Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased. MORA ADONG v. CHEONG SENG GEE G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922 FACTS Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands and left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed by Cheong Seng Gee, an alleged legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the other hand, Mora Adong, the alleged lawful wife of the deceased who married him in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters are also claiming as heirs of the decedent. The conflicting claims to the estate were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge reached the conclusion that the proof of the marriage of Tan Dit to the decedent was not sufficient. Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child. On the other hand, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved, but, under the laws of the Philippine Islands, it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; thus, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia. Thus, both parties appealed. ISSUES 1. W/N the marriage between Tan Dit and the decedent is valid. 2. W/N the marriage between Mora and the decedent is valid considering that it is a Mohammedan marriage. RULING As to the first issue: The Court ruled that to establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In this case, the proof presented in Court did not sustain the validity of the marriage of Tan Bit and the decedent. The Court noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. The Court also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
3B 2009-2010
FACTS Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract. Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project. Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamarus contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD. Nippons contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamarus ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis. ISSUE W/N the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens. RULING NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts
3B 2009-2010
3B 2009-2010
MHC
Incorporator of
MHIC L
Trains personnel of
Palace Hotel
The NLRC awarded damages to Santos, but MHC and MHICL assailed NLRCs jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE Did the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case at bar? RULING No. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case
3B 2009-2010
FACTS Ducat obtained two separate loans from Ayala and Philsec in the sum of $2.5M secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, 1488 Inc. undertook the obligation to pay by virtue of a Warranty Deed with a Vendors Lien. Through the latter, 1488 Inc. sold to Athona Holdings (Athona) a parcel of land in Texas while Philsec and Ayala extended a $2.5M loan to Athona to partially cover the value of the $2.8M lot. Athona executed a promissory note in favour of 1488 Inc. worth $.3M to complete the payment for the lot. After all these transactions, Ducat was released by Philsec and Ayala of his loan. Athona thereafter failed to pay the $.3M promissory note. 1488 Inc. sued Athona, Philsec and Ayala for the payment of the $.3M. The case was filed in Texas. While the Texas case was pending, Philsec filed a complaint to recover a sum of money with damages in a Makati RTC against Ducat. Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a motion to dismiss on the basis of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens. The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc. because the action was neither in rem nor quasi in rem, accompanied by the fact that the said defendant was a non-resident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. ISSUES 1. Does a judgment in a US court bar actions to be instituted in Philippine courts? (i.e. Can the foreign judgment constitute res judicata?) 2. Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the principle of forum non conveniens? RULING 1. It depends. The foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving the adverse party an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated in Rule 39, 50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for
2.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither Philippine courts do not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an "overseas contract worker" a fact which he admits with conviction.
3B 2009-2010
3B 2009-2010
3B 2009-2010
3B 2009-2010
3B 2009-2010
10
3B 2009-2010
11
3B 2009-2010
12
3B 2009-2010
KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC. 465 U.S. 770 (1984) FACTS Keeton (NY) brought a libel suit against Hustler Magazine (Ohio) in New Hampshire, alleging jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship. Keetons only connection with New Hampshire is the circulation there of a magazine that she assists in producing. Hustler Magazines contacts with New Hampshire consist of monthly sales of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its nationally published magazine. ISSUE Whether or not New Hampshire has jurisdiction RULING YES. Hustler Magazines regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. The fact that Keeton has very limited contacts in New Hampshire does not defeat jurisdiction, since a plaintiff is not required to have minimum contacts with the forum State before that State is permitted to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Here, where Hustler Magazine has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine, and since Hustler Magazine can be charged with knowledge of the single publication rule, it must anticipate that such a suit will seek nationwide damages. There is no unfairness in calling Hustler Magazine to answer for the contents of its national publication wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed. ASAHI METAL INDUSTRY CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 480 U.S. 102 (1987) FACTS Asahi Metal Industry Co. was an international corporation based in Japan, which manufactured a valve used in the manufacture of motorcycle wheels. These valves were bought by Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., a Taiwanese distributor. One of these valves was alleged to have failed, causing an accident in the State of California. As a result of the accident the driver of the motorcycle sustained serious injuries and his wife, who was riding on the motorcycle as a passenger, was killed. The accident victim sued Cheng Shin in a California state court, and Cheng Shin in
13
3B 2009-2010
The Court finds that fair play would be violated because: The burden on the defendant is severe because the corporation would have to travel from Japan to California and defend itself under the laws of a foreign country. The plaintiff is not a California resident, and thus Californias interests in the case are diminished. California can enforce its interest in having safe products in its state indirectly by applying pressure to direct suppliers of goods to California, who in turn will apply commercial pressure to their suppliers. Cheng Shin has not shown that California is a more convenient forum than Japan or Taiwan in which to pursue its claim. Jurisdiction is not necessarily in the best interests of the other countries involved. Jurisdiction is not warranted by any international policy considerations, if they even exist. Because an assertion of jurisdiction would disturb the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," the decision of the California Supreme Court was reversed and the judgment of California Court of Appeal (California's intermediate appellate court) was effectively reinstated.
14
3B 2009-2010
15
3B 2009-2010
16
3B 2009-2010
17
3B 2009-2010
18
3B 2009-2010
FACTS Luis Regner had three daughters with his first wife, namely Cynthia, Teresa and Melinda (all of whom were based in California). The petitioner is Luis' second wife, Victoria Regner. During his lifetime, Luis acquired several properties, including the Cebu Country Club. Sometime in 1998, Luis executed a Deed of Donation in favor of respondents Cynthia and Teresa covering the country club. On 15 June 1999, Victoria filed a Complaint of Order for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed Donation with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining against Cynthia and Teresa with the RTC. Victoria alleged in her complaint that: on 17 March 1997, Luis made a written declaration wherein he stated that due to his illness and forgetfulness, he would not sign any document without the knowledge of his lawyer, Atty. Francis Zosa. She averred that on 15 May 1998, when Luis was already very ill and no longer of sound and disposing mind, Cynthia and Teresa , conspired to make it appear that Luis donated to them said property. Since Luis no longer had the ability to write or affix his signature, Melinda, acting under the influence of her sisters, Cynthia and Teresa, fraudulently manipulated the hand of Luis so that he could affix his thumbmark on the assailed Deed of Donation Sheriff Melchor A. Solon served the summonses on Cynthia and Teresa at the Borja Family Clinic in Tagbilaran City wherein Melinda worked as a doctor, but Melinda refused to receive the summonses for her sisters and informed the sheriff that their lawyer, Atty. Francis Zosa, would be the one to receive the same. Upon her arrival in the Philippines, on 1 June 2000, Teresa was personally served the summons at Room 304, Regency Crest Condominium, Banilad, Cebu City. Subsequently, on 12 September 2002, Teresa filed a motion to dismiss the case because of petitioners failure to prosecute her action for an unreasonable length of time. Petitioner opposed the motion and filed her own motion to set the case for pre-trial, to which Teresa filed her rejoinder on the ground that their sister, Cynthia, an indispensable party, had not yet been served a summons. Thus, Teresa prayed for the dismissal of petitioners complaint, as the case would not proceed without Cynthias presence. ISSUE (1) Whether a co-donee is an indispensable party in an action to declare the nullity of the deed of donation, and (2)Whether delay in the service of summons upon one of the defendants constitutes failure to prosecute that would warrant dismissal of the complaint.
19
3B 2009-2010
20
3B 2009-2010
RULING 1. No. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. If conclusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually useless. Jurisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied. As a result, many plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums. Ordinarily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper. Additionally, this would lead to other practical problems. At least where the foreign plaintiff named an American manufacturer as defendant, a court could not dismiss the case on grounds of forum non conveniens where dismissal might lead to an unfavorable change in law. The American courts, already very attractive to plaintiffs, would become even more attractive. The flow of litigation into the United States would increase and further congest already crowded courts. 2. Yes. Under the Gilbert ruling, dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice. Hence, the court's holding that the case would be better suited in Scotland was not unreasonable. First, because the majority of evidence was there and second, because the decedents were not able to properly implead the defendants. Also, Pennsylvania would not be a good venue because there would need to be two law standards - the Pennsylvania law would apply to Piper and Scottish law would apply to Hartzell. A trial involving two sets of laws would be confusing to the jury. A lack of familiarity with Scottish law would also be confusing. Another powerful reason why Pennsylvania is a bad venue is that Scotland has a very strong interest in this litigation. There is "a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." The incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in American court is likely to be insignificant. The American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried there.
FACTS Gilbert is a resident of Virginia, where he operated a public warehouse. One day, there was an explosion in the warehouse. Gilbert alleged that the explosion was caused by Gulf Oils negligent handling of gasoline. In view of said accusation, Gilbert brought an action in a court in New York City against Gulf Oil to recover damages for destruction of the Gilberts public warehouse and its contents in Virginia by fire resulting from Gulf Oil's negligence. Note that Gulf Oil was a Pennsylvania corporation qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York and it has designated agents in both states to receive summons. When sued in New York, the defendant, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate place for trial is Virginia, where the plaintiff lives and defendant does business, where all events in litigation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, and where both state and federal courts are available to plaintiff, and are able to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. The New York Court dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. The appellate court, however, disagreed. ISSUE Whether or not the United States District Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens RULING Yes. The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. The federal law contains no such express criteria to guide the district court in exercising its power. There are, however, important considerations in the application of the doctrine--from the standpoint of litigants, are relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, possibility of view of the premises if that be appropriate, and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Considerations of public interest in applying the doctrine include the undesirability of piling up litigation in congested centers, the burden of jury duty on people of a community having no relation to the litigation, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, and the unnecessary injection of problems in conflict of laws. In this case, the doctrine was properly applied. The Gilbert himself is not a resident of New York, nor did any event connected with the case take place there, nor does any witness with the possible exception of experts live there. The only reasons given by Gilbert in filing the case in New York are that the jury in Virginia may not
21
3B 2009-2010
Courts consider the following private interest factors: (1) (2) (3) (4) the residence of the parties and the witnesses; the forum's convenience to the litigants; access to physical evidence and other sources of proof; whether unwilling witnesses can be compelled to testify;
22
3B 2009-2010
ERIE RAILROAD Co. v. TOMPKINS 304 U.S. 64 (1938) FACTS Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation, or maintenance, of the train. He was rightfully on the premises as licensee because on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks, and that he was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars. To enforce that claim, he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. It denied liability, and the case was tried by a jury. The Erie insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that, under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way -- that is, a longitudinal pathway, as distinguished from a crossing -- are to be deemed trespassers, and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence unless it be wanton or willful. Tompkins denied the applicability of such rule since there was no statute of the State on the subject. The railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that the applicable law precluded recovery and awarded a sum of money. The Circuit Trial Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Eries had contended that application of the Pennsylvania rule was required by 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act which provides: "The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." ISSUE W/n such rule of Pennsylvania is required and should be considered by the Court in deciding the present case. RULING
Courts consider the following public interest factors: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) local interest of lawsuit; the court's familiarity with governing law; burden on local courts and juries; congestion in the court; and the costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to this forum.
The public interest factors weigh against maintenance of this action in Arizona. None of the remaining plaintiffs are citizens or residents of the United States. One of the defendants is a citizen of the chosen forum: Honeywell, which manufactured the radio altimeter in issue. The citizens of Arizona certainly have an interest in the manufacturing of defective products by corporations located in their forum. However, this interest is slight compared to the time and resources the district court in Arizona would expend if it were to retain jurisdiction over this dispute. Furthermore, the interest in New Zealand regarding this suit is extremely high. The crash involved a New Zealand airline carrying New Zealand passengers. The accident and its aftermath, including the accident investigation, the postinvestigation activity, and the various legal proceedings including an ongoing criminal probe, have all received significant attention by the local media. Because the local interest in this lawsuit is comparatively low, the citizens of Arizona should not be forced to bear the burden of this dispute.
23
3B 2009-2010
24
3B 2009-2010
25
3B 2009-2010
26
3B 2009-2010
27
3B 2009-2010
28
3B 2009-2010
29
3B 2009-2010
30
3B 2009-2010
31
3B 2009-2010
32
3B 2009-2010
33
3B 2009-2010
34
3B 2009-2010
of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure relied upon by Judge Ranada prescribes a corresponding filing fee based on total sum claimed for ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-in-interventions, and money claims against estates which are not based on judgment. The SC said Section 7(a) was not applicable because although the action was a claim against the estate of Marcos, it is one that is based on judgment, which in this case, was a foreign judgment. But the SC said that where the rule does not distinguish, ...
35
3B 2009-2010
36
3B 2009-2010
37
3B 2009-2010
38
3B 2009-2010
39
3B 2009-2010
When the fund had just been started, however, Central Hanover had sent notice by mail of the future proceedings. Subsequent notice in the paper included only the name of the trust, the date of establishment and the estates in the trust. The names of beneficiaries were not included. Appellant Kenneth Mullane was appointed special guardian and attorney for those parties known or unknown who had any interest in the income of the fund, and James N. Vaughan was appointed to represent those parties with interest in the principal. Mullane appeared specially to object to the statutory provision for notice, claiming that it was inadequate to afford the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Surrogate overruled Mullanes objections, and entered a decree accepting the accounting and terminating any rights the beneficiaries may have had against Central Hanover for mismanagement of the trust. The New York Supreme Court Appellate Division subsequently affirmed, as did the New York Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari. ISSUE What are the constitutional requirements for notice of judicial proceedings to a potential party under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
40
3B 2009-2010
41
3B 2009-2010
42
3B 2009-2010
43
3B 2009-2010
RULING Yes to both. The Court of Appeals reverse the dismissal of the claims against Petra Bank for lack of personal jurisdiction and remand to allow El-Fadl to conduct discovery of jurisdictional facts and reverse the dismissal of the claims against Petra Bank and PIBC on grounds of forum non conveniens, remanding for a finding whether Petra Bank and PIBC can show that Jordan is an adequate alternative forum. First, it is imperative to point out that the appellate court declared that ElFadl's brief does not distinguish between "transacting business" under the long-arm statute and "doing business" for purposes of general jurisdiction. His reliance on the long-arm statute is misplaced because he has failed to show any connection between the alleged jurisdictional acts and the District of Columbia. Because ElFadl's claims are not related to any of Petra Bank's general business contacts with the District of Columbia, they cannot confer specific jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. In spite of this the Court of Appeals stated that El-Fadl's brief presents both possible bases, general and specific, for personal jurisdiction over Petra Bank. Indeed, El-Fadl asserts, in his statement of issues presented, that "[t]he District Court erred ... in dismissing claims against a foreign defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction, prior to discovery or a hearing." At the very least, El-Fadl is entitled to discovery on this matter before it is decided. In other words, even though El-Fadl's present jurisdictional allegations are insufficient, he has sufficiently demonstrated
44
3B 2009-2010
ISSUE Did the district court act correctly in denying the Banks motion to dismiss, saying that the act of state doctrine will not be violated in granting the relief sought by Rosales? RULING The district court was wrong. Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
1 The "Chinn assignment" is a document that purportedly assigns all right, title and interest of the Marcos Estate in any bank accounts maintained in Switzerland to Robert A. Swift, "for the benefit of" the MDL plaintiffs. This assignment was signed by Walter Chinn, Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, at the direction of the district court as a contempt sanction against Marcos
45
3B 2009-2010
46
3B 2009-2010
47
3B 2009-2010
48
3B 2009-2010
HELEN LIU vs. REPUBLIC OF CHINA No. 87-2976. FACTS Admiral Wong His-Ling (Wong), Director of the Defense Intelligence Bureau (DIB) of the Republic of China (ROC), complained about the Chinese people overseas who criticized the ROC after they had received favorable treatment in Taiwan. Wong used Henry Liu as an example of this type of "ungrateful" Chinese person. Chen Chili, a member of the Bamboo Union Gang, stated that such people should be "taught a lesson," and that he could be trusted with such an assignment. Wong agreed that Henry Liu should be "given a lesson" once the opportunity presented itself. Chen Chi-li recruited Wu and Tong to murder Liu. They shot and killed Henry Liu in Daly City, California. Wong, Chen Hu-men, and another DIB employee were convicted by ROC military courts of conspiracy for their part in the Henry Liu murder. In her complaint filed in the district court, Helen Liu (Liu) asserts that the ROC was involved in the conspiracy to kill Henry Liu. The ROC filed a motion based on the act of state doctrine to dismiss it as a party defendant. The district court denied it initially to give Liu a chance to establish that, based on the findings of the ROC courts, the ROC was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The district court denied Liu's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the ROC's motion to dismiss it as a party defendant on act of state grounds. The district court held that Wong's act was not incidental to his duties as Director of the DIB, or reasonably foreseeable to the ROC. The district court also held that the act of state doctrine precluded an American court from piercing the findings of the ROC tribunals. The court found that the ROC decisions were "acts of state" because the judgments represented "an exercise of the ROC's jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests in assessing responsibility for the murder." ISSUE Whether or not there was subject matter jurisdiction over the ROC under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), codified in part at 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611 (1982)? RULING Yes. The FSIA is "the sole basis for obtaining [subject matter] jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts." Jurisprudence generally provides that foreign states are immune from suit in the United States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607.
49
3B 2009-2010
2 [a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of
the States in any case--- (5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above [commercial activities], in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, ..., occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment.... This exception does not apply, however, to claims based upon the exercise of or failure to exercise a discretionary function.
50
3B 2009-2010
ISSUE Whether or not the petition for certiorari will prosper? NO RULING By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. Idonah Slade Perkins in her cross-complaint brought suit against Eugene Arthur Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settled and determine. The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment "annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this
51
3B 2009-2010
13. Force Majeure: the execution of this agrrement is subject to any and allGovernment restrictions prohibiting or penalizing in whole or in part theexport of Iron & Steel Scrap from the Philippines, and the Seller shall not be responsible for delay in or failure of shipment or delivery or delays in transportation due to force majeure, strikes, dfferences with workmen, accidents, fires, flood, mobilizations, wars, foreign wars, riots, revolutions, regulations and restrictions or to any conditions beyond thecontrol of the SELLER whether the nature herein stated or not. 14. Dispute: In case of disputes, Board of Arbitration may be formed in Japan. Decision by the board of Arbitration shall be final and binding on both BUYER AND SELLER. Upon perfection of the contract Nankai opened a letter for credit (No. 38/80049) with the China Banking Corporation. On March 15, 1957, only four (4) days before the expiration of the Far East licence, three (3) boats sent by Nankai arrived in the PhilippinesOn March 19, 1957, the expiration of the export license, only 1,058.6 metric tons of scrap steel was loaded on the SS Mina. The loading was accordingly stopped. On April 27, 1957, Nankai confirmed and acknowleged delivery of the 1,058.6 metric tons of steel scrap, but asked for damages amounting to $148,135.00 consisting of dead freight charges, damages, bank charges, phone and cable expenses. As repeated requests, both against the shipping agent and the buyers (Nankai), for the issuance of the of Bill Lading were ignored, Far East filed on May 16, 1957, the present complaint for Specific Performance, damages, a writ of preliminiry mandatory injunction directed against Nankai and the shipping company, to issue and deliver to the plaintiff, a complete set of negotiable of Lading for the 1,058.6 metric tons of scrap and a writ of preliminary injunction against the China Banking Corporation and the Nankai to maintain the Letter Credit. The lower court issued on May 17, 1957 an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction, after Far East had posted a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The lower court rendered judgment absolving, defendants Everett Steamship Company and China Banking Corporation from liability and denied the claim for damages, both actual and moral, of the parties; found that the question of jurisdiction over the person of defendant and the subject matter has become moot ISSUE Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant-appellant?
52
3B 2009-2010
53
3B 2009-2010