was dark and the room only had 1 door and 1 window, and vines covered the window; all he could do was ask who it was. He asked twice, and then, when no response came, he threatened the attacker that if he continued, he would be killed. He took a knife which he kept under his pillow because of the robberies occurring recently, and when he was hit on the knee by a chair he uses to keep the door closed, he attacked and killed the man who turned out to be his roommate, Pascal Gualberto. He called for help immediately but it was too late. Issue: Is he liable for the crime? Held: No; it was a mistake of facts. The act would have been lawful if the facts had been as he believed them to be. People vs. Oanis and Galanta Facts: Under instructions to seize Balagtas (escaped convict), the two policemen went to a house where they suspected Balagtas to be hiding. Upon finding a sleeping man inside, they shot him. He turned out to be Tecson, an innocent man. Issue: Are they liable? Held: Yes; unlike in Ah Chong, facts did not show that they tried to ascertain that they had the right man. As they did not exercise due precaution, they were guilty of murder. Held: We find from a careful review of the facts on record that the unfortunate incident was more the result of reckless imprudence than of malicious intent. Therefore, the trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime of murder qualified by evident premeditation. The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the appellant to commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the appellant clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. The victims brother, Bentley, testified that the vehicle stopped after it bumped the victim, but it moved forward and ran over the prostrate body of her sister. From his narration, we find that no sufficient time elapsed for appellant to decide to commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that appellant performed other overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.5 These circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant could have reacted on instinct and relied on sheer impulse to respond to the situation at hand. While it is possible that appellant deliberately ran over the victim, it is equally possible, if not more probable, that the vehicle moved forward because appellant failed to control its momentum. Indeed, this is more consistent with the unrebutted evidence that the jeepney, which had no handbrake, was moving fast and that appellant became confused when the accident occurred. Furthermore, appellants act of bringing the victim to the hospital despite numerous opportunities to flee from the scene is more compatible with a state of mind devoid of criminal intent. In view of the gravity of the offense involved, the trial court should have been more circumspect in weighing the evidence of both parties. Our own evaluation of the evidence reveals that appellant had no intention to kill the victim. As such, he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, must be resolved in favor of appellant.6 Thus, appellant is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. v. Maleza,7 we explained the rationale behind this crime as follows: A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.8 Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.9 Appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution when he disregarded a traffic sign cautioning motorists to slow down10 and drove his vehicle in full speed despite being aware that he was traversing a school zone and pedestrians were crossing the street. He should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area. Garcia vs CA Facts: That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully

PEOPLE v. PUGAY [167 SCRA 439 (November 17, 1988)] Facts: The deceased Bayani Miranda was a 25-year-old retardate. He was friends with the accused Fernando Pugay. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they sometimes slept together. 19 May 1982: In a town fiesta fair in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite, there were different kinds of rides, including a ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight of said date, Eduardo Gabion was in the ferris wheel reading a comic book with his friend Henry. The accused Pugay and Benjamin Samson arrived with several companions, very boisterous and appearing to be intoxicated. When the group saw Miranda walking by, they started making fun of him by poking him with a piece of wood in the ass. Not content with their merrymaking, Pugay suddenly took a gun of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents poured its contents upon the body of the retardate. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already doing it. Samson set Miranda on fire, making a human torch of the latter. Issue: W/N Pugay and Samson are guilty of the felony of homicide Held: Pugay is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under RPC365 while Samson is guilty of homicide under RPC249. Ratio: Pugay averred that he thought that the can contained only water. However, the Court held that he failed to exercise the diligence necessary to avoid the undesirable consequences of his type of merrymaking. Pugay should have ordinarily smelled the characteristic odor of the gasoline and known at once that the can did not contain water, but a flammable substance. Samson, on the other hand, is guilty of the felony of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem. The Court held that there can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Given that they were only making fun of the deceased, their only intent was to set Mirandas cloth es on fire and not to make a human torch of him. Penalty Pugay: 4mos arresto mayor as minimum to 4y2mos prision correccional as maximum Samson: 8y prision mayor as minimum to 14y of reclusion temporal as maximum People vs Garcia Facts: On May 22, 1998, Bentley Billon and Sanily, boarded a passenger jeepney on their way to school and alighted on Zabarto Road. While Sanily was crossing the street, a passenger jeepney hit her. The jeepney stopped and suddenly accelerated running over Sanilys stomach. Bentley and appellant pulled her from underneath the vehicle and brought her to the hospital where she died four days later. The lower court rendered judgment, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by evident premeditation because he deliberately ran over the slumped body of the victim. Issue:Whether or not he is guilty of murder or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

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decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes. In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted Issue: Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses? Held: Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another. Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero. During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board. Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC. Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that th e Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law. The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision. Manuel vs People FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law. HELD: 1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court ruled against the petitioner. 2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable. People vs Delim Facts: Marlon, Leon & Ronald Delim were convicted for murder of Modesto Delim, resident of Bila, Sison, Pangasinan. Modesto is the adopted child of Marlons Dad. Marlon, Manuel & Robert are brothers & Leon & Ronald are their nephews. Around 6:30 pm, January 23, 1999, Modesto and family were preparing to eat dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald arrived. Marlon poked gun, other two grabbed, hog tied and gagged Modesto. They herded him out of the hose and went to the direction of Paldit. Leon and Manual guarded Rita & Randy until 7 am and told them to stay put. They searched for him for 3 days and reported to police three days after the incident. Randy with relatives found Modesto in the housing project in Paldit under bushes. He was dead due to gun shot wound on head. Issues: 1. WON case is murder or kidnapping? Murder: when primary purpose is to kill, deprivation is incidental and doesnt constitute kidnapping (US v. Ancheta). Specific intent: active desire to do certain criminal acts or particular purpose (example, murder and kidnappingkill and deprive victim of liberty) motive: reason which prompts accused to engage in particular criminal activity (ex. Kidnap for ransomrasnom) essential for kidnapping. Information: described murder and kidnapping not specified. 2. WON prosecution had sufficient evidence? Yes. Prosecution proved intent to kill with their knives and handguns, 5 gun shot wounds and 4 stab wounds (defensive). Furthermore, the pieces of circumstancial evidence were convincing: Rita and Randy testified events. Rita claimed she heard 3 gunshots and accordingly, decomposing body was found with gunshot wounds and stabs.

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3. WON there was conspiracy? Yes. Conspiracy is when two or more persons agree and decide to commit a felony. This is proven by acts of criminal. Before during and after crime committed and that accused had same purpose and united in execution; act of one act of all. Wharton criminal lawactual presence not necessary if theres direct connection bet actor and crime 4. WON witness testimonies were valid? Yes. Inconsistencies mean and even strengthen. It was not rehearsed 5. WON alibi warranted? No. Positive identification over alibi. Unable to prove that they were in another place and impossible to go to crime scene 6. WON there was treachery and other aggravting circumstances? No. Treachery and taking advantage of superior strength was not proven as there was no witness or evidence. The unlicensed firearm and dwelling was further not included in information. Held: Conviction affirmed with modification 21. Ivler vs San Pedro Facts: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Issues: (1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and (2) Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband. Ruling: On Petition for Certiorari The RTC dismissed Ivlers petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to m aintain said petition arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property. In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel. Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. On Double Jeopardy The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, postconviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasioffense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasioffenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy. 22. People vs Bayona Facts At about eleven o'clock in the morning of June 5, 1934, while celebrahan general election in the precinct number 4, located in the Barrio de Aranguel Township Pilar, Capiz Province, the defendant here was surprised by Jose E. Desiderio, who was then the representative of the Department of Interior to inspect the general election in the Province of Capiz, and the commander of the Constabulary FB Agdamag that was on this occasion with said Jose E. Desiderio, carrying in his belt the Colt revolver caliber 32, No. 195 382,

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Exhibit A, within the fence that surrounded the building for the said polling station number 4 and a distance of 22 meters of that polling station. Jose E. immediatel Desiderio seized the gun in question. The defense, through the testimony of Jose D. Buenvenida Dioscoro Benliro and sought to establish that the defendant stop here on the street in front of the polling station was number 4 at the invitation of the Jose D. Benliro and in order to plead to the said defendant to bring home to the voters of said Jose D. Benliro had already finished voting, and that when they arrived Jose E. Comadante Desidierio and F.B. Agdamag, the defendant here was on the street. Since the electoral college to the site where, according to the witnesses, the defendant was when I remove the revolver Exhibit A, there is a distance of 27 meters. Issue Whether defendant is guilty? Held: That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to influence in any way the free and voluntary exercise of suffrage; That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in question should only be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20, 1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar there is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him. We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.) While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.) The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p. 169, ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms 23. US vs Chico Facts: On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon which were printed the miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one set forth above, the appellant had purchased the said medallion sold at a public sale under the authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public, and in doing so, he placed the medallions in his showcase and on one of the windows of his store. The appellant was ignorant of any law against the display of such medallions and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted. The appellant has two propositions for his acquittal: first is that before a conviction can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is directed against the use of identical banners, devices or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States. Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws. Held: The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The words used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. 24. People vs Iligan FACTS: At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and his companions Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On the way they met the accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix quickly said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his nephew fall, Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed. Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while and even passed the house of Quinones, when they noticed that they were no longer being chased the three decided to head back to Quinones house. On the way back the three accused suddenly emerged from the road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked Quinones Jr. on the forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy ran. Upon returning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted. The postmortem examination report and the death certificate indicates that the victim died of shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are liable for the victims death given that it was due to a vehicular accident and not the hacking. HELD: YES. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony has been committed and that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was considered superficial by the physician is immaterial. The location of the wound intended to do away with him. The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles pass any moment, the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him and was run over by a vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the proximate cause of the victims death. Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any qualifying circumstances 25.People vs Mananquil FACTS: VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as follows: On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee bottle. She was angry of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day

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shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON" The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame. The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written statement where she admitted having burned the victim. Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. due to pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary. 3 ISSUES: (1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given; (2) whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death. HELD: 1) YES. No denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be released later. Furthermore almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations contained therein 2) YES. The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-mortem findings immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Art. 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred. 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender 26. Quinto vs Andres Facts: Petitioner Quinto is the mother of an 11-year old boy named Wilson who died while going inside a drainage with the respondents Andres and Pacheco, who were also of the same age. What was clear according to a witness who was a friend of the victim was that the three of them (Wilson and the respondents) went inside the drainage filled with water. First to emerge was Pacheco who immediately went home, and then next to come out was Andres who was already carrying the dead body of Wilson. After being charged with homicide, the trial court the respondents not guilty and also found the same not civilly liable because of the absence of preponderance of evidence to prove liability. QUinto appealed the civil aspect of the decision which the CA affirmed. Issue: Petitioner comes to the Court and raises the following issues: 1) Does extinction of criminal liability carry with it extinction of the civil liability; and 2) was the prosecution able to establish preponderance of evidence. Decision: The civil action based on delict is not extinguished unless the court itself finds that civil liability did not arise. In the case at bar, the trial court was very clear that the prosecution was not able to establish a preponderance of evidence to find the respondents liable. As to whether preponderance of evidence should have been considered, the trial court and the CA was correct in their findings. Preponderance of evidence should not be based on the fact that the evidence of the defense is weaker. The evidence presented must be strong enough to SUFFICIENTLY SUSTAIN THE CAUSE OF ACTION. In the case at bar, the prosecution single prosecution witness testified that the hematomas on the alleged victim may have been caused by either hitting with a blunt object or slipping and falling on the hard pavement. Even the friend of the deceased testified that the drainage was so dark and this was the reason that he did not come with the other boys inside. And so, the possibility of slippage by Wilson was very much a possibility. 27.People vs Quianzon Facts: On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of the deceased person was being held in the house of Victoria Cacpal in a barrio, near the poblacion, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of the relatives and friends. The incident that led to the filling of these charges took place between 3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the victuals in his care. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied ran to the place where the people were gathered exclaiming that he is wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the tenth day after the incident. There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense as regards the foregoing facts. The question to be determined is who wounded Aribuabo. Issue: Whether defendant should be declared guilty of homicide? Held: YES It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or isolate the infection. This contention is without merit. According to the physician who examined whether he could survive or not." It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was cause by the fecal matter from the large intestine which has been perforated. The possibility, admitted by said physician that the patient might have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that the act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the punishable act of the accused. One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that the other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. . . . (13 R. C.L., 748.) Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage, had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge that he was performing an act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the strongest instinct in living beings. It much be assumed, therefore, that he unconsciously did so due to his pathological condition and to his state of nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain caused by the wound, aggravated by the contract of the drainage tube with the inflammed peritoneum. "When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to a perforation of the stomach, intestine or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated by violent shivering and pain first localized at a point in the abdomen, extending later to the entire abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which is aggravated by the slightest movement, becoming unbearable upon contact with the hand, a rag, or the bedclothes. The pain is continuous but it gives frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomittings of the greenish matter, which are very annoying and terribly painful, take from the beginning and continue while the disease lasts." (XVI Spanish-America Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 176; see also XXI Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is added the fact that the victim in this case was mentally deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes more evident that the accused is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim. The question herein raised by the appellant has already been finally settled by jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3, 1879, said in the case similar to the present, the following: "Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act and in this case the physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc." In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the abdominal wound was less serious than that received by Aribuabo in this case, as it was not penetrating, merely involving the muscular tissue. In said case the death of the victim was due to a secondary hemorrhage produced twenty-four hours after the wound had been inflicted, because of the "bodily movements of the patient, who was in a state of nervousness, sitting up in bed, getting up and pacing about the room, as as a consequence of which he internal vessels, already congested because of the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus produced caused his death." The court in deciding the question stated that

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"when a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor's orders, not because of carelessness or a desire to increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply because the doctor was of the opinion that the wound might have healed in seven days." The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly set forth in 13 R.C.L., 751, as follows: While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it may be taken to be settled rule of the common law that on who inflicts an injury on another will be held responsible for his death, although it may appear that the deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to a surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of the criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which are of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But, however, this may be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of the medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and punishment. 28. Urbano vs IAC Facts: Urbano had a dispute with Javier due to latters opening of irrigation system which flooded farmers palay storage. Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo but they had amicable settlement later on. 22 days after incident, Javier died due to tetanus. Issue: WON Urbano is criminally liable? Held: No. Civil liabilities only. Death wasnt directly due to the hacking. Proximate cause is that cause, w/c, in natural & continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury & w/o w/c the result wouldnt have occurred. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, & logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a criminal conviction). Infection of wound was efficient intervening cause between wounding & hacking w/c was distinct & foreign to the crime. The petitioner at the very least is guilty of slight physical injury. But because Urbano & Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement, the criminal liability is wiped out by virtue of PD 1508, 2(3) w/c allows settlement of minor offenses. 29. Intod vs CA Impossible Crime FACTS: In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed. At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured ISSUE: Whether or not said act constitutes an impossible crime HELD: YES. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. 30. People vs Domasian FACTS: The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. After that the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the driver got suspicious and reported the matter to two barangay tanods. the tanods went after the two, Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him. At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3 The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian. Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon ISSUE: 1)whether or not the act constitutes a crime of kidnapping under art 267 2)whether or not the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime HELD: 1)YES. Kidnapping may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty 2)NO. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty Moreover the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.