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The Belief Exportation Principle: Necessarily, for all subjects S and objects x, if a singular
S to be some way.
way to S.
The Seeing Principle: Necessarily, for all objects x and y, and all properties F, x
The phenomenal looking exportation principle and the seeing principle together entail the
relational phenomenal looking principle. It is the relational looking principle with which I am
Suppose that one is looking at a particular building, A, and that one does not see the
Eiffel Tower, and that one says ‘A looks to me the same height as the Eiffel Tower’. Supposing
that ‘the Eiffel Tower’ is a singular term, then the relational phenomenal looking principle
entails that A does not phenomenally look to one the same height as the Eiffel Tower, where ‘the
same height as the Eiffel Tower’ is within the scope of ‘phenomenally look’.
Suppose that I am looking at an object, B, that is to the right of me, and I say ‘B looks to
the right of me’. Supposing that I do not see myself, then the relational phenomenal looking
principle entails that the object I see does not phenomenally look to the right of me, where ‘to the
• Being in front of me
In ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, Quine argued that if (1) is true, then (2) is
That is, if Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy, then one can export the name ‘Ortcutt’
from within the scope of the ‘believes that’. By contrast, (4) does not follow from (3).
(4) There exists a spy such that Ralph believes z(z is a spy) of that spy.
In general, it seems that if a subject S believes that T is F, where ‘T’ is a singular term,
and ‘F’ is a predicate, then it is possible to export ‘T’ from within the scope of the ‘believes
The Belief Exportation Principle: Necessarily, for all subjects S and objects x, if a singular
S to be some way.
I will assume that a singular term is one that contributes only its reference to the
proposition expressed by sentences containing it. I will also assume that proper names,
demonstratives and indexicals are singular terms. A Fregean would deny that proper names,
demonstratives and indexicals are singular terms, as we have defined ‘singular term’. Later I will
discuss a version of the belief exportation principle that a Fregean could accept.
There is an example, attributed to Kripke, that could be used to challenge the belief
exportation principle (thanks to Ofra Magidor for bringing this example to my attention). Soames
discusses the example in (Soames, 2003, p411-412), and below I paraphrase his description of
the example.
Suppose that I have one false belief that I express using the sentence ‘S’. I introduce a
(5) The object x which is such that, if S, then x is Princeton University, and if not-S, then x is
I think ‘S’ is true, so I think ‘PU’ refers to Princeton University. However, ‘S’ is false,
and ‘PU’ in fact refers to Saul Kripke’s left thumbnail. Thinking that Princeton University is an
institution of higher learning, I form the belief that PU is an institution of higher learning.
Suppose that (6) is true. (6), together with the belief exportation principle, entails (7), and
Soames thinks that (8) is false, and his solution is to reject (6). Soames does not challenge
the inference from (6) to (7), and therefore he does not himself take Kripke’s example to
undermine the belief exportation principle. In another work he takes the belief exportation
Soames’s own solution is to reject (6), and to argue that (5) is not sufficient to introduce
the name ‘PU’. He uses Kripke’s example to argue that there are some restrictions on the use of
Robin Jeshion has discussed Kripke’s example, and she regards (8) as acceptable. That is,
she does not think that the example undermines the belief exportation principle, nor that (5) is an
However, one could use the example to challenge the belief exportation principle. One
might hold that it is intuitive that (6) is true and intuitive that (7) is false.
I will consider two responses to this challenge to the belief exportation principle. The
If (9) does follow from (6), then it no longer seems objectionable to suppose that (7)
follows from (6). However, in the context of the current challenge to the belief exportation
principle, it seems question-begging to suppose that (9) follows from (6). After all, in (9) ‘PU’
has been exported from within the scope of the belief-ascription in (6), so the move from (6) to
The second response is as follows. We are assuming that names are singular terms. We
have said that singular terms contribute only their referents to the propositions expressed by
sentences containing them. Let us suppose that ‘Bob’ is a very well-known name for Saul
Kripke’s left thumbnail: speakers know that ‘Bob’ refers to Saul Kripke’s left thumbnail. If ‘PU’
If (10) is true, then it does not seem so objectionable to suppose that (11) is true:
And (11) is true iff (8) is true, since Bob is Saul Kripke’s left thumbnail.
Let us call the view that names are singular terms Russellianism. If Russellianism is
correct, then (6) entails (10). One might think that this consequence is implausible, and thus
reject Russellianism in favour of Fregeanism, the view that names contribute modes of
According to a Fregean, (6) does not entail (10), since the names ‘Bob’ and ‘PU’ are associated
could, as Soames does, argue that (6) is false. Secondly, one could, as Jeshion does, argue that
(7) is acceptable. Thirdly, one could endorse Fregeanism and argue that (6) does not entail (7).
Endorsing Fregeanism does not involve abandoning the belief exportation principle, but it
involves the denial that there are any singular terms. This denial removes the theoretical interest
A Fregean who denies that (6) entails (7) may accept that, ordinarily, it is possible to
export proper names from within the scope of attitude ascriptions. A Fregean may say that (6)
does not entail (7) for a reason that is peculiar to the situation. For instance, a Fregean may say
that (6) does not entail (7) because I do not know which thing ‘PU’ is, or because I am not
Let us suppose that a Fregean holds that names, demonstratives and indexicals belong to
the same semantic category. Let us say that they are all singular terms*. A Fregean may accept
The Belief Exportation Principle*: Necessarily, for all subjects S and objects x, if there is a
The belief exportation principle* is like the belief exportation principle, except that the
belief exportation principle* concerns singular terms*, and a condition of knowledge-which has
In what follows I will assume the belief exportation principle, though my argument does
not depend on the assumption of this principle instead of the belief exportation principle*.
Analogues of the belief exportation principle apply for desires, hopes, fears and
assertions. If a subject S desires that John open the door, then John is desired by S to open the
door. If S said that John opened the door, then John was said by S to have opened the door.
Phenomenal-looks statements ascribe mental states to subjects: they ascribe the mental
state of being phenomenally looked to by a certain object. Given that analogues of the belief
exportation principle seem to apply in general to ascriptions of mental states to subjects, it seems
that there is a prima facie reason to think that an analogue of the belief exportation principle
applies to states of being phenomenally looked to. This analogue of the belief exportation
way to S.
One might argue that there is a reason why the belief exportation principle holds, and
why analogues of it hold for hopes, fears and desires, and that this reason does not support the
phenomenal looking exportation principle. I shall now consider some arguments of this form.
One might argue that the belief exportation principle and analogues of it apply only to
states with propositional contents, such as beliefs, desires, hopes and fears. As we argued in
chapter 1, phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a property. Therefore states
It might be argued that this difference between states of being phenomenally looked to a
certain way, and states of belief, desires, hopes and fears, explains why the belief exportation
principle and analogues of it for desires, hopes and fears are true without the phenomenal
However, it is not clear why the fact that beliefs have propositional content would
explain why the belief exportation principle is true. David Lewis held that beliefs were relations
to properties rather than propositions, but there seems nothing about this theory in itself that rules
Lewis out from accepting the belief exportation principle. (Lewis, 1979). The claim that (13)
below follows from (12) is supposed to be pretheoretically plausible, and is not based on a
Thus, this argument does not seem to undermine support for the phenomenal looking
exportation principle.
Let us introduce the term ‘represents’ as follows. If one believes, desires, fears or hopes
that Sally is tall, then one is representing the property of being Sally and the property of being
tall. If Sally phenomenally looks tall to one, then one is also representing the property of being
tall.
We can introduce ‘conceptual representation’ as follows:
A state represents a property Fness nonconceptually iff it represents Fness, but does not
Let us suppose that beliefs, desires, fears and hopes represent properties in a conceptual
way, and states of being phenomenally looked to represent properties in a nonconceptual way.
If the conceptual representation principle is correct, then the argument for the
principle is false. On this account of concepts, the concept F is the ability to think about F things
as F things. Thus, the concept dog is the ability to think about dogs as dogs. It follows from this
applies. If S thinks that John opened the door, then John is thought by S to have opened the door.
However, if thoughts represent properties conceptually by definition, then this fact cannot
explain why an analogue of the belief exportation principle applies to thoughts. Therefore, if the
conceptual representation principle is correct, a different account of concepts from the one
I will now present an additional problem for the conceptual representation principle.
Intuitively, the state of saying that p is one to which an analogue of the belief exportation
principle applies. However, I shall argue that the state of saying that p represents properties
principle is true, and of why an analogue of the belief exportation principle for the state of saying
It seems that one can say that p without having concepts that characterize the proposition
that p. If an eight year old child, say, wanting to impress her chemistry teacher, utters the
sentence ‘water has two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom’, a sentence which she has
committed to memory from a chemistry textbook, it seems intuitive that she says that water has
two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, even though she may not have the concepts hydrogen
atom and oxygen atom. The basis for this claim is that it seems legitimate for the teacher to reply
‘what you just said is quite right, but do you understand what you just said?’. That is, one can say
If the child had said ‘water has two oxygen atoms and one hydrogen atom’ it would have
been legitimate for the teacher to say ‘what you said is not quite right’ which presupposes that
the child said that water has two oxygen atoms and one hydrogen atom.
Thus, the state of saying that p, for some p, seems to represent properties
nonconceptually. It also seems that an analogue of the belief exportation principle applies to the
state of saying. If Jack said that Sally is tall, then it seems to follow that Sally was said by Jack to
be tall. If these points are correct, then it seems that we should reject the conceptual
properties conceptually and a state’s satisfying an analogue of the belief exportation principle.
The Knowledge Which Principle: For all subjects S, if ‘T’ is a singular term, and if one can
According to the knowledge which principle, if (12) entails (13), then the explanation of
The Nonconceptual
Representation Principle: For all states K, and all subjects S, if K is a state of being
We now consider an objector who claims that the combination of the knowledge which
principle and the nonconceptual representation principle entails that there is no reason to think
reports is explained by states of knowing which, but states of knowing which are irrelevant to the
It is not clear what the argument is for the knowledge which principle. The fact that John
believes that Sally is tall does not seem explanatory of the fact that Sally is believed by John to
be tall. Thus if the objection is to stand, further argument for the knowledge which principle is
required.
Secondly, we argued above that the state of saying that p, for some p, represents
properties nonconceptually, and that an analogue of the belief exportation principle applies to the
state of saying that p, for some p. If this argument is sound, and if the explanation for the ability
to export singular terms from within the scope of ‘says that’ in true ascriptions of what is said is
the same as the equivalent ability in the case of belief reports, then it seems we should reject the
convincing.
The seeing principle seems to be intuitively plausible. The seeing principle and the
phenomenal looking exportation principle together entail the relational phenomenal looking
principle:
Looking Principle: Necessarily, for all objects x, y and z, and all relations R, if
The relational looking phenomenal looking principle entails that, when I do not see
myself, objects do not phenomenally look to bear relations to me, such as being to the left of me,
One might think that, since I see B, (14) satisfies the relational phenomenal looking
principle. However, A’s being to the right of B is a three-place relation between A, B and me: it
is a matter of A’s being further to the right of me than B is. According to the relational
phenomenal looking principle, A phenomenally looks to stand in this three-place relation to B
The relational phenomenal looking principle rules out objects phenomenally looking a
certain distance from me when I do not see myself. Suppose that I see two objects, A and B, and
I say (15):
One might think that (15) satisfies the relational phenomenal looking principle since I see
B. However, A’s being further away than B is a three-place relation between A, B and me: it is a
matter of A’s being further away from me than B. According to the relational phenomenal
looking principle, A phenomenally looks to stand in this three-place relation to B and to me only
if I see myself.
Some have argued that shape constancy is a feature of visual perception. According to
some philosophers who endorse this claim, when a circular coin is at a slant from me, it
phenomenally looks circular and at a slant from me. However, it is a consequence of the
relational phenomenal looking principle that, if I do not see myself, then the coin does not
Some philosophers have argued that the property of being red is an observer-relative
relational phenomenal looking principle has the consequence that, if I do not see myself, then
In this section I consider two kinds of fall-back positions that one might defend in the
light of the above argument, and also an objection to the above argument.
Russellian, a proposition is a structured entity containing objects, properties and relations. Thus
the proposition that Sally is tall contains Sally and the property of being tall. According to
Russellianism, if (16) is true, then what S believes is a proposition containing A, the relation of
being to the left of, and S. Thus, according to Russellianism, (16) is elliptical for (17):
(17) S believes that A is to the left of S.
and properties. The same object may have different modes of presentation. Thus, according to a
Fregean, the propositions that Hesperus is a star and that Phosphorus is a star are distinct. A
Fregean could argue that there is an indexical mode of presentation to the left which picks out the
relation of being to the left of whatever subject is entertaining that mode of presentation.
If (16) is true, a Fregean could argue that the proposition that S believes is composed of
the modes of presentation A and to the left. A Fregean could thus deny that (16) is elliptical for
(17).
The Property View: Phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a property.
The Fregean View: Phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a Fregean mode
of presentation of a property.
According to the Fregean view, if (18) is true, then A stands in the phenomenal looking
relation to me and to the mode of presentation to the left, and thus (18) need not entail (19). I will
Fregean modes of presentation are most naturally thought of as concepts, in the non-
Fregean sense of ‘concept’. Thus, if a subject is entertaining the Fregean mode of presentation to
Peacocke has argued that, in addition to Fregean modes of presentation, there are non-
In an earlier work, Peacocke elaborates on his example of the shape that can be perceived
Peacocke argues that the content of visual experience is nonconceptual, and so we should
not think of the ways in which properties are given in experience that he refers to as Fregean
The view that emerges from the above two quoted passages is a combination of the
property.
This view emerges from the passages as Peacocke suggests that the content of experience
A consequence of the property view is that (18) entails (19). This is also a consequence
of the property and nonconceptual mode of presentation view. According to the property and
nonconceptual mode of presentation view, (18) expresses the proposition that A stands in the
phenomenal looking relation to me, to the property of being to the left of me, and to a
It seems that there are two views which will allow the inference from (18) to (19) to be
blocked: the Fregean view and the nonconceptual mode of presentation view. Consider this
‘It is not necessary… that the subject possess the egocentric concept ‘to
the right’ if he is to be able to have the experience of a sound as being to the
right.’ (Evans, 1982, p159).
Many who defend the view that (18) can be true even when I do not see myself find
Evans’s point above compelling. Given that Evans’s claim seems inconsistent with the Fregean
nonconceptual modes of presentation of the same property. For instance, suppose that an object
phenomenally looks red1. According to the nonconceptual mode of presentation view, the object
stands in the phenomenal looking relation to some nonconceptual mode of presentation of the
property of being red1; let us call this nonconceptual mode of presentation red1*. There is
question about what the criterion is for determining whether there is a second nonconceptual
mode of presentation of being red1, say F*, which the object may stand in the phenomenal
is possible rationally to doubt that A is B, then ‘A’ and ‘B’ have distinct Fregean modes of
presentation. However, it is not clear that this condition can be appealed to here: there is no
reason to think that what one can rationally doubt is a constraint on nonconceptual modes of
presentation.
Peacocke’s remarks in the passages quoted above suggest the following necessary
condition on there being two nonconceptual modes of presentation of the same property.
Nonconceptual Modes of Presentation: Necessarily, for all objects x, y and z, and all
phenomenally looking square and an object phenomenally looking diamond. If this is correct,
since being square is being diamond, the claim that there are two nonconceptual modes of
presentation.
The way that Peacocke characterizes these phenomenal differences is in terms of which
properties are perceived. He says that ‘[w]hen something is perceived as a diamond, the
perceived symmetry is a symmetry about the bisector of its angles. When something is perceived
as a square, the perceived symmetry is a symmetry about the bisector of its sides.’ (Peacocke,
1992, p76).
The natural view that emerges from this quotation is that an object may phenomenally
look to have a single shape property from t1 to t3, but phenomenally look symmetrical along one
axis from t1 to t2 and phenomenally look symmetrical along a different axis from t2 to t3. It is not
clear why Peacocke rejected this view and preferred to account for the phenomenal difference in
John Campbell, for instance, argues that cases of objects looking to the left and to the right
Suppose that an object can phenomenally look tallerTB, where tallerTB* is a nonconceptual
mode of presentation picking out the property of being taller than Tony Blair. Suppose that, at t1,
one sees Bill Clinton and one does not see Tony Blair, and suppose that Bill Clinton
Suppose that at t2 one sees Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, and that Bill Clinton
phenomenally looks taller than Tony Blair to one. Let us suppose that at t1 Bill Clinton stands in
the phenomenal looking relation to you and to the nonconceptual mode of presentation
tallerTB*, and let us suppose that at t2, Bill Clinton stands in the phenomenal looking relation to
What kind of visual phenomenal difference might one notice between Bill Clinton
phenomenally looking tallerTB and Bill Clinton phenomenally looking taller than Tony Blair?
Certainly, when one comes to see Tony Blair, there will be visual phenomenal differences owing
to Tony Blair phenomenally looking to have a colour and a position. However, what kind of
visual phenomenal difference might one expect to notice that is due in particular to Bill Clinton
standing in the phenomenal looking relation to the nonconceptual mode of presentation taller
than Tony Blair* as opposed to the nonconceptual mode of presentation tallerTB*? It is not
obvious that there is such a visual phenomenal difference, and, given the phenomenal condition
on nonconceptual modes of presentation, it would follow from this that there are not two
different nonconceptual modes of presentation of the property of being taller than Tony Blair.
Similar problems apply when one considers nonconceptual modes of presentation of the
property of being to the left of me; let us call one such nonconceptual mode of presentation to the
left*. Suppose that, at t1, subject S does not see himself, but does see an apple, and the apple
phenomenally looks to S to the left. Suppose that, at t2, S sees himself and the apple, and the
apple phenomenally looks to S to the left of S. What kind of visual phenomenal difference might
S notice between t1 and t2? Certainly, when S sees himself, there will be visual phenomenal
differences owing to S phenomenally looking to S to have a certain colour and a position. But
what visual phenomenal difference might S expect to notice that is due in particular to S standing
in the phenomenal looking relation to the nonconceptual mode of presentation to the left of S* as
opposed to the nonconceptual mode of presentation to the left*? It is not obvious that there is
such a visual phenomenal difference, and, given the phenomenal condition on nonconceptual
modes of presentation, it would follow that there are not two different nonconceptual modes of
the left*. However, if the defender of nonconceptual modes of presentations allows that an object
can ever phenomenally look to bear some relation to another object, it is not clear why they
would deny that an object can phenomenally look to S to be to the left of S when S does in fact
see himself. It seems more plausible that the lack of visual phenomenal difference identified in
the above paragraph between t1 and t2 is explained by there being no nonconceptual mode of
The above considerations suggest that phenomenal looking is not a relation between
objects and nonconceptual modes of presentations. Thus we may assume that (18) is elliptical for
(19):
This objection is best phrased in the terminology of the content of experience as opposed
to the terminology of the ways that objects phenomenally look. The objector argues as follows.
There must be a time index in the content of experience. After all, if my experience represents
that this apple is green, my experience is not made veridical by this apple being green at some
time in the past or future. My experience is veridical only if the apple is green now. Therefore
my experience represents that this apple is green now. And ‘now’ picks out a relation to a time.
If t1 is the time of the experience, the content of my experience is: this apple is green at t1. So we
can say that ‘this apple phenomenally looks green at t1’ reports the content of my experience.
But, the objection continues, the sentence ‘this apple phenomenally looks green at t1’
does not satisfy the phenomenal looking exportation principle. Assuming that ‘t1’ is a singular
term, we cannot export it and say ‘t1 phenomenally looks to S to be some way’, since S does not
see t1.
One way to respond to this challenge would be to allow that the apple phenomenally
looks green now, but deny that ‘now’ picks out a relation to a time. One could defend
nominalism and continue to describe events as happening ‘now’, but deny that there are entities,
However, I will not pursue this nominalist line of response here. My answer to this
challenge is to deny that objects phenomenally look to have properties such as being green now.
Suppose that, at t2, we ask the following question about some apple A:
According to the objector, if, at t2, A phenomenally looks green, (21) reports the way A
The objector holds that ‘now’ in (21) is within the scope of the ‘phenomenally looks’.
Since ‘now’ in (21) picks out time t2, the objector holds that if (21) is true, then the way A
However, when we ask (20), we are not asking whether the apple is green at t2, which is
the time at which we ask (20). If, at t2, the apple phenomenally looks green, then (20) is asking
whether the apple was green at t1. Thus the natural reading of (20) is incompatible with the
objector’s claim that, when an object phenomenally looks green, it really phenomenally looks
green now, where ‘now’ is within the scope of the ‘phenomenally looks’.
The objector argued that a time index should be included within the content of experience
because otherwise the experience could be made ‘accidentally veridical’ by the apple being
green at some point in the past or future. Call this the accidental veridicality problem. The
accidental veridicality problem is removed if we use the terminology of the ‘is the way it
In asking (22), we are clearly asking whether the apple now has the properties that it
phenomenally looks to have, and so there is no danger of how the apple was yesterday or two
years ago affecting the answer to this question. One can avoid the problem of accidental
Each question will receive an answer that is unaffected by the answers to the other
The belief exportation principle and the phenomenal looking exportation principle are
constraints on singular terms occurring within the scope of certain mental state ascriptions.
Given our definition of a singular term, on which a singular term contributes only its reference to
Moreover, it seems plausible that definite descriptions cannot always be exported from
within the scope of mental state ascriptions. It does not seem, for instance, that (25) entails (26):
the scope of attitude ascriptions and argue that whilst (27) might not be true, (28) may well be
true:
Call the appeal to definite descriptions to avoid the main argument of this paper the
definite description fall-back option. ‘Here’ in (28) is a singular term, and, by the phenomenal
looking exportation principle, is exportable. If ‘here’ refers to the exact region that I occupy, then
it seems that if I do not see myself, then I will also not see the reference of ‘here’, in which case
‘here’ will not be exportable from within the scope of ‘phenomenally looks’ in (28). If ‘here’
refers to a larger region than the one that I exactly occupy, then there will be occasions in which
another subject exists in that region, and the uniqueness condition implied by the definite
A defender of the definite description fall-back option might refine their position and
(29) O phenomenally looks to me to the left of the subject at the centre of this region
of space.
We suppose that the reference of ‘this region of space’ is large enough so that, if the
subject can see any region of space, she can see this one. We also assume that the subject can see
regions of space.
There is initially an issue of refinement. ‘The subject at the centre of this region of space’
presumably means ‘the subject centred on the central point in this region of space’. However,
there is no point which is the exact centre of a given human being, and therefore no region of
space which has a human being centred on its central point. A defender of the definite
description fall-back option could solve this problem by arguing instead that (30) may be true:
(30) O phenomenally looks to me to the left of the subject part of which occupies the
subject. Suppose that the reference of ‘this region’ in (30) happens to be one whose central point
is occupied by a part of my baby. If the central point is one that is also occupied by a part of me,
then the uniqueness implied by ‘the subject part of which occupies the point at the centre of this
If the central point is one that only a part of my baby occupies, then the uniqueness of
‘the subject part of which occupies the point at the centre of this region of space’ will be
satisfied, but whether O is the way it phenomenally looks to me will depend on which direction
sensitive to whether one is pregnant or not, how big one’s baby is if one is pregnant, and so on. It
seems implausible to suppose that facts about the position properties that objects phenomenally
look to have are sensitive to facts about whether one is pregnant, and facts about the size of one’s
baby if one is pregnant. Thus the definite description fall-back option is an unattractive view.
(31) A is red21.
If (31) expresses the same proposition as (32), then, given propositionalism, which we
Since ‘red21ness’ is a singular term, then by the belief exportation principle, (34) entails
(35):
(35) Red21ness is believed by S to be a property of A.
If (33) entails (35), then one can export predicates from within the scope of ‘believes
that’ in true belief ascriptions. If this is true, then one should be able to export predicates from
within the scope of ‘phenomenally looks’ in true ascriptions of states of phenomenal looking.
That is, if (31) expresses the same proposition as (32), then it seems that (36) expresses the same
proposition as (37):
Since ‘red21ness’ is a singular term, then, by the phenomenal looking exportation principle,
phenomenal looking exportation principle together with (36) entail (39). However, (39) is false.
One might try to avoid this argument by arguing that (39) is true. There is a sense of (39)
which is true, the sense in which (39) is true iff some object phenomenally looks red21 to S.
However, this is not the sense of ‘sees’ in sentences such as ‘S sees that apple’, and it is the latter
sense of ‘sees’, which we may call the literal sense of ‘sees’, that the seeing principle employs.
One might argue that, even in the literal sense of ‘sees’, (39) may be true. Suppose that
‘red21ness’ in (37), (38) and (39) refers to a trope that A has, or to a universal which is wholly
present in A. One might think that on this supposition, (39) would be true. Some philosophers
have claimed that one can see property instances as well as objects.
However, this option does not seem viable, since it seems that (36) can be true without A
being red21. In such a situation there would be no property instance of red21ness in A to be seen. If
an object can phenomenally look red21 without being red21, then (36) does not entail (39).
Another way of responding to the argument against the phenomenal looking exportation
principle is to endorse ostrich nominalism, and hold that properties do not exist (Armstrong 1978
introduces the term ‘ostrich nominalism’). If properties do not exist, then it would seem that (31)
does not express the same proposition as (32), and that (36) does not express the same
proposition as (37). Ostrich nominalism would therefore block the entailment from (36) to (39).
Hence, if ostrich nominalism is true, then we can defend the phenomenal looking
In the section on modes of presentation above we discussed the property view and the
The Property View: Phenomenal looking is a relation between two objects and a
property.
If ostrich nominalism is true, then neither the property view nor the nonconceptual mode
of presentation view is true. An objector may wonder how one would argue that (18) entails (19)
introduced in chapter 1, entails that, if an object can phenomenally look to the left without
phenomenally looking to the left of me, then what it is like for me for an object phenomenally to
look to the left is different from what it is like for me for an object phenomenally to look to the
left of me. In the section above on modes of presentation, we argued that there were certain
constraints on this phenomenal difference, and we argued that it does not seem that these