Umber Bin Ibad, The End of History

THE END OF HISTORY: INTERPRETING HEGELIAN AND HEIDEGGERIAN GROUND AND BEING TOWARDS THEIR WAY TO TRUTH
UMBER BIN IBAD GC UNIVERSITY, LAHORE PAKISTAN
ABSTRACT History is the realization of the selfconsciousness of WorldSpirit. The understanding of History achieves through the Rationality prevails and reflects in the Philosophical world of ideas. Each step of self consciousness is also a step for the Spirits knowing itself completely, therefore, a step for The End of History. For the Hegelian understanding of The End of History one needs not to accept the difference either between Hegels understanding moving anthropologically or only in the realm of ideas. His descriptive history makes it clear that the modern Europe is the only way open for the rest of the world to participate within. The history of the rest of the world, especially India has been ended through the descriptive details of Hegelian history. Hegelian conception of history is based upon his understanding of Being and Ground. Heidegger criticizes Hegelian conception of Being and Ground and highlights their limitations. Heideggers criticism opens up the ways to Being and brings forth the nature of relation between holding certain method, orthewaystoBeing,andtheconceptionofTruth.To reach The End of History is not the inherent possibility of the movement of the worldhistory. To conceive The End of History, either in the realm of Idea or in the realm of history, depends upon the mode of engagement with beings. The critical engagement with beings, following Heidegger, the historical understanding keeps the horizon of thinkingopenfortheexpressionofBeing. 75

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KEY WORDS:Hegel,Heidegger,Being,Ground,thinkinghistory,Spirit, selfconsciousness,Method,TheEndofhistory For Hegel, History comes out as the mode of understanding, the highest mode of rationality and the moment of selfconsciousness of the Spirit. It is the understanding the power of looking at an object in an independent objective light, and comprehending it in its rational connection with other objects that makes History possible. Only thosepeoples,forHegel,thereforearealonecapableofHistory,who have arrived at that period of development (and can make that their startingpoint)atwhichindividualscomprehendtheirownexistenceas 1 independent,i.e.,possessselfconsciousness. To write history, for Hegel, is to understand human actions within already organized political whole synthesizing its discrete elements into universal reality of law, as an external objectifying reality, and Morality as a subjective obeying. It is, therefore, the phenomenon of the state in the history of human being that gives Hegel his starting point. For Hegel, therefore, the beginning of history emerges withthe emergence of first traces of theOriental world, only when this world found organized within States. The understanding of history, however, for him, must remain within the presupposed understanding of Worldhistory, or the journey of Spirits self consciousness. It is only participating within such worldhistorical consciousness that any historical incident takes its meaning. The worldhistory, however, must be a history of states remained existed withinthehistoryofhumanbeing. For Hegel, History is a serious business because History displaystherationalityrealizedinTime.Infactsuchaseriousbusiness that the societies, like that of India that could not bring forth the understandingofhistoryinitspast,cannotbegivenasignificantplace withinthehistoryoftheworld. 2 For him, History is prose, and myths fall short of History. The consciousness of external definite existence only arises in connection with the power to form abstract distinctions and assign abstract predicates; and in proportion as a capacity for expressing Laws (of natural or social life) is acquired, in the same proportion does the ability manifest itself to comprehend objects in an unpoetical form. 3 Theproseofhistory,whenunderstandsLaws,infact,alsounderstands therationalityrealizedinTime. It is in the realm of philosophy where essence of rationality finds its coherent existence. Each philosophical activity for him is also a reflection of certain time that can also be understood as the moment of selfconsciousness of WorldSpirit. It is this realm that 76

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reflectstheTruth,notonlyinitsuniversal,andthereforeintheeternal mode, but also in the realized essentiality of Time. For Hegel, the reflection of eternal Truth appears in and through Logic, the heart of philosophyandtheabodeoftheessentialnatureofSpirit. The selfrealization of Spirit at certain moment is also the realization of Absolute. Each rational activity as a Spirits self conscious moment, therefore, is moving towards the End of its completion and also the realization of its End. The historical moment, that is also a realized expression of WorldSpirit and, in other words, the certain moment of Absolute moves towards its completion, and therefore towards its End. The End of History would arrive with the completion of Reason when the difference between Reality and 4 Rationalitywoulddisappear. The realization of the Rationality of Absolute WorldSpirit, that is, the possibility of The End of History, is an expression of correspondence between the Essence of Being and Being. This correspondence, however, could only take place when both are grounded in the grounding of Truth as grounded Truth. Whether it takesplaceinacontemporaneousTimeisaquestiontobeunderstood onlythroughexploringtheconceptsofGround,BeingandHistory.The understanding of these concepts can provide the vindication of HegelianunderstandingregardingTheEndofHistory. There are two wellknown approaches towards understanding Hegelian conception of The End of History: one mode of thinking takes anthropological understanding of Hegel and considers Hegels philosophical exposition as oriented towards The End of history. In twentieth century, Kojeve (19021968) 5 and Fukuyama (1952) 6 can be considered two significant figures for maintaining such orientation and holding of The End of history thesis as an eschatological or contemporaneous possibility. This position gives significant importance to one of the Hegels work, The Phenomenology of Spirit. 7 The second mode of thinking follows such figures as Jean Hippolite (19071968) and Althusser (19181990). This mode of thinking considers Hegelian approach as oriented, though towardsAbsoluteKnowledge,yetthisorientationattains,ifatall,self reflective absoluteness in the world of Ideas. This mode of thinking refuses to accept the anthropological understanding of Hegel and termsitasantiliberalbecauseofitsculminationinTheEndofHistory. This article, however, intends to take an alternative position for understanding Hegels position of The End of History. Instead of following any of the either it intends to see Hegel as he appears through his descriptive history. To consider his own time, the best of the time, not only with reference to his traditions own past but also 77

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against all societies and states staying away from modern European position, stations him accepting the certain mode of The End of History, even if it remains concealed. The whole of the worldhistory stands for Hegel as justifying his specific European Time. All the other part of the world would keep on enjoying their wretched existence until and unless they accept and own the modern world of Hegel. Whether Hegels modern world would take another leap in the dialectics of Time, is a question animating his own world, but for the restoftheworld,especiallyIndia,theirhistoryhasbeenended. This study, initiated from the world for which the history has been ended, intends to explore further the very concepts, Ground, Being and Truth on which Hegels descriptive understanding is placed. This study finds that Hegel, despite his selfreflective consciousness, stood upon his own very modern tradition compelling him to own certain methodology and follows it through. His acceptance of the decision of his Time, especially regarding low the Oriental World, sets his own conception of History. To find an alternative position this article places Heidegger against Hegel. While placing Heideggerian critique on its side, this article sees the Ground of Hegelian understanding in its relationship with Being only standing upon which Hegels own understanding of realized history arises. The Heideggerian understanding questions the very question of Being that normallysetsthedirectionforthearticulationofTruth. This article divides itself into three portions: first portion bringsforwardtheHegelsdescriptiveworldhistory,withitsemphasis uponIndianhistory.ItistoshowthedetermineddirectionofHegelian understanding of Worldhistory.; the second part shows the understanding of Being in both Hegelian and Heideggerian understandingandalsotherelationalunderstandingofbothregarding Ground while letting Heidegger criticize the Hegelian position; third part relates Being through Ground to show the form of Truth coming outofthisrelation.ThispositionsoonshowsthemodeofTruthasthe way of Truth. The relation between the way or Method and Truth highlights the framing of Truth through the relation of Method and Truth.FinallythediscussionofTheEndofHistoryconcludesthearticle with the emphasis upon the possibilities of opening up the ways for Truth. (I) HEGELS DESCRIPTIVE WORLD-HISTORY For Hegel, the origin of the world history starts from the Oriental world, and interestingly, it occurs to him as compulsion. The origin of 78

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world history, where appears for him simple, there, at the same time giveshimsomuchtroublethathebrushesasidetheoriginalmoments of history as delirium and madness. 8 His conception of rationality, intelligence,morality,freedom,subjectivity,oppositionality,etc.,finds a shock while encountering the Oriental World. 9 His logic makes him understandtheorigincompulsivelyassimple,yetunstable.Thevery simplicity of origin should find the simple oppositionality to get itself transformed into simple but compulsive dynamism, as becoming. Yet his encountering with the Oriental world places him against the multiplicity of Chinese, and especially, Indian consciousness. His developmental mode of rationality, however, helps him degrading the multiplicity and constructing the oppositionality within the dynamism of the Oriental World. Categories of modernity are sufficient enough 10 for bringing out reality as the Enframed picture. If, historical facts are problematic then they can be categorized within frameworks developed through the dynamism of modernity. And the luggage that is not befitting can be thrown away, into the category of Other, not required for the truth. And Hegel, like any intelligent active person of the modern times threw them away with the deserving insulting remarks. How can the madness be tolerated within the absolute Reason? With China and the Mongols, for Hegel, as the realm of despotism, History begins. 11 As soon as he enters into the Chinese World, he places it within the category of Patriarchy, as the constitutive principle of Chinese life. The subjectivity, under patriarchal principle, can not find its free moving space. The human action, therefore, can only be understood as Natural and not a free act. The sphere of subjectivity does not then attain to maturity here, since moral laws are treated as legislative enactments, and law on its part has an ethical aspect. All that we call subjectivity is concentrated in the supreme head of the state, who, in all his legislation has an eye tothehealth,wealthandbenefitofthewhole. 12 India comes, for Hegel, nextin the description of the Oriental world. Its diversity, lack of civil machinery and political organizations coupled with the diverse conscious expressions through multiple spiritual writings gives Hegel the bad taste for India from the very start. He though finds categorical imperatives through the classification of Castes, but these imperatives appear for him Natural. He thinks that giving rules by a person does not necessitate them to be considered as Morals. He, however, ignores this point that it is their (Indians) historical owning of those Morals that turns them into social reality. Can this historical owning of Morals appear as an 79

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immediate historical moment? For Hegel, this question is not worth considering. 13 A state, for Hegel, is a realization of Spirit such that in it the selfconscious being of Spiritthe freedom of the Willis realized as Law. Such an institution then, necessarily, presupposes the consciousnessof FreeWill. 14 Once Hegel decides that a state canonly be like it, he never refrains from seeing Indian political organization but from the stated definition. He, however, can not find anything in Indian history resembling his definition of state. In India, therefore, the proper basis of the state, for him is absent. Only tyrannical despotism ruled its history. And, this tyranny always appears to the people as normality, to be more precise, Natural. To others (other states)despotictyrannyisanexceptionbutinIndia,thereisnosense of personal independence with which a state of despotism could be compared, and which would raise revolt in the soul; nothing approaching even a resentful protest against it, is left, except the corporeal smart, and the pain of being deprived of absolute 15 necessariesandofpleasure. ForHegel,inIndia,itisfutiletosearchforhistory,inboththe senses, that is to search for annals and to search for his dynamic, developmental and dialectical processes that may take it to modern times.EventhefindingofIndianbrilliancesinAstronomyandAlgebra, and even in philosophy can not reduce Hegels anger against Indian multiplicity and Indias strong and resilient inability to resolve oppositions into synthetic Unity. Even in the presence of marvelous literary activities, as the recent discoveries of the treasures of Indian Literature have shown us what a reputation the Hindoos have acquired in Geometry, Astronomy, and Algebra that they have made great advances in Philosophy, and that among them, Grammar has been so far cultivated that no language can be regarded as more 16 fully developed than the Sanscrit, Indians can not be considered rational because they dont have History and therefore do not have theabilitytoseerealityinanobjectivemanner. 17 For Hegel, the present of India remains historical, that is, Indias present is its history and even that history is its history of origin. To see India, as it is through Hegels eyes, as a whole, is to see India from those categories developed in Modern Times. Englishmen have given India its wholeness. India is composed of hindoos India Proper is the country which the English divide into two large sections: the Deccan the great peninsula which has the Bay of Bengal on the east, and the Indian Sea on the west and Hindostan, formed by the valleyoftheGanges,andextendinginthedirectionofPersiaWecall the inhabitants of the great country which we have now to consider 80

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Indians, from the river Indus (the English call them Hindoos) They themselves have never given a name to the whole, for it has never becomeoneEmpire,and[yetweconsideritassuch.] 18 For Hegel, the character of Indian spirit is that of living in a state of dream. For him the dream condition entails the absence of consciousnessofobjectiveexistence: When awake, I exist for myself, and the rest of creation is an external, fixed objectivity, as I myself am for it. As external, the rest of existence expands itself to a rationally connected whole; a system of relations, in which my individual being is itself a member an individual being united with that totality. This is the sphere of Understanding. In the state of dreaming, on thecontrary, this separation is suspended. Spirit has ceased to exist for itself in contrast with alien existence, and thus the separation of the external and individual dissolves before its universality its essence. The dreaming Indian is therefore all that we call finite and individual; and, at the same time as infinitely universal and unlimited a something intrinsically 19 divine. The history ofIndia is rooted into thedichotomy of sensuous pleasure and Natural compulsion. No effort, in Indian history, ever made to bring closer the inherent and prevailed oppositionality. The Universal Pantheism coexists with the sensuous objectifications manifested through rituals. Things are not things anymore and the Divine is not in its pure Divinity anymore. The general idea of Indian universe, for Hegel, may betaken as, Things are as much stripped of rationality,of finite consistent stability of cause and effect, as man is of the 20 steadfastnessoffreeindividuality,ofpersonality,andfreedom. For Hegel, India remains open for invaders. In India states come and go without giving centralized political unity. The valiant Muslims are one of these rulers. Rulers come and go, whatever their background may be, while despotism remains prevailed. Indian people, that is, Hindoos, who can only be understood through their ancient religious writings, largely remain indifferent and never show any tinkling of resistance. After the acquaintance of Europeans with India, the representation of strife and diversity remains a rule. There was an order of things very nearly approaching feudal organization; and the Kingdoms in question were divided into districts, having as 81

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governors Mahometans, or people of the Warrior Caste of HindoosThe whole state of things, therefore, is not that of repose, but of continual struggle; while moreover nothing is developed or furthered. It is the struggle of an energetic will on the part of this or thatprinceagainstafeeblerone;thehistoryofreigningdynasties,but not of peoples; a series of perpetually varying intrigues and revolts not indeed of subjects against their rulers, but of a princes son, for instance, against his father; of brothers, uncles and nephews in 21 contestwitheachother;andoffunctionariesagainsttheirmaster. The Indian history remained vacuous of ideological prevalence that might contribute as uniting factor. The Indian life, to Hegel, seems to be united with naked force and as soon as the force disappears the unity disperses too. The business of the ruling Indian governorsconsistedincollectingtaxesandcarryingonwars;andthey thus formed a kind of aristocracy, the Princes Council of State. But only as far as their princes are feared and excite fear, have they any power; and no obedience is rendered to them but by force. As long as the prince does not want money, he has troops; and neighboring princes, if they are inferior to him in force, are often obliged to pay 22 taxes,butwhichareyieldedonlyoncompulsion. Hegel is eager to see some instance like that of French Revolution within Indian history 23 and remains frustrated after not finding it. French Revolution is a worldHistorical event for Hegel in its bearing upon history. It gives shape to the modern world and it must become beacon that would enlighten the worldhistory. 24 After not finding a similar instance in Indian history his disdain for it increases. He, however, ignores all efforts of Indian people to attain freedom within their historical conditions. He fixes them up in his stable and singular categories which are eager to move ahead through finding opposite singular categories only to get prevailed as Modern Spirit of Time. He looks at Muslims only as a ruler but never bothers to see them as acommon people. He, though,glimpses upon the multiplicity of Indian population, as he mentions Sikhs inhabiting the area of 25 Punjab, yet he excludes, under the compulsion of singular categories, other population, like Muslims and Hindoos, coexisting with each other at the same time. He is in such a hurry to move forward on the path of dialectical dynamism that he can not see the harmonized social networks and relations beneath the confused political conditions. He even ignores with contempt the enduring tendencyofIndiansociallifethatremainsitsharmonyandcomposure despite the diversity of religious and regional identities. His 26 enthusiasm for dialectical synthetic movements and the need to explain everything from there let him ignore the force of those ideas 82

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that does not move dialectically, that plays patiently but more seriously than the Greek games, between oppositionalities without compelling them to unite in a larger whole. The plurality can remain syncretically, even in a larger whole, without disturbing a lot ones identity is almost unthinkable to Hegelian mindset. Without directed towards progress human life is not worth living for him. And progress can only take place when one of the oppositional identities prevails upon other to assimilate its ownness within itself and brings forward a larger synthetic unity. This movement is a movement towards absolute idea, and a realization of absolute idea, where differences 27 prevail but grouped together within larger whole. His anxiety to move ahead quickly makes him oblivious to acknowledge the sameness prevailed in the multiplicity of Indian history. For his own presence, that is, European presence, his emphasis remains upon the assimilative tendencies correlating the colonizing European dialectical experiences. For India, therefore, he can only find oppositionality, standing against each other absolutely. India is destined to remain what its origin is. But Europe is not its history but its future. For India, however, there is no future because its history is bleak and illusory. Therefore its present is bleak and illusory. India meets its End of History through Hegelian selfconscious activity of narrating Indias history. (II) HEGELIAN UNDERSTANDING OF BEING The totality of Hegelian understanding appears in the Hegelian conception of history as Time is a Concept itself, which is there. 28 The realization of Concept into the moments of history gives Hegel that sense of understanding with which he absolves Truth from eternity and transforms it into the selfconscious moments in time. The logical plane of concepts resides within the plane of eternity, within God. The moments of history becomes for Hegel the moment of Spirits coming into itself, as God knowing itself in time. The logical plane in which Hegel discusses the multiplicity of concepts manifests Being in its interrelated manifoldness. The truth appears as Idea appeared through gradual knowing of its contradictory multiplicity. HegeldiscussesthispositioninhisLogicthatappearsinthreedifferent books: a) The Science of Logic b) Encyclopedia c) The Shorter Logic. What follows, well take The Science of Logic to understand Hegels conceptofBeingwithinLogical,andtherefore,Eternalplane. 83

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Though concepts are interrelated despite their division into dichotomies, the contradiction between Nature and Spirit appears for Hegel necessary to bring out the complete picture of manifold understanding of Beingforitself and Beinginitself. The necessary element for the existence of Beingforitself is Freedom that can not be seen in Nature. The objects in Nature are determined through its fixed laws. But the sphere of Spirit requires freedom for its existence; without freedom beingforitself can not find its own being and thus can not be what it is. The distinction between Nature and Spirit is, therefore, necessary for understanding the history of beingforitself 29 orbeinghuman. To bring out the understanding of beingforitself and the process of its realization through its actions, Hegel devises two ways; one is to narrate a story of consciousness towards its self consciousness; the other is the story of realization of Spirits truths through the moments in time. The earlier translates into The Phenomenology of Spirit and the latter appears in Lectures on Philosophy of History. In both of the works the concept of Being appears in its manifold modes. In The Phenomenology of Spirit, its Beingforitself, that takes primacy upon beinginitself. The Phenomenology is the journey of Being for itself for itself, through multiple stages, finding multiple moments of incompleteness, moving ahead by assimilating and annulling the previous moments, and remaining always in the presence of oppositionality. The journey of selfconsciousness brings out the passage of certain being for its own sake.Inthefollowingthatcertainsenseofbeingwillbebroughtout. In the Philosophy of History Hegel traverses through the worldhistoryinhisefforttoseetherealizationofSpiritinthemoment of time. The realization of Spirit he finds in the State understood as the Universal inhering within it the particular interests through objectification of Law. He finds the expression of State in the annals and the preservation of the record of history becomes for him synonym with the selfconsciousness of the state. The state, for him, arises and passes away while letting itself transmitted into other part oftheworld.Fromonestatearisesanotherstatetilltheemergenceof modern times, that is, the time in which Hegel himself lives. The modern time, for him, becomes the standard of looking back into the world history to see everything culminating into the modern existence. Reason that he sees everywhere prevailed in the history becomes real with the each effort of universalizing identity, that is, State. His own time, however, reaches the moment when Real also becomes Rational. His staunch owning of this position, however, though changes with time yet the disposition towards his own time 84

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remains same. Being has to appear through its contingencies into the modeofexistenceinwhichhistimeandreasonfashionsittobe. Being appears in both The Phenomenology of Spirit and The Philosophy of World history as moving in specific direction, taking specific points, transforming into certain mode and showing disposition to move towards a certain goal. The specific tendencies of Being or, in other words, the determining of Being, animates both the journeys of is works. The individual position in phenomenology achieves sameness that is achieved in the World history. And both achieve the sameness that is achieved in Logic, that is, in the eternal abode of Concepts. The determination of Being appears differently, in different modes and in different planes of life, yet they all, for him fulfilling the sameness destined by the determination of Being. Being has to appear in the way through which Hegel already conceives it through his philosophy. His truth of both modes finds its ground in his holdingofcertainconceptionofBeingthatwasalreadyachievedinhis philosophy.Thetruthofhistoryisinthetruthofhisphilosophy,thatis in The Phenomenology of Spirit and the truth of The PhenomenologyofSpiritcanbeattainedwhileseeingitsrealizationin time. And truth of both can be seen in the logic, as the realization of eternity. Living in the circularity with his Reason is what always inspiredHegel. HEIDEGGERS CONCEPTION OF BEING It will not be an exaggeratedclaim that thewhole of the philosophical activity of Heidegger remains around the concern of the question of being. For him the greatest sin took place in the history of philosophy is the oblivion of the question of Being. His position is to revive this concern and bring out the engagement of Dasein with Being. His extensive writings and lectures remained a struggle against the positions making up themselves without invoking the concern of being. He locates this lack of concern in the prevalence of certain sort of metaphysical position deeply embedded in science and technology, in modern epoch, as its establishing ground. Heidegger traces this obliviousness to the metaphysical traditions of western world and reached early Greek thinkers, through multiple epochs, where belonging with Being appears in wholeness. Each epoch, for him, is a belonging with Being through the prevalent metaphysical tradition that opens up determinate mode of direction. This opening up of the destiny, embedded in the certain metaphysical view, lies in the incomplete view of Being, to have the view with Beings certain manifestationintheabsenceofotherpossibilities. 85

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BEING APPEARS IN DIFFERENCE Being, for Heidegger, is not that appear through the essents. Neither doesitappearthroughthegeneralanduniversalpositionofBeing.Itis the difference of one from the other, that is the difference of essents fromBeing,thatletBeingandessentappearsinbeingness.For,Being aswellastheessent,intheirdifferentways,emergefromandthrough theDifference. When we thus think ofBeing in terms of Difference, of Being as Difference, Being shows itself in the character of going over to the essent, as coming down to it and revealing it and the essent appears as that which, through such descent of Being, comes into unhiddenness and appears as if it were by itself unhidden. As against the traditional conception of transcendence as the movement from Dasein to Being, Heidegger thinks of the Difference now as the interplay and resolution (Austrag) of beings descent into beings and the latters emergence into unconcealedness. Being is the revealing descent and the essent is the coming into and enduring in the heaven of unhiddenness, the arrival which hides its own self in this unconcealedness. Both emerge, as thus differentiated, from the Difference, their identical source. The Difference between Being and essents is not just a static and formal relation between two terms but the interplay, the working out or the process of resolution of the two 30 opposedmovementsofrevealing(descent)andconcealing(arrival). ORIGIN IS SIMPLE BUT WHOLE BeingappearstoHegel,initsorigin,simpleandunstable.However,for Heidegger, each historical understanding of Being is simple because there the divisions of disclosure are not fixed with the determined direction of subjectivity already historically determined through the essenceofBeing.There,intheoriginofhistory,beingappearsinunity of identity while identity is understood not the identity of two things or essents but the identity of the totality as a whole. Contrasting his position with Hegel, Heidegger points out his position in Hegel and the Greeks as ; yet if we now attend to the enigma of aletheia, whichholdsswayoverthebeginningofGreekphilosophyandoverthe course of philosophy as a whole, then the philosophy of the Greeks showsitselftoourthinkingtooinanotyet.Butthisisthenotyetof the unthought not a not yet that does not satisfy us, but rather a 31 notyettowhichwearenotsufficient,andwhichwefailtosatisfy. 87

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BEING AS POSSIBILITY [MOGLICHKEIT] InaLetteronHumanism,Heideggerbringsouthisconceptionofbeing as enablingfavoring. 32 Moving away from metaphysically burdened languageheoptsforthewordsseldomfoundinthehistoryofwestern metaphysical literature. Heidegger, in this essay, is trying to bring out the condition of Being as Being. He wants to differentiate the dominating subjectivity and the possibility of appearing being. He also intends to emphasize upon the belongingness in the working of logos alreadyunderstoodasbelongingtogetherness. In the history of western metaphysical tradition the togetherness as logos found its due stress within the order of the epochalreadydirectedthroughthedeterminationofBeing.Theeffort tobringoutthethoughtfulwithdrawswhatistherebutwhatremains notyetproper to be appeared as the togetherness of logos. The stress of belongingness remains far away from thought itself. The order of the togetherness even makes it essential to thrust aside belongingness as far away as possible from the domain of truth. Heidegger tries to throw light upon the unthought in the history of metaphysical tradition. Instead following the subjective impulse to graspBeinginitsessentiality,Heideggerfavorstheactivityoflistening. As the belonging to being that listens, thinking is what it is according to its essential originTo embrace a thing or a person in their essence means to love them, to favor them. Thought in a more original way such favoring means the bestowal of their essence as a gift. Such favoring [Mogen] is the proper essence of enabling, which not only can achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let it be. Itisonthestrengthofsuchenablingbyfavoringthat something is properly able to be. This enabling is what is properly possible [das Mogliche], whose essence resides in favoring. From this favoring being enables thinking...As the element, being is the quite power of the favoringenabling, that is, of the 33 possible. BEING AS UNHIDDENNESS (ALETHEIA) For Heidegger, the Western Metaphysical tradition brings out the conception of being as presence. This presence can be found from 88

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Plato through medieval scholars to Descartes and modern philosophy. Yet this presence is always considered through generalized and universal conception of being. This being appears in each essent and the being of essent appears through it. In Hegel the presence of being appears as an indeterminate immediate that can only be grasped through subjective activity of speculative and dialectical manner. This forHeideggercannotbethecasebecauseHegelheremissesthepoint that before bringing forward the trail of speculative dialectical movement towards absolute subjectivity, he must have already experienced the relation to the essence of history in terms of essence of being that becomes the matter of his thought. This essence, however, is presencing, that is to say, an enduring coming forth from concealment into unconcealment. In coming to presence, disclosure is 34 atplay. BEING AS BELONGING-TOGETHERNESS Identityremainsabasicelementofalmosteachmetaphysicalthought. The diversity, when understood, reduces into the identity. Each metaphysical conception of Identity appears as Being. Yet this appearance, for Heidegger, remains within the determined direction of Being. As Heidegger points out, the earliest Greek utterance in which this Being is expressly mentioned, viz. the saying of Parmenides that Being and apprehension (Thought) are the same (to gar auto noein estin te kai einai), expresses something entirely different. As against the traditional doctrine of metaphysics, according to which Identity belongs to Being, Parmenides suggests that being inheres in an Identity, that thinking and Being belong in the Selfsame, that they belong together through this selfsame. The sameness of to auto, the Selfsame, lies, according to Heidegger, in a belongingtogether, though a belongingtogether which must be interpreted otherwise than in terms of the later metaphysical conception of identity as a feature of Being, for here Being itself is regarded as a feature of this 35 Identity. Heidegger differentiates between mediated identity and the identity as a wholeness, as Being. Heidegger points out that in belongingtogether,themediatedidentity,asanelementoftraditional metaphysical position, gives primacy to togetherness, instead of belongingness. The latter, in fact, withdraws from that belonging in the purity of adequate connection, as correspondence. Here, to belong means, Heidegger says, to be coordinated and incorporated intotheorderofatogether,givenitsplaceintheunityofamanifold, put together into the unity of a system mediated through the unifying 89

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center of an effective synthesis. Philosophy conceives such belonging togetherasnexusandconnexio,asthenecessaryconnectionbetween onethingandanother.Ontheotherhand,belongingtogethermyalso be understood as belongingtogether, such that together is determined in terms of belonging. Belongingtogether can yield a sense in which it is not the unity of togetherness that determines the sense of belonging but in which togetherness itself is understood in the light of belonging. It is in this sense that thought and Being 36 belongstogetherintheSelfsame. BEING APPEARS IN MULTIPLE WAYS IN MULTIPLE EPOCHS For Heidegger, Being appears to multiple epochs differently. Each metaphysicalpositiondeterminestheunveilingofBeingincertainway and hides many other. The withdrawal of Being in its manifold possibilities could enable that metaphysical position to reveal the being of essents. For example, the stress on Logic of the Latin world withdraws the possibilities of logos of early Greek experience. The stress on Logic reduces the being of Reason into the rules, that is, specified directions in which reason can and should move. The distance of reason from initial experience of logos enables Reason to correlate itself with statement and judgment. Where statement is an expressionofideainlogicalformandjudgmentisthecorrespondence of statement with the actualitas coming out in statement of idea. Logos, however, initially appeared in a mode of aletheia, the unhiddenness. The original essence of truth could not be retained and preserved and there was a collapse of unhiddenness, of the area opened out for the appearing of the essent; from the debris idea and statement, ousia and kategoria, were salvagedeach existing as an objective entity, disjoined from the other and connectable only by a relation having itself the character of an objective entity. Ever since, philosophy has labored to explain and render plausible the relation between judgment (thought) and Being by all sorts of ingenious 37 theories.

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BEING APPEARS THROUGH APPREHENSION NOT GRASPING In his effort to bring forward the conception of Being other than metaphysically burdened language constructions, Heidegger moves toward early Greeks. In that movement, and his reinterpretation of early Greek thinkers, Heidegger discovers the distorted meaning of many concepts, and even that of concept itself. He brings out the initial meaning of knowing as apprehension as contrasting with grasping entailed by concept itself. Through the famous saying of Parmenides; (to gar auto noein estin te kai einai), that is commonly understood as : Being and thought are the same. Heidegger brings out the hidden meaning of noein (thought), while insisting to refrain from projecting into noein the modern conception of thinking as the activity of a subject, with Being as its correlate, and from interpreting 38 it in Kantian or Hegelian terms. Heidegger insists that we must understand thought in the sense of apprehension. This sense brings out the double signification of taking up, accepting, letting what appears come up and of hearing a witness, questioning him and so determining. 39 Apprehensionis neither a power of a subject for the grasping nor the faculty of a human being. Considering human being a subject is itself a determining of apprehension in certain sense. Apprehension is not a faculty possessed by a humanbeing; instead apprehension is the mutual sharing of a human being with Being and in Being. Apprehension is rather a happening, sharing in which alone man enters into history as an essent, appears, that is, in the literal sense, 40 comesintobeing.
IS THE SELF-SAME NOT MOVING FOR ABSOLUTE SELFREALIZATION

BEING

For Heidegger, it is Hegel who determines truth to be the goal of philosophy.Thisisachievedonlyatthestageofcompletion.Thestage of Greek philosophy remains in the notyet. As the stage of beauty, it is not yet the stage of truth. 41 The Greeks stage of truth for Hegel is still only a thesis or a moment of spirits realization of its self consciousness that can be assimilated into other stages for achieving thesubjectivecertaintyoftheabsolute.ForHegel,thereisnodenying that in the Greek world the spirit indeed comes for the first time into free and open opposition to being. But spirit does not yet properly come to absolute certainty of itself as selfknowing subject. It is with Hegelian system of speculative dialectical metaphysics, does 42 philosophycomestobewhatitis. 91

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Heidegger thinks Hegel grasps the understanding of spirit as immersed in his own time. Hegel couldnt critically engage with the spirit of his own time. Instead, he owned and accepted the very direction without opening up other possibilities for Being to get emerge. However, Being for Heidegger is the selfsame. He does not think the thought of each metaphysical epoch enables to bring forth the being of essents. For Heidegger each time the effort is made to apprehend Being through concepts, it also enables Being to withdraw. Thiswithdrawingenablesbeingtoappearaswedesireittogetappear throughourimmersionwithinessents. HEGELIAN AND HEIDEGGERIAN UNDERSTANDING OF GROUND 43 The ground for Hegel appears to be, in and through his Logic, 44 the systematicexpansionofcategoriesforbringingouttheMatterofFact. This systematic expansion of categories is interlocked to produce certain triadic dynamism in order to produce ground for the synthesis of diverse and oppositional identities. The ground on which this grounding takes place moves upon the principle of reason. This principle of Reason lies in the roots of western metaphysical 45 tradition. The principle of Reason appeared as a ground of Reason throughLeibnizianposition. 46 Thisgroundcameout,asitcameout,in HegelianLogic,asgroundingtheassertivestatements. Themovementofgroundtakesacertaindirectionandattains a certain characteristic in order to synthesize the oppositionality. It is for accomplishing this certain direction and characteristic that movementfirstofalltakesplace.Themovementtakesplacefortaking oppositional identities into their opposition and after going through their incomplete appearance that turns each identity into indeterminate mode, compelling them to resolve their opposition and getresolvedintosyntheticunity.Thismovementaccomplisheswhatit intends to accomplish only through being certain speculation, that is, only through determinate apprehension, comprehension or taking sightof. The movement, however, couldnt take place without, first, considering or taking identities as oppositions. The identities are identities because they are immediate determinations and they are in opposition. Why should they be in opposition? This is not clear through Hegelian speculation. But their opposition, just like their being as identities, appears to him as selfevident as the ground of grounding that provides him justification to move philosophically throughassertiveposition. 92

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The relation between ground and being, however, appears whenbeingappearsasgroundedandgroundappearsinthereflection of being, though as unreflected. Ground, one can understand in its geographical imagery. In this situation it would appear almost in the same fashion as it appeared to Hegel. 47 Ground as Land, however, keeps individuals who are treading on it, and the Land itself, distinct from each other. The change in Land may not create change in the ground. The change may only take place when individuals are related with Land in certain belonging. Only then, the change in Land may bringsomechangeinindividuals.TheimageryofLand,inthissituation is helpful though the effort to take it very far only makes matter difficult to understand. The relationship between ground and being is more intimate than the relationship between the imagery of Land and individuals. With the change in ground the determinate change in being takes place. And with the change in being the correlative change in groundmayensue.Thechangeingroundmayappearwiththechange in the determinateness of being, that is, with the change in its ability to be in the determinate form what it is. If the ground does not ground but loses its ground, then what is the sense to say it ground. Yet, even, in the absence of its foundational condition, the ground may appear as ground. This position can only appear with the relation of time. It is only with the relation of time that ground, in its grounding,mayappearasground,yetlosesitspositionbybringingout theconcealedtemporalpositionofbeing. (III) BEING APPEARS THROUGH GROUND BeingappearswhenGroundletitappear.It(letting)istheshapingof ground that shapes the being itself. The history of philosophy, for Hegel, appears as the dialectical movement already divided into thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For, Hegel understands the Cartesian position as the antithesis of the previous philosophical position that stretches back to the early Greek thinkers. The antithesis of Cartesian position brings out the opposition between subject and object first time in the history of philosophy. This position also prepares the ground within the subjective situation for the synthetic unity. The synthesis, however, has to wait for Hegel to bring out in the synthetic unityofantihesisandthesisbycallingbacktheunityofobjectthought withinthehorizonofBeing. 93

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The thesis of the history of philosophy, for Hegel, initiates in the Greek world within the writings of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato andAristotle.ItwasParmenidesfromwhomtheEnorthewholeness of Being enters into the world of philosophy. For Hegel, It is with Parmenides philosophizing proper beganThis beginning is admittedlystillconfusedandindeterminate. 48 With Heraclitus it was Logos that entered into the world of philosophy. Logos lets everything that is as a whole lie before and appears as beings. Logos, for Hegel, transforms into the logic of its dialectic. His speculative dialectic makes object appear in the opposition of subject. This appearance takes place through the mediation of reflection that places oppositional identities into self reflectivewhole. 49 The abode of particulars into intrinsically determinate Universal and interlocking of universals into another Universal makes a case of Plato for Hegel. Philosophy for the first time appears for him into the realm of indeterminate immediacy and this appearance becomes itself the motivating factor to transform the illusory existence into the eternal Universal. Within Universal, indeterminate being finds its abode through its own reflected mediation. Ideas are notimmediatelyinconsciousness(namely,asanintuition),ratherthey are (mediatedin consciousness) in cognition. For this reason onedoes not have them, but rather they arebrought forth within spirit through cognition. Idea becomes the home for Hegel for which his stream of categories moves to give particular instances the very safe heaven they always longed for. Yet this home is more like a small production unit.Thecognitiveactivityismorelikeproducingofabsoluteknowing, i.e., science. Therefore, Hegel says: With Plato begins philosophical science as scienceWhat is distinctive of Platonic philosophy is its 50 orientationtowardtheintellectual,thesupersensibleworld. It is, however, Aristotle who becomes the driving force for the driving force of Hegels philosophy. His concept Energeia translates into that activity that shapes each phenomenon into determinate being. This determinacy arises through the destiny embedded within the Energeia itself, that is, as enetelechy. The driving force becomes its own ground. Hegel took this ground as grounding activity through its absolute subjective position and the 51 groundingactivityturnsintothespeculativedialecticsofHegel. For Hegel, in philosophy as such, in its present and final stage, is contained everything that the work of millennia has brought forth; it is the result of everything that has gone before. 52 The experience of Hegel towards history of philosophy, as it explicates itself through his employment of four major concepts, makes him 94

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understand the explicated categories within the horizon of being. It is how for him being is to appear in its determinate form, and that is, indeterminate immediacy. Being appears through the ground that is alreadyhistoricallyrelatedwithbeing. The relationship between the ground and being brings out theindeterminateimmediacyofHegelsunderstandingofbeingthatis located in that historical experience that shows this indeterminate immediacyinitsdeterminedbeingthroughthebelongingofsubjective experience with the ground. The indeterminate immediacy of being unfoldsitselfthroughcognitivemeditatingdeterminedway.Whilethe subjectiverelationofbeingandthehistoricityofsubjectiveexperience explicatesitselfthroughtime. The ground of indeterminate being appears as the determined being showing itself without rooted into the historical experience; the determinacy come out as methodology. Only within and through this determined passage Being shows itself. The truth of the content lies in the method. It is the interlocking of matter, and its multiple positions within a method and the correspondence of reflectingideaswiththealreadydevelopedrealitythatgivestruth. Cartesian position insists upon the method for bringing out matter of fact as achieving certainty. It is the way of attaining clear and distinct ideas 53 in thinking that matters. Thinking may come out in multiple possibilities yet the determined possibility that can bring out ideas as distinct and clear can manifest itself only through the determined way. The ground of accomplishing certainty appears as the method of taking matterinto schematic form from the foundation ofsubjectivityalreadyperceivedasI. Hegel accepts the subjective position of Descartes but refuse toaccepttheprimacyofmethod.Heoptsforthemovementitself;the movement that can move in a certain direction through the already grounded mode of movement and the goal towards which it has to move. The letting of content to move itself to engender its own methodology is to give being its givenness from its on shining. This shining forth of being is apprehended through the gathering of subjectivity into the unfolding unity of subjectivity. In this way, subjectivity grows together with gathering. Hegels dialectical speculationfindsitssensewithinthisapprehension. The growth of subjectivity with the gatheringtogether becomes for Hegel the ground of dialectical speculation that is the reflection of what is already moving through its own self. Considered in this way, speculation is the positive whole of that which dialectic is meant to signify here. To understand Hegels dialectic in the form of transcendental, critically restrictive, or even polemical way of 95

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thinking is to understand Hegel far short of its original spirit. Hegels dialectic should be understood as the mirroring and uniting of oppositesastheprocessoftheproductionofspirititself. 54 Hegel considers his speculative dialectic as the only method he employed. By considering it as Method, however, he neither ascribed it themeaning of the instrumentof representing nor merely a special way of proceeding in philosophy. For him Method is the innermost movement of subjectivity, the soul of being, the production process through which the web of the whole actuality of theabsoluteiswoven. 55 It is not only speculative dialectic of Hegel that moves through the innermost movement of subjectivity but all form of determined reflectivity that, when come out, has to move within it. In moderntimeswhenphysicsbringsoutitsformulafortheworld,then itbecomesapparentthatthebeingofbeingshasdissolveditselfinthe methodofcalculability. 56 Whenever the determined position comes out in modern time, following Hegel, it would appear within calculative environment. ForHeidegger,theCalculativethinkingisathinkingofaspecialkind. It deals, in fact, with circumstances that are already given, and which wetakeintoconsideration,tocarryoutprojectsortoreachgoalsthat we want to achieve. Calculative thinking does not pause to consider the meaning inherent ineverything that is. It is alwayson the move, 57 isrestlessanditnevercollectsitself. The calculative thinking prevails for Heidegger through out the modern times. The beginning of modern spirit, initiated from Descartes, to whom Hegel ascribes the setting foot up on the secure land, came upwith the booktitled, Discourse de le methode (1637). Hegels speculative dialectic, as Method, becomes the fundamental traitofallactuality.Forthisreason,methoddeterminesallhappening, i.e.,history,asmovement. 58 METHOD AND WAY It was clear even through Being and Time (1928) that Heideggerian approach towards Method is not embedded in the Hegelian spirit. His initiation of the project of Fundamental Ontology, and his phenomenological emphasis upon the Things Themselves, 59 though still reminiscent of deterministic methodology, yet his stress upon following these lines through phenomenological hermeneutical position was already distinguishing him from the entrapment of Method. His stress upon subjective position and with the direction towards authenticbeing, the meaning immersed in the jungle of 96

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interpretive situation found its reception in a concealed way. The primacy of hermeneuticity, as interpretation of being as belonging togetherness,hadtowaitformanydecadestofinditsdueposition. The Phenomenological position from that very beginning was already embedded with Hermeneutical position, as the possibility of thinking being. 60 Instead of taking Husserls mode of reflection, a reflection which takes place in reflective acts as intentional acts of consciousnessofahigherlevel, 61 Heideggertakeslogosasaletheuein means: to take beings that are being talked about in legein as apophainesthi out of their concealment; to let them be seen as something unconcealed (alethes). 62 Heidegger also brings out three senses of Logos: a) as Reason, b) as Ground or Ratio, c) as Relatedness. 63 Logos itself appears through Daseins projective understanding. While Dasein is understood, not as having the faculty of Dasein, but is constituted by understanding that is itself projective in nature. Dasein comes out through understanding as existing existentially. The projective understanding, however, comes out as thrown understanding due to the thrownness of Dasein itself. 64 Hermeneuticalphenomenologicalunderstandingthinkingbecomesfor Heideggerasdisclosednessofprojectinginterpretingunderstandingin beingintheworld. 65 The constitution of the structure of understanding appears forHeideggerthroughthehistoricityofDaseinitself.Thishistoricityof understanding appears in threefold ways: forehaving, forethought and foregrasping. Dasein finds itself as existing through its thrown projective understanding. The projection shows itself through projected being. What is projected in the projection may be considered as forehaving. The projection appears in regard of something for Dasein. This in regard of can be understood as fore sight. While the projective understanding moves with forehaving and foresight through its already understanding character. The understanding that already prevails through the projective 66 understandingmaybeunderstoodasforegrasping. The understanding appears for Heidegger through and within thecircularity.Tounderstandbeingthroughitsforestructures,Dasein already understands through its nonthematic structures of fore understanding. 67 That is the reason the search for presuppositionless foundation, for bringing out the grasping of being, remains a futile effort for Heidegger. This moving into the circle, however, does not make understanding as moving nowhere. This very movement nourishesbothforeunderstandingandthemanifestnessofbeing.In so far as interpretive understanding nourishes itself from the projectible understanding, in a certain sense it moves in a circle, 97

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though not an empty one. Rather this circle deepens and differentiatesunderstanding. 68 This interpretive position, however, remains embedded within the Method that, though position itself, as a liberating mode. Hermeneutics was understood as the methodology of the historical humanistic disciplines. The Phenomenology was considered as the scienceofthedisciplinemeansitgraspsitsobjectsinsuchawaythat everything about them to be discussed must be directly indicated and directly demonstrated. The demonstration of the interpretive understanding was to be acquired through grasping 69 conceptualization). Thisposition,however,graduallytransformsinthewritingsof Heidegger and the emphasis shifted towards history of being, instead of Dasein. The conceptions found their new meanings through the apprehension of the history of being and its determining relation to the forestructure of the interpretive understanding of Dasein. It is Being, as destiny, gains primacy and the method finds its meaning as the way of understanding. The epoch of modernity was considered astheageofscienceandtheconcerningoftechnology.Theincreasing determinacy, through the destined spirit of Hegelian dialectic, only further increased the domination of onedimensional thought, that is, positivism. Truth, even as aletheia, was considered to become subservient to the prevalent being of time. The project of self overcoming was considered as pursuing the will of power. The authenticunderstanding, now, had to transform itself, into meditative thinking, instead of staying as demonstrative. Even the question of Being was considered as the product of metaphysical thinking. The journey towards man found its new path and so does the way of attainingit(Method). The transformed understanding of Heideggers ermeneutical phenomenological position appears as thinking in terms of the history ofbeing.Thinkingbecomes,forHeidegger,theengagementbyandfor the truth of Being. The history of Being is never past but stands ever beforeIn order to learn how to experience the aforementioned essence of thinking purely, and that means to carry it through, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking. 70 Interpretation divides itself into, atleast, two mode of appearance, one is technical and the other is nontechnical. It is the latter interpretationthatbecomesthedwellingcenterofHeidegger. Hermeneutics, as the interpretive activity, now opts for listening to show being instead of grasping being in its un coveredness.AsthebelongingtoBeingthatlistensthinkingiswhatit is according to its essential origin. 71 The belonging to Being now 98

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appearsinthecomportmentofLove,asfavoring.Thought,nowarises, as the favoringenabling, that is, the possibility of possible. 72 This favoringenabling translates as thought that lets Being appear within the comportment of Dasein that hears. The interpretive activity becomes as the messenger to bring message and tidings to the listening being. This hermeneutic relation engages with the history of beinga thinking that thinks the relation of being to Dasein and the comporting relationship of Dasein to Being, thinking the whole 73 relationasEreignis. The relationship between thought and Being, now appears as belonging togetherness (Logos). In the technical interpretation, the stress remained upon the togetherness (Logos) and with it the relationship with Being appears as grasping and dominating. The stress, now, on belonging gives primacy to Being and the need to turn through comportment with Love to embrace Being. This belongingness favors the enabling of Being appear in its manifold possibilities. Thought and Being finds their identity in such a relationship of belongingtogetherness but not in Hegelian way in which subject resolves the contradiction compulsively for moving 74 aheadinordertoaccomplishitsdialecticalpursuitoftruth. Being manifests itself through the belongingtogetherness in the very Difference between Being and essents. Either Being comes out as being of beings or beings come out as beings of being. Both movements for Heidegger are the expressions of metaphysical thought. Both Being and essents emerge, in their different ways from and through the Difference. The Difference between Being and essents is not just a static and formal relation between two terms but the interplay, the working out or the process of resolution of the two 75 opposedmovementsofrevealingandconcealing. Being appears in the interactive play of Being and essents, between revealing and concealing. Each time being appears the withdrawaloccurstoo.Thisinteractiveplayisadistancedactivityfrom the scientific activity of finding truth. The scientific activity is deeply rooted in establishing itself upon methodology for expressing the determined being (subjectmatter) in its truth. Their relationship, that is, between subjectmatter and method is the relation of domination of one (method) upon the other (subjectmatter). All power of knowing lies in the method. The subjectmatter is taken up and absorbed by the methodBeing themselves do not provide the pattern for access to themThis domineering in which modern methodunfoldsisanessentialwayforthemodernsubjecttoestablish 76 itsreignoverbeings. 99

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The thinking being, for Dasein, thinks not immersing in methodology nor in the absence of it. He takes method through its root meaning, that is, along the way. Instead of giving the primacy to theMethod,he recommends to move inadifference as an interactive play between Method and subjectmatter. This interactive play of thinking, with the projective understanding of thinking being who thinks through comportment, takes a pathway for its expression withoutgivingprimacytoeither. THE END OF HISTORY History, as discipline, when appear as following the determined standards and criteria of a methodology, as a primacy upon the subjectmatter, it falls short of what it should be as an activity of a thinking being. History is the history of being and to bring forth that being through the dominated method is to give primacy to a single mode of truth, projective understanding and certain absorption of beinginthe world. For bringing out beingitself, the historian as a thinking being, and therefore the lover of truth, is to let the being showitselfinordertoattainselfjoining. History, moving with the primacy of method, is an activity movinguponandthroughthespiritoftime.Theforestructuresofthe understanding of the historian let the projection play its role and the absorption in the world conceals itself while bringing forward the determined expression of being. Such a history, as a Hegelian project, moves upon the completed understanding of being and assimilates or reject positions only to pursue the very movement that remains prevail as a conscious moment of spirit. In such a history there is a beginning and there is an end. Yet it remains away from the thinking beingengagedinselfjoining. Historicalthinkingthatdwellsintheregionandfreesitupfor thinking what is to be thought, understands being in revealing concealing. It is the interactive play of way and being that open up the possibility of unconcealment. When thinking hears, understands and unfolds what is freed up as what meets thinking, then thinking setsuponawaythatgetsshownfromtheregion. 77 The Ground of history that gives rise to Historie, the ascertaining explaining of the past from within the horizon of the calculative dealing of the present, shelters the Historie through concealing presence of its abground (abyss). It is this notground thatbecomestheshelterofenduringpresenceofHistorie.Beingsare hereby presupposed as what is orderable, producible, and ascertainable. 78 History, as discipline, appears to control the whole 100

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pastness, to bring it back into the totality of knowledge. History moves upon the ground that let facts appear as presenting for making them orderable. History remains as an activity of mastering history. It staysupontheground,likestandinguponthelandafterthevoyageof sea. Theground givescertainty as grounded. It appearsasfoundation, as established and as having selfevidence. The ground conceals because of its linkage with the simile of Land what is there as not there. The Ground conceals its presencing that stays till grounding presences through its nongrounding. This relationship between Ground and Truth appears as nonoriginary relation to the thinking being. For the originary relation between Ground and Being the change in the simile of Land may help. Heidegger makes us understand Ground through considering it as Region. Region is called region because region regions and makes free what is to be thought by thinking. Region brings forward that belonging that is missing in concept of Ground as Land. Region is a meeting point, where thought comes over against thinking. Region becomes a ground where the possibility of thinking again and thinking against thought lies. When thinking hears, understands and unfolds what is freed up as what meetsthinking,thenthinkingsetsuponwaythatgetsshownfromthe 79 region.Inthethinkingofbeing,thewaybelongsintheregion. TheconceptofGround,insteadofunderstandingthroughthe simileofLand,whenconsideredinthesimileofregion,themeaningof Ground itself changes. The relation between Ground and Being, that was persistently concealing the sheltering nonground, now thinks against thought persistently in order to join itself with itself through understanding hearing. The Ground, in its relation with Being in Historie, the mode of Hegels historical understanding, appears as Daseins steadfastness. It loses its solidness when it appears in originary relationship with Being, as regioning. The Ground is ground because it grounds, its grounding finds its space in the region as moving on the way to understanding hearing. This grounding of Ground stays upon the sheltering of being till the countermovement, that takes back thinkingtotherootunfoldingandthustowardtheselfjoining. The way to history finds its clearing through placing the light of questioning. The questioning itself is a possibility of a way. It is the expression of a distance from the immediate indeterminateness and a hope for regaining belongingness. Putting the question to something and asking after something need here and everywhere first to be addressed by that which touches them in questioning and which they pursue in questioning. The starting point of any question always 101

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already dwells within the appeal of that to which the question is put. 80 In order to initiate this questioning and inquiry, we must open ourselves to a regard or sight which, as Heidegger emphasizes, is not limited to the questions just touched upon. That to which we put thequestionandaskaftermustalreadyhavebeenaddressedtous. History has no ground but grounding that appears through each activity of making history. This thinking that makes history possible upon grounding is the interactive play of occurrence between immediate indeterminateness and the possibility of possible. History, as a mode of being, comes out with the comportment of Human Being that translates its thinking activity into the determinate being. History, as a grounding belonging, let being appears as a meaningful whole without fixing into The End of History. Each End appearsasamomentofregioning,insteadacompletedEnd.

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END NOTES
1

G.W.Hegel,PhilosophyofHistory(NewYork:Doverpublications,1996), p.162. 2 Inhishistoryoftheworld,HegelgivesmanyreasonsforconsideringOriental world,especially,Indiaworthless.SeeIbid.,p.164. 3 Ibid.,p.112. 4 InHegelsfamousphrase,RealisRationalandRationalisReal,hismany interpretersunderstandTheEndofHistoryavalidcorollary.Formany,his contemporaneousstateachievedtheEndthatSpiritmovesforrealization. 5 KojeveisfamousforhisinterpretationofHegelsThePhenomenologyof Spirit.SeeAlexandreKojve,IntroductiontotheReadingofHegel:Lectureson ThePhenomenologyofSpirit(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1980) 6 SeeFrancisFukuyama,TheEndofHistoryandTheLastMan(NewYork:Free Press,1992) 7 AllexCallinicos,TheoriesandNarratives;ReflectionsonthePhilosophyof History(Cambridge:PolityPress,1995) 8 Hegel,PhilosophyofHistory,p.162. 9 Ibid.,p.167. 10 MartinHeidegger,TheQuestionConcerningTechnology,inWilliamLovitt trans.,TheQuestionConcerningTechnologyandotherEssays(NewYork: Harpercolophonbooks,1977),p.21. 11 Hegel,PhilosophyofHistory,p.116. 12 Ibid.,p.113. 13 Ibid.,pp.113114. 14 Ibid.,p.160. 15 Ibid.,p.161. 16 Ibid.,pp.164. 17 Ibid.,p.162. 18 Ibid.,p143. 19 Ibid.,p.140. 20 Ibid.,p.141. 21 Ibid.,p.165. 22 Ibid.,p.165. 23 Ibid.,p.161. 24 Ibid.,p.446. 25 Ibid.,p.143. 26 SeeG.W.FHegel,TheScienceofLogic, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.htm,accessedon10 March2009. 27 SeeG.W.FHegel,ThePhenomenologyofSpirit(London:Doverpublications, 1990) 28 AlexnderKojeve,IntroductiontotheReadingofHegel(Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress,1980) 29 FrederickCoplestone,AHistoryofPhilosophy,Vol.VII,(NewYork: Doubleday,1994).pp.189195.

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30

J.L.Mehta,ThePhilosophyofMartinHeidegger(NewYork:Harper Torchbooks,1971),p.206. 31 MartinHeidegger,HegelandGreeks,inWilliamMcNeill(ed.),Pathmarks (Melbourn:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998) 32 MartinHeidegger,LetteronHumanisminDavidFarrellKrell(ed.),Martin Heidegger:BasicWritings(SanFrancisco:Harper,1993),p.218. 33 Heidegger,HegelandGreeks,p.242. 34 Ibid.,p.333. 35 Mehta,ThePhilosophyofMartinHeidegger,p.208. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.,p.145. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Heidegger,HegelandGreeks,p.331. 43 TheexplorationofGroundhasalreadybeendiscussedindetailinUmberBin IbadTheGroundofHistory:ARelationalUnderstandingofHegeland Hieidegger,TheHistorian,Vol.7(1),(JanuaryJune2009),p.63.Hereonly briefexpositionwouldsuffice. 44 Hegelsthoughtuponlogicappearsundertwodifferenttitles:indetailed expositionitappearsinTheScienceofLogicorGreaterLogicandin condensedformitappearsinTheShortLogicorLesserLogic.Here,Logic meansTheScienceofLogic 45 MartinHeidegger,OntheEssenceofGround,WilliamMcNeill(ed.), Pathmarks(Melbourn:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),p.101. 46 LebnizianprincipleofReasoninhisPrimaeVeritates(1686)presentsthis pointas:Thusapredicate,orconsequent,isalwayspresentinasubject,or antecedent:andinthisfactconsiststheuniversalnatureoftruth,orthe connectionbetweenthetermsoftheassertion. 47 InhisHistoryofPhilosophy(18051806),inthesectionofDescartes,Hegel givesanalogyoffoundingGroundofModernthoughtthroughlandingonthe shoreafterspendinglongtimeinthesea.See http://www.marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/descar.htm, accessedon14May2009 48 Heidegger,HegelandGreeks,p.329. 49 Ibid.,p.330. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid.,p.331. 52 Ibid.,p.332. 53 SeeHegelsdiscussiononDescartesinG.W.FHegel,HistoryofPhilosophy, http://www.marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/descar.htm, accessedon14May2009. 54 Heidegger,HegelandGreeks,p.326. 55 Ibid.,p.326. 56 Ibid.

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57 58

Heidegger,TheQuestionConcerningTechnologyandOtherEssays,p.44. Heidegger,HegelandGreeks,p.327. 59 MartinHeidegger,BeingandTime,trans.byJoanStaumbaugh,(NewYork: SUNYpress,1996),p.24. 60 FriedrickWilhemVonHermann,WayandMethod,inChristopherMcann (ed.),CriticalHeidegger(London:Routledge,1996),p.173. 61 Ibid.,p.174. 62 Heidegger,BeingandTime,p.29. 63 Ibid.,p.30. 64 Ibid.,p.136. 65 Ibid.,p.137. 66 Ibid.,p.142. 67 Ibid.,p.143. 68 Hermann,WayandMethod,p.178. 69 Heidegger,BeingandTime,p.29. 70Heidegger,LetteronHumanism,p.218. 71 Ibid.,p.220. 72 Ibid. 73 Hermann,WayandMethod,p.179. 74 Mehta,ThePhilosophyofMartinHeidegger,p.209. 75 Ibid.,p.206. 76 Hermann,WayandMethod,p.184. 77 Ibid.,p.185. 78 MartinHeidegger,ContributionstoPhilosophy(FromEnowning),trans.Prvis EmmadandKennethMaly(Indianapolis:Indianpress1999)p.217. 79 Hermann,WayandMethod,p.185. 80 Ibid.,p.187.

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