Private Land Ownership: Matthews vs. Taylor, G.R. 164584, June 22, 2009Facts: On June 20, 1988.

Respondent Benjamin Taylor, a British, married a Filipina named Joselyn Taylor. Eventually, theybought a lot. The transaction was said to be financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin constructed improvements and made aninn to the said lot. Permits and licenses were secured for the establishment. Three years passed and their relationship turned sourand Joselyn ran away with Philip Matthews. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement)involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by theparties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as MusicGarden Resort.Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamininstituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wife over a land bought during their marriage? Ruling: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, saveonly in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and morealiens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, isabsolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be thedesignated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustainBenjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, noimplied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that thesubject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity orpersonality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merelyexercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property.1998 BAR:Express your agreement or disagreement with any of the following statements. Begin your answer with the statement: "IAGREE" or "DISAGREE" as the case may be.1. Anyone, whether Individual, corporation or association, qualified to acquire private lands is also qualified to acquire public landsin the Philippines.2. A religious corporation is qualified to have lands in the Philippines on which it may build Its church and make otherimprovements provided these are actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes.3. A religious corporation cannot lease private lands In the Philippines.4. A religious corporation can acquire private lands in the Philippines provided all its members are citizens of the Philippines.5. A foreign corporation can only lease private lands in the Philippines.SUGGESTED ANSWER:1.) I disagree. Under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution, a corporation or association which is sixty percent owned by Filipinocitizens can acquire private land, because it can lease public land and can therefore hold public land. However, it cannot acquirepublic land. Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private corporations and associations can only lease and cannot acquirepublic land. Under Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship mayacquire private land only and cannot acquire public land.2.) I disagree. The mere fact that a corporation is religious does not entitle it to own public land. As held In Register of Deeds vs.UngSiu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58, 61, land tenure is not indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession ofworship. The religious corporation can own private land only if it is at least sixty per cent owned by Filipino citizens.3.) I disagree. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 471, corporations and associations owned by aliens are allowed to leaseprivate lands up to twenty-five years, renewable for another period of twenty-five years upon agreement of the lessor and the lessee.Hence, even if the religious corporation is owned by aliens, it can lease private lands.4.) I disagree. For a corporation to qualify to acquire private lands in the Philippines, under Section 7, Article Xn of the Constitutionin relation to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, only sixty per cent (60%) of the corporation is required to be owned byFilipino citizens for it to qualify to acquire private lands.5.) I agree. A foreign corporation can lease private lands only and cannot lease public land. Under Section 2, Article XII of theConstitution, the exploration, development and utilization of public lands may be undertaken through co-production. Joint ventureor production-sharing agreements only with Filipino citizen or corporations or associations which are at least sixty per cent ownedby Filipino citizen.2009 BAR: True or FalseAliens are absolutely prohibited from owning private lands in the Philippines.SUGGESTED ANSWER:False, Aliens may own private lands in the Philippines if they acquire the property through hereditary succession. Also, natural-bornFilipino citizen who lost their Philippine citizenship may be transferees of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.2011 BAR: Althea, a Filipino citizen, bought a lot in the Philippines in 1975. Herpredecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession of the lot since 1940, in the concept of owner. In 1988, Altheabecame a naturalized Australian citizen. Is she qualified to apply for registrationof the lot in her name? The answer is CA. Yes, provided she acquires back her Filipino citizenship.B. No, except when it can be proved that Australia has a counterpart domestic. Borromeo v. Descallar

Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met Antonietta Descallar (respondent), a Filipina, while theformer was working in the Philippines sometime in 1983. The two became sweetheart, and later cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.During their cohabitation, the two acquired some real properties in the Philippines composed of several houses and lots which they bought from Agro-Macro Development Corporation. Thedeed of sale of said real properties were placed in the name of both Jambrich and Descallar as buyers, but were registered under the Torrens system in the name of Descallar alone as Jambrichis disqualified to own real properties in the country. It is sufficiently established though that thefunds used to buy said properties came solely from Jambrich, as Descallar has no sufficientsource of income.After their relationship has turned sour and the two went their separate ways, Jambrich sold hisrights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Camilo Borromeo (the petitioner), a Filipino,evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. When Borromeo, the buyer, tried to register the properties in his name, he discovered that it is registered in the name of Descallar, and that ithas already been mortgaged.Borromeo filed a complaint for recovery of real property against Descallar. Issues: 1. Having established that the true buyer of the disputed properties was the Austrian WilhelmJambrich, what is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent Descallar? 2. Whether the sale or assignment made by Jambrich to Borromeo valid considering that theformer as alien is disqualified to own real properties in the Philippines? Held: 1. The registration of the properties in question in the name of Descallar does not make her theowner of the said properties. It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one thetrue owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.(Borromeo vs. Descallar, ibid.) 2. Given that aliens are disqualified to own real properties in the country, *t+herefore, in theinstant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who isan Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v.Sebastian (G.R. No. L-34672, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 446), the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien whosubsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the originaltransaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES,Respondent. G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012 Dutch national seeks to reimburse funds he invested in allowing his Filipina spouse tobuy parcels of Filipino land after their marriage was declared null.FACTSPetitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage. Consequently,petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated praying for thedistribution of properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots W, X, Y, and Z, parcels of land,were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with themoney he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit sincerespondent did not have sufficient income. He also claimed that the joint affidavit theysubmitted was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. The RTC ruledthat, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots W, X, Y and Z,petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties aspetitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of theconstitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. This was madeevident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subjectparcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the hereinrespondent. Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having cometo court with clean hands. CA affirmed. Petitioner appealed. ISSUEW/N a foreigner may reimburse his investment in the purchase of Filipino land DECISIONThe Court AFFIRMED the rulings of the RTC and CA. In In Re: Petition For Separationof Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied aclaim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner against his former Filipina spouse. It held that the foreigner cannot seekreimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine landenshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutionalprohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of suchadmission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling. The time-honored principle is that he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, alitigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct hasbeen inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Surely, a contract thatviolates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates noobligations and produces no legal effect at all. Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. It does not apply if the actionis proscribed by the Constitution. Manotok v. Barque FACTS: Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed apetition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted theQuezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering theproperty.Upon being notified of the petition for administrative recon-stitution, private respondents(petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the titleunder reconstitution forms

part of the land covered by their reconsti-tuted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners predeces-sors-in-interest is spurious. ISSUE: Whether or not irregularly issued titles can be cancelled by the LRA. Held: Respondents levied on a portion of the MAGRA to satisfy the tax delinquency of PNOC-EDC.However, the land being levied is classified as inalienable. It is owned by the governmentand thus, cannot be sold at public auction. Likewise, the machineries, equipment and otherinfrastructures in the MAGRA cannot be levied and sold at public auction because it is notthe property that is subject to the tax. The personal liability for the tax delinquency, is generally on whoever is the owner of thereal property at the time the tax accrues; where, however, the tax liability is imposed on thebeneficial use of the real property such as those owned but leased to private persons orentities by the government, or when the assessment is made on the basis of the actual usethereof, the personal liability is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at thetime of the accrual of the tax.In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC is the beneficial user, however, since respondents cannot availof the administrative remedy through levy, they can only enforce the collection of realproperty tax through civil action.PNOC-EDC also claims that the real property tax assessment is not yet final and executory. Itavers that prior resort to administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies is notnecessary considering that the issue raised is purely a question of law. Consequently, itneed not appeal the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals or to the CentralBoard of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 22627 and 22928 of the LGC.We disagree. It is well-settled in Systems Plus Computer College of Caloocan City v. LocalGovernment of Caloocan City29 that all adminis-trative remedies must be exhausted beforeavailing of the judicial remedies. Thus: The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies anddirectly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly purequestion of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board,body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhaustingall remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of thecourts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by theadministrative processes. If PNOC-EDC was not satisfied with the assessment of its property, it should have appealedto the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from receipt of the written notice of assessment. Instead, it waited until the issuance of a warrant of levy before it filed apetition for injunction in the regional trial court, which was not in accordance with theremedies provided in the LGC.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED insofar as it declared PNOC-EDC liable to pay the real property taxaccruing from its use of the MAGRA. Respondents however are DIRECTED to refrain fromlevying on the buildings, infrastructures and machineries of PNOC-EDC to satisfy thepayment of the real property tax delinquency. SPOUSES CUSI VS. LILIA V.DOMINGO, G.R. Nos. 195825 and 195871, February 27, 2013 Land Titles;Torrens system of land registration. Under the Torrens system of land registration, the registered owner of realty cannot be deprived of her property through fraud, unless a transferee acquires the property as an innocent purchaser for value. A transferee who acquires the property covered by a reissued owners copy of the certificate of title without taking the ordinary precautions of honest persons in doing business and examining the records of the proper Registry of Deeds, or who fails to pay the full market value of the property is not considered an innocent purchaser for value. DATU KIRAM SAMPACO v. HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD G.R. No. 163551 July 18, 2011Facts: Respondent Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud filed an action to quiet title with damages withthe RTC of Lanao del Sur against petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco alleging that he is the ownerin fee simple of the subject parcel of residential lot with an area of 897 square meters covered byO r i g n i a C l e r t f i c a t e o f T t i e l ( O C T ) N o P . 6 5 8 . Petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco denied the respondents claim and asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in open, public, continuous, and exclusive possession of the property in dispute. He alleges that the lot in question is only a portion of the1,800square meters of land that he inherited in 1952 from his father. Since then, he had been inadverse possession and ownership of the subject lot through his caretaker. In 1962, he mortgagedthe land (1,800square meters) with the Development Bank of the Philippines. He declared theland (1,800 square meters) for taxation purposes and paid real estate taxes. Petitioner contendedthat OCT No. P-658 was secured in violation of laws and through fraud, deception andmisrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a residential lot and the titleissued is a free patent. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages. He soughtthe cancellation of respondents OCT No. P -658 and the reconveyance of the subject parcel ofland.Trial Court dismissed the complaint; declared the Original Certificate of Title No. P-658 null andvoid and of no legal effect; and declared the respondent the absolute or true owner and possessorof the land in dispute. On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the RTC and held that there is nocontroversy that respondent is a holder of a Torrens title; hence, he is the owner of the subject property.Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No. P-658and in confirming respondent as owner of the property in dispute.Held: No. The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of theland described therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which isan incontrovertible proof of ownership. An original certificate of title issued by the Registerof Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issuedunder judicial proceedings. However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title does notattach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.In this case, petitioner alleged in his

Answer to respondents Complaint in the trial court that respondents title, OCT No. P-658, was secured in violation of the law and throughfraud, deception and misrepresentation, because the subject parcel of land is a residential lot,which cannot be subject of a free patent, since only agricultural lands are subject of a free patent.It should be pointed out that the allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was madeonly by respondent, but the true classification of the disputed land as residential was not shownto have been made by the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known asThe Public Land Act.Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance of respondents free patent title on the ground that it covered residential land based only on the Complaint whichstated that the property was residential land when it was not shown that it was the President whoclassified the disputed property as residential, and OCT No. P658 itself stated that thefree patent title covered agricultural land. Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the free patent title was granted over agricultural land as stated in OCT No. P-658. Republic of the Philippines v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc.G. R. No. 185124. January 25, 2012.Second Division; Sereno, J. Facts: The National Irrigation Authority (NIA) is the government-owned-and-controlledcorporation primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in the country. Tocarry out its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized by law to exercise the power of eminentdomain.NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-MarigadaoIrrigation Project. Consequently, it filed with a Regional Trial Court a Complaint for theexpropriation of a portion of 3 parcels of land. Among the affected parcels of land was Lot No.3080 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-61963 and registered under the RuralBank of Kabacan (RBK). In its answer, RBK alleged, inter alia , that it no longer owned Lot No.3080. Subsequently thereafter, in response to the expropriation complaint, Margarita Tabaoda,Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz, Lina Erlinda Ortiz, Mario Ortiz, Juan Mamac and Gloria Matas(Intervenors) filed their Answerin-Intervention. They essentially pointed out that Tabaoda andPortia were the new owners of Lot No. 3080, which the two acquired from RBK. After due process, the RTC granted the complaint and ordered NIA, among others, toforward the payments intended for RBK to Tabaoda and Portia who have already acquiredownership over Lot No. 3080. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) , affirmed the RTCs decision that the payments intended for RBK should be given to Tabaoda and Portia. The CA based itsconclusion on the non-participation of RBK in the expropriatio n proceedings and the latters manifestation that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080. Issue: Whether or not the payment of just compensation for Lot No. 3080 should be made to Taboada and Portia? Held: No. It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds. Inthis kind of proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their evaluation of the justcompensation to be awarded to the owner of the expropriated property. Thus, it was imprudent forthe CA to rel y on RBKs mere declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in theexpropriation proceeding to validate intervenors claim of entitlement to that payment. The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to be valid. It should be noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance must be embodiedin a public document and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property issituated. We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found no proof of conveyanceor evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot No. 3080 from its registered owner, RBK to theintervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the name of the RBK. It is not disputed that RBK did not participate in the expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested that it no longer ownedLot No. 3080. The trial court should have nevertheless required it and the intervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the conveyance of the subject lot. The court cannot rely on mereinference, considering that the payment of just compensation is intended to be awarded solely owner based on the latters proof of ownership. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080. Despite the fact that the lot wascovered by TCT No. T-61963 and was registered under its name, the RBK manifested that it nolonger owned the lot, but the intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to the conveyancethereof. G.R. No. 175025 ROGELIO J. JAKOSALEM and GODOFREDO B. DULFO Petitioners,

Present:

- versus-

CORONA, C. J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, PEREZ, and SERENO, JJ.

ROBERTO S. BARANGAN, Promulgated: Respondent. February 15, 2012 Facts: On August 13, 1966, respondent Col. Roberto S. Barangan (respondent Barangan) entered into a Land Purchase Agreement with Ireneo S. Labsilica of Citadel Realty Corporation whereby respondent Barangan agreed to purchase on installment a 300 square meter parcel of land, located in Antipolo, Rizal. Upon full payment of the purchase price, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on August 31, 1976 in his favor. Consequently, the old title was cancelled and a new one was issued in his name. Since then, he has been dutifully paying real property taxes for the said property. He was not, however, able to physically occupy the subject property because as a member of the Philippine Air Force, he was often assigned to various stations in the Philippines. On December 23, 1993, when he was about to retire from the government service, respondent Barangan went to visit his property, where he was planning to build a retirement home. It was only then that he discovered that it was being occupied by petitioner Godofredo Dulfo (petitioner Dulfo) and his family. On February 4, 1994, respondent Barangan sent a letter to petitioner Dulfo demanding that he and his family vacate the subject property within 30 days. In reply, petitioner Atty. Rogelio J. Jakosalem (petitioner Jakosalem), the son-in-law of petitioner Dulfo, sent a letter claiming ownership over the subject property.

On February 19, 1994, respondent Barangan filed with Barangay San Luis, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law against petitioners. No settlement was reached; hence, the complaint was filed before the Prosecutors Office of Rizal. The case, however, was dismissed because the issue of ownership must first be resolved in a civil action. On May 28, 1994, respondent Barangan commissioned Geodetic Engineer Lope C. Jonco (Engr. Jonco) of Surveying Services to conduct a relocation survey of the subject property based on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans TCT. The relocation survey revealed that the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family is the same property covered by respondent Barangans title. On November 17, 1994, respondent Barangan filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Antipolo City. Respondent Barangan prayed that petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay a monthly rental of P3,000.00 for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May 1979 until the time the subject property is vacated, plus moral and exemplary damages and cost of suit. In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem claimed that the subject property was assigned to petitioner Jakosalem by Mr. Nicanor Samson (Samson); that they have been in possession of the subject property since May 8, 1979; and that the property covered by respondent Barangans title is not the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family. Issues: Whether or not respondent barangan is entitled to possession of the subject property? 1. Whether or not prescription/laches may apply in order for petitioner to retain possession of the subject property? Ruling 1: Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that *i+n an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover possession, a person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.

C A S T R O

V S .

M O N S O D FACTS:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of landwith a n are a of 130 sq.m. wh ile res ponde nt i s t he owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner. Respon de nt cau se d th e an notation of an a dver seclaim against 65 sq.m. of the property of petitioner. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was merelyasserting the existing legal easement of lateral andsubjacent support at the rear portion of his estate top r e v e n t t h e p r o p e r t y f r o m c o l l a p s i n g , s i n c e h i s property is located at an elevated plateau of fifteen15 feet above the level of petitioners property Prio r to the f ili ng of th e ca se, p etit ioner notice d a leak that caused the front portion of her house to beslippery, she hired construction workers to see wherethe leak was coming from. The workers had alreadys t a r t e d d i g g i n g w h e n p o l i c e o f f i c e r s s e n t b y res pond en t came and stop pe d th e worke rs from finishing their job.. In defiance, petitioner filed a complaint for damageswith temporary restraining order/writ of preliminaryinjunction. Respondent alleged that the elevated part of M a n u e l a h o m e s ( l o c a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y o f p e t i t i o n e r ) w e r e b u l l d o z e d , e x c a v a t e d , a n d transferred portions of the elevated land to the lowerp o r t i o n s o f M a n u e l a H o m e s . Thus, Manuela Homes became lowerthan Moonwalk Village (location of the property of respondent). Before the said excavation, respondent personallycomplained to Pilar Development Corporation andwas assured that an embankment will be retained att h e b o u n d a r y o f M a n u e l a H o m e s a n d M o o n w a l k Village. Manuela Homes retained the embankment consistingof soil a nd rocks. R espon de nt had t he op en sp ace riprapped with stones as reinforcement against anyp o t e n t i a l s o i l e r o s i o n , e a r t h q u a k e , a n d p o s s i b l e digging by any person. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitionerOn appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial courte x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e a n n o t a t i o n w a s t o prevent petitioner from making injurious excavations on thesubject embankment as to deprive the residential houseand lot of respondent of its natural support and cause it tocollapse. Respondent only asked that petitioner respect thelegal easement already existing thereon. ISSUE: Whether the easem ent of lateral ands ubja cen t supp ort exists on t he sub ject adja cent properties and, if it does, whether the same may beannotated at the b ack of the tit le of the servient estate.HELD: YES. Article 437 of the Civil Code provides that the ownerof a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereonany works, or make any plantations and excavationswhich he may deem proper. However, such right of t h e owner is not absolute and is subject to thef o l l o w i n g l i m i t a t i o n s : ( 1 ) s e r v i t u d e s o r easements, (2) special laws, (3) ordinances, (4)reasonable requirements of aerial navigation, and(5) rights of third persons

.His reason for the annotation is only to prevent petitionerfrom r emoving t he emba nkme nt or from digg in g on th ep rop erty for fear of soil e rosion t hat mi ght weak en thefo un dation of the rea r port ion of hi s p roperty wh ich i sadjacent to the property of petitioner. A n e a s e m e n t o r s e r v i t u d e i s a n e n c u m b r a n c e i m p o s e d u p o n a n i m m o v a b l e f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f ano ther immovable belonging to a different owner. An easement is established either by law or by will of theo w n e r s . T h e c o u r t s c a n n o t i m p o s e o r c o n s t i t u t e a n y servit ud e where none exist ed. Th ey c an only declar e it se xis tenc e if i n rea lity i t e xis ts by la w or by the wi ll of th e owners. There are therefore no judicial easements. Art icl e 684 of th e Civi l Code pro vide s tha t no pro pri etor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprivea n y a d j a c e n t l a n d o r b u i l d i n g o f s u f f i c i e n t l a t e r a l o r subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right,may make excavations on his land, but his right is subjectto the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent lando r b u i l d i n g o f s u f f i c i e n t l a t e r a l o r s u b j a c e n t s u p p o r t . Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absoluteproperty right to have his land laterally supported by thesoil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his ownp r e m i s e s , h e s o d i s t u r b s t h e l a t e r a l s u p p o r t o f h i s neighbors land as to cause it, or,in its natural state, by thepre ssu re of its own wei ght, to fal l away or slid e from it s position, the one so excavating is liableI n t he i nsta nt case, a n ea seme nt of s u bjacent andl a t e r a l s u p p o r t e x i s t s i n f a v o r o f r e s p o n d e n t . I t w a s established that the properties of petitioner and respondenta d j o i n e a c h o t h e r . T h e r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e a n d l o t o f respondent is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15)f e e t a b o v e t h e l e v e l o f p e t i t i o n e r s p r o p e r t y . T h e e m b a n k m e n t a n d t h e r i p r a p p e d s t o n e s h a v e b e e n i n existence even before petitioner became the owner of theproperty. It was proven that petitioner has been makingexcavations and diggings on the subject embankment and,u n l e s s r e s t r a i n e d , t h e c o n t i n u e d e x c a v a t i o n o f t h e embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portionof the house of respondent to collapse, resulting in thedestruction of a huge part of the family dwelling An annotation of the existence of the subjacent andl a t e r a l s u p p o r t i s n o l o n g e r n e c e s s a r y . I t e x i s t s whether or not it is annotated or registered in theregistry of property. A judicial recognition of thesame already binds the property and the owner of t h e s a m e , i n c l u d i n g h e r s u c c e s s o r s - i n - i n t e r e s t .Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to courtor have the easement of subjacent and lateral supportregistered in order for it to be recognized and respected. G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA * IBRAHIM UY, Respondents. FACTS: Anunciacion Neri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut , namely: Eu tropia a nd Vict oria and secon d marriage with Enrique Neri , namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties located inSamal, Davao del Norte. In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor childrenRosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate withAbsolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000.00. In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the homestead propertiesagainst spouses Uy before t he RTC, as saili ng t he val idi ty of the sal e for h aving bee n sol d wit hin th e prohi bit ed perio d. The com plai nt was later am en ded to incl ud e Eutropia a nd Victor ia ad diti onal pla int iffs for hav in g b een excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage. RTC RULING: Rendered the sale void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights andthat Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. CA RULING:

Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid. While recognizingRosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question itupon reach in g th e ag e of majority. It also foun d l aches to have set i n b ecau se of th eir inac tion for a long pe riod of time. ISSUES: Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, has the power todispose or encumber the property of the minor? RULING: All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages and consequently, they areentitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of theExtra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa andDouglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them.Whil e th e s ettl em ent of t he e stat e is nu ll a n d void, th e s ub se qu ent sal e of the prop erti es ma de b y Enriq ue and hisc hil dre n, Na poleon, Alicia a nd Vi smin da, i n fav or of the s pous es i s vali d b ut only wit h r es pect to t hei r proportiona te shares.With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their naturalguardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at thattime, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother . Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the naturalpurpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter . Such power is grantedb y law only to a ju dicia l gua rdi an o f the war ds p roper ty an d e ven t hen only wit h court s prior approval secu red in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.

NANCY T. LORZANO, Petitioner, - versus - JUAN TABAYAG, JR., Respondent. G.R. No. 189647 Present: February 6, 2012 Facts:The instant case stemmed from an amended complaint for annulment of document andreconveyance filed by Juan Tabayag, Jr. (respondent) against the petitioner.The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan Tabayag (Tabayag)who died on June 2, 1992. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Sto. Domingo, Iriga City (subjectproperty). Right after the burial of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings thatshe be allowed to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject property until after her eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioners siblings acceded to the said request. After the petitioners eldest son finished college, her siblings asked her to return to them the possession of the subject property so that they could partition it among themselves. However, thepetitioner refused to relinquish her possession of the subject property claiming that she purchased thesubject property from their father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property executed bythe latter on May 25, 1992.Issue:Whether an action for reconveyance is proper in the instant case?