764257

The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus Author(s): John Rawls Source: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No.
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THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

JOHN RAWLS*
CONSENSUSt
The aims of politicalphilosophy depend on the societyit addresses.In a one of its mostimportant constitutional aims is presenting a political democracy of justice that can not only providea sharedpublic basis forthe conception of political and socialinstitutions but also helpsensure from stability justification one generation to the next.Now a basis of justification that restson self-or alonecannotbe stable;sucha basis mustbe, I think, evenwhen group-interests constitutional a meremodus moderated on a vivendi, design, by skilful dependent fortuitous of What is needed is a regulative conjunction contingencies. political ofjusticethatcan articulate and order in a principled conception waythepolitical ideals and values of a democratic the aims the regime,therebyspecifying is to achieveand thelimits constitution it mustrespect. In addition, thispolitical needs to be such that there is some of its the of conception hope gaining support an overlapping that is, a consensusin whichit is affirmed consensus, the by opposing religious,philosophicaland moral doctrineslikely to thriveover in a moreor lessjust constitutional where thecriterion of generations democracy, that is itself. conception political justice In thefirst three features ofa political (Secs I-II) I review partofmydiscussion ofjusticeand notewhya conception withthese features is appropriate conception and socialconditions of a modemdemocratic and in giventhehistorical society, thecondition I shallrefer to as thefactofpluralism. The secondpart particular, I think we (Secs III-VII) takesup fourillustrative-but misplaced--objections are likely to haveto theidea ofan overlapping and to itscorollary that consensus, social unity in a democracy cannotreston a sharedconception of themeaning,
revision of a lecture tThis essay is a considerable in May as the Hart Lecturein givenat Oxford and Moral Philosophy for1986 underthetitle'PoliticalPhilosophy in a Democratic Jurisprudence idea of thelecture's Society'.The titlehas been changedto give a morespecific contents. It was a forme to be able to give thislecture in honour of Professor 1H.L. A. Hart from privilege whomI havelearned so much, bothfrom his workand his example, sincetheFall of 1952whenin Oxford I was first so fortunate as to be exposedto them.I shouldlike to thanktheMasterand Fellowsof me to give thelecture and forthegenerous University Collegeforinviting hospitality theyshowed me during to Derek Parfit fora number ofvaluablesuggestions mystayin Oxford.I am grateful and fordiscussionafterwards I shouldlike to thankRonald Dworkin, priorto the lecture, Allan Gibbard and Paul Seabright, and Professor Hart himself. Partsof the lecturewere also givenin at theUniversity ofSt. Andrews as theKnox Memorial April after whichI received Lecture, highly instructive written comments fromJohnHaldane, and at BedfordCollege,London University. to the United States I benefited Followingmy return fromnumerous valuable suggestions and criticisms from Cohen,Thomas Nagel,David Sachs and T. M. Scanlon.Burton Joshua Drebenhas beenofvery thebeginning. greathelpfrom *Professor ofPhilosophy, HarvardUniversity.
I @ Oxford University Press 1987 OxfordJournal of Legal Studies Vol.
7No.
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value and purposeof humanlife.This corollary does not imply, as one might thattherefore social unity mustrestsolelyon a convergence and of selfthink, or on thefortunate outcome of political It allowsfor group-interests, bargaining. the possibility of stablesocial unitysecuredby an overlapping on a consensus reasonable ofjustice.It is thisconception fora ofsocialunity political conception I wantto explain democratic anddefend. society several comments. When Hobbes addressedthe By way of background, contentious of his daybetween divisions theCrown, sects,andbetween religious and middle-classes, men's the basis of his appeal was self-interest: aristocracy ofdeathand their fear desire forthemeansofa commodious life. On thisbasishe obedienceto an existing effective soughtto justify (even if need be absolute) Hobbes not did think this form of sovereign. psychological egoismwas true;but he thought it was accurateenoughforhis purposes.The assumption was a to his views In a effect. one,adopted give political fragmented practical by society sectarian divisions and warring he saw no othercommon foothold for interests, political argument. How far Hobbes's perception of the situationwas accuratewe need not of three forin our case matters are different. We are thebeneficiaries consider, centuries of democratic and constitutional thought developing practice;and we can presume notonlysomepublicunderstanding to, of,but also someallegiance democratic institutions. This ideals and values as realizedin existing political on a political the idea of an overlapping consensus opens the way to elaborate ofjustice:sucha consensus, bothin itsobject as we shallsee,is moral conception andgrounds, from a consensus, and so is distinct founded solely inevitably fragile, on selfor group-interest, evenwhenordered The constitution.' by a well-framed idea of an overlapping enablesus to understand consensus how a constitutional characterized by the factof pluralism despiteits deep divisions, regime might, ofa reasonable achievestability and socialunity recognition political bythepublic of conception justice.
The thesisof the first and social part of my discussionis thatthe historical of a conception us to regard conditions of a modern democratic society require in a certain us to institutions way.Or rather, they require justiceforits political do so, ifsucha conception andconsistent withthelimits is to be bothpracticable
in liberalism, I refer to theHobbesianstrand I Occasionally by whichI meantheidea thatordered and constitutional design framedto guide self-(family-) libertyis best achieved by skilful to workforsocialpurposes devicessuchas balanceofpowers group-interests bytheuse ofvarious and thelike; it can be found in Montesquieu's SpiritofLaws (1748), Hume's essay'That Politics Number1o (1788), and in Kant's may be reducedto a Science'(1741), in Madison'sFederalist, 'PerpetualPeace' (1796). This strandbecomespurelyHobbesianto the extentthatit sees selfkind of as the only available, or the only politically relevant, (family-)and group-interests ofcourse, motivation; Hume,Madisonand Kantdid notholdthisview. Montesquieu,
JOHN RAWLS
ofdemocratic Whattheseconditions politics. are,andhowthey affect thefeatures of a practicable conception, I notein connection withthree features of a political ofjustice,two of whichI now describe, thethird forthenext leaving conception section. The firstfeatureof a politicalconception of justice is that,while such a is, of course,a moralconception, it is a moralconception worked out conception for a specifickind of subject, namely,for political,social and economic In particular, it is worked outto applyto whatwe maycallthe'basic institutions.2 structure' of a modernconstitutional (I shall use 'constitutional democracy. and 'democratic and similarphrasesinterchangeably.) democracy', regime', By thisstructure I meana society's mainpolitical, social and economic institutions, and how they fit intoone unified ofsocialcooperation. scheme The focus together of a political of is the of basic institutions framework and the conception justice and precepts standards thatapplyto them, as wellas how thosenorms principles, areexpressed in thecharacter and attitudes ofthemembers ofsociety whorealize its ideals. One mightsuppose that this first is alreadyimpliedby the feature of a political ofjustice:forifa conception does notapplyto meaning conception thebasic structure of society, it wouldnotbe a political at all. But I conception meanmorethanthis, forI think ofa political ofjusticeas a conception conception in thefirst framed for thespecialcase ofthebasic structure. solely instance3 The secondfeature the a political is not to be complements first: conception understood as a general and comprehensive moralconception thatappliesto the kindof case, order,as if this orderwas onlyanother political subject,another under that a of Thus, falling political conception justiceis different conception.4 from moral familiar for these are as general doctrines, many widelyunderstood and comprehensive views. Perfectionism and utilitarianism are clear examples, sincethe principles of perfection and utility are thought to applyto all kindsof fromthe conductof individuals and personal relations to the subjectsranging
In sayingthat a conception is moral I mean,amongotherthings, that its contentis givenby certain and standards; and thatthesenorms ideals,principles articulate certain values,in thiscase values. political instance' indicates thatwe are to focusfirst on thebasic structure. 3 The phrase'in thefirst Should we find a reasonably ofjusticeforthiscase, we can thentry to extend it to satisfactory conception further is therelations cases, ofwhichone ofthemostimportant between statesand thesystem of between them.I acceptKant's view in 'Perpetual Peace' thata worldstatewouldbe cooperation eitheran oppressiveautocracy, or continually disturbedby open or latentcivil wars between and peoples.Hence we wouldlookforprinciples to regulate a confederation ofstatesand regions to specify the powersof its severalmembers. We also need to clarify how theprinciples ofjustice within thestate.On this,see theremarks in 'The Basic Structure as Subject', applyto associations Secs II and IX, in Valuesand Morals,eds A. I. Goldmanand Jaegwon Kim (Reidel,1978). ofa moralconception as general whenit appliesto a widerangeofsubjects 4 I think ofappraisal (in thelimit of all subjectsuniversally), and as comprehensive whenit includes ofwhatis conceptions of value in humanlife,ideals of personalvirtueand character, and the like,thatare to inform much of our conduct(in the limitof our life as a whole). Many religiousand philosophical doctrines tendto be general and fully See also footnote comprehensive. 23 on p 14.
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ofsociety as a whole, andevento thelaw ofnations. as Theircontent organization doctrines is their to and institutions political specified by application political of social policy.Idealismand Marxismin their variousforms are also questions and comprehensive. a of general contrast, By political conception justiceinvolves, so faras possible, no prior commitment to anywider doctrine. It looksinitially to thebasicstructure andtries to elaborate a reasonable for that structure conception alone. Now one reasonforfocusing on a political forthe basic directly conception structure is that,as a practical no generaland comprehensive politicalmatter, viewcan provide a publicly basis fora political ofjustice.5 acceptable conception The social and historical of modern conditions democratic have their regimes the Reformation and the subsequent originsin the Wars of Religionfollowing of the principle of toleration, and in the growth of constitutional development and of large industrialmarket economies. These conditions government affect the requirements of a workable of justice: among profoundly conception other things,such a conceptionmust allow for a diversity of generaland and indeed doctrines,and for the pluralityof conflicting, comprehensive of the meaning, value and purpose of humanlife incommensurable, conceptions ofthegood') affirmed of (or whatI shallcall forshort 'conceptions bythecitizens democratic societies.6 This diversity of doctrines-thefactof pluralism--is not a merehistorical condition thatwill soon pass away; it is, I believe, a permanent of the feature of culture modern democracies. Under the and social conditions public political secured and liberties associated theseregimes, with bythebasic rights historically the diversity of views will persistand may increase.A public and workable on a single and comprehensive couldbe maintained agreement general conception the use of state Since we are concerned withsecuring onlyby oppressive power.'
basis I meana basis thatincludes and standards thatall ideals,principles 5 By a publicly acceptable members of society can not onlyaffirm but also mutually one another. A public before recognize basis involves,then, the public recognition of certain principlesas regulativeof political and as expressing valuesthattheconstitution is to be framed to realize. institutions, political 6 It is a disputed and in whatsenseconceptions ofthegood areincommensurable. questionwhether For our purposes is to be understood as a political an aspectofthe here,incommensurability fact, factof pluralism: the factthatthereis no availablepolitical as to how to namely, understanding commensurate theseconceptions forsettling ofpolitical questions justice. I give a fuller list of these social and historical withthe conditions, 7 For convenience, beginning threealreadymentioned above: (i) the fact of pluralism;(2) the fact of the permanence of on a singlecomprehensive institutions; pluralism, givendemocratic (3) the factthatagreement doctrine theoppressive use ofstatepower.Four additional ones are: (4) thefactthat presupposes an enduring and stabledemocratic one not dividedintocontending and hostile factions regime, and freely of at least its politically classes,mustbe willingly supported by a substantial majority activecitizens;(5) the factthata comprehensive if not universally, whenever doctrine, widely, sharedin society, tendsto becomeoppressive and stifling; favourable (6) thefactthatreasonably conditions and thelike),whichmakedemocracy economic, (administrative, technological possible, of a society exist; and finally, witha democratic tradition (7) the factthatthe politicalculture
JOHN RAWLS
the stability of a constitutional and wish to achievefreeand willing regime, on a politicalconceptionof justice that establishesat least the agreement we mustfind thanthatof a constitutional basis of agreement another essentials, and comprehensive Andso, as thisalternative doctrine.8 basis,we lookfor general a politicalconceptionof justice that mightbe supported by an overlapping consensus. assumethatan overlapping We do not,of course, is alwayspossible, consensus society.It is often given the doctrines currently existingin any democratic obviousthatit is not,not at leastuntilfirmly in fundamental heldbeliefs change consensuson a political ways.' But the point of the idea of an overlapping is to show how, despitea diversity of doctrines, on a conception convergence of justice may be achievedand social unitysustainedin politicalconception thatis,overtimefrom to thenext. one generation equilibrium, long-run
II
ofa political So farI havenotedtwofeatures ofjustice:first, thatit is conception framed to the to basic structure of and that it is second, expressly apply society: from notto be seenas derived doctrine. and anygeneral comprehensive of thesefeatures are clear.Yet it maybe useful to Perhapsthe consequences For them. while no one a that survey any longersupposes practicable political for a constitutional conception regimecan rest on a shareddevotionto the Catholicor the Protestant Faith,or to any otherreligious view,it may stillbe that and and moral doctrines thought general comprehensive philosophical might servein thisrole.The secondfeature deniesthisnotonly for and Hegel'sidealism and forteleological moral forms Marxism, views,as I have said,butalso for many of liberalism as well. While I believethat in fact any workable of conception mustindeedbe in an appropriate sense political justicefora democratic regime liberal-I come back to this question later-its liberalism will not be the liberalism ofKant orofJ.S. Mill,to taketwoprominent examples. Consider of why:thepublicroleof a mutually recognized political conception a pointofviewfrom whichall citizens can examine before one justiceis to specify
containscertainfundamental intuitive ideas fromwhich it is possibleto work up a implicitly ofjusticesuitable fora constitutional whenwe political conception (This last is important regime. a politicalconception characterize ofjusticein thenextsection.)We maythink of thefirst six of thesesevenconditions as known from our sharedhistory and sense,thatis, as known by common theevident and aspectsofour political features culture and present circumstances. to They belong what we might refer to as the commonsense politicalsociology of democratic societies.When a politicalconception ofjustice,we mustbear in mindthatit mustbe workable and elaborating in a society in whichthefirst six conditions obtain. practicable 8 Here I assume that free and willing agreementis agreement endorsedby our considered convictions on due reflection, or in what I have elsewhere called 'reflective See A equilibrium'. Theory ofJustice, pp 19ff, 48ff. 9 Ilow thesebeliefs might changeis discussedlaterin Secs VI-VII.
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another or nottheir whether arejust. It enablesthemto do institutions political thisby citingwhat are recognized reasons them as valid and sufficient among out of that singled by conception itself.'oQuestions politicaljustice can be ormore discussed on thesamebasis by all citizens, whatever their socialposition, views. or aims or moral and their interests, particular philosophical religious, with in who is to others of addressed matters Justification disagree justice political and we that and it from some consensus: from therefore us, premises proceeds of a the others as for as or reasonable true, purpose reaching working recognize and ofpluralism, on thefundamentals ofpolitical agreement justice.Giventhefact given that justificationbegins from some consensus, no general and can assume the role of a publicly doctrine acceptablebasis of comprehensive political justice. theliberalisms with ofKant it is clearwhatis problematic Fromthisconclusion in moraldoctrines: and comprehensive and Mill. They are bothgeneral general in that they that theyapply to a wide rangeof subjects,and comprehensive and virtue idealsofpersonal ofwhatis ofvaluein human include life, conceptions as a whole.Here I have in and conduct our thought character thatare to inform it with the values of the and his connecting mind Kant's ideal of autonomy it withthe and his and Mill's ideal of individuality connecting Enlightenment, more thanthe far both valuesof modernity. These two liberalisms comprehend on and ideals in rest of freeinstitutions large part political."Their doctrines in a democratic shared even or perhaps values that are not generally, widely, ofjustice, conception publicbasis ofa political society. They arenota practicable Mill. of Kant and those besides ofmany liberalisms and I suspect thesameis true it is of ofa political feature Thus we cometo a third namely, conception justice, or and comprehensive in terms ofa general notformulated philosophical religious, ideasviewedas intuitive fundamental ofcertain butrather interms moral doctrine These ideas are used culture of a democratic latent in thepublicpolitical society. values.We assume its basic to articulate and orderin a principled political way thecontent ofdemocratic existsa tradition there thatin anysuchsociety thought, to citizensgenerally. familiar of which is at least intuitively Society'smain are seenas a oftheir forms withtheaccepted institutions, interpretation, together We supposethatthese ideas and principles. fundamental fund shared ofimplicitly ofjustice, which intoa political can be elaborated ideas and principles conception that this can Of consensus. ofan overlapping we hopecan gainthesupport course, of a be donecan be verified conception justice elaborating political byactually only
of the mutually and standards by the ideals,principles Io I suppose thesereasonsto be specified Thus political a moralconception. whichis, as notedearlier, conception, political acknowledged of a happyconvergence in terms to all citizenssimply of as justified institutions are not thought withthe is in contrast ofjustification and the like. This conception of self-or group-interest, it is foundin Rousseau's Social Contract of liberalthought; Hobbesian strandin the tradition rolein Hegel'sPhilosophy ofRight (1762) and playsa central (I82z). 'On Liberty' and forMill see especially (1859), Ch ix For Kant again see 'What is Enlightenment?' III, pars i-9.
JOHN RAWLS
It's also likely that the way in whichit could be thussupported. and exhibiting thefundof shared morethanone political conception maybe workedup from will then politicalideas; indeed,this is desirable,as these rival conceptions modified and deepenedby the and be gradually competeforcitizens'allegiance contest them. between evensketch ofa political Here I cannot, ofcourse, thedevelopment conception. I have But in orderto conveywhat is meant,I mightsay thatthe conception called'justiceas fairness' is a political of this elsewhere kind.12 It can conception withthefundamental as a fair be seenas starting intuitive idea ofpolitical society of socialcooperation between as free citizens and equal persons, system regarded life. and as bornintothe societyin whichtheyare assumedto lead a complete described as havingcertain Citizensare further moralpowersthatwouldenable themto takepartin socialcooperation. The problem ofjusticeis thenunderstood as that of specifying the fairtermsof social cooperation betweencitizensso is thatby working out such ideas, whichI view as conceived.The conjecture in the public politicalculture, we can in due coursearriveat widely implicit ofpolitical acceptable justice." principles The detailsarenotimportant here.Whatis important is that, so faras possible, intuitive ideas are not takenforreligious, or these fundamental philosophical ideas. For example, whenit is said thatcitizens areregarded as free metaphysical in ways and equal persons,theirfreedom and equalityare to be understood in terms to thepublicpolitical culture and explicable ofthedesignand congenial ofitsbasic institutions. ofcitizens The conception as free andequal requirements in connection a is the which content of is, therefore, political conception, specified withsuch thingsas the basic rights of democratic The and liberties citizens."'
For thefullest see A Theory as a discussion, justiceas fairness ofJustice (197I). I have discussed in 'Justice as Fairness: Politicalnot Metaphysical', and Putblic politicalconception Philosophy of equalityis, I think, another Affairs,Summer 1985. Ronald I)workin's liberalconception ofjustice.See his A MatterofPrinciple Harvard exampleof a political conception (Cambridge, andjustice. Press,1986),theessaysin PartThreeon liberalism University These principles willexpressand give certain to familiar values such as liberty political weights I3 and equality,fairequalityof opportunity, and the efficient to servethe designof institutions commongood, and the like. But we can arriveat a politicalconception of justice in a very different values directly way, namely, by balancingthese competing againstone anotherand in the lightof theoverallbalance,or pattern, themto one another ofvalues eventually adjusting thatseemns of thiskindis suggested best to us. A procedure by Sir Isaiah Berlin;see forexample his essay 'Equality',in Concepts and Categories of starting (Oxford, i980), p ioo. The advantage withthefundamental intuitive idea of society as a fairsystem of social cooperation maybe that we do not simply in thelight balancevaluesdirectly ofan overall but see how thevalues pattern, and their at in theway theyare specified are arrived in oftheparties weights bythedeliberations the originalposition.Here I refer to the detailsof how justice as fairness is workedout. The hereis thatthesedetailsprovide a clearer ofhow weights thought conception maybe determined thanthe idea of balancingin thelight of an overallpattern. But perhapsthe idea of societyas a fairsystem of social cooperation itself as sucha pattern, in whichcase thetwo be regarded might couldcoincide. procedures Sec V. 14 On this,see 'PoliticalnotMetaphysical',
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ofjusticeto whichthisconception of citizens hope is thattheconception belongs ofcomprehensive to a widerange doctrines andhencesupported willbe acceptable consensus. byanoverlapping successin achieving and shouldemphasize, consensus But,as I have indicated and to so far as that be, requires possible, try independent political philosophy autonomousfrom other parts of philosophy, especiallyfrom philosophy's For giventhe aim of consensus, to and controversies. problems long-standing But as we shallsee (in Sec IV) we may otherwise wouldbe self-defeating. proceed theobjection notbe ableto do thisentirely to answer that claims whenwe attempt to religious, that aiming for consensus implies scepticismor indifference for thereason truth. ormoral Nevertheless, deeper questions avoiding philosophical a political vieweither remains. For as I havesaid above,we can present bystarting or we can start from from a general and comprehensive within doctrine, explicitly These ideasregarded as latent in thepublic culture. fundamental intuitive political even is significant two waysof proceeding are very and thisdifference different, own of our be assert certain we sometimes forced to aspects though may avoid to not be able So while we doctrine. comprehensive comprehensive may on theirmorespecific we do what we can to reducerelying doctrines entirely, must is: whatis theleastthat or their The question more features. details, disputed form? be asserted; andifitmust be asserted, whatis itsleastcontroversial a political of with connected companion Finally, conception justiceis an essential involves variouselements. A of freepublicreason.This conception conception of ofjusticeneedscertain one is this: crucial principles conception just as a political of tospecify itscontent, italsoneedscertain for thebasicstructure guidelines justice enquiryand publiclyrecognizedrules of assessing evidence to govern its those whether thereis no agreedway fordetermining Otherwise, application. ofparticular whatthey are satisfied, andfor institutions, require settling principles ofjusticeis worthless-not on a conception or in particular situations. Agreement matters. And on thesefurther at all-without agreement an effective agreement to than alternative there no better thefact ofpluralism, is,I think, practicable given available the and limitourselves to the sharedmethods to, of, publicknowledge ofsciencewhenthesearenot and conclusions common sense,and theprocedures that common allowsus It is theseshared methods andthis controversial. knowledge is ofthislimit As I shallstress lateron,theacceptance to speakofpublicreason.'" of claims to the or indifference not motivated comprehensive by scepticism for thisfact meansthatin a it springs thefactofpluralism, from doctrines; rather, in no other established reason free can be way.'6 effectively society pluralist public
Lect II, see A Theory Sec 34, and 'Kantian Constructivism', discussion, 15 For a fuller ofJustice, PP 535-543. is a are these:thefirst of theidea offreepublicreasoninjusticeas fairness I6 Two otherelements of everyone's (rational)advantage,or good, to be used as an conception publiclyrecognized in matters ofpolitical justice.This leads to an account comparisons agreedbasis ofinterpersonal
JOHN RAWLS III
ofmydiscussion to thesecond I nowturn up four (Secs III-VII) andtake part founded on an to be raised idea of social the unity likely against objections want I These a of on consensus objections political conceptionjustice. overlapping is most reasonable the I believe our can what torebut, for prevent accepting they themostobvious to us. I beginwithperhaps available basis of socialunity But vivendi. modus is a mere thatan overlapping consensus namely, objection, comments. several first explanatory is supported of I noted itmeans to saythat what a conception Earlier by justice itis supported It means that consensus. an overlapping including bya consensus over to thrive doctrines and moral theopposing likely philosophical religious, These of that in the conceptionjustice. effectively regulated by generations society incommensurable andindeed we assume toinvolve doctrines conflicting opposing ofhuman life of the value and (or meaning, purpose conceptions comprehensive view are no resources within the of there the and political to conceptions good), provided they conceptions. Theyareequally permissible conflicting judgethose Yetdespite the fact the ofpolitical the limits justice. imposed by principles respect insociety, there is no affirmed there areopposing that comprehensive conceptions Sincedifferent consensus exist. as tohowan overlapping premises may difficulty elements that theessential we simply leadto thesameconclusions, suppose may aretheorems, as it itsprinciples, ofthepolitical standards andideals, conception, or in the consensus intersect doctrines were,at whichthe comprehensive to indicate consensus case ofan overlapping To fixideasI shalluse a model to time. from time It contains return is meant; to this andI shall what example the political becauseits religious views: one view affirms three conception the oftoleration andunderwrite leadto a principle doctrine offaith andaccount the view affirms the of a constitutional second liberties fundamental regime; a the of liberal moral doctrine such as on basis political comprehensive conception as thethird the not those ofKantandMill;while supports political conception butrather as initself sufficient toexpress on anywider founded doctrine political favourable conditions that make a more orless values under thereasonably that, whatever other values justconstitutional democracy possible, normally outweigh about this that them. thefirst twoviews-the Observe only may example oppose of Kant or Mill-are generaland and the liberalism doctrine religious it does The political ofjustice itself is not;although comprehensive. conception it is for favourable holdthatunder conditions, normally reasonably adequate
of primary eds, Goods', in A. K. Sen and B. Williams, goods. See 'Social Unityand Primary and Beyond(CambridgeUniversity Utilitarianism Press, 1982),Secs I-V. The secondfurther whichrequiresthatthe principles of political element is the idea of publicity, justice and their of be publicly availableto all citizens, own terms) alongwiththeknowledge justification (in their are just or unjust.See 'Kantian Constructivism', Lect II, whether theirpoliticalinstitutions PP 535-543.
converge.
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ofpolitical assumesthatthetwo questions justice.Observealso thattheexample views with the of in this the comprehensive agree judgments political conception respect. To begin with the objection:some will thinkthat even if an overlapping consensus shouldbe sufficiently on an founded stable,theidea of political unity must still of consensus be the since it abandons overlapping rejected, hope political and settles a mere instead fora publicunderstanding thatis at bottom community modusvivendi.To thisobjection, we say thatthehope of political community mustindeedbe abandoned, ifby such a community we mean a political society unitedin affirming is a generaland comprehensive This possibility doctrine. excluded fact of the of the the use with by pluralism together rejection oppressive ofstatepowerto overcome alternative it. I believethere is no practicable superior to the stablepolitical secured consensus on a reasonable unity by an overlapping politicalconceptionof justice. Hence the substantive questionconcernsthe of features affect social such a how these features and consensus significant concordand the moral qualityof public life. I turnto why an overlapping consensus is nota mere modus vivendi.'7 A typical a treaty between use of thephrase'modusvivendi'is to characterize a two stateswhosenationalaims and interests put themat odds. In negotiating each statewould be wise and prudent to make sure thatthe agreement treaty of andconditions an equilibrium proposed represents point:thatis,thattheterms thatit is not thetreaty are drawnup in such a way thatit is publicknowledge will thenbe adheredto foreitherstate to violateit. The treaty advantageous its because doing so is regarded by each as in its nationalinterest, including Butingeneral in itsreputation honours treaties. bothstates interest as a statethat are readyto pursuetheir oftheother, and shouldconditions goalsat theexpense
is not all values of community is (recall that a community 17 Note that what is impracticable restson a comprehensive of the or society whoseunity as an association understood conception as fairness and its values. Justice assumes,as otherliberal good) but onlypolitical community not essential but realizable, are first in of the values that do views also, only community political of thebasic structure, lifewithin theframework and on their thatcarry thevariousassociations suchas churches ofnation-states, thatextend acrosstheboundaries secondin thoseassociations other thestateas a community Liberalism societies. and scientific because,among things, rejects denial of basic libertiesand to the oppressiveuse of the state's it leads to the systematic of (legal) force.I shouldadd that in the well-ordered societyof justice as fairness monopoly theaim ofpolitical citizenssharea common justice, aim,and one thathas highpriority: namely, and social institutions arejust, and of giving thatpolitical thatis, the aim of ensuring justiceto and wantforone another. It is nottrue, need forthemselves as whatcitizens personsgenerally, commonaims. Nor is it truethatthe then,thaton a liberalview citizenshave no fundamental as is aim of political 'identity', (usingtheterm partof theiridentity justiceis not an important to whichwe characterize the thebasic aims and projects now often done,to include byreference aim of political muchwantto be). But thiscommon kindof personwe very justicemustnotbe ofthislastpoint, see ofthegood. For a discussion for mistaken (whatI havecalled)a conception and PublicAffairs, Summer Criticsof Liberalism', 'Communitarian Philosophy AmyGutmann, 14. 1985,P 3' I, footnote
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II
thewayin which a treaty is a changethey maydo so. This background highlights meremodusvivendi.A similarbackground is present whenwe think of social consensusfoundedon self-or group-interests, or on the outcomeof political is social as on bargaining: unity only apparent its stabilityis contingent circumstances such as not to upset the fortunate of remaining convergence interests. consensus is quitedifferent from a modus Now, thatan overlapping vivendi is clearfrom our modelcase. In thatexample, notetwo aspects:first, theobjectof the politicalconception of justice,is itselfa moralconception. consensus, And on moralgrounds, thatis, it includes of society second,it is affirmed conceptions and of citizensas persons, as well as principles ofjustice,and an accountof the which those principles are embodiedin human cooperativevirtuesthrough in publiclife.An overlapping character and expressed is not consensus, therefore, a consensus certain on accepting or on complying withcertain authorities, merely of selfon a convergence or group-interests. institutional founded arrangements, affirm thepolitical as I have said,each viewsin theexample Allthree conception: as theshared and virtues content at which itsconcepts, their principles recognizes the political severalviews coincide.The factthatthosewho affirm conception from their own comprehensive start within different view,and hencebeginfrom premisesand grounds,does not make their affirmation any less religious, or moral, as thecase maybe. philosophical The preceding two aspects(moralobjectand moralgrounds) ofan overlapping consensus witha third that of connect that aspect, stability: is, thosewhoaffirm the politicalconception the variousviews supporting will not withdraw their of relative it should the of their view in increase and support strength society So become as the dominant. three views are affirmed and not eventually long the will still be in shifts of the revised, political conception supported regardless distribution of politicalpower.We mightsay: each view supports the political forits own sake,or on its own merits; and thetestforthisis whether conception theconsensus is stablewithrespect to changes in thedistribution ofpoweramong views.This feature ofstability a basic contrast between an overlapping highlights consensus and a modus vivendi, the stabilityof which does depend on and a balanceofrelative forces. happenstance This becomes clear once we changeour exampleand includethe views of Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth We no longerhave an century. on the consensus of At toleration. that timebothfaiths held overlapping principle thatit was the dutyof the rulerto upholdthe truereligion and to repress the and falsedoctrine. In thiscase theacceptance of theprinciple of spreadofheresy toleration wouldindeedbe a meremodus becauseifeither faith becomes vivendi, the principle of toleration will no longerbe followed. with dominant, Stability of powerno longerholds. So long as views held by respectto the distribution Catholics and Protestants in thesixteenth are very muchin theminority, century and are likely to remainso, theydo not significantly affect themoralqualityof
12
CONSENSUS
For the vast majority in society are publiclifeand the basis of social concord. confident of powerwillrangeoverand be widely thatthedistribution sharedby viewsin theconsensus thataffirm the political ofjusticeforits own conception sake.But shouldthissituation the moral of lifewillalso change, quality political in waysI assumeto be obviousandto require no comment. change The preceding remarks us to ask whichfamiliar ofjustice prompt conceptions can belongto a consensusstablewithrespect to the distribution of power.It seems that while some teleological can so belong,othersquite conceptions forexample, Or at leastthisseemsto be thecase cannot, utilitarianism."s possibly unless certainassumptions are made limiting the content of citizens'desires, or interests."Otherwisethereappears to be no assurancethat preferences, or suppressing thebasic liberties of somemaynotbe thebestwayto restricting maximize thetotal(or average)socialwelfare. in its various Since utilitarianism formsis a historically and continuing of prominent part of the tradition democratic we may hope thereare ways of construing or revising thought, utilitarian so thatit can support doctrine a conception ofjusticeappropriate for a even if it can do so onlyindirectly2o constitutional as a meansto the regime, welfare. Insofaras utilitarianism is likelyto persistin a well-ordered greatest the is consensus in that stableandsecure. case allthemore society, overlapping IV I turnto the second objectionto the idea of an overlapping consensuson a avoidance of of that the political conception justice: namely, general and or to a doctrines indifference as whether comprehensive implies scepticism of is true. This to that avoidance political conception justice mayappear suggest sucha conception oneforus evenwhenit is known be themostreasonable might notto be true, as iftruth weresimply it wouldbe fatal besidethepoint.In reply, to thepointofa political it to see as or indifferent to, about, conception sceptical or indifference muchless as in conflict withit. Such scepticism wouldput truth, in conflict and thus withnumerous doctrines, political comprehensive philosophy In following defeat from theoutset its aimofachieving an overlapping consensus. themethod of avoidance, to as we maycall it, we try, so faras we can,neither
18 Here I meantheviewof Bentham, and Sidgwick, and of suchcontemporary writers Edgeworth as R. B. Brandtin A Theory 1979), R. M. Hare in Moral of the Good and theRight(Oxford, For and Against(Cambridge, (Oxford,198i), and J. J. C. Smartin Utilitarianism: Thinking are not the same but have distinctfeatures;and these and interests 19 Desires, preferences 1973). differences ofutilitarianism versions partin different espousedby thewriters playan important I believe, mentioned in the previous footnote. thatthegeneralpointin thetextholds however, againstall theseversions. For a clearaccount of J.S. hererefers to indirect so-called. The adverb utilitarianism 'indirectly' thisdoctrine, Mill's view as exemplifying A Defence see JohnGray,Mill on Liberty: (London, I983).
20
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assertnorto denyanyreligious, or moral associated views,or their philosophical accountsof truth and the statusof values. Since we assumeeach philosophical citizento affirm some such view or other, we hope to makeit possibleforall to from the standpoint of as true,or as reasonable, acceptthe politicalconception itmaybe.2' their owncomprehensive view,whatever of justiceneed be no more then,a politicalconception understood, Properly of toleration, indifferent, suitably say, to truthin moralsthan the principle to truth needbe indifferent We simply in religion. understood, applytheprinciple to philosophy itself.In this way we hope to avoid philosophy's of toleration oftruth aboutthenature controversies, long-standing amongthemcontroversies and subjectivism. Sincewe seek and thestatusof valuesas expressed by realism in matters an agreedbasis of public ofjustice,and sinceno political justification on those disputedquestionscan reasonably be expected,we turn agreement intuitive thepublic insteadto the fundamental ideas we seem to sharethrough culture. We to from these ideas a of try develop politicalconception political our on reflection. as with with considered convictions due Just justicecongruent citizens situated in thoughtand beliefwithintheir comprehensive religion, of justice as true,or as reasonable, doctrines, regardthe politicalconception thecase maybe. whatever theseprotests, withthis:they Some maynotbe satisfied that, despite mayreply a political of must or indifference Otherwise scepticism. conception justice express and it could not lay aside fundamental moral questions religious, philosophical difficult or may proveintractable. Certain because theyare politically to settle, it may be said, concern so that differences about them truths, things important have to be fought that out,even shouldthismeancivilwar.To thiswe sayfirst, from thepolitical to so because speak, questionsare not removed solely agenda, we appealto a political are a sourceof conflict. ofjustice Rather, they conception thosequestions thatcan be reasonably to distinguish between from removed the politicalagenda and thosethatcannot,all the whileaimingforan overlapping consensus. Some questionsstillon the agenda willbe controversial, at least to somedegree; withpolitical thisis normal issues.
to see thattheview thatphilosophy in theclassicalsense as the searchfortruth 21 It is important moral ordercannot providethe shared basis for a political about a prior and independent ofjustice (assertedin 'Politicalnot Metaphysical', the conception p 230) does not presuppose controversial claim thatthereis no such order.The above paragraph makesclear metaphysical and sociological, and havenothing whyit does not.The reasonsI giveforthatviewarehistorical to do withmetaphysical doctrines about the statusofvalues.What I hold is thatwe mustdraw theobviouslessonsof our political sincetheReformation and the Wars ofReligion, and history of modern the development constitutional democracies. As I say in Sec I above,it is no longer reasonable and comprehensive to expectus to reachpoliticalagreement on a general doctrine as a way of reachingpoliticalagreement on constitutional essentials,unless,of course,we are to use theapparatus ofthestateas an instrument If we arenotprepared ofoppression. prepared to do that,we must,as a practical look forwhat I have called a political of matter, conception justice.
14
CONSENSUS
To illustrate: from within a political ofjusticelet'ssupposewe can conception account bothforequal liberty ofconscience, ofreligion off whichtakesthetruths thepolitical and the out and civilliberties, which agenda, equal political byruling serfdom and slavery takesthepossibility ofthoseinstitutions off theagenda.22 But controversial issuesinevitably remain: more for how to draw the example, exactly ofthebasic liberties boundaries whenthey 'the wall between conflict to set (where church and state');how to interpret of distributive therequirements justiceeven whenthere is considerable on the basic for structure; agreement general principles and finally, of nuclear These such as the use of cannot questions policy weapons. be removed from we But doctrines politics. tryto by avoidingcomprehensive as to have some and philosophy's controversies so bypassreligion profoundest a basis ofa stableoverlapping consensus. hopeofuncovering Nevertheless in affirming a political ofjustice we mayeventually conception have to assertat least certain (by no means aspectsof our own comprehensive doctrine.This necessarily fully comprehensive)23 religiousor philosophical someoneinsists, forexample, thatcertainquestionsare so happenswhenever fundamental The civil strife. that to ensuretheirbeing rightly settled justifies of or indeed thesalvation salvation ofthoseholding a particular religious religion, a whole people,may be said to dependon it. At this pointwe may have no alternative butto denythis,andto assert we hadhopedto avoid. thekind ofthing Buttheaspectsofourviewthatwe assertshould whatis necessary notgo beyond forthepolitical aimofconsensus. we mayassertin someform Thus,for example, thedoctrine of freereligious faith of conscience; thatsupports and equal liberty of for the existence a constitutional we that the concern given just regime, deny with We not state salvation that do more requires liberty. anything incompatible thequestfor ofourcomprehensive wouldadvance viewthanwe think consensus. The reasonforthis restraint as best we can, the limitsof free is to respect, earlierat the end of Sec II). Let's supposethatby publicreason (mentioned these limits we an overlapping succeedin reaching consensus on a respecting
22 To explain:whencertain thepolitical matters are takenoff agenda,theyare no longer regarded or otherplurality In regard to equal decisionby majority as propersubjectsforpolitical voting. of conscienceand rejection of slaveryand serfdom, this means that the equal basic liberty are takenas fixed, thatcoverthesematters settled once and forall. liberties in the constitution They are part of the public charterof a constitutional regimeand not a suitabletopic for as if theycan be changedat any time,one way or the on-going publicdebate and legislation, the moreestablished thesematters as other.Moreover, politicalpartieslikewiseacknowledge are takenoffthe political settled. Of course,thatcertainmatters agendadoes not meanthata ofjustice shouldnot explainwhythis is done. Indeed,as I note above,a politicalconception as taking ofbasic rights and liberties this.For thinking shoulddo precisely political conception thepolitical to Stephen Holmes. certain questionsoff agendaI am indebted ifit coversall recognized within valuesand virtues of a doctrine as fully 23 I think comprehensive when is onlypartially whereasa doctrine one rather articulated comprehensive system; precisely it comprises a number and is rather This of non-political values and virtues looselyarticulated. in Sec VI-VII limitedscope and loosenessturnsout to be important withregardto stability below.
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of politicaljustice. Some mightsay that reachingthis reflective conception is sufficient forregarding thatconception as true, or at grounds agreement itself rate But we refrain from this further it is step: highly probable. any unnecessary and may interfere with the practicalaim of finding an agreedpublic basis of The idea of an overlapping consensus leavesthisstepto be taken justification. by citizensindividually in accordancewith theirown generaland comprehensive views. In doing this a politicalconception of justice completesand extendsthe of thought thatbeganthree centuries movement ago withthegradualacceptance oftoleration oftheprinciple andled to thenon-confessional stateand equalliberty of conscience.This extensionis requiredfor an agreement on a political of the historical and social circumstances of a democratic conception justicegiven In this the full of democratic citizens connects witha way autonomy society. as itself of autonomous and of philosophy conception political independent general and comprehensive doctrines.In applyingthe principlesof tolerationto itselfit is leftto citizensindividually to resolveforthemselves the philosophy of and in morals accordance with the views questions religion, philosophy they affirm. freely
V
A third is thefollowing: evenifwe grant thatan overlapping consensus objection is nota modus it maybe said thata workable must be vivendi, political conception and comprehensive. Without sucha doctrine on hand,there is no way to general orderthe manyconflicts ofjusticethatarise in publiclife.The idea is thatthe and philosophical bases of thoseconflicts, themoregeneral deepertheconceptual and comprehensive thelevelofphilosophical reflection must be iftheir rootsareto be laid bare and an appropriate found.It is useless, the objection ordering to tryto workout a political ofjusticeexpressly concludes, forthe conception basic structure doctrine. Andas we havejust seen, apartfrom anycomprehensive we maybe forced to refer, at leastin someway,to sucha view.24 This objection is perfectly natural: we are indeed to askhowelsecould tempted theseconflicting claimsbe adjudicated. Yet partoftheanswer is found in thethird
to distinguish between viewsand viewswe think 24 It is essential ofas generaland comprehensive abstract. thefundamental Thus, whenjusticeas fairness intuitive idea ofsociety as a beginsfrom fair systemof cooperationand proceedsto elaboratethat idea, the resulting conceptionof It is abstract in thesameway thattheconception political justicemaybe said to be abstract. ofa or of generaleconomicequilibrium, is abstract:thatis, it singles market, perfectly competitive out, or focuseson, certainaspects of societyas especiallysignificant fromthe standpoint of theconception thatresults political justice and leaves othersaside. But whether itself is general and comprehensive, as I have used those terms, is a separatequestion.I believethe conflicts in the factof pluralism forcepoliticalphilosophy to present implicit ofjustice that conceptions are abstract, if it is to achieveits aims; but the same conflicts thoseconceptions from prevent andcomprehensive. beinggeneral
x6
CONSENSUS
a political ofjusticeregarded viewin ourmodelcase: namely, notas a conception doctrine but as in itself sufficient to express consequenceof a comprehensive whatever other valuesopposethem, valuesthatnormally at leastunder outweigh favourable conditions that make a constitutional the reasonably democracy of a just regimeis specified possible. Here the criterion by that political and thevaluesin question are seenfrom itsprinciples and standards, conception; and from its accountof the cooperative virtues of political justice,and thelike. Those who hold thisconception other viewsas well,viewsthat have,of course, valuesand virtues to other from differ citizens specify belonging partsoflife;they thetwoother viewsin ourexample ofan overlapping inhaving consensus holding no fully within whichtheysee doctrine (as opposedto partially)25 comprehensive values and virtuesas being ordered.They don't say such a doctrineis all but rather Theirconviction is that, impossible, practically speaking unnecessary. within the scope allowedby thebasic liberties and theother of a just provisions all citizenscan pursuetheir and properly constitution, way of lifeon fairterms its values. So long as thoseconstitutional are respect (non-public) guarantees no conflict of valuesis likely to arisethatwouldjustify their secure, theythink thepolitical as a whole,or on suchfundamental matters as opposing conception of or or and the like. basic civil liberties, liberty conscience, equalpolitical rights, Those holding thispartially it as follows. viewmight We comprehensive explain should notassumethatthere existreasonable andgenerally answers for acceptable all or even formanyquestionsof political be that asked. Rather, justice might we mustbe prepared to acceptthe factthatonlya few suchquestionscan be resolved.Politicalwisdomconsistsin identifying those few,and satisfactorily them the most we That must frame the of the institutions done, among urgent. basic structure so thatintractable conflicts are unlikely to arise; we must also thegeneral form and content of acceptthe need forclearand simpleprinciples, whichwe hopecan be publicly A political is a understood. at best but conception of framework deliberation which and reflection us reach guiding helps political on at leasttheconstitutional If it seemsto havecleared essentials. our agreement view and made our considered ifit has narrowed morecoherent; convictions the theconscientious convictions whoacceptthebasicideasofa ofthose gap between constitutional thenit has servedits practical Andthis regime, political purpose. remains trueeventhough we can'tfully ouragreement: we know that explain only thepolitical citizens who affirm and who havebeenraisedin and are conception, familiar with-the fundamental ideas of thepublicpolitical when find culture, that, ofdeliberation, so their theyadoptitsframework judgments converge sufficiently thatpolitical on thebasis ofmutual can be maintained. cooperation respect They view thepolitical as itself and maynotexpect, sufficient or conception normally think than that. need,greater they political understanding
vs partially see footnote between a doctrine's 23 in 25 For thedistinction beingfully comprehensive,
Sec IV.
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of justice But herewe are boundto ask: how can a political conception make that the favourable conditions under values that, reasonably express with values conflict whatever other outweigh normally democracy possible, them?One way is this. As I have said, the most reasonable political liberal. fora democratic ofjustice willbe,broadly speaking, regime conception the in the nextsection, thatit protects But this means,as I will explain it also includes and assignsthema specialpriority; familiar basic rights to in society havesufficient material means to ensure thatall persons measures a Faced withthefactof pluralism, makeeffective use of thosebasic rights. fromthe political liberalview removes issues, agendathe most divisive undermine must the contention aboutwhich and serious uncertainty pervasive basesofsocialcooperation. that make a constitutional The virtues of political regime cooperation of I mean,forexample, the virtues are, then, verygreatvirtues. possible and the virtueof and being ready to meet othershalfway, tolerance these with the When virtues reasonableness andthesenseoffairness. (together in sentiments are and of and modes thought involve) widespread society they ofjustice, constitute a very its political sustain they conception great public the values that conflict the with of Thus, political part society's good, capital.26 and its virtues be of may sustaining normally conception justice political conflict with thevery that conditions comeinto make because they outweighed a on of mutual fair socialcooperation possible footing respect. thepolitical valuesaremuch reduced when with conflicts Moreover, political an the so more themore is consensus, by overlapping conception supported For in thiscase thepolitical not is inclusive theconsensus. viewed conception with basicreligious, andmoral values. We avoid as incompatible philosophical ofthepolitical ofjustice theclaims to consider those against conception having of thisor thatcomprehensive valuesare view;norneedwe say thatpolitical thanother valuesand that'swhythelatter are moreimportant intrinsically thatis the kindof thing we hopeto avoid,and overridden. Indeed,saying consensus enables us to avoidit. an overlapping achieving To conclude:given the fact of pluralism, what does the work of and thusenables us to avoidreliance reconciliation on reason, public by free is two the and doctrines, first, general things: comprehensive identifying role of political valuesin expressing the terms fundamental of fairsocial consistent with mutual between citizens as free cooperation respect regarded andequal;and second, a inclusive fit concordant uncoveringsufficiently among in an overlapping andother values as displayed consensus. political
26 The term and familiar in thisconnection becausethesevirtues arebuiltup 'capital'is appropriate slowlyover time and dependnot onlyon existingpoliticaland social institutions (themselves as a whole and theirknowledge of the past. slowlybuiltup), but also on citizens'experience as it were,and mustbe constantly renewed Again,likecapital,thesevirtues depreciate, bybeing reaffirmed and actedfrom in thepresent.
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THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING VI
CONSENSUS
is consensus The last difficulty I shallconsider is thattheidea ofan overlapping forces social,or psychological utopian;thatis, thereare not sufficient political, either to bringabout an overlapping consensus (whenone does notexist),or to I renderone stable(should one exist). Here can onlytouchon this intricate come outline one way in whichsuch a consensus might questionand I merely about and its stability made secure.For thispurposeI use the idea of a liberal main to havethree thecontent of whichI stipulate of political justice, conception liberties basic of certain elements a first, specification rights, (notedpreviously): democratic constitutional from and opportunities regimes); (of thekindfamiliar to those rights,libertiesand of a special priority second, an assignment withrespectto the claimsof the generalgood and of opportunities, especially and values; third,measures assuringto all citizens adequate perfectionist andopportunities.27 basicliberties to make effective use oftheir means all-purpose historical events ofvarious as a result Now let's supposethatat a certain time, havecometo be accepted of a liberal and contingencies, theprinciples conception meet their as a mere modusvivendi,and that existingpoliticalinstitutions has come about,we may assume,in muchthe This acceptance requirements. came vivendi as a modus oftoleration oftheprinciple samewayas theacceptance as providing butnevertheless at first aboutfollowing theReformation: reluctantly, is Our question, civilstrife. theonlyalternative to endlessand destructive then, in initial the this: how mightit happenthat over generations acquiescence a into a stable and of justice as a modusvivendidevelops liberalconception in looseness I think a certain ? connection consensus In this enduring overlapping be their not as as well ourcomprehensive views, may beingfully comprehensive, case. to ourmodel To see this, let'sreturn particularly significant. doctrines is thattwo of the three One way in whichthatexampleis atypical of free doctrine a and were described as fully comprehensive,religious general of Kant or Mill. In these cases the liberalism faithand the comprehensive and to depend from was said to be derived of thepolitical conception acceptance does theallegiance in how far But doctrine. on the practice comprehensive solely a comprehensive from to a political actually dependon its derivation conception
must ofjusticeis this:(1) political of a liberalconception idea of thecontent authority 27 A fuller of thecommongood that includesthe good of every respectthe rule of law and a conception to and thisextends is to be guaranteed, of thought and freedom ofconscience citizen;(2) liberty of it does not violatethe principles of the good,provided one's conception theliberty to follow of the press and justice; (3) equal politicalrightsare to be assured,and in additionfreedom the idea of a loyal opposition; the rightto form (4) fair politicalparties,including assembly, choiceofoccupation are to be maintained and free ofopportunity againsta background equality meansso and (5) all citizensare to be assureda fairshareof material of diverseopportunities; liberties of theirequal basic rights, and can take advantage thattheyare suitably independent in different can be understood each of theseelements and fair ways,and so Plainly opportunities. mentioned at least thethree of themall as sharing thereare manyliberalisms. However,I think in thetext.
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RAWLS
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threecases: the For simplicity view? There are severalpossibilities. distinguish derived from the it is notderived is doctrine; comprehensive conception political is and last, the political from but is compatible withthatdoctrine; conception or even we have not In life it. with decided, usually thought incompatible everyday them wouldraisehighly muchabout,whichofthesecases hold.To decideamong Most issues; and it is notclearthatwe needto decideamongthem. complicated and moral doctrines are not seen them as fully people'sreligious, philosophical by and theseaspectsadmit ofvariations ofdegree. and comprehensive, There general is lots of slippage, so to speak,manywaysforthepolitical to cohere conception the views,and manyways within comprehensive looselywith those(partially) of justice to allow forthe pursuitof different limitsof a politicalconception doctrines. This suggests thatmanyifnotmostcitizens (partially) comprehensive theircommonpolitical come to affirm without seeingany particular conception one way or theother, betweenit and their otherviews.Hence it is connection, to affirm the the politicalconception and to appreciate possibleforthemfirst in a democratic Should an incompatibility society. publicgood it accomplishes and theirwiderdoctrines, betweenthe political laterbe recognized conception thanrejectthe rather or revise doctrines well these thentheymight adjust very political conception.28 At this point we ask: in virtueof what politicalvalues mighta liberal An allegiance ofjusticegain an allegiance to itself? to institutions and conception to the conceptionthat regulatesthemmay, of course,be based in part on or simply selfcustomand traditional on and group-interests, attitudes, long-term the desire to conform done. Widespread to what is expectedand normally forall citizensthe securing by institutions allegiancemay also be encouraged values included underwhat Hart calls the minimum of natural content political law. Butherewe areconcerned withthefurther bases ofallegiance bya generated liberal ofjustice.29 conception Now whena liberalconception basic political institutions, regulates effectively it meetsthree ofa stableconstitutional essential First, requirements regime. given the fact of pluralism-the fact that necessitates a liberalregimeas a modus vivendi in the firstplace--a liberal conceptionmeets the urgentpolitical to fix, onceand forall,thecontent ofbasicrights andliberties, andto requirement them this thoseguarantees takes offthe political assign Doing special priority. thecalculus of socialinterests, agendaand putsthem beyond thereby establishing
28 Note thathere we distinguish betweentheinitialallegiance to, or appreciation of,the political or revisionof comprehensive doctrinesto which that conceptionand the later adjustment or revisions leads wheninconsistencies arise. These adjustments we allegianceor appreciation may suppose to take place slowlyover time as the politicalconception shapes comprehensive viewsto coherewithit. For muchofthisapproach I am indebted to SamuelScheffler. 29 See the The Conceptof Law, (Oxford, i96I), pp 189-I95, forwhat Hart calls the minimum ofnatural content law. I assumethata liberal other familiar (as do many conception conceptions) includesthisminimum content;and so in the textI focuson the basis of the allegiancesuch a ofthedistinctive in virtue ofitsprinciples. content conception generates
20
CONSENSUS
and firmly theterms of socialcooperation on a footing ofmutual clearly respect. To regard thatcalculusas relevant in thesematters leavesthestatusand content of those rightsand libertiesstill unsettled; it subjectsthemto the shifting of time and place, and by greatly circumstances raisingthe stakesof political theinsecurity life. increases ofpublic andhostility Thus, controversy, dangerously the unwillingness to take these matters the deep offthe agenda perpetuates divisions in latentin society; it betrays a readiness to revive thoseantagonisms the hope of gaining a morefavourable should later circumstances position prove their the basic liberties and recognizing So, by contrast, propitious. securing of work on achieves the reconciliation and seals mutual priority acceptance a of footing equality. The secondrequirement is connected witha liberalconception's idea of free is that form It desirable the of a reason. public reasoning conception highly andreasonably reliable be seento be, correct shouldbe, and can publicly specifies in its own terms."3 A liberalconception triesto meetthesedesiderata in several ofjusticeit starts out a political conception ways.As we have seen,in working it detaches from ideas latentin the sharedpublicculture; fundamental intuitive and sectarian (non-public) comprehensive politicalvalues fromany particular ofpolitical to limit thatconception's and it tries doctrine; justice scopeto matters and its social policies).Further, (as we saw in Sec II) it (the basic structure ofjusticeis to no effect on a political that an agreement recognizes conception and rules for without of a companion on agreement guidelines publicenquiry be the fact these and evidence. Given of guidelines rulesmust assessing pluralism, and to the of available common reference to forms sense, by specified by reasoning The role of the procedures of sciencewhennot controversial. and conclusions the political in applying these shared methodsand this commonknowledge to of the freedom reason makes protection given speechand conception public; The of and it claims makes (as religion philosophy previously free. thought but as a condition out of scepticism or indifference, are notexcluded emphasized) basis for free reason. a shared ofestablishing public To A liberalconception's idea of publicreasonalso has a certain simplicity. were illustrate:even if general and comprehensive teleologicalconceptions of publicreasoning ofjustice,the form they acceptableas politicalconceptions For if the elaborate theoretical be would unworkable. specify politically calculationsinvolvedin applyingtheir principlesare publiclyadmittedin in applying forexample, whatis involved of political questions justice(consider, thehighly natureand the principle of utility to thebasic structure), speculative
concerned withwhether the meansthatwe are notat present 30 Here thephrase'in its own terms' conceptionin question is true,or reasonable(as the case may be), but with how easily its and reliably can be correctly understood and standards appliedin publicdiscussion. principles
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RAWLS
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enormouscomplexity of these calculationsare bound to make citizenswith interestshighly suspicious of one another's arguments.The conflicting information is veryhard if not impossible to obtain,and often theypresuppose thereare insuperable in reaching an objective and agreedassessment. problems even thoughwe thinkour arguments sincereand not self-serving Moreover, when we presentthem,we must considerwhat it is reasonableto expect othersto thinkwho stand to lose when our reasoningprevails.Arguments should,if possible,not onlybe soundbut such political supporting judgments that theycan be publicly seen to be sound.The maximthatjustice mustnot onlybe done, but be seen to be done,holds good not onlyin law but in free publicreason. The third metby a liberalconception is relatedto thepreceding requirement ones. The basic institutions such a and its conception enjoinedby conception, of free public reason-when effectively over working time-encourage the virtues of politicallife: the virtueof reasonableness and a sense of cooperative a spiritof compromise and a readinessto meetothershalfway, fairness, all of whichare connected with the willingness if not the desire to cooperatewith otherson political termsthat everyone can publiclyaccept consistent with mutualrespect.Politicalliberalism testsprinciples and ordersinstitutions with an eye to their influence on themoralqualityof publiclife, on thecivicvirtues and habits of mind theirpublic recognition tends to foster, and which are neededto sustaina stableconstitutional This requirement is related to regime. the precedingtwo in this way. When the termsof social cooperationare settledon a footingof mutualrespectby fixing once and for all the basic libertiesand opportunities with theirpriority, and when this fact itselfis thereis a tendency forthe essential publicly recognized, virtues to cooperative And this is further develop. conductof tendency strengthened by successful freepublic reason in arriving at what are regardedas just policies and fair understandings. The three requirements met by a liberal conceptionare evidentin the fundamental structural features of the publicworldit realizes, and in its effects on citizens' politicalcharacter, a characterthat takes the basic rightsand libertiesfor grantedand disciplinesits deliberations in accordancewith the guidelinesof free public reason. A politicalconception of justice (liberalor otherwise)specifiesthe formof a social world-a background framework withinwhich the lifeof associations, citizensproceeds. groupsand individual Inside that framework a workingconsensus may often be secured by a of selfor but to securestability convergence thatframework group-interests; mustbe honoured and seen as fixed itself affirmed by the political conception, on moralgrounds. The conjecture, then,is that as citizenscome to appreciate what a liberal does, theyacquire an allegianceto it, an allegiancethat becomes conception over time.They come to think stronger it both reasonableand wise forthem
22
THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
to confirm theirallegiance to its principles ofjustice as expressing values that, under the reasonablyfavourable conditionsthat make democracy possible, counterbalance whatevervalues may oppose them. With this an normally consensus is achieved. overlapping
VII
Now we are ready to draw on the precedingassumptions to answer once again the question: how might an overlapping consensus on a liberal conception of justice develop from its acceptance as a mere modus vivendi? Recall our assumption that the comprehensive doctrines of most people are not fully
of justice as a meremodusvivendichangesovertimeintoa stable conception is all we needto say in consensus. Thus theconclusion overlapping just reached Yet to make to the objection is utopian. thattheidea of such a consensus reply this conclusion someof moreplausible, I shallindicate, necessarily onlybriefly, ofhowpolitical themainassumptions thepreceding account allegiance underlying is generated. in what I shall call a reasonable contained First,thereare the assumptions of moralpsychology, that is, a psychology humanbeingsas capable of being thefollowing: Here I include in fairsocialcooperation. reasonable and engaging a capacityto have of the for besides a a (i) good, people conception capacity terms of fair of and fairness (which specify acquire conceptions justice that when believe as to act these and (2) require; they cooperation) conceptions institutions or socialpractices arejust,or fair (as theseconceptions specify), they have are readyand willing to do their they provided partin thosearrangements with willalso do their thatothers reasonable assurance part;(3) ifother persons strive to do their evident intention arrangements, peopletendto partinjustorfair becomes in them; (4) this trustand confidence developtrustand confidence is and morecomplete as thesuccessof shared cooperative arrangements stronger framed to secure sustained overa longer time;and also(5) as thebasicinstitutions and are morefirmly our fundamental interests (the basic rightsand liberties) recognized. willingly whatI havecalledthehistorical We mayalso supposethateveryone recognizes and societies: ofmodern democratic and socialconditions (i) thefactofpluralism can this the fact that as the as well fact of its (iii) pluralism be (ii) permanence, a control of state the use overcome (which power presupposes oppressive onlyby a common of the state no group possesses). These conditionsconstitute is (iv) thefactof But also seenas partof thiscommon predicament predicament. ofgains moderate and (v) thefactof there beingnumerous possibilities scarcity can be established on ifonlycooperation socialcooperation, from well-organized of thecircumstances characterize fair terms. Alltheseconditions and assumptions justice. political
I have just outlined how it may happen that an initial acquiescence in a liberal
JOHN RAWLS
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allows for andhowthis the ofan independent scope development comprehensive, to a liberal once how it works is This conception appreciated. allegiance in turn leads with in to evident intention act allegiance independent people accordance withliberalarrangements, sincetheyhave reasonable assurance that willalsocomply on pastexperience) others with them. So gradually (founded over ofpolitical as thesuccess citizens come tohave time, continues, cooperation inoneanother. trust andconfidence increasing ofliberal Notealsothat ofa thesuccess institutions comeas a discovery may new socialpossibility: the possibility of a reasonably harmonious and stable the successful Before and peaceful in of toleration pluralist society. practice societies with liberal institutions there was no wayofknowing ofthat political It can easilyseemmorenatural to believe, as thecenturies' possibility. long ofintolerance toconfirm, that social andconcord practice appeared unity requires on a general and comprehensive or moral agreement religious, philosophical Intolerance was accepted as a condition andstability."3 doctrine. ofsocialorder ofthat The weakening belief toclear thewayfor Andif liberal institutions. helps offree weaskhowthedoctrine it is faith with connected develop, perhaps might that it is difficult, ifnotimpossible, inthedamnation tobelieve ofthose thefact whom wehave onfair trust andconfidence. with terms with long cooperated To conclude: viewofourmodel thethird of case,seenas a liberal conception a meremodus to develop intoan vivendi justice, mayencourage eventually andcomprehensive. consensus itis notgeneral The because overlapping precisely of our comprehensive withthelooseness limited conception's scopetogether toitself it togainan initial andthereby to doctrines allows for allegiance leeway as conflicts a process thattakes arise, shapethosedoctrines accordingly place moral a reasonable overgenerations gradually (assuming psychology). Religions that come toaffirm a doctrine it and once to toleration offree rejected may accept the liberalisms of Kant and while viewed as suitable for faith; comprehensive Mill, for life bases and as a constitutional are non-public affirming possible regime, no of this as On an account longer conceptionsjustice. proposed political overlapping consensus is nota happy evenifaidedas it no doubt must be by coincidence, historical butis rather inpart ofsociety's thework tradition goodfortune, public ofpolitical thought.
VIII
on whatI havecalled liberalism. We I conclude briefly political bycommenting have seen thatthisview steers a coursebetween the Hobbesian strand in as a modus vivendi a of secured selfand liberalism-liberalism by convergence as coordinated and balanced constitutional group-interests by well-designed a liberalism founded ona comprehensive moral doctrine such arrangements-and
on thisin par 6 of'Liberty ofthePress' 31 Humeremarks (i741).
24
CONSENSUS
as thatof Kant or Mill. By itself, the former cannotsecurean enduring social Political liberalismis unity, the latter cannot gain sufficient agreement. in ourmodelcase ofan overlapping viewonce consensus represented bythethird we take the politicalconception in questionas liberal.So understood political liberalism is theview thatunderthereasonably thatmake favourable conditions constitutional of institutions theprinciples possible, democracy political satisfying a liberalconception of justice realize politicalvalues and ideals that normally whatever other valuesopposethem. outweigh Politicalliberalism mustdeal withtwo basic objections: of one is the charge and indifference, the otherthat it cannotgain sufficient to scepticism support assure compliance with its principles are of justice. Both of these objections answeredby finding a reasonableliberal conception of justice that can be For sucha consensus achieves consensus. supported by an overlapping compliance by a concordantfit between the political conception and general and of the verygreat doctrines withthe publicrecognition comprehensive together value of the political virtues. an overlapping But as we saw, successin finding consensus forces ofand to be, so faras possible, independent political philosophy autonomousfrom other parts of philosophy, from philosophy's especially and controversies. And this in turngives rise to the problems long-standing thatpolitical is sceptical of religious and philosophical liberalism truth, objection or indifferent to their ofa political to values.Butifwe relate thenature conception thefactof pluralism fora sharedbasis offree and withwhatis essential public thisobjection is seento be mistaken. We can also note(see theendofSec reason, from otherpartsof and autonomy IV) how political philosophy's independence with freedom and of connects the citizenship. autonomy democratic philosophy in a constitutional Some maythink thatto securestablesocialunity by regime looking for an overlappingconsensus detaches political philosophyfrom Yes and no: thepolitician, we say,looksto and makesit intopolitics. philosophy to the nextgeneration, the nextelection, the statesman and philosophy to the of indefinite future. sees the world as an Philosophy system political on-going in Political is over time, speaking. cooperation philosophy perpetuity practically as moral related to politics becauseit mustbe concerned, neednotbe, philosophy withpractical This has led us to outline, for how example, political possibilities.32 it is possibleforthedeepdivisions in a pluralistic to be reconciled society present a political ofjusticethatgradually overgenerations becomes through conception this concernwith practical consensus.Moreover, the focus of an overlapping to considerfundamental institutional compels politicalphilosophy possibility a moral of reasonable and the psychology. assumptions questions is notmerepolitics: in addressing culture it Thus political thepublic philosophy takes the longest view, looks to society's permanent historicaland social It hopes to uncover, and triesto mediatesociety's conditions, deepestconflicts.
on Rousseau: Autonomy remarks see theinstructive Cohen,'Reflections 32 On thispoint, byJoshua and PublicAffairs, and Democracy', Summer 1986,pp 296f. Philosophy
JOHN
RAWLS
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a sharedbasis of consensus on a political and to helpto articulate, of conception citizens' fundamental intuitive ideas about their and justicedrawing society upon theirplace in it. In exhibiting the possibility of an overlapping consensusin a tradition confronted witha democratic by thefactof pluralism, political society role the Kant to the defence of assumes philosophy gave philosophy generally: In our case thisbecomesthedefence of reasonable reasonable faith in the faith. ofa just constitutional realpossibility regime.

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The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus Author(s): John Rawls Source: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No.

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

JOHN RAWLS III

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING VI

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING

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