Evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and becomes the property of the case.

To be excluded, timely objection should be made. Objection to the testimony of a witness should be made as soon as the question is asked and before the answer is given. If the witness has begun to answer an improper question, he should be stopped immediately and the objection made. This is so because testimonial evidence is considered offered right after being given.4 If the question is proper but the answer is objectionable, e.g., for being hearsay, the remedy is to strike the answer off the record. The same remedy is available if the witness answers immediately, depriving opposing counsel of sufficient opportunity to object. Documents, on the other hand, should be objected to at the time they are being offered, not when they are merely being identified by a witness or marked as exhibits by counsel.6 Document have to be identified so that their authenticity can be established. The offer to documentary evidence is made after the witnesses have testified and just before a party rests his case. And the offer is made by disclosing the purpose for which a document is being presented. The ground for objection, whether for testimonial of documentary evidence, must be specified always. Once stated, the objection is good and effective only for that ground.

To the same class of evidence already objected to, repetition of the same objection is not necessary. It is the duty of the court to rule immediately on the objection. But if the court desires to study the matter further, it must rule at such time during the trial so as to give the parties an opportunity to meet the situation created by the ruling. After evidence is admitted, the court shall determine its weight while preparing the decision. Admitted evidence does not mean that it is significant or believable. It does not mean that it is entitled to weight automatically.

In Bustos vs. Lucero,* (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448), this Court cited with approval the following definitions of substantive law: Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J. 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions (36 C.J. 27; 52 C.J.S. 1026) There are several types of evidence that may be used in a court setting. Evidence can be direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is the items in a court case that can be seen or certain types of eyewitness testimony. Circumstantial evidence is usually a series of events or characterization that implies guilt. All the facts that are collected for a court case are tied together to help a judge or jury make a decision to convict or not to convict someone on trial. Direct evidence can be physical objects or testimony under oath that leads directly to the crime and person who committed it. This type of proof should point to the guilty person and should leave no doubt. It should prove the exact circumstances of the crime. Physical evidence is one type of direct evidence. This includes the items found by investigators at a crime scene. The physical signs tell the story of how the crime was believed to have happened. Some of the physical signs can be gathered right away. This can include broken glass, weapons, drugs, and other items left behind at the scene. Types of evidence Evidence is basically four types: Testimonial oral, is used to establish

foundation for other types of evidence Documentary mainly writings, but grown to include microfilm and computer data Real actual physical object Demonstrative presentation designed to clarify one of the preceding types of evidence

Trials need evidence . A trial is a legal proceeding built out of evidence. Everything that can be legitimately considered at the trial must be presented in the form of admissible evidence Evidence is the way the truth of the existence or nonexistence of facts are proved or disproved RememberProof is not evidence, it is the result of evidence heirarchy of evidentiary values All administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents. Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . ." 13 while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance . . . ." 14 Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order. the heirarchy of evidentiary values (from the highest to the lowest): 1. proof beyond reasonable doubt, or proof beyond the shadow of doubt 2.clear and convincing evidence 3. preponderance of evidence 4.substantial evidence Clear and convincing evidence Clear and convincing evidence is a higher level of burden of persuasion than a "Preponderance of the Evidence". It is employed intra-adjudicatively in Administrative Court determinations, as well as in civil and certain criminal procedure in the United States. For example, a prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief from capital punishment must prove his factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.[6] This standard is used in many types of equity cases, including paternity, PINS, juvenile delinquency, child custody, the probate of both wills and living wills, petitions to remove a person from life support ("right to die" cases),[7] and many similar cases. Clear and convincing proof means that the evidence presented by a party during the trial must be highly and substantially more probable to be true than not and the trier of fact must have a firm belief or conviction in its factuality. In this standard, a greater degree of believability must be met than the common standard of proof in civil actions, "Preponderance of the Evidence", which requires that the facts as a threshold be more likely than not to prove the issue for which they are asserted. This standard is also known as "Clear and Convincing Evidence"; "Clear, Convincing, and Satisfactory Evidence"; "Clear, Cognizant, and Convincing Evidence"; and "Clear, Unequivocal, Satisfactory, and Convincing Evidence", and is applied in cases or situations involving an equitable remedy or where a presumptive civil liberty interest exists. onus probandi The burden of proof (Latin: onus probandi) is the obligation to shift the accepted conclusion away from an oppositional opinion to one's own position.

The burden of proof is often associated with the Latin maxim semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit, the best translation of which seems to be: "the necessity of proof always lies with the person who lays charges."[1] He who does not carry the burden of proof carries the benefit of assumption, meaning he needs no evidence to support his claim. Fulfilling the burden of proof effectively captures the benefit of assumption, passing the burden of proof off to another party. WHAT IS THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED IN WRIT OF AMPARO APPLICATIONS? answer: The parties must establish their claims by substantial evidence. SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (25 September 2007) THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO Autoptic evidence is physical evidence that can be seen and inspected. Such evidences have probative value but do not play a direct role to prove or clarify the subject matter in question. Such evidences are ordinarily given to clarify a testimony. Explanatory notes, maps, charts, maps, and computer illustration given to support a testimony can be classified as autoptic evidence. It is also termed demonstrative evidence. Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.1

In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or suspension of Authority or License, no rule requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence as erroneously contended by pubic respondents. Clear and convincing proof is ". . . more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . ." 13 while substantial evidence ". . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance . . . ." 14 Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order. That the administrative determination of facts may result in the suspension or revocation of the authority of CPSI does not require a higher degree of proof. The proceedings are administrative, and the consequent imposition of suspension/revocation of Authority/License does not make the proceedings criminal. Moreover, the sanctions are administrative and, accordingly, their

infliction does not give rise to double jeopardy when a criminal action is instituted for the same act. Thus We held in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr. 15 . . . it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984].
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC. As we have already said, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The fact that respondent did not formally offer her exhibits the way she would in the courts of justice does not prevent the Board of Professional Teachers or Court of Appeals from admitting said exhibits and considering them in the resolution of the case. Under Section 5 of PRC Resolution No. 06-342 (A), Series of 2006, also known as the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulation Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, "technical errors in the admission of the evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of the parties shall not vitiate the proceedings." Here, we do not find any evidence that respondents failure to formally offer her exhibits substantially prejudiced petitioner Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal or trial-type hearing is not required. The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. In Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, substantial evidence is defined: In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.29 For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the administrative offense. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence.

In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.1 Administrative due process does not even require an actual hearing. The essence thereof is simply an opportunity to be heard. In this administrative case, respondent was amply given the opportunity to rebut the evidence of the complainant. xxx It needs to be stressed in this regard that in the instant proceeding, respondent is being held to account for serious misconduct or malfeasance in office in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The quantum of proof required to establish respondent's misconduct in the administrative complaint is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.2 There exists substantial evidence of respondent's misconduct thus prompting us in the challenged decision to concur with the Investigating Judge in holding that complainant was able to muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove her charge against respondent. We see no reason to disturb such findings. And even without such notice, we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that "under the Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 07), particularly Sec. 7, in relation to Sec. 4, while complainants in preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman actively participated therein, their participation is no longer accorded to them as a matter of right in the stage of the reinvestigation."26 In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.27 To repeat, it is well-settled that in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman, who, depending on his finding and considered evaluation of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it. The general rule is that administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of evidence. It can accept documents which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the Rules of Court are strictly observed. It can choose to give weight or disregard such evidence, depending on its trustworthiness.21 Here, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COA when it admitted the affidavits of Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr. and gave weight to them in the light of the other circumstances established by the records which will be shown later in the decision. It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.21 In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the non-presentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the said witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held that the contention was unavailing, stating that In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating that the petitioner therein could not argue that she had been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing Casimiro v. Tandog, 459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.22 The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies.23
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence. We disagree. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,7 in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.8 From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals9 teaches: Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads: Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10 As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxxx That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Edithas medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation. The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.11 Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology,14 include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations. Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.1awphil Section 3 of Rule 130 provides: 1. Best Evidence Rule Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence. Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and th e removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area. In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building."16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidenc e and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case. A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary.6 Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise.7 The essential profits that must be proven to that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine. The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: "1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted. 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."10 Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case. First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim11 against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute".12 Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.14 Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the

assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff. We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value because she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent. Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.16 Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an informal one. As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. xxx The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein. x x x27 (Italics supplied) Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence the checks. As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each others claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Mans Statute;28 besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them. The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads: The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each others favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased. Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied) Res inter alios acta, aliis nec nocet nec prodest (Latin for "a thing done between others does not harm or benefit others") is a law doctrine which holds that a contract cannot adversely affect the rights of one who is not a party to the contract. "Res inter alios" has a common meaning: "A matter between others is not our business."

EVIDENCE: "RES INTER ALIOS ACTA ALTERI NOCERE NON DEBET" RULE IN RELATION TO

THE RULE ON EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION

The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:

On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him (HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third Division, Corona, J.).

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration (emphasis supplied).

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

In Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, et. al., aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them (HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third Division, Corona, J.).
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.[32] Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused[33] and is considered as hearsay against them.[34] The reason for this rule is that:

on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are b inding upon himself, and are evidence

against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.[35] An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.[36] Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.[37] Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.[38]

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them. res inter alios acta /'rz-'in-tr-'-l-s-'ak-t, 'rs-'in-ter-'-l-s-'k-t/ n [Late Latin, literally, thing done among others]: something transacted between other parties This term is used in reference to matters not involving the same parties as those in litigation. Evidence of such matters is generally inadmissible.

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE The expression if fully expressed reads: res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet which literally means that things done to strangers ought not to injure those who are not parties to them (Blacks, 5th Ed., 1178). Branches The res inter alios acta rule has two branches, namely: (a) The rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission or another (Sec. 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court) (b) The rule that evidence of previous conduct or similar acts at one time is not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same act at another time (Sec. 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court). The first branch is a very simple and logical rule which holds that whatever one says or does or omits to do should only affect him but should not affect or prejudice others. In other words, both common reason and fairness demand that a mans actions and declarations should affect him alone and should not affect others. Thus, if X makes a statement before the media admitting his participation in a previous murder, his statement is admissible against him under Sec. 26 of Rule 130. The rest of his statement pointing to Y and Z as co-participants in the murder are not admissible against Y and Z under the first branch of the res inter alios acta rule in Sec. 28 of Rule 130. Under this rule, the statement of X should not affect or prejudice Y and Z. Rule refers to extrajudicial declaration The rule has reference to extrajudicial declarations. Hence, statements made in open court by a witness implicating persons aside from his own judicial admissions, are admissible as declarations from one who has personal knowledge of the facts testified to.

Exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule The first branch of the rule admits of certain exception, to wit: (a) admission by a co-partner or agent (Sec. 29, Rule 130); (b) admission by a co-conspirator (Sec. 30, Rule 130; and (c) admission by privies (Sec. 31, Rule 130). Note that all the exceptions to res inter alios acta require that the relationship be proven by evidence independent of the act or declaration sought to be admitted. Basis The basis for admitting the above admissions is that the person making the statements is under the same circumstances as the person against whom it is offered. Such circumstances give him substantially the same interest and the same motive to make a statement about certain matters (4 Wigmore Sec. 1080a, 140). Cases People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992) Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of an extra-judicial confession of another admitting his participation in the offense. Held: This is not a co-conspirators statement because there was no evidence of conspiracy independent of the extra-judicial confession. Furthermore, the confession was executed long after the supposed conspiracy had ended. Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and pointed to his co-accused, the testimony would have been admissible. In this case, what was presented was a merely his affidavit. People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) absent independent evidence of conspiracy, extra-judicial confession of the accused is not admissible against others People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996) extra-judicial confession of accused can not be used to implicate coaccused unless repeated in open court. People vs. Valero (1982) Facts: Michael and Annabel, children of Ceferino Velasco, died of poisoning after eating bread containing endrin, a commercial insecticide. Their sister Imelda would have also died if not for the timely medical assistance given to her. At about the same time, 3 puppies of Velasco under the balcony where the children ate the bread also died of poisoning. Earlier that morning, Velasco was seen throwing poisoned rats in the river near his house. The evidence of the prosecution shows that the poisoned bread was given to the children by Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, deaf-mute brother of accused Lucila Valero, and that it was Lucila who gave Alfonso the bread to be delivered to the children. Lucila denies the allegation. The evidence of the defense tends to show that the children might have eaten one of the sliced poisoned bread used by their father in poisoning the rats. 3/9 witnesses for the prosecution: 1. Rodolfo Quilang testified that he saw Lucila deliver something wrapped in a piece of paper to Alfonso and instructed him by sign language to deliver the same to the Velasco children. He never saw what was inside the piece of paper. His testimony as to WON he saw the parcel delivered to the children was a series of contradictions. He is what the defense counsel calls and eleventh-hour witness 2. Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco did not see Lucila deliver to Alfonso the alleged parcel, as well as the alleged instruction. Both claimed that they learned the information from Pipe after interviewing him by means of sign language. Testimony of Jaime was confusing. There is nothing in the testimony of Velasco indicating that Alfonso pointed to Lucila as the source of the poisoned bread. Issue: WON the testimonies of Jaime and Velasco may be admitted Held: No. The evidence is pure hearsay. It violates the principle of res inter alios acta. Alfonso, who was the source of the information, was never presented as a witness either for the defense or the prosecution. Testimony of Velasco cannot be considered as part of res gestae because when the information was allegedly obtained by Velasco from Alfonso, nobody was poisoned yet. With regard to the testimony of Jaime, there is no showing that

the revelation was made by Alfonso under the influence of a startling occurrence. The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence does not give such evidence probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of an offense and decide to commit it. Although the facts may show a unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective, essential however is an agreement to commit the crime and a decision to commit it. 9 Only recently we emphasized the rule that: Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 10 Where a party is denied the right to introduce evidence because that evidence would be inflammatory, hearsay, or would lack sufficient authentication, that party must make a proffer of what the evidence would have shown in order to preserve the issue for appeal. The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,[47] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original.[48] Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.[49] Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper

anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence. Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42]

In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T 62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836). A de bene esse deposition is used to preserve the testimony of a witness who is expected not to be available to appear at trial and be cross-examined. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13 To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16 Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18 At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus: Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.4 Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.6 IS NARRATIVE TESTIMONY PROHIBITED IN COURT TRIAL? Usually in criminal cases, the material facts within the knowledge of a witness are elicited by questions put to him by the counsel calling him. By this means, the evidence is readily limited and confined within the issue for the reason that the relevancy of the answer can in most cases be ascertained from the character of the question (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 387, p. 742). While this is the general rule, it still rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a witness will be required to testify by question and answer, or will be permitted to testify in a narrative form (98 C.J.S., Sec. 325, p. 26). There is no legal principle which

prevents a witness from giving his testimony in a narrative form if he is requested to do so by counsel. A witness may be allowed to testify by narration if it would be the best way of getting at what he knew or could state concerning the matter at issue. It would expedite the trial and would perhaps furnish the court a clearer understanding of the matters related as they occurred. Moreover, narrative testimony may be allowed if material parts of his evidence cannot be easily obtained through piecemeal testimonies. But if, in giving such testimony, the witness states matters irrelevant or immaterial or incompetent, it is the right and duty of counsel objecting to such testimony to interpose and arrest the narration by calling the attention of the court particularly to the objectionable matter and, by a motion to strike it out, obtain a ruling of the court excluding such testimony from the case (98 C.J.S., Ibid.). While a witness may be permitted in the discretion of the court to narrate his knowledge of material facts bearing upon the case without specifically being interrogated in detail, it is also within the discretion of the court to prohibit a witness from volunteering unsought information in connection with the case (5 Jones on Evidence, Sec. 2312).

Which should prevail the affidavit or the oral testimony in court? The contradiction between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness may be explained by the fact that an affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated. As an affidavit is taken ex-parte, it is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject. It has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed when the affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Moreover, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him.1

Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or define the subject matter of a writing, it must first be shown that the writing itself already contains a description sufficient to serve as a foundation for the admission of such parol evidence; the evidence should also be consistent with the writing. Otherwise stated, in order to admit parol evidence to aid in the description of the subject matter of a deed or other writing, there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such evidence; the writing must at least give some data from which the description may be found and made certain. Parol evidence is not admissible to identify the property where the description thereof is so vague as to amount to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description, but only to apply it. 26 In his Commentary on the Rules of Court, 27 former Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran explains the rule in the evident of patent ambiguity, as is the case in Exhibit "3": . . . The rule is that "if the words of a document are so defective or ambiguous as to be unmeaning, no evidence can be given to show what the author of the document intended to say." (Steph, Evidence, Art. 91) The reason for the rule, in the language of Mr. Justice Story, is that "if the language be too doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission of parol evidence you create and do not merely construe the contract. You attempt to do that for the party which he has not chosen to do for himself; and the law very property denies such an authority to courts of Justice." (Peisch v. Dickson, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 911, 1 Mason, 9.) As Lord Bacon said, "Ambiguitas patens cannot be holpen by averment." (Bacon, Max., 23) A case of patent ambiguity is that of a deed wherein "a parcel of land" without description is donated. The donation is void. The uncertainty cannot be explained by parol evidence. (Wigmore on Evidence, 2d. ed., p. 414.) The following appears to be the most accurate and most comprehensive statement of the rule regarding patent ambiguity: "In other words and more generally, if the court, placing itself in the situation in which the testator or contracting party stood at the time of executing the instrument, and with a full understanding of the force and import of the words, cannot ascertain his meaning and intention from the language of the instrument, then it is a case of incurable, hopeless uncertainty and the instrument is, therefore, so far inoperative and void." (Palmer v. Albee, 50 Ia., 429, 432, quoting 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, par. 300.) As to Exhibit "4", We agree with the trial court that it could not have been prepared in 1935, as contended by private respondent, because it makes reference to Tax Declarations issued in 1948, thirteen (13) years later. Common sense and logic reject such contention. Unfortunately, the respondent Court belabored the explanation that Exhibit "4" must have been executed on or before 1948 to confirm the prior sale. This is unacceptable as it is purely conjectural. Absent any evidence that it was signed by Elpidio Borillo, it is not difficult to conclude that this document does not proceed from any legitimate source. It is one which could easily be fabricated. The trial court did not then err when it considered Exhibit "4" as "wholly unworthy and undeserving of any credence."

[French, The country; the neighborhood.] A trial per pais denotes a trial by the country; that is, trial by jury. An Estoppel in pais means that a party is prevented by his or her own conduct from obtaining the enforcement of a right which would operate to the detriment of another who justifiably relied on such conduct. This type of estoppel differs from an estoppel by deed or by record which, as a result of the language set out in a document, bars the enforcement of a claim against a party who acted in reliance upon those written terms. Estoppel is essentially a rule of evidence[3] whereby a person is barred from denying the truth of a fact that has already been settled. Where a court finds that a party has done something warranting a form of estoppel, that party is said to be "estopped" from making certain related arguments or claiming certain related rights. The defendant is said to be "estopped" from presenting the related defence, or the plaintiff is said to be "estopped" from making the related argument against the defendant. Lord Coke stated, "It is called an estoppel or conclusion, because a man's own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth."[4] The plea of estoppel is closely connected with the plea of waiver, the object of both being to ensure bona fides in day to day transactions. [5] Because estoppel is so factually dependent, it is perhaps best understood by considering specific examples. Example 1: A city entered into a contract with another party. The contract stated that it had been reviewed by the city's counsel and that the contract was proper. Estoppel applied to estop the city from claiming the contract was invalid.[6] Example 2: A creditor unofficially informs a debtor that the creditor forgives the debt between them. Even if such forgiveness is not formally documented, the creditor may be estopped from changing its mind and seeking to collect the debt, because that change would be unfair. Example 3: A landlord informs a tenant that rent has been reduced, for example, because there was construction or a lapse in utility services. If the tenant relies on this statement in choosing to remain in the premises, the landlord could be estopped from collecting the full rent. Estoppel is closely related to the doctrines of waiver, variation, and election and is applied in many areas of law, including insurance, banking, employment, contracts, etc. In English law, the concept of legitimate expectation in the realm of administrative law and judicial review is estoppel's counterpart in public law, although subtle but important differences exist. Promissory estoppel is often applied where there is an agreement without a consideration, or the consideration is future based; as a promise. When applied in defense by a defendant it may be called a 'shield', and where applied by a plaintiff it may be called a 'sword'.[7][8] It is most commonly used as a 'shield',[9] with some commentators stating that it can only be used as a shield, although this varies with jurisdictions.[10] Major types The main species of estoppel under English, Australian, and American laws are: Reliance-based estoppels: These involve one party relying on something the other party has done or said. The party who performed/spoke is the one who is estopped. Under English law, this class includes estoppel by representation of fact, promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel (see Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 16(2), 2003). Although some authorities have used language to suggest reliance-based estoppels are mere rules of evidence, they are rules of substantive law. Estoppel by representation of fact (English law name), equitable estoppel (American law) Equitable estoppel (in English law), including Proprietary estoppel Promissory estoppel Estoppel by record: This frequently arises as issue/cause of action estoppel or judicial estoppel where the orders or judgments made in previous legal proceedings prevent the parties from relitigating the same issues or causes of action, Estoppel by deed (often regarded as technical or formal estoppels) Where rules of evidence prevent a litigant from denying the truth of what was said or done Estoppel by silence or acquiescence: Estoppel that prevents a person from asserting something when he had the right and opportunity to do so earlier, and such silence put another person at a disadvantage. Laches: estoppel in equity by delay. Laches has been considered both a reliance-based estoppel, and a sui generis estoppel. Estoppel In Pais The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. (Hanopol v. Shoemart, Inc., G.R. No. 137774, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 439; Phil. Realty Holdings Corp. v. Firematic Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 156251, April 27, 2007, Callejo, J).

In discrediting the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness, accused- appellant points out that because Silvestre Sanggalan has had no formal schooling in a special school for deaf-mutes, the possibility that resort to conjectures and surmises, brought about by overzealousness to understand what his witness really wanted to say could not be discounted. Thus, accused-appellant cites certain portions of Sanggalan's testimony which appeared unclear, e.g., the witness admitted that the place where the incident happened was "very dark", and he was inconsistent as to who, between Adel Tuangco or Jun Tatoo, was the first to rape the victim. Thus, his handicap prevented a truthful narration of what really transpired. The Solicitor General prays for an affirmance of the decision in all respects. He asserts that a deaf-mute is qualified to testify, and the interpreter explained that through sign language, Sanggalan demonstrated how Eugenio was raped and thereafter killed by appellants and Pineda, Jr. It is claimed that the inconsistencies pointed out are minor and do not detract from the positive identification made by witness Sanggalan of the accusedappellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her personal effects. The POEA Administrator, in finding petitioners liable to private respondent for medical benefits accruing to the latter under the Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia, took judicial notice of the said law. To this extent, the POEA Administrator's actuations are legally defensible. We have earlier ruled in Norse Management Co. (PTE) vs. National Seamen Board 12 that evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which a mere quasi-judicial body is not strict about. Although in a long line of cases, we have ruled that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, in order to be recognized and applied in a particular controversy involving conflicts of laws, jurisprudence on this matter was not meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies in the light of the well-settled rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. 13 Nonetheless, only to this extent were the acts of the POEA Administrator amply supported by the law. Her actual application thereof, however, is starkly erroneous. The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. 14 That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar. Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. 15 The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his coaccused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 16 In their first assignment, appellants assail the admission in evidence over the objection of the appellant of Exhibit "3". This exhibit is a decision in favor of the defendant-appellee against herein plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura, by the council of Barrio of San Pascual, Tuba, Benguet, in its Administrative Case No. 4, for the settlement of ownership and possession of the land. The decision is ultra vires because barrio councils, which are not courts, have no judicial powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution; see Sec. 12, Rep. Act 2370, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter). Therefore, as contended by appellants, the exhibit is not admissible in a judicial proceeding as evidence for ascertaining the truth respecting the fact of ownership and possession (Sec. 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court).

burden of proof required in writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (25 September 2007) THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order: a. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party; b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or c. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established herein. SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge. When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately. SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following: a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner; b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; c. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and f. The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance. SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to

make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following: a. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission; b. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; c. All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and d. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken: i. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; iv. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived. SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: a. Motion to dismiss; b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; c. Dilatory motion for postponement; d. Motion for a bill of particulars; e. Counterclaim or cross-claim; f. Third-party complaint; g. Reply; h. Motion to declare respondent in default; i. Intervention; j. Memorandum; k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte. SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus. SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs: (a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an

organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge. (b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons. (c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion of the respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section. A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent. SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine.

Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove thatordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove thatextraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 17. SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases. SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year. SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo. SEC. 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights recognized and protected by the Constitution. SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts. SEC. 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.