G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R.

REGUYAL, OCELYN P. CA!APANG, ENRICO ". REGALADO, EROME O. ARCEGA, ERNES!OC. #LAS, R., ELPEDIO M. ALMA$AN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner, vs. COUR! O% APPEALS &'( PRO%ESSIONAL REGULA!ION COMMISSION, respondent. Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

$ny examinee violating this instruction shall be sub9ect to the sanctions prescribed by ,ec. (, $rt. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1 0n 0ctober &2, &'(2, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to ta e the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on 0ctober 1/ and -ovember 1 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated li e them, with the Regional Trial Court of 3anila, 4ranch :::II, a complaint for in9uction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary in9unction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above*mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on 0ctober 1&, &'() on the ground that the lower court had no 9urisdiction to review and to en9oin the enforcement of its resolution. In an 0rder of 0ctober 1&, &'(), the lower court declared that it had 9urisdiction to try the case and en9oined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution -o. &./ which it found to be unconstitutional. -ot satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on -ovember &., &'(2, filed with the Court of $ppeals a petition for the nullification of the above 0rder of the lower court. ,aid petiton was granted in the ;ecision of the Court of $ppeals promulagated on %anuary &", &'(), to wit7 <=8R8>0R8, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby +R$-T8; and the other dated 0ctober 1&, &'(2 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with pre9udice Civil Case -o. (2*")'/. for want of 9urisdiction over the sub9ect matter thereof. -o cost in this instance. ,0 0R;8R8;. 2 =ence, this petition. The Court of $ppeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of 3anila had no 9urisdiction to entertain the case and to en9oin the enforcement of the Resolution -o. &./, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co*e?ual bodies. Thus it held @ That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co*e?ual body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond ?uestion, and co*e?ual bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each otherAs acts. 3

GANCAYCO, J.: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the li e three !"# days before the date of the examination? These are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of $ppeals promulagated on %anuary &", &'(), in C$*+.R. ,P -o. &./'(, ) declaring null and void the other dated 0cober 1&, &'(2 issued by the Regional Trial Court of 3anila, 4ranch "1 in Civil Case -o. (2*")'/. entitled 5 6upo 6. 6upangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission.5 The records shows the following undisputed facts7 0n or about 0ctober 2, &'(2, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission !PRC# issued Resolution -o. &./ as parts of its 5$dditional Instructions to 8xaminess,5 to all those applying for admission to ta e the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions7 -o examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the li e conducted by, or shall receive any hand*out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the li e or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.

To strenghten its position, the Court of $ppeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration s. !endoza" 4 which cites Pineda s. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific #ishing" $nc. s. L%na" * where this Court held that a Court of >irst Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission, the two being co*e?ual bodies. $fter a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case, <e rule in favor of the petitioner. The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of >irst Instance could not interfere with the orders of the ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda s. Lantin, <e explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission, he cannot see relief from courts of general 9urisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth $ct -o. (", as amended by Republic $ct -o. 2"/, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission, his remedy is to go the ,upreme Court on a petition for review. 6i ewise, in Philippine Pacific #ishing &o." $nc. s. L%na" it was stressed that if an order of the ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy ta e is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the ,upreme Court as mandated in Presidential ;ecree -o. '.1*$, the law creating the new ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission. -owhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of >irst Instance has no 9urisdiction over all other government agencies. 0n the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission. The respondent court erred when it place the ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. $s alraedy mentioned, with respect to the ,ecurities and 8xchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be ta en when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Bpon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to ?uestion a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Bnli e Commonwealth $ct -o. (" and Presidential ;ecree -o. '.1*$, there is no provision in Presidential ;ecree -o. 11", creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of $ppeals or to the,upreme Court. Conse?uently, Civil Case -o. (2*")'/., which was filed in order to en9oin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general 9urisdiction of the Court of >irst Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7 <hat is clear from Presidential ;ecree -o. 11" is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the 0ffice of the President for general direction and

coordination. 8 <ell settled in our 9urisprudence is the view that even acts of the 0ffice of the President may be reviewed by the Court of >irst Instance !now the Regional Trial Court#. In !edalla s. Sa'o" 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit7 In so far as 9urisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions andCor resolutions of the Civil ,ervice Commission and of the residential 8xecutive $sssistant is concerned, there should be no ?uestion but that the power of 9udicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion7 The ob9ection to a 9udicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recogniDe the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co*e?ual departments, the executives, the legislative and the 9udicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. <hen a presidential act is challenged before the courts of 9ustice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the 8xecutive is being made sub9ect and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under 9udicial review, not because the 8xecutive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief 8xecutive himself, and the courts see only to interpret, apply or implement it !the law#. $ 9udicial review of the PresidentAs decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil ,ervice 4oard of $ppeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the 9ucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 1+ (ep%)lic s. Presiding *%dge" &#$ of Lanao del Norte" Br. $$ , 11 is another case in point. =ere, 5the 8xecutive 0ffice5A of the ;epartment of 8ducation and Culture issued 3emorandum 0rder -o. '" under the authority of then ,ecretary of 8ducation %uan 3anuel. $s in this case, a complaint for in9unction was filed with the Court of >irst Instance of 6anao del -orte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that 5the Court of >irst Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the 8xecutive 0ffice which has the force and effect of law.5 In resolving the issue, <e held7

... <e definitely state that respondent Court lawfully ac?uired 9urisdiction in Civil Case -o. II*1E. !(# because the plaintiff therein as ed the lower court for relief, in the form of in9unction, in defense of a legal right !freedom to enter into contracts# . . . . . =ence there is a clear infringement of private respondentAs constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the ris of being violated by the threatened implementation of 8xecutive 0ffice 3emorandum Circular -o. '", dated >ebruary /, &'2(, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent &o%rt is not onl' right )%t d%t' )o%nd to ta+e cognizance of cases of this nat%re wherein a constit%tional and stat%tor' right is allegedl' infringed )' the administrati e action of a go ernment office. &o%rts of first $nstance ha e original ,%risdiction o er all ci il actions in which the s%),ect of the litigation is not capa)le of pec%niar' estimation -Sec. .." (ep%)lic Act /01" as amended2. 12 !8mphasis supplied.# In San !ig%el &orporation s. A elino, 13 <e ruled that a 9udge of the Court of >irst Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the ,ecretary of %ustice and an opinion thereon had been rendered. In view of the foregoing, <e find no cogent reason why Resolution -o. &./, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general 9urisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under ,ection ', paragraph " of 4.P. 4lg. &1', it is the Court of $ppeals which has 9urisdiction over the case. The said law provides7 ,8C. '. *%risdiction. @ The Intermediate $ppellate Court shall exercise7 xxx xxx xxx !"# 8xclusive appellate 9urisdiction over all final 9udgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and 3%asi4,%dicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate 9urisdiction of the ,upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this $ct, and of subparagraph !&# of the third

paragraph and subparagraph !E# of the fourth paragraph of ,ection &) of the %udiciary $ct of &'E(. The contention is devoid of merit. In order to invo e the exclusive appellate 9urisdiction of the Court of $ppeals as provided for in ,ection ', paragraph " of 4.P. 4lg. &1', there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its 3%asi4,%dicial functions. In 4lac As 6aw ;ictionary, 3%asi4,%dicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies re?uired to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a 9udicial nature. To expound thereon, 3%asi4 ,%dicial ad9udication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 1, This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions li e Resolution -o. &./ which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. The above rule was adhered to in #ilipinas Engineering and !achine Shop s. #errer. 1- In this case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of >irst Instance had 9urisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on 8lections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, 9udgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on 8lections fall within the exclusive 9urisdiction of the ,upreme Court by way of certiorari. =ence, it has been consistently held that 5it is the ,upreme Court, not the Court of >irst Instance, which has exclusive 9urisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on 8lections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws.5 1* $s to whether or not the Court of >irst Instance had 9urisdiction in saidcase, <e said7 <e are however, far from convinced that an order of the C03868C awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a 5final order5 which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. <hat is contemplated by the term 5final orders, rulings and decisions, of the C03868C reviewable by certiorari by the ,upreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the C03868C and ta en cogniDance of by the said body in the e5ercise of its ad,%dicator' or 3%asi4,%dicial powers. !8mphasis supplied.#

xxx xxx xxx <e agree with petitionerAs contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the ?uestioned order was issuedF and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. $n short" the &O!ELE& resol%tion awarding the contract in fa or of Acme was not iss%ed p%rs%ant to its 3%asi4,%dicial f%nctions )%t merel' as an incident of its inherent administrati e f%nctions o er the cond%ct of elections" and hence" the said resol%tion ma' not )e deemed as a 6final order re iewa)le )' certiorari )' the S%preme &o%rt. 4eing non*9udicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the C03868C from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. $ny ?uestion arising from said order may be well ta en in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. !8mphasis supplied.# 17 0ne other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Sal%d s. &entral Ban+ of the Philippines. 18 =ere, petitioner Central 4an , li e respondent in this case, argued that under ,ection ', paragraph " of 4.P. 4lg. &1', orders of the 3onetary 4oard are appealable only to the Intermediate $ppellate Court. Thus7 The Central 4an and its 6i?uidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the 3onetary 4oard is among the 5?uasi*9udicial ... boards5 whose 9udgments are within the exclusive appellate 9urisdiction of the I$CF hence, it is only said Court, 5to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts,5 that may review the 3onetary 4oardAs resolutions. 19 $nent the posture of the Central 4an , <e made the following pronouncement7 The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The I$C has no appellate 9urisdiction over resolution or orders of the 3onetary 4oard. -o law prescribes any mode of appeal from the 3onetary 4oard to the I$C. 2+ In view of the foregoing, <e hold that the Regional Trial Court has 9urisdiction to entertain Civil Case -o. (2*")'/. and en9oin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.

$lthough <e have finally settled the issue of 9urisdiction, <e find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution -o. &./ so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it. 0f course, <e realiDe that the ?uestioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is 5to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations.5 =owever, its good aim cannot be a cloa to conceal its constitutional infirmities. 0n its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend an' re iew class" )riefing" conference or the li+e" or recei e an' hand4 o%t" re iew material" or an' tip from an' school" collge or %ni ersit'" or an' re iew center or the li+e or an' re iewer" lect%rer" instr%ctor" official or emplo'ee of an' of the aforementioned or similar instit%tions . ... 21 The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from ta ing future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. >urthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authoriDed to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22 Resolution -o. &./ is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examineesA right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from ta ing all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to ma e use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to en9oy their freedom to ac?uire useful nowledge that will promote their personal growth. $s defined in a decision of the Bnited ,tates ,upreme Court7 The term 5liberty5 means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the e?ual rights of others, as his 9udgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest en9oyment. 23 $nother evident ob9ection to Resolution -o. &./ is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the

conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards re?uired before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Bnless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. $t this 9uncture, <e call attention to 0ur pronouncement in Garcia vs. The #ac%lt' Admission &ommittee" Lo'ola School of Theolog'" 2, regarding academic freedom to wit7 ... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and ob9ectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. -eedless to say, the enforcement of Resolution -o. &./ is not a guarantee that the alleged lea ages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimiDed. 3a ing the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days*when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological ma e*up for the examination day itself* would be li e uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. <hat is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such lea ages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. >ixers or swindlers should be flushed out. ,trict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revo ed. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential ;ecree -o. 11". 4ut by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. In the light of the above, <e hereby R8G8R,8 and ,8T $,I;8, the decision of the Court of $ppeals in C$*+.R. ,P -o. &./'& and another 9udgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution -o. &./ null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. -o costs. ,0 0R;8R8;.