Cox v Louisiana (1965) Facts: On December 14, 1961, 23 students from Southern University (Negro college) were arrested

in Baton Rouge, Louisiana for picketing stores that maintained segregated lunch counters, urging a boycott of the stores as part of a general protest movement against racial segregation. The next morning, 2,000 students led by Reverend Cox, assembled and marched peacefully and orderly to the courthouse where the students were detained. When the police approached them, Cox identified himself as the leader, explaining that the students were demonstrating to protest the arrest and the evil of discrimination. As they were approaching the vicinity of the courthouse, they were confronted by the Chief of Police, and Cox outlined the program: singing of the Star Spangled Banner and a freedom song, recitation of the Lords Prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance, and a short speech. The Chief told Cox that he must confine the demonstration to the west side of the street, across from the courthouse. In the last part of Cox speech he said: All right. Its lunch time. Lets go eat. There are twelve stores we are protesting. A number of these stores have twenty counter s; they accept your money from nineteen. They wont accept it from the twentieth counte r. This is an act of racial demonstration. These stores are open to the public. You are members of the public. We pay taxes to the Federal Govt, and you who live here pay ta xes to the State. The Sherriff found this last part inflammatory, ordering the dispersal of the demonstration, leading to the exploding of tear gas shells. Cox was arrested a day after, charged with criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. Issue: WoN he should be convicted of: 1. disturbing the peace; 2. obstructing public passages Held: 1. NO; CONVICTION REVERSED. Louisiana may not constitutionally punish Cox under this statute 1 for engaging in the type of conduct which the record reveals, and also that the statute as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana SC is unconstitutionally broad in scope. The conduct of the demonstrators, (cheering and applauding when the prisoners sang with them), were not disorderly; nor hostile, aggressive, or unfriendly. The fear of violence was only due to the mutterings of the white crowd that watched the demonstration. Constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise. With regard to the unconstitutionality of the statute, the statute has 2 elements: (1) congregating with others with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances that a breach of the peace may be occasioned, and (2) a refusal to move on after having been ordered to do so by a law enforcement officer. The term breach of the peace was defined as to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet. Yet, a function of free speech under our system of govt is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions, and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech is protected against censorship or punishment. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups. Maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion is a basic tenet of our constitutional democracy. 2. NO; CONVICTION REVERSED. The court first declared that the rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in a democratic society, still do not meant that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of any organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. That the State has the right to regulate the use of city streets and other facilities to assure safety and convenience of the people. The court rejected the notion of appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech. The court based its decision on the fact that the statute allows the authorities in Baton Rouge to permit or prohibit parades or street meeting in their completely uncontrolled discretion, which sanctions a device for the suppression of the communication of ideas and permits the official to acts as a censor. It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute. The practice in Baton Rouge allowing unfettered discretion in local officials in the regulation of the use of the streets for peaceful parades and meeting is an unwarranted abridgment of appellants freedom of speech and assembly.

Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby crowds or congregates with others in or upon a public street or public highway, or upon a public sidewalk, or any other public place or building and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on when ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer of any munic ipality, or parish, in which such act or acts are committed, or by any law enforce ment officer of the state of Louisiana, or any other authorized person shall be guilty of disturbing the peace.