Appeasement Disadvantage - UTNIF 2013

Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 1
Appeasement Disadvantage
University of Texas National Institute in Forensics
Pg. 1
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 2
***Cuba***
Pg. 2
Appeasement DA 1NC Shell
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 3
Unconditionally lifting the embargo only emboldens US adversaries impact is prolif and miscalc Brookes 2009 (Peter is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. KEEP
THE EMBARGO, O April 15, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_Oul9gWKYCFsACA0D6IVpvL)
In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel
demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US
economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting
the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.
Because the economy is
fight against the Yanquis,
nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We
also don't need a pumped-up Cuba
that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. ( The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba .) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and antiAmericanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early
1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people.
Giving in to evil only begets more of it.
Haven't
we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime,
we should hold firm onto the leverage
the embargo provides.
Proliferation will be fast and destabilizing guarantees nuclear war Evans and Kawaguchi 9 (Gareth, Chancellor of the Australian National University, an Honorary Professorial Fellow
at the University of Melbourne and President Emeritus of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Member of the House of Councillors for the Liberal Democratic Party since 2005. She was Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Japan, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-ii-3.html) 3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear armed must con tinue to be one of the worlds top
international security priorities.
Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks of accident or
miscalculation as well as deliberate use involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under
Pg. 3
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 4
severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail , and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical and for all those reasons, strongly emotive dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 19982002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve . Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The actionreaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the
Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever
the chances of stable deterrence prevailing in a Cold War or IndiaPakistan setting, the
prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and crosscutting sources of conflict.
Pg. 4
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 5
***Uniqueness***
Pg. 5
Appeasement DA 2NC Uniqueness Wall
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 6
No appeasement now the US will stick to the embargo despite rhetoric Kovalik and Lamrani 6-30-13 (Daniel Kovalik, Senior Associate General Counsel of the United Steelworkers,
AFL-CIO (USW), Dr. Salim Lamrani, lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Valle University and French journalist, Trying to Destroy The Danger of a Good Example The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba JUNE 28-30, 2013 http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/) Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts. Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting: Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cubas economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island. The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade. He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place.
Pg. 6
Appeasement DA ATAppeasement Now
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 7
Despite promises, Obama wont soften his stance on Cuba Piccone 11 [Ted Piccone is a senior fellow and deputy director for Foreign Policy at Brookings. Piccone specializes in
U.S.-Latin American relations; global democracy and human rights; and multilateral affairs. Piccone serves as an advisor to the Club of Madrid and has served on the National Security Council, at the State Department and Pentagon. Foggy Forecast for U.S.-Cuba Relations [http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/05/02-us-cuba-piccone] In the earliest days of his administration, President Obama promised "a new beginning" in U.S.-Cuba relations and to his credit took some initial steps to expand travel and remittances for Americans with family on the island. He quickly fell, however, into the trap of a tit-fortat approach, demanding additional reforms even as the Castro regime moved in a more positive direction. Despite having clear executive authority to do much more to loosen the embargo, Obama chose a timid approach of hiding behind the case of a USAID contractor arrested in late 2009 for distributing computer and satellite equipment under a Bush-era democracy promotion program. This certainly kept the hardliners in Washington and Miami happy for a while, but did nothing to protect Democrats from eventual defeat in the 2010 midterm elections. With the ascendancy of the Republicans to control of the House, including pro-embargo legislators as chairs of key committees, all hope for congressional action to soften the embargo is gone.
Pg. 7
Appeasement DA ATEmbargo Lift
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 8
Past summits prove Obama committed to the embargo Nicholas, 09; Peter Nicholas; Times staff writer Tracy Wilkinson in Mexico City contributed to this report.; Obama
resists pressure to lift Cuba trade embargo[http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/19/world/fg-obama-latin19]
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who called the last U.S. president the "devil," gave Barack Obama a book on Latin America and clasped hands with him as if he'd been reunited with an old friend. Obama proved an able statesman during his trip to Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago, which ends today, as he did early this month in Europe. But on both trips he found that personal diplomacy has its limitations -- that a leader's abundant charisma can't overcome hard national interests or policy disputes marinated in decades of resentment.
Obama came to the summit of 34 democratically elected leaders in the Western Hemisphere hoping to talk about issues that invite consensus, such as environmental protection and economic recovery. Many of his counterparts, however, wanted a commitment to end the U.S.'s 47-year trade embargo against Cuba, a commitment Obama would not make. "It's fair to say there's a disagreement on Cuba," deputy national security advisor Denis McDonough told reporters
Saturday night. On the president's trip, the limits of personal diplomacy were evident on all sides. Obama stopped first in Mexico City, where he repeatedly praised President Felipe Calderon for his courage in combating the drug cartels. The visit in Mexico was designed to show solidarity with Calderon. Calderon made few specific demands of Obama, but he did want the U.S. to reinstate a ban on assault weapons, arguing that since the prohibition lapsed in 2004, the number of such firearms showing up in Mexico has soared. Obama would not relent. White House aides said that reimposing the weapons ban would be politically untenable, requiring votes of conservative congressional Democrats worried about alienating gun-rights advocates. The president faced much the same reality in his European debut. Smitten with First Lady Michelle Obama, the paparazzi doted on America's premier power couple. Yet agreements on major issues proved elusive. Although European leaders spoke of the importance of the Afghanistan mission, the 5,000 new troops pledged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization failed to include the combat forces sought by Washington, and the $1.1 trillion in loans and guarantees to countries most hurt by the global downturn announced at the Group of 20 summit fell short of the "new global deal" called for by Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Not that there weren't achievements. A project that Obama has embraced is burnishing the United States' image in the world. His predecessor, George W. Bush, was often criticized for ignoring or dictating terms to world leaders, rather than working collaboratively. To that end, Obama says it's important for him to listen. And he has gotten points for reticence. During one session at the Summit of the Americas devoted to democratic governance, Obama did not speak at all, McDonough said. The president merely listened and took "copious notes," he said. Obama prepared carefully for the latest summit.
The White House knew beforehand that Cuba would be a focus, aides said. Obama was not
prepared to lift the embargo , but he did make a concession before arriving in Trinidad, lifting restrictions on Cuban Americans who wish to visit family.
Speaking at the opening ceremony Friday, Obama said, "The United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba." He also said, "I am prepared to have my administration engage with the Cuban government on a wide range of issues -- from human rights, free speech, and democratic reform to drugs, migration and economic issues." The statement followed Cuban President Raul Castro's comment a day earlier expressing willingness to discuss traditionally off-limit topics, including human rights. As it turned out, Obama's moves on Cuba were not enough to defuse the issue. Increasingly, Latin America has made U.S. policy on Cuba the measure by which to test Obama's pledge to improve relations in the region. That's the case not only for leaders on the left, like Chavez and Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega, but also for moderates such as Argentina's President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Fernandez used her opening remarks at the summit Friday to call for lifting of the "anachronistic blockade." Cuba
is "a theme that is on everyone's mind," Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said. "The big test was progress in the relations with Cuba. I think a small step in the right direction has been taken. And now what we need is direct dialogue." Shortly after Fidel Castro took power half a century ago, Washington broke relations with Havana and persuaded most of the hemisphere to follow suit. Every country except the United States has since reversed itself. Experts on the region said that to Latin
American leaders, Obama's actions on Cuba may seem small. Administration officials have cast the liberalized travel policy as a historic action. But other presidents have gone further. Julia Sweig, author of the forthcoming book "Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know," said President Carter dropped all travel restrictions to Cuba. And another Democrat, Bill Clinton, allowed Americans to visit Cuba as part of certain cultural exchange programs. "What they [Latin American leaders] do know is that he only opened the door a little to a handful of Americans," Sweig said. "And some know it was once open much more. By taking only a limited step,
he
paradoxically turns it into more of a Cuba summit than he would prefer."
Pg. 8
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 9
***Link***
Pg. 9
Appeasement DA 2NC Engagement Link

***DO NOT READ WITH CONDITIONS CP***
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 10
Engagement is a bankrupt strategy it only strengthens anti-US sentiment and legitimizes tyranny Rubin, 2011 (Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post, Obamas Cuba appeasement, Washington Post, 8/18,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html) The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didnt try to engage . It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters . Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants. As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the
administration actions didnt stop there. The Associated Press reported, The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior
U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States. Former deputy national
security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The
implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime. The administrations conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Grosss imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to engagement mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? Well sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? Well trade prisoners
and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? Well put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The
response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administrations willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.
Pg. 10
Appeasement DA 2NC Terror List Link
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 11
Appeasement policies like the plan only strengthen oppressive regimes Rubin 11 (Jennifer, Washington Post, "Obamas Cuba appeasement, The Washington Post, 10/18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cubaappeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html)
As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didnt stop there. The Associated Press reported, The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism ; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States. Former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime. The administrations conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Grosss imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to engagement mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? Well sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? Well trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? Well put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administrations willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.
Pg. 11
Appeasement DA 2NC Embargo Link
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 12
More ev lifting the embargo signals US weakness Suchlicki 2007 (Jaime is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami. Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban, April 11, 2007, FrontPageMagazine.com) Lifting the travel ban without any major concession from Cuba would send the wrong message to the enemies of the United States: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United Sates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will forget and forgive, and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid.
Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While the U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. A normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Supporting
regimes and dictators that violate human rights and abuse their population is an ill-advised policy that rewards and encourages further abuses.
Pg. 12
Appeasement DA 2NC Travel Ban Link
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 13
Lifting the travel ban sends a signal of weakness also, the plan cant solve the DA Suchlicki 2007 (Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban
and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban Front Page Magazine, Wednesday, April 11, 2007, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26082) There are a number of reasons the Cuba travel ban should not be lifted at this time: American tourists will not bring democracy to Cuba. Over the past decades hundreds of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. The assumption that tourism or trade will lead to economic and political change is not borne out by empirical studies. In Eastern Europe,
communism collapsed a decade after tourism peaked. No study of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union claims that tourism, trade or investments had anything to do with the end of communism. A disastrous economic system, competition with the West, successive leadership changes with no legitimacy, anti-Soviet feeling in Eastern Europe and the failed Soviet war in Afghanistan were among the reasons for change. There
is no evidence to support the notion that engagement
with a totalitarian state will bring about its demise. Only academic ideologues and those interested in economic gains cling to this notion. Their calls for ending the embargo have little to do with democracy in Cuba or the welfare of the Cuban people. The repeated statement that the embargo is the cause of Cubas economic problems is hollow. The reasons for the economic misery of the Cubans are a failed political and economic system. Like the communist systems of Eastern Europe, Cubas system does not function, stifles initiative and productivity and destroys human freedom and dignity. As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cubas limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the islands economic
contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro. The
assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best nave. Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidels brother. American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are
off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cubas efficient security apparatus. Most Americans dont speak Spanish, will have limited contact with ord inary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the
economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by
the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. Carlos Lage, the czar of the Cuban economy, reiterated that the
economic objective of the Cuban government is to strengthen state enterprises. Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans
represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. Lifting
the travel ban without any major concession from Cuba would send the wrong message to the enemies of the United States: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United Sates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will forget and forgive, and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under
President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While the U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. A
normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Supporting regimes and dictators that violate human rights and abuse their population is an ill-advised policy that rewards and encourages further abuses. A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic,
Pg. 13
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 14
the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries. Since tourism would become a two-way affair, with Cubans visiting the United States in great numbers, it is likely that many would stay in the United States as illegal immigrants, complicating another thorny issue in American domestic politics. If the travel ban is lifted unilaterally now by the U.S., what will the U.S. government have to negotiate with a future regime in Cuba and to encourage changes in the island? Lifting the ban could be an important bargaining chip with a future regime willing to provide irreversible concessions in the area of political and economic freedoms. The travel ban and the embargo should be lifted as a result of negotiations between the U.S. and a Cuban government willing to provide meaningful political and economic concessions or when there is a democratic government in place in the island.
Pg. 14
Appeasement DA ATCP Links
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 15
Negotiations are NOT the same as appeasement the CP solves Dueck 2006 (Colin Dueck, associate professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason
University, Strategies for Managing Rogue States, Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223241) Appeasement The strategy of appeasement, while seemingly discredited after 1938, has recently attracted surprising and favorable attention from scholars of international relations.2 Part of the problem surrounding the term has been a failure to agree on its meaning. Properly speaking, appeasement is not synonymous with diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic concessions, but refers only to those cases where one country attempts to alter or satiate the aggressive intentions of another through unilateral political, economic, and/or military concessions.3 It is sometimes argued that appeasement can work under certain circumstances, and that Neville Chamberlain's performance at Munich in 1938 was simply a case of appeasement badly handled.4 The drawbacks of appeasement, however, are inherent. They lie in the fact that concrete concessions are made by one side only, while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions from hostile to benign. With this strategy, there is nothing to stop the appeased state from pocketing its gains and moving on to the next aggression.5
Britain's rapprochement with the United States in the 1890s is often described as a successful case of appeasement.6 Skillful British diplomacy indeed played a part in significantly improving relations between the two over the course of that decade, but that case does not deserve the term. The United States was not particularly hostile to Great Britain in the first place, and no vital conflicts of interest existed between the two powers. The Anglo-American rapprochement was more the result than the cause of that commonality of interests.7 In sum,
appeasement strictly defined is a strategy best avoided . Realistic bargaining or not be confused with
negotiations involving mutual compromise and presumably fixed intentions is another matter entirely, however, and should
appeasement.
Pg. 15
Appeasement DA ATEngagement Solves
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 16
Empirics disprove this argument past gestures have only legitimized Cuban aggression Claver-Carone, 1-22-13 (Mauricio Claver-Clarone, Executive Director of Cuba Democracy Advocates in
Washington, D.C., Board of Directors of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, Why Obama's 'extended hand' is counterproductive, The Hill, 1/22, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/278543-why-obamas-extended-handis-counter-productive)
In the 19th century, U.S. abolitionist leader William Lloyd Garrison astutely observed, With reasonable men, I will reason; with humane men I will plead; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost. Garrison recognized something in the psyche of tyrants that withstands the test of time. In the last century, Western leaders failed to heed Garrisons advice and, as a result, opened the flood-gates of two of the greatest tragedies in modern history -- fascism and communism -- at tremendous human cost and suffering: In 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain conceded the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia to Germany in hopes of app easing Adolf Hitlers aggression. Then in 1945, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Chamberlains successor, Winston Churchill, conceded to a Soviet Union sphere of political influence in Eastern and Central Europe believing Joseph Stalin could be reasoned with. At the time Churchill even remarked, "Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong, but I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin." He lived to regret his serious miscalculation. Unfortunately, U.S.
President Barack Obama began his 21st Century presidency, also failing to heed Garrisons advice, offering an extended hand to the rogue regimes of our time. During his inaugural speech in 2009, Obama famously stated, "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." The results have been counter-productive; the more so because the president prematurely extends his hand before tyrants give the slightest indication of unclenching their fists. In Iran, Obama ignored the calls for freedom by the Green Movement in 2009, when
thousands risked (and many lost) their lives to protest that countrys brutal regime, and sent a letter to Ayatollah Ali Kham enei seeking to improve relations. The result has been a more belligerent Iran one intent on fomenting terrorism and building nuclear weapons. In Syria, the president bet that tyrant Bashar al-Assad was something of a reformer. In 2011, as Syrians in their quest for freedom took to street demonstrations, Secretary of State Hi llary Clinton doubled down on Obamas bet apparently thinking we could reason with Assad. The result has been 50,000 civilian deaths and a threat to unleash chemical weapons on his own people and, perhaps, even his neighbors .
In Cuba, Obama eased travel and remittance sanctions almost immediately upon taking office as a good-faith gesture. The response has been the taking of an American hostage, Alan P. Gross, who recently began his fourth year in one of Castros prisons, and the sharpest spike in repression since the 1960s. Last year alone there were over 6,250 documented political arrests by the Castro regime against peaceful democracy activists. Finally, in North Korea, Obama continued the path of his predecessor, George W. Bush, in seeking fruitless aid-for-moratorium
deals, with the boyish new dictator Kim Jong Un. These were answered with two dangerous rocket launches in 2012 -- a failed one in April and a successful one in December. Obama is now trying to correct his positions issuing stronger sanctions toward Iran, granting diplomatic recognition of Assads opposition and warning North Korea of serious "consequenc es" if it fires another missile. Not
as regards Cuba. Obamas Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication, Ben Rhodes, reiterated again this month that Obama is still willing to extend a hand to Castros brutal regime. Thats not very strategic. Why is Obamas extended hand so counter-productive in dealing with these tyrants? Advocates for normalizing relations with these regimes can't deny these policies fail, instead they say brutal regimes need an enemy abroad to blame for their failures. It is a pompous rationale, which assumes residents of these countries are ignorant or impervious to who is beating, torturing, imprisoning and executing them. Hint: It is not the United States. The reason why the extended hand policy is so counter-productive is - as Garrison warned long ago -- tyrants are not reasonable and view an extended hand as a sign of weakness and, seeing no risk of consequences, ratchet up their criminal behavior. Obama understands this in dealing with Al Qaeda, which happens to be his greatest
foreign policy success. The President should apply a similar rationale to dealing with the Ahmadinejads, Assads, Castros and Kims of the world.
Pg. 16
Appeasement DA AT Appeasement Solves (w/ CP)
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 17
Appeasement fails only a quid pro quo can incentivize Cuban cooperation Crdenas 2012 (Jos R. Crdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International
Development under Bush Administration, How Not to Appease a dictatorship Friday, Monday December 31, 2012, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/31/how_not_to_appease_a_dictatorship ) Do we really need another lesson on the folly of attempting to appease dictators ? Apparently, Foreign Affairs thinks so -- albeit inadvertently. They recently posted a piece, "Our Man in Havana," about the heroic efforts of some Obama administration officials to give the Castro regime everything it wanted for the release of jailed development worker Alan Gross . Specifically, this meant gutting the official U.S. democracy program for Cuba that Gross was operating under. In the end, however, they just could not overcome the intransigence of -- not the Castro regime -- but the "Cuban-American Lobby" in Congress. Indeed, not only did they not wind up with the long-suffering Gross's freedom, but, to boot, former Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela was forced to sit through a humiliating meeting with Cuban officials ranting about all the dictatorship's grievances against the United States. As the article puts it, " The Cubans were far less flexible than the Americans expected ." (One doesn't know whether to laugh or cry.) The central figure in this drama of high diplomacy is one Fulton Armstrong, a controversial former CIA
analyst who began a second career as a staffer for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-MA). (Today, he is affiliated with American University.) Armstrong was such an unabashed promoter of U.S.-Cuba normalization in the inter-agency
Armstrong was enlisted by the administration to serve as a go-between with the Castro regime, no doubt due to the fact that he was a "friendly face" in the eyes of the Cubans. His mission: convince the Castro regime that the Obama administration agrees with them that USAID's Cuba democracy programs "are stupid" and that, in the words of
process that he was shipped off to Europe during the Bush 43 administration, although not before playing a role in trying to scuttle John Bolton's nomination to serve as U.S. representative to the United Nations. Apparently, Armstrong, "we're cleaning them up. Just give us time, because politically we can't kill them." The article also includes other Armstrong-sourced inanities meant to further discredit the USAID program: that he was told by a "State Department official" that
Gross's mission was "classified" and by another that Gross "likely worked for the Central Intelligence Agency." Apparently, Armstrong needs new sources, because such assertions are nonsense and known to be by anyone remotely associated with the program (as I was during my time with the Bush administration.) The everresourceful, man-on-a-mission Armstrong even enlisted his former boss, Senator Kerry, in the appeasement effort, arranging for him to meet with Cuban officials in New York. The
article reports, "
there was no quid pro quo , but the meeting seemed to reassure the Cubans that the democracy programs would change, and the Cubans expressed confidence that Gross would receive a humanitarian release shortly Enter the villain: Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), a member of the nefarious "Cuban American Lobby." He supposedly called Denis McDonough, Obama's deputy national
after his trial." (That was in March 2011.)
security adviser, to say basically hands off the Cuba program. According to a former government official, "McDonough was boxed in." Now, there's a tough call: side either with a lawless dictatorship or with an influential U.S. senator from your own party In the end,
the effort to appease the Castro regime ended predictably: no freedom for Alan Gross and only utter contempt from Castro regime lackeys. Indeed, is there any mystery why Gross continues to languish in a Cuban jail cell when, according to Armstrong, unnamed administration officials signal to the Cubans that they think the democracy program is "stupid" as well?
Moreover,
offering to gut a democracy program because a dictatorship opposes it sends a terrible message to authoritarian
regimes around the globe.
Pg. 17
Appeasement DA ATIneffective
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 18
Even if its ineffective, we should keep embargo in place. Sadowski 11 Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of
Production of the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention w ithin the Framework of the United States Embargo Sustainable Development Law & Policy Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource Conflicts Article 10 http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp
Many critics of the embargo complain that the policy is inherently ineffective and actually exacts a human toll.52 They note that many of
the societal ills of the Cuban people are furthered by the embargos economic impacts on Cuba. 53 For instance, the American Association for World Healths yearlong study of Cuba concluded that the embargo itself has led to increased suffering and death in Cuba, a condition that has been aggravated by the passage of the Helms-Burton Act.54 The study found that the declining availability of foodstuffs, medicines and such basic medical supplies as replacement parts for 30-year-old X-ray machines is taking a tragic human toll.55 Further, they argue that the opposition of the Cuban people to the embargo is ignored.56 Opponents view the embargo as a hypocritical U.S. policy that allows enthusiastic trade with China, a communist nation where political oppression is at least as great as in Cuba.57 These criticisms put further demands on the United States to end the embargo in the interest of human rights.58 Dealing with Cubas Oil Plans without Compromising the Embargo The Embargo is Still Necessary Despite
calls for its revocation, the embargos purpose is as important now as when it was enacted. Cuba is still an oppressive country.59 Cubans may not leave the country without permission and still lack fundamental
freedoms of expression.60 Jos Miguel Vivanco, the director of Americas division at Human Rights Watch, notes that as Cubas draconian laws and sham trials remain in place, [the country] continue[s] to restock the prison cells with new generations of innocent Cubans who dare to exercise their basic rights.61 Moreover, a recent proposal by the Cuban Communist Party makes clear that there will be no change in the countrys oppressive one-party political system.62 In doing so, the lengthy document declares [o]nly socialism is capable of overcoming the current difficulties and preserving the victories of the revolution.63 Cubas
treatment of its own citizens is a situation the United States cannot ignore. The embargos twin goals of backing democracy and ending oppressive rule have not been met. Until they are, the embargo must remain in place.
Pg. 18
Appeasement DA ATInternational Consensus
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 19
Consensus means nothing even if we dont use force, we shouldnt make concessions Henriksen 1999 (Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states,
and insurgencies, Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159 ) Shows of Strength and Armed Interventions to Coerce or Eliminate Rogue Governments Rogue regimes, by their very nature, are less persuaded by appeals to the fine points of international law and customary diplomatic practices than by armed force. Coercive diplomacy is initiated after, or in response to, a hostile action, whereas deterring a foe dissuades him from undertaking an activity by threatening retaliation. But the principle is similar. Strong displays of force can contribute to persuasion as well as deterrence . Tyrants traditionally treat conciliatory actions in response to egregious behavior with contempt: Hitler interpreted Chamberlain's appeasement over Czechoslovakia at Munich as weakness, America's cruise missile retaliation for an Iraqi attempt on former President Bush's life during his 1993 visit to Kuwait did not discourage Baghdad from dispatching army units right up to the border of the oil-rich kingdom in 1994. To resist the Iraqi aggression, Washington had to deploy American troops to Kuwait. Showing the flag aggressively should not be perceived as an end in itself. Or the target may call the showman's bluff. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Washington demonstrated enough political resolve and military power that
Moscow backed down and withdrew its missile batteries from Cuban soil. This standoff became a classic case of a superpower using force to prevent a fundamental change in the balance of power in a vital region. The May 1998 the
exercise of power must not be undercut by ill-advised concessions. For instance, in Clinton administration prompted NATO to display its air power close to Serbia's borders to persuade Milosevic to curb his forces in the province of Kosovo. But the Clinton administration then offered to lift the recently imposed investment bans on Serbia, hoping to facilitate U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke's peace negotiations with Belgrade. Subsequent American and NATO policy failed to make up for the misstep, and the situation worsened as special Serb police and army units committed a wave of well-publicized atrocities against
Kosovo Albanians during the succeeding five months. During the Soviet era, deterrence was a mainstay of U.S. policy toward Moscow's nuclear threat. In the post=ncold war period, deterrence may also dissuade rogue regimes from spreading biological agents or launching nuclear-armed missiles. But if rogue players persist in deadly actions, then a preemptive strike or counterassault may be in order.
Iraq, as an illustration, ignored the U.N. Security Council
ultimatum in November 1990 to withdraw from Kuwait during the course of the American-led military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Conflict became the only effective option. Hostilities broke out weeks later as coalition forces counterattacked to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait. The 1980s witnessed more-accomplished uses of military power for diplomatic motives. In a dramatic exercise, Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion and temporary occupation of Grenada in October 1983. During the two preceding years, Washington had looked with deepening concern at the hundreds of Cuban soldiers who were working on Grenadan construction projects, especially the airport. It soon
became apparent that the airport's expansion was intended for military use, not tourism as was officially announced. Reagan's hand was forced when a radical Marxist Soviet-Cuban putsch endangered several hundred American medical students studying on the small Caribbean island, alarming Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, and other tiny states of the region. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) urged the United States to bring order to Grenada and restore democratic government. A series of reports from Grenada heightened the Reagan administration's fears for the safety of the medical students. Those anxieties deepened when the Grenadan government imposed brutal martial law to suppress legitimate opposition and closed the airport to international landings. After
an urgent public appeal
from the OECS for U.S. military intervention, the ensuing air and sea invasion encountered some stiff but isolated resistance from the twenty-five hundred Cuban and Grenadan troops. But it soon rescued the students without their suffering any fatalities, repatriated the Cuban contingent, and restored American credibility worldwide. The large-scale military deployment raised American standing after the decline
it had suffered with the loss of 241 U.S. Marines in a terrorist bombing in Beirut, followed by the precipitous American departure from Lebanon. The rippling effect of Reagan's projection of power in the Caribbean also had an immediate and proximate reaction. Suriname, located not far from Grenada, reversed its political course and expelled a large Cuban garrison in the wake of the U.S. assault. President Reagan also struck at Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in retribution for a series of state-sponsored terrorist incidents occurring over several years that culminated in the bombing of a West German discotheque in which two U.S. servicemen died. Long
frustrated by being unable to build a coalition among European allies that would impose effective sanctions, the United States retaliated days later with air strikes. Bombs hit Qaddafi's residence and military installations, nearly killing the Libyan dictator. After the bombardment,
Libya appeared politically subdued, and some believed that it had been deterred from future terrorism. That judgment was only partially correct; during the balance of the 1980s Qaddafi used violence but sought to disguise his hand in it.13 For its part, the United States incurred world opprobrium when the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the American raid on Libya. Fighting
subversion can invite terrorist reprisals. Reagan's air strikes on
Pg. 19
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 20 Libya probably resulted in the downing of Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, which killed 259
people aboard the jumbo jet and 11 others on the ground. Evidence pointed to two Libyan agents as having placed the bomb aboard the U.S.-bound flight. The Bush administration responded by getting U.N. sanctions against Libya and insisting that Qaddafi surrender the two suspects for trial either in the United States or in Scotland. To date, Qaddafi has refused to comply but seems open to holding the trial in an unnamed third country. As the
Libyan case demonstrates, counterterrorism--whether punishment or preemptive assaults--can breed a cycle of violence for which the American people must be prepared. A chain reaction of terrorism has already unfolded in the wake of the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. If the
future reflects the past, terrorists will certainly avenge President Clinton's firing of cruise missiles at a pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing nerve gas in Sudan and at the paramilitary training camps in Afghanistan. Neither the administration's unconvincing one-shot, remote-control counterattacks nor its bank pincers on the financial assets of Osama bin Laden will win the "war on terrorism." It
will take a determined and sustained campaign. A riskless, terrorist-free world is simply beyond realistic attainment, just as is a crime-free society. But a hollow reaction will invite evermore subversion and casualties. History teaches that a massive application of power is sometimes the only method to deal with a rogue. For example, General Manuel Noriega's
corrupt military dictatorship in Panama had bedeviled U.S. drug interdiction efforts for years. Grand juries in Tampa and Miami indicted Noriega for drug trafficking and racketeering in February 1988. Washington's
economic sanctions failed to change Noriega's behavior. No opposition movement existed that was capable of wresting power from him, for he enjoyed the backing of the Panama Defense Forces. He put down an attempted coup in
March and spurned offers of amnesty in return for going into exile. America's initial reluctance to employ military force only steeled Noriega's determination to holdout against U.S. economic pressure. His fraudulent claim to reelection in May 1989 deepened skepticism in Bush administration circles that Noriega could be deposed by internal opponents. Panamanian
military thugs had also assaulted and killed two American servicemen and attacked
Bush opted for military intervention. In December 1989 a U.S. airborne invasion--the largest deployed since the Vietnam War--dismantled the PDF, captured Noriega, transported him to a Miami jail to await federal trial and eventual conviction, and restored democracy to Panama. Finally, Bush led the largest military coalition since World War II to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1990. He mobilized a
members of their families stationed in the Canal Zone. Believing that Noriega's presence endangered the smooth transfer of the canal to Panamanian authority, 500,000-strong U.S.-led force, convinced a reluctant Congress to back a war against Baghdad, and organized a thirty-nation coalition, many of them Arab countries, to repulse Iraq. His
achievement represented a post=ncold war high-watermark in U.S. leadership resolved to back American diplomacy with real power. The Grenada, Panama, and Iraq expeditionary operations shared salient similarities despite their geographic and political differences. Each concentrated massive martial force for limited and achievable strategic objectives. Each succeeded in periods measured in months rather than years. Each saw an American president reach out for international support but fail to win universal consensus. Each witnessed a determined Washington push ahead in the face of domestic and foreign opposition. Each thus represents a milestone in the deployment of forceful measures for national purposes. Reagan and Bush relished foreign affairs. Clinton
shirks them. Their records reflect their emphases.
Pg. 20
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 21
***Impact***
Pg. 21
Appeasement DA 2NC Hegemony Impact
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 22
Appeasement ruins American credibilityencourages resistance to US policy Rock 2kprofessor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A.,
Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 4)/ It does so in either (or both) or two ways. First, by ceding strategically valuable territory or abandoning certain of its defenses, the appeaser allows the military balance to shift in favor of the potential aggressor, eroding the formers deterrent capacity. This might be called the material effect of appeasement. Thus, for example, the abandonment of formidable Czech defenses in 1938 at Munich and the loss of the Czech Army in March of 1939 shifted the military balance toward Germany and rendered her attack on Poland more likely to succeed. Second, and much more critical, is what one can term the psychological effect of appeasement. Specifically, it is argued that appeasement gravely weakens the credibility of deterrent threats. Once it has received inducements, the adversary refuses to accept the possibility that the government of the conciliatory state will later stand firm. It thus advances new and more far-reaching demands. When the government of the appeasing state responds to these demands by issuing a deterrent threat, it is not believe. Ultimately, deterrence fails, and the appeasing state must go to war if it wishes to defend its interests.
The real tragedy of Munich, from this perspective, was not that Anglo-French concessions failed to satisfy Hitler in September of 1938although that was bad enoughbut that they encouraged him to attack Poland a year later, in blatant disregard of warnings from London and Paris that they would intervene.
Tyranny guarantees war maintaining hegemony is vital Lewis 09Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009,(James, The blessings of Pax
Americana,http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/09/the_blessings_of_pax_americana.html) The American Non-Empire --- what kind of "empire" is this, anyway? --- is far and away the best cop in world history, bringing the longest period of world peace (since 1948), the widest spread of freedom and democracy, the freest economies ever known, and as a direct result, the greatest world-wide prosperity from China to Brazil. Yes, we've seen horrific tyrannies and wars since 1948 --- but they have been local. No repeat of the Thirty Year War, of the Napoleonic mass wars, 1848, 1878, 1914, 1932, and in spite of decades of Cold War, no imperial expansion by Stalin and Mao Zedong. The Cold War stayed cold, a damned good thing. The Europeans have turned their armies into welfare programs. We were invited to rescue them when the Balkans blew up during the Clinton years. The Middle East is always on a low boil, but it never blows up. (So far.) The same goes for Asia. Koreans still hate Japan because of the horrific actions of the Japanese armies in World War Two. So do the Chinese. But they haven't come to blows. They understand that they are benefiting from the Good Cop of Pax Americana. Just let the US Navy withdraw from Asia and watch the Japanese getting a nuclear bomb, the Chinese invading Taiwan, and a new age of armed alliances emerging. Democratic governance only spread in Asia after the US victory over Japan. Before that it was tried by Sun Yat Sen and failed. Who would you like to be guarding the world instead of the United States? The UN? China or Russia? Europe? Well, let them call the UN Human Rights Commission the next time they have a problem. (That would be Iran, the Sudan, and Libya.) For sixty years the troubles have been kept local and regional. That is an unprecedented achievement for the United States. Those facts are all around us. Everybody knows it -- our allies, fake allies, enemies
and friends. It's hard to tell who's who, but every time they get a choice between American leadership and anything else, they choose us. Then they go home and bitch about it. It's
either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.
Pg. 22
Appeasement DA 2NC Turns Case
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 23
Appeasement independently collapses the global order turns case Henriksen 1999 (Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states,
and insurgencies, Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159 ) Conclusion and Recommendations At the dawn of a new millennium, the United States finds itself entering an era of neither war nor peace. Rather, it confronts an uncertain and increasingly deadly world. We face not one arms race but many, in which weapons of mass destruction have fallen--or are falling--into the most desperate hands. Rogue adversaries covet nuclear, chemical, or biological capabilities to obliterate ancient enemies or to terrorize their way into the circles of the great powers. They are also rapidly acquiring the long-range missiles to deliver awesome destruction to our allies' and our own shores. A congressionally chartered Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States under the chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld concluded in 1998 that Iran and North Korea will be able "to inflict major destruction on the United States" within five years and Iraq within ten. How
the United States handles rogue states will be of decisive importance to
America's well-being and global primacy. If it is judged timorous in the use of power, it will be open to challenge as its own vulnerability becomes apparent. Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military theorist, emphasized that war is to be understood as the continuation of politics by other means. Our adoption of severe remedies short of declared conflict must be seen as an extension of diplomatic instruments to realize our strategic goals. Power must be employed to further diplomatic goals. Sanctions and criminal legal proceedings make up part of our arsenal . These initial steps can build international support for more draconian measures. Offensive military operations and other measures short of war are our best defense for peace and continued security. They represent political warfare, provided, of course, that the United States has the tenacity and wherewithal to complete them once begun. By backing away from realistic approaches we will demonstrate to our opponents that they can oppose us without cost. Our allies will take note and go their own way. This turn of events will cause still further problems down the road. If the forces of global disorder come to dominate the world scene, the human condition will be degraded, producing fertile soil for still
more extreme elements to take root. The
alternative to American leadership is growing international anarchy. Unless we restore
power, and the credibility it represents, to U.S. diplomacy, we await the dire consequences of our feebleness.
Pg. 23
Appeasement DA Cred Key to HegeTop Level
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 24
Decline in U.S. Credibility Undermines U.S. Hegemony APSA 09 (American Political Science Association, U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future, Task Force Report, September 2009)
As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As credibility and esteem decline, the United States
may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We
suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it.
US credibility key to US hege Kydd 96 (Andrew, received his Ph. D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 1996 and taught at the
University of California, Riverside and Harvard, In America(used to) Trust the Hegemony, the Yale Press, 7/2/1996) (http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20202601?uid=3739728&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102552206777)
Benign hegemony explains why the hegemon cooperates, but why do any of the other states cooperate? The theory of coercive hegemony provides an answer. Although the smaller states in the system may prefer to free ride, the hegemon coerces them into cooperating by offering additional incentives or threatening additional costs for noncompliance. This perspective is a favorite of Marxists and realists alike. Revisionist historians of the Cold War portrayed U.S. foreign policy as driven by its economic interests. In this view, domestic elites, eager for export markets and outlets for investment, used American power to force economic openness on an unwilling world and to suppress popular re sistance.8 Realists such as Robert Gilpin have argued that great powers establish international orders to their liking after they prevail in hegemonic wars. These orders serve the security interests of the reigning hegemon at the expense of the lesser powers, until one of them, by dint of economic growth, rises to a position where it can challenge the hegemon in a new great-power war.9 Coercive hegemony is the Mafioso view of hegemony?hegemony as an offer you cannot refuse.
Credibility is important, in the sense envisioned by deterrence theory. The hegemon's threats must be credible, in that the followers believe that if the hegemon makes a threat, it will carry it out. Coercive hegemons enforce their will on reluctant followers and would rather be feared than loved. The Bush administration's view of hegemony combines ideas from both benign and coercive hegemony. In this view, most states obey the rules of the international system. Some states, however, pose grave threats to American security and to global stability. These states must be deterred or coerced into abandoning their links to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction programs, or general adversarial stance. The United States may have to provide this public good alone, because most states prefer to free ride, but this is the burden of hegemony.
What is important is not what the free riders think, because their behavior is inconsequential, but what the potential threats think. They must fear the wrath of the United States. In the tipping game, the payoffs for cooperating and free riding both increase, but once past the tipping point, states prefer to cooperate rather than free ride. This means if states think that many others will cooperate, they prefer to cooperate as well. Credibility
is conceived of differently in the third view of hegemony, the hegemonic assurance perspective.10 This view is based on the tipping game.11 The tipping game is like the public goods game except for one crucial assump tion: in the tipping game, the payoff for cooperation eventually exceeds the payoff for free riding if enough others are expected to cooperate. In Figure 2, this is illustrated by the fact that
the payoff lines cross and the payoff for co operation ends up on top. All states think that cooperation is a good idea and would like to cooperate if they could be assured that enough others will as well. Each state fears, however, that not enough other states will cooperate to make their own cooperation worthwhile. In order to cooperate, then, each state needs to be assured that a sufficient number of other states will cooperate to get the group past the "tipping point" where the lines intersect, beyond which everyone prefers to cooperate. 10 Given that everyone wants to cooperate if everyone else is expected to, one might wonder why cooperation is not more or less automatic in the tipping game. Why would states fail to cooperate if everyone knows that everyone else wants to? One of the most important impediments to cooperation in situations such as the tipping game is mistrust. Mistrust in this context is a fear that other states may secretly prefer to free ride, as in the public goods game, or may be at tempting to hijack the cooperative effort of others to serve their own narrow interests. Hegemony promotes cooperation in the face of this kind of mistrust in two ways. First, by engaging in discussions and providing credible information, the hegemon builds a consensus that the parties have a common goal, have identified a workable strategy for attaining it, and face a tipping problem in executing the strategy.12 Second, by pledging
Pg. 24
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 25
to cooperate, the hegemon helps to get everyone to the tipping point so that they wish to cooperate as well. Given its size, if the United States is willing to cooperate, only a few other states need to cooperate as well to push past the tipping point and get cooperation from the rest of the group. Thus, hegemons are well placed to foster international cooperation by persuading the group that they face a tipping problem and then getting the group past the tipping point so that everyone wants to cooperate. However, this process only works if the hegemon is trusted by the other states. If the hegemon is seen as trustworthy, the information it provides about the nature of the problem and the appropriate response will be viewed as credi ble, so that other states will come to see the issue as a tipping problem. The hegemon's intention to cooperate will also be regarded as credible, so other states will be willing to cooperate as well. The hegemon's power is then a boon. By moving the world closer to the tipping point, the hegemon makes it that much easier for the world to cooperate. If the hegemon is untrustworthy, however, it will not only not promote cooperation, it will make other states less likely to cooperate.
If the hegemon is untrustworthy, others will doubt the information it provides and question the wisdom of the proposed solution. They will also doubt whether the hegemon will abide by its side of any cooperative arrange ments. These concerns will prevent the other states from cooperating. For hege mony to promote cooperation via hegemonic assurance, therefore, the hegemon needs to be trustworthy.
Pg. 25
Appeasement DA Cred K2 HegeCollapse Causes War

Looking weak collapses heg and makes a laundry list of conflicts inevitable
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 26
Hanson, 2009 Victor Davis Hanson (professor of classics at California State University, Fresno, and is currently the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at
Stanford University's Hoover Institution) December 2009 Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama http://pjmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answersfrom-victor-davis-hanson/ BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obamas marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape whether
China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. are just waiting to see whos going to be the first to try Obama and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three.
I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. Theres an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. Indias borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it
will bite or when.
Pg. 26
Appeasement DA Cred K2 HegeStudies

Best studies of credibility prove it influences international relations
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 27
Gibler, 2008 Douglas M. Gibler Department of Political Science University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jun., 2008), pp. 426-454
I argue above that alliance formation provides an excellent alternative for testing the effects of state reputation. More isolated from the strategic selection of deterrence situations, with a public signal that remains relatively constant across time, region, and even perhaps situation, state reputations formed by honoring or violating alliance commitments offer many advantages for testing a seemingly intangible quality like reputation. Thus, using a relatively simple research design, this article was able to establish what international theorists have suspected, but empirical tests have thus far been unable to prove: reputations have important consequences for state behavior.
Pg. 27
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 28
***Venezuela**
Pg. 28
Appeasement DA 1NC Shell
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 29
The plans unconditional nature turns the entirety of AFF solvency-Venezuela will use renewed relations with the US to obscure corruption and maintain ties with US adversaries Walser 6-7-13. Ray Walser was a career Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State for 27 years and is a
Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America @ Heritage. Buyer Beware: Secretary Kerry and Venezuela [http://blog.heritage.org/2013/06/07/buyer-beware-secretary-kerry-and-venezuela/] [MG]
Regrettably, Secretary Kerry
and his Department of State colleagues are succumbing to Diplomats Syndrome , a form of optical illusion or top diplomats of the U.S. and
mental disorientation that mistakes talk for action and assigns friendly gestures equal weight with actual deeds. That
Venezuela talked is no big deal. President Obama made nice with President Chavez in April 2009 and relations continued to deteriorate. What really matters
is whether Venezuelas populist authoritarian leadership is genuinely ready to modify behaviors that clash with important U.S . interests and values. Beginning with the death of Chavez on March 5, the Maduro regime has engaged in virtually non-stop anti-American diatribes. It arrested U.S. citizen and filmmaker Tim Tracy on farcical charges of espionage. His recent release is a long overdue and little more than a concession to reality. Since March, President Maduro and company have repeatedly blocked efforts to obtain a fair review of voting irregularities in the April 14 elections and threatened and assaulted members of the democratic opposition, including a brutal attack on opposition legislators on the floor of the National Assembly. Maduro and company have also spoken of punitive reprisals against U.S. ally Colombia, because Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with defeated opposition candidate Henrique Capriles. Maduro and Jaua clearly hope that Secretary Kerry and the Obama Administration will finally recognize the outcome of the April 14 elections a nd legitimate Maduros presidency while openly throwing the democratic opposition under the bus. Kerrys
statement equating Maduros mouthpiece Jaua with Venezuela is disconcerting. The offensive of Maduro and Jaua is aimed at undercutting the diplomatic offensive of the opposition. They also hope to keep the systemic failures of their Cuban-inspired socialism and economic mismanagement out of the discussion and obscure
their ties
with Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. Therefore, the bar for genuine improvements in U.S.Venezuela
relations should remain high . It should include a serious commitment by the Maduro regime to not only respect the rights of the democratic opposition but to enter into an actual dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and preserving fundamental political and economic rights. It will also require
a major reversal in persistent anti-Americanism coupled with
genuine
cooperation to combat illicit drug trafficking and terrorism and adherence to all Iran and Syria sanctions. Without progress on these keys themes, Kerry and company will falter when it comes to changing the dynamic with post-Chavez
Venezuela and
legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela.
The US must implement strong strategies against rogue states and potential proliferators to preserve US international image Enold 09 (Scott A. Enold, Colonel, United States Air Force, ROGUE STATES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY
02-04-2009, Strategy research project) To effectively engage rogue states who have proliferated nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or are attempting to proliferate them, the United States must develop and implement an effective policy designed to persuade, pursue and punish those governments and regimes. The United States government must possess extreme tactics and measures. Preemptive targeting must be available if rogue states or actors utilize nuclear terror tactics as they seek political gains or to be recognized as a key participant in the world balance of power. It is imperative that rogue states or actors cannot employ nuclear weapons. As rogue states acquire nuclear technology, the United States must develop a range of policies to apply constant pressure on these states. The United States must be prepared to demonstrate resiliency to attacks
should they occur. The United States government must prepare its citizens to accept the fact terrorist acts will occur on the continent. The citizens must understand that every effort is made to protect the population. Actors
exist who seek to harm citizens or provide evidence of weak resolve or weak policies inside the United States. In doing so, rouge states or actors seek to secure a foothold for a continued exploitation of the United States. Presently, the United States National Security Strategy does not lay out a direct policy demonstrating a complete and unconditional strategy
Pg. 29
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 30 to stop rogue state or actor nuclear weapon employment. There must be actionable and if necessary violent steps available to take against rogue states and actors. They must to be aware of and understand the harsh retaliation should they chose to utilize a nuclear option.
Proliferation will be fast and destabilizing guarantees nuclear war Evans and Kawaguchi 9 (Gareth, Chancellor of the Australian National University, an Honorary Professorial Fellow
at the University of Melbourne and President Emeritus of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Member of the House of Councillors for the Liberal Democratic Party since 2005. She was Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Japan, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, International Commission on Nuclear Non -Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-ii-3.html) 3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear armed must continue to be one of the worl ds top
international security priorities.
Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks of accident or
miscalculation as well as deliberate use involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail , and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical and for all those reasons, strongly emotive dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 19982002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve . Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The actionreaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the
Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever
the chances of stable deterrence prevailing in a Cold War or IndiaPakistan setting, the
prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and crosscutting sources of conflict.
Pg. 30
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 31
***Uniqueness***
Pg. 31
Appeasement DA Hardline Now
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 32
The US is taking a strong stance in Venezuela now Sends a signal to others Crdenas 4/19/13 (Jos R. Crdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International
Development under Bush Administration, Obama must stand firm on Venezuela Friday, April 19, 2013 - 12:14 PM, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4784) After an ill-advised overture to Hugo Chvez's government last November, the Obama administration has regained its footing with a strong, principled stance on Venezuela's contested election. Based on the razor-thin margin and opposition protests of irregularities, the administration has yet to recognize as the winner Vice President Nicolas Maduro, Chvez's anointed successor, and has instead supported a review of the vote count. In appearances before both the House and Senate in recent days, Secretary of State John Kerry re-affirmed that position "so that the people
of Venezuela who participated in such a closely divided and important election can have the confidence that they have the legitimacy that is necessary in the government going forward." He said, "I don't know whether it's going to happen. ... [But] obviously, if
there are huge irregularities, we are going to
have serious questions about the viability of that government." Kerry's statements brought the predictable howls of protest from Venezuela. "It's
obscene, the U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela," Mr. Maduro said. "Take your eyes off Venezuela, John Kerry! Get out of here! Enough interventionism!" But no one should be intimidated by such false bravado. Maduro
is in a panic. He knows he cannot handle declining socioeconomic conditions in the face of a reinvigorated opposition, dissension in his own ranks, and an engaged U.S. government standing firm on principle regarding the legitimacy of his election. Of course, the administration will face a vociferous public campaign by
chavista sympathizers pressuring it to accept Sunday's disputed result. Already, the feckless Organization of American States Secretary General Jos Miguel Insulza has
Recognition proponents will tell us the United States faces "isolation" in the region if the administration doesn't recognize Maduro (only Panama and Paraguay have joined the call for a recount) and that its supposed intransigence plays right into Maduro's hands, allowing him to whip up nationalist sentiment. Nonsense. Those proposing such arguments fail to recognize that governments are pursuing interests. Certain countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and even Russia and China, have benefited greatly from economic ties with Venezuela under Chvez and their short-sighted view is to try and keep that spigot open. Most citizens
backtracked from the organization's initial strong statement on behalf of a recount and now has accepted the result. throughout the region, however, tend to be more appreciative of principles, such as the security and integrity of one's vote. One can be sure that, in case of a disputed election in their own country, they would
hope to count on external support for an honest accounting in their own electoral processes. is not Chvez, and his capacity to whip up anything but official violence against Venezuelans protesting in the streets is extremely doubtful (Warning: graphic photos here). In short, no one should be misled by the noisemakers. A continued firm stand on behalf of a clean election will resonate positively throughout the region, sending a strong signal to all democrats that the United States does indeed care and that intimidation and violence have no place in any democracy. It is not likely that such sentiments will sway Maduro and his Cuban advisors to accept any sort of recount, but it will certainly place the United States on the right side of the debates and confrontations to come.
Secondly, as the election just demonstrated, Maduro
Pg. 32
Appeasement DA Snowden
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 33
Maduro is openly hostile the Snowden saga proves Forero and Englund 7-8-13( Juan Forero and Will Englund, Washington post reporters, With Snowden offer,
Venezuelas Maduro is on world stage, Washington post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offervenezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story_1.html ) Newly elected and facing staggering economic problems at home despite the countrys oil wealth, Maduro appears to have made a high-pitched, openly hostile position against the Obama administration a cornerstone of his governments foreign policy. He took his most provocative stand Friday in announcing that Venezuela would take in Snowden. On Monday, Maduro said that a letter from Snowden requesting asylum had
been received and that the young American would simply have to decide when to fly to Caracas. Maduro has accused the United States of fomenting protests against his government after his disputed April 14 election victory, which gave him the presidency his predecessor, Hugo Chvez, had held for 14 turbulent years until his death from cancer. The
Snowden saga a young American revealing secrets the U.S. government wants to contain provided the perfect opportunity for Maduro to take on the Obama administration, said Eduardo Semtei, a former Venezuelan government official. To figure internationally, to show that he is a player among big powers, he offered asylum to Snowden, said Semtei, who had been close to Chvezs brother, Adn, a leading
ideologue in the late presidents radical movement. This grabs headlines, and it shows that hes a strong president, one with character, and that hes capable o f challenging the United States. Maduro and Venezuela came late to the Snowden saga, as tiny Ecuador, an ally also committed to opposing American initiatives, heaped praise on Snowden and expressed a willingness to help him after he had flown from Hong Kong to Moscow on June 23 to avoid American justice. When Ecuador backed away from its initial enthusiasm over Snowden, Venezuela stepped in last week as Maduro arrived in Moscow for an energy summit. The
50year-old Maduro, who found his political calling as a socialist activist with close ties to Cuba, took a sharply anti-imperialist stand in embracing Snowden. He said the United States had created an evil system, half Orwellian, that intends to control the communications of the world, and characterized Snowden as an antiwar activist and hero who had unmasked the dastardly plans of Americas ruling elite. Political analysts say the opportunity to take sides against Washington was simply irresistible for a government that has for years characterized itself as a moral force speaking out for the weak against the empire, as the United States is known in Caracas. And the fact that the secrets Snowden divulged were embarrassing to the Obama administration only gave more fuel to Venezuela, former Venezuelan diplomats and political analysts in Caracas said. Edward Snowden
became the symbol for the anti-imperialist rhetoric, for progressivism, for international radicalism, said Carlos Romero, an analyst and author who closely tracks Venezuelas international diplomacy. Venezuela
helped channel the fury of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Suriname after Bolivian President Evo Moraless plane was apparently refused entry into the airspace of as many as four European countries last Tuesday
because of the belief that Snowden was hiding aboard. And on Monday, Venezuelas state media apparatus seemed to take more of fense than the Brazilian government over revelations that the NSA had collected data on countless telephone and e-mail conversations in Brazil. But former diplomats familiar with Venezuela say that
there are other aspects to consider in deciphering Maduros support for Snowden. Ignacio Arcaya, a diplomat who served the Chvez government in the United States in the early part of his presidency, said Maduro has had the challenge of trying to ease the concerns of radicalized sectors in his movement that have been worried about a resumption of relations with Washington now that Chvez is gone. Indeed, until recently, Maduro was spearheading an effort at rapprochement, as shown by a meeting in Guatemala on June 5 between Secretary of State John F. Kerry and his Venezuelan counterpart, Elas Jaua. What Maduro is doing is aimed at quieting the radical sectors of his party who think he is negotiating with the United States and think that hes talking to private industry, Arcaya said. Maduro also has to consider his own unstable political position after the April 14 election, which is being contested by his challenger, Henrique Capriles, who says the vote was stolen from him. At the same time, Maduro faces millions of Venezuelans tired of the countrys sky-high inflation, rampant homicide rate and serious shortages of everything from chicken to toilet paper. Myles R.R. Frechette, a retired American diplomat who served in Venezuela and other Latin American countries, said Maduro is using a tried-and-true strategy: loudly oppose the United States to distract from domestic problems. It plays very well, said Frechette. Its the card to play. Its what youve always got in your drawer. You open your drawe r and play to your most
radical elements. Englund reported from Moscow.
Pg. 33
Appeasement DA Maduro Recognition
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 34
US refuses to acknowledge Maduro relations are at a deadlock Baverstock 5-17-13 (Alasdair Baverstock, Foreign Correspondent, Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on
Washington's recognition May 17, 2013, The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition) More than a month after Venezuelas contested presidential election, President Nicols Maduros narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chvez. A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuelas opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiplevoting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation. Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government, said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduros victory in April. While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how if at all it will impact Venezuela post-Chvez. [The US isnt] recognizing or failing to recognize, says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. Theyre just waiting. But here in Venezuela thats seen as an act of belligerence.
The USs reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US the USs reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers. Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela, says Mark Jones, professor of political science at
'Symbolic' refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe Rice University in Texas. countries
The USs refusal to recognize him is more symbolic
than anything else.
Ignoring Maduros win sends a signal to other Latin American
that these elections didnt meet minimum democratic standards. Other observers cite the socialist leaders continued belligerence toward Washington Maduro blames the US governments dark forces for the death of Mr. Chvez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor as a factor in the USs reluctance to recognize Maduro as president. You cant blame the US for not extending their hand, says Mr. Smilde. Maduro has been denouncing US conspiracies since the day Chvez died. Maduro reacted publicly to President Obamas announcement that the US was withholding recognition of his victory by describing the US president as the Grand chief of devils and threatening to cut off oil exports to the country. Thats an entirely hollow threat, says Professor Jones, 96 percent of Venezuelas export revenues come from oil, so Maduro is not going to do anything to upset that.
Pg. 34
Appeasement DA Relations
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 35
US Venezuelan relations at an all-time Low No diplomatic relations remain Villarreal 5/12/13 (Ryan Villarreal, journalist based in New York City Specializes in Latin America, Diplomacy
War Or Political Theater? Maduro Ramps Up Anti-US Rhetoric As Venezuelan Elections Approach, March 12 2013 1:03 PM, http://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelanelections-approach ) The U.S. and Venezuela have both expelled diplomats from each others countries amid high political tensions in the South American nation following the death of President Hugo Chvez last week, ahead of new elections. Hours before the Venezuelan government announced Chvezs passing last Tuesday, Caracas expelled two U.S. Air Force attachs. The U.S. followed in kind, dismissing two Venezuelan diplomats on Sunday. Around the world, when our people are thrown out unjustly, were going to take reciprocal action, Victoria Nuland, the State Department spokeswoman, said in a statement on Monday. And we need to do that to protect our own people. The Venezuelan government justified its action, saying that the attachs were engaged in efforts to destabilize the country during a time of political vulnerability. It has been suggested that Venezuelas acting president and the socialist presidential candidate Nicolas Maduro expelled the attachs to appease supporters of his predecessor in preparation for elections scheduled for April 14. Maduro also recently accused the U.S. government of giving Chvez cancer, from which he died after a two-year battle. Maduro is shoring up political support within Chavismo, said Carl
Meacham, Americas Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, the Miami Herald reported.
Pg. 35
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 36
***Link***
Pg. 36
Appeasement DA Engagement LinkNorms Credibility
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 37
Genuine Venezuelan engagement is impossible the plan is ONLY appeasement Harper, 10 (Liz, Americas Quarters, Venezuelas Formal Rejection of Ambassador-Designate Larry Palmer,
Americas Quarterly, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/taxonomy/term/2741) On one side, you have those espousing "strategic engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on
areas of mutual interest. You raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one pers on said, engagement should be subversive," because you seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission.
But, the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, is more
like "appeasement ," say people clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death by a thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chvez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby further eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chvez threatens more than human rights and democratic norms; the U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chvez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral?
Pg. 37
Appeasement DA Engagement LinkSolvency Turn
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 38
Engagement legitimizes the Maduro regime the plan has no effect on relations which independently takes out solvency Christy 3-15-13 (Patrick Christy is a senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative Obama must stand up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela)
For over a decade, Chavez led ideologically-driven efforts to erode U.S. standing in Latin America and around the globe. The populist leader expanded Venezuela's ties with rogue states such as Cuba and Iran, aided and protected terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and actively undermined the rule of law in Venezuela and throughout the Americas. In the Western Hemisphere alone, Chavez used record petrol prices to prop up antiAmerican socialist leaders, most notably in Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. Chavez leaves behind a broken economy, a deeply divided nation and a dysfunctional government, all of which will take yearsif not decadesto overcome.
Venezuela is plagued with double-digit inflation, mounting budget deficits and rising levels of violence. While the OPEC nation maintains one of the world's largest geological oil reserves, crude exportswhich account for roughly 45 percent of federal budget revenueshave declined by nearly half since 1999. The United States imports roughly one million barrels from Venezuela per day. Chavez's protg Nicolas
Maduro, the former vice president who's now acting as Venezuela's interim president, is running to succeed the late strongman, but it's not preordained that he'll win. It remains to be seen the extent to which he can properly unite prior to the election the many competing populist factions that benefited under Chavez for so many years. What is clear is that he will drape himself in the political ideology of chavismo in the run up to April 14 elections, and useand quite possibly abuse government institutions and petrodollars in attempt to woo the country's voters. What's perverse is how the Obama administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency than to resuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed itself to be even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death. Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition .
The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should:
Pg. 38
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 39
***Impact***
Pg. 39
Appeasement DA Hegemony
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 40
US flip flop now legitimizes Maduro and undermines US influence Christy 6/13/13 (Patrick Christy, Senior Policy Analyst U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuelas Democratic
Opposition U.S. News and World Report's World Report, June 13, 2013 http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/usovertures-maduro-hurt-venezuela%E2%80%99s-democratic-opposition#sthash.g3CoVrbN.dpuf ) On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jose Jaua, marking the Obama administration's latest attempt to reset relations with the South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find, in his words, a "new way forward" with Venezuela could end up legitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state institutions. Since the death of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March, Maduro's actions have more resembled those of a Cuban strongman than a democratically-elected official. Indeed, he has taken drastic moves to preserve his power and discredit his critics in recent months. First, the Maduro regime is refusing to allow a full audit of the fraudulent April 13th presidential elections, as opposition presidential
candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As the Associated Press notes a full audit "would have included not just comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, but also comparing those with the poll station registries that contain voter signatures and with digitally recorded
appointees loyal to the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and Supreme Court the two government institutions able to challenge election results it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a full election recount. Second, Maduro's government is taking steps to dominate radio and television coverage of the regime. Last month, Globovision, one of Venezuela's last remaining independent news channels, was sold to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcasting station faced years of pressure as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, the company's new ownership has banned live video coverage of opposition leader Henrique Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned. Third, the regime and its allies are using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition. On April 30th, pro-Maduro lawmakers physically attacked opposition legislators on the floor of Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, the regime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's growing influence on Venezuela's armed forces. More recently, Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend the sovereignty of the homeland." In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary
fingerprints." However, because Chavez-era Kerry's words, "an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior. To be sure, Caracas's
recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook. While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings
and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse,
if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's
government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by Mara Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power. Rather
than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's
Pg. 40
Appeasement DA
government. By
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 41
popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals especially those related to institutional corruption could further erode public confidence in the current
resetting relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protg's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.
Pg. 41
Appeasement DA Turns Credibility
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 42
Engagement with the country actively contributes to instability and collapse regional cooperation Wilson 11. Bill Wilson, President of Americans for Limited Government. Obamas Appeasement to the South. [http://netrightdaily.com/2010/12/obamas-appeasement-to-the-south/][MG]
Of course, at
some point, appeasement begins to look like approval . The silence has been inexcusable, but the statement by U.S. Ambassador
to Nicaragua Robert Callahan that the communist state was now a candidate for U.S. foreign aid via the Millennium Challenge Corporation is an insult. And Valenzuelas handshake with Ortega a week after the invasion began is a crime against liberty. Making matters worse, Nicaragu an dictator Daniel Ortega has stacked that countrys Supreme Court simply so it could rule he is eligible to run for reelection even though he is term-limited by the constitution. Clearly, Ortega has taken a page from Manuel Zelaya, who attempted a similar coup in Honduras to stay in power for life. Moreover, the Sandinistas have s een fit to reprint the Nicaraguan constitution to allow term-limited officials, including Supreme Court justices and election magistrates, to stay in power indefinitely, undoubtedly to s olidify Ortegas hold on power. This is the same regime responsible for the murder of thousands of Nicaraguans in th e 1980s as it waged its revolution.
Weakness invites
aggression , and it is clear that the ineptitude of the Obama Administration has not gone unheeded in the region. In the last week o f the year, Chavez expelled U.S. envoy Palmer for his comments about Venezuelas proxy war against U.S. ally Columbia. Columbia, like Costa Rica, is in danger from these insurgent forces seeking to topple freedom in the region. Venezuela has unsurprisingly refused to condemn the Nicaraguan invasion of Costa Rica in the Organization of American States, and itself has a horrendous record of suppressing opposition in its country . Chavez has made himself dictator-for-life and has eliminated privately-run
press organizations. And Barack Obama has done nothing, and his stooge, Valenzuela, since being appointed to his post continues to project a weak U.S. posture in the region. That wont be changing any time soon, and certainly not in time to save nations like Nicaragua from once again fallin g into the grips of an authoritarian regime.
Freedom will not long endure in the Americas without U.S. leadership, and under the Obama Administration, Central and South America are becoming less free.
Pg. 42
Appeasement DA Turns Democracy
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 43
Recognition of Maduro in any form will undermine democratic signals to the entire region Baverstock 5-17-13. Alasdair, CS Monitor. Foreign Correspondent and Guidebook Author. Venezuela's Maduro still
waiting on Washington's recognition [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-stillwaiting-on-Washington-s-recognition] [MG] The USs reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe the USs reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers.
science at Rice University in Texas. The Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela, says Mark Jones, professor of political
USs refusal to recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduros
win sends a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didnt meet minimum democratic standards.
Pg. 43
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 44
DA Infrastructure
Pg. 44
Appeasement DA Hege Impacts
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 45
Heg decline causes Great-Power war---Bandwagoning empirically prevents Global Instability

August 16, Thayer 12 *BradleyProfessor of Political Science at Baylor University, Doubting the Decline of Great Power War Thesis, Global Trends 2030, http://gt2030.com/2012/08/16/doubting-the-decline-of-great-power-war-thesis/, DOA 11/15/12
The decline of Great Power war thesis advanced by the NIC analysis pivots on an important empirical fact: there havent been any since World War II. The cause, or causes, of the Long Peace is less transparent and widely debated. I advance two arguments here. First, U.S. power is the principal cause of stability in international politics but is likely to weaken in the timeframe considered by the NIC report. As the relative power of the U.S. declines, the likelihood of great power conflict rises. Second, the NIC study underplays the probability of intense security competition with China. As a consequence, I am doubtful the world has seen the end of great power war. In addition to ensuring the security of the U.S. and its allies, American primacy provides four benefits for the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were frequent antagonists. Today, American primacy reduces nuclear proliferation incentives and helps keep a number of historically dicey relationships peacefulsuch as between Greece and Turkey. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread the positive norms and values the NIC document identifies. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States. This is because liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy, as the NIC analysis recognizes. With its allies, the United States has toiled to create a globalized trade regime defined by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets. The prosperity that flows from this liberal order is a global good. Fourth, the United States has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but also to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The U.S. military has participated in scores of humanitarian operations since the end of the Cold War. Given these great benefits, we may be confident of one prediction: Many people around the world will miss U.S. primacy when its gone. Without U.S. power, the liberal order is likely to end, and this alone is liable to exacerbate tensions. But the waning of U.S. power, at least in relative terms, introduces additional problems concerning
the future prospects for great power war. Declining hegemons have a choice. They may labor to reverse their decline, perhaps through innovation or greater competition with the challenger, which may lead to conflict. Or they may accept it, and watch their influence wither and allies drift away, which also introduces avenues of conflict. There is no reason to believe that the United States will escape this difficult decision, either of which holds the prospect of conflict with China. On the other side of the coin, Chinas rise in relative power contains great risks of conflict and intense security competition . Briefly, here are three major reasons for pessimism when we consider the likelihood of a Sino-American conflict. First, China has numerous border disputes in the South and East China Seas, India, and, of course, Taiwan. Each of these conflicts is dangerous, particularly those in the South China Sea, due to the national security interest of Beijing, Washington and its allies, and the risk of intentional or inadvertent escalation. Second, we must consider Beijing s and Washingtons conflicting grand
The world has witnessed Chinas abandonment of Dengs 24-Character Strategy and talk of a Peaceful Rise in favor of rapid military expansion and what can only be described as a strategic autism or tone deafness that has alarmed Japan, India, and the ASEAN states, to the benefit of the U.S. Unfortunately, unless Beijings trajectory changes, it is on a collision course with Washington. Third, the systemic problems of alliances, mutual concerns over credibility, buck-passing, chain ganging and abandonment, confront the United States in its explicit or de facto alliances with Japan, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam. These alliances provide prodigious benefits but also introduce pathways to conflict with China. Friends are great to have but they can get you into trouble. To this, we must add the dangers well identified by theories of hegemonic war and power transition concerning the incentives, held by the declining hegemon or challenger, or both, for arms racing and other forms of intense security competition. In sum, there are significant reasons to doubt the decline of Great Power war thesis in the context of Chinas relations with other Great Powers.
strategic interests. The report underplays how belligerent, revisionist, and risk accepting China may be in the future.
Pg. 45
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 46
Hegemony is critical to preventing collapse of civilization---decline causes power vacuum resulting in global instability
Brzezinski 12
[1/3, *Zbigniew BrzezinskiRobert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, PhD in Political Science @ Harvard, After America, Foreign Policy Magazine, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america, DOA 2/21/12] Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese
official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fastmoving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial
lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China
is not yet ready to
assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development,
wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and
have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates
Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders
Pg. 46
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 47 are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's
economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A
decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a
particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by
cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.
Your defense doesnt apply---decline triggers great power war

Kagan 12 [2/11, **Robert Kagan: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe for Brookings, Why the World Needs America,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html, WSJ, accessed February 11, 2012] History shows that world
orders, including our own, are transient. They rise and fall, and the institutions they erect, the beliefs and "norms" that guide them, the economic systems they supportthey rise and fall, too. The downfall of the Roman Empire brought an end not just to Roman rule but a and law and to an entire economic system stretching from Northern Europe to North Africa. Culture, the arts, even progress in science and technology, were set back for centuries. Many of us take for granted how the world looks today. But it might look a lot different without America at the top. The Brookings Institution's Robert Kagan talks with Washington bureau chief Jerry Seib about his new book, "The World America Made," and whether a U.S. decline is inevitable. Modern history has followed a similar pattern. After the Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th century, British control of the seas and the balance of great powers on the European continent provided relative security and stability. Prosperity grew, personal freedoms expanded, and the world was knit more closely together by revolutions in commerce and
communication. With the outbreak of World War I, the age of settled peace and advancing liberalismof European civilization approaching its pinnaclecollapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism and economic calamity. The once-promising
spread of democracy and liberalism halted and then reversed course, leaving a handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The collapse of the British and European orders in the 20th century did not produce a new dark age though if Nazi Germany and
imperial Japan had prevailed, it might havebut the horrific conflict that it produced was, in its own way, just as devastating. Would the end of the present Americandominated order have less dire consequences? A surprising number of American intellectuals, politicians and policy makers greet the prospect with equanimity. There is a general sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not mean the end of the present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the current economic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers. American power may diminish, the political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive." The commentator Fareed Zakaria believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers like China "will continue to live within the framework of the current international system." And there are elements across the political spectrumRepublicans who call for retrenchment, Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutions who don't imagine that a "post-American world" would look very different from the American world. If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The
present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great-power autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in a new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some
of the rising democraciesBrazil, India, Turkey, South Africapicked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it. What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People
assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. A Romney Adviser University of Texas National Institute in Forensics Pg. 47
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 48
Read by Democrats Robert Kagan's new book, "The World America Made," is finding an eager readership in the nation's capital, among prominent members of both political parties. Around the time of President Barack Obama's Jan. 24 State of the Union Address, Washington was abuzz with reports that the president had discussed a portion of the book with a group of news anchors. Mr. Kagan serves on the Foreign Policy Advisory Board of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but more notably, in this election season, he is a foreign policy adviser to the presidential campaign of Mitt Romney. The president's speech touched upon the debate over whether America is in decline, a central theme of Mr. Kagan's book. "America
is back," he declared, referring to a range of recent U.S. actions on the world stage. "Anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about," he continued. "America remains the one indispensable nation in world affairsand as long as I'm president, I intend to keep it that
way." Says Mr. Kagan: "No president wants to preside over American decline, and it's good to see him repudiate the idea that his policy is built on the idea that
The creation and survival of a liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global commonsor rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security . As Mohan
American influence must fade." Unfortunately, they might not be able to help themselves. Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The
move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order . And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the
country's enormous population, but in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over $40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly where Slovenia and Greece are today. As Arvind Subramanian and other economists have pointed out, this will make for a historically unique situation. In the past, the largest and most dominant economies in the world have also been the richest. Nations whose peoples are such obvious winners in a relatively unfettered economic system have less temptation to pursue protectionist measures and have more of an incentive to keep the system open.
China's leaders, presiding over a poorer and still developing country, may prove less willing to open their economy. They have already begun closing some sectors to foreign competition and are likely to close others in the future. Even optimists like Mr. Subramanian believe that the liberal economic order will require "some insurance" against a scenario in which " China exercises its dominance by either reversing its previous policies or failing to open areas of the economy that are now highly protected." American economic dominance has been welcomed by much of the world because, like the mobster Hyman Roth in "The Godfather," the U.S. has always made money for its partners. Chinese economic dominance may get a different reception. Another problem is that China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, [is] with the ultimate goal of preserving the rule of the Communist Party. Unlike the eras of British and American pre-eminence, when the leading economic powers were dominated largely by private individuals or companies, China's system is more like the mercantilist arrangements of previous centuries. The government amasses wealth in order to secure its continued rule and to pay for armies and navies to compete with other
great powers. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of
multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful . Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to miscalculation . Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europewide wars that followed the French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of
multipolar harmony. But roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War
The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker has observed, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for maintaining the balance of power." There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of
(1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded.
Pg. 48
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 49 American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. President Bill Clinton left office believing that the key task for America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the
world's only superpower," to prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can it be done? For particularly in matters of security, the rules and institutions of international order rarely survive the decline of the nations that erected them. They are like scaffolding around a building: They don't hold the building up; the building holds them up. It
will last only as long as those who favor it retain the will and
capacity to defend it.
Many foreign-policy experts see the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. Americans certainly like to believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and justnot only for us but for everyone. We assume that the
triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system, and that both are irreversible. That is
why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But international
order is not an
evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over othersin America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No
divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The
better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or
more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that the
U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.
Pg. 49
Appeasement DA Prolif Impacts

Prolif drastically increases the risk of accidents guarantees nuclear war
Sturm 09 Fellow at the National Truman Security Project, a national security based institute in Washington DC
for the 21st Century, Truman National Security Project)
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 50
(Frankie, Nuclear Weapons: A New Paradigm
Accidents happen, but the price of a nuclear accident is impermissible. Yet, past incidents over the last several decades far less known than Chernobyl could very well have led to more catastrophic results: 1979, U.S. Mistakes Computer Exercise for Soviet Nuclear S trike.
When a realistic training tape was mistakenly inserted into the computer running the United States early warning system, launch control centers for Minuteman missiles received preliminary warning that the U.S. was under attack, while the entire continental air defense interceptor force was put on alert. In a country with less sophisticated systems, such an incident could have provoked a hasty retaliatory strike and accidental nuclear war. 1988, Pakistan Mistakes Explosion for Indian Nuclear Attack. When a massive conventional munitions explosion occurred at a secret ammunition dump near Rawalpindi, some Pakistani officials mistook it for the start of an Indian nuclear strike. Given the size of Pakistans conventional forces compared to Indias and the proximity of the two nations, cutting down the decision time in the event of a launch such an incident could easily have resulted in accidental nuclear war. 1995, Russia Mistakes Weather Balloon for U.S. Nuclear Strike. When Norway launched a weather rocket to investigate the Northern Lights, Russian radars mistook the rocket for a missile launched by a U.S. submarine. Russian officials scrambled their nuclear forces into position and activated President Boris Yeltsins nuclear brief- case. A nation that feels vulnerable to nuclear attack might feel obligated to launch a retaliatory strike before all the facts are in, leading to an accidental nuclear war. The list of nuclear accidents and potential calamities goes on. As clearly put by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt? In addition to the threat of discrete nuclear accidents lies the broader problem of
loose nuclear material. Russia possesses more than 10,000 nuclear warheads, many of which are poorly guarded and vulnerable to theft. Although the U.S. and Russia have worked together through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative to secure nuclear material and deactivate thousands of warheads, analysts fear that underpaid
scientists and lax security could create a situation in which a terrorist group could buy or steal a bomb. Meanwhile, the security of Pakistans nuclear arsenal remains in question, stoking fears that state collapse in that volatile country could also enable terrorists to acquire a nuclear weapon. The accidental detonation of a single nuclear weapon could kill thousands; an accidental nuclear war could kill millions worldwide. This threat has been with us for decades, but the prospect that mistakes or mishaps could inadvertently help terrorists obtain nuclear weapons adds extra gravity to the threat.
Proliferation leads to miscalculation and accidents

ICNND, 9 International Commission of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs of the
International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (Elimintating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda From Gloabal Policymakers 2009 http://icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-ii-3.html)
Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with
3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nuclear-armed must continue to be one of the worlds top international security priorities. ideological, territorial, historical and for all those reasons, strongly emotive dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the
Pg. 50
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 51
arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 19982002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems.
The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such
countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The actionreaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action,
The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult.
have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. Whatever the chances of stable deterrence prevailing in a Cold War or IndiaPakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.
Proliferation causes regional conflicts to escalate

Sokoski, 09 - Former Director Nonproliferation Education Center served on the US congressional commission of the prevention of weapons of
mass destruction proliferation and terrorism (Henry Features: Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd Policy Review, June/July 2009 http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)
There are limits, however, to what this approach can acomplish. Such a
weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): (Graph Omitted) Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that
would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the
military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear states military would place an even higher premium than before on being able
to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly,
in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired
terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. could
easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with strategic consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.
Prolif exacterbates hair trigger responses and guarantees accidental nuclear war
Cimbala, 05 Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US
Department of State and private defense contractors (Stephen J East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia The Journal of Slavic Military Studies vol. 18 iss 4. 12/1/2005 Lexis)
command and control systems that connect political and military leaders with force operators, and with one another. Although command and control variables have not been built into the model, the implications for command decision making, and for the problem of control during crisis management, are clear enough.
The performance of forces in our illustrative and hypothetical case is also influenced by the
Pg. 51
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 52 The forces most dependent on land based ballistic missiles show the most discrepancy between hair-trigger and slowtrigger responses. On the other hand, states with balanced forces such as Russia, or with major reliance upon sea based as opposed to land based missiles (Japan), are comparatively less reliant on jumpy warning and fast firing. If hair trigger responses are necessary for survivability, then policy makers and commanders will have few minutes in which to make life and death decisions for entire societies. And missiles of theater or shorter range offer even fewer minutes of decision time than ICBMs , whose intercontinental reach
requires 20 minutes or so from silo to silo. Faced with this analysis, states might decide to supplement vulnerable and potentially provocative land based ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Cruise missiles can be based in various environments; on land, at sea and in the air. They can be moved on relatively short notice and can attack from various azimuths with high accuracy. Other states cannot have failed to notice the U.S. use of cruise missiles to great effect during the Gulf War of 1991 and in punitive strike campaigns throughout the 1990s, as well as during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Cruise missiles can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads: the choice obviously depends on the target and mission, and the decision whether to arm the missile with nuclear or non-nuclear munitions affects its operational range. But it is certainly conceivable that various states in our mix will turn to ALCMs (air launched cruise missiles), SLCMs (sea launched), and ground launched (GLCMs) as weapons of choice for high priority conventional, or nuclear, missions: the absence of air defenses of any consequence, in many states, invites their opponents to explore this option if they can.
Pg. 52
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 53
***Critical Defense of Hegemony***
Pg. 53
Appeasement DA Hege Solves WarHistorical Analysis
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 54
Things are getting better now because of hegemonyintensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history Drezner 5Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University,
Daniel, Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html
Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers:
The University
of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening
simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the
extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago.
Easterbrook spends the rest of
the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the
biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon
called the United States right now.
Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign Sept. 11 comes to mind and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The
flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few
thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S.
supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.
Pg. 54
Appeasement DA Hege Solves WarData
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 55
War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy-best statistical studies prove heg solves war because it makes democratic peace resilient globalization sustainable-its the deeper cause of proximate checks against war Owen 11 associate professor in the University of Virginias Department of Politics, John, Dont Discount Hegemony,
Cato Unbound, 2-11
Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that
violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linearFigure 1.1 actually shows
that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980sbut the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the nuclear -peace theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of assured destructionthat any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important nuclear-peace claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear -armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilitiesenough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemywill have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack
is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the democratic peace (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or commercial peace (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more antiwar than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealinga logic similar to that of the commercial peace thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peaceinducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The
answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the nuclear peace thesis, at least outside of the United States.
That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony stability theory.
specifically American hegemony .
A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic
that for the global economy to remain openfor countries to keep barriers to trade and investment lowone powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we
The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts consult, taking the lead entails
paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the
international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both . The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The
distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.
There is no obvious reason why hegemonic
stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs , human
Pg. 55
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 56
rights , international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest heresuggest, not testis that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.
How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politic ians claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as
The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon
ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to developmentcommunism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading onesand left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as
Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditionsthe chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target statebut those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administrationthe most antithe global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. communist government America ever hadbegan to dump Americas old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti -American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries.
But general U.S. material and moral support
for liberal democracy remains strong.
Pg. 56
Appeasement DA ATRoot Cause Arguments
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 57
Reject the infinite number of root causes that debilitate actionFocus on strategic deterrence and democracy are key to adverting crisis escalation John Moore 4 chaired law prof, UVA. Frm first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the
Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State, Beyond the Democratic Peace, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis [*393] If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have
focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may
well play a role in motivating aggression or
generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging highrisk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of
democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. n158 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given
the difficulties in overcoming many of these social
problems , an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.
[*394] A useful framework for thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State and War, n159 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government
structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high-
risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace " is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the
international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision to go to war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high-risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant - I have already argued that it
is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence .
It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who are disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposed to high-risk behavior. We might also want to keep open the possibility that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence. Nondemocracies' leaders can have different perceptions of the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, the key to war avoidance is understanding that major international war is critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three - specifically an absence of [*395] democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy
and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision
elites of engaging in high-risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. n160
Pg. 57
Appeasement DA ATSecurity Kritiks Hegemony
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 58
Deterrence resolves ontological insecurity and violent foreign policy Lupovici 8, Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto, (Amir Why the Cold
War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse) Since deterrence can become part of the actors identity, it is also involved in the actors will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily lifethe essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context. These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations,
rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this co ntext and the actors identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in
situations where states are restrained from using violencesuch as MAD (mutual assured destruction)states not only avoid violence, but ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security, 21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension
between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussens (2002: 331-2) assertionaccording to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical securityis only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.
Securitization doesnt result in war except when heg isnt there to check it.
Gartzke 12Erik Gartzke, University of California, San Diego, Could climate change precipitate peace?, Journal of
Peace Research 49(1) 177192, http://www.openbriefing.org/docs/JPRclimateconflict.pdf Violent conflict occurs wherever human beings inhabit the globe. Disputes require some mechanism for resolution, whether this involves force or persuasion. When the stakes are high, the temptation to resort to violence as the final arbiter must remain strong. State monopolies on force do not refute, but instead reflect the logic of political competition. Of course, the fact that politics involves violence does not make all politics violent. The possibility of punishment or coercion is itself available to deter or compel, and therefore often prevents the exercise of force. Common conjecture about the eventuality of conflict shadows political discourse, often making behavioral violence redundant. Political actors can anticipate when another actor is incentivized to violence and can choose to avoid provocation (Leeds & Davis, 1997). Alternately, ignorance, indifference or an inability to act can result in political violence. Scholars must thus view context, motive, and information to determine whether certain situations make force more or less likely.
Pg. 58
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 59
***Critical Defense of WoT***
Pg. 59
Appeasement DA Threat Real
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 60
Terrorist threat is real and will cause extinction must take actions against terrorists Washington Post 7 (the writer is the is the secretary of Homeland Security, Make No Mistake: This Is War, Washington Post, 4/22,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042001940.html)
when scholars such as Zbigniew Brzezinski accuse our leaders of falsely depicting or hyping a "war on terror" to promote a "culture of fear," it's clear that historical revisionism has gone mainstream. Brzezinski stated the obvious in describing terrorism as a tactic, not an enemy ["Terrorized by 'War on Terror,' Outlook,
Since Sept. 11, a conspiracy-minded fringe has claimed that American officials plotted the destruction. But March 25]. But this misses the point. We are at war with a global movement and ideology whose members seek to advance totalitarian aims through terrorism.
Brzezinski is deeply mistaken to mock the notion that we are at war and to suggest that we should adopt "more muted reactions" to acts of terrorism. The impulse to minimize the threat we face is eerily reminiscent of the way America's leaders played down the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary fanaticism in the late 1970s. That naive approach ultimately foundered on the kidnapping of our diplomats in Tehran. A sensible strategy against al-Qaeda and others in its ideological terror network begins with recognizing the scope of the threat they pose. Al-Qaeda and its ilk have a world vision that is comparable to that
of historical totalitarian ideologues but adapted to the 21st-century global network. Is this actually a war? Well, the short answer comes from our enemies. Osama bin Laden's fatwa of Feb. 23, 1998, was a declaration of war, a self-serving accusation that America had somehow declared war on Islam, followed by a "ruling" to "kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military . . . in any country where it is possible to do it." Since
then, bin Laden and his allies have sought to carry out acts designed to strike at our global system of security, safety and economy. I am reminded of that every day when I see threat assessments and other evidence of a militarized and networked foe. Measured by intent, capability and consequence, fanatical Islamist ideologues have declared -- and are prosecuting -- what is, by any objective rendering, a real war. Intent: Today's extreme Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda do not merely seek political revolution in their own countries. They aspire to dominate all countries . Their goal is a totalitarian, theocratic empire to be achieved by waging perpetual war on soldiers and civilians alike. That includes the use of weapons of mass destruction. Capability: The fanatics' intent, while grandiose, is not entirely fanciful. Islamist extremists such as those in al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated groups from North Africa to Iraq and South Asia are fighting for and sometimes achieving control of territory in which they can train; assemble advanced, inhumane weaponry; impose their own vision of repressive law; and dominate local life. To be sure, as Brzezinski observes, the geographic reach of this network does not put them in the same group as the Nazis or Stalinists when they achieved first-class military power. But without relentless vigilance and effort from the civilized world, Islamist extremists could gain control of a state or establish a network of radical "statelets" in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Consequence: The events of Sept. 11 highlight the dramatic difference between the consequences of Islamist extremist war-making and those of the political
terrorist attacks unleashed against the West in the 1970s. The Sept. 11 attacks were the most devastating single blow ever visited upon our homeland by foreign
The Islamist extremists' plot last summer to blow up multiple transatlantic airlines in Britain threatened a similarly devastating -- but thankfully unrealized -- consequence. Both episodes demonstrate that the terrorist ideologues aim to achieve not only a massive loss of life but also substantial disruption of our international system of travel and trade. Simply put, our foes have declared their intent to make war, have demonstrated a capability to prosecute war and have laid on us the horrific consequences commensurate with war. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, our allies correctly perceived al-Qaeda's strikes as acts of international aggression. By Sept. 12, the U.N. Security Council had passed a resolution vowing to respond, and NATO began its unprecedented move of declaring the attacks to be aggression against all of its members.
enemies.
Pg. 60
Appeasement DA Terror Talk K2 Hege
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 61
Their kritik of terrorism ties-down the United States preventing the action necessary to save lives Victor Davis Hanson, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California Univer sity, Fresno, The Fruits of Appeasement, City Journal, Spring 20 04, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hansonSpr04.html, UK: Fisher
Pg. 61
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 62
Rather than springing from realpolitik, sloth, or fear of oil cutoffs, much of our appeasement of Middle Eastern terrorists derived from a new sort of anti-Americanism that thrived in the growing therapeutic society of the 1980s and 1990s. Though the abrupt collapse of communism was a dilemma for the Left, it opened as many doors as it shut. To be sure, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, few Marxists could argue for a state-controlled economy or mouth the old romance about a workers' paradise not with scenes of East German families crammed into smoking clunkers lumbering over potholed roads, like American pioneers of old on their way west. But if the creed of the socialist republics was impossible to take seriously in either economic or political terms, such a collapse of doctrinaire statism did not discredit the gospel of forced egalitarianism and resentment against prosperous capitalists. Far from it. If
Marx receded from economics departments, his spirit reemerged among our intelligentsia in the novel guises of post-structuralism, new historicism, multiculturalism, and all the other dogmas whose fundamental tenet was that white male capitalists had systematically oppressed women, minorities, and Third World people in countless insidious ways. The font of that collective oppression, both at home and abroad, was the rich, corporate, Republican, and white United States. The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced these newer post-colonial and liberation fields of study by immunizing their promulgators from charges of fellow-traveling or being dupes of Russian expansionism. Communisms demise likewise freed these trendy ideologies from having to offer some wooden, unworkable Marxist alternative to the West; thus they could happily remain entirely critical, sarcastic, and cynical without any obligation to suggest something better, as witness the nihilist signs at recent protest marches proclaiming: I Love Iraq, Bomb Texas. From writers like Arundhati Roy and Michel Foucault
(who anointed Khomeini a kind of mystic saint who would usher in a new political spirituality that would transfigure the world) an d from old standbys like Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre (to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, to destroy an oppressor and the man he oppresses at the same time),
there filtered down a vague notion that the United States and the West in general were responsible for Third World misery in ways that transcended the dull old class struggle. Endemic racism and the legacy of colonialism, the oppressive multinational corporation and the
humiliation and erosion of indigenous culture brought on by globalization and a smug, self-important cultural condescensionall this and more explained poverty and despair, whether in Damascus, Teheran, or Beirut. There
was victim status for everybody, from gender, race, and class at home to colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony abroad. Anyone could play in these area studies that cobbled together the barrio, the West Bank, and the
freedom fighter into some sloppy global union of the oppresseda far hipper enterprise than rehashing Das Kapital or listening to a six-hour harangue from Fidel. Of
pampered Western intellectuals since Diderot have always dreamed up a noble savage, who lived in harmony with nature precisely because of his distance from the corruption of Western civilization. But now this fuzzy romanticism had an updated, political edge: the bearded killer and wild-eyed savage were not merely better than we because they lived apart in a pre-modern landscape. No: they had a right to strike back and kill modernizing Westerners who had intruded into and disrupted their better worldwhether Jews on Temple Mount, women in Westernized dress in Teheran, Christian missionaries in Kabul, capitalist
course, profiteers in Islamabad, whiskey-drinking oilmen in Riyadh, or miniskirted tourists in Cairo. An Ayatollah Khomeini who turned back the clock on female emancipation in Iran, who murdered non-Muslims, and who refashioned Iranian state policy to hunt down, torture, and kill liberals nevertheless seemed to liberal Western eyes as preferable to the Shaha Western-supported anti-communist, after all, who was engaged in the messy, often corrupt task of bringing Iran from the tenth to the twentieth century, down the arduous, dangerous path that, as in Taiwan or South Korea, might eventually lead to a consensual, capitalist society like our own. Yet in
the new world of utopian multiculturalism and knee-jerk anti-Americanism, in which a Noam Chomsky could proclaim reasoned argument was futile. Indeed, how could critical debate arise for those committed to social change, when no universal standards were to be applied to those outside the West? Thanks to the doctrine of cultural relativism, oppressed peoples either could not be judged by our biased and constructed values (false universals, in Edward Saids infamous term) or were seen as more pristine than ourselves, uncorrupted by the evils of Western capitalism. Who were we to gainsay Khomeinis butchery and oppression? We had no way of understanding the nuances of his new liberationist and nationalist Islam. Now back in the hands of indigenous peoples, Iran might offer the world an alternate path, a different
Khomeinis gulag to be independent nationalism, discourse about how to organize a society that emphasized native values (of some sort) over mere profit. So at precisely th e time of these increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, the silly gospel of multiculturalism insisted that Westerners have neither earned the right to censure others, nor do they possess the intellectual tools to make judgments about the relative value of different cultures. And if the initial wave of multiculturalist relativism among the elitescoupled with the age-old romantic forbearance for Third World rogueryexplained tolerance for early unpunished attacks on Americans, its spread to our popular culture only encouraged more. This nonjudgmentalismessentially a form of nihilismdeemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely different rather than odious.
Anyone who has taught freshmen at a state university can sense the fuzzy thinking of our undergraduates: most come to us prepped in high schools not to make value judgments about other peoples who are often victims of American "oppression." Thus, before female-hating psychopath Mohamed Atta piloted a jet into the World Trade Center, neither Western intellectuals nor their students would have taken him to task for what he said or condemned him as hypocritical for his parasitical existence on Western society. Instead, without logic but with plenty of romance, they would more likely have excused him as a victim of globalization or of the biases of American foreign policy. They would have deconstructed
Pg. 62
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 63
Atta's promotion of anti-Semitic, misogynist, Western-hating thought, as well as his conspiracies with Third World criminals, as anything but a danger and a pathology to be remedied by deportation or incarceration.
Pg. 63
Appeasement DA Terror Talk K2 Hege
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 64
Terror Securitization is key to hegemony/Global peace Kelstrup 4 (Morten, Globalisation and Societal Insecurity,Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace
Research, pg.115, Writer and editor for Sage Publications)
This strategy is, it seems, challenged by a
new, power-based strategy of dominance based on a global securitisation. Of course, a strategy of power and power projection is not entirely new, but it and in particular its legitimation is being reinforced through the securitisation of the globalisation of the threat from terrorism. The new strategy might be viewed as the action which a superpower might undertake relatively unrestricted by existing international law, but because, through securitisation, it involves legitimation it is also a project for the reformulation of legitimising norms and rules in the global system. It is clear that the USA, as the only superpower, has the possibility of disregarding the rather weak elements of existing international law and acting unilaterally. Much in the USA's attitude towards the UN system indicates that the USA does not support the traditional strategy for global governance, but aims at establishing an alternative. The USA's attitude towards international agreements and its withdrawal of its signature on the agreement on the UN Tribunal on Crime in The Hague is a rather clear manifestation of this. The problem for such a new power-based strategy, which at least partly rests on USA unilateralism, is not only whether the USA has the capacity to act, but also how it might be possible for the USA to get its policy accepted from others, i.e. to give it legitimation. In this, securitisation plays an important role. Securitisation might change a basically unilateral strate into a much broader and more legitimate power project. Through securitisation it might be possible to generate support for a strategy for global governance led by the only superpower in defence of 'humanity' or 'civilisation'. The interpretation suggested here is that securitisation and the 'war on terror' is part of such a strategy.
Fearing terrorism is the only rational response Krauthammer 4 (Charles, 10/18, The Case for Fearmongering,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,995420,00.html, AG)
Such piety is always ridiculous but never more ridiculous than today. Never
in American history has fear been a more appropriate feeling. Never has addressing that fear been a more relevant issue in a political campaign. Shortly after Hiroshima, wrote physicist Richard
Feynman in his memoirs, "I would go along and I would see people building a bridge ... and I thought, they're crazy, they just don't understand, they don't understand. Why are they making new things? It's so useless." Useless because doomed. Futile because humanity had no future. That's what happens to a man who worked on the Manhattan Project and saw with his own eyes at Alamogordo intimations of the apocalypse. Feynman had firsthand knowledge of what man had wrought--and a firstclass mind deeply skeptical of the ability of his own primitive species not to be undone by its own cleverness. Feynman was not alone. The
late 1940s and '50s were so pervaded by a general fear of nuclear annihilation that the era was known as the Age of Anxiety. That anxiety dissipated over the decades as we convinced ourselves that deterrence (the threat of mutual annihilation) would assure our safety. Sept. 11 ripped away that illusion. Deterrence depends on rationality. But the new enemy is the embodiment of irrationality: nihilists with a cult of death, yearning for the apocalypse--armed, ready and appallingly able. The primordial fear that haunted us through the first days and weeks after 9/11 has dissipated. Not because the threat has disappeared but for the simple reason that in our ordinary lives we simply cannot sustain that level of anxiety. The threat is as real as it was on Sept. 12. It only feels distant because it is psychologically impossible to constantly face the truth and yet carry on day to day. But as it is the first duty of government to provide for the common defense, it is the first duty of any post-9/11 government to face that truth every day--and to raise it to national consciousness at least once every four years, when the nation chooses its leaders. Fearmongering? Yes. And very salutary. When you live in an age of terrorism with increasingly available weapons of mass destruction, it is the absence of fear that is utterly irrational.
Pg. 64
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 65
Pg. 65
Appeasement DA ATRoot Cause Arguments
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 66
Attempting to identify the root causes of terrorism or other crimes fail history shows that triggers inaction, which allows for violence Thomas Sowell, Rose and Milton Friedman Senior Fellow at The Hoover Institution, Pacifism and War, Jewish World Review, September 24 , 2001,
th
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell092401.asp, UK: Fisher ALTHOUGH most Americans seem to understand the gravity of the situation that terrorism has put us in -- and the need for some serious military response, even if that means dangers to the lives of us all --
there are still those who insist on posturing, while on the edge of a volcano. In the forefront are college students who demand a "peaceful" response to an act of war. But there are others who are old enough to know better, who are still repeating the pacifist platitudes of the 1930s that contributed so much to bringing on World War II. A former ambassador from the weak-kneed Carter administration says that we should look at the "root causes" behind the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. We should understand the "alienation" and "sense of grievance" against us by various people in the Middle East. It is astonishing to see the 1960s phrase "root causes" resurrected at this late date and in this context. It was precisely this kind of thinking, which sought the "root causes of crime" during that decade, creating soft policies toward criminals, which led to skyrocketing crime rates. Moreover, these soaring crime rates came right after a period when crime rates were lower than they had been in decades. On the international scene, trying to assuage aggressors' feelings and look at the world from their point of view has had an even more catastrophic track record. A typical sample of this kind of thinking can be found in a speech to the British Parliament by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938: "It has always seemed to me that in dealing with foreign countries we do not give ourselves a chance of success unless we try to understand their mentality, which is not always the same as our own, and it really is astonishing to contemplate how the identically same facts are regarded from two different angles." Like our former ambassador from the Carter era, Chamberlain sought to "remove the causes of strife or war." He wanted "a general settlement of the grievances of the world without war." In other words, the British prime minister approached Hitler with the attitude of someone negotiating a labor contract, where each side gives a little and everything gets worked out in the end. What Chamberlain did not understand was that all his concessions simply led to new demands from Hitler -- and contempt for him by Hitler. What Winston Churchill understood at the time, and Chamberlain did not, was that Hitler was driven by what Churchill called "currents of hatred so intense as to sear the souls of those who swim upon them." That was also what drove the men who drove the planes into the World Trade Center.
Pg. 66
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 67
Appeasement Answers
Pg. 67
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 68
***Uniqueness Answers***
Pg. 68
Appeasement DA No Cred NowInaction Over Syria
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 69
No US credibility nowinaction in Syria undermined US legitimacy Singh 13-- managing director of The Washington Institute (Michael, U.S. Credibility on Iran at Stake in Syria, The
Washington Institute, 6/12, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-credibility-on-iran-at-stake-insyria) Likewise, many analysts were surprised by Hezbollah's open admission of its deep involvement in Syria, because they viewed the
group as primarily a Lebanese political party or as engaged in fighting Israel. While both of these are true, they neglect that Hezbollah is more fundamentally a group created to project Iranian power into the Levant, a mission with which its Syrian venture -- as well as its activities in Iraq during the last decade -- is perfectly compatible. Western
officials' inattention to this broader picture has real strategic consequences for U.S. interests. No matter
how much American policymakers stress that the "military option" is on the table with respect to Iran's nuclear program, Washington's failure to push back on Iranian aggression in Syria, and the European Union's reluctance to penalize Hezbollah for its actions, undercut the credibility of Western warnings . Whatever the view of the West, for Tehran these issues, as well as the West's responses to them, are inextricably connected. And not just for Tehran -- America's allies in the region also see U.S. actions in different theaters as linked, and they view with alarm Washington's passivity in the region. Consequently, American influence is everywhere diminished as friends and foes alike increasingly factor Washington out of policy decisions, and the force of America's allies collectively is reduced as each pursues policies independently not just of the United States but, to a great extent, of one another. Once lost, influence is costly to regain, which gives rise to a vicious cycle. Re-establishing U.S. influence and credibility requires actions that, as crises deepen and multiply, become costlier as time passes, which reinforces the argument against taking them. Nowhere is this more evident than in Syria. Costly
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have soured U.S. officials on further entanglement in the Middle East. But disengaging from the region will only add to the costs of those wars, not compensate for them. One lesson we must learn from those conflicts, however, is to have clear objectives and to pursue them economically. When it comes to Iran, the objective has never been and should not become merely limiting Iranian nuclear activities, but disrupting the strategy of which both the nuclear program and Syria, as well as Iran's asymmetric actions, are parts.
A non-nuclear Iran emboldened by victory in Syria remains dangerous. The economical way to begin countering Iran's strategy is not to wait for a last-resort strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, or worse yet to continue offering Iran nuclear concessions in hopes it will bite; rather, it is to press Iran in a place like Syria, where it is far from home and perhaps overextended. Defeating Iranian designs in Syria will not halt Tehran's nuclear ambitions, but it may restore
in the eyes of Iranian and allied officials alike the credibility of American power, and force Tehran to reconsider the costs of its strategy. For Iran, Major General Safavi reminds us, has a strategy in the Middle East; the United States must as well.
Pg. 69
Appeasement DA No Cred NowIran Proves
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 70
Non-Unique Iran is an alt cause to any of their appeasement bad args Holleran, 2012 (Scott Holleran, journalist for the LA times and the San Francisco Inquirer, 30 years of Appeasing
Iran, CNN News, 10/1, http://cnsnews.com/blog/scott-holleran/30-years-appeasing-iran) Every [Iranian] leader since Khomeini has threatened America with jihadincluding by nuclear meansand every U.S. administration has responded with coddling and cooperation. Appeasement began within months of Khomeinis takeover and the embassy attack and despite the act of war, the U.S. did not launch a military counterstrike to the assaultever. 1979 was the beginning of a repeat cycle; Iran would attackthe U.S. would appeaseand Iran would attack harder and deeper. For example, President Carter redefined Iran's initial act of war as a crisis and, after he negotiated a hostage release, Iran attacked our Marinescausing
Reagan to withdraw troopswhich encouraged Iran to attack Americans everywhere. This included ordering the assassination of writer Salman Rushdie, and threatening to bomb his U.S. publisher and bookstores, prompting the first President Bush to abandon defense of Americans at homein turn causing Iran to attack more Americans. By the time a Clinton administration official declared in 1997 that America has nothing against an Islamic government in Iran, Iran was on its way to bombing the U.S. Navy and co-sponsoring 9/11. After 9/11, the second President Bushs secretary of state sought to negotiate with Iran for help in the war against the Talibanhelp from an Islamicist dictatorship in a war against an Islamicist dictatorship revealing America as a paper tiger. In
each instance of U.S. appeasement, Iran escalated both the scale and severity of its attacks. Under President Obama, who campaigned pledging cooperation, Iran has continued its advance toward nuclear weapons. History shows that appeasement leads to mass murder and that, from 1979 to 9/11, Iranian-sponsored attacks are often launched with secrecy and surprise. With the looming reality of an atomic Iran, we need an urgent end to appeasement.
Pg. 70
Appeasement DA CubaTrade
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 71
Agricultural trade should have triggered it Hanson & Lee 13 Stephanie Hanson, Aassociate director and coordinating editor at Council on Foreign
Relations.Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR. U.S.-Cuba Relations. [http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cubarelations/p11113] What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations? They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions .
Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama
eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.
Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries.
Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor
who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite initial optimism over Obama's election,
Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Ral and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Ral Castro
accused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."
Trade negotiations ongoing Taylor 7/4/13 (Guy Taylor, State Department correspondent, Private talks hint at change in U.S.-Cuba relationship
The Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/4/private-talks-hint-at-change-in-us-cubarelationsh/ ) The State Department has quietly been holding talks with a small but diverse cadre of Cuban natives in Washington including democracy activists offering insider views of the communist islands politics that analysts say could send shock waves through the long-standing debate about what a future U.S. policy toward Cuba should look like. Obama administration officials are mum on the closed-door meetings, including one held at Foggy Bottom last week with renowned Cuban hunger-striker Guillermo Farinas, who came bearing a somewhat paradoxical message: Most pro-democracy activists now operating in Cuba, which has been a Communist dictatorship and a U.S. enemy for more than a half-century, oppose lifting the long-standing U.S. embargo on trade with their nation. Such realities may not surprise close Cuba watchers, who say U.S. officials have known for years that ending the embargo might unleash a flow of badly needed foreign cash to the government of President Raul Castro enhancing its ability to crush the islands fragile pro-democracy movement. But activists like Mr. Farinas are now being allowed to inject their
views directly into the heart of Washingtons foreign policy establishment, ironically because he and other dissidents have been allowed to take advantage of Januarys historic lifting by the Castro government of a decades-old ban on travel abroad. The activists are feeling with their blood and bones the repression of the Cuban security apparatus, said Mauricio Claver-Carone, executive director of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC in Washington. U.S. policymakers now get to actually see it and feel it firsthand from the protagonists themselves, he said. Thats extraordinary and its very helpful. The impact su ch visits are having on the Obama
U.S. and Cuban officials, who talked about possibly re-establishing direct mail service between the two nations. The two nations plan to meet July 17 to talk about regulating migration. Together, the negotiations have some in Washington wondering whether the Obama administration is looking to break the stalemate that has defined U.S. relations with Havana since Cuban leader Fidel
administration, however, is a subject of debate. Mr. Farinas visit occurred in the shadow of headlines from a landmark meeting last month between
Pg. 71
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 72
Castro agreed to house Soviet ballistic missiles in 1961. Mr. Castro, 86, stepped down in 2008, and the top post is now held by his 82-year-old brother, who has allowed such incremental reforms as the easing of the ban on his citizens travel. Raul Castro has said that he will step down when his five-year term ends in 2018.
Pg. 72
Appeasement DA VenezuelaDiplomacy
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 73
State department already triggered the disadvantage Crdenas 6-14-13. Jos R. Crdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International
Development under Bush Administration. How Not to Treat the Neighborhood Bully [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4784] Trying to track the course of U.S. policy toward Venezuela is enough to give one whiplash. Where a few weeks ago Barack Obama's administration appeared to take a principled stand behind opposition protests asserting that this April's presidential election to elect Hugo Chvez's successor was stolen, today it seems to have tossed the opposition overboard as it seeks to normalize relations with the disputed government of Nicols Maduro. Even as opposition leader Henrique Capriles has been traveling to regional capitals seeking support for his campaign for a clean election, someone at the State Department evidently thought it was perfect timing for a smiling, handshaking photo op between Secretary of State John Kerry and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elas Jaua at last week's Organization of American States meeting in Guatemala. Certainly it would be understandable if a U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement was the product of some identifiable change in that government's behavior -- some nod to the legitimacy of the opposition's complaints, maybe a commitment to stop berating the United States and friendly countries, or perhaps even a public pledge to finally cooperate on counternarcotics policy. Yet none of this has occurred. Instead, this is what we have seen from the Maduro government in the last few months: Accused the United States of giving Chvez his cancer Repeatedly accused the United States of fomenting instability in Venezuela, including alleging that former U.S. officials had entered the country to poison him Expelled two U.S. military attachs from the U.S. Embassy, accusing them of destabilizing the country Insulted Obama as "the big boss of the devils" Arrested a U.S. filmmaker (subsequently released) on spurious charges of espionage Accused the United States of trying to assassinate Capriles and make it look like it was the government Accused former Colombian President lvaro Uribe of trying to assassinate Maduro Accused the opposition of purchasing 18 U.S. warplanes to be based in Colombia Accused Salvadoran mercenaries of trying to kill Maduro Denounced the Peruvian foreign minister for suggesting that Latin American countries could help mediate political tensions in Venezuela (the minister was forced to resign) Accused CNN of fomenting a coup against his government More closely aligned Venezuela with the Castros' Cuba than anything ever seen under Chvez Not exactly what you would call a charm offensive. Indeed, the only thing we have seen from the Maduro government since its tainted victory is an accelerated offensive to replace the Castro regime as the bully in the Latin American neighborhood, using threats both explicit and implicit to intimidate anyone daring to criticize its anti-democratic actions.
Pg. 73
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 74
***Link Answers***
Pg. 74
Appeasement DA Appeasement Wont Hurt FlexibilityCuba
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 75
Positive engagement still leaves room for US strategic capabilities Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State
Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187] Policymakers in America often emphasize that any change on America's end must be met with irreversible change on Cuba's end, based on the idea that the United States might be offering irreversible carrots for nothing. The underlying premise of
that notion
is simply wrong : there is no reason to believe that once the United States changes parts of its Cuba policy, it be reversed: targeted sanctions can be reapplied
after they have been removed; [*218]
cannot reverse those changes in response to negative behavior in Havana. Concessions the United States makes on many of these
issues can
travel bans can be reinstituted
after they have been lifted; diplomatic
relations can be re-severed after they have been re-established. If the United States normalizes relations with the Cuban government, only to witness the Cuban government imprison or execute hundreds of dissidents, there is no reason why our government could not respond strongly, and even consider reverting back to hostile relations. Establishing relations between Washington and Havana is not an end in itself, nor is it a right that has been taken away from Havana. Instead, normalized relations should properly be seen as a privilege
United States. But even that Cuba has to earn before it is once again offered by the
if it is offered to Cuba, by no means are any overtures on Washington's end irreversible.
Pg. 75
Appeasement DA Appeasement Wont Hurt DeterrenceGeneric
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 76
There is minimal evidence to support appeasement failurestheir authors are speculating Rock 2Kprofessor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A.,
Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 5) Although this critique of appeasement is deeply ingrained in the American consciousness, there is surprisingly little evidence to support it [the failure of appeasement]. No systematic analysis of cases of attempted appeasement exist, and there is no reason to believe, a priori, that concessions never work, that it is impossible to satisfy a dissatisfied state or leader. Indeed, simple logic suggests otherwise. Not every statesman is a Hitler or even a Stalin . Not every state that makes demands has unlimited ambitions. As Robert Jervis notes, Our memories of Hitler have tended to obscure the fact that most statesmen are unwilling to pay an exorbitant price for a chance at expansion. More moderate leaders are apt to become defenders of the status quo when they receive significant concessions. Of course the value of these
concessions to the status quo power may be high enough to justify resistance and even war, but the demands are not always the tip of an iceberg. To use the more common metaphor, the appetite does not always grow with the eating.As I shall argue later, cases of successful appeasement can be found. But even if they could not, this would not in itself prove the futility of the strategy. Defenders
of deterrence have recently argued that, contrary to claims made by critics, most deterrence failures can be attributed mainly to improper implementation of deterrent policy, rather than to flaws in the underlying model of state behavior on which the policy is based. While this dispute remains unresolved, it offers an important lesson to those who would reject appeasement because of its failures, without investigating their causes. Failed attempts at appeasement must be scrutinized in order to determine whether the outcome was primarily the result of policy mistakeswhich could presumably be remedied by policymakersor the consequences of erroneous assumptions made by appeasement about the nature of states and of their interactions. There is also only minimal evidence to support the second major criticism of appeasement: that by undermining a states credibility, it renders later attempts at deterrence futile. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, in their study of crisis bargaining, found that states did not generally base expectations regarding others behavior on their past actions. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett similarly concluded that, in terms of what makes deterrence work, the defenders past behavior in crises seems to make no systematic difference.
Pg. 76
Appeasement DA Engagement Solves the LinkGeneric
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 77
Engagement is NOT appeasement Larison, 12 Senior editor for The American Conservative (Daniel, Engagement is not Appeasement, The American
Conservative, 12/17, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/engagement-is-not-appeasement/) The former Republican Senator from Nebraska could have been speaking to his former colleagues when he insisted, Engagement wont fix all problems, but engagement isnt appeasement or surrender or even negotiation its a bridge-building process, an opportunity to better understand others on the basis of mutual self-respect. Cutting off contacts with other regimes doesnt hasten their downfall or weaken their hold on power. On the contrary, such regimes can take advantage of attempts at isolation to suppress dissent, consolidate power, and rally their nations behind them. It is not the purpose of engagement to undermine other regimes. The purpose is and should be to advance the interests of the United States. It is more likely that authoritarian regimes
will gradually lose their grip on power if the people in their countries are exposed more regularly to contacts with other nations than if they are shut off from them.
Repressive regimes will engage in brutal crackdowns and will violently suppress challenges to their control. That isnt going to change, and it will happen no matter who occupies different Cabinet posts or the White House. That isnt something that the U.S. can normally prevent, nor does the U.S. have the resources to police how all these regimes act in their own countries, but it is something that the U.S. might be able to limit to some degree if it were in a position to influence these regimes . Refusing to engage with these regimes deprives the U.S. of influence. It deprives these regimes of nothing.
Pg. 77
Appeasement DA Engagement Solves the LinkVenezuela
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 78
US hardline policies worsen anti-US sentiment across Latin Americaengagement is key to increased US credibilityturns the DA Griffin 13-- a Crimson editorial writer (John A., Engage with Venezuela, The Harvard Crimson, 4/3,
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)/ When Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez died in early February, his country was thrown into a period of national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance. As Venezuela chooses its next president, Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere. While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chvez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing away, Chvez had handpicked a successor in
Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chvezs handpicked successor, Maduro has alre ady continued with his mentors trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chvez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chvezs death, and both nations have started expelling diplomats from the other. Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other. Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chvez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist, Chvez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba, repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas hold o n their country.
The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies . Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large , especially in Latin America. Chvez (along with his
friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around Chvez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chvez galvanized these nationsmany of whom have experienced American interventionist tacticsby vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately
for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chvezs position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chvez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuelas. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the worlds largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now,
America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company. Engagement
with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuelas efforts that the United States was unable to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and
Pg. 78
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 79 making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policiesnothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing tough guy with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We arent catching any flies with our vinegar its high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
Pg. 79
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 80
***Internal Link Answers***
Pg. 80
Appeasement DA AT CredibilityDiscourse Critique
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 81
Their impacts regarding credibility are hyperbolic and unsubstantiatedThis leads to DANGEROUS decision making practices that eliminate logic and rationality Fettweis 08 (Christopher Fettweis, assistant professor of political science at Tulane University, Credibility and the
War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2007/2008,)
The
second
observation on the
use of the credibility imperative in policy debate is perhaps related to the first: the imperative often
produces astonishing hyperbole, even in otherwise sober analysts. If the United States were to lose credibility, the floodgates would open to a variety of
catastrophes, setting off dominoes that would eventually not only threaten vital interests and make war necessary, but perhaps even lead to the end of the Republic itself. The
credibility imperative warns that momentum toward disaster can begin with the smallest demonstration of
thus sustaining the vision of an interdependent system in which there are no inconsequential events. In the words of Dale Copeland, "It is easier to
irresolution,
stop a snowball before it begins to roll downhill than to intervene only after it has started to gain momentum."61 Therefore, even the smallest of slips can lead to largescale disaster. Thus, although Quemoy and Matsu might have seemed like irrelevant, uninhabitable rocky atolls, if they fell to the Chinese without action from the United States, the resulting loss of credibility for the United States would enable the communists "to begin their objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, right
Dean Rusk wrote that if U.S. commitments became discredited because of a defeat in Vietnam, "the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war."63 Ronald Reagan told Congress that if the United States failed in Central America, "our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy."64 The examples are legion-indeed, the tendency toward hyperbole seems almost irresistible. In a world where threats are interdependent, the loss of credibility in one area threatens U.S. goals everywhere. The fall of Vietnam, thought Nixon, "would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace-in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere."65 Credibility is apparently the glue holding together the international system of dominoes. Audiences often seem distressingly willing to accept such statements at face value. Rarely are policymakers or analysts asked to justify these visions, or
back to Hawaii and even to the United States," according to John Foster Dulles.62 Ten years later, pressed to examine the logic connecting the present decisions to such catastrophic future consequences. Could interdependence alone set off such enormous strings of disasters? Why
should anyone believe that the loss of credibility would result in an unprecedented string of disasters ? For
those under the spell of the credibility imperative, the logic behind these statements seemed less relevant than establishing the potential, however slim, for catastrophe. Since foreign policy is a worst-case-scenario business, the sagacious policymaker hedges against disaster, no matter how absurdly remote the risk may seem. Who would oppose the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, if that defense might prevent a "catastrophic war"? Similarly, it was difficult to argue that aid to the Contras was not in the national interest once it became linked to the survival of NATO and the safety of "our homeland." Once
policymakers accept the imperative to
remain credible, logic and reason can become casualties of fear.
It DOES nothing to advance U.S. interests, its a rhetorical tool and nothing else Fettweis 08 (Christopher Fettweis, assistant professor of political science at Tulane University, Credibility and the
War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2007/2008,)
Credibility in Practice The evidence seems to fall heavily on one side of the divide between scholars and practitioners over the importance of credibility. This division is not merely of academic interest. The
credibility imperative has distinct and profound effects upon policymaking, all of which are apparent during the current war on terror. In order to assess more accurately the true value of a healthy reputation for resolve, policymakers ought to be aware of the following general rules about how the credibility imperative shapes national debate. Three such effects are presented below, more
as arguments rather than testable hypotheses, owing to the nature of the subject. Although the supporting evidence is by necessity somewhat anecdotal, the arguments themselves should not be very controversial. First, the credibility imperative is almost always employed
to bolster the most hawkish position in
a foreign policy debate. Cries of appeasement (and of the need to maintain credibility) arise almost every time the use of force is debated in the United States. Critics warned that U.S. credibility would be irreparably harmed if Washington failed to get involved in Vietnam, and then if it did not stay until the war was won; if it did not use air strikes against the Soviet missiles in Cuba; if it did not respond to Bosnian Serb provocations with sufficient force; if it failed to attack the leaders of the military coup in Haiti in 1994; and, of course, if it does not "stay the course" today in Iraq. At other times, hawks have employed the credibility imperative to urge two presidents to use University of Texas National Institute in Forensics Pg. 81
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 82
military force to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea and to punish the recalcitrant Saddam Hussein.55 The reputation of the United States is always endangered by inaction, not by action, no matter how peripheral the proposed war might be to tangible national interests. The reputation for good policy judgment never seems to be as important as the reputation for belligerence. The credibility imperative not only urges the use of military force, but it encourages hawkish behavior at the negotiating table as well, supporting rigidity and decrying all compromise as demonstrations of weakness. Only victory can legitimate diplomacy; compromised settlements only encourage further challenges,
and are synonymous with appeasement. Madeleine Albright reported a typical example in her memoirs, explaining that during Bosnia negotiations "the ordinarily hawkish Jamie Rubin urged me to compromise on a particular measure. I glared and said, 'Jamie, do you think we're in Munich?'"56 After Jimmy Carter's now-famous mission helped find common ground between Pyongyang and Washington in 1994, McCain worried that the deal "will have changed the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East. That it will have changed for the worse is obvious."57 Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer labeled the compromise on the same peninsula in 2003 "an abject cave-in," which would prove to be a "threat to American credibility everywhere."58 This is not meant to suggest, of course, that individual cases of belligerence or intervention were not warranted; however, it is important to recognize that, for better or for worse, the
credibility imperative is the
rhetorical instrument of the hawk. The actors employing the imperative are not always the same, but their prescription never waivers. Many of the doves of
the 1980s had become hawks by the 1990s, warning of the potential loss of credibility if strong action were not taken in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Haiti. For example, the New York Times cited "United States diplomats" warning President Clinton that a failure to act in Bosnia in 1993 would "badly damage U.S. credibility abroad."59 Anthony Lake told the Council on Foreign Relations that among the reasons to act in Haiti was the need to defend American credibility in world affairs.60 In general, the
more a policymaker or strategist saw the credibility of the United States in peril, the more willing he or she was to use force to prevent its erosion.
Pg. 82
Appeasement DA AT CredibilityDoesnt Solve Hege
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 83
Credibility is NOT key to hegemony Fettweis 08 (Christopher Fettweis, assistant professor of political science at Tulane University, Credibility and the
War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2007/2008,) The third and final observation is that there is a loose inverse relationship between the rhetorical employment of the credibility imperative and the presence of vital, more tangible national interests. Franklin D. Roosevelt did not make reference to the reputation of the United States when he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan in 1941. Similarly, Winston Churchill's stirring speeches rallying his countrymen at their darkest hour did not mention the importance of maintaining the credibility of the realm. When a clear national interest is at stake, policymakers have no need to defend (or sell) their actions with reference to the national reputation or credibility. Simply put, the more tangible the national interest, the smaller the role that intangible factors will play in either
decisions or justifications for policy. The United States was willing to use force to ensure that Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua stayed in the camp of free nations despite the fact that none had any measurable impact upon the global balance of power. "El Salvador doesn't really matter," one of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisers admitted in 1981, but "we have to establish credibility because we are in very serious trouble."66 When
credibility is the primary justification for action, the interest is usually not vital to the United States. Since Washington had no strategic interests at stake in the Balkans in the 1990s, for example, it was forced to invent some. Rather than sell the policy based solely on what it waspredominantly a humanitarian intervention-the Clinton administration repeatedly linked the fate of the Muslims of southeastern Europe to the credibility of the United States and NATO. By doing so, according to Owen Harries, the administration "managed to create a serious national interest in Bosnia where none before existed: an interest, that is, in the preservation of this country's prestige and credibility."67 The credibility imperative rose to prominence precisely because no tangible U.S. interest in Bosnia existed. In sum, when the credibility imperative drives policy, states fearful of hyperbolic future consequences are likely to follow hawkish recommendations in order to send messages that other states are unlikely to receive. Policymakers are thus wise to beware of the credibility imperative when devising policy, questioning the assumptions that it contains and remaining skeptical of the catastrophes of which it warns. They must recognize that the imperative is typically employed when no tangible national interest exists, used as a rhetorical smoke screen to win over otherwise-peaceful masses. Most importantly, it should perhaps give them pause that scholars can supply virtually no evidence supporting the conventional wisdom about its importance. It might seem blasphemous, or at least dangerously nave, to suggest that the
blood and treasure spilled over the past six decades to preserve the credibility of the United States has been in vain. offers little evidence to support one of the most deeply held beliefs of the makers of U.S. foreign policy. States cannot control their reputations or their credibility, since target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own perceptions, often learning incorrect lessons. Even the best efforts to bolster the credibility of the United States ultimately serve little purpose.
However, history
Pg. 83
Appeasement DA AT CredibilityHege Inevitable
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 84
Hegemony is sustainable and inevitableinsurmountable leads in economics, navy, military, and diplomatic capital Kagan 12-Senior Fellow and Foreign Policy Commentator @ the Brookings Institution, co-founder of the Project for
the New American Century, PhD in US History @ American University, MPP @ the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, BA in History @ Yale [Robert, the New Republic, Not Fade Away, 1/11/2012, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-powerdeclinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI#, DKP] Powerful as this sense of decline may be, however, it deserves a more rigorous examination. Measuring changes in a nations relative power is a tricky business, but there are some basic indicators: the size and the influence of its economy relative to that of other powers; the magnitude of military power compared with that of potential adversaries; the degree of political influence it wields in the
international systemall of which make up what the Chinese call comprehensive national power. And there is the matter of time. Judgments based on only a few years evidence are problematic. A great powers decline is the product of fundamental changes in the international distribut ion of various forms of power that usually occur over longer stretches of time. Great powers rarely decline suddenly. A war may bring them down, but even that is usually a symptom, and a culmination, of a longer process. The decline of the British Empire, for instance, occurred over several decades. In 1870, the British share of global manufacturing was over 30 percent. In 1900, it was 20 percent. By 1910, it was under 15 percent well below the rising United States, which had climbed over the same period from more than 20 percent to more than 25 percent; and also less than Germany, which had lagged far behind Britain throughout the nineteenth century but had caught and surpassed it in the first decade of the twentieth century. Over the course of that period, the British navy went from unchallenged master of the seas to sharing control of the oceans with rising naval powers. In 1883, Britain possessed more battleships than all the other powers combined. By 1897, its dominance had been eclipsed. British officials considered their navy completely outclassed in t he Western hemisphere by the United States, in East Asia by Japan, and even close to home by the combined navies of Russia and Franceand that was before the threatening growth of the German navy. These were clear-cut, measurable, steady declines in two of the most important measures of power over the course of a half-century. SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS for Americas relative decline these days would be more potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even
a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 1890s,
the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence. Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of Americas decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on the rise and fall of the great
in history had there been such a great disparity of power as between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that no other great power had held such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of American power was unprecedented. In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a comprehensive uni-polarity unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing about the post-American world and the rise of the rest, and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of Americas relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years? The answer is no. Lets start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, Americas position in the world has not changed. Its share of the worlds GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the worlds economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about Chinas development predict that it will overtake the
powers, America included, declared that never United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the sheer size of an economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the international system. If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then the worlds largest economy, would have been the predominant power inst ead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even
if China does reach this pinnacle againand Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the countrys growth indefinitelyit will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP. Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, military strength underpins hegemony. Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline
Pg. 84
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 85 in Americas relative military capacityat least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan,
which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annuallya higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate Americas actual superiority in military capability. American
land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world.
Pg. 85
Appeasement DA AT CredibilityHardline Worse
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 86
Hardline policy in Latin America is WORSE for credibility in the long-termUS is LOSING its position because of it Grandin, 2011 (Greg, Obama's Latin America Policy: Renewal or Further Decline? March 16, The Nation,
http://www.thenation.com/blog/159256/obama-latin-america-renewal-or-further-decline) Barack Obama heads to Latin America tomorrow, bringing with him little more than a winning smile and the hope that the afterglow of his election, which Latin Americans
celebrated with great cheer, still warms. The trip is meant to show that his administration has not let crises, domestic and foreign, prevent a proactive engagement with the region. In reality,
Obama will be playing catch-up, trying to slow down Chinas inroads into what used to be the United Statess backyard, shore up an alternative to the
so-called bad left countries of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and sometimes Ec uador and Argentina, and win back Brazil. With its $6 trillion economy, Brazil has helped lead what Ecuadors president Rafael Correa recently called the second and definitive independence of Latin America, opposing Washing ton on issues ranging from climate change to trade, Palestine to Honduras. Having been early critics of the militarism ( most
Latin American countries opposed the War on Terror broadly and the invasion of Iraq in particular) and extreme neoliberalism that crashed the United States, they believed he would help them create a new hemispheric framework, leaving behind the old failed orthodoxies and finding a way to cooperatively deal with transnational problems like poverty, inequality, crime, migration and climate change. At the very least, they thought he would finally end the US cold war against Cuba. But despite getting off to a good start at the Summit of the Americas shortly after his inauguration, Obama has largely disappointed. His administrations shameful legitimizing of the June 2009 Honduran coup was a symbolic turning point, but the disenchantment has been widespread. An expected alliance with Brazils Luiz Incio Lula da Silva didnt pan out; immigration reform is off the table, as is a renewal of the assault rifles ban that might stem the flow of the weapons into Mexico; the United States refuses to lower its multibilliondollar subsidy and tariff program that floats corporate giants like ADM and Monsanto; Cuba remains a pariah, if only in Washingtons eyes. As Obama quickly learned, obstacles to an effective hemispheric diplomacy were not to be found in the bad left" countries but much closer to home: its the NRA, the anti-Castro Cuban lobby, agro-industry, anti-Latino jingoism, as well as the State and Commerce departments (along with the Office of the US Trade Representative) stuffed with holdovers from the Clinton and Bush administrations, that prevent much-needed movement on any
number of issues: migration, Cuba, gun smuggling into Mexico, tariffs (the last Congress renewed a 54 cent tariff on each gallon of imported Brazilian ethanol so much for free trade), and poverty reduction. As a result, Obama
succumbed to inertia, carrying on a disastrous war on drugs and pushing an economic agenda as if 2008 (or 2002 in Argentina, the worst recorded economic collapse in history) never happened.
Pg. 86
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 87
***Critiques of Prolif Impacts***
Pg. 87
Appeasement DA Top Level Defense
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 88
History proves nuclear acquisition will be slow and doesnt increase likelihood or magnitude of war Bennett 05 (Drake, Boston Globe, Give nukes a chance, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/03/20/give_nukes_a_chance?p g=full)
KENNETH N. WALTZ, adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University, doesn't like the phrase ''nuclear proliferation.'' ''The
term proliferation' is a great misnomer,'' he said in a recent interview. ''It refers to things that spread like wildfire. But we've had nuclear military capabilities extant in the world for 50 years and now, even counting North Korea, we only have nine nuclear countries.'' Strictly speaking, then, Waltz is as against the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the next sane human being. After all, he argues, ''most countries don't need them.'' But the eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons by those few countries that see fit to pursue them, that he's for. As he sees it, nuclear weapons prevent wars. ''The only thing a country can do with nuclear weapons is use them for a deterrent,'' Waltz told me. ''And that makes for internal stability, that makes for peace, and that makes for cautious behavior.'' Especially in a unipolar world, argues Waltz, the possession of nuclear deterrents by smaller nations can check the disruptive ambitions of a reckless superpower. As a result, in words Waltz wrote 10 years ago and has been reiterating ever since, ''The gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.''
More evidence - prolif doesnt cause war Waltz 03 [Kenneth, Emeritus Professor of IR at Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 27-9]
An opponent who attacks what is unambiguously mine risks suffering great distress if I have second-strike forces. This statement has important implications for both the deterrer and the deterred. Where territorial claims are shadowy and disputed, deterrent writs do not run. As Steven J. Rosen has said, "It is difficult to imagine Israel committing national suicide to hold on to Abu Rudeis or Hebron or Mount Hermon." 27 Establishing the credibility of a deterrent force requires moderation of territorial claims on the part of the would-be deterrer. For modest states, weapons whose very existence works strongly against their use are just what is wanted. In a nuclear world, conservative would-be attackers will be prudent, but will
would-be attackers be conservative? A new Hitler is not unimaginable. Would the presence of nuclear weapons have moderated Hitler's behavior? Hitler did not start
western democracies had not come to the aid of a geographically defensible and militarily strong Czechoslovakia. Why then should they have declared war on behalf of an indefensible Poland and against a Germany made stronger by the incorporation of Czechoslovakia's armor? From the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 to the invasion of Poland in 1939, Hitler's calculations were realistically made. In those years, Hitler would have been deterred from acting in ways that immediately threatened massive death and widespread destruction in Germany. And, even if Hitler had not been deterred, would his generals have obeyed his commands? In a nuclear world, to act in blatantly offensive ways is madness. Under the circumstances, how many generals would obey the commands of a madman? One man alone does not make war. To believe that nuclear deterrence would have worked against Germany in 1939 is easy. It is also easy to believe that in 1945, given the ability to do so, Hitler and some few around him would
World War II in order to destroy the Third Reich. Indeed, he was dismayed by British and French declarations of war on Poland's behalf. After all, the have fired nuclear warheads at the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as their armies advanced, whatever the consequences for Germany. Two considerations work against this possibility: the first applies in any world; the second in a nuclear world. First, when defeat is seen to be inevitable, a ruler's authority may vanish. Early in 1945, Hitler apparently ordered the initiation of gas warfare, but his generals did not respond. 28 Second, no country will press a nuclear nation to the point of decisive defeat. In the desperation of defeat, desperate measures may be taken, and the last thing anyone wants to do is to make a nuclear nation despe r-
ate. The unconditional surrender of a nuclear nation cannot be demanded. Nuclear weapons affect the deterrer as well as the deterred.
Pg. 88
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 89
No risk of prolif, it wouldnt cause a chain reaction, and it would be slow at worst - your evidence is alarmism Gavin 10 (Francis, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law @ the
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs @ the University of Texas at Austin, Sam As It Ever Was; Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War, Lexis)
Fears of a tipping point were especially acute in the aftermath of China's 1964 detonation of an atomic bomb: it was predicted that India, Indonesia, and Japan might follow, with consequences worldwide, as "Israel, Sweden, Germany, and other potential nuclear countries far from China and India would be affected by proliferation in Asia." 40 A U.S. government document identified "at least eleven nations (India,
Japan, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia)" with the capacity to go nuclear, a number that would soon "grow substantially" to include "South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico." 41 A top-secret, blue-ribbon committee established to craft the U.S. response contended that "the [1964] Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers." 42
These
predictions were largely wrong. In 1985 the National Intelligence Council noted that for "almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb." All of these estimates based their largely pessimistic and ultimately incorrect estimates on factors such as the increased "access to fissile materials," improved technical capabilities in countries, the likelihood of "chain reactions," or a "scramble" to proliferation when "even one additional state demonstrates a nuclear capability." The 1985 report
goes on, "The most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that, despite the alarms rung by past Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964." Although
"some proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments have taken place in the past two decades," they did not have "the damaging, systemwide impacts that the Intelligence community generally anticipated they would." 43 In his analysis of more than sixty years of failed efforts to accurately predict nuclear proliferation, analyst Moeed Yusuf concludes that "the pace of proliferation has been much slower than anticipated by most." The majority of countries suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear weapons capability "never even came close to crossing the threshold. In fact, most did not even initiate a weapons program." If all the countries that were considered prime suspects over the past sixty years had developed nuclear weapons, "the world would have at least 19 nuclear powers today." 44 As Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue, government and academic experts frequently "exaggerated the scope and pace of nuclear weapons proliferation." 45 Nor is there compelling evidence that a nuclear proliferation chain reaction will ever occur. Rather, the pool of potential proliferators has been shrinking. Proliferation pressures were far greater during the Cold War. In the 1960s, at least twenty-one countries either had or were considering nuclear weapons research programs. Today only nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons. Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine have dismantled their weapons programs. Even rogue states that are/were a great concern to U.S. policymakers--Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea--began their nuclear weapons programs before the Cold War had ended. 46 As far as is known, no nation has started a new nuclear weapons program since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. 47 Ironically, by focusing on the threat of rogue states, policymakers may have underestimated the potentially far more destabilizing effect of
proliferation in "respectable" states such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Accidents will never occur- safeguards, no use or lose pressures, and rational leaders all prevent them and history proves the scenario is science fiction
Quinlan 9 (Sir Michael Quinlan, Former Permanent Under-Secretary of State UK Ministry of Defense, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems,
Prospects, p. 63-69, The book reflects the author's experience across more than forty years in assessing and forming policy about nuclear weapons, mostly at senior levels close to the centre both of British governmental decision-making and of NATO's development of plans and deployments, with much interaction also with comparable levels of United States activity in the Pentagon and the State department)
Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decision-makers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which drive modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted
Pg. 89
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 90
earlier, whether newer nuclear weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any
presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgment that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacker possessor used nuclear weapons, whether firs t or in response to the aggressors own first use, this judgment would begin to look dangerously precariou s. There must be at least a substantial probability of the aggressor leaders concluding that their initial judgment had been mistakenthat the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own countrys surviva l they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgment and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternativeit can be only surrender. But a more hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum.
Real-life conflict would have a political context.
Pg. 90
Appeasement DA Propaganda
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 91
All anti-prolif arguments are at best baseless Americentrist propaganda Gray, 99 strategic thinker and professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading,
where he is the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies; Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy (Colin. Beyond the Fuel Cycle: Strategy and the Proliferation Puzzle. The Second Nuclear Age. CIAO) For reasons that seem excellent and generally valid, the United States is apt to regard its strategic choices and subsequent behavior through the lens of understanding provided by the assumption of an exceptional, and exceptionally benign, U.S. role in world politics. Many U.S. strategic commentators would be shocked to be told that there are people abroad who genuinely believe that sometimes the United States needs to be
deterred. For a related point, it is surprising just how many apparently sophisticated and well-informed people in the United States are comfortable with the deeply pejorative, and prospectively perilously misleading, concept of the rogue statean issue raised briefly in Chapter 1. 11 What is a rogue state? How would a particular polity qualify to be so classified? The answer, stolen as an analogy with the misbehavior of some large mammals in the wild animal kingdom, is a state that behaves in a grossly antisocial manneralways assuming that the concept of an international society of states has some authority, of course. In practice, the problem is that the spectrum of antisocial behavior in world politics can range from regimes that set out to conquer the worldtruly the neighbors from hellthrough regimes whose security demands are incompatible with the reasonable needs of other regimes in the immediate region, to regimes whose
A significant problem promoted by the U.S. thesis of exceptionalism is that it lacks a natural frontier. Leaving aside the large and potent ideological cultural dimension to the claim for U.S. exceptionalism, even the fairly raw and brutal realpolitical claims for exceptional global license that flow from hegemonic, or unipolar, superpower status are prone to mislead the unwary. A United States that is profoundly exceptional in U.S. self-assessment is not exactly a United States well equipped to distinguish the universal from the exceptional in its strategic reasoning. A hegemonic superpower is apt to suspect roguery when what it sees is not so much roguery as it is common political thought and behavior on the subject of security. For strategic cultural reasons, the argument that
principal sins fall in the category of an honest and not unreasonable definition of national interests that is at some odds with contemporary preferences in U.S. foreign policy. follows can be difficult to explain to a U.S. audience. Some of the reasons the United States is, and in my opinion should be, the most lethally militarily equipped polity in the world pertain to the unique political condition of the United States as the global hegemon. But other important reasons the United States is an abundantly nuclear-armed polity are reasons that find resonance in many regions around the world. To Americans, and indeed to non-Americans who are sympathetic or committed to the U.S.-protected world order, it is all but self-evident why the United States should enjoy counterdeterrent effectiveness at worst and escalation dominance at best in all categories of weapons and classes of conflicts. The
point is that some of the more important reasons the United States chooses to remain a nuclear weapons state (NWS) are common to a range of polities and, frighteningly, even to some would-be polities around the world. The political and strategic logic that underpins the preceding
paragraphs is probably easier to grasp if one is not American. The problem for Americans is how to grasp what is not at all exceptional in their basket of strategic cultural beliefs.
The careful U.S. study of WMD proliferation thus is likely to run afoul of the problem, or condition, that beliefs and behavior that are roguish to Americans are simply prudent to the natives. The study of nuclear (inter alia) proliferation is unlikely to yield significant benefit to Western clients so long as the motives of threshold states, and other presumed would-be proliferants, are framed by a theory of roguery. For every genuine rogue state there will be a handful of candidate
proliferants whose core motives for WMD acquisition are entirely congruent with some large fraction of U.S. motivation. Some of the reasons currently authoritative for the effectively indefinite maintenance of British status as an NWS look distinctly attractive to polities geostrategically far more exposed to danger than Britain is likely to be during the next half century.
Pg. 91
Appeasement DA Racist
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 92
Their impact claims are based on outdated theories and racist assumptions Karl, 1996 (David J., Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California, Proliferation
pessimism and emerging nuclear powers, International Security, Vol. 21, Issue 3, Winter) Pessimism informs the conventional wisdom on proliferation issues and is the touchstone for U.S. nonproliferation policies. Despite its wide currency, it has traditionally suffered from two major problems, however. First, it relies mostly on deductive logic, with the historical record used more to illustrate arguments rather than to conduct rigorous empirical inquiry and theory-building. Indeed, a good deal of
the proliferation debate remains a recitation of arguments already in circulation twenty years ago, with scholars continuing to focus on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff while neglecting the study of the several past or extant bilateral nuclear rivalries in Asia. The
Sino-Soviet and Indo-Pakistani rivalries, in particular, bring important evidence to bear on when and how nuclear weapons influence strategic interactions between states . Yet
scholarship still offers, as one scholar noted fifteen years ago, "scant analysis of what happens when actual nuclearization takes place, especially in a region where states
Second, the contrasts that pessimists have drawn between the logic and behavior patterns in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear experience and those of other states, particularly in the Third World, have often been so stark that it seemed hard to acquit them of the ethnocentric bias with which their critics charge them.[18] This is especially true of arguments that the virulent ethnic and religious hatreds in Third World regions may not yield to fears of nuclear retaliation, or that leaders of Third World regimes possess personal value structures predisposing them to capricious and illogical acts from which not even threats of nuclear retaliation can dissuade them.[19]
have a history of violent antagonism towards each other."[17]
Pg. 92
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 93
***Critiques of Hegemony***
Pg. 93
Appeasement DA Doesnt Solve War
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 94
Arguments for unipolarity are about cobling together a coherent identity for a directionless United States and providing a new set of justifications for imperialist American power; associated doomsday predictions are the consequence ofNOT the reason forthat position. Shapiro 93 critical international relations theorist and a professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii. 1993,
Michael j. That obscure object of violence: Logistic and Desire in the Gulf War The political subject of violence p.135 The Gulf War leaves us with a similar suspicion. Saddam Hussein, our archenemy, remains in place, occupying a position that national desire would nevertheless reproduce were he to be removed. Despite the trumpeting about our 'victory in the Gulf, the discourse on the danger from such enemies reasserts itself. Even now, the media dwarfs are busy helping the militarised national consciousness fix on an antagonism. The problematic at the moment is how to justify armed preparedness in a world of dissolving powerblocs that have, until recently, reliably supplied antagonists. Unable to use the old ideological discourse that required the existence of implacable communist regimes, one inventive commentator has provided a geopolitical category that is aimed at saving our antagonistic identity. There exists the dangerous entity he, calls 'the weapons state', which possesses 'weapons of mass destruction' and includes such feisty little places as Libya, North Korea and Iraq. He argues that the antagonistic structure of response to such enemies must be unipolar', i.e. that the US must be the sole geopolitical unit taking the responsibility for managing the dangers. It turnsout that national-level hostility still needs its objects, but the rationale remains duplicitous. As in the case of Clausewitz's discourse, the objects only appear to be the result of an epistemologically oriented kind of thinking , a thinking that locates dangers as external objects to be met by the endangered subject. As in Clausewitz's case, the more significant frame is ontological. The commentator is fixing on objects, but their meaning derives from the concern with maintaining selfhood. This is made even more evident when an adjacent dwarf (one writing in the same issue of Foreign Affairs [note the pun]) writes of the need for a new self-justification' now that the US lacks the one it had for nearly a half century because the Eastern Bloc has dissolved. Lest there be any doubt that it is the maintenance of a coherent subjectivity, not rationality in the old external means-ends sense that is at stake, the commentator is explicit, and here I can rest my case for the operation of a desire whose restless quest is aimed through its objects of attention - at its own constitutive identity: 'The great lesson of how the cold war ended may be stated in these words: being is superior to doing. What a nation is, is essential. What it does can only express what it is.'
Pg. 94
Appeasement DA Causes War
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 95
US Leadership Ensures Global Destruction We Only Believe it is Stabilizing Because We Refuse to Question it
Burke 7-Professor of Politics and International Relations @ the University of New South Wales [Anthony, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 231-2, 2007,
DKP] Yet the first act
in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, if 'peace' is its object, its means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward a
Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama naturalises war and
coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people defined
only through their lack of 'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of
'world-historical' violence that stretches back to Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession through which the modem United States was created and then expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global economic and strategic order after 1945. This role involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive 'strategic'
involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least 200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's benign
intentions, of America putting its 'power at the service of principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the 'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom' offers us, however, is the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, but by the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is how we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the
people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's actors."
Pg. 95
Appeasement DA Causes Extinction
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 96
Hegemony = self-fulfilling prophecy based on epistemologically tenuous assumptions and war, genocide, collective suicide and extinction
Hoggett 4 prof of politics and co-dir. of Center for Psycho-Social Studies, U West England. Degree in social psychology, U
SussexANDDr. Simon Clarkeprof of psycho-social studies and co-dir. of the center The Empire of Fear: The American Political Psyche and the Culture of Paranoia, http://www.btinternet.com/~psycho_social/Vol5/JPSS5-PHSC1.htm
The image of Prometheus has often been used as a metaphor to describe the conjoining of capitalist and technological development, something which has unleashed processes of modernisation, the like of which have never been seen before (Landes 1969). The metaphor of `Prometheus Unbound , once used by Shelley as descriptor for the Industrial Revolution in the 19th Century, now seems an apt image for American economic, military and cultural power at the beginning of the new century. Prometheus represents humanitys freedom to rebel against the Gods, a rage against the arbitrary finality of mortality. But whilst Prometheus is noble hubris and grandiosity also mark his stance the creations of his imagination will displace the divine. Therefore, like other less clamorous and dynamic narcissants, the Promethean is one also contemptuous of limits and incapable of (inter)relations. Alone in a world of his own creation. In her classic paper on narcissism Joan Riviere (1936) insists `we
should not be deceived by the positive aspects of narcissism but should look deeper, for the depression that will be found to underlie it (p.368). Fear is now an abiding, pervasive and dominant affect in American life and has been since the Second World War. However this relates to a paradox that the ancient Greeks knew so well. Lying at the very heart of the hubris of an individual or nation that believes in its omniscience lies fear, fear of its own capacity for self-annihilation. Speaking of the narcissistic character, Rivierre noted that
ultimately this individual lives in `fear of his own suicide or madness; thi s is the essence of what she calls his depressive anxiety. It is necessary therefore to focus upon
this is a figure wracked by guilt and anxiety concerning the destructive consequences of his creative powers. First there is internal destruction. In a recent bestseller, The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things, Barry
this dark side of the new Promethean for Glassner (1999) investigates a range of social anxieties which have beset the American psyche, from panics about smack and gunslinging black teenagers to scares about satanic abuse and internet addiction. The book is a rich description of some of the fears that haunt the contemporary American psyche but it is ultimately disappointing for it offers little insight into the deeper cultural anxieties that the American media so cleverly exploits. What Glassner highlights, without ever examining, is the internal destruction consequent upon the American mode of development. The
USA is a grossly unequal society and one in which structural inequality remains steadfastly mapped onto questions of race and class. Right at the end of his book Glassner briefly examines
the source of the moral panics he has described, suggesting that they are òblique expressions of concern about problems Americans know to be pernicious but have not taken decisive action to quash problems such as hunger, dilapidated schools, gun proliferation, and deficient health care for much of the US population (Gl assner p.209). No more vivid expression of this social divisiveness can be found than in statistics regarding prison populations. According to recent Home Office (2000) figures, Britain, the worst offender in Europe, has a prison population of 72,000, equivalent to 139 per 100,000 people (Norway has 59). But the US tops the table with 686 per 100,000 (compared to Chinas 111 and Brazils 133). The US prison population currently stands at 1.96 million people, an astronomical figure, the overwhelming proportion of whom are black men, and the US government spends more on imprisonment than on higher education! Contrary to the belief that the US exemplifies an effective multicultural society what we see is a severely restricted multiculturalism in which racial divisions, focusing upon the
exclusion of African-Americans and Latinos, are more entrenched than ever. This has led some commentators to suggest that the USs failure to understand global inequality and its incomprehension at the rage that many peoples feel towards it is an expression of its own inability to understand the sharpness of its own internal differences (Shapiro 2003). But social disintegration in
the US is not just mapped along racial lines. As the effects of decades of neo-Liberal social and fiscal policies accumulate it is increasingly clear that in the US the concept of a `safety net, central to the post-war settlement in western type democracies, has all but disappeared. As a consequence, and this has been glimpsed in some of Richard Sennetts (1998) recent work, failure can now have catastrophic psycho logical and material effects even upon the American middle classes. The result seems to be a form of `moral isolationism', which is spreading through American society, a feeling that there is no-one and no-thing to rely upon. And whilst associationism, despite Putnams (2000) gloomy prognostications, still seems to be a strong feature of civic culture in the USA, with a few exce ptions, such as strong faith communities, this offers little consolation when the chips are really down. In the absence of collective solutions to shared risk Americans fall back upon themselves. But this is not healthy individualism but social anomie, an isolationism fueled by those survival anxieties which were first glimpsed by Christopher Lasch (1985). There
exists a second reservoir of guilt and anxiety, which is intimately connected to the destructive creativity of the American Prometheus. This can be traced back to the hideous and monstrous child that America, more than any other, nurtured from conception through to realisation. A monstrous child, Little Boy by name, which was unleashed upon the ordinary civilians of Hiroshima. The first of countless thousands of such children which, along with consequences of other monstrous biological and chemical conceptions, now constitute the exterminating logic of modernity. Let us not forget who unleashed the first Weapon of Mass Destruction and the imprint that this act
must have left upon the collective psyche of the perpetrator. Within a few years a whole genre of sci-fi American B movies, paperbacks and comics was flourishing in which the theme of mutation was a constant motif (Jancovich 1996). This was the return of the repressed, or, rather, the annihilated. A whole culture of paranoia was developing; partly fueled by the Cold War, a culture that remains a potent dimension of the American psyche to this day. Richard Hofstadter (1979) described how this
Pg. 96
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 97 culture of paranoia infused American politics. Describing the paranoid style of the American politician, Hofstadter argues that whilst retaining some of the characteristics of the clinical paranoiac - overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and apocalyptic in expression this character does not perceive that the hostile and conspiratorial world is necessarily directed at him. Rather he sees all that is bad and evil
directed at his nation, his culture and his way of life (Hofstadter, p.4). This has been typical of new right politics for many years and, for example, has resulted in persecutory immigration policies designed to protect ways of life that are often fictitious and based in phantasy. In a recent essay, Jason Cowley (2001) argues that this culture, despite its religiosity, ìs essentially an entertainment culture,
addicted to narratives of catastrophe in everything from film right through to computer
games. Sat astride the pinnacle of this culture is Tom Clancy, the best-selling, Reagan-adoring writer of fiction such as the Sum of all Fears which presciently described the hijacking by Arab militants of civilian planes which were then used as weapons against the American people. Fiction becomes fact. America looks into the mirror of the world and sees an enemy, an enemy which if not contained will spread. Thus the `domino theory, given vivid expression by Harry.S. Truman who succeeded Roosevelt as US President in 1944, a `theory which justified American intervention in Greece, Turkey and countless Latin Ame rican countries during the Cold War, inspired the Vietnam tragedy and now `the War on Terror in which a febrile Islam is imagined to be spreading rhizome-like around the edges of the `free world. But who is this enemy if not Thanatos, Little Boy and all his heirs, the dark echoes of the idealisation of the American way of life - a variety and quantity of weapons of mass destruction which are now, like Chinas citizens, almost beyond enumeration? In 2000 American defence expenditure stood at $295bn, this exceeded the combined expenditure of the rest of the world by almost $30bn. This year, 2003, it is set to rise by a further 14%, the biggest leap in over two decades, as a new generation of tactical nuclear weaponry, outlined in Rumsfelds `nuclear posture review of the previous year, is actively co ntemplated by the National Nuclear Security Agency (Guardian 2003). Despite the caution of John Quincy Adams, Americas sixth president, not to go ìn search of monsters to destroy, Rumsfeld and Co. are clearly bent on fostering the conditions that will keep this species sustainable for decades to come (and the US defence industry by the way). Such
an overwhelming degree of military superiority betrays not just the extent of American ambitions for global hegemony but also the extent of Americas fear. Returning to Riviere, she notes how depressive anxiety gives rise to its own special defence, the manic defence. In place of vulnerability there is omnipotence and specifically an attitude of contempt and depreciation for the relationships upon which the narcissist
depends. Listening to Richard Perle and other architects of the Project for the New American Century this contempt for the United Nations, Òld Europe and countries which cannot or will not embrace the neo-conservative brand of modernisation is explicit and worn with smirking pride. Contemplating the demise of the UN after the war on Iraq, Perle notes that `whilst the chatterbox on the Hudson will continue to bleat what will die ìs the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of the new world order (Perle 2003). He then unleashes an apparently clinical demolition of the repeated failure of the Security Council to act against breaches of international law without providing even the faintest of hints that in truth it has been the US which has most consistently used its veto on the Security Council nine times in all since 1990 against the four vetos cast by the other four members combined during the same period. And whilst were on the subje ct of inaction in the face of breaches of international law wed do well to remember that over the last thirty years the USA has ve toed 34 UN resolutions on Israel and has consistently supported Israels routine violations of UN resolution 242 to which the US is a signatory. What we have here is both cold cunning there is no room for the UN as a countervailing source of authority in `the Project and
a paranoia about the world which has become so routine that it is not even aware of itself. Allusions to `threat and `security run like a thread throughout the brief manifesto of the Project, that is, its `Statement of Principles. But what makes this paranoia, instead of a rational fear response to the real threats that exist to American hegemony around the world? The massive overkill, the self-fulfilling nature of so many American interventions, the uncanny knack that American foreign policy has displayed of making its worst fears come true, the classic paranoid conviction that one is the misunderstood victim and never the perpetrator, the complete inability to perceive how ones own `defensive actions are experienced by the other as provocation and threat wherever we look, the àrms race with the Soviet Union, the run-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, fear of communist contagion in S.E Asia and Latin America, the current `war on terrorism and `containment of N.Korea we see the same mixture of provocation, ineptness and misunderstanding. In his recent book on paranoia, David Bell (2003)
notes how the fears that the paranoid is subject to are the echo of what has become alien(ated). In this way Melanie Klein adds a twist to our understanding of alienation by insisting that what
we project into the world forever threatens to return and haunt us. Bell notes how films such as Alien and The Conversation vividly depict this. Indeed Klein argues that through projective identification the other can become subject to control by self, in subtle ways becoming nudged and coerced into enacting what is put into them. In this way paranoia can become selffulfilling and it really does seem as if the world is out to get you. Gods chosen people Estimates suggest that well over 60% of the citizens of
the USA engage in religious worship on a regular basis in Britain the figure is more like 7%. Christian fundamentalism has become particularly powerful in the USA since the late 1960s, perhaps as the backlash towards 60s `godlessness. But these fundamentalist movements seem to be simply the tip of the iceberg that is modern American religiosity. Indeed, as Karen Armstrong (2001) noted, the concept of `fundamentalism was first coined to characteri se the emergence of charismatic religious movements in N.America at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact God and America have walked hand in hand ever since the Founding Fathers. This has found a powerful and consistent expression in the politics of the United States, and particularly in its foreign policy, where analysts have coined the phrase Àmerican exceptionalism to describe the belief that `the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to play in human history (McCrisken 2001). Almost from the beginning of the occupation by European settlers N.America has been construed as a promised land and its citizens a chosen people. The New World was, in this sense contrasted with the Old, a world of famine, war and intolerance from which many of these settlers had fled. McCrisken provides countless indications of this exceptionalist belief system from George Washington to Bill Clinton but all are characterised by certain common suppositions that America is the land of the free, that its intentions are inherently benevolent, that inside every non-American there is an American struggling to get out and, perhaps most importantly given the War on Terror and the occupation of Iraq, that the US is the embodiment of universal human values based on the rights of all mankind freedom, democracy and justice.
Pg. 97
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 98
Weinberg (1935) described this in terms of the belief in `manifest destiny which gave successive administrations in the nineteenth century the sense of Americas special mission to bring freedom to the peoples of the world, as in the Mexican War or the Spanish-American War which led to the `liberation of Cuba. Today
the sense of manifest destiny is no less strong but now it is garbed in the cloak of `modernisation the belief that all societies pass through certain stages of development (from traditional to modern) and that the West, and particularly the United States, is the common endpoint towards which all peoples must irresistibly move. Of course, this is Fukuyamas ènd of history and it is perhaps no surprise to find him to
be (along with Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz & Co.) one of the 25 signatories to the Statement of Principles (written in June 1997) of the Project for the New American Century the neo-Conservative manifesto which now directs American and British foreign policy. The point about all this is that this
very idealisation of America
by Americans, its self-identification with virtue, contributes enormously both to its innocence and to its arrogance. There is often a real generosity of spirit and a friendly naivete which strikes the non-American (at least the English ones) when encountering an American citizen. One thinks of the countless jokes about the American as an ìnnocent abroad captured in the image of the gawping Americ an tourist. But there is also the arrogance added to this, an arrogance which leads even hard nosed strategists to assume that invading troops need know nothing about the peoples that they are about to `liberate, a mistake which had tragic consequences in Somalia and is now being repeated in Iraq. Moreover this is an arrogance which leaves Americans with such a strong sense that they have virtue on their side, and it is
this that has provided the fertile ground for the splitting and paranoia which has been such a feature of the American view of the world since the Second World War. Again, if we return to Hofstadter's ideas about American politics we can see this paranoid belief in a vast and sinister conspiracy which is set out to undermine and destroy a way of life. Indeed for Hofstadter, `the paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic terms - he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always
manning the barricades of civilization (Hofstadter 1979, p.29). Three decades on and this still sounds very familiar. One thinks of the `fighting talk of George Bush in the war on Iraq, in the fight against the Axis of Evil, and the struggle against global terrorism - fighting terror with terror, the talion morality of the paranoid schizoid position, destroying and re-creating political systems, acting as the purveyor of civilization to the world. This then, is a world in which American society has been called upon to resist the spreading evils, first of communism, now of militant Islam. Moreover, it has been this splitting of good and evil which fueled the rise of McCarthyism in the 1950s and which is threatening American civil liberties today. Injured narcissism In 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms' Melanie Klein (1946) describes
the destructive and controlling nature of the narcissistic state of mind. A typical feature of paranoid object relations is their narcissistic nature, for in reality the objects to which the paranoid individual or group relates are representations of their alienated selves. Moreover the narcissistic relationship has strong obsessional features, and in particular the need to control others, to remain omnipotent and all powerful. David Bell develops this theme in his commentary on Mike Daviss recent NLR article (Davis 2001) in
which he notes that the resort, following September 11th, to increasingly pervasive forms of security and control within the USA actually contributes the very anxiety these measures seek to address. Bell argues, `the grandiose demand
for complete security creates ever more, in our minds, enemies endowed with our own omnipotence who are imagined as seeking to control us (Bell, p.37). But what happens when this narcissism is injured, omnipotence punctured? In the real world, as opposed to the world of the imaginary, this attitude of omnipotence is repeatedly subject to disconfirmation. McCrisken (2003) refers to the `Vietnam syndrome as a defining element of American foreign policy since the
1970s, something which formed the backdrop to the first Gulf War through which it reached a partial and incomplete resolutio n. Vietnam was a trauma for the USA in two ways. The American claim to have a monopoly on virtue was destroyed by successive scandals, atrocities and outrages, in fact they were revealed to be as savage as any other occupying power. Jean-Paul Sartre (1968) famously argued that the war waged by America on Vietnam was implicitly genocidal. Indeed for Sartre, the war in Vietnam signified a new stage in the development of imperialism - 'it is the greatest power on earth against a poor peasant people. Those who fight it are living out the only possible relationship between an over-industrialized country and an under-developed country, that is to say, a genocidal relationship implemented through racism' (p.42). Worse still, they lost the war, against one of the most economically backward societies imaginable the might of American military power came to nought. The impact of Vietnam was such that the USA virtually avoided direct military involvement for twenty five years, preferring indirect involvement (encouraging and equipping Iraq versus Iran, Afghanistan versus the Soviet Union) or direct engagement in situations such as tiny Grenada where they could hardly lose. The Vietnam Syndrome also encouraged the development of an approach to warfare which gave maximum emphasis to the use of air power and the avoidance of ground troops, something exemplified by the intervention in Kosovo and, later, Afghanistan. We
can also understand the Vietnam Syndrome in terms of Freuds work on trauma and his notions of repetition and working through. Trauma (whether loss of limb or sexual abuse) is an attack upon the narcissistic organisation of the psyche/body, it is experienced as loss which is irreparable. But loss can be managed sufficiently for a life to move on, and for this to occur a place in the psyche/culture needs to be found in which some of the shock, rage, horror and grief can be addressed symbolically. And for a while in the 1970s elements of the liberal American intelligentsia were able to initiate such a process
through critical self-analysis, literature, film and music. But a quite different response, based upon a manic form of denial, was waiting in the wings. Freud notes how a
child may engage in the repetition of traumatic experience in an attempt to magically overcome it by reversing the subject/object relationship, by becoming master rather than victim. But this is a `working through by enactment, an attempt to àct upon reality rather than understand it. Thus the àction movie and the àction hero of the Hollywood movies which began in the 1970s featuring Schwarzenegger, Jean Claude Van Damme, and, later, Bruce Willis. But, more seriously, we can also see the same process of `working through in terms of the search to re-enact in reverse the humiliation of Vietnam but this time with the US as master. The
Pg. 98
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 99
first Gulf War only partially accomplishes this, Saddam remains unfinished business for many of the neo-conservatives gathering with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in the late 1990s. It is in this context that we can understand September 11th . For September 11th was a second huge narcissistic injury for the USA and the current war on Iraq is a further attempt at `working through. As by now is absolutely clear (and openly admitted by Wolfowitz) the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq was the pretext for an intervention which had quite different motives. These motives were partly strategic (oil, the need to find an alternative to Saudi Arabia as a forward base for US forces in the region) but they were also partly simply about the reassertion of American power against a more fulfilling target than the Taliban in Afghanistan. They set about `finishing the job begun by Bush Snr and achieving `closure, closing the narcissistic wound opened up by Vietnam and never properly healed. Psychotic Anxieties, Splitting and
September 11th If we think psychoanalytically about the events leading up to the war on Iraq, then the starting point is the twin towers - September 11th . Its not easy to forget the horror of that day. There was no absence of bodies then. Horrific scenes of people jumping out of windows, running for life, mangled and dismembered corpses. On September 11th we witnessed true annihilation, not a film, just annihilation. As Cowley (2001) acutely observed, Ìslamic terrorists appropriated the destructive impulses of American entertainment culture, making of a nations ap ocalyptic fantasies a terrifying actuality, as if they were attempting to speak to the Americans in their own language. This was a massive attack on the security of the American nation. As Hanna Segal (2002) not ed, the trauma of the terrorist attack had an added dynamic 'the crushing realisation that there is somebody out there who actually hates you to the point of annihilation'. It is now commonplace to say that the USA lost its innocence on September 11th. But what it really lost was its embrace of the imaginary. Until that day the American psyche had been consumed by a helpless fascination with a fictional threat, or rather a series of fictional threats; on September 11th they received the sh ock of the real. `Welcome to the world some people said. Suddenly Americans became as vulnerable as the rest of us. The immediate response to September 11th was bewilderment and incredulity. Again, as Segal noted, the question on most American lips was `why? It is a common reaction for people in trauma situations to think that people are out to get them, in the case of the terrorist attacks it is actually a true fact. Ones worst nightmares come true. Segal added another dimension - the symbolism of the twin towers and the Pentagon. This is very important if we are to try and understand the meanings and motivations behind the war on Iraq. So, the symbolism equates to we are all -powerful, with our weapons, finance, high tech - we can dominate you completely. The suicide bombers destroyed this omnipotence. As Segal noted: we were pushed into a world of terror versus terror, disintegration and confusion. The shock was followed by mourning and barely contained anxiety. The president of the United States of America appeared on global television networks as `the child adult, a little boy lost. At first he seemed quite inadequate to the part that was being demanded of him. It almost looked like he wanted to run asking, `why me? For weeks the USA was gripped by a wave of panics about anthrax and other impending attacks . But traces of American triumphalism were being quickly reasserted. The flags which, from Maine to Arizona, first hung from poles and windows in grief quickly transmuted into a sign of strength and resolution, and later, to bellicosity. This other mood could also be discerned in homage to the courage of fire crews and emergency service personnel and to the passengers who overcame the hi-jackers on the fourth plane (`lets roll). But rage took time to gather. Many liberals and leftists in Europe anticipated an outpouring of vengeful rhetoric from the Republicans, but it did not come. Rather, the response was surprisingly measured and multilateral. And whilst many opposed the war of the `coalition against terror against Afghanistan, at least the connection with September 11th seemed obvious Al Quaeda was clearly being protected by the Taliban regime. It was only when this phyric victory had been swiftly achieved that a shift, symbolised by t he Àxis of Evil speech in January 2002, into a more paranoid and in-your-face triumphalist discourse began. The question of weapons of mass destruction became central to the moral and ethical charge for war. Was there any proof of their existence? The weapons inspectors could find none, yet we were told time after time that clear evidence existed, even though the documents cited had very little credibility. Again, as Hofstadter noted, the typical procedure
of higher paranoid scholarship is to start by accumalating facts, or what appear to be facts to establish 'proof' that a conspiracy exists - the paranoid mentality seeks a coherence that reality cannot provide. Indeed for Hofstadter, `what distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts (though it is occasionally true that in his extravagant passion for facts the paranoid occasionally manufactures them), but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of events. (Hofstadter 1979, p.39). The deployment of reason and strategic cunning becomes unpinned by the apocalyptic vision of paranoid politics. Destroying the Bad Object Classically, in a paranoid schizoid state, manic defenses are called into play. The splitting of good and bad, processes of idealisation and denigration, as we have seen, lead us to perceive the world in dichotomous relationships between good and bad. The bad object/other becomes the fixation point of our anger, fear, rage and paranoia. Excessive projection leaves the individual in mortal fear of an attack from the bad object. Thus we try and destroy this object, lest it comes back to destroy us. The question arises though, as to what happens when these destructive forces are unable to find a satisfactory object. Despite the measured and multi-lateral nature of the
intervention there was still something murderous and retaliatory about the attack on the people of Afghanistan. An attack based in the talion morality of the paranoid schizoid position - an eye for an eye. The
problem with the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban was there was no sense of gratification and the lust to get equal was never satisfied. There are several reasons for this. First, the bombing of Afghanistan simply wasnt enough to either exact
revenge, or to demonstrate the power of the Apocalypse - you cannot bomb the stone age back into the stone age even though, as Sartre (1968, p.40) had noted over thirty years earlier, this had already been attempted in Vietnam with disastrous effects. Second, Bin Laden disappeared, vaporised - there was no bad object to destroy. Finally, the exercise of military might, of unadulterated power had nothing to be powerful over - power only exists if people are the objects of that power. Instead we seemed to have an increasingly paranoid American population and its government on the one hand and disappearing enemy bodies on the other. And then came the Àxis of Evil speech and a further ratcheting up of the spiral of splitting, projection, paranoid phantasy, and defensive of fence. White House rhetoric began providing florid depictions of a world divided between good and evil in which there was no ìn between, `you are either with us or you are against us. Fakhry Davids (2002) notes that the events of September 11th were brought home vividly to us by the wall to wall media coverage - the shocking images of the planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, and then its collapse. Psychically
unbearable events, argues Davids, call into play powerful defences whose
Pg. 99
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 100
aim is to protect us from perceived danger. For Davids, the extent to which the event has been reframed in stereotyped racist terms is apparent
everywhere, the problem has now been reduced to a conflict between the enlightened, civilised, tolerant, freedom loving, cle an living democrat versus the bearded, robed, Kalashnikov bearing bigoted, intolerant, glint in the eye fundamentalist fanatic, or viewed from the other side, the humble believer with God on his side versus the infidel armed with all the worldly might of the devil (Davids 2002, p.362). For Davids, it
is difficult for us to find neutral ground - you are either with us, or against us - which side are you on? This reduction of a complex situation into black and white, good and bad is a paranoid solution to intense anxiety which reinforces the self-idealisation which we have seen lies at the heart of American exceptionalism. As Davids notes, such a world view makes us feel that we know who we are, and may justify actions that make us feel better. The problem is that we dont face the problem. There have been many arguments about why America and Britain decided to wage war on Iraq. All quite plausible in their own right - Saddam the evil dictator, Saddam the murderer of his own people, then there are the
economic, the oil, the money to be made from reconstructing the country, the geo-political, securing the middle east - stopping a snowball of violence, and of course harbouring the terrorist. Then of course there are the weapons of mass destruction, yet to be found, despite the documentation of the paranoid conspirators. All these explanations contribute to a fuller picture, but as David Hare (2003) recently wrote, the
main motivation behind this war was a simply assertion of American power, `the feral pleasure of the flex. Uppity Saddam had dared to piss on the boots of Uncle Sam. A lesson in respect was due. An annihilatory lesson aimed at the global (and not just Islamic) psyche. But weve been here before. This is Sartre (1968, p.42) again on Vietnam, `when a peasant falls in his rice paddy, mowed down by a machine gun, everyone of us is hit. The group which the United States wants to intimidate and terrorize by way of the Vietnamese nation is the human group in its entirety. Not just an attack but an annihilatory one aimed at the Iraqi body, its government, its history and its country an attempt at vaporisation - an apocalyptic vision - such is the style of paranoid politics. And for a while the world did look on in shock and awe. Empty Boots, Empty Tanks, Empty Buildings According to
Baudrillard (1994), `Coppola makes his films like the Americans make war with the same immoderation, the same excess of means, the same monstrous candour and the same success. The war as entrenchment, as technological and psychedelic fantasy, the war as a succession of special effects, the war becomes film even before being filmed a test site, a gigantic territory in which to test their arms, their methods, their power. America
had a choice after September 11th. It could have joined much of the rest of the world in its shared sense of vulnerability and interdependence. But, once more, America chose denial and magic. Denial of the real and a manic reassertion of omnipotence. The war on Iraq was a demonstration of pure and total
power. It became sanitised as a film of all the elements that might obstruct or resist power. There were no bodies, just empty tanks, boots and buildings that were endlessly pounded as a demonstration of shock andawe. The Iraqi bodies disappeared, the presidential guard disappeared and then Saddam disappeared, as did the mighty Republican Guard and, oh yes, it seems so have the weapons of mass destruction. Peter Preston (2003) commented along similar lines, `the missing link, for those of us watching far away is death: the bodies of the men and women who have died. Preston argued that the televised war turned away from the reality of the situation. Nobody wanted to see dead bodies, wounded soldiers or civilians suffering. We can watch the bombs falling, but not see the effect - the dead become undead for photographic purposes. In Britain, the first time we saw blood and bodies, despite the apocalyptic first night of the cr uise missiles, was a report by John Simpson two weeks into the war. Simpson (2003) was with a convey of Kurdish fighters and American special forces when they came under attack from American warplanes: "This is just a scene from hell here. All the vehicles on fire. There are bodies burning around me, there are bodies lying around, there are bits of bodies on the ground. This is a really bad own goal by the Americans" . The very graphic images were even worse, broadcast on BBC television - blood dripping down the windscreen of a vehicle while the reporter sat inside. The cameraman wiping blood from the lens of the camera with his fingers. It was as if the full horror of war had suddenly hit the world. We could at last see the very symbolic and sickening images of a real, as opposed to a hyperreal war. It is paradoxical that there has been more emphasis on casualties since the end of the war. Some conclusions The destruction of the world trade centre was a terrible event in world history, a terrible shock to the American psyche and brought terrible traumas to the ordinary citizens of New York. For the US A as the only world power, the bubble was burst. Coppolla wasnt there, or even Bruce Willis to protect the ordinary person in the street - the terrorists struck at the very heart of America. The tables, however, were turned and the Middle East temporarily succumbed to the (film) show of power (with no casualties), the show that should have protected the twin towers but didnt. T he problem is we cannot have war without bodies - and there cannot be power without being in relation to the other. Despite the fact the neo-Conservatives were itching to take on Saddam before Bush even got into office, despite the fact that for some of these strategists September 11th was therefore both a shock and an opportunity sent from heaven, despite the long period of military preparation and the diplomatic side-show conducted by that nave Mr Blair that accompanied it, despite all this the occupation of Iraq looks like being a piece of inept foreign policy making in the best traditions of American irrationalism. Little thought appears to have been given to what happens once the military occupation was achieved, to the problem of law and order or to reviving the basic infrastructure. Little thought appears to have been given to the possibility that armed Saddam loyalists might `melt into the night in order to fight a sustained campaign of sabotage and guerilla warfare or that the repressed Shias migh t quickly fill the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Baathists and look to their theocratic Shia neighbours in Iran as guide and model. Little thought seems to have been given to an exit strategy and, as the situation deteriorates, the obvious solution call for the UN to pick up the pieces can only be reached for if an enormous chunk of humble pie is swallowed. Besides, the Project for the New American Century is not concerned to restore any legitimacy to this Òld World institution. To return to more or less where we began, it
is impossible to stress enough the narcissistic and fearful character of contemporary American power. This is a power based in a paranoid syle of politics and expressed from a seemingly omnipotent position. Five decades of a
growing ascendancy have encouraged the fantasy that there really are no limits, a delusional belief system has become corroborated by reality. Well almost. Gods chosen people really have acquired a technical, military and economic superiority, which seems to make
interdependence unnecessary. But this is
the problem of the narcissant, the attack upon relatedness. That America can destroy (like in Afghanistan) there can be no doubt, but it has little or
Pg. 100
Appeasement DA
(witness the continued degradation of the former Soviet Bloc). America,
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 101 the Empire of Fear, now stands as the major threat to global society.
no capacity to build or create beyond that which can be included within a commodified mode of relatedness it has lost the capacity to rebuild states or civil societies
Pg. 101
Appeasement DA Discourse Critque
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 102
Their pursuit of hegemony is based on a fantasy of control that relies upon the existence of threatening monsters to justify a permanent state of conflict
Chernus 06-Professor of Religious Studies and Co-director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Colorado-Boulder [Ira, Monsters to
Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin , Published by Paradigm Publishers, ISBN 1594512752, p. 53-54, 2006, DKP]
The end of the cold war spawned a tempting fantasy of imperial omnipotence on a global scale. The neocons want to turn that fantasy into reality. But reality will not conform to the fa ntasy; it wont stand still or keep any semblance of permanent order. So the neocons efforts inevitably backfire. Political scientist Benjamin Barber explains that a nation with unprecedented power has unprecedented vulnerability: for it must repeatedly extend the compass of its power to preserve what
it already has, and so is almost by definition always overextended. Gary Dorrien sees in security coming at the neoconservatives in another way,
too:
For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it maybe, it never
feels secure enough. The [neocon] unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. . . . Just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the
neocons, heightened by ideological ardor.39 If the U.S. must control every event everywhere, as neocons assume, every act
of resistance looks like a threat to the very existence of the nation. There is no good way to distinguish between nations or forces that genuinely oppose U.S. interests and those that dont. Indeed , change of any kind , in any nation, becomes a potential threat. Everyone begins to look like a threatening monster that might have to be destroyed. Its no surprise that a nation imagined as an implacable enemy often turns into a real enemy. When the U.S. intervenes to prevent change, it is likely to provoke resistance. Faced with an aggressive U.S. stance, any nation might get tough in return. Of course, the U.S. can say that it is selflessly trying to serve the world. But why would other nations believe that? It is more likely that others will resist, making hegemony harder to achieve. To the neocons, though, resistance only proves that the enemy really is a threat that must be destroyed. So the likelihood of conflict grows, making everyone less secure. Moreover, the neocons want to do it all in the public spotlight. In the past, any nation that set out to conquer others usually kept its plans largely secret. Indeed, the cold war neocons regularly blasted the Soviets for harboring a secret plan for world conquest. Now here they are calling on the U.S. to blare out its own domineering intentions for all the world to [end page 53] hear. That hardly seems well calculated to achieve the goal of hegemony. But it is calculated to foster the assertive, even swaggering, mood on the home front that the neocons long for. Journalist Ron Suskind has noted that neocons always offer a statement of enveloping peril and no hypothesis for any real solution. They have no hope of finding a real solution because they have no reason to look for one. Their story allows for success only as a fantasy. In reality, they expect to find nothing but an endless battle against an enemy that can never be defeated. At least two prominent neocons have said it
quite bluntly. Kenneth Adelman: We should not try to convince people that things are getting better. Michael Ledeen: The s truggle against evil is going to go on forever.40 This vision of endless conflict is not a conclusion drawn from observing reality. It is both the premise and the
goal of the neocons fantasy. Ultimately, it seems, endless resistance is what they really want. Their call for a unipolar world ensures a permanent state of conflict , so that the U.S. can go on forever proving its military supremacy and promoting the manly virtues of militarism. They have to admit that the U.S., with its vastly incomparable power, already has unprecedented security against any foreign army. So they must sound the alarm about a shadowy new kind of enemy, one that can attack in novel, unexpected ways. They must make distant changes appear as huge imminent threats to America, make the implausible seem plausible, and thus find new monsters to destroy. The neocons story does not allow for a final triumph of order because it is not really about creating a politically calm, orderly world. It is about creating a society full of virtuous people who are willing and able to fight off the threatening forces of social chaos. Having superior power is less important than proving superior power. That always requires an enemy. Just as neocons need monsters abroad, they need a frightened society at home. Only insecurity can justify their shrill call for a stronger nation (and a higher military budget). The more dire their warnings of insecurity, the more they can demand greater
Pg. 102
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 103 military strength and moral resolve. Every foreign enemy is, above all, another occasion to prod the American people to overcome their anxiety, identify evil, fight resolutely against it, and stand strong in defense of their highest values. Hegemony will do no good unless there is challenge to be met, weakness to be conquered, evil to be overcome. The American people must actively seek hegemony and make sacrifices for it, to show that they are striving to overcome their own weakness. So the quest for strength still demands a public confession of weakness, just as the neocons had demanded two decades earlier when they warned of a Soviet nuclear attack through a window of vulnerability. The quest for strength through the structures of national security still demands a public declaration of national insecurity. Otherwise, there is nothing to overcome. The more frightened the public, the more likely it is to believe and enact the neocon story.
Pg. 103
Appeasement DA ATData
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 104
Your statistical data for heg/deterrence fails---too many complexities and varying interpretations Bernstein 2k - et al., Steven Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, The
Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley. European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43. A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the 'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet the most relaxed 'scientific' tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states are close to trivial, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance
on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse isneither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin
the quest for predictive theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in
by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.' We develop the case for forward `tracking' of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This
article is not a nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large- n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and
in a complementary fashion, to `scientific' theory-testing. Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena the trajectories of individual planets can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherently unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about trillions of atoms and molecules. In
international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is
often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of polarity, relative power and the balance of power are among the most widely used independent variables, but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be `tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition andevaluation of deterrence outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is
not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or sloppiness although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves. Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe.
However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on 'idealizations', that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but implicit 'theories' about actors and contexts that do not exist (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). University of Texas National Institute in Forensics Pg. 104
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 105 If problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct large enough samples of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the variation across time and the complexity of the interaction among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory extraordinarily low. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.' Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more
sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars to continue with the same example are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. Wars involve relatively few actors. Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably not inherent properties of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their potentially random distribution relative to underlying causes makes it difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This
uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult. It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic, since we have no way of knowing what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information reliably and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one's own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I.
Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context is ultimately a set of mental constructs. We have descriptive terms like 'chain reaction' or 'contagion effect' to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects.
Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertories of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships even if they existed could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. Any regularities would be `soft'; they would be the outcome of processes that are embedded in history and have a short half-life. They would decay quickly because of the memories, creative searching and learning by political leaders. Ironically, the`findings' of social science contribute to this decay (Weber, 1969; Almond and Genco, 1977: 496-522; Gunnell, 1982: Ch. 2;
Ball, 1987: Ch. 4; Kratochwil, 1989; Rorty, 1989; Hollis, 1994: Ch. 9). Beyond these conceptual and empirical difficulties lies a familiar but fundamental difference of purpose. Boyle's Law, half-lives, or any other scientific principle based on probability, says nothing about the behavior of single units such as molecules. For many
social science ultimately aspires or should aspire to provide insight into practical world problems that are generally part of a small or very small n. In international relations, the dynamics and outcomes of single cases are often much more important than any statistical regularities. The conception of causality on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in closed systems. Open systems can be influenced by external stimuli, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarilydo so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant.
theoretical and practical purposes this is adequate. But Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this a priori from the causal
Pg. 105
Appeasement DA
UTNIF 2013
Pg. 106
statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course ofdevelopment. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible. The
risk in saying that social scientists can 'predict' the value of variables in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives
from that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which the theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this 'theory-testing' or 'evaluating' activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time.5
Pg. 106

Appeasement Disadvantage - UTNIF 2013

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Appeasement Disadvantage - UTNIF 2013

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Appeasement DA

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 1NC Shell

fight against the Yanquis,

also don't need a pumped-up Cuba

Giving in to evil only begets more of it.

we should hold firm onto the leverage

the embargo provides.

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 2NC Uniqueness Wall

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA ATAppeasement Now

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA ATEmbargo Lift

paradoxically turns it into more of a Cuba summit than he would prefer."

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 2NC Engagement Link

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 2NC Terror List Link

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 2NC Embargo Link

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 2NC Travel Ban Link

is no evidence to support the notion that engagement

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA ATCP Links

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA ATEngagement Solves

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA AT Appeasement Solves (w/ CP)

after his trial." (That was in March 2011.)

regimes around the globe.

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA ATInternational Consensus

Iraq, as an illustration, ignored the U.N. Security Council

an urgent public appeal

subversion can invite terrorist reprisals. Reagan's air strikes on

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 2NC Hegemony Impact

either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 2NC Turns Case

the United States handles rogue states will be of decisive importance to

alternative to American leadership is growing international anarchy. Unless we restore

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA Cred Key to HegeTop Level

suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it.

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA Cred K2 HegeCollapse Causes War

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA Cred K2 HegeStudies

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

University of Texas National Institute in Forensics

Appeasement DA 1NC Shell

legitimate authoritarian rule in Venezuela.

Critical Defense of Hegemony

Critical Defense of WoT