Polytechnic University of the Philippines College of Communication Department of Broadcast Communication

Freedom of Information Bill

(Term Paper)
Submitted By: Charlegne Mae M. Climacosa BABRC 2-4

Submitted To: Prof. Arapia C. Ariraya

Introduction:
The Philippines is on the verge of passing a landmark Freedom of Information Law that could help end the culture of government secrecy and corruption. But without a surge of public support right now, we could lose this historic opportunity. If passed, this law would prevent the government from hiding crucial information from the public. By shining a light into dark corners, experience shows it would be a highly effective tool in exposing corruption and allowing us to campaign to prevent abuses of power. This law will also facilitate infomed participation by the public in government decision-making, and more efficient access to government services. President Aquino ran for election on a platform of anti-corruption and good governance, and endorsed the law in January this year. But now, the FOI bill languishes in the House of Representatives. Without our support and continuing demand, it will again die there.

Background:
This draft bill is a result of a consultative process after careful study of similar legislation by an administration study group in order to ensure that it serves public interest without compromising governments legitimate rightsin other words, balance legitimate needs for secrecy with the publics right to know The administration study group is composed of Communications Usec. Manuel L. Quezon III (lead), Sec. Ramon A. Carandang, Presidential Spokesperson Edwin Lacierda, Sec. Florencio B. Abad, and Deputy Presidential Spokesperson Abigail Valte, in coordination with the stakeholders. Since the proposed Substitute Bill was submitted to the House, Rep. Erin Taada has filed a consolidated bill incorporating the administration proposed Substitute Bill; in the Senate, Senator Gregorio Honasan II has filed a bill also incorporating the administration proposal.

Contemporary Studies:

For the next administration, the proposed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) could be a priority because it is watered down already. When a party-list member of the House of Representatives (HOR) said that the incoming 15th Congress might pass a watered-down version of the bill, he misses the point entirely: As it is, the proposed FOIA is already weak in substance. While having an enabling law to strengthen the constitutional provision of the peoples right to information is necessary, Senate Bill No. (SBN) 3308 and House Bill No. (HBN) 3732 do not guarantee the freedom they are supposed to uphold and protect. The proposed FOIA has a legal presumption in favor of access to information (Sec. 5). It does not, however, have a sunshine clause that compels the Philippine government to declassify confidential documents that are deemed to have permanent historical value. Citing the case of the United States FOIA, I wrote in the past that then US President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order No. 12958 in April 1995 which authorized the release of previously classified national security documents more than 25 years old and [and deemed] to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code (Sec. 1.6c of EO 12958). What is preventing the Philippine Congress from adopting a sunshine clause which guarantees declassification of selected confidential documents? Perhaps the concerned legislators are aware of the success of certain US media organizations in exposing, for example, the torture methods of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Latin America during the 1980s. Given this, they cannot imagine the impact of declassification of documents, particularly from the Philippine military during Martial Law from 1972 to 1986, which may expose the plethora of government wrongdoings like human rights violations. For the government officials supporting outgoing President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, their imagination apparently runs more wildly as they think about the repercussions of the eventual declassification of documents pertaining to government transactions from 2001 to 2010, as well as controversial issues like alleged fraud in the 2004 elections. If and when he assumes office, leading presidential candidate Sen. Benigno Noynoy Aquino III may greatly benefit from the declassification of confidential documents related to the assassination of his father, Ninoy Aquino, in August 1981. If only for this, the incoming administration should support the inclusion of a sunshine clause. That it is called sunshine clause has apparently to do with the effect of declassification: It helps shed light on issues by putting erstwhile confidential documents that have historical value out in the open after a certain period of time. Political vampires in Congress and beyond are therefore expected to block the passage of such a provision. It is likely that they will find acceptable the current version of the bill. However, Rep. BienvenidoAbantes statement after the non-passage of FOIA last Friday shows that the certain government officials want the bill to be prospective and not retroactive. This means that if the powers-that-be would have their way, government transactions prior to the laws effectivity would not be covered. Any provision to this effect would definitely weaken the already watered-down FOIA: This, after all, could deprive the public, especially the media, of crucial information pertaining to the past actions of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo whose

administration from 2001 to 2010 had been beset with numerous controversies. Concerned individuals and groups should therefore resist any move to make the already watered-down FOIA from getting any weaker. They should consider the following courses of action: Include a sunshine clause that will compel the government to disclose confidential documents with historical value after 25 years. Reject any provision that would make the FOIA prospective in nature. If necessary, a provision explicitly stating the FOIAs retroactive nature should be included. Provide a special provision for the government agencies expeditious granting or denial of information requests from journalists, subject to the same procedure of access as stated in Section 9(a). The first two recommendations should be seen as absolutely necessary to strengthen the FOIA. The third, on the other hand, should be considered an acknowledgment of the workings of the press where deadlines are an everyday reality, and that subjecting journalists to a maximum of a seven-day working period (Sec. 9e, SBN 3308) is simply unacceptable.

Articles:
Rolling in the Deep: The Right of Reply Monkey Wrench in FOI NepomucenoMalaluan 24 November 2012

IN an opinion piece published last October, political economy expert and Akbayan Party-List Rep. Walden Bello wondered whether or not there was an ideological connection between Malacaangs lack of support for the passage of the Freedom of Information bill and its vigorous push for cyberlibel. At the same time, Rep. Bello had wondered, and hoped, that the situation was merely one of President Aquino getting bad advice. But if it was indeed a case of an ideological position, Rep. Bello felt that it was truly disturbing as it hints at a conservative, elitist stance on free speech and transparency issues. President Aquino himself would later volunteer a plain, clear answer to Rep. Bellos question in his speech before the management conference of the KapisananngmgaBrodkasterngPilipinas on November 15.

The President said: Sa karanasankopo, tilabanakasanayannang media angmagpaulanngbatikossamgalumalabasnabalita. Allergic poyataangibasa good news kundi man iiwasanangmgaito, ay hahanapannamannilangmasamanganggulo.... [In my experience, it looks like the media has gotten used to raining criticisms in the news that come out. I guess others are allergic to good news -- if these can't be avoided they will look for a negative angle...] Sa duloponito, tayo ring mga Pilipino angmakikinabangsamakatotohanan at kumpletongpamamahayag.Kapag may sapat at tamangimpormasyonsi Juan dela Cruz samgaisyungpanlipunanhindilamangsiyaarmadosakaalamangaganahan at maeengganyorinsiyangmakilahoksapagpapaunladngbayan. [At the end, it is also us Filipinos who will benefit from truthful and complete journalism. If Juan dela Cruz has sufficient and correct information about issues of society not only is he armed with he will also be inspired and encouraged to participate in the effort to develop the country.] Hindi ponalalayosadiwangitoangpaninindigannatinukolsamgaisyutungkolsa media at publiko, tuladng Right of Reply.Ikanga: the truth will set you free kung patasnanaibabalitaangmagkabilangpanigngbawatstorya, kung wastoangdetalyengbawatulat, at kung nabibigyang-halagaangkalayaanngmgaPilipinongbumuongsarilingpananaw at pasyasamgausapingpanlipunan, walanaman pong dapatalalahaninangsinumangmamamahayag, di poba? [This idea is not far from my conviction about issues concerning the media and the public, such as Right of Reply. As they say: the truth will set you free - if the two sides of every story is reported equally, if every detail is accurate, and if the freedom of Filipinos to form their own view and decision on public issues, every journalist has nothing to fear, right?] It is one thing for the President to express his views on how he thinks the press should be doing its reporting; it is another thing altogether to propose to enforce it by legislation. The notion that fairness, positive slant, and accuracy in reporting can be made a legal requirement, as the President seems to suggest by making these the context for his mention of the Right of Reply, is repugnant to both our Constitutional guarantee and international human rights standards on freedoms of speech, expression, opinion, and the press. Section 4 of our Bill of Rights provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press. A right of reply to enforce fairness is an abridgement. A US case (Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo) decided in 1974 is

illustrative. In 1972, Tornillo ran for a seat in the Florida House of Representatives. Miami Herald published editorials critical of his candidacy. When Tornillo's demand for printing of his reply was refused, he sued Miami Herald based on a Florida right of reply statute. This statute gives a candidate the right to demand the printing of a reply, free of cost to the candidate, if his nomination or election is assailed with respect to his personal character or official record by any newspaper, under pain of penalty should the demand be refused. The US Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional. It said: "x xx A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution, and, like many other virtues, it cannot be legislated. Appellee's argument that the Florida statute does not amount to a restriction of appellant's right to speak, because "the statute in question here has not prevented the Miami Herald from saying anything it wished," begs the core question. Compelling editors or publishers to publish that which "reason' tells them should not be published" is what is at issue in this case. The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter. Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns tobe subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers. The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper. The first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print. It is correct, as appellee contends, that a newspaper is not subject to the finite technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster, but it is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies that a government agency determines or a statute commands the readers should have available. Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate." In terms of international human rights standards, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 2. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it

special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. In General Comment No. 34 (102nd session, Geneva, 11-29 July 2011), the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) provided guidance for the interpretation and observance of the said Article 19. It emphasized that no restriction is allowed on grounds not specified in Article 19 (3). If any restriction is at all imposed, it must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality and may not put in jeopardy the right itself. Not only are the objectives contemplated for introducing the idea of a Right of Reply in the Presidents speech not among the list of grounds for restrictions in theprovision, they attack the very rights protected by Article 19. Freedom is abridged through mandatory publication of a reply for the purpose of shaping and balancing reportage. What is worse, the area where the restriction is sought to apply -- the media coverage of matters of public interest or concern -- is one which the law accords even higher protection. In the case of Borjal vs. CA (G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999), the Supreme Court states: A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. We hear politicians cry of the media being "too powerful". What citizens must not lose sight of is that the purpose of the guarantee of a free press is not to accord the press a privileged standing. It is to protect citizens from the abuse by government officialdom of the power and authority we entrust to them as well as the taxes that we pay for government operation. In US vs. Bustos (G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918), the Supreme Court points out: "The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts." The Court, in Borjal vs. CA, did take the opportunity to remind media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble

profession. But to promote responsibility, the Court pointed to self-regulation as the ideal mean rather than self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements. The idea of the right of reply takes concrete form in a proposed rider to the FOI bill by Rep. Rodolfo Antonino. He inserts in his version the provision: "Opportunity to Reply. Any person natural or juridical who came to be involved directly or indirectly in the issue publicly obtained must be given the opportunity to account for, explain, manifest or throw light upon the issue concerned in the following manner: (a) That, it shall be in the same space of the printed material, newspapers or magazines, newsletters or publications circulated commercially or for free; (b) That, it shall be aired over the same program on radio, television, website, or any electronic device as the case may be; (c) That mandatory explanation on the part of the person natural or juridical who is involved or happened to be involved in the public information obtained shall be published or broadcasted not later than three (3) days; (d) That the explanation shall be thorough, clear and complete as to shed light on the issue of public concern." Elsewhere in his bill, Rep. Antonino provides the consequences for failure to publish or broadcast the reply: "The publisher and editor-in-chief of the publication or the owner and station manager of the broadcast media who fails or willfully refuses to publish or broadcast the manifestation of the person who happened to be involved in the issue concerned as mandated in this Act shall be fined an amount not exceeding P10,000 for the first offense; P50,000 for the second offense; P100,000 for the third offense and closure or suspension as the case may be, of the franchise of the publication or broadcast media outlet or station for 30 days." Thus, mere being "involved directly or indirectly in the issue publicly obtained" gives a natural or juridical person the right to demand the publication of a reply, on pain of fines and even closure. Every publication (and the proposed provision is all encompassing, not limited to media publication) of a matter making use of information obtained through the FOI law carries with it a legal responsibility to publish a reply of any natural or juridical person "involved directly or indirectly in the issue". The requirement, which carries with it a penalty, obtains whether or not you want to publish a reply, the reply is relevant, or you have the resources for such reply. Where is the guarantee of freedom in that? In the advocacy for the passage of the FOI bill in the 15th Congress, we engaged the government in earnest to address various concerns on the bill. The changes we accepted, subject to safeguards, were major: expansion of the national security exception, addition of executive privilege, reclassification of offenses from criminal to administrative, and allowing the defense of good faith for violations of the act.

We, citizens, not just the media, recognize the responsibility that goes with our exercise of our right to information. To address the concerns over possible abuse of the FOI, we worked out with the Senate committee the following provision: "No abuse in the exercise of rights and in the performance of duties under this Act. Public officials and employees, in the performance of their duties under this Act, as well as citizens in the exercise of their rights under this Act, shall act with justice, give everyone his or her due, and observe honesty and good faith. Public officials and employees as well as citizens shall endeavor to handle information kept or obtained under this Act with due care, to the end that inaccuracies and distortions are avoided. Any public official or employee, or citizen who, in the performance of duties or exercise of rights under this Act, willfully or negligently causes loss, damage or injury to another, in a manner that is contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy, shall compensate the latter for the damage incurred. This is without prejudice to other remedies available to the aggrieved party under any other law for the same acts." We requested Rep. Antonino to consider adopting the said approach, without prejudice to the House committee taking up the Right of Reply separately to allow its full deliberation, without holding hostage the FOI bill. But Rep. Antonino would insist on a patently unconstitutional rider to the FOI bill. Clearly, it is intended to throw a monkey wrench to the FOI bill's passage. He must now feel affirmed by President Aquino's express support for the right of reply. My colleague in Action for Economic Reforms, Manuel Buencamino, verbalized in his recent column supporting Rep. Antonino's right of reply, what in reality has already unfolded. He says, "Lets have freedom of information and the right of reply. Both or nothing." Every Filipino's right to information now falls victim to the administration's beef with media. It has to be stressed that FOI is not for the media alone. It is for pensioners who seek to clarify inaccuracies in their service records, for would-be beneficiaries who follow-up on the status of their claims to government services, for students and academics who seek hard -to -obtain government data for their research, for workers and farmers who ask for texts of negotiations and decisions that affect their livelihoods, for ordinary citizens who want to know how their hard-earned taxes are spent by government. Citizens' direct access to information -- perhaps, there lies the fundamental fear of FOI. And so we get nothing. Pop singer Adele has the perfect words for our wake-up call: But you played it

with a beating. __._,_.___

Content:
Summary of Comments on Malacaang Amendments to the Taada FOI Bill 11 ay 2011

1.Improvements in Malacaang version We acknowledge and welcome the following improvements introduced by Malacaang: The assistance to persons who are illiterate or with disability, under Section 10 (a) The introduction of a tracking system for requests, under Section 10 (b) The expansion of the information for mandatory disclosure under Section 14, subject to: improvement of style; clarification of vague provision under letter (b); clarification of why certain transactions under the original list, such as loan agreements, have been deleted; and harmonization with Section 17 (a) of the Taada consolidation.

2.Non-controversial changes We do not object to the following changes that we do not regard as controversial: The changing of implementing to strengthening in the title, but the rest of the title under the Taada bill should be retained as they properly refer to the Constitutional guarantee and policy on access to information. Changes in exceptions (i), (j), (g), (f) Changes in exception (b), inspired by US FOIA, except that the privacy part may already be redundant in view of exception (c) covering privacy. New exception (l), subject to further clarification of what constitutes

compliance. Minor amendment under Section 10 (d) Addition under Section 10 (h) on repetitious request Addition under Section 10 (i) on notice of grant of request New Section 15 on publication in the Official Gazette

3. Exceptions a. National security The Malacaang version inserts national security in Section 7 (a). In contrast, the Taada version attempts to limit national security to national defense, in view of the general tendency of governments to give national security an overbroad scope and meaning. Even without mention of national security, the Chief Executive has the traditional constitutional prerogative over the determination of national security, and so may include this more expansive concept in the promulgation of the classification. This is the better option given the sensitivity as well by many groups to the traditional abuse of the scope of national security.

b. Deliberative process privilege The concern by Malacaang over the confidentiality of deliberative process is seen in amendments under Section 6 and the introduction of new exceptions (d) and (e) under Section 7. We do not agree to the phrase inserted by Malacaang in Section 6 that limits the availability of the right to information only from when a decision on government policy has been taken. This represents a pushback of the Constitutional guarantee. It fails to recognize the right to participate in decision-making, and also goes against many policies and legislations opening up the decision-making processes to the public. Malacaangs concerns should instead be addressed in the provisions on exceptions, rather than in the statement of the general right under Section 6. As an acceptable adjustment, the following phrase can be added at the end of the second sentence: subject to the exceptions enumerated under Section 7 of this Act. The new exception under Section 7 (d) on inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda is copied from exception 5 of the US FOIA. We object to the

inclusion of this section. It does not identify the harm that we wish to avoid, and would exclude a whole class of documents even if there is legitimate public interest in disclosure. The language is opaque and it took years of jurisprudence in the US to define its coverage, which now covers

-three areas: (1) deliberative process privilege; (2) attorney work-product privilege; and (3) attorney-client privilege. The latter 2 exceptions are already covered by letter (e) in the Taada version and letter (j) in the Malacaang amended version. What is left then is the recognition and extent of deliberative privilege, which is better threshed out precisely than through the opaque language of the US FOIA and which Malacaang attempts to define in letter (e) below. The new exception under Section 7 (e) on records of minutes and advice and opinion given during decision-making or policy formulation appears to be Malacaangs more specific rendition of the deliberative process privilege, making redundant the opaque letter (d) copied from the US FOIA. As it is formulated, we have a number of objections. First, it s not harm based, and excludes full categories of information that people may have legitimate interest in knowing. Second, access to this documents at the time of decision-making is important because of the peoples right to participation in decision-making. Third, it extends the privilege to all government officials and personnel, well beyond the deliberative process privilege currently recognized in Philippine jurisprudence in relation to the constitutional right to information. Based on existing jurisprudence, deliberative process privilege is recognized in executive privilege, executive sessions on the part of Congress, and judicial deliberations on the part of the Supreme Court. Clearly, this privilege is by far made available only to the highestofficials of the country on the most sensitive of issues . This can begleaned from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Senate v. Ermita (GR No. 169777, 20 April 2006). In discussion the scope of executive privilege the court states: Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, orthe public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of informationof a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (emphasis supplied) To start a reasonable discussion of this exception, Malacaang should define clearly the harm that it wishes to avoid, and state clearly how farther it wants to extend coverage from that of executive privilege both in terms of the officials as well as the subject matter covered.

c. Internal personnel rules and practices Malacaang introduces another new exception under Section 7 (c) on

internal rules and practices of an agency. This is taken from exception 2 of the US FOIA. In the US, it took time for its legal coverage to evolve. Over the years, US jurisprudence has given the following coverage to this exception: (a) internal matters of a relatively trivial nature; and (b) more substantial internal matters, the disclosure of which would risk circumvention of a legal requirement. In (a), the triviality is such that there is no reasonable public interest in its disclosure, and in (b), a public harm can be expected from disclosure of the internal rules, such as for example in law enforcement manuals which disclosure could assist criminal elements in circumventing detection or apprehension. We object to this exception because it does not identify any harm that we wish to protect, and would exclude a whole class of document even if there is legitimate public interest in disclosure. As to the harm sought to be avoided as identified by US interpretation, we submit that they are already amply included in the other harm-based exceptions. 4. Burden of proof Malacaang deletes the reference to the assignment of the burden of proof in Section 5. We do not agree to such deletion. This is already settled jurisprudence. The Supreme Court in its decisions place the burden of proof on government. In Legaspi v. CSC (GR No. L-72119, May 29, 1987), the court states: In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]).

5. Removal of public interest override Malacaang deletes the entire Section 9 that provides for a mechanism for a public interest override, clarification on access by Congress, and disclosure of serious risks to health and public safety. We object to the deletion.

The public interest override is an important mechanism for the public to argue a greater public interest in disclosure than in the harm sought to be protected by the exception. The government claiming the exception is as much given the opportunity to prove the exception. Also, if there is a legitimate exception, the burden of proof shifts to the public to prove the overriding public interest, and the position of the government will expectedly be given considerable weight. We can expect an override only with overwhelming evidence of an overriding public interest. The qualification on access by Congress just qualifies that the exceptions apply to access by citizens, and a different standard applies to access by Congress in the exercise of its powers of legislation and inquiry. In the US FOIA, there is the clause This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress. The disclosure of risks is a laudable amendment from Rep. Apostol. 6. Notice of denial In section 11, Malacaang deletes the requirement of the specification of the name, rank, title or position of the person making the denial of a request. In the Taada bill, the identification of the person making the denial is needed for proper attribution of the act, which is important for accountability for the denial. The Malacaang version centralizes notification to an Information Committee making proper attribution difficult. 7. Creation of Information Commission The Malacaang proposal removes recourse to the Ombudsman, and replaces it with the Information Commission as an appeal mechanism from denial by the Head of Agency. The Commission is also given a list of specific functions. Concurrent recourse to courts was removed. In terms of legislative history of the Taada bill, early versions had provisions for an independent information commission. However, earlier Congresses resisted the creation of any new bodies in view of its fiscal impact. Various alternative existing institutions were explored, and the best fit was the Office of the Ombudsman given its broad Constitutional powers and mandate. We raise a number of objections to/questions on the Malacaang model:

- It is not independent, being attached to the Office of the President.

It is doubtful whether such office can have appellate jurisdiction over independent constitutional bodies and Congress Does it have jurisdiction to impose the administrative penalties? The qualification to the position of commissioners is weak on expertise on human rights/right to information. There is no indication of what is the remedy from decisions of the Information Commission. Presumably remedies under the Rules of Court applies?

8. Sanctions for violation of right to information Malacaang removes the criminal liability for the acts identified under Section 18 of the Taada consolidation, and instead imposes on them only administrative liability. The administrative sanctions, however, were not specified. It is important to specify the extent of administrative liability for enforcement purposes, and for us to know whether they can constitute enough deterrence for violation of the right, or commensurate accountability if the right is violated. We also prefer that certain acts still be considered criminal, such as if the denial of access was done for the purpose of concealing criminal acts in government. The Malacaang amendment is also not clear on who has the jurisdiction to impose the administrative liability.

Conclusion:
Having access to information therefore is important for a person to exercise his or her other basic freedoms, particularly of speech and of expression. Through this proposed measure, a person is guaranteed that he or she will not be deprived of information deemed important in his or her decision-making. There is cogent reason for the people to support the proposed Freedom of Information Act though journalists should be wary of the implications of certain provisions. The media can also benefit more from the proposed measure if it includes the release of previously classified documents with historical and social value after a certain period of time.

Even if journalists can be passionately persistent and remarkably creative in information gathering, government agencies should ensure expeditious granting of their requests. In order to discourage a journalist from circumventing the law in his or her quest to get the elusive information, the government should be transparent in providing necessary information and efficient in acting on such requests. It is therefore hoped that a special provision be included for the government agencies expeditious granting or denial of information requests from journalists, subject to the same procedure of access as stated in Section 9(a) of HB 3732. In pushing for this provision, it must be stressed that special treatment is not being requested for journalists. Expeditious granting or denial of information requests from journalists should be seen in the context of governments commitment to provide an atmosphere conducive to the exercise of press freedom. The governments cooperation with media organizations would surely help fulfill the latters sworn duty to provide relevant and up-to-date information to the people. If such a provision were included in the proposed FIA in the Philippines, the media and the public can greatly benefit from the full disclosure of certain confidential documents that have historical and social value, particularly those that are related to burning issues of the day, all of which clearly have historical contexts. Declassified national security documents could provide more details, for example, of what life was during Martial Law from 1972 to 1986. In this context, it would do well for the proposed FIA to provide for the full disclosure of classified documents more than 25 years old if they are deemed to have permanent historical and social value. Through these revisions to the proposed FIA, the government may uphold freedom of the press and implement full public disclosure of alltransactions involving public interest (Art. II, Sec. 28 of 1987 Constitution).

References:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/507967/house-urged-to-start-deliberations-on-foi-bill http://www.rappler.com/nation/40081-lower-house-first-foi-bill-hearing http://ifoi.ph/ http://www.mondaq.com/x/262414/data+protection/Freedom+of+Information http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/index.php/en/news/regions/20563-lawyer-orients-local -media-on-freedom-of-information-bill

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. L-8777-79 August 14, 1956

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CORAZON AQUINO alias AZON, defendant-appellee. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman for appellant. Antonio Bengzon, Jr., for appellee. REYES, A., J.: In three separate informations identically worded except that each referred to a different offended party, Corazon Aquino was accused, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, of the crime of grave oral defamation for having allegedly uttered in this public, on or about June 4,1954, words to this effect: "You Merrera lawyers, are stealers . . . shameless . . . impolite." Three informations were filed on the theory that, as there were three lawyers bearing the surname "Merrera" three separate crime of defamation were committed. But the lower court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the informations consolidated into one on the ground that, as the deformatory statement was uttered but once and on single occasion against a group of persons not mentioned individually, the act complained of constituted only one offense. From this order, the prosecution appealed to this Court. In support of its order, the lower court cities various cases of libel decided by this Court (among them, that of U.S. vs. Kelly, 35 Phil., 419) in which, regardless of the number of persons libeled, the accused were sentenced for only one offense. The court also cites decisions holding that a person who, on the same occasion and in the same place, steals properties belonging to different owners, is guilty of only one crime of theft. At common law, "a libel on two or more persons contained in one writing and published by a single act indictment therefor" (State vs. Hoskins, 60 Minn., 168), this for the reason that "the law makes the publication of libel punishable as a crime, not because of injury to the reputation, but because the publication of such articles tends to effect injurously the peace and good order of society." The Solicitor General, however, cites the case of People vs. Del Rosario, et al., (86 Phil., 163) where this Court upheld the theory that a "libelous publication one crime or more". That decision, it is to be noted, was predicated on the ruling laid down in the case of People vs. Luz Jose, 76 Phil., 599, to the effect that libel or defamation-of the nature of that committed in the present cases-cannot be prosecuted de oficio but only at the instance of the offended party or parties, from which this Court deduced the conclusion that in libel or defamation of that kind the policy of the law is to redress the injury to the individual rather than the injury to the peace and good order of society. But that conclusion is now without basis, for the said case of People vs. Luz Jose had already been overruled by the (98 Phil., 111), promulgated December 19, 1955 where this Court said. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime that maybe prosecuted de oficio, or of a crime that may not be prosecuted de oficio, "or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the

memory of the one who is dead." In libel imputing the commission of a crime that may be prosecuted de oficio, the complaint of the offended party is not necessary, and the information filed by the prosecuting officer is enough to confer jurisdiction upon the court to try the defendant charged with the crime. A libel imputing the commission of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, such as adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. A libel attributing a defect or vice, real or imaginary, which does not constitute a crime but brings into disrepute, scorn or ridicule or tends to cause him dishonor, discredit, or contempt, does not come under the last paragraph of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party." This is the only exception provided for by law in which the instance and complaint of the offended party are required in order to vest or confer jurisdiction upon the court to take cognizance of the crime of libel and try the defendant charged with it. It this is the only exception, then it cannot be extended beyond the import and terms of the law. A libel ascribing a defect or vice, the real or imaginary, which does not constitute a crime but brings or tends to cause him dishonor, discredit, or contempt is not included in the exception. Hence the informations filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija for the City of Attorney charging the defendants with libel which consist of an imputation of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or judicial person, are sufficient in the law to confer jurisdiction upon the court or try the defendants charged with the crime. In the line this latter decision, we have to hold that the utterance of the defamatory statement complained of in the present access should be regarded as only one offense and main the subject of only one information, the utterance having been made but once and referring apparently to a family of lawyers designated by their common surname but not separately mentioned. Wherefore, the order appealed from it affirmed. No costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion , Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur. A rural family decides to run a prostitute service based in a fake theater in Angeles, Pampanga. The theater shows dated sexy double-feature films. The old building also serves as the residence of the family. Nanay Flor serves as the matriarch of the movie house while her family serve as her employees. Her daughter Nayda, son-in-law Lando and adopted daughter Jewel take turns in manning the ticket booth and canteen. Her nephews Ronald and Alan also help in the family business as a projectionist and billboard painter respectively. Nanay Flor files a bigamy case against her husband but loses the case and feels betrayed when her own son testifies in court in favor of his father. Alan, financially unprepared for marriage, feels burdened by the fact that his pregnant girlfriend wants him to marry her. Nayda is torn between her commitment to her husband and her attraction to her cousin Ronald. Unknown to the family, aside from movies, there's another kind of business going on inside the theater. The movie house also serves as a den for "serbis" boys (male prostitutes) who offer sexual services to gay patrons for a price.