The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same in India: The Bahujan and the

Paradox of the Democratic Upsurge Author(s): K. K. Kailash Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No. 2 (March/April 2012), pp. 321-347 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.2.321 . Accessed: 03/02/2014 01:42
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K. K. KAILASH

The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same in India
The Bahujan and the Paradox of the Democratic Upsurge
A B S T R AC T

This paper examines no opinion and dont know responses in the National Election Study 2004. Comparing responses on social and political questions, it nds that the marginalized sectors of society are more likely to be socially opinionated than to express substantive political opinions. This paradox might explain why the so-called democratic upsurge did not produce radical political transformation in India.
K E Y WO r D s : no opinion, dont know, National Election Study, democratic upsurge,

bahujan

This paper engages one of the more celebrated findings of Indian democracy, the so-called democratic upsurge thesis.1 According to this thesis, the post-Congress Party polity, which was inaugurated in the early 1990s, has witnessed a marked participatory upsurge among the socially underprivileged, whether seen in terms of caste hierarchy, economic class, gender
K. K. Kailash is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Chandigarh, Punjab, India. This paper was made possible by the University of Michigan Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) Lokniti Indian Institute of Advanced Study (IIAS) collaborative program, which enabled me to attend a summer school on research methodology analyzing quantitative data on Indian politics. I am indebted to Pradeep Chhibber and Irfan Nooruddin for valuable help with problems related to analysis, and thank two anonymous referees and the editors for their suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. I thank Abhay Datar, Rajeshwari Deshpande, Praveen Rai, Dhananjai Joshi, Reetika Syal, and Rahul Verma for their help at the workshops. The data used were made available by the CSDS Data Unit. Neither the Lokniti network nor the Data Unit bear any responsibility for the analysis and interpretation presented here; I am responsible for any errors that remain. Email: <kailashkk@pu.ac.in>. 1. Yogendra Yadav, Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s, in Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy, eds. Francine R. Frankel et al. (New Delhi: Oxford, 2000), pp. 12045. Asian Survey, Vol. 52, Number 2, pp. 321347. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2012 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2012.52.2.321.
321

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distinction or the rural-urban divide.2 These victim communities of social deprivation(bahujan) are not only more active than Indias socially and economically privileged groups, but their participation in voting and other political activities differs distinctly from their own past.3 This expansion of the participatory base of democracy is accompanied by both higher vote efficacy and higher levels of trust and legitimacy for the democratic system among these groups, compared to the more privileged sections of society.4 However, little more than a decade later, it became clear that the transformative potential of the upsurge had disappeared, and a huge gap had appeared between increased participation and its consequences for the socially underprivileged. Yogendra Yadav, who was among the first to outline the democratic upsurge thesis, notes that the 2004 elections marked a historical closure and the democratic upsurge of the 1990s had thus been contained and domesticated.5 Not only did the participation trends stabilize, the upsurge itself did not bring any new demands or claims on the political system. The bahujan, it appears, became victims of the upsurge, in which the success of politics of social justice is limited to the accession of leaders from dalit-bahujan communities to governmental power, detached from

2. Ibid., p. 120. 3. In this paper, bahujan include dalits, adivasis, the poor, women, and rural sections of the Indian population. This usage closely follows that of Yogendra Yadav and others who have sought to engage in the debate on the democratic upsurge thesis. Bahujan in the contemporary dalit movement vocabulary include only dalits, adivasis, Other Backward Castes (OBCs), and select minorities. Yadav expanded its usage to all other victim communities of social deprivation, adding women and the poor. See ibid., p. 121. In their examination of participation trends, Suhas Palshikar and Sanjay Kumar use the term less privileged to refer to an identical category that includes dalits, adivasis, the poor, and women. Suhas Palshikar and Sanjay Kumar, Participatory Norm: How Broad-based Is It? Economic and Political Weekly 39:51 (2004), p. 5417. Literally meaning, oppressed, dalit is today the politically correct term used to refer to the Scheduled Castes (SCs). The SCs comprise varied historically exploited caste groups, who were at the bottom of the traditional Hindu caste hierarchy and consequently suffer from various forms of backwardness and discrimination. SC itself is an administrative term that comes from the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, that the government of India enacted to enumerate these exploited caste groups for the purpose of channeling developmental activities and affirmative action policies. The term adivasis literally means first dwellers, and is used to refer to tribal communities and groups who are historically disadvantaged in multiple ways. They are also referred to as Scheduled Tribes (STs). ST again has administrative origins and is derived from the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, which was enacted for the protection and development of historically disadvantaged tribal groups. 4. Yadav, Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge, pp. 13840. 5. Yogendra Yadav, The Elusive Mandate of 2004, Economic and Political Weekly39:51 (2004), p. 5384.

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 2 3

any substantive consequences for dalit-bahujan communities.6 Therefore, while there was a deepening of political representation, there was very little attention to redressing disadvantages, deprivation and discrimination that characterized the caste system.7 In other words, while the marginalized have had some say in who rules, they are less successful when it comes to the public policies the rulers adopt. The radical hopes of social change that this discursive shift in Indian politics carried remained unfulfilled for the bahujan. The limitations of the upsurge have quite naturally received considerable attention. Both Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta observed that rather than creating some universalistic norms of citizenship, justice, and civic reciprocity, the practice of democracy has only strengthened unequal social structures.8 Mehta is more critical, believing that the Indian practice has neither enriched the idea of democracy nor produced any fundamental anchors and norms. Instead, politics has become a struggle to displace the holders of power rather than an ambition to bring about social transformation.9 On the contrary, both Suhas Palshikar and Ashutosh Varshney, although aware of its limitations, throw light on other facets of the democratic story. Palshikar argues that the Indian democratic experience can be seen in terms of the evolution of three different claimsappropriational, aspirational, and transformational. The appropriational claims, though couched in universal terms, often only legitimize existing positions. This claim could co-opt both demands, which seek space within the existing order, as well as those that want to transform the existing status quo. Appropriational politics could therefore be illusory and may postpone, and even negate, transformational goals. Aspirational claims are by and large limited to fulfilling specific group interests and therefore not only lack a universalistic perspective but also wield limited transformative potential. Nevertheless, aspirational politics plays a valuable role because it prevents the dominant groups from constructing a hegemonic project. The transformational claim comes from underprivileged and discriminated groups. Their objective condition clearly demands a reordering of the existing state of affairs to accommodate their claims and
6. Idem, Rethinking Social Justice, Seminar 601 (September 2009), p. 82. 7. Ibid., p. 84. 8. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Burden of Democracy (Delhi: Penguin, 2003); Niraja Gopal Jayal, Introduction: Situating Indian Democracy, in Democracy in India, ed. idem (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 149. 9. Mehta, The Burden of Democracy, p. 46.

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therefore conflict with appropriational claims.10 This narrative of a contest between different claims may explain the reasons underlying some of the limitations of Indian democracy. For Varshney, while existing social and economic inequalities may take some sheen off Indian democracy, he argues that it does not make it undemocratic. The real gain, according to him, has been the fact that democracy has taken the battle for social dignity to the public sphere. Accordingly, there have been substantive gains for the marginalized in terms of everyday dignity and respect.11 The failure of public policies reflects the political and bureaucratic elites lack of imagination rather than the failure of democracy as such. To sum up, even though increased participation has enhanced the representative character of Indian democracy, there are doubts about how concretely it has helped bring gains for the bahujan. From the above discussion, it is clear that although the Indian experience of democratization is contrary to much of received democratic theory, there are still unanswered questions. According to the standard democratization model, people from higher social and economic classes, and with better education, are more likely to participate in the political process than their poorer counterparts. What is puzzling in the Indian experience is the fact that the substantive position of the underprivileged remains the same despite their enhanced participation. The upsurge formulation was derived from a mix of aggregate data regarding voting as well as attitudinal aspects derived from survey data. To understand why the radical potential in the upsurge dissipated, we should consider the thesis components more closely. In this context, a study by Suhas Palshikar and Sanjay Kumar is particularly instructive. Analyzing National Election Study (NES) 2004 survey data, they found that the diversification of voters as a result of the upsurge was not matched by a broadening of the social base of participants and active citizens. They make a distinction between different levels of participation. In their formulation, the act of voting is considered to be the simplest form of participation; more complex forms of participation include taking an interest in election campaigns and participating in election
10. Suhas Palshikar, Whose Democracy Are We Talking About? Hegemony and Democracy in India, in Indian Democracy: Meanings and Practices, eds. Rajendra Vora and Suhas Palshikar (New Delhi: Sage, 2004), pp. 12764. 11. Ashutosh Varshney, Is India Becoming More Democratic? Journal of Asian Studies 59:1 (February 2000), pp. 325.

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 2 5

rallies, meetings, and campaigns. They found that people in higher class categories and those with greater levels of education participated more actively as compared to dalits, adivasis, the poor, and women. While the bahujan vote, the more active citizens actually come from the privileged sections of society. Palshikar and Kumar conclude that the increased participation did not automatically ensure the entry of the less privileged sections into the political process.12 This article attempts to extend this line of research by analyzing the nature and levels of opinion. It follows from the democratic upsurge proposition that the underprivileged yet participating population is both politically sophisticated and has beliefs, orientations, and opinions. The assumption is that those who vote and are politically active should have opinions, and be willing to express them. It is the expression of opinion that brings clarification to political goals and values. These views, beliefs, and expectations in turn will come to bear upon on politics generally and on political questions specifically. So, it can be expected that a participating population will have views to express on at least simple questions and concerns. For analytical purposes, this study distinguishes having an opinion on political issues and on social ones.13 This differentiation is essential because I expect that most Indians would have clearly formed opinions on simple social issues. This is because for them, direct experience of social events and concerns is more likely than the chance of engaging phenomena such as foreign affairs or fiscal policy, which are removed from everyday life. At the same time, from the democratic upsurge thesis it follows that Indians have opinions on political questions as well. However, what happens if the bahujan happen to be more socially opinionated and less politically opinionated?14
12. Palshikar and Kumar, Participatory Norm, p. 5417. 13. In this study, political basically revolves around reactions to the democratic system and some of its elementary components, as well as evaluating government performance, examining its impact on peoples lives, and making alternate choices between political parties. Social involves issues of marriage, property, and gender as well as community and caste and religious interaction in the context of everyday life experiences. While the political involves an element of evaluation and judgment, the social is relatively simpler and only requires an agree or disagree response. This difference is essential because politics is, after all, about making choices and judgments and looking beyond societal givens. 14. In the survey analysis, no opinion (NoP) and/or dont know (DK) response categories are usually categorized as non-substantial and have commonly been bundled into the missing category, unless they are the object of analysis. In this context, the other categories are called substantial responses. In this study, the term opinionated is used to distinguish substantial responses

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If this is the case, then we have another paradox of the democratic upsurge where the underprivileged participate in large numbers and yet choose not to express substantive political opinions, thereby blunting their own impact on political and policy outcomes. To examine how opinionated people are, and to contrast political and social opinions, I focus on respondents who gave no substantial answer but preferred NoP and/or DK responses in NES 2004.15 At one level, this allows us to assess the degree of being opinionated. At another, if respondents choose either the NoP or DK response instead of a more substantial response to political but not to social questions, we may garner clues why the upsurge and mobilization failed to achieve substantial benefits for the bahujan. The remainder of this paper is organized in six sections. In the first section, I review the literature on NoP and DK responses. Then, I offer a framework to explain which types of citizens would be most likely to be less opinionated. The third section describes the empirical strategy and the data used to test the research hypotheses. The penultimate section presents results from the data analysis and attempts to draw conclusions about the population characteristics from the sample of the NoP and DK responses. The fifth section discusses possible alternative explanations. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and their implications for the understanding of contemporary Indian politics.
L it E rat U r E R E V i E W

NoP and DK responses have received a fair share of attention in the literature on survey analysis.16 The emphasis has largely been on the issue of NoP and questionnaire design. Two contrasting perspectives can be identified in the literature regarding NoP responses. One pushes for the inclusion of NoP responses, arguing that non-inclusion could lead to fabrication of attitudes by respondents and consequently reporting of non-attitudes in analyses.17
from non-substantial responses. The word opinionated should therefore not be confused with the potentially pejorative (and common) usage as being unreasonably dogmatic. 15. By combining NoP and DK responses, I am not arguing that they are interchangeable but only that unlike other responses, these two are clearly not committed to a particular substantive option. 16. For a review of the literature on NoP responses, see Jon A. Krosnick, Survey Research, Annual Review of Psychology50 (1999), pp. 53767. 17. See, for instance, Jean M. Converse and Stanley Presser, Survey Questions: Handcrafting the Standardized Questionnaire (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1986).

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 2 7

In contrast, another view argues that using NoP filters does not necessarily remove all people without meaningful opinions.18 Instead, it suggests that omitting NoP completely may force people to offer an opinion: experimental studies have shown that these opinions can be both stable and meaningful. Despite this difference, there is a general agreement that analysis of nonsubstantial responses could be a worthwhile exercise. Empirical studies have assessed the correlation between non-substantial responses and population characteristics, and identified a number of factors (including socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, age, education, occupation, and race) that often influenced responses. In the U.S., for example, males and whites, in comparison to females and non-whites, are more likely to be politically opinionated.19 Numerous studies have found less education to be a good predictor of higher NoP and DK responses.20 Similarly, it was found that there is a correlation between ones interest, motivation, and involvement in particular issues and ones level of non-substantial responses. To explain, respondents with greater interest and higher levels of involvement are less likely to offer NoP and DK responses.21 Access to information also plays a significant role. Studies found that greater access to the news media, for instance, reduced the level of non-substantial responses.22 Besides relating non-substantial responses to population characteristics, there have been attempts to examine why such responses occur. Jon Krosnick, for instance, identified what he called satisficing.23 In this case, respondents do not strive to give their best answers to questions. Answering questions requires mental effort and, for different reasons, some people might not want to make the effort. Consequently, they choose answers irrespective of their actual opinions. Related to this, it was also found that DK responses were
18. For a review of studies on the effects of no filters, see Jon A. Krosnick, The Causes of NoOpinion Responses to Attitude Measures in Surveys: They Are Rarely What They Appear to Be, in Survey Nonresponse, eds. Robert M. Groves et al. (New York: Wiley, 2002), pp. 87100. 19. Joe D. Francis and Lawrence Busch, What We Now Know about I Dont Knows,Public Opinion Quarterly39:2 (1975), pp. 20718. 20. See, for instance, Jean M. Converse, Predicting No Opinion in the Polls, Public Opinion Quarterly 40:4 (197677), pp. 51530; Sowmya Narayan and Jon A. Krosnick, Education Moderates Some Response Effects in Attitude Measurement,ibid., 60:1 (1996), pp. 5888. 21. Charles M. Judd, Jon A. Krosnick, and Michael A. Milburn, Political Involvement and Attitude Structure in the General Public, American Sociological Review 46:5 (1981), pp. 66069. 22. Jon A. Krosnick and Michael A. Milburn, Psychological Determinants of Political Opinionation, Social Cognition 8:1 (1990), pp. 4972. 23. Jon A. Krosnick, Response Strategies for Coping with the Cognitive Demands of Attitude Measures in Surveys, Applied Cognitive Psychology 5:3 (1991), pp. 21336.

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3 28 asia N s U r V E Y 5 2 : 2

sometimes used when respondents did not want to admit ignorance or wished to hide or shade socially unacceptable opinions behind a DK response.24 Studies have also found that NoP responses are related to the design of the survey instrument. Robert Ferber, for instance, observed that NoP responses increased with the difficulty and complexity of the issue.25 Ambiguous questions similarly boosted non-substantial responses.26 Based on the assumption that respondents are likely to get tired and distracted as the survey proceeds, it has been observed that NoP and DK responses increase progressively toward the end of the questionnaire.27 It follows that how questions are structured and placed, as well as the length of the questionnaire, can influence responses. From this review, it is clear that two issues need to be incorporated while drawing the framework to examine whether the bahujan are politically opinionated. One, non-substantial responses can be traced to particular sections of society. Second, elements of the instrument must be considered while mapping responses.
T h E O r E tical F ram E W O rk

Information availability has a decisive influence on opinion formation. The social location and attitudinal disposition of individuals not only determine their opportunities to obtain information but also to process it.28 Accordingly, this study includes two categories of independent variables. The first consists of socioeconomic indicators. The second revolves around media exposure, interest, and sociability. Socioeconomic indicatorsgender, education, income, locality, and castewere included in the first category of independent variables. Women
24. See, for instance, Andrzej Sicinski, Dont Know Answers in Cross-National Surveys,Public Opinion Quarterly34:1 (1970), pp. 12629; Adam J. Berinsky, The Two Faces of Public Opinion, American Journal of Political Science 43:4 (1999), pp. 120930. 25. Robert Ferber, Item Nonresponse in a Consumer Survey, Public Opinion Quarterly 30:3 (1966), pp. 399415. 26. David G. Faulkenberry and Robert Mason, Characteristics of Nonopinion and No Opinion Response Groups,ibid. 42:4 (1978), pp. 53343. 27. Wendy R. Smith, I. J. Culpepper, and Jon A. Krosnick, The Impact of Question Order on Cognitive Effort in Survey Responding, in Proceedings of the Sixth National Conference on Undergraduate Research (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), at <http://comm.stanford. edu/faculty/krosnick/>, accessed May 5, 2010. 28. Attitudinal disposition here refers to the individual character and temperament in terms of interest, motivation, and congeniality.

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 2 9

and those traditionally lower in the caste order have occupied particular social spaces in Indian society; this in turn has shaped their collective experiences. Historically at the margins, for these groups their dependence on others not only hindered access to information but also reduced space and opportunity for independent opinion formation. Though their subjective as well as objective condition may have changed over time, their long subjugated experience puts them in a relatively disadvantaged position as compared to other sections of society in terms of opinion formation. Consequently, it may be expected that women, dalits, and adivasis are likely to be less opinionated, as compared to men and those from other caste categories. Education not only influences knowledge formation and information availability but also acts as an enabling agent in multiple ways. It builds the power of expression as well as aiding the development of skills required to process information. I assume that the greater the level of education, the less likely is the probability of NoP and DK responses. Similarly, income and social location in terms of the degree of urbanity both influence the opportunity for exposure to news and ideas, and consequently the probability of forming opinions. The higher the level of income, the less likely the individual is to give NoP and DK responses. Given the better range of facilities and connectivity available in urban areas as compared to rural areas, it can be assumed that the level of urbanity matters when it comes to determining opportunities to obtain information. I assume that those with higher levels of income and those living in urban areas also obtain information earlier than the rural poor. Income and location also enhance access to wider sources of information. The second assumption is that the degree of political interest and involvement could influence respondents opinions. It is likely that those who are interested and involved in politics are more motivated to express opinions on political issues compared to the disinterested and uninvolved. I define the politically interested as people who not only have an interest in politics and public affairs generally, i.e., outside of election periods, but who are also interested in election campaigns and participate in election related activities. A related assumption is that the degree of sociability also influences the nature of responses. In this study, I understand sociability to mean how amenable people are to being in the company of others. Outgoing individuals have not only a greater chance of obtaining information but also have more opportunities to hear and form opinions. Consequently, the degree of sociability could impinge on opinion formation. In this study, I use membership

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of groups and associations as an indicator of sociability. It follows that the lower the degree of sociability, the higher the probability of NoP and DK responses. An important source of information in any society is the media. This includes newspapers, radio, and television. Our literature review showed that the greater the exposure to media sources, the higher the information availability. Some sections of society are not only more likely to have a higher level of media exposure as compared to others but may also be better equipped to use that information. I assume that a greater degree of media exposure will increase the probability of having an opinion. The above discussion shows that it is possible that the degree to which people hold opinions can be related to population attributes. The hypotheses derived can be tested to investigate whether non-substantial responses are systematically related to population attributes or, as the null hypotheses would suggest, whether there is no relation. At another level, the discussion also suggests that it is also possible that the level of being opinionated varies from issue to issue.
Empirical S trat E g Y a N D Data

The analysis is conducted at two levels. I begin by examining whether nonsubstantial responses are systematically related to population attributes. Following this, I compare non-substantial responses on social and political opinion-based questions. I use cross-tabulations to compare the distribution of the independent variable with the dependent variable, with special focus on the difference between different groups in the variables. The chi-square test and independent samples T-test are significant and robust tests for hypothesis testing in the social sciences. While both test individual variables, a binary logistic regression analysis evaluates all variables not only combined but separately. This will enable comparison between social and political opinion questions. This study examines NoP responses from the NES 2004 conducted by the Lokniti-CSDS team.29 The NES 2004, which was conducted after Indias
29. This study uses NES 2004 despite NES 2009 results being available, because a comparison of NoP responses revealed identical respondent characteristics. Furthermore, procedural innovations in NES 2009 in the form of a split sample interview schedule with five questionnaire sets reduced the sample available for analysis.

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 3 1

table 1. Comparison of NES 2004 Profile with Census 2001 by Gender, Locality, Religion, Dalits, and Adivasis
Variable Men Women Rural Urban Hindus Muslims Dalits Adivasis Census 51.7 48.3 72.2 27.8 80.5 13.4 16.2 8.2 Survey 53.5 46.5 78.6 21.4 79.8 11.3 17.9 9.0

source: Lokniti Team, NES 2004, pp. 537879.

fourteenth general elections in May 2004, inaugurated the third generation of NES conducted in India and was, in many ways, different from the previous surveys. It was a single-wave post-election survey, the largest study of its type at the time.30 It covered almost the entire country, and its achieved sample of 27,189 was drawn using a multistage stratified random sampling technique. This study uses a data set of 27,110, weighted by state population. The NES 2004 achieved better representativeness compared to previous surveys by drawing a probability sample at the state level (replacing the earlier practice of drawing a self-weighted national probability sample) and by reducing the sample size at the primary sampling unit. It covered 420 parliamentary constituencies within which 932 assembly constituencies were sampled. Within the latter, 2,380 polling stations were covered. The respondents at the polling station were selected from electoral rolls by circular sampling with a random start (see Table 1). The representativeness of the achieved sample in the table is noteworthy. Table 1 shows that in terms of its demographic profile, it fits closely with the Census of India 2001 data covering fairly all social categories in the populationwhether gender, rural-urban, or caste-community. Furthermore, the questionnaire was translated into different languages with an emphasis on dialects of major Indian languages in order to allow it to capture the nuances
30. It was undertaken in the period between the completion of polling and the start of counting. Lokniti Team, National Election Study 2004 [hereafter, NES 2004]: An Introduction, Economic and Political Weekly 39:51 (2004), p. 5373.

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of the language. This is significant for my study because, to a certain degree, it removes the ambiguity in responses that might reflect a lack of clarity faced by respondents. The instrument had 52 questions (112 items) in addition to 43 background items. To understand the distribution of opinionation, two dependent variables were constructedone based on social opinion questions and the other on political opinion questions.31 I assume that on both these issues, individuals would find it easier to offer a substantial response because social and political opinion questions are more likely to include concerns from everyday experience and maybe even direct involvement, compared to questions that seek opinion on complex economic, defense, or foreign policy matters. This allows me to examine, first, whether the increased participation also carries substantial involvement in terms of a clear expression of ideas and opinions and, second, whether the degree of being opinionated varies between social and political opinion-based questions. The social opinion dependent variable was constructed using three questions revolving around the theme of inter-caste and inter-religious marriage, and the issue of women in politics.32 Marriage and the position of women (compared to more distant issues like community rights, minority-majority relations, and religious conversion) are relatively less complex. The two issues are also likely to be encountered on a regular basis; therefore, the probability of people having an opinion on them is higher. The political-opinion dependent variable was constructed using two questions probing responses to democracy.33 The questions were selected for very
31. As is apparent from the correlation matrix in Table 2 below, the two dependent variables are highly correlated since those who have opinions on political issues are more likely to have opinions on social issues. However, this high correlation masks the higher levels of NoP chosen on the political questions, a trend that is especially marked for the lower castes. Therefore, analyzing both dependent variables separately is valuable. 32. The three statements used for creating the social opinion dependent variable included the following: (A) Marriage of boys and girls from different religions should be banned, (B) Marriage of boys and girls from different castes should be banned, (C) Doing politics is not meant for women. All the statements had the following response options: Agree (Fully/Somewhat), Disagree (Somewhat/Fully), and No-P. For more details, see Appendix 1 Table 1. Non-Substantial Responses across Different Questions, at the end of this article. 33. There were several questions used for the political index. One was the following: (A) People have different opinions about democracy. Some people believe that democracy is better than any form of government. Others believe that dictatorship is better than democracy in certain conditions. And others believe that it makes no real difference between a democratic or any other form of government. What is your opinion about it? (1) Democracy is better, (2) Dictatorship is better,

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 3 3

specific reasons. First, these questions are less likely to intimidate respondents and force shading of opinions compared with questions evaluating party or government performance. Second, other political questions in the survey not only involved an element of evaluation but were also combined with issues that respondents may not connect with immediately. Third, even the original formulation of the upsurge thesis uses the question of support for democracy to assess peoples trust in the legitimacy of the democratic system. Although the political-opinion questions used for the construction of the dependent variable may appear to be removed from direct experience, they are fairly straightforward and have been used in surveys to assess attitudinal positions. Furthermore, these questions allow us to assess the strength of the foundations of Indias democratic practice as well as the democratic upsurge. The dependent variables were created after recoding responses from low to high with NoP responses as 0 and all substantial responses as 1. Simple addition was used to create the dependent variable indices. The following range was used for this purpose: NoP (0), some opinion (0, 1), and opinionated (1). The same thresholds were used for creation of both social and political dependent variables. A respondent would be included in the NoP category when the response was either NoP or DK to all questions, and in the opinionated category when all responses were substantial. The some-opinion category includes those who gave a mix of substantial and non-substantial responses. This particular choice of questions for construction of the dependent variables also allows me to examine whether NoP responses tend to increase toward the end of the survey, as suggested in the literature. In the instrument, the selected political questions are found toward the middle, and the social questions are found at the end. If the social questions have a higher level of non-substantive responses, it may be inferred that question placement matters, given that it was a lengthy survey. Additionally, the particular questions selected for the creation of the social and political dependent variables had a relatively lower level of NoP responses compared to other questions in the same category.34 By deliberately choosing questions with a low level of NoP
(3) Makes no difference, or (4) DK. Another question used for the political index was the following: (B) Suppose there were no parties or assemblies and elections were not held, do you think that the government in this country can be run better? (1) No, (2) Yes, or (3) DK. For more details, see Appendix 1 Table 1. Non-Substantial Responses across Different Questions. 34. Ibid.

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3 34 asia N s U r V E Y 5 2 : 2

responses, I was able to ensure that the complexities in the question did not influence the response in the non-substantial direction. After all, as the literature review shows, complexity is one of the reasons for increase in the level of NoP responses. A three-category political interest index was used to discover the relationship between being politically interested and involved, and being opinionated. It was constructed using two questions on interestin politics and election campaignsand five questions on participation/involvement in various activities during elections.35 All opportunities to participate (including election meetings, rallies, door-to-door canvassing, collection and contribution of money, and distribution of leaflets and posters) are treated at par, although the degree of involvement in each activity can vary. The range for this index was as follows: no interest (0), some interest (14), and full interest (57). Those who said they had no interest or did not participate in any of the activities were categorized as having no interest. Those who had some interest included those who responded positively on at least four of the activities. The full interest category consisted of those who responded positively to more than five activities. A two-category sociability index was constructed using three questions regarding membership of political parties, religious/caste organizations, and other associations such as cooperatives, farmers associations, trade unions, welfare organizations, and cultural and sports organizations. I assume that membership involves certain conscious action, and therefore not knowing whether one is a member is equal to not being a member in the first place. Respondents who were not members of any organization were categorized as not sociable, while those who were members of at least one organization were considered to be sociable. The six-category media exposure index from low to high exposure was created by adding three components: newspaper, radio, and television. The frequency of reading, listening, or watching was the main consideration. While those who had no exposure had no connection whatsoever with any of the three sources of information, the very high exposure category had an almost daily link with the three media sources.

35. Ibid.

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 3 5

figure 1. Social and Political Opinion across Educational Levels

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Social Political No Opinion Non-Literate Social Political Social Political

Some Opinion Some School High School

Opinionated College

source: Based on author calculations from the NES 2004 data set, available at the CSDS Data Unit.

R E s U lts

The first part of this discussion focuses on the relationship between nonsubstantial responses and the socioeconomic characteristics of the population. I found that women as compared to men, dalits and adivasis as compared to other caste categories, and rural residents compared to urban populations were more likely to give non-substantial responses on both social and political questions. At the same time, the probability of women, dalits and adivasis, and the rural population having opinions on social questions was higher compared to political questions. Education is an enabling factor in multiple ways and a crucial factor in the model. As Figure 1 shows, non-substantial responses declined on both social and political questions as we moved from lower to higher education levels. Non-literate persons were more likely to have a social opinion than a political opinion. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that having some schooling was a threshold: non-substantial responses declined drastically on both social and political questions after this stage. Levels of income had a similar relationship with NoP and DK responses. People with lower incomes had higher non-substantial responses compared with those with higher incomes, on both social and political questions. People with low incomes were less likely to be politically opinionated, compared to being socially opinionated. Besides shedding light on the role of

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3 36 asia N s U r V E Y 5 2 : 2

figure 2. Social and Political Opinion across Levels of Political Interest

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Social Political No Opinion No-Interest source: Ibid. to Figure 1. Social Political Social Political

Some Opinion Some Interest Full Interest

Opinionated

key socioeconomic indicators, the analysis also revealed that non-substantial responses were correlated with attitudinal issues of sociability and political interest. The results showed that the more sociable among the population were more likely to be opinionated on both social and political questions. The probability of less sociable people having political opinions was less than the probability of them having a social opinion. Likewise, political interest was significantly related to opinion level. As can be seen in Figure 2, when we moved from no interest to full interest, the proportion of people being opinionated increased on both social and political questions. The analysis shows that those with lower levels of interest were more likely to be socially opinionated and relatively less likely to hold political opinions. The study also found that as media exposure increased, non-substantial responses declined for both social and political questions. As in the previous analyses, those with lower media exposure had lower levels of political opinions compared to social opinions. A closer examination reveals a systematic relationship between responses and population attributes. Non-substantial responses were clearly traced to certain sections of the population. Table 2 shows the Pearson correlations for the different variables in the study. There was a moderate to strong correlation between the political opinion dependent variable, and locality, gender, income, political interest, and sociability.

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table 2. Correlations
Caste Gender Income Interest Sociability Media Exposure Political Opinion Social Opinion

Locality

Education

Locality

PC .000 .000 24,638 .788** .000 24,638 .264** .000 27,110 .125** .000 27,110 .083** .000 26,844.597 24,846 .076** .000 26,845 .221** .000 27,110 .298** .000 26,845 .000 24,638 .464** .000 24,638 .342** .000 24,638 27,110 .184** .000 26,831 1.000 .406 27,109.927 27,110 .005 .406 27,110 .178** .000 26,845 26,845 .000 .037** 1.000 27,109.927 26,845 25,068 .000 .000 1.000 .037** .267** 26,845 25,068 27,110 .000 .000 .008 .005 .178** .027** .016** 26,831 26,610 24,827 26,831 26,831 .158** .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .243** .409** .218** .141** .522** 27,110 26,845 25,068 27,110 27,110 .077 .000 .559 .000 .000

1.000

.247**

.094**

.011

.300**

.004

.026**

.192**

.313**

.203** .000 24,638 .654** .000 24,638 .198** .000 24,638 .319** .000 24,638 .362** .000 24,638 (Continued)

Sig.

.000

27,109.927 26,831

Education PC

.247**

1.000

Sig.

.000

26,831

26,831.048

Caste

PC

.094**

.184**

Sig.

.000

.000

27,110

26,831

Gender

PC

.011

.243**

Sig.

.077

.000

27,110

26,831

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Income

PC

.300**

.409**

Sig.

.000

.000

26,845

26,610

table 2. (Continued)
Caste Gender Income Interest Sociability Media Exposure Political Opinion Social Opinion

Locality

Education

Interest .434** .000 24,638 .326** .000 24,638 .791** .000 27,109.927 24,638 .326** .000 24,638 .264** .000 24,638 .000 24,638 .791** .000 24,638 .802** .000 24,638 .916** .587** .000 24,638 1.000 .000 25,068 .016** .008 27,110 .158** .000 27,110 .264** .000 24,638 .198** .000 24,638 24,638 24,638 .000 .000 .319** .362** 24,638 24,638 24,638 .000 .000 .000 .464** .342** .434** 27,110 26,845 25,068 27,110 .000 .000 .000 .000 .221** .298** .307** .250** 27,110 26,845 25,068 27,109.927 27,110 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .125** .076** .295** 1.000 .250** 25,068 24,846 25,068.448 25,068 25,068 .000 .000 .000 .000

PC

.004

.218**

.027**

.267**

.083**

1.000

.295**

.307**

.587** .000 24,638 .264** .000 24,638 .802** .000 24,638 .916** .000

Sig.

.559

.000

25,068

24,827

Sociability PC

.026**

.141**

Sig.

.000

.000

27,110

26,831

Media PC exposure Sig.

.192**

.522**

.000

.000

27,110

26,831

Political PC opinion Sig.

.313**

.788**

.000

.000

24,638

24,638

24,637.932 24,638 1.000 24,637.932

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Social PC opinion Sig.

.203**

.654**

.000

.000

24,638

24,638

source: Ibid. to Figure 2. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 3 9

Similarly, there was a moderate to strong correlation between the social opinion dependent variable and gender, income, and political interest. There was only a weak to moderate correlation between the political opinion dependent variable and caste. Similarly, locality, caste, and sociability had a weak to moderate correlation with the social opinion dependent variable. At the same time, there was a strong to perfect correlation between educational status and media exposure, on one side, and the political opinion dependent variable. A similar correlation was seen between educational status and media exposure, and the social opinion dependent variable. There was moderate to strong correlation among income, media exposure, and educational status; between media exposure and political interest; and between income and educational status. There was a weak to moderate correlation among locality, gender, political interest, membership, and educational status; among caste, media exposure, and income; and between membership and political interest. The social and political dependent variable exhibits a strong to perfect correlation with each other. The correlation results between the different variables appear reasonable because they by and large exhibit the same relationship characteristics. Given that there are no perfect correlations, and only four high correlations between the independent variables, it is easy to distinguish the impact of each independent variable on the dependent variables. The analysis until now has shown that those who prefer to give nonsubstantial responses are not randomly distributed but can be traced to the socially and economically underprivileged sections of the population. The final test is a logit regression analysis, which attempts not only to find out which of the independent variables most influences non-substantial responses but also to quantify the relative importance of different variables. For this purpose, I collapse the dependent variables into two levels, NoP and opinionated. Political interest followed by media exposure and educational level had the greatest influence on the social opinion dependent variable. In the model, the higher the political interest, education level, and media exposure, the lower the chances of not having a social opinion. The regression results in Table 3 show that the contribution of income to the model was relatively modest. Locality, sociability, gender, and caste were statistically insignificant in the social opinion model. These results show that the bahujan are very likely to have social opinions.

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3 40 asia N s U r V E Y 5 2 : 2

table 3. Regression Results with Social and Political Opinion as Dependent Variables
Variables in the Equation B Step 1 Locality 0.011 Education 0.333 Caste 0.064 Gender 0.084 Income 0.11 Political 0.636 interest Sociability 0.032 Media 0.388 exposure Constant 1.034 Social Opinion S.E. 0.042 0.041 0.056 0.054 0.042 0.053 0.076 0.025 0.103 Sig. 0.797 0 0.248 0.122 0.009 0 0.678 0 0 B 0.172 0.439 0.163 0.357 0.033 0.147 0.255 0.229 0.972 Political Opinion S.E. 0.03 0.027 0.04 0.038 0.028 0.033 0.051 0.016 0.073 Sig. 0 0 0 0 0.238 0 0 0 0

source: Ibid. to Table 2. note: Dependent Variables: Social Opinion, Political Opinion; Threshold of Significance: statistically significant at 0.001 level or below; N = 27,110.

In sharp contrast, almost all the variables were statistically significant in the political opinion model except for income. Education, gender, membership, and media exposure were the greatest predictors for having a political opinion. Those with higher levels of education, males, sociable individuals, and those with greater media exposure were more likely to have a political opinion. The contributions of locality, caste, and political interest were relatively modest to the model. It may be inferred that the probability of the bahujan having political opinions is low. From the results it is clear that the bahujan are more likely to be socially rather than politically opinionated. The logit regression results reinforce this observation. Assessing who is more likely to give a non-substantial response on both political and social questions, we find solid results of likelihood: those with no political interest are more likely than those fully interested, as well as the non-sociable compared to the sociable, those with lower educations vs. those with higher educational levels, women compared to men, dalits and adivasis compared to other castes, those in rural areas compared to urban areas, those with lower levels of media exposure vs. those with higher levels, and those with lower income levels. The logit regression also shows that the difference in the degree of being opinionated varies only marginally among the higher categories in each

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 4 1

figure 3. Social and Political Opinion Compared

0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 Dalits + Adivasis and Others No Exposure and Very Low Exposure Female and Male Non-sociable and Sociable Village and Town Non-literate and Some School No Interest and Some Interest Poor and Low Income

Social Opinion
source: Ibid. to Table 3.

Political Opinion

independent variable when compared to the lowest category. Figure 3 highlights the widest spread between the different levels within an independent variable. This has always been between the lowest and the next higher category of the independent variable. For instance, opinion levels vary very little among towns, cities, and big cities, compared to their difference with the village level. Despite an identical trajectory, it was observed that within different categorieswhether locality, education, gender, or media exposurethe variation in the levels of social opinion is much less, compared with political opinion. For instance, social opinion levels within the education category are relatively similar compared to greater differences on political questions. The logit regression analysis brought out more distinctly the variation between social and political opinions. While social opinion levels are relatively comparable across different sectors of society, there is a sharp difference when it comes to the question of having an opinion on political issues.
P Ot E N tial A lt E r N ati V E Expla N ati O N s

At least two alternate explanations might undermine the assessment above. My main assumption was that information and the capacity to process it was the key to determining the level of non-substantial responses. The greater the access to information and higher the education level, the more likely that non-substantial responses would be low. The other assumption was that lower

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3 42 asia N s U r V E Y 5 2 : 2

levels of sociability and interest could also lead to higher non-substantial responses. What could undermine the hypothesis is when non-substantial responses represent a conscious and astute decision to remain ambiguous or to shade actual positions. Respondents could fear retribution for taking a particular stand, or have an opinion that is not socially and politically legitimate, and therefore not reveal their actual position. Although I have selected questions for analysis carefully to avoid this situation, the model will not be able to differentiate between these two potential positions. Another major factor that could also undermine the hypothesis is when nonsubstantial responses could be the result of the survey procedure itself. Issues such as the nature of questions posed, clarity and complexity of questions, language used, role of the interviewer, sampling frame, and so on may need careful scrutiny for better analysis. It must be mentioned that NES 2004 over represents two categories, males and rural areas, disproportionately to the census figures.36 Second, even though the issues selected were relatively simple, the survey procedure could impinge on the responses, and this has to be recognized while looking at the model. Nonetheless, these types of issues (unless specifically discussed) are outside the immediate purview of this analysis.
Disc U ssi O N a N D C O N cl U si O N s

This study attempted to ascertain whether the bahujan were opinionated, and willing to express social and political opinions. For this purpose, I analyzed NoP and DK responses on social and political questions in the NES 2004. The analysis revealed that those not having an opinion were not randomly distributed but could be traced to the socially and economically underprivileged sections of the population. On both social and political questions, marginalized sections of society such as women, dalits, and adivasis were more likely not to express an opinion, compared to males and other castes. Compared to the urban population, the rural population is more likely to give non-substantial responses. Similarly, people with lower levels of education were more likely to use the NoP and DK options compared to those with higher education levels. This study found that education of any kind made the biggest difference to the probability of being opinionated. The positive impact of education in
36. Lokniti Team, NES 2004, p. 5378.

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K A I L A S H / PA R A DOX O F DE M O C R AT I C U P S U R G E I N I ND I A 3 4 3

enhancing the likelihood of a substantive response is visible when those with some school education were compared with the non-literate. 37 In contrast, while higher levels of education after some basic schooling increased the probability of having a substantial opinion, it was relatively modest compared to the huge difference between some schooling and non-literate. The point is not that non-literate people lack political sensibilities. Rather, education appears to increase the ability of people to better understand and engage with politics. Knowing how to read also enhances the possibility of accessing different sources of information, which in turn could make citizens more discerning. Increasing both accessibility to and the quality of lower-level education could therefore play a key role in bringing substance to the democratic upsurge. Similarly, people with lower income levels were more likely to give NoP and DK responses compared with those with higher incomes. Yet, in the final analysis, the study found that it was education and not income that made a difference. Sociability and political interest were also significant factors that determined non-substantial responses. Disinterested and non-sociable respondents were more likely to be not-opinionated. The results also showed that females as compared to males, dalits and adivasis as compared to others, those with lower levels of education and income as compared to those with higher levels, people from rural areas as compared to urban areas, those with lower media exposure as compared to those with higher media exposure, those with lesser interest and involvement as compared to those with higher interest and involvement, and non-members as compared to members of civic organizations and political parties were more likely to have higher levels of social opinions than political opinions. In other words, the bahujan were more likely to be socially opinionated than politically opinionated. The study did not find question placement affecting non-substantial responses; NoP responses did not necessarily appear to increase toward the end of the questionnaire. Yet, it should be noted that this study does not capture non-substantial responses arising out of survey design and procedural complications; at the same time, it cannot distinguish between normal responses and non-substantial responses that mask conscious shading decisions. The literature survey, which was based on the experiences of Western countries, had shown that non-substantial responses could be systematically traced
37. The some school category in this study included those below primary (5th grade), primary pass, middle pass (8th grade), as well as those who failed the matric (10th grade). The non-literate category included all those who cannot read and write.

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3 44 asia N s U r V E Y 5 2 : 2

to particular sectors of society, including those with low levels of education and income, women as compared to men, and those with low levels of media exposure, interest, and information. The findings in this studythat the underprivileged have higher levels of non-substantial responsesdiffer little from analysis of non-substantial responses in surveys elsewhere. Thus, although Indias democratic experience and practice vary strongly from the dominant liberal democratic tradition, the actual position of the underprivileged does not seem to be very different. The bahujans increased participation has not changed their substantive position. This paradox of the democratic upsurge, where the bahujan express political preferences but do not articulate a coherent political opinion, may explain why the upsurge lacked substance. Political opinion is a key driver of politics, and when those participating choose not to express it, the politics can be captured or appropriated by others. Surveys may not be the best tool to capture the rich texture of activities that underlie an opinion including the processes, motivations, and context. Yet, given the absence of other studies that probe these finer details, opinions expressed in surveys are currently one legitimate basis for analyses. Critics may argue that it might be too much to expect the bahujan to express opinions in a survey context. While this may be true, there is no guarantee that bahujan members are expressing opinions outside of a survey context either. If this were the case, their participation should have made a substantial difference in their positions. It can be argued that the democratic upsurge should have resulted in extensive political change. After all, according to liberal democratic tradition, when a majority of marginalized and deprived citizens begin actively participating in politics, their preferences should be articulated in resultant public policies. Consequently, the upsurge should have brought about a state focused on removing existing disadvantages and deprivations, and brought about a structural transformation in the system. Economic redistributive policies, for instance, should have been implemented for a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. Demand for quality educational opportunities could have created new opportunities for access to work and income generation. However, this has not occurred in India. In fact, there have been no significant changes in the lives of the participants, despite a change in the social composition of legislatures and governments. This, I believe, may be the paradox of the democratic upsurge in India.

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appendix 1 table 1. Non-Substantial Responses across Different Questions (in %)

NoP/DK

Q. No.

Frame

q13a q13b q13c q13d

18.1 16.3 17.2 24.1 17.6 19.6 19.7 19.6 20.6 19.7 19.9 18.7

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q20a q20b q20c q20d q20e q20f q23 q27

Now, I will ask you to make a comparison between the Congress and the BJP. Tell me, on these issues, which of these two is better? For curbing corruption, which party is better? For good governance/administration, which party is better? For good leaders, which party is better? For eradicating terrorism, which party is better? . . . You tell me, in the last five years have the conditions regarding these issues improved or deteriorated? Curbing corruption . . . ? Security of the country/national security? Employment opportunities? Indias image in the world? Hindu-Muslim brotherhood? Development of the country? People have different opinions about democracy. . . . What is your opinion about it? Suppose there were no parties or assemblies and elections were not helddo you think that the government in this country can be run better?

q24a q24b q24c q24d

We should be loyal to our own region first and then to the country. One should vote in the same way ones caste/community votes. Compared to national parties, regional/local parties can provide better government in states. On the site of Babri Masjid, only Ram temple should be built.

14.8 12.7 30.8 22.9 (Continued)

appendix 1 table 1. (Continued)

NoP/DK

Q. No.

Frame

q24e q24f q24g q24h q24i q24j q24k

Making of the atomic bomb has not benefited the country. The needs and problems of Muslims have been neglected in India. Large states should be divided up, and smaller states should be created. Protecting the interests of the minorities is the responsibility of the government. Country should increase spending on the army even if it increases the burden on ordinary people. Those who are not well educated should not be allowed to contest elections. War is the only solution to the Indo-Pakistan problem.

35.6 31.1 30.2 24.6 24.3 13.8 23.1 14.9 23.1 30.3 31.1 12.3 12.6 19.2 8.7 15.4 17.3 8.2 30.4 (Continued)

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q30a q30b q30c q30d q30e q30f

There should be a ban on possessing land and property above a limit. The number of government employees should be reduced, as paying their salaries is costly for the country. The government factories and businesses should be sold/handed over to private companies. Foreign companies should not be allowed free trade in India. People themselves are responsible for their poverty, not the government. Government hospitals should offer better treatment even if it means charging high/costly fees.

q36a q36b q36c q36d q36e q36f

Every community should be allowed to have its own laws to govern marriage and property rights. Marriage of boys and girls from different religions should be banned. Seats should be reserved for women in Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha. There should not be caste-based reservations in jobs. Higher education is not good for women. In a democracy, it is appropriate that the opinions of the majority community should prevail.

appendix 1 table 1. (Continued)

NoP/DK

Q. No.

Frame

q36g q36h q36i q36j

Like men, women also have the right to work. There should be a legal ban on religious conversions. Marriage of boys and girls from different castes should be banned. Doing politics is not meant for women.

8 16.6 9.1 10.2

SOURCE:

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NOTE:

Based on author calculations from the NES 2004 data set, available at the CSDS Data Unit. For exact wording of the questionnaire, see survey instrument, NES 2004 post-poll survey questionnaire, available at <http://www.lokniti.org/pdfs_dataunit/NES%20 Series/13%20NES-2004%20%20All%20India%20Post%20Poll%20 (English).PDF>, accessed September 19, 2008. Additional Appendix 1 material is available directly from the author upon request: Table 2. Summary of Descriptives; Table 3. Cross-tabulation Results of Dependent Variable (Social Opinion) with Independent Variables; and Table 4. Cross-tabulation Results of Dependent Variable (Political Opinion) with Independent Variables.