Issue No.

14 January 2008

January 2008

Issue No. 14

From the Editor

E-JETS NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical items. This newsletter, compiled by EMBRAER Fleet Technical Center (EFTC), brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization and efficiency in daily operation. E-JETS NEWS addresses Operators concerns with maintenance support and dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance. Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to EMBRAER Customers. Earlier editions of E-JETS NEWS publication can be found at CIS / Aerochain at http://www.aerochain.com - Login (enter username and password); - Select Technical Services and then EMBRAER Customer Services; - Select Maintenance Support; - Select E-JETS NEWS; - Click on desired E-JETS NEWS. If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-JETS NEWS is needed, please contact the local EMBRAER Field Service Representative. General questions or comments about the E-JETS NEWS publication can be addressed to:

E-JETS NEWS Tel: Fax: +55 12 3927 7075 +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE The articles published in E-JETS NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third party without EMBRAERs written consent. Also, no article published should be considered authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

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January 2008

Issue No. 14
The installation of the hydraulic fuse PN 38-909500-2 on the main system (already on emergency/ parking brake system) was approved as an alterative to PN 38-909500-3. This will improve aircraft communality only. It is not a fix to reduce BRK LH (RH) FAULT events. Based on the above explained, EMBRAER recommends, regarding BRK LH/ RH FAULT due to pressure more than commanded, the compliance of SB 190-32-0025, even for those aircraft that are not presenting Brake Fault events. The restrictor fitting will preclude BCV first stage to be further damaged by eliminating the negative pressure.

BRK LH/RH FAULT (P>C) Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 EMBRAER issued SB 190-32-0025Rev.1 introducing a restrictor fitting to the brake shutoff valve (SOV) return port with worldwide fleet effectivity. EMBRAER recommends operators to comply with SB 190-32-0025, even for those aircraft that are not presenting Brake Fault events. Investigations revealed that a negative pressure (suction) occurs when the brake shutoff valve (SOV) is closing during its normal operation, which causes a degradation of the Brake Control Valve (BCV) first stage. It has been demonstrated that the introduction of a restrictor fitting in the SOV return port eliminates the negative pressure occurrence. Extensive tests performed at rig and prototype aircraft revealed that the BRK LH (RH) FAULT messages, correlated with INBD (or OUTBD) L (or R) PR MORE THAN BCM CMD are significantly reduced when the SOV negative pressure effect is eliminated. Currently, EMBRAER is conducting an inservice evaluation of the modification. Restrictor fittings were installed late December in 5 aircraft and no fault occurred up to 14/Jan/2008. Although the tests have shown that the introduction of the restrictor reduced drastically the occurrence of BRK LH (RH) FAULT due pressure more than commanded, even when pre-damaged BCVs were used, a slight number of failures are expected on such circumstances. EMBRAER will use the in-service evaluation to determine the actions to be taken regarding BCVs which may have been damaged prior to restrictor installation. Regarding other modification on EMBRAER 190 brake system, it is important to observe that: Further BCV modifications that were being considered by EMBRAER are now on hold until the conclusion of the evaluation of restrictor fitting introduction on field, expected to be completed by March/2008;

CF34-10E, Aft Engine Mount Wear Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 There are some field reports received by EMBRAER concerning aft engine mount wear as presented in E-Jets NEWS Release No.12 and as shown in the pictures below.

Observed wear on engine Aft Mount related to thermal blanket

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January 2008
The maximum wear depth reported was 0.018 inches and the wear observed is related to the thermal blanket contacting the aft engine mount in the following location identified in the next pictures:

Issue No. 14
There is a proposal to revise these current limits to provide more flexibility regarding wear limits and blending procedures to the operators as presented below. This revision of the manual postponed by GE to Feb/2008. was

Maximum Serviceable Limit: Any amount, if no more than 0.010 in depth. Maximum Repairable Limit: Any amount, if no more than .030 in depth, 0.500 in width, 0.600 in length. Or surface area 2 no more than 0.300 in . After the repair depth cannot exceed .040 in and surface area cannot exceed 0.360 in2 more than 0.010 in depth Repair Method: Blend. Refer to TASK 7042-00-350-002 (70-42-00, Blending Procedures) The proposed limits apply only to the fixed link lugs only, not including holes and bushings. The blended depth cannot exceed 0.040 inches. Investigations for the final fix are considering a design change to the thermal blanket to create more clearance. A conclusion is expected by the end of February.

APU High EGT Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 As informed in E-Jets NEWS Release No. 10, EMBRAER detected some aircraft, mainly in the EMBRAER 190/ 195 fleet, with occurrences of APU HIGH EGT (fault code 49105425APU) faults and is currently investigating this issue together with Hamilton APU and Hamilton AMS partners. Two conditions in which this fault is most likely to occur have already been identified: 1) 2) During engine start on-ground; During bleed transition from engines to APU on ground.

Location of contact on blanket

For this issue, GE is still recommending: lightly tapping blanket with rubber mallet provides more clearance. The current wear limits are in CF34-10E Engine Manual, 71-20-02 Aft Engine Mount, inspection 001 (4. Visual inspection, subtask 71-20-02-220-001, F. All other areas for: wear).

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January 2008
Also, as informed previously, the suspected root cause is a bleed transients in the AMS system, which can shortly increase APU bleed extraction in the two conditions stated above. This scenario is aggravated if the APU AntiSurge Valve (AIPC 49-53-01) is malfunctioning. EMBRAER recommends the valve replacement when fault code 49535226APU - APU ANTI-SURGE VLV/WRG FAULT is triggered on the CMC. Also, EMBRAER and Hamilton did a field campaign with operators to replace any faulty anti-surge valves with no CMC messages. Aircraft tests revealed APU EGT peaks during the first seconds of the main engine start, which can lead to an APU High EGT. It was confirmed also that the E190 fleet is more susceptible to this condition. A change proposal is being evaluated to avoid the bleed extraction peak during engine start and also to smooth the transient loads while transitioning the bleed source from the engines to the APU.

Issue No. 14

Main and Aft Flap Tracks Wear

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 EMBRAER Structures released SNL 17057-0001 which covers the damage (wear) that has occurred in the flap tracks. As an immediate action, EMBRAER provided the allowable limits for wear on tracks through IC2007-170/05998 (world wide fleet). These limits will be incorporated on SRM PART II. Further information is available in the mentioned SNL.

Escape slides Inspection Service Bulletin due to Tie Wraps Installation

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 It was reported that on December 5th, 2007 an escape slide assembly was found with tie wraps around the slide pack during an inspection of the fwd service door by an operator. The tie wraps are used to prevent the escape slide release pin from twisting during normal slide handling and installation. The added straps hold the girt and keep the release pin motionless during this process. The straps are supposed to be removed for the installation of the girt bar in the final stages of the slide installation on the doors.

New Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Control Electronic (HS-ACE) PN 415300-1003

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 Researches based on engineering analysis revealed that some HS-ACE monitors have been nuisance tripping in the EMBRAER 170/175 fleet, driving Flight Control No Dispatch message in CAS and causing loss of Pitch Trim Indication. This article intends to advise that SB 17027-0032 is available on AEROChain. This bulletin releases the new HS-ACE PN 415300-1003, which has been improved to increase the robustness of the Horizontal Stabilizer System by preventing nuisance faults.

Figure 1 Example of a slide pack with tie wraps attached. Page 4

January 2008
EMBRAER already inspected all aircraft in the production line and in the delivery process, and no discrepancy was found. EMBRAER informs that the Service Bulletins 170-25-0088 and 190-25-0062 (EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS - ESCAPE SLIDE INSPECTION) have already been released informing how to inspect and correct the escape slide installation, if necessary. EMBRAER recommends the inspection to be accomplished within 600 FH after the Service Bulletin release. The process of adding the tie wraps and removing them in the production line started in the middle of 2006, please refer to the mentioned bulletins for detailed effectivity information.

Issue No. 14

New APU ESC Part Numbers

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 In order to improve configuration management and traceability, some modifications have been done to the upcoming APU ESC part numbers. Please refer to the table below:

Old Part Numbers ESC B Mod K PN 4505005B ESC B Mod L PN 4505005B ESC B Mod M PN 4505005B ESC C PN 4505005C

New Part Numbers ESC B Mod K PN 4505005B ESC C PN 4505005C Disregarded ESC 2 PN 4508022

Clamps Replacement in the Hydraulic System

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Due to an incompatibility between some clamps and the hydraulic tube inside the wing fuel tank, EMBRAER issued in October 2006, Service Bulletins SB17029-0006 and SB190-29-0003 for clamps replacement in the hydraulic system. These bulletins were covered by two Airworthiness Directives from ANAC, AD2007-04-01 and AD2007-04-02, which initially established the compliance within 12,000 flight hours. Although these ADs have just been revised to establish a compliance of 8,000 flight hours, which is in accordance with the service bulletins, and are already available with the effective date from December 21st, 2007 and on. Special attention is required for AD 200704-02R1 related to the applicable clamps part numbers listed in the compliance section of this AD. Due to a printing error, the clamps Part Numbers are wrong in this section and an additional paragraph has been attached to the end of the document to correct it.

The ESC B Mod K is the actual production standard. The former ESC B Mod L will be re-identified to ESC C and the former ESC C will be re-identified to ESC 2.

HPSOV - Operational Test

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER would like to inform that AMM Task 36-11-00-710-801-A Engine Pneumatic Bleed System - Operational Test and AMM Task 36-11-00-710-802-A Engine Pneumatic Bleed System in Idle Condition - Operational Test have been revised to include the procedure to check the HPSOV status on the CMC. This task is under present HPSOV parameter 0 (zero) The AMM revision released in April/08. revision process to modulating status instead of 8 (eight). is scheduled to be

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January 2008

Issue No. 14

Escape slides Inspection Service Bulletin due to Bolt/ Nut Installation

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 An event was reported by an EMBRAER 170 / 190 operator in which the fwd pax door escape slide fell from the door during normal operation on the ground. The escape slide assembly is attached to the door structure by a bolt and a nut plate assembly (composed by a nut and a clip). A further inspection found the nut and clip in the door frame with no bolt. Investigations indicated that the bolt that attaches the slide assembly could not be properly tightened (torque not according to AMM specification).

Interchange of Nose Wheel Tires between EMBRAER 170 and EMBRAER 190
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Nose wheel tires from EMBRAER 170 and EMBRAER 190 are not interchangeable. The PN from each installation are presented in the AIPC as follows:

Aircraft model EMBRAER 170

Tire PN

Wheel PN

DR15855T

90000581 IW PN: 90000581-1

EMBRAER 190

DR15857T

90000581-1

It has been requested by some operators the evaluation of the possibility to use in EMBRAER 170 nose wheel the same tire used in EMBRAER 190. For operators with both aircraft models in their fleet, this measure would help in the maintenance and stock control for this specific component.
Figure 1 Typical slide installation and area to be inspected (bustle removed).

Service Bulletins 170-52-0045 and 19052-0029 have already been informing how to inspect the escape slides installation, for both passenger and service doors. EMBRAER recommends the accomplishment of this service bulletin during the next basic maintenance check. Refer to the mentioned bulletins for detailed effectivity and inspection procedures.

New qualification tests are necessary in order to approve this request, and EMBRAER is planning to perform these tests this year. The goal is to conclude the evaluation and approval process until October/ 2008. There will be a charge to approve the use of EMBRAER 190 nose tires in EMBRAER 170 aircraft. Operators interested, should contact EMBRAER Customer Account Manager for the commercial agreement.

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January 2008

Issue No. 14
Since similar cases started to be reported by other operators, EMBRAER would like to inform that it is aware of such events, that the investigations are advancing and the root cause is very close from being defined. For all E-Jet operators facing such events of engine or APU fire extinguishing bottles that were removed due to lowpressure indication (with FIREX BTL LO PR FAULT maintenance messages on CMC), EMBRAER would like to ask the customers to contact the respective Technical Representative with information of the affected serial numbers. Depending on the case, customers may be instructed to ship the affected bottles to a specific Pacific Scientific address accordingly.

Fire extinguishing bottles removals under investigation

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER has received reports of one specific operator presenting a high number of fire extinguishing bottle (PN 33500026-1) removals and, since then, the bottles manufacturer, Pacific Scientific, has been involved in the investigation for the root cause of so many replacements.

Note: 1. For the mentioned operator, 38% of the removals were caused by commanded discharges (intentional and inadvertent). The remaining 4% were related to isolated failures.

Figure 1 Fire extinguishing bottle

It was verified that 58%1 of the replaced bottles from this operator were removed due to low pressure sensed by the fire extinguishing system, evidenced by FIREX BTL LO PR FAULT maintenance messages on the CMC. The on-course investigation is trying to define the conditions that bring sensors to detect low pressures inside such bottles, being them real or nuisance. The bottles were submitted to tests such as weight measuring, leakage, functional and electrical TCPS (Temperature Compensated Pressure Switch), among other tests. The results are not conclusive yet, but are leading to something related to TCPS bringing erroneous low-pressure indication.

Service News Letter Engine Trend Monitoring New Parameters included in LDI V08
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190 EMBRAER has released the Service News Letter SNL 190-71-0003 to inform about the inclusion of new Engine Trend Report parameters in the DL_TAKEOFF_REPORT and DL_CRUISE_REPORT with LDI V08. The inclusion of these parameters will improve the engine trend monitoring analysis. This information intends to make operators aware of these changes.

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January 2008

Issue No. 14
Considering the solutions presented, EMBRAER recommends this Service Bulletin accomplishment. Furthermore ANAC (Brazilian Certification Authority) is considering the possibility of issuing an AD for this Service Bulletin. This process will include the issuance of a NPRM (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) in early February and, if applicable, the AD is expected to be issued during March.

EMBRAER 170/ 175 - FADEC Software v5.40

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 EMBRAER has issued Service Bulletin 170-73-0004 related to the new FADEC software version 5.40 comprising EMBRAER 170/175 aircraft. This new software version will bring corrections and improvements such as: Improved FMU LVDT fault accommodation logic to minimize occurrence of LOTC (Loss of Thrust Control) events. - Improved robustness for the TCMA (Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation) logic. - Improved Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS) trigger logic to minimize inadvertent activation. - Increased Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) tolerance to shut the engine down with the thrust lever at IDLE position. - Vibration indication changes with improved accommodations of bowed rotor starts. - Vibration will be indicated as zero (0.0) instead of dashes with engines shutdown and no Integrated Engine Vibration Monitor (IEVM) failures. - Improved VG LVDT (Linear Variable Differential-Transducer) disagree fault accommodation. - Time Limited Dispatch categorization reviewed. (TLD)

FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH due to MSV/Leakage Test failed

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 EMBRAER has received some reports from the field where FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAS message could be displayed during the flight controls built-in test (Hydraulic P-BIT) on airplanes with Primus EPIC LOAD 19 incorporated. After the Hydraulic P-BIT finishes (FLT CTRL TEST IN PROGRESS message is extinguished), the FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH message might be correlated with one of the messages below: L OUTBD EL PCU [MSV OP TEST] L OUTBD EL PCU [LEAK OP TEST] UPR RUDDER PCU [MSV OP TEST] UPR RUDDER PCU [LEAK OP TEST] L INBD EL PCU [MSV OP TEST] L INBD EL PCU [LEAK OP TEST] R INBD EL PCU [MSV OP TEST] R INBD EL PCU [LEAK OP TEST] R OUTBD EL PCU [MSV OP TEST] R OUTBD EL PCU [LEAK OP TEST] LWR RUDDER PCU [MSV OP TEST] LWR RUDDER PCU [LEAK OP TEST]

- Improved overspeed test logic to detect Fuel Metering Unit (FMU) miswiring condition. - Faults detection/ accommodation logic improved. - Added recall faults functionality. - Implemented cross-engine check for FADEC software version.

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January 2008
Therefore, in order to minimize the FCND occurrences, EMBRAER suggests the following procedure: 1) Before push back, set HYD SYS ELEC PUMPS 1, 2 and 3A to on. 2) Wait for the HYD PBIT to finish (FLT CTRL TEST IN PROGRESS is extinguished), which takes about 80 seconds. 3) If FCND is not displayed, go to step 5.

Issue No. 14

Acronyms
AD = Airworthiness Directive AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual AMS = Air Management System ANAC = Agncia Nacional de Aviao Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority) AOM = Airplane Operations Manual

4) If FCND is displayed: APU = Auxiliary Power Unit - Perform 05 full stroke rudder and elevator cycles. (Do not move the surfaces simultaneously) - Set HYD SYS ELEC PUMPS 1, 2 and 3A to OFF. - Wait until the Hyd Sys 1, 2 and 3 pressure drops below 250 psi. - Set HYD SYS ELEC PUMPS 1, 2 and 3A to "ON" and wait for the HYD PBIT to finish (FLT CTRL TEST IN PROGRESS is extinguished) or 2 minutes. - If FCND is displayed again, go back to the beginning of step 1. - If FCND is not displayed, go to next step. 5) Start push back. - Keep the HYD SYS ELEC PUMPS 1, 2 and 3A to ON during the push back. 6) After the second engine is started, set HYD SYS ELEC PUMPS 1 and 2 to AUTO. Note: In order to reset the FCND message, the HYD PBIT has to run again successfully. There is no need to PD/PU the airplane neither run a Return To Service (RTS). In addition, the Service News Letter 17027-0006 / 190-27-0005 and Operational Bulletin 170-012/04 Rev.1 have been reviewed to inform all the operators about this new scenario. BCV = Brake Control Valve CAS = Crew Alerting System CMC = Central Maintenance Computer CMM = Component Maintenance Manual DLS = Data Load System EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual EGT = Exhaust Gas Temperature ESC =Electronic Starter Controller FADEC = Full Authority Digital Electronic Control FCND = Flight Control No Dispatch FH = Flight Hour FHDB = Fault History Database FIM = Fault Isolation Manual FOL = Flight Operations Letter HPSOV = High Pressure Shutoff Valve HS-ACE = Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Control Electronic LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information LRU = Line Replaceable Unit MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List OB = Operational Bulletins P-BIT = Power-up Built-In-Test PN = Part Number
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January 2008
SB = Service Bulletin SN = Serial Number SNL = Service Newsletter SOV = Shutoff Valve TCPS = Temperature Pressure Switch Compensated

Issue No. 14

Note: All abbreviations used in EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

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