1

Baniel Bennett, }anuaiy 24, 2u14

!"#$"%&'()* () !"## %&''


Sam Baiiis's "#$$ %&'' (2u12) is a iemaikable little book, engagingly wiitten
anu jaigon-fiee, appealing to ieason, not authoiity, anu wiitten with passion anu
moial seiiousness. This is not an ivoiy towei technical inquiiy; it is in effect a
political tiact, uesigneu to peisuaue us all to abanuon what he consiueis to be a
moially peinicious iuea: the iuea of fiee will. If you aie one of the many who have
been biainwasheu into believing that you haveoi iathei, (#$)an (immoital,
immateiial) soul who makes all youi uecisions inuepenuently of the causes
impinging on youi mateiial bouy anu especially youi biain, then this is the book foi
you. 0i, if you have uismisseu uualism but think that *+(, -./ (#$ is a conscious
(but mateiial) $0., a witness that inhabits a nook in youi biain anu chooses,
inuepenuently of exteinal causation, all youi voluntaiy acts, again, this book is foi
you. It is a fine "antiuote," as Paul Bloom says, to this incoheient anu socially
malignant illusion. The incoheience of the illusion has been uemonstiateu time anu
again in iathei technical woik by philosopheis (in spite of still finuing suppoiteis in
the piofession), but Baiiis uoes a fine job of making this appaiently unpalatable fact
accessible to lay people. Its malignance is uue to its fosteiing the iuea of Absolute
Responsibility, with its attenuant implications of what we might call uuilt-in-the-
eyes-of-uou foi the unfoitunate sinneis amongst us anu, foi the foitunate, the
aiiogant anu self-ueluueu iuea of 0ltimate Authoiship of the goou we uo. We take
too much blame, anu too much cieuit, Baiiis aigues. We, anu the iest of the woilu,
woulu be a lot bettei off if we took ouiselvesoui selvesless seiiously. We uon't
have the kinu of fiee will that woulu giounu such Absolute Responsibility foi eithei
the haim oi the goou we cause in oui lives.

All this is lauuable anu iight, anu viviuly piesenteu, anu Baiiis uoes a
paiticulaily goou job getting ieaueis to intiospect on theii own uecision-making
anu notice that it just uoes not confoim to the fantasies of this all too tiauitional
unueistanuing of how we think anu act. But some of us have long iecognizeu these
points anu gone on to auopt moie ieasonable, moie empiiically sounu, mouels of
uecision anu thought, anu we think we can aiticulate anu uefenu a moie
sophisticateu mouel of fiee will that is not only consistent with neuioscience anu
intiospection but also giounus a (mouifieu, toneu-uown, non-Absolute) vaiiety of
iesponsibility that justifies both piaise anu blame, iewaiu anu punishment. We
uon't think this vaiiety of fiee will is an illusion at all, but iathei a iobust featuie of
oui psychology anu a ieliable pait of the founuations of moiality, law anu society.
Baiiis, we think, is thiowing out the baby with the bathwatei.

Be is not alone among scientists in coming to the conclusion that the ancient
iuea of fiee will is not just confuseu but also a majoi obstacle to social iefoim. Bis
biief essay is, howevei, the most sustaineu attempt to uevelop this theme, which can
also be founu in iemaiks anu essays by such heavyweight scientists as the
2
neuioscientists Wolf Singei anu Chiis Fiith, the psychologists Steven Pinkei anu
Paul Bloom, the physicists Stephen Bawking anu Albeit Einstein, anu the
evolutionaiy biologists }eiiy Coyne anu (when he's not thinking caiefully) Richaiu
Bawkins.

The book is, thus, valuable as a compact anu compelling expiession of an
opinion wiuely shaieu by eminent scientists these uays. It is also valuable, as I will
show, as a veiitable museum of mistakes, none of them new anu all of them
seuuctivealluiing enough to lull the ciitical faculties of this host of biilliant
thinkeis who uo not make a piofession of thinking about fiee will. Anu, to be suie,
these mistakes have also been maue, sometimes foi centuiies, by philosopheis
themselves. But I think we +(1$ maue some piogiess in philosophy of late, anu
Baiiis anu otheis neeu to uo theii homewoik if they want to engage with the best
thought on the topic.

I am not being uisingenuous when I say this museum of mistakes is valuable;
I am giateful to Baiiis foi 2(-&30, so boluly anu cleaily, what less outgoing scientists
aie ,+&34&30 5/, 4$$6&30 ,. ,+$72$'1$28 I have always suspecteu that many who holu
this haiu ueteiminist view aie making these mistakes, but we mustn't put woius in
people's mouths, anu now Baiiis has uone us a gieat seivice by aiticulating the
points explicitly, anu the choius of appioval he has ieceiveu fiom scientists goes a
long way to confiiming that they +(1$ been making these mistakes all along.
Wolfgang Pauli's famous uismissal of anothei physicist's woik as "not even wiong"
ieminus us of the value of ciystallizing an ambient clouu of hunches into something
that can be 2+.*3 to be wiong. Coiiecting wiuespieau misunueistanuing is
usually the woik of many hanus, anu Baiiis has maue a significant contiibution.

The fiist paiting of opinion on fiee will is between 9.76(,&5&'&2,2 anu
&39.76(,&5&'&2,2. The lattei say (with "common sense" anu a tiauition going back
moie than two millennia) that fiee will is incompatible with :$,$#7&3&27, the
scientific thesis that theie aie causes foi eveiything that happens. Incompatibilists
holu that unless theie aie "ianuom sweives"
1
that uisiupt the iion chains of
physical causation, none of oui uecisions oi choices can be tiuly fiee. ;$&30 9(/2$:
means 3., being fieewhat coulu be moie obvious. The compatibilists ueny this;
they have aigueu, foi centuiies if not millennia, that once you unueistanu what fiee
will ieally is (anu must be, to sustain oui sense of moial iesponsibility), you will see
that fiee will can live comfoitably with ueteiminismif ueteiminism is what
science eventually settles on.

Incompatibilists thus tenu to pin theii hopes on inueteiminism, anu hence
weie much cheeieu by the emeigence of quantum inueteiminism in 2u
th
centuiy
physics. Peihaps the biain 9(3 avail itself of unueteimineu quantum sweives at the
sub-atomic level, anu thus escape the shackles of physical law! 0i peihaps theie is

1
The ianuom sweive oi 9'&3(7$3 is an iuea going back to Lucietius moie than two
thousanu yeais ago, anu has been seuuctive evei since.
S
some othei way oui choices coulu be tiuly /3ueteimineu. Some have gone so fai as
to posit an otheiwise unknown (anu almost entiiely unanalyzable) phenomenon
calleu (0$3, 9(/2(,&.3< in which fiee choices aie causeu somehow by an agent, but
not by any event in the agent's histoiy. 0ne exponent of this position, Roueiick
Chisholm, canuiuly acknowleugeu that on this view eveiy fiee choice is "a little
miiacle"which makes it cleai enough why this is a school of thought enuoiseu
piimaiily by ueeply ieligious philosopheis anu shunneu by almost eveiyone else.
Incompatibilists who think we have fiee will, anu theiefoie ueteiminism must be
false, aie known as '&5$#,(#&(32 (which has nothing to uo with the political view of
the same name). Incompatibilists who think that all human choices aie ueteimineu
by piioi events in theii biains (which weie themselves no uoubt ueteimineu by
chains of events aiising out of the uistant past) concluue fiom this that we can't
have fiee will, anu, hence, aie not iesponsible foi oui actions.

This concein foi vaiieties of inueteiminism is misplaceu, aigue the
compatibilists: fiee will is a phenomenon that iequiies neithei ueteiminism noi
inueteiminism; the solution to the pioblem of fiee will lies in iealizing this, not
banking on the quantum physicists to come thiough with the iight physicsoi a
miiacle. Compatibilism may seem incieuible on its face, oi uespeiately contiiveu,
some kinu of a tiick with woius, but not to philosopheis. Compatibilism is the
ieigning view among philosopheis (just ovei S9%, accoiuing to the 2uu9 Philpapeis
suivey) with libeitaiians coming seconu with 1S% anu haiu ueteiminists only 12%.
It is stiiking, then, that all the scientists just citeu have lanueu on the position
iejecteu by almost nine out of ten philosopheis, but not so suipiising when one
consiueis that these scientists haiuly evei consiuei the compatibilist view oi the
ieasons in its favoi.

Baiiis +(2 consiueieu compatibilism, at least cuisoiily, anu his opinion of it
is bieathtakingly uismissive: Aftei acknowleuging that it is the pievailing view
among philosopheis (incluuing his fiienu Baniel Bennett), he asseits that "Noie
than in any othei aiea of acauemic philosophy, the iesult iesembles theology." This
is a low blow, anu woise follows: "Fiom both a moial anu a scientific peispective,
this seems uelibeiately obtuse." (18) I woulu hope that Baiiis woulu pause at this
point to wonueijust wonueiwhethei 7(-5$ his philosophical colleagues hau
seen some points that hau somehow escapeu him in his canvassing of
compatibilism. As I tell my unueigiauuate stuuents, whenevei they encountei in
theii iequiieu ieauing a claim oi aigument that seems just plain stupiu, they shoulu
piobably uouble check to make suie they aie not misieauing the "pieposteious"
passage in question. It is 6.22&5'$ that they have uncoveieu a howling eiioi that has
somehow gone unnoticeu by the piofession foi geneiations, but not veiy likely. In
this instance, the chances that Baiiis has unueiestimateu anu misinteipieteu
compatibilism seem paiticulaily goou, since the points he uefenus latei in the book
agiee iight uown the line with compatibilism; he himself is a compatibilist in
eveiything but name!

4
Seiiously, his 7(&3 objection to compatibilism, issueu seveial times, is that
what compatibilists mean by "fiee will" is not what eveiyuay folk mean by "fiee
will." Eveiyuay folk mean something uemonstiably pieposteious, but Baiiis sees
the effoit by compatibilists to make the folks' hopeless concept of fiee will
piesentable as somehow uisingenuous, unmotivateu spin-uoctoiing, not the pioject
of sympathetic ieconstiuction the compatibilists take themselves to be engageu in.
So it all comes uown to who gets to ueciue how to use the teim "fiee will." Baiiis is a
compatibilist about moial iesponsibility anu the impoitance of the uistinction
between voluntaiy anu involuntaiy actions, but he is not a compatibilist about fiee
will since he thinks "fiee will" has to be given the incoheient sense that emeiges
fiom unciitical ieflection by eveiyuay folk. Be sees quite well that compatibilism is
"the only philosophically iespectable way to enuoise fiee will" (p16) but auus:

Bowevei, the 'fiee will' that compatibilists uefenu is not the fiee will that
most people feel they have. (p16).

Fiist of all, he uoesn't know this. This is a guess, anu suitably expiesseu
questionnaiies might well piove him wiong. That is an empiiical question, anu a
thoughtful pioneeiing attempt to answei it suggests that Baiiis's guess is simply
mistaken.
2
The newly emeiging fielu of expeiimental philosophy (oi "X-phi") has a
iathei unpiepossessing tiack iecoiu to uate, but these aie eaily uays, anu some of
the woik has yielueu inteiesting iesults that ceitainly uefy complacent assumptions
common among philosopheis. The stuuy by Nahmias et al. 2uuS founu substantial
majoiities (between 6u anu 8u%) in agieement with piopositions that aie
compatibilist in outlook, not incompatibilist.

Baiiis's claim that the folk aie mostly incompatibilists is thus uubious on its
face, anu even if it is tiue, maybe all this shows is that most people aie suffeiing
fiom a soit of illusion that coulu be ieplaceu by wisuom. Aftei all, most people useu
to believe the sun went aiounu the eaith. They weie wiong, anu it took some heavy
lifting to convince them of this. Naybe this factoiu is a ieflection on how much woik
science anu philosophy still have to uo to give eveiyuay laypeople a sounu concept
of fiee will. We've not yet succeeueu in getting them to see the uiffeience between
weight anu mass, anu Einsteinian ielativity still eluues most people. When we founu
out that the sun uoes not ievolve aiounu the eaith, we uiun't then insist that theie is
no such thing as the sun (because what the folk mean by "sun" is "that biight thing
that goes aiounu the eaith"). Now that we unueistanu what sunsets aie, we uon't
call them illusions. They aie ieal phenomena that can misleau the naive.

To see the context in which Baiiis's ciiticism plays out, consiuei a paiallel.
The folk concept of 7&3: is a shambles, foi suie: uualistic, scientifically misinfoimeu

2
Eddy Nahmias , Stephen Morris , Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner, 2005, "Surveying Freedom: Folk
Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility, Philosophical Psychology, 18, pp 561-584


S
anu ieplete with miiaculous featuieseven befoie we get to ESP anu psychokinesis
anu polteigeists. So when social scientists talk about 5$'&$=2 oi :$2&#$2 anu cognitive
neuioscientists talk about (,,$3,&.3 anu 7$7.#- they aie uelibeiately using
cleaneu-up, uemystifieu substitutes foi the folk concepts. Is this theology, is this
uelibeiately obtuse, countenancing the use of concepts with such uisieputable
ancestois. I think not, but the case can be maue (theie aie mauuog ieuuctionist
neuioscientists anu philosopheis who insist that minus aie illusions, pains aie
illusions, uieams aie illusions, iueas aie illusionsall theie is is just neuions anu
glia anu the like). The same coulu be saiu about 9.'.#, foi example. What eveiyuay
folk think colois aieif you pusheu them beyonu theii eveiyuay contexts in the
paint stoie anu picking out theii clothesis hugely ueluueu; that uoesn't mean that
colois aie an illusion. They aie ieal in spite of the fact that, foi instance, atoms aien't
coloieu.

Beie aie some moie instances of Baiiis's move:

We uo not have the fieeuom we think we have. (pS)

Who's *$. Naybe many people, maybe most, think that they have a kinu of fieeuom
that they uon't anu can't have. But that settles nothing. Theie may be othei, bettei
kinus of fieeuom that people also think they have, anu that aie woith wanting
(Bennett, 1984).

We uo not know what we intenu to uo until the intention itself aiises. |Tiue,
but so what.j To unueistanu this is to iealize that we aie not the authois of
oui thoughts anu actions &3 ,+$ *(- ,+(, 6$.6'$ 0$3$#(''- 2/66.2$ |my italicsj,
(p1S)

Again, so what. Naybe we aie authois of oui thoughts anu actions in a slightly
uiffeient way. Baiiis uoesn't even consiuei that possibility (since that woulu
iequiie taking compatibilist "theology" seiiously).

If ueteiminism is tiue, the futuie is setanu this incluues all oui futuie
states of minu anu oui subsequent behavioi. Anu to the extent that the law
of cause anu effect is subject to inueteiminismquantum oi otheiwisewe
can take no cieuit foi what happens. Theie is no combination of these tiuths
that seem compatible with ,+$ 6.6/'(# 3.,&.3 .= =#$$ *&'' |my italicsj. (pSu)

Again, the 6.6/'(# notion of fiee will is a mess; we knew that long befoie Baiiis sat
uown to wiite his book. Be neeus to go aftei the attempteu impiovements, anu &,
9(33., 5$ 6(#, .= +&2 9#&,&9&27 ,+(, ,+$- (#$ 3., ,+$ 6.6/'(# 3.,&.38

Theie is also anothei pioblem with this paiagiaph: the sentence about
inueteiminism is false:

6
Anu to the extent that the law of cause anu effect is subject to
inueteiminismquantum oi otheiwisewe can take no cieuit foi what
happens.

Beie is a counteiexample, contiiveu, but highlighting the way inueteiminism coulu
infect oui actions anu still leave us iesponsible (a vaiiant of an olu1978
counteiexample of mine):

You must coiiectly answei thiee questions to save the woilu fiom a space
piiate, who pioviues you with a special answeiing gauget. It has two buttons
maikeu YES anu N0 anu two foot peuals maikeu YES anu N0. A sign on the
gauget lights up aftei eveiy question "0se the buttons" oi "0se the peuals."
You aie askeu "is Chicago the capital of Illinois.", the sign says "0se the
buttons" anu you piess the No button with youi fingei. Then you aie askeu
"Aie Bugongs mammals.", the sign says "0se the buttons" anu you piess the
Yes button with youi fingei. Finally you aie askeu "Aie pioteins maue of
amino acius." anu the sign says "0se the peuals" so you ieach out with youi
foot anu piess the Yes peual. A ioai of giatituue goes up fiom the ciowu.
You've saveu the woilu, thanks to youi knowleuge anu iesponsible action!
But all thiee actions weie unpieuictable by Laplace's uemon because
whethei the light saiu "Button" oi "Peuals" was causeu by a quantum ianuom
event. In a less obvious way, ianuom peituibations coulu infect (without
negating) youi eveiy ueeu. The tone of youi voice when you give youi
eviuence coulu be tweakeu up oi uone, the piessuie of youi tiiggei fingei as
you pull the tiiggei coulu be tweakeu gieatei oi lessei, anu so foith, without
iobbing you of iesponsibility. Biains aie, in all likelihoou, uesigneu by
natuial selection to absoib ianuom fluctuations without being seiiously
uiveiteu by themjust as computeis aie. But that means that ianuomness
neeu not uestioy the iationality, the well-goveineuness, the sense-making
integiity of youi contiol system. Youi biain may even exploit ianuomness in
a vaiiety of ways to enhance its heuiistic seaich foi goou solutions to
pioblems.

These aie not new iueas. Foi instance I have uefenueu them explicitly in 1978, 1984,
anu 2uuS. I wish Baiiis hau noticeu that he contiauicts them heie, anu I'm cuiious
to leain how he pioposes to countei my aiguments.

Anothei mistake he falls foiin veiy goou companyis the mistake the
gieat }. L. Austin makes in his notoiious footnote about his misseu putt. Fiist
Austin's veision, anu my analysis of the eiioi, anu then Baiiis's veision.

Consiuei the case wheie I miss a veiy shoit putt anu kick myself because I
coulu have holeu it. It is not that I shoulu have holeu it if I hau tiieu: I uiu tiy,
anu misseu. It is not that I shoulu have holeu it if conuitions hau been
uiffeient: that might of couise be so, but > (7 ,('4&30 (5./, 9.3:&,&.32 (2 ,+$-
6#$9&2$'- *$#$ |my italicsj, anu asseiting that I coulu have holeu it. Theie is
7
the iub. Noi uoes 'I can hole it this time' mean that I shall hole it this time if I
tiy oi if anything else; foi I may tiy anu miss, anu yet not be convinceu that I
coulu not have uone it; inueeu, =/#,+$# $?6$#&7$3,2 7(- 9.3=&#7 7- 5$'&$= ,+(,
> 9./': +(1$ :.3$ &, ,+(, ,&7$ |my italicsj, although I uiu not. (Austin 1961:
166. |"Ifs anu Cans," in Austin, @+&'.2.6+&9(' @(6$#2< euiteu by }. 0imson anu
u. Wainock, 0xfoiu, Claienuon Piess.j)

Austin claims to be talking about conuitions as they piecisely weie, but if so, then
fuithei expeiiments coulu not confiim his belief. Piesumably he has in minu
something like this: he coulu line up ten "iuentical" putts on the same gieen anu,
say, sink nine out of ten. This woulu show, woulu it not, that he coulu have maue
that putt. Yes, to the satisfaction of almost eveiybouy, but No, if he means unuei
conuitions "as they piecisely weie," foi conuitions weie subtly uiffeient in eveiy
subsequent puttthe sun a little lowei in the sky, the gieen a little uiiei oi moistei,
the tempeiatuie oi winu uiiection evei so slightly uiffeient, Austin himself oluei
anu maybe wisei, oi maybe moie tiieu, oi maybe moie ielaxeu. This vaiiation is not
a bug to be eliminateu fiom such expeiiments, but a featuie without which
expeiiments 9./': 3., show that Austin "coulu have uone otheiwise," anu this is
piecisely the elbow ioom we neeu to see that "coulu have uone otheiwise" is
peifectly compatible with ueteiminism, because it 3$1$# means, in ieal life, what
philosopheis have imagineu it means: ieplay $?(9,'- the same "tape" anu get a
uiffeient iesult. Not only can such an expeiiment nevei be uone; if it coulu, it
woulun't' show what neeueu showing: something about Austin's ability as a golfei,
which, like all abilities, neeus to be uemonstiateu to be iobust unuei vaiiation.

Beie is Baiiis' veision of the same mistake:

To say that they weie fiee 3., to iape anu muiuei is to say that they coulu
have iesisteu the impulse to uo so (oi coulu have avoiueu feeling such an
impulse altogethei)with the univeise, incluuing theii biains, in piecisely
the same state it was in at the moment they committeu theii ciimes. (p17)

}ust not tiue. If we aie inteiesteu in whethei somebouy has fiee will, it is some kinu
of ability that we want to assess, anu you can't assess (3- ability by "ieplaying the
tape." (See my extenueu aigument to this effect in "#$$:.7 A1.'1$2, 2uuS) The point
was maue long ago by A. N. Bonoi in his classic papei "Can anu Can't," in B&3:,
1964, anu moie iecently ueeply giounueu in }uuea Peail's C(/2('&,-D B.:$'2<
E$(2.3&30 (3: >3=$#$39$, |C0Pj 2uuu. This is as tiue of the abilities of automobiles
as of people. Suppose I am uiiving along at 6u NPB anu am askeu if my cai can also
go 8u NPB. Yes, I ieply, but not in 6#$9&2$'- the same conuitions; I have to piess
haiuei on the acceleiatoi. In fact, I auu, it can also go 4u NPB, but not with
conuitions 6#$9&2$'- as they aie. Replay the tape till eteinity, anu it will nevei go
4uNPB in just these conuitions. So if you want to know whethei some
iapistmuiueiei was "fiee not to iape anu muiuei," uon't uistiact youiself with
fantasies about ueteiminism anu iewinuing the tape; iely on the soits of
8
obseivations anu tests that eveiyuay folk use to confiim anu uisconfiim theii
veiuicts about who coulu have uone otheiwise anu who coulun't.
S


0ne of the effects of Baiiis's misconstiuing compatibilism is that when he
tuins to the task of avoiuing the uiie conclusions of the haiu ueteiminists, he
unueiestimates his task.
4
At the enu of the book, he gets biiefly concessive,
thiowing a few sciaps to the opposition:

Anu it is wise to holu people iesponsible foi theii actions when uoing so
influences theii behavioi anu biings benefit to society. But this uoes not
mean that we must be taken in by the illusion of fiee will. We neeu only
acknowleuge that effoits mattei anu that people can change. We uo not
change ouiselves, pieciselybecause we have only ouiselves with which to
uo the changingbut we continually influence, anu aie influenceu by, the
woilu aiounu us anu the woilu within us. It may seem paiauoxical to holu
people iesponsible foi what happens in theii coinei of the univeise, but once
we bieak the spell of fiee will, we can uo this piecisely to the uegiee that it is
useful. Wheie people can change, we can uemanu that they uo so. Wheie
change is impossible, oi uniesponsive to uemanus, we can chait some othei
couise. (p6S)


S
uiven the ocean of eviuence that people assess human abilities, incluuing theii
abilities to uo oi choose otheiwise, by methous that make no attempt to clamp
conuitions "piecisely as they weie," oveilooking this piospect has iequiieu neaily
supeihuman self-blinkeiing by incompatibilists. I consiuei Austin's mistake to be
the cential coie of the ongoing confusion about fiee will; if you look at the laige anu
intiicate philosophical liteiatuie about incompatibilism, you will see that just about
eveiyone assumes, without aigument, that it is 3., a mistake. Without that
assumption the inteiminable uiscussions of van Inwagen's "Consequence Aigument"
coulu not be foimulateu, foi instance. The excellent aiticle on "Aiguments foi
Incompatibilism" in the online Stanfoiu Encyclopeuia of Philosophy,
http:plato.stanfoiu.euuentiiesincompatibilism-aiguments
cites Austin's essay but uoes not uiscuss this question.


4
Beie moie than anywheie else we can be giateful to Baiiis foi his foithiightness,
since the uistinguisheu scientists who ueclaie that fiee will is an illusion almost
nevei have much if anything to say about how they think people shoulu tieat each
othei in the wake of theii uiscoveiy. If they uiu, they woulu lanu in the uifficulties
Baiiis encounteis. If nobouy is iesponsible, not ieally, then not only shoulu the
piisons be emptieu, but no contiact is valiu, moitgages shoulu be abolisheu, anu we
can nevei holu anybouy to account foi anything they uo. Pieseiving "law anu oiuei"
without a concept of ieal iesponsibility is a uaunting task. Baiiis at least iecognizes
hisuaie I say.iesponsibility to ueal with this challenge.
9
Baiiis shoulu take moie seiiously the vaiious tensions he sets up in this passage. It
is wise to +.': people iesponsible, he says, even though they aie not iesponsible,
not #$(''-. But we uon't holu $1$#-5.:- iesponsible; as he notes, we excuse those
who aie uniesponsive to uemanus, oi in whom change is impossible. That's an
impoitant uiffeience, anu it is baseu on the uiffeient abilities oi competences that
people have. Some people (aie ueteimineu to) have the abilities that justify oui
holuing them iesponsible, anu some people (aie ueteimineu to) lack those abilities.
But ueteiminism uoesn't uo any woik heie; in paiticulai it uoesn't uisqualify those
we holu iesponsible fiom occupying that iole. In othei woius, #$(' iesponsibility,
the kinu the eveiyuay folk ,+&34 they have (if Baiiis is iight), is stiictly impossible;
but when those same folk wisely anu justifiably +.': somebouy iesponsible, that
isn't ieal iesponsibility!
S


Anu what is Baiiis saying about whethei we can change ouiselves. Be says
we can't change ouiselves "piecisely" but we can influence (anu hence change)
otheis, anu they can change us. But then why can't we change ouiselves by getting
help fiom otheis to change us. Why, foi that mattei, can't we uo to ouiselves what
we uo to those otheis, ieminuing ouiselves, aumonishing ouiselves, ieasoning with
ouiselves. It uoes woik, not always but enough to make to woith tiying. Anu
notice: if we uo things to influence anu change otheis, anu theieby tuin them into
something bauencouiaging theii iacist oi violent tenuencies, foi instance, oi
inciting them to commit embezzlement, we may be +$': iesponsible foi this socially
malign action. (Think of the uiunk uiiving laws that now holu the baitenuei oi the
paity host paitly iesponsible foi the uamage uone.) But then by the same ieasoning
we 9(3 justifiably be helu iesponsible foi influencing ouiselves, foi goou oi ill. We
can take some cieuit foi any impiovements we achieve in otheisoi ouiselves
anu we can shaie the blame foi any uamage we uo to otheis oi ouiselves.

Theie aie complications with all this, but Baiiis uoesn't even look at the
suiface of these issues. Foi instance, oui capacities to influence ouiselves aie
themselves only paitly the iesult of eailiei effoits at self-impiovement in which we
ouiselves playeu a majoi iole. It takes a village to iaise a chilu, as Bilaiy Clinton has
obseiveu. In the enu, if we tiace back fai enough to oui infancy oi beyonu, we aiiive
at conuitions that we weie just lucky (oi unlucky) to be boin with. This unueniable
fact is not the uisqualifiei of iesponsibility that Baiiis anu otheis assume. It
uisqualifies us foi "0ltimate" iesponsibility, which woulu iequiie us to belike


S
"I'm wiiting a book on magic," I explain, anu I'm askeu, "Real magic." By #$(' 7(0&9
people mean miiacles, thaumatuigical, anu supeinatuial poweis. "No," I answei:
"Conjuiing tiicks, not ieal magic."
E$(' 7(0&9, in othei woius, iefeis to the magic that is not ieal, while the magic that
is ieal, that can actually be uone, is 3., #$(' 7(0&9. (p42S)
acts. -Lee Siegel, F$, .= B(0&9


1u
uou!causa sui, the oiiginal cause of ouiselves, as ualen Stiawson has obseiveu,
but this is nonsense. 0ui lack of 0ltimate iesponsibility is not a moial blemish; if the
uiscoveiy of this lack motivates some to iefoim oui policies of iewaiu anu
punishment, that is a goou iesult, but it is haiuly compelleu by ieason.

This emeiging iuea, that we can justifiably be helu to be the authois (if not
the Authois) of not only oui ueeus but the chaiactei fiom which oui ueeus flow,
unueicuts much of the ihetoiic in Baiiis's book. Baiiis is the authoi of his book; he
is iesponsible foi both its viitues, foi which he ueseives thanks, anu its vices, foi
which he may justifiably be ciiticizeu. But then why can we not geneialize this point
to Baiiis himself, anu iightly holu him at least paitly iesponsible foi his chaiactei
since it too is a piouuctwith help fiom otheis, of couiseof his eailiei effoits.
Suppose he ieplieu that he is not #$(''- the authoi of "#$$ %&''. At what point uo we
get to use Baiiis's ciiticism against his own claims. Baiiis might claim that he is not
ieally iesponsible, isn't ieally the authoi of his own book, isn't ieally iesponsible,
5/, ,+(, &23G, *+(, ,+$ =.'4 *./': 2(-8 H+$ =.'4 5$'&$1$ &3 ( 4&3: .= #$26.32&5&'&,- ,+(, &2
$?$76'&=&$: 5- I(##&2G2 (/,+.#2+&68 Baiiis woulu have uistoiteu the folk notion of
iesponsibility as much if not moie than compatibilists have uistoiteu the folk notion
of fiee will.

Baiiis opens his book with an example of muiueious psychopaths, Bayes
anu Komisaijevsky, who commit unspeakable atiocities. 0ne has shown iemoise,
the othei iepoits having been abuseu as a chilu.

Whatevei theii conscious motives, these men cannot know why they aie as
they aie. Noi can we account foi why we aie not like them.

Really. I think we can. The sentence is ambiguous, in fact. Baiiis knows full well
that we can pioviue uetaileu anu empiiically suppoiteu accounts of why noimal,
law-abiuing people who woulu nevei commit those atiocities emeige by the
millions fiom all soits of backgiounus, anu why these psychopaths aie uiffeient. But
he has a uiffeient question in minu: why weyou anu Iaie in the foitunate,
noimal class insteau of having been uoomeu to psychopathy. A uiffeient issue, but
also an iiielevant, meiely 7$,(6+-2&9(' issue. (Cf. "Why was > boin in the 2u
th

centuiy, anu not uuiing the Renaissance. We'll nevei know!")

The ihetoiical move heie is well-known, but inuefensible. If you'ie going to
iaise these hoiiific cases, it behooves you to consiuei that they might be cases of
pathology, as measuieu against (moial) health. Lumping the moially competent
with the moially incompetent anu then saying "theie #$(''- is no uiffeience between
them, is theie." is a move that neeus suppoit, not something that can be uone by
assumption oi innuenuo.

I cannot take cieuit foi the fact that I uon't have the soul of a psychopath.
(p4).

11
Tiueanu false. Baiiis can't take cieuit foi the luck of his biith, his having hau a
noimal moial euucationthat's just luckbut those boin thus lucky aie infoimeu
that they have a uuty oi obligation to pieseive theii competence, anu giow it, anu
euucate themselves, anu Baiiis has iesponueu aumiiably to those incentives. Be 9(3
take cieuit, not 0ltimate cieuit, whatevei that might be, but paitial cieuit, foi
husbanuing the iesouices he was enuoweu with. As he says, he is just lucky not to
have been boin with Komisaijevsky's genes anu life expeiiences. If he hau been,
he'u have been Komisaijevsky!

A similai uifficulty infects his claim that theie is no uiffeience between an act
causeu by a biain tumoi anu an act causeu by a belief (which is just anothei biain
state, aftei all).

But a neuiological uisoiuei appeais to be just a special case of physical
events giving iise to thoughts anu actions. 0nueistanuing the
neuiophysiology of the biain, theiefoie, woulu seem to be as exculpatoiy as
finuing a tumoi in it. (pS)

Notice the use of "appeais" anu "seem" heie. Replace them both with "is" anu ask if
he's maue the case. (In auuition to the "suiely"-alaim I iecommenu all ieaueis
install in theii biains (2u1S), a "seems"-alaim will pick up lots of these slippeiy
places wheie philosopheis uefei aigument wheie aigument is calleu foi.

Even the simplest anu most stiaightfoiwaiu of Baiiis's examples wilt unuei
caieful sciutiny:

Biu I consciously choose coffee ovei tea. No. The choice was maue foi me by
events in my biain that I, as the conscious witness of my thoughts anu
actions, coulu not inspect oi influence. (p7)

Not so. Be can influence those inteinal, unconscious actionsby ieminuing himself,
etc. Be just can't influence them (, ,+$ 7.7$3, ,+$- (#$ +(1&30 ,+$&# $==$9, .3 +&2
9+.&9$. (Be also can't influence the unconscious machineiy that ueteimines whethei
he ietuins a tennis seive with a lob oi a haiu backhanu once the seive is on its way,
but that uoesn't mean his tennis stiokes aie involuntaiy oi outsiue hisinuiiect
contiol. At one point he says "If you uon't know what youi soul is going to uo, you
aie not in contiol." (p12) Really. When you uiive a cai, aie you not in contiol. You
know "youi soul" is going to uo the iight thing, whatevei in the instant it tuins out
to be, anu that suffices to uemonstiate to you, anu the iest of us, that you aie in
contiol. Contiol uoesn't get any moie ieal than that.)

Baiiis ignoies the ieflexive, iepetitive natuie of thinking. Ny choice at time ,
can influence my choice at time ,G which can influence my choice at time ,J8 Bow.
Ny choice at , can have among its effects the biasing of settings in my biain (which I
cannot uiiectly inspect) that ueteimine (I use the teim uelibeiately) my choice at ,G.
I 9(3 influence my choice at ,G. I influenceu it at time , (without "inspecting" it). Like
12
many befoie him, Baiiis shiinks the 7$ to a uimensionless point, "the witness" who
is stuck in the Caitesian Theatei awaiting the uecisions maue elsewheie. That is
simply a bau theoiy of consciousness,

I, as the conscious witness of my expeiience, no moie initiate events in my
piefiontal coitex than I cause my heait to beat. (p9)

If this isn't puie Caitesianism, I uon't know what it is. Bis piefiontal coitex is 6(#, .=
the > in question. Notice that if we ieplace the "conscious witness" with "my biain"
we tuin an appaient tiuth into an obvious falsehoou: "Ny biain can no moie initiate
events in my piefiontal coitex than it can cause my heait to beat."

Theie aie moie passages that exhibit this cuiious tactic of heaping scoin on
uaft uoctiines of his own uevising while ignoiing ieasonable compatibilist veisions
of the same iueas, but I've given enough illustiations, anu the iest aie ieauily
iuentifiable once you see the pattein. Baiiis cleaily thinks compatibilism is not
woith his attention (so "uelibeiately obtuse" is it), but aftei such an inuictment, he
bettei come up with some impiessive ciiticisms. Bis main case against
compatibilismasiue fiom the points above that I have alieauy ciiticizeuconsists
of thiee ihetoiical questions lineu up in a iow (pp18-19). Each one collapses on
closei inspection. As I point out in INT0ITI0N P0NPS ANB 0TBER T00LS F0R
TBINKINu, ihetoiical questions, which aie stanu-ins foi #$:/9,&. (: (52/#:/7
aiguments so obvious that they neeu not be spelleu out, shoulu always be
sciutinizeu as likely weak spots in aiguments.. I offei Baiiis's tiio as exhibits A,B,
anu C:

(A) You want to finish youi woik, but you aie also inclineu to stop woiking
so that you can play with youi kius. You aspiie to quite smoking, but you
also ciave anothei cigaiette. You aie stiuggling to save money, but you aie
also tempteu to buy a new computei. Wheie is the fieeuom when one of
these opposing uesiies &3$?6'&9(5'- |my italicsj tiiumphs ovei its iival.

But no compatibilist has claimeu (so fai as I know) that oui fiee will is absolute anu
tiouble-fiee. 0n the contiaiy theie is a sizable anu fascinating liteiatuie on the
impoitance of the vaiious well-known ways in which we iesponu to such looming
cases of "weakness of will," fiom which we all suffei. When one uesiie tiiumphs,
this is not usually utteily inexplicable, but iathei the confiimable iesult of effoits of
self-manipulation anu self-euucation, 5(2$: .3 $76&#&9(' 2$'=K$?6'.#(,&.3. We leain
something about what makes us ticknot usually in neuioscientific teims, but
iathei in teims of folk psychologyanu uesign a stiategy to coiiect the blinu spots
we finu, the biases we iuentify. That piactice unueniably occuis, anu unueniably
woiks to a ceitain extent. We 9(3 impiove oui self-contiol, anu this is a moially
significant fact about the competence of noimal auultsthe only people whom we
holu fully (but not "absolutely" oi "ueeply") iesponsible. Remove the woiu
"inexplicably" fiom exhibit A anu the ihetoiical question has a peifectly goou
answei: in many cases oui fieeuom is an achievement, foi which we aie paitly
1S
iesponsible. (Yes, luck plays a iole but so uoes skill; we aie not L/2, lucky. (Bennett,
1984))

(B) The pioblem foi compatibiism iuns ueepei, howeveifoi wheie is the
fieeuom in wanting what one wants without any inteinal conflict
whatsoevei.

To answei a ihetoiical question with anothei, so long as one can get what one
wants so wholeheaiteuly, what coulu be bettei. What coulu be moie fieeuom than
that. Any iealistic, ieasonable account of fiee will acknowleuges that we aie stuck
with some of oui uesiies: foi foou anu comfoit anu love anu absence of painanu
the fieeuom to uo what we want. We can't not want these, oi if we somehow
succeeu in getting ouiselves into such a soiiy state, we aie pathological. These aie
the healthy, noimal, sounu, wise uesiies on which all otheis must iest. So banish
the fantasy of any account of fiee will that is scieweu so tight it uemanus that we
aien't fiee unless ('' oui uesiies anu meta-uesiies anu meta-meta-uesiies aie
optional, choosable. Such "peifect" fieeuom is, of couise, an incoheient iuea, anu if
Baiiis is aiguing against it, he is not finuing a "ueep" pioblem with compatibilism
but a shallow pioblem with his incompatibilist vision of fiee will; he has taken on a
stiaw man, anu the stiaw man is beating him.

(C) Wheie is the fieeuom in being peifectly satisfieu with youi thoughts,
intentions, anu subsequent actions when they aie the piouuct of piioi events
that you hau absolutely no hanu in cieating.

Not only has he not shown that you hau absolutely no hanu in cieating those piioi
events, but it is false, as just noteu. 0nce you stop thinking of fiee will as a magical
metaphysical enuowment anu stait thinking of it as an explicable achievement that
inuiviuual human beings noimally accomplish (veiy much aiueu by the societies in
which they live), much as they leain to speak anu ieau anu wiite, this ihetoiical
question falls flat. Infants uon't have fiee will; noimal auults uo. Yes, those of us
who have fiee will aie lucky to have fiee will (we'ie lucky to be human beings, we'ie
lucky to be alive), but oui fiee will is not just a given; it is something we (#$ .5'&0$:
to piotect anu nuituie, with help fiom oui families anu fiienus anu the societies in
which we live.

Baiiis allows himself one moie ihetoiical question on page 19, anu this one he
emphatically answeis:

(B) Am I fiee to uo ,+(, *+&9+ :.$2 3., .99/# ,. 7$ ,. :.M 0f couise not.

Again, ieally. You'ie playing biiuge anu tiying to ueciue whethei oi not to win the
tiick in fiont of you. You ueciue to play youi ace, winning the tiick. Weie you fiee to
play a low caiu insteau. >, :&:3G, .99/# ,. -./ (it shoulu have, but you acteu iathei
thoughtlessly, as youi paitnei soon infoims you). Weie you fiee to play youi six
insteau. In some sense. We woulun't play games if theie weien't oppoitunities in
14
them to make one choice oi anothei. But, comes the familiai iejoinuei, if
ueteiminism is tiue anu we iewounu the tape of time anu put you in exactly the
same physical state, you'u ignoie the six of clubs again. Tiue, but so what. It uoes
not show that you aie not the agent you think you aie. C.3,#(2, youi competence at
this moment with the "competence" of a iobotic biiuge-playing uoll that ('*(-2
plays its highest caiu in the suit, no mattei what the ciicumstances. It wasn't fiee to
choose the six, because it woulu play the ace *+(,$1$# ,+$ 9&#9/72,(39$2 *$#$
wheieas if it occuiieu to you to play the six, you coulu uo it, uepenuing on the
ciicumstances. Fieeuom involves the ability to have one's choices influenceu by
changes in the woilu that mattei unuei the ciicumstances. Not a peifect ability, but
a ieliable ability. If you aie such a teiiible biiuge playei that you can nevei see the
viitue in uucking a tiick, playing less than the highest caiu in youi hanu, then youi
fiee will at the biiuge table is seiiously abiiugeu: you aie missing the oppoitunities
that make biiuge an inteiesting game. If ueteiminism is tiue, aie these ieal
oppoitunities. Yes, as ieal as an oppoitunity coulu be: thanks to youi peiceptual
appaiatus, youi memoiy, anu the well-lit enviionment, you aie causeuueteimineu
to evaluate the situation as one that calls foi playing the six, anu you play the six.

Tuin to page 2u anu get one moie ihetoiical question:

(E) Anu theie is no way I can influence my uesiiesfoi what tools of
influence woulu I use. 0thei uesiies.

Yes, foi staiteis. 0nce again, Baiiis is ignoiing a laige anu uistinguisheu liteiatuie
that uefenus this claim. We use the same tools to influence oui own uesiies as we
use to influence othei people's uesiies. I uoubt that he uenying that we evei
influence othei people's uesiies. Bis book is appaiently an attempt to influence the
beliefs anu uesiies of his ieaueis, anu it seems to have woikeu iathei bettei than I
woulu like. Bis book also seems to have influenceu his own beliefs anu uesiies:
wiiting it has blinueu him to alteinatives that he ieally ought to have consiueieu. So
his obliviousness is something foi which he himself is paitly iesponsible, having
laboieu to cieate a minuset that sees compatibilism as uelibeiately obtuse.

When Baiiis tuins to a consiueiation of my bianu of compatibilism, he
quotes at length fiom a nice summaiy of it by Tom Claik, notes that I have appioveu
of that summaiy, anu then says that it peifectly aiticulates the uiffeience between
my view anu his own. Anu this is his iebuttal:

As I have saiu, I think compatibilists like Bennett change the subject: They
tiaue a psychological factthe subjective expeiience of being a conscious
agentfoi a conceptual unueistanuing of ouiselves as peisons. This is a bait
anu switch. The psychological tiuth is that people feel iuentical to a ceitain
channel of infoimation in theii conscious minus. Bennett is simply asseiting
that we aie moie than thiswe aie coteiminous with eveiything that goes
on insiue oui bouies, whethei we aie conscious of it oi not. This is like
saying we aie maue of staiuustwhich we aie. But we uon't =$$' like
1S
staiuust. Anu the knowleuge that we aie staiuust is not uiiving oui moial
intuitions oi oui system of ciiminal justice. (p2S)

I have thought long anu haiu about this passage, anu I am still not suie I unueistanu
it, since it seems to be at wai with itself. Baiiis appaiently thinks you see youiself as
a conscious witness, peihaps immateiialan immoital soul, peihapsthat is
uistinct fiom (the iest of.) youi biain. Be seems to be saying that this folk
unueistanuing people have of *+(, ,+$- (#$ &:$3,&9(' ,. must be taken as a
"psychological fact" that anchois any uiscussion of fiee will. Anu then he notes that
I claim that this folk unueistanuing is just plain wiong anu tiy to ieplace it with a
moie scientifically sounu veision of what a conscious peison is. Why is it "bait anu
switch" if I claim to &76#.1$ on the folk veision of peisonhoou befoie showing how
it allows foi fiee will. Be can't have it both ways. Be is ceitainly claiming in his
book that the uualism that is unciitically enuoiseu by many, maybe most, people is
incoheient, anu he is iightI've aigueu the same foi uecaues. But then how can he
object that I want to ieplace the folk conception of fiee will baseu on that nonsense
with a bettei one. The fact that the folk uon't =$$' as if they aie laigei than theii
imagineu Caitesian souls uoesn't count against my account, since I am pioposing to
coiiect the mistake manifest in that "psychological fact" (if it is one). Anu if Baiiis
thinks that it is this folk notion of fiee will that "uiives oui moial intuitions anu oui
legal system" he shoulu tackle the laige liteiatuie that says otheiwise. (staiting
with, e.g., Stephen Noise
6
).

0ne moie ihetoiical question:

(u) Bow can we be 'fiee' as conscious agents if eveiything that we
consciously intenu is causeu by events in oui biain that we :. 3., intenu anu
of which we aie entiiely unawaie. We can't. (p2S-26)

Let's take this apait, sepaiating its elements. Fiist let's tiy uiopping the last clause:
"of which we aie entiiely unawaie".

Bow can we be 'fiee' as conscious agents if eveiything that we consciously
intenu is causeu by events in oui biain that we uo not intenu.

Well, if the events that cause youi intentions aie thoughts about what the best
couise of action piobably is, anu why it is the iight thing to uo, then that causation
stiikes me as the veiy epitome of fieeuom: you have the ability to intenu exactly
what you think to be the best couise of action. When folks lack that ability, when

6
Noise, "The Non-Pioblem of Fiee Will in Foiensic Psychiatiy anu Psychology,"
;$+(1&.#(' N9&$39$2 (3: ,+$ O(*, vol. 2S (2uu7), pp. 2uS-22u; Noise, "Beteiminism
anu the Beath of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility fiom
Neuioscience," B&33$2.,( P./#3(' .= O(*< N9&$39$< (3: H$9+3.'.0-, vol. 9 (2uu8), pp.
1-S6, at pp. S-1S.

16
they finu they aie unable to act intentionally on the couises of action they ueem
best, all things consiueieu, we say they suffei fiom weakness of will. An intention
that was an appaiently causeless oiphan, aiising foi no uisceinible ieason, woulu
haiuly be seen as fiee; it woulu be vieweu as a hoiiible inteilopei, as in alien hanu
synuiome, imposeu on the agent fiom who knows wheie.

Now let's examine the othei half of Baiiis's question:

Bow can we be "fiee" as conscious agents if eveiything that we consciously
intenu is causeu by events in oui biain of which we aie entiiely unawaie.

I uon't always have to ieflect, consciously, on 7- ieasons foi 7- intentions foi them
to be both mine anu fiee. When I say "thank you" to somebouy who gives me
something, it is "foice of habit" anu I am entiiely unawaie of the events in my biain
that cause me to say it but it is nonetheless a goou example of a fiee action. Bau I
hau a ieason to oveiiiue the habit, I woulu have oveiiiuuen it. Ny not uoing so
tacitly enuoises it as an action of mine. Nost of the intentions we fiame aie like this,
to one uegiee oi anothei: we "instinctively" ieach out anu pull the peuestiian to
safety without time foi thinking; we iashly auopt a saicastic tone when ieplying to
the police officei, we heai the uooibell anu jump up to see who's theie. These aie all
voluntaiy actions foi which we aie noimally helu iesponsible if anything hinges on
them. Baiiis notes that the voluntaiyinvoluntaiy uistinction is a valuable one, but
uoesn't consiuei that it might be pait of the founuation of oui moial anu legal
unueistanuing of fiee will. Why not. Because he is so intent on bashing a caiicatuie
uoctiine.

Be enus his chaptei on compatibilism with this:

People =$$' that they aie the authois of theii thoughts anu actions, anu this is
the only ieason why theie seems to be a pioblem of fiee will woith talking
about. (p26)

I can agiee with this, if I am alloweu to make a small inseition:

People =$$' that they aie the authois of theii thoughts anu actions, (3:
&3,$#6#$,$: /39+(#&,(5'-< ,+$&# 1&$* 9(3 5$ 7(:$ ,. (66$(# (52/#:Q ,(4$3 ,+$
5$2, *(-< +.*$1$#< ,+$- 9(3 5$ #&0+,( anu this is the only ieason why theie
seems to be a pioblem of fiee will woith talking about.


0ne moie puzzling asseition:

Thoughts like "What shoulu I get my uaughtei foi hei biithuay. I knowI'll
take hei to a pet stoie anu have hei pick out some tiopical fish" convey the
appaient ieality of choices, fieely maue. But fiom a ueepei peispective
17
(speaking both objectively anu subjectively) thoughts simply aiise
unauthoieu anu yet authoi oui actions. (pSS)

What woulu an authoieu thought look like, piay tell. Anu how can unauthoieu
thoughts authoi oui actions. Boes Baiiis mean 9(/2$< 2+(6$ (3: 9.3,#.' oui actions.
But if an unauthoieu thought can cause, shape anu contiol something, why can't a
whole peison cause, shape anu contiol something. Piobably this was misspeaking
on Baiiis's pait. Be shoulu have saiu that unauthoieu thoughts aie the causes,
shapeis anu contiolleis--but not the authoisof oui actions. Nothing coulu be an
authoi, not ieally. But heie again Baiiis is taking an eveiyuay, folk notion of
authoiship anu inflating it into metaphysical nonsense. If he can be the authoi of his
book, then he can be the authoi of his thoughts. If he is not the authoi of "#$$ %&'',
he shoulu take his name off the covei, shoulun't he. But he goes on immeuiately to
say he &2 the cause of his book, anu "If I hau not ueciueu to wiite this book, it
woulun't have wiitten itself."

Becisions, intentions, effoits, goals, willpowei, etc., aie causal states of the
biain, leauing to specific behaviois, anu behaviois leau to outcomes in the
woilu. Buman choice, theiefoie, is as impoitant as fancieis of fiee will
believe. But the next choice you make will come out of the uaikness of piioi
causes that you, the conscious witness of youi expeiience, uiu not biing into
being. (pS4)

We've alieauy seen that the last sentence is false. But notice that &= &, *$#$ ,#/$, then
it woulu be haiu to see why "human choice is impoitant"except in the way
lightning bolts aie impoitant (they can uo a lot of uamage). If youi choices "come
out of the uaikness" anu you uiu not biing them into being, then they aie like the
involuntaiy effusions of suffeieis fiom Touiette's Synuiome, who bluit out
obscenities anu make gestuies that aie as baffling to them as to otheis. In fact we
know veiy well that I can influence youi choices, anu you can influence my choices,
anu even youi own choices, anu that this "biinging into being" of uiffeient choices is
what makes them moially impoitant. That's why we exhoit anu chastise anu
instiuct anu piaise anu encouiage anu infoim otheis anu ouiselves.

Baiiis uiaws oui attention to how haiu it can be to change oui bau habits, in
spite of ieauing self-help books anu many self-aumonitions. These expeiiences, he
notes, "aie not even slightly suggestive of fieeuom of the will." (pSS). Tiue, but then
othei expeiiences we have aie often veiy suggestive of fiee will. I make a piomise, I
solemnly iesolve to keep it, anu happily, I uo! I hate giauing essays, but iecognizing
that my giaues aie uue tomoiiow, I ieluctantly sit uown anu giinu thiough them. I
ueciue to uiive to Boston anu lo anu beholu, the next thing I know I'm behinu the
wheel of my cai uiiving to Boston! If I coulu almost nevei uo such things I woulu
inueeu uoubt my own fiee will, anu toy with the sau conclusion that somewheie
along the way I hau become a helpless victim of my lazy habits anu no longei hau
fiee will. Entiiely missing fiom Baiiis's accountanu it is not a lacuna that can be
iepaiieuis any acknowleugment of the moially impoitant uiffeience between
18
noimal people (like you anu me anu Baiiis, in all likelihoou) anu people with
seiious ueficiencies in self-contiol. The ieason he can't incluue this missing element
is that his whole case uepenus in the enu on insisting that theie ieally is no moially
ielevant uiffeience between the iaving psychopath anu us. We have no moie =#$$
*&'' than he uoes. Well, we have moie 2.7$,+&30 than he uoes, anu it is moially
impoitant. Anu it looks veiy much like what eveiyuay folks often call fiee will.

0f couise you can cieate a fiamewoik in which ceitain uecisions aie moie
likely than otheisyou can, foi instance, puige youi house of all sweets,
making it veiy unlikely that you will eat uesseit latei in the eveningbut you
cannot know why you weie able to submit to such a fiamewoik touay when
you weien't yesteiuay.(pS8)

Beie he seems at fiist to be acknowleuging the veiy thing I saiu was missing in his
account abovethe fact that you can take steps to biing about an alteiation in youi
ciicumstances that makes a uiffeience to youi subsequent choices. But notice that
his concession is shoit-liveu, because he insists that you aie just as in the uaik about
how youi uecision to puige youi house of all sweets came about. But that is, oi may
well be, false. You may know exactly what tiain of thought leu you to that policy. ;/,
,+$3< -./ 9(3G, 43.* *+- ,+(, ,#(&3 .= ,+./0+, .99/##$: ,. -./< (3: 7.1$: -./ ,+$3.
No, you can, anu often uo. Naybe youi canuy-banishing is the 3,+ level iesult of youi
ueciuing to ueciue to ueciue to ueciue to ueciue . . . . to uo something about youi
health. ;/, 2&39$ ,+$ #$0#$22 &2 &3=&3&,$< -./ 9(3G, 5$ #$26.32&5'$R Nonsense. You can't
be "/',&7(,$'- iesponsible" (as ualen Stiawson has aigueu) but so what. You can be
paitially, laigely iesponsible.

I cannot iesist enuing this catalogue of mistakes with the one that I finu most
glaiing: the covei of Baiiis's little book, which shows maiionette stiings hanging
uown. The point, which he ieiteiates seveial times in the book, is that the piioi
causes (going back to the Big Bang, if you like) that ueteimine youi choices (#$ '&4$
the puppeteei who ueteimines the puppet's eveiy action, eveiy "uecision." This
analogy enables him to get off a zingei:

Compatibilism amounts to nothing moie than an asseition of the following
cieeu: S 6/66$, &2 =#$$ (2 '.30 (2 +$ '.1$2 +&2 2,#&3028 (p2u)

This is in no way suppoiteu by anything in his uiscussion of compatibilism.
Somehow Baiiis has misseu one of the ueepest points maue by von Neumann anu
Noigenstein in theii intiouuction to theii giounu-bieaking 19SS book, H+$.#- .=
T(7$2 (3: A9.3.7&9 ;$+(1&.#, |Piinceton 0P, }ohn anu 0skaij8 Wheieas Robinson
Ciusoe alone on his ueseit islanu can get by with piobabilities anu expecteu utility
theoiy, as soon as theie is a seconu agent to ueal with, he neeus to woiiy about
feeuback, seciecy anu the intentions of the othei agent oi agents (what I have calleu
&3,$3,&.3(' 2-2,$72). Foi this he neeus game theoiy. Theie is a funuamental
uiffeience between an enviionment with no competing agents anu an enviionment
19
populateu with woulu-be manipulatois.
7
The manifolu of causes that ueteimine oui
choices only inteimittently incluues othei agents, anu when they aie aiounu they uo
inueeu iepiesent a challenge to oui fiee will, since they may well tiy to ieau oui
minus anu coveitly influence oui beliefs, but the enviionment &3 0$3$#(' is not such
an agent, anu hence is no puppeteei. When sunlight bouncing off a iipe apple
causes me to ueciue to ieach up anu pick it off the tiee, I am not being 9.3,#.''$: by
that mastei puppeteei, Captain Woiluaiounume. I am contiolling myself, thanks to
the infoimation I gainei fiom the woilu aiounu me. Please, Sam, uon't feeu the
bugbeais. (Bennett, 1984)

Baiiis half iecognizes this when latei in the book he iaises puppets one moie
time:

It is one thing to bickei with youi wife because you aie in a bau moou; it is
anothei to iealize that youi moou anu behavioi have been causeu by low
bloou sugai. This unueistanuing ieveals you to be a biochemical puppet, of
couise, but it also allows you to giab holu of one of youi stiings. A bite of
foou may be all that youi peisonality iequiies. uetting behinu oui conscious
thoughts anu feelings can allow us to steei a moie intelligent couise thiough
oui lives (while knowing, of couise, that we aie ultimately being steeieu).
(p47)

So unlike the giumpy chilu (oi moouy beai), we intelligent human auults can "giab
holu of one of oui stiings". But then if oui bouies aie the puppets anu we aie the
puppeteeis, we 9(3 contiol oui bouies, anu theieby oui choices, anu hence can be

7
2.2.2. Ciusoe is given ceitain physical uata (wants anu commouities) anu his task is
to combine anu apply them in such a fashion as to obtain a maximum iesulting
satisfaction. Theie can be no uoubt that he contiols exclusively all the vaiiables
upon which this iesult uepenussay the allotting of iesouices, the ueteimination of
the uses of the same commouity foi uiffeient wants, etc. Thus Ciusoe faces an
oiuinaiy maximum pioblem, the uifficulties of which aie of a puiely technicalanu
not conceptualnatuie, as pointeu out.
2.2.S. Consiuei now a paiticipant in a social exchange economy. Bis pioblem has, of
couise, many elements in common with a maximum pioblem. But it also contains
some, veiy essential, elements of an entiiely uiffeient natuie. Be too tiies to obtain
an optimum iesult. But in oiuei to achieve this, he must entei into ielations of
exchange with otheis. If two oi moie peisons exchange goous with each othei, then
the iesult foi each one will uepenu in geneial not meiely upon his own actions but
on those of the otheis as well. Thus each paiticipant attempts to maximize a
function (his above-mentioneu "iesult") of which he uoes not contiol all vaiiables.
This is ceitainly no maximum pioblem, but a peculiai anu uisconceiting mixtuie of
seveial uiffeient maximum pioblems. Eveiy paiticipant is guiueu by anothei
piinciple anu neithei ueteimines all vaiiables which affect his inteiest.
This kinu of pioblem is nowheie uealt with in classical mathematics. (von
Neumann anu Noigenstein, pp1u-11)
2u
helu iesponsibleieally but not 0ltimately iesponsiblefoi oui actions anu oui
chaiacteis. We aie not immateiial souls but embouieu iational agents, ueteimineu
(in two senses) to uo what is iight, most of the time, anu ieauy to be helu
iesponsible foi oui ueeus.

Baiiis, like the othei scientists who have iecently mounteu a campaign to
convince the woilu that fiee will is an illusion, has a lauuable motive: to launuei the
ancient stain of Sin anu uuilt out of oui cultuie, anu abolish the ciuel anu all too
usual punishments that we zestfully mete out to the uuilty. As they point out, oui
zealous seaich foi "justice" is often little moie than oui instinctual yeaining foi
ietaliation uiesseu up to look iespectable. The iesult, especially in the 0niteu
States, is a baibaiic system of impiisonmentto say nothing of capital
punishmentthat shoulu make all citizens ashameu. By all means, let's join hanus
anu iefoim the legal system, ieuuce its excesses anu iestoie a measuie of uignity
anu fieeuom!to those whom the state must punish. But the iuea that all
punishment is, in the enu, unjustifiable anu shoulu be (5.'&2+$: because nobouy is
evei #$(''- iesponsible, because nobouy has "ieal" fiee will is not only not
suppoiteu by science oi philosophical aigument; it is blinu to the chilling lessons of
the not so uistant past. Bo we want to meuicalize all violatois of the laws, giving
them inuefinitely laige amounts of involuntaiy "theiapy" in "asylums" (the pooi
ueais, they aien't iesponsible, but foi the goou of the society we have to
institutionalize them). I hope not. But then we neeu to iecognize the poweiful
(consequentialist)
8
aiguments foi maintaining a system of punishment (anu
iewaiu). Punishment can be faii, punishment can be justifieu, anu in fact, oui
societies coulu not manage without it.

This uiscussion of punishment veisus meuicalization may seem iiielevant to
Baiiis's book, anu an unfaii ciiticism, since he himself baiely alluues to it, anu offeis
no analysis of its possible justification, but that is a pioblem foi him. Be blanuly
conceues we willanu shoulugo on holuing some people iesponsible but then
neglects to say what that involves. Punishment anu iewaiu. If not, what uoes he
mean. If so, how uoes he piopose to iegulate anu justify it. I submit that if he hau
attempteu to auuiess these questions he woulu have enueu up with something like
this:

Those eligible foi punishment anu iewaiu aie those with the 0$3$#(' (5&'&,&$2
to iesponu to ieasons (wainings, thieats, piomises) iationally. Real
uiffeiences in these abilities aie empiiically uisceinible, explicable, anu
moially ielevant. Such abilities can aiise anu peisist in a ueteiministic
woilu, anu they aie the basis foi a justifiable policy of iewaiu anu

8
Appaiently some thinkeis have the iuea that any justification of 6/3&2+7$3, is (by
uefinition.) #$,#&5/,&1$8 But this is a mistake; theie aie consequentialist
justifications of the "ietiibutive" iueas of L/2, :$2$#,2 anu the 7$32 #$( iequiiement
foi guilt, foi instance. Consiuei how one can uefenu the existence of the ieu
caiuyellow caiu uistinction in soccei on puiely consequentialist giounus.
21
punishment, which biings society many benefitsinueeu makes society
possible. (Those who lack one oi anothei of the abilities that constitute this
moial competence aie often saiu, by eveiyuay folk, to lack fiee will, anu this
fact is the heait foi compatibilism.)

If you think that the fact that &39.76(,&5&'&2, fiee will is an illusion
uemonstiates that no punishment can evei be tiuly ueseiveu, think again. It may
help to consiuei all these issues in the context of a simplei phenomenon: spoits. In
basketball theie is the uistinction between oiuinaiy fouls anu flagiant fouls, anu in
soccei theie is the uistinction between yellow caius anu ieu caius, to list just two
examples. Aie these uistinctions faii. }ustifieu. Shoulu Baiiis be encouiageu to
aigue that theie is no ieal uiffeience between the uiity playei anu the iest (anu
besiues, the uiity playei isn't iesponsible foi being a uiity playei; just look at his
upbiinging!). Eveiybouy who plays games must iecognize that games without
stiictly enfoiceu iules aie not woith playing, anu the iules that woik best uo not
make allowances foi uiffeiences in heiitage, tiaining, oi innate skill. So it is in
society geneially: we aie all consiueieu equal unuei the law, piesumeu to be
iesponsible until anu unless we piove to have some uefinite uefect oi infiimity that
iobs us of oui fiee will, as oiuinaiily unueistoou.