IB Twentieth Century World History

The idea of collective security and the League of

Nations that would create a more peaceful world, and reduce the need for extensive armaments. The believe that arms races in various forms had been a major cause of the war and the at reducing arms would reduce the chance of another war. The sheer cost of arms at a time when nations were struggling to recover from economic dislocation of the war. This made arms reduction programs attractive, economically and politically, especially in the democracies, and was particularly true after the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. The impression after the relatively peaceful 1920s that the risk of war had been greatly reduced and that large military establishments were no longer necessary. The optimism of the Locarno Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Agreement served to support this general viewpoint. The League of Nations was to promote the cause of world disarmament as part of the mandate to maintain peace. The League began to prepare for a world disarmament conference which was to be convened in Geneva in 1932.

 In 1930, The London Naval Conference was held. The US, UK, France, Italy, and Japan met in London to revise and extend the agreement

reached in 1922 in Washington. They increased the ration of ships ( 10:10:7 ). They also agreed on the size and number of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that each nation could possess. Italy and France refused to take part, but did agree to continue the ban on Capital ships for another 5 years. Other rules were made regarding submarine warfare. A Sub could not sink a ship unless the passengers and crew were removed to a place of safety. The Treaty was to remain in effect until 1936. This all happened during the depression, when governments were looking for ways to cut back expenditures in the face of falling tax revenues. This is especially true in democracies were defense spending was unpopular compared to domestic relief programs. Therefore it was easy to agree to limit armaments. In 1935 the major powers met again to renegotiate the London treaty that would expire in 36. The London Naval Treaty of 1936 was a complete failure. The Japanese and Italians walked out. Japan did not with to submit to limits on her naval construction and demanded equal tonnage with the UK and US. The UK, US, and France signed the treaty with respect to cruiser tonnage, but all agreements on limiting the number and size of warships collapsed after 1936 in view of the Japanese and German rearmament programs and the increased number of crises and conflicts in the world.

 The Great Depression had reduced the enthusiasm

for international cooperation. Another big issue was distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons. The US had called for the elimination of offensive weapons to make nations feel more secure. The debate over what is offensive and defensive, led to a series of debates that undermined the conference. Whatever decisions were made had no enforcement. This is obvious when you consider that Germany was evading disarmament provisions as early as 1922 thanks to the Rapallo Treaty with Russia. Another problem was that disarmament would not proceed unless all nations felt secure in reducing their armaments. Germany argued that all nations should reduce the size of their military to Germanys, or Germany should be allowed to increase their military to the same size as theirs. After everyone ignored these comments, Germany withdrew from the conference in July of 1932.

After strenuous diplomatic effort, Germany rejoined the conference in 1933, but Hitler is now Chancellor. Hitler repeats Germanys demand for equal treatment, and when it did not happen, he withdrew from the conference and the League. Hitler had no interest in disarmament, but the conference gave him an excuse to begin his rearmament campaign. This made the French look bad, because they would not consider arms reduction. Italy would not consider arms reduction in light of its imperial ambitions. Mussolini tried to divert the work of the conference to a four power agreement involving the UK, France, Italy and Germany. This group would carry out peaceful revisions to the treaties (Versailles), would made Germany an equal partner and would resemble Locarno as a means of negotiating between France and Germany. The pact was never ratified because of French objections. This does show a shift from the League as the main peacekeeping force, back to the concert of Europe model. The Conference broke up without any agreement. Because of this, it left nations uneasy, and with few options.

1. Increase arms spending to defend oneself, as in the case of the Maginot Line in France, or force concessions from other nations, following Hitler's Model. 2. Attempt to negotiate a settlement of the outstanding issues and problems with other nations as a way to avoid escalation of tensions and the need to rearm. This was the case with the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, as well as Mussolinis abortive Four Power Pact, which sought to produce negotiated settlements and recapture the spirit of Locarno.

As long as Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia were determine to revise the Paris settlements to reclaim lost territory, there was little hope for disarmament.

A major factor in the effectiveness of the League was the absence of a number of major powers. Many of these were the defeated states during WWI, which labeled them as criminal or outlaw states. This did not fit with Wilsons vision of International community. The USSR was excluded because Communism was considered a threat to Western Ideals. The most catastrophic was the US refusal to join. This would have both diplomatic and psychological effects. The US was the only nation to emerge from the war in a stronger position than when it entered. The absence of the US meant that Britain and France would have free reign to govern the League as they saw fit. The US refusal to join the League and its principle of collective security undermined the credibility of the organization and its fundamental principles. The real impact of the absence of Russia and Germany came in 1922 with the Treaty of Rapallo. This alliance did not bode well for the new nations created in Eastern and Central Europe. The League was not seen as doing anything (Washington, Locarno) Without the US, the other allies were not enthusiastic about enforcing the Versailles Treaty.

 British attitudes were affected by the

American withdrawal. The immediate effect is the cancellation of the Anglo-American guarantee. The British began to revert to a state of isolationism to protect her freedom of action. The UK would not commit to intervention in Europe without American support and was suspicious of French ambitions. The French wanted the League to police the Versailles settlement in order to suppress any German aggression. The British wanted to rebuild the German economy in order to improve British trade. The British wanted the Germans as a counterweight to French ambitions. The League seemed to be designed to enforce the status quo as determined at Versailles. To further weaken the League, many important members dropped out between 1919-1936

 Collective Security was the cornerstone of the

League philosophy. Traditional alliances were made between nations with mutual interests and were designed to protect or defend against specific threats or specific nations. Collective Security is a more abstract concept. It does not specify were threats come from, or what response should be under certain circumstances. It assumes all nations are equally prepared to act in defense of the principle that aggression is wrong and must be resisted. It assumes that all nations will see each challenge to the peace in exactly the same light and will be willing, regardless of the cost or how their own interests will be affected, to defend the principle. The fact is that not all nations see each crisis in the same way and are able or willing to make the kind of sacrifices-either monetary or human- to intervene.

 In 1923 the Draft Treaty of Mutual

Assistance which required all members of the League to come to the aide of a victim of aggression to an extent determined by the League Council. It was accepted by France who feared German aggression, but rejected by the UK. The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific settlements of International Disputes suffered the same fate. Few members of the League were willing to take on open-ended commitments that collective security entailed. The fact is that the population of any nation would not support an armed conflict in the aftermath of WWI This is seen in the Corfu dispute in 1923, led by Mussolini, in which members of the League took no action. Collective Security sounded great on paper, but utilizing it did not work.