Logic in the Islamic Legacy: A General Overview Prof Dr. Aref Al Attari Faculty of Education armou!

"niversity #$ordan draref%hotmail.com, arefatar%yahoo.com Lecture Delivered at the Institute of Logic and &ognition 'an# at 'un "niversity Guang(hou# P.). of &hina *arch +,-In this lecture I traverse the following: A .relude with reference to Gree! logic and the early encounter of *uslims with the Gree! logic /he Aristotelian Pro.onents: Al Fara0i and Averoes 1I0n )ushd2 /he *iddle .ath: Al Ga(ali /he Post Aristotelianism: Avicena 1I0n 'ina2 /he Anti Gree! Logic: I0n /aimyyah Logic#related issues &oncluding )emar!s

Logic: A 0rief overview Logic is the discipline of valid reasoning, inference and demonstration. While many cultures have employed systems of reasoning, and logical methods are evident in all human thought, logic descending from the Gree! tradition3 .articularly Aristotelian logic3 impacted more on and was further developed by Islamic logicians from the 8th till 14th centuries. 4Mantiq4 is the Arabic e uivalent of 4logic4. It points to the practice of defending the tenets of Islam through rational argument.

A te5t 0y Avicenna 1I0n 'ina2

/he 6eginnings !he study of mantiq was initially part of the foreign disciplines, and only in the twelfth century was it was accepted as an essential preliminary to a "uslim education. !he other essential elements were the Islamic disciplines which prepared a scholar to read the #oran and !raditions, and to e$tract from them theological and legal doctrines. %ne such discipline was the eti7uette of de0ate in which pragmatic arrangements stipulated for a debate about legal principles were e$tended to serve as rules for any &ind of debate at all' it was to be replaced by dialectic by the fourteenth century. (ertain other Islamic disciplines deal with language#related uestions. "uslim interest in Mantiq and philosophy started in the Abbasid Caliphate )*+,1-+8., appro$imately two centuries after the advent of Islam. In the Prophetic and Rashidin era )the early few decades of Islam. Mantiq philosophy were almost un&nown for different reasons. It was the /nation building/ era. !he pro$imity to the 0rophet/s times and the fresh understanding of the religion which was not influenced by the inter-cultural encounters with other nations raised no need for philosophy. In the Ummayyad era which succeeded the Rashidin Caliphate philosophy and Mantiq were the business of non *uslims of the newly incorporated countries such as 1yria. According to Ibn #huldun/s theory of associating prosperity of science with urbani2ation early "uslims did not show interest in the sciences of old nations as those "uslims were not urbani2ed yet. When the Islamic 1tate was firmly established and became prosperous they turned their attention to those sciences. !he cumulative

nature of &nowledge and the emergence of Islamic schools of thought and sects contributed to the spread of logic and philosophy as tools to be employed by different groups albeit within the framewor& of Islam. !he schism which erupted between the intellectual leadership and the political leadership, and the big schism between Islamic sects )in particular Shiaites and Sunni "uslims. led each party to draw upon the #oran and Hadith )0rophet/s !radition., employ e$egesis and manipulate human interpretations in ways that were not &nown during the time of the 0rophet and the Rashidin Caliphs. !his coincided with the intercultural encounter between "uslims and other nations particularly those which represented the most important centers of earlier civili2ations prior to be incorporated within the Islamic civili2ational orbit. !hese cultures were introduced into the controversy. !he Abbasid Caliphate witnessed arousing passion for philosophy among the ruling elite and "uslim scholars. 0hilosophy, besides that, continued as a business for non "uslims. 3or "uslims it was meant to be employed in the intra-and-inter religious dialogue and debate. !he above developments ushered in the translation movement which aimed to introduce those cultures particularly the 4ree& philosophy into Arabic. !he beginning was with the 1yriac decoctions of philosophy then the Aristotelian te$ts and commentaries. !he translation movement continued to pic& up momentum through the 5th century and by the 86,s a circle of translators were closely coordinated around Al #indi )d. 8*,. who produced a short overview of the whole Organon and members of his circle produced an epitome of and commentary on the Categories' an epitome of On Interpretation' a version of the Sophisticated Fallacies' and probably an early translation of the Rhetoric. !he great 1yriac (hristian translators 7unayn ibn Ish8 )d. 8*6. and his son Ish8 ibn 7unayn )d. 51,. began to produce integral translations of complete wor&s from the Organon, generally by way of 1yriac translations. !hey translated the Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics Ish8 provided revised translations of the !opics and the Rhetoric. /he Aristotelian E5.ositors AL#FA)A6I

Al farabi was the outstanding contributor to the Aristotelian pro9ect, though not as a translator. Al farabi claimed that logic was indispensable for analy2ing the argumentforms used in 9urisprudence and theology, a claim that was to be ta&en up a century later by Abu 7amid al-4ha2ali )d. 1111., thereby introducing the study of logic into the madrasa. !o support his claim, Alfarabi wrote !he Short !reatise on Reasoning in the "ay o# the !heologians in which he interpreted the arguments of the theologians and the analogies )qiy$s$t. of the 9urists as logical syllogisms in accordance with the doctrines of the ancients. "aybe Alfarabi is the first truly independent thin&er in Arabic logic, a fact commemorated by bestowing upon him /the 1econd !eacher/ )after Aristotle.. Al farabi was the first "uslim to bring 4ree& thin&ing closer to Islamic understanding, which, then pivoted around the codification and clarification of :ur/anic e$pression. al-3iarabi was first and foremost a commentator of Aristotelian te$ts' his commentary on Aristotle/s Organon served as the wor& of reference for other "uslim scholars. 7is wor&, however, went further in analogical reasoning to produce uni ue ideas not present in the Aristotelian original, and was dedicated to the inclusion of analogical inferences )transference.. AI-3arabI/s original contribution to analogical inference lay in his systemati2ation of inductive reasoning under the rubric of the categorical syllogism. 7is intent was to raise the strength of analogy to that of a first order Aristotelian syllogism, i.e. a syllogism which does not deviate from the 4ree& rendering of two .remises3 a middle term3 and the .roduction of new !nowledge which in turn may serve as a premise for further inferences. ;rawing general or universal conclusions from premises generated by the scientific study of e5.erience bodes well with the analogical framewor& of li&ewise generating general conclusions from .articular instances of human e5.erience-foreshadowing the methods of induction not yet fully developed in Western philosophical history. !his commensurability between the formal syllogism and analogy is defended by al-3arabl when he uses what he calls 4inference 0y transfer4 or, as he notes of the muta%allimiln, <inference from evidence to the absent<, or, as #ant would have it, from the .henomenal to the noumenal realms. /he act of transference re7uires that the syllogism have a middle term3 what analogy calls similarity. AI-3arabi further contends that, <if we are determined to have the /transfer/ be correct it is necessary that the /matter/ which is similar in the two compared ob9ects be

investigated. 7e presents a case depicting the )evident. createdness of animals or plants with the )absent. notion of createdness in the s&y and the stars, and sets out to establish not only a middle term that denotes similarity, but one which also spea&s of relevance. If both similarity and relevance obtain, then analogical inference ta&es on the form and strength of a first order syllogism, and a causal connection is established. 7owever, .ro0lems still arise when similarity might a..ear to o0tain3 0ut3 in fact3 does not. When this happens, analogical reasoning contains at least one faulty .remise that has not been detected by those forwarding an analogical argument. AI3arabi refers to this distinction as the method of 4raising4 where0y conclusions are raised 0ut do not o0tain u.on further logical investigation. 7owever, leaving room for a legitimate analogy, al-3arabi then spea&s of the method of 4finding4. /1imply stated, al-3arabl reminds the reader that, <if one establishes a 9udgment by /raising/ it does not necessarily result that when one/ finds/ this thing )which is /raised/. one will /find< the 9udgment )to be true.' rather it is the converse of this that is necessitated, namely if one /finds/ the 9udgment, one /finds/ )also. the thing )in uestion.<. In this sense, al-3arabi anticipates harsh criticisms against the analogy that he does not necessarily accept. Inductive and analogical arguments were converted into syllogisms ma!ing the cause or similarity in analogy the middle term in the syllogism43 which compounded the difficulty of defining and determining the e$act limits of qiyas !he force of the inferences made in an analogy is identical to those of a first figure syllogism because the similarity )/ illa& is the sub9ect term in the ma9or premise and the predicate term in the minor. If the 'illa is absent when the 9udgment is absent...and present when the 9udgment is present... the 'illa is all the more true. If one removes animality, for e$ample, from a thing, then one removes from this thing the property of being a man. =ut it is not necessarily true that if one finds an animal he also finds a man. >ather the converse is true' if one finds a man it necessarily follows that one finds an animal. !o establish the truthfulness of a matter by the method of non e$istence, it necessarily follows that when the 'illa is found the 9udgment is also found. In order to ensure valid conclusions from an analogy )following this reasoning. the similarity ('illa&, has to be relevant to the two cases' the 8udgments must 0e true of any case if it has the same9 illa) the 'illa itself must be found and verified in each of the cases considered' it must be established that the 9udgment e$ists in all cases which possess an 'illa in common. al#Fara0i9s

im.ortance lies in the fact that he .laced heavy em.hasis on the necessity and im.ortance of the 'illa in all inferences: <3or a complete inference and for achieving a high degree of certainty he insists that an illa must accompany the 9udgment<. AI3ariibi/s marriage of analogy to the first order syllogism e$ists within a neo-0latonic and Aristotelian framewor& of metaphysics, replete with positivistic inclinations concerning the notions of cause and effect, and its importance for both logic and ontologic. !hus, his legal concerns cross both ?Islamic and 4ree& boundaries at their very source, and are less tied to simply the a priori sensibilities demanded by the more literal readings of the #oran that were adhered to by the muta%allimun AI-3arabi managed to transform analogy into a first-figure syllogism, setting a standard by which the legal process could be developed. AI-3arabi had maintained, in accordance with his @eo-0latonic Aristotelian emanative position, that Allah was the God of meta.hysical 1i.e. causal2 statements and that the :oran had to 0e inter.reted meta.horically. !his, along with discussions on logic and other sciences, was nonetheless accused of being un-Islamic, and the theological milieu remained highly antagonistic to the 4ree& <foreign<Aheretical sciences. !hey re9ected the concept of natural causation )i.e., arguing from cause to effect and from effect to cause. that maintained that phenomenal acts advance from a thing/s uiddity. !hey held the view that only divine will held the power to cause. It was in this manner, that they upheld the concept of divine omnipotence. And later, al-3arabi would become the focus of attac&s directed against the <1chool of =aghdad<. Averroes 1I0n )ushd2 and the End of Aristotelianism Averroes was one of the last representatives of a dying 3arabian Aristotelianism. Averroes was aware of Alfarabi/s attempts to ma&e sense of the difficulties in Aristotle/s te$ts. In one such area, the modal logic, Averroes was to return to the problems four times through his career. Averroes/ pro9ect is illustrated in his Philosophical *ssays, a number of which are on logical matters. Averroes defends and refines Alfarabi/s account of the conversion of modal propositions and then uses that account as the basis of a new interpretation of the modal syllogistic. A second e$ample of the way Averroes wor&s is his reappraisal and vindication of Aristotle/s doctrines of the hypothetical syllogistic against

Avicenna/s alternative division into connective and repetitive syllogisms )Averroes )1586. Maq$l$t essay 5, 18*--,*.. In his fourth attempt to interpret Aristotle/s modal system Averroes differs from Avicenna first and foremost by insisting on a consideration Avicenna has been at pains to remove from his syllogisticB is the sub9ect pic&ed out by a term essential to itC Averroes/ final system comprises two distinct aspects. !he first aspectnot original to Averroes nor apparently to the Arabic traditionis seeing the modality of a proposition as a function of the modality of its terms, which in turn is a function of how each term pic&s out what it refers to. !he second aspect is that different classes of modal syllogism are differentiated by the types of terms occurring in them. >ather than loo&ing on the modality of the proposition as something which belongs irreducibly to the proposition, Averroes classifies modals in the following wayB Dou should &now that assertoric propositions have assertoric terms, necessary propositions necessary terms. =y necessary term I mean that the term is one per se, and these propositions are composed of a sub9ect and an essential predicate )mahm+l ,a-har.. of that sub9ect, or a sub9ect and an inseparable accident )arad l$/im. belonging to that sub9ect. !hose propositions with assertoric terms are those which are composed of denominative terms which are sometimes present in the denominated thing and sometimes absent )si#$t t+,ad lil0mahm+l t$ratan -a0tu#qad t$ratan.. =ut when one of these denominative terms is present in the sub9ect, there must be present another denominative term that follows on it necessarily which is the predicate, as inB e1erything -al%ing is mo1ing. 3or when wal&ing is actually present the thing must be moving' and when wal&ing is withdrawn from it )irta#a minhu., so too is movement. !hese are the simple assertoric premises )al0muqaddam$t al0 -u,+diyya al02as.ta. which are atemporal )#. ghayri /am$n., and they are what Aristotle intends firstly to tal& about in this boo&. !heir sub9ect and predicate ali&e are one per accidens )-al0ma-d+ #.h$ -$hid 2il0arad -a0%a0dh$li%a l0mahm+l.. And there e$ists another &ind of proposition that is partly assertoric and partly necessary )min ,iha -u,+d. -a0min ,iha dar+r..that is, the sub9ect is composed of a substance and a changeable denomination ),a-har -a0si#a muta2addila., from which follows a predicate composed of the substance of the denomination and its intrinsic essential attribute )si#a ,a-hariyya ghar./iyya.. !he sub9ect here is one per accidents and the predicate is one per se, for e$ample, when we say that everything wal&ing is an animal. And this is assertoric on account of the denomination of the denominated sub9ect, and necessary on account of the predicate of the denomination. 3or wal&ing, when it occurs, signifies an animal by discontinuous signification )#al0mashy idh$ -u,ida dalla al$ l0haya-$n dal$latan ghayra d$'ima., but for the times at which wal&ing is present in it. !he sub9ect of wal&ing implies being an animal always )-a0 ma-d+u l0mashy yal/amuhu -u,+du l0haya-$n d$'iman., because the sub9ect of wal&ing and what is denoted by that is necessarily an animal. And this proposition is

in one respect necessary and in another assertoric )dar+r.ya min ,iha -a0-u,+d.ya min ,iha.necessary per accidens and assertoric per se )dar+r.ya 2il0arad -a0 -u,+d.ya 2idh0dh$t.. A proposition that conversely has a necessary sub9ect and a predicate of assertoric matter )m$dda. is 9ust assertoric, and is not necessary per accidens. !his is a temporal assertoric, I say, where the sub9ect implies the predicate for a specified time, and necessity is not found in it, only a conne$ion of the predicate and sub9ect merely for that time. !he characteristic of this EpropositionF is that the predicate is not connected to the sub9ect for all times at which the sub9ect e$ists, but only for a certain specified time. And so, as Aristotle says, syllogisms in the sciences are not constructed from this type of assertoric. With a per se necessity proposition described above, he has truth-conditions which will allow him to ma&e sense of Aristotle/s claim that e1ery 3 is necessarily 4 converts to some 4 is necessarily 3. In fact, Averroes is able to replicate Aristotle/s results with necessity and possibility premises )!hom )-,,6. 155.. 7e does so, however, at the cost of having to slide between calling a proposition of type 6 a necessity proposition or an assertoric according to the dictates of the e$egetical moment. Dissention from Aristotelian Legacy /he Avicennan /radition of the /welfth &entury Avicenna )d. 1,6*. was beginning his career far away in the east, in #hurasan )0ersia.. Ged by his Intuition, he presented himself as an autodidact able to assess and repair the Aristotelian tradition. 7ere is what he says in the Syllogism of the Cure, written about midway through his careerB /Dou should reali2e that most of what Aristotle/s writings have to say about the modal mi$es are tests, and are not genuine opinionsthis will become clear to you in a number of places/ )Avicenna )15H4., 5iy$s -,4.1,-1-. %f all his many wor&s, it is Avicenna/s Pointers and Reminders that had most impact on subse uent generations of logicians. 3rom it we may note a few broad but typical differences from the Prior Analytics in the syllogistic. First, the absolute )mutlaq$t, often translated assertoric. propositions have truth-conditions stipulated somewhat li&e those stipulated for possibility propositions )so that, for e$ample, the contradictory of an absolute is not an absolute, absolute e-propositions do not convert, second-figure syllogisms with absolute premises are sterile..

'econdly, Avicenna begins to e$plore the logical properties of propositions of the form e1ery 3 is 4 -hile 3. /hirdly, Avicenna divides syllogistic into connective )iqtir$n.. and repetitive )istithn$'.. forms, a division which replaces the old one into categorical and hypothetical )Avicenna )15*1. al0Ish$r$t 6,5, 614, 6*4.. We may call a logician Avicennan if he adopts these doctrines. Avicennan logicians embar&ed upon repairing and reformulating Avicenna/s wor&. Iust as Avicenna had declared himself free to rewor& Aristotle as Intuition dictated, so too Avicenna/s school regarded itself free to repair the Avicennan system as need arose, whether from internal inconsistencies, or from intellectual re uirements e$trinsic to the system. A ma9or early representative of this trend is Jmar ibn 1ahlan as-1awi )d. 1148. who began, in his 6ogical Insights #or 7as.radd.n, to rewor& Avicenna/s modal syllogistic. It was to be his students and their students, however, who would go on to ma&e the final changes to Avicennan logic that characteri2ed the sub9ect that came to be taught in the madrasa. /;s< and the =eo#Avicennan )es.onse !he great 1hKK scholar @asiraddKn at-!LsK )d. 1-*4. e$plains why Avicenna e$plores it the way he doesB What spurred him to this was that in the assertoric syllogistic Aristotle and others sometimes used contradictories of absolute propositions on the assumption that they are absolute' and that was why so many decided that absolutes did contradict absolutes. When Avicenna had shown this to be wrong, he wanted to give a way of construing those e$amples from Aristotle )!usi )15*1. Sharh al0Isharat 61-.+-*.. )evisionist Avicennan Logicians =y and large, the >evisionists adopt most of Avicenna/s distinctions and stipulations. =uton their pre#erred reading o# the propositionthey re9ect, among other inferences. If e1ery 3 is possi2ly 4, and e1ery 4 is necessarily A, it doesn/t follow that every I actually becomes = such that it is necessarily A. #8tibK does not ampliate the sub9ect term to the possible )so that it would be understood as e1ery possi2le 4 is necessarily A., nor does he read each proposition as being embedded in a necessity operator. >ather, he understands the possibility proposition as followsB there are Is, and whatever is at one time I is possibly =. !his means that #8tibK and the other

>evisionists have a modal syllogistic that differs significantly from Avicenna/s. !he way the >evisionists put this difference is as followsB %ur statement e1ery 3 is 4 is used occasionally according to the essence )hasa2 al0 haq.qa., and its meaning is that everything which, were it to e$ist, would be a 3 among possible individuals would be, in so far as it were to e$ist, a 4' that is, everything that is an implicand of 3 is an implicand of 4. And occasionally Eit is usedF according to actual e$istence )hasa2 al0%h$ri,., and its meaning is that every 3 actually )#. l0%h$ri,., whether at the time of the 9udgment or before it or after it, is = actually )#. l0%h$ri,.. !he distinction between the two considerations is clear. Were there no s uares actually )#. l0%h$ri,. it would be true to say a s uare is a figure under the first consideration and not the second' and were there no figures actually other than s uares, it would be correct to say every figure is a s uare under the second consideration but not the first )#8tibK )1548. Shamsiyya 51.1-4, 5H.1--14.. In fact, the >evisionists are prepared to accept the Avicennan inferences given an essentialist reading of the propositions, but this is a half-hearted concession never pursued in their treatises. !he uestion is why, and I conclude this section by speculating as to the answer. =oth groups, the Avicennan and the >evisionists, want to be able not only to trace valid inferences, they want also to use the system they produce for e$tra-logical purposes. /hey want arguments that are not only valid3 0ut also sound3 that is3 arguments that are not only formally .erfect3 0ut that have true .remises. !o use the essentialist reading to say e1ery co- is necessarily #our0stomached, as an Avicennan would, is to claim necessarily, every cow is necessarily four-stomached' this is much stronger in one important respect than the >evisionist claim that there are actually cows, and everything that/s actually a cow is necessarily four-stomached. Gha(>l< and Logic: !he twelfth century is one of the most comple$ periods of transformation in "uslim intellectual history. !his period has been called the 4olden Age of Arabic philosophy. !he growth of logic in the preceding two centuries was concordant with the advance of the medical sciences and conse uently it gained support with a wider audience. !he century before had seen the advent of the madrasa as the prime institution of learning in the Islamic

world )"a&disi )1581. -*-6-., and Abu 7amid al-4ha2ali )d. 1111. had been appointed to the most prestigious of these new institutions. 4ha2ali had successfully introduced logic into the madrasa which attracted much more gifted logicians )4utas )-,,-.. al-4ha2ali too& up Alfarabi/s arguments in support of the utility of logic for theology and law, especially in his last 9uridical summa, Distillation of the Principles of Jurisprudence, a te$t which soon became a mainstay of the madrasa. It is in this period that the ma9or change in the coverage and structure of Avicennan logic occurred. !he late twelfth century also saw Averroes produce what was effectively the last of the wor& in the 3arabian tradition of logic, wor& which was to be translated into 7ebrew and Gatin but which was neglected by Arabic logicians. 3inally, through the course of the twelfth century, the modified Avicennan logic that would be adopted by the logic te$ts of the madrasa began to emerge. 4ha2ali argued that, properly understood, logic was entirely free of metaphysical presuppositions in9urious to the faith. !his meant that logic could be used in forensic reasoningB We shall ma&e &nown to you that speculation in 9uristic matters )al0#iqhiyy$t. is not distinct from speculation in philosophical matters )al0aqliyy$t. in terms of its composition, conditions, or measures, but only in terms of where it ta&es its premises from )4ha28lK )15H1. Miy$r -8.--4.. 4ha2ali tended to an even stronger position towards the end of his lifeB more than being merely harmless, logic was necessary for true &nowledge. 7owever for all his historical importance in the process of introducing logic into the madrasa, the logic that 4ha28lK defended was too dilute to be recogni2ably 3arabian or Avicennan. AI-4ha2iili/s position was largely formed by both his philosophical preparation and his theological convictions. al-4ha2ali as a 9uristAtheologian was very much interested in the logical uestions that legal discussions could comprise. /he attraction that the foreign sciences held for al#Gha(ali was in direct relation to their usefulness in furthering the cause of theology. AI#Gha(ali raised the .ossi0ility that these sciences could 0e demonstra0ly true and that they might have some 0earing on

religion3 i.e., that when the speciali2ed sciences )mainly logic and physics. offered demonstrations which conflicted with the literal readings of scripture, the latter must alter their status to one of metaphor. And because al-4ha2ali held the view that 4od could not actuate something self-contradictory, literal readings should therefore be sub9ected to demonstrable proofs where and when they appear to e$ist. 3or e$ample, when dealing with some of the well established facts of cosmology such as ecli.ses he writesB 4thus3 when one who studies these demonstrations and ascertains their .roofs3 deriving there0y information a0out the times of the two ecli.ses3 their e5tent and duration3 is told that this is contrary to religion3 he will not suspect this science, but only religion. 7owever, al-4ha2alI also wanted to maintain that logic and the sciences were doctrinal-y neutral, particularly where the world of natural causation was concerned, and especially where they attempted to redefine the ontological stature of the :ur/an. 7e statesB 4As for logical sciences3 none of these relates to religion either 0y way of denial or 0y affirmation. /hey are no more than the study of the methods or .roof and standards of reasoning3 the conditions of the .remises of demonstration and the manner of their ordering3 the conditions of correct definition and the manner of its construction. In re9ecting <the principle of necessary causal connection< which was <the cornerstone of Aristotelian demonstrative science,< al-4ha2al/i entered into a parado$ vi2. the logical sciences to which he was committed. 7ow can logic and science ad9udicate scriptures, but remain doctrinally neutral in its first principlesC al-4ha2al/i/s intent was not to indicate that demonstrative logic is philosophically uncommitted. In stead, his purpose lay in the impossible attempt to prove that its philosophical commitment is not given to an Aristotelian metaphysic. Al-4ha2al/i was evidently reacting against what was then the well established refusal at the time, to integrate useful aspects of formal logic )i.e., the syllogism. into law. Attempting to avoid a contradictory position where logic is concerned, al#Gha(al9i maintained that logic could 0e disengaged from the heretical meta.hysical framewor! in which it was im0edded and 0e used as a tool or method in the realm of al-fiqh Whether he did so successfully or not is uestionable. !he answer given by al-4ha2ali is motivated by theological reasons first and foremost. It is based on the parent eternal nature of the natural world implied by emanationist )causal. theories which attempt either to lower 4od/s eternality to the finite stature of the

world, or raise the finitude of the world to 4od/s eternality, much in the way al-3arabi attempted to move from <evidence to absence<. =oth would be contradictory statements about the sovereign nature of 4od as stated in the :ur/an. Instead, al# Gha(ali attem.ts to 8ettison the meta.hysical as.ects of Gree! thin!ing3 while harmoni(ing its logical tools with Islamic law. Al-4ha2alI/s reformulation of the 4ree&s/ tools of reasoning (qiyas8syllogism. relates primarily to matters of law which denote items given to <less clear speech< as opposed to <clear speech<. !hese ambiguous legal aspects might suggest )I. finding a te$t relevant to the new case in the :ur/an or 7adIth' )-. discerning the essential similarities or ratio legis between two cases' )6. allowing for differences l#uruq& and determining that they can be discounted' and )4. e$tending or interpreting the ratio legis to cover the new case. =ut under the auspicious abilities of qiyas that bore some affinity with a #ortiori forms of reasoning, al-4ha2ali endeavored to include analogy, and argumentum a simile Al#Gha(al9i demarcates the qiyas from analogy only on the 0asis that the former 0ears certain !nowledge3 while the latter renders only .ro0a0le inference. AI-4ha2alI/s insistence on converting analogy to a first figure syllogism, a reformulation of al-3arabI/s systemi2ation of inductive reasoning, intentionally grounded legal theory in an Aristotelian framewor& of &nowledge. 7ere an awareness of the dubious relationship between analogy and the syllogism )qiyas& uncovers an inconsistency in the metaphysical system that supported it. We can leave aside the dichotomous application of logic given by al Gha(ali who found it relevant in worldly 1legal2 affairs3 0ut trou0lesome when im.inging on esta0lished meta.hysical norms3 or theology )vi2. the circumstances of 4od/s unlimited freedom.. In sum it was Ga(ali9s madrasa that .rovided the 0ac!0one of the tradition3 and a num0er of 8urists came time and again to stress that the study of logic was so im.ortant to religion as to 0e a fard kifya3 that is3 a religious duty such that it is incum0ent on the community to ensure at least some scholars are a0le to .ursue its study. In Ga(ali9s words: As for the logic that is not mi$ed with philosophy . there is no disagreement concerning the permissibility of engaging in it, and it is re9ected only by he who has no in&ling of the rational sciences. Indeed, it is a #ard %i#$ya because the ability to reply to heretical views in rational theology )%al$m., which is a #ard %i#$ya, depends

on mastering this science, and that which is necessary for a religious duty is itself a religious duty. I6= /A *I A lbn !aymiyya is best considered a theologian and a 9urist, one who often leveled polemical accusations at 4ree& logic. Gi&e al-4ha2ali, lbn !aymiyya was concerned with God9s unlimited .ower and freedom of the divine will, and so re9ected causal theories which would tie 4od e$plicitly to the natural world and ualify his involvement )causality. with his world. !hus, al- forms of unitary e5.osition 1universals2 were re8ected as conventions 1nominal2 by lbn !aymiyya. Ibn !aymiyya/s position rested on its own universal premiseB that under no conditions can universals 1of any !ind2 0e esta0lished outside the mind of the one who e5.eriences. ;oubtless, the e5ce.tion here is .ro.hecy. !his amounted to a re9ection of universals altogether, i.e., an anti-realist and nominalist position in metaphysics which claims that where universals flourish in logical discourse3 they do so only mental-y3 and not 1in any sense2 in reality. !hus, universals can 0e esta0lished so long as it is understood that they function .ragmatically within the s.ecific needs of a given conte5t3 that which still demands a medium for human communication. "niversals cannot o0tain either meta.hysically3 or theologically3 where there is o.en and full communication with God. !he substanceAaccident debate collapses in Ibn !aymiyya/s nomimalist schematic. Mssence and accident are but arbitrary and relative demarcations set apart from each other in accordance with usage. Ibn !aymiyya writesB <3urthermore, there is no doubt that what the logicians held concerning the theory of definition is of their own invention...Accordingly3 it is necessary for them to distinguish 0etween what in their o.inion is essential and what is not...where0y they deem one attri0ute3 to the e5clusion of the other3 to 0e of the essence.9 !here is undoubtedly a strong element of relativism in I0n /aymiyya9s e.istemological thin!ing, especially as he contends that 4.eo.le differ in their faculties of .erce.tion in a way that cannot 0e standardi(ed4 . I0n /aymiyya attac!s the most delicate as.ects of the syllogism#its definitions and concepts which support its larger )conceptual. relations. It is a strategy employed by lbn !aymiyya, simply because in order for a syllogism to function correctly )demonstrating true, false or even probable conclusions. an agreement must be reached concerning the definitional terms )i.e., the universality of its contents.. 7ere, according to I0n /aymiyya3 .hiloso.hers and theologians3 whether dealing with

an analogy or a syllogism .er se3 assume too much in the way of universal terms that denote e5tra#mental realities. Ibn !aymiyya statesB <!he universal e$ists only in the mind. If the particulars of a universal e$ist in the e$tra mental world, then this will be conducive to the &nowledge that it is a universal affirmative<. !he ideas penned by Ibn !aymiyya evo&e 7ume who also interrogated both philosophy and theology on the matter of universals and their relationship to the e$ternal world. In =oo& 1 )%f the Jnderstanding. of his A !reatise o# Human 7ature, 7ume reduces the perceptions of the human mind to what he calls impressions and ideas. Impressions are more immediate in their presence before the mind and feed our ideas that are faint and sub9ect to greater discontinuity. =ecause 7ume is considered an empiricist, both impressions and ideas are necessarily derived from the e$ternal world. 7e writesB 4=ow since nothing is ever .resent to the mind 0ut perceptions3 and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently .resent to the mind? it follows3 that it is im.ossi0le for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing s.ecifically different from ideas and im.ressions.4 As is the case with Ibn !aymiyya, ideas and im.ressions are una0le to form universals that can 0e .laced 0ac! u.on the e5ternal world. 7ume writesB 4@e can never really advance a ste. 0eyond ourselves3 nor can conceive any !ind of e5istence3 0ut those .erce.tions3 which have a..eared in that narrow com.ass4. /he logical conclusion of this .osition im.lies that nothing new in the way of !nowledge could ever arise from syllogistics. @here definitions 0rea! down3 so too does the idea of advancing new !nowledge. Ibn !aymiyya holds that the lin!s logicians ma!e 0etween conce.t and definition is too .ronounced. 7e feels that concepts that belong to this or that vocational field are nothing more than an arbitrary invention of the logician. In a rather dogmatic view of conception )which has no need of formal definitions. Ibn !aimiyyah writesB ... all the communities of scholars3 advocates of religious doctrines3 craftsmen3 and .rofessionals !now the things they need to !now3 and verify what they encounter in the sciences and the .rofessions without s.ea!ing of definitions. @e do not find any of the leading scholars discussing these definitions#certainly not the leading scholars of law3 grammar3 medicine3 arithmetic# nor craftsmen3 though they do form conce.ts of the terms used in their fields. !herefore, it is &nown that there is no need for these definitions in order to form conce.ts. =y attac&ing the heart of the syllogism )identity., Ibn !aymiyya is left with the circular uestion of 9ust how legitimate rational concepts are established. 7e might

agree that this presents a problem of sorts, but it is his dogmatism )or faith. which rescues him from having to deal with the problem of phenomena more earnestly. 7is argumentative style appears to suggest that while definitions are necessary for the articulation of logical concepts, the necessary definitions of e$istence are already established within the :ur/iin and have no need of logical analysis. Ibn !aimiyyah writesB Ae who reads treatises on .hilology3 medicine or other su08ects must !now what their authors meant 0y these names and what they meant 0y their com.osite discourse? so must he who reads 0oo!s on law3 theology3 .hiloso.hy3 and other su08ects. /he !nowledge of these definitions is derived from religion3 for every word is found in the 6oo! of God3 the e5alted3 as well as in the 'unnah of Ais *essenger.

/he Decline
!hey is as yet so little e$plored of the logical activity in the post 14,,s to the invasions of the Western powers. !he first and most dangerous pitfall facing the historian is the assumption that there was a decline in logical studies in the realms under "uslim control that corresponds with the si$teenth century decline of the sub9ect in early modern Murope. It is tempting to ma&e this assumption but it needs to be e$amined and relevant te$ts must be edited and studied.

Domains of Logic
/he 'u08ect *atter of Logic
Al-3arabi, in his Ihsa' al0'ulum )Mnumeration of the 1ciences., defines logic as an instrumental3 rule#0ased science aimed at directing the intellect towards the truth and safeguarding it from error in its acts of reasoning. 7e statesB !he sub9ect matters )ma-d+$t. of logic are the things for which ElogicF provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by e$pressions, and e$pressions in so far as they signify intelligibles. 7e defends the need for such a science of reasoning on the grounds that it is possible for the mind to err in at least some of its acts, for e$ample, in those in which the intelligibles sought are not innate, but are rather attained discursively and empirically /through reflection and contemplation/. Al-3arabi compares logic to tools such as

rulers and compasses, which are used to ensure e$actness when we measure physical ob9ects sub9ect to the errors of sensation. Gi&e these tools, logical measures can be employed by their users to verify both their own acts of reasoning and the arguments of others. Indeed, logic is especially useful and important to guide the intellect when it is faced with the need to ad9udicate between opposed and conflicting opinions and authorities. Al-3arabi/s view of logic as a rule-based science which governs the mind/s operations over intelligibles forms the foundation for Ibn 1ina/s later refinements. In the opening chapters of his al0Mad%hal )Introduction., the first logical boo& of his encyclopedic wor& al0Shi#a' (Healing&, I0n 'ina descri0es the .ur.ose of logic as one of ena0ling the intellect to ac7uire 9!nowledge of the un!nown from the !nown9. 7e defends the need for logic by arguing that the innate capacities of reasoning are insufficient to ensure the attainment of this purpose, and thus they re uire the aid of an art. While there may be some cases in which innate intelligence is sufficient to ensure the attainment of true &nowledge, such cases are hapha2ard at best' he compares them to someone who manages to hit a target on occasion without being a true mar&sman. /he most im.ortant and influential innovation that I0n 'ina introduces into the characteri(ation of logic is his identification of its su08ect matter as 9second intentions9 or 9secondary conce.ts9, in contrast to /first intentions/. !his distinction is closely lin&ed in Ibn 1ina/s philosophy to his important metaphysical claim that essence or uiddity can be distinguished from e$istence, and that e$istence in turn can be considered in either of its two modesB e$istence in concrete, singular things in the e$ternal world' or conceptual e$istence in one of the soul/s sensible or intellectual faculties. In al0Mad%hal, Ibn 1ina argues that logic differs from the other sciences because it considers not conceptual e$istence as such )this would be psychology., but rather the accidents or properties that belong to any uiddity by virtue of its being conceptuali2ed by the mind. !hese properties, according to Ibn 1ina, include such things as essential and accidental predication, being a sub9ect or being a predicate, and being a premise or a syllogism. It is these properties that allow the mind to connect concepts together in order to ac uire &nowledge of the un&nown' they provide the foundation for the rules of reasoning and inference that logic studies. !hey are

moreover formal properties in the sense that, as properties belonging to all concepts in virtue of their mental mode of e$istence, they are entirely independent of the content of the thought itself' they are indifferent to the intrinsic natures of the uiddities which they serve to lin& together. In the Ilahiyyat )Metaphysics& of al0Shi#a', Ibn 1ina introduces the terminology of first and second /intentions/ or concepts in order to e$press the relation between the concepts of these uiddities themselves - which are studied in the theoretical sciences - and the concepts of the states and accidents of their mental e$istence which logic studiesB /As you &now, the sub9ect matter of logical science is second intelligible intentions )al0ma'ani al0ma'qula al0thaniyya. which are dependent upon the primary intelligible intentions with respect to some property by which they lead from the &nown to the un&nown/ )Ilahiyyat =oo& 1, ch. -,.. 3or e$ample, the second intentions of /being a sub9ect/ and /being a predicate/ are studied in logic independently of whatever first intentions function as the sub9ect and predicate terms in a given proposition, for e$ample, /human being/ and /rational animal/ in the proposition /a human being is a rational animal/. !he logical second intentions depend upon the first intentions because the first intentions are the conceptual building bloc&s of the new &nowledge which second intentions lin& togetherB but logic studies the second intentions in abstraction from whatever particular first intentions the logical relations depend upon in any given case. 'econdary Intelligi0les A more careful statement is provided by Avicenna. (oncepts li&e horse, animal, body, correspond to entities in the real world, entities which can have various properties. In the realm of the mental, concepts too can ac uire various properties, properties they ac uire simply by virtue of e$isting and being manipulated by the mind, properties li&e being a sub9ect, or a predicate, or a genus. !hese are the sub9ect matter of logic, and it seems it is only mental manipulation that gives rise to these propertiesB If we wish to investigate things and gain &nowledge of them we must bring them into (onception )#. t0tasa--ur.' thus they necessarily ac uire certain states )ah-$l. that come to be in (onceptionB we must therefore consider those states which belong to them in (onception, especially as we see& by thought to arrive at things un&nown

from those that are &nown. @ow things can be un&nown or &nown only in relation to a mind' and it is in (onception that they ac uire what they do ac uire in order that we move from what is &nown to what is un&nown regarding them, without however losing what belongs to them in themselves' we ought, therefore, to have &nowledge of these states and of their uantity and uality and of how they may be e$amined in this new circumstance. !hese properties that concepts ac uire are secondary intelligibles' here is an e$position of this part of Avicennan doctrine by >82KB !he sub9ect matter of logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as it is possible to pass by means of them from the &nown )al0mal+m$t. to the un&nown )al0ma,h+l$t. not in so far as they are intelligible and possess intellectual e$istence )an e$istence. which does not depend on matter at all, or depends on an incorporeal matter... !he e$planation of secondary intelligibles is that man (onceives the realities of things )haq$'iq al0ashy$. in the first place, then ualifies some with others either restrictively or predicatively )hu%man taqy.diyyan a- %ha2ariyyan.. !he uiddity/s being ualified in this way is something that only attaches to the uiddity after it has become &nown in the first place, so it is a second-order EconsiderationF )#. d0dara,ati th0th$niya.. If these considerations are investigated, not absolutely, but rather with respect to how it is possible to pass correctly by means of them from the &nown to the un&nown, that is logic. 1o its sub9ect matter is certainly the secondary intelligibles under the consideration mentioned above )>82K )1681 A. 7.. Mula%h%has 1,.1-1,.8.. In identifying the secondary intelligibles, Avicenna is able to place logic within the hierarchy of the sciences, because it has its own distinct stretch of being which is its proper sub9ect matter. 1o much for the first problem in Alfarabi/s formulation of what the sub9ect matter of logic is' finding it to be secondary intelligibles preserves the topic-neutrality of logic. Avicenna also has a view on the second problem, the uestion of whether or not e$pression is essential to a definition of logic and its sub9ect matter. !here is no merit in what some say, that the sub9ect matter of logic is speculation concerning the e$pressions insofar as they signify meanings And since the sub9ect matter of logic is not in fact distinguished by these things, and there is no way in which they are its sub9ect matter, )such people. are only babbling and showing themselves to be stupid. &once.tions and Assents #hLna9K argued in the second uarter of the thirteenth century that the sub9ect matter of logic was (onceptions and AssentsB

A thing is &nowable in two waysB one of them is for the thing to be merely (onceived )yutasa--ara. so that when the name of the thing is uttered, its meaning becomes present in the mind without there being truth or falsity, as when someone says man or do thisN 3or when you understand the meaning of what has been said to you, you will have conceived it. !he second is for the (onception to be EaccompaniedF with Assent, so that if someone says to you, for e$ample, every whiteness is an accident, you do not only have a (onception of the meaning of this statement, but EalsoF Assent to it being so. If, however, you doubt whether it is so or not, then you have (onceived what is said, for you cannot doubt what you do not (onceive or understand but what you have gained through (onception in this ElatterF case is that the form of this composition and what it is composed of, such as whiteness and accident, have been produced in the mind. Assent, however, occurs when there ta&es place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them' denial is the opposite of that. @ote that an Assent is not merely the production of a proposition by tying a sub9ect and predicate together' Assent, however, occurs when there ta&es place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them. All !nowledge3 according to Avicenna3 is either &once.tion or Assent. &once.tion is .roduced 0y definition3 Assent 0y .roof. All Avicennan treatises on logic are structured in accordance with this doctrineB a first section deals with definition, which conduces to (onception, a second with proof, which conduces to Assent. Gater logicians in the line of 3a&hraddKn ar->82K made (onceptions and Assents the sub9ect matter of logic. We &now that #hLna9K was the first to do this than&s to a report in the 5ist$s al0A#%$r of 1hamsaddKn as-1amar andK )d. c. 161,.. 1amar andK saysB !his is the view adopted by the verifying scholars )al0muhaqqiq+n., but #hLna9K )s$hi2 al0%ash#. and the people who follow him differed from them and saidB Gogic may investigate the universal and the particular and the essential and the accidental and the sub9ect and the predicate' they are among the uestions Eof the scienceF. Dou EAvicennan logiciansF are ta&ing the sub9ect matter of logic as more general than the secondary intelligibles so that the secondary intelligibles and )especially. the secondary intelligibles you have mentioned and what follows after them may come under it as logic. It would be correct for you to say that the sub9ect matter of logic is &nown (onceptions and Assents )al0mal+m$t at0tasa--uriyya -a0t0tasd.qiyya. not in so far as they are Ewhat they areF but in so far as they conduce to what is sought )al0matl+2.

!wo logicians who followed #hLna9K on this were AbharK and #8tibK. 7ere is AbharK/s statementB !he sub9ect matter of logic, I mean, the thing which the logician investigates in respect of its concomitants in so far as it is what it is, are precisely (onceptions and Assents. E!his isF because Ethe logicianF investigates what conduces to (onception and what the means Eto (onceptionF depends upon )for something to be universal and particular, essential and accidental, and such li&e.' and he investigates what conduces to Assent and what the means to Assent depends upon, whether pro$imately )li&e something being a proposition or the converse of a proposition or the contradictory of a proposition and such li&e. or remotely )li&e something being a predicate or a sub9ect.. !hese are states which inhere in (onceptions and Assents in so far as they are what they are. 1o certainly its sub9ect matter is (onceptions and Assents )!LsK )15*4b. !ad.l 144.14--,.. 7ere is part of !LsK/s re9ectionB If what he means by (onceptions and Assents is everything on which these two nouns fall, it is the sciences in their entirety, because &nowledge is divided into these two' whereupon what is understood from Ehis claimF is that the sub9ect matter of logic is all the sciences. Det there is no doubt that they are not the sub9ect matter of logic !he truth is that the sub9ect matter for logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as reflection on them leads from the &nown to the un&nown )or to something similar, as do reductive arguments or persuasive arguments E14HF or imaginative arguments and the li&e.. And if they are characterised by the rider mentioned by the masters of this craft, (onceptions and Assents are among the set of secondary intelligibles in 9ust the same way as definition and syllogism and their parts, li&e universal and particular and sub9ect and predicate and proposition and premise and conclusion )!LsK )15*4b. !ad.l 144.-1-u, 14+.pu-14H.6.. It is hard to &now precisely what is being disputed. What we can note at this stage is that one point at issue has to do with the claim that Avicenna/s identification of secondary intelligibles as logic/s sub9ect matter is inaccurate, and too narrow to achieve what he hopes it can. Arguments aim to bring about Assent' more precisely, when (onceptions have been gained that produce in the mind both the meaning of the terms in a given proposition, and the form of composition of these terms, Assent occurs when there ta&es place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them In fact, different &inds of discourse can bring about one or other &ind of Assent, or something enough li&e Assent to be included in a general theory of discourse..

1ince Avicenna had finished e$plaining the formal and uasi-formal aspects of syllogistic, he turned to its material aspects. With respect to these, syllogistic divides into five &inds, because it either conveys an Assent, or an Influence )taaththur. of another &ind )I mean an Imagining or Wonder.. What leads to Assent leads either to an Assent which is !ruth-apt ),$/im. or to one which is not. And what is !ruth-apt is either ta&en Ein the argumentF as !rue )haqq., or is not so ta&en. And what is ta&en as !rue either is true, or isn/t. !hat which leads to true truth-apt Assent is ;emonstration' untrue truth-apt Assent is 1ophistry. !hat which leads to truth-apt Assent not ta&en as true or false but rather as )a matter of. (ommon (onsent )um+m al0itir$#. isif it/s li&e this;ialectic ),adal., otherwise it/s Mristic )shagha2. which is, along with 1ophistry )sa#sata., under one &ind of 3allacy 0roduction )mugh$lata.. And what leads to %verwhelming though not !ruth-apt Assent is >hetoric' and to Imagining rather than Assent, 0oetry )!LsK )15*1. Sharh al0Ish$r$t 4H,.1-4H1.1-.. !LsK immediately goes on to lay out grounds for Assent to propositions, for e$ample, because they are primary, or because they are agreed for the purposes of discussion. 0ropositions to be used as premises for ;emonstration ma&e the most irresistible demands for our Assent' premises for lower &inds of discourse ma&e wea&er demands. Logic and Language Alfara0i e5.lains how logic3 grammar and language relate to each other: And this art 1of logic2 is analogous to the art of grammar3 in that the relation of the art of logic to the intellect and the intelligi0les is li!e the relation of the art of grammar to language and e5.ressions. /hat is3 to every rule for e5.ressions which the science of grammar .rovides us3 there is a corres.onding BruleC for intelligi0les which the science of logic .rovides us 1 hsa' al-'ulu!3 in Amin -DEF: EF2. al-3arabi argues that logic and grammar both have some legitimate interest in language, but whereas grammatical rules primarily govern the use of language, logical rules primarily govern the use of intelligibles.

"ore precisely, al-3arabi e$plains that although grammar and logic share a mutual concern with e$pressions, grammar provides rules that govern the correct use of e$pressions in a given language, but logic provides rules that govern the use of any language whatsoever in so far as it signifies intelligibles. !hus, logic will have some of the characteristics of a universal grammar, attending to the common features of all languages that reflect their underlying intelligible content. 1ome linguistic features will be studied in both logic and grammar, but logic will study them as they are common, and grammar in so far as they are idiomatic. %n the basis of this comparison with grammar, then, al-3arabi is able to complete his characteri2ation of the sub9ect matter of logic as followsB /!he sub9ect-matters of logic are the things for which logic provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by e$pressions, and e$pressions in so far as they signify intelligibles/ )Ihsa/ al-/ulum, in Amin 15H8B *4.. Alfarabi addsB Gogic shares something with grammar in that it provides rules for e$pressions, yet it differs in that grammar only provides rules specific to the e$pressions of a given community, whereas the science of logic provides common rules that are general for the e$pressions of every community. !his is to saylogic is something of a universal grammar or, more strictly, providing a universal grammar is one of the tas&s of logic. Avicenna recogni2es and attempts to deal with the close ne$us between language and thoughtB Were it possible for logic to be learned through pure cogitation, so that meanings alone would be observed in it, then this would suffice. And if it were possible for the disputant to disclose what is in his soul through some other device, then he would dispense entirely with its e$pression. =ut since it is necessary to employ e$pressions, and especially as it is not possible for the reasoning faculty to arrange meanings without imagining the e$pressions corresponding to them )reasoning being rather a dialogue with oneself by means of imagined e$pressions., it follows that e$pressions have various modes )ah-$l. on account of which the modes of the meanings corresponding to them in the soul vary so as to ac uire ualifications )ah%$m. which would not have e$isted without the e$pressions. It is for this reason that the art of logic must be concerned in part with investigating the modes of e$pressions =ut there is no value in the doctrine of those who say that the sub9ect matter of logic is to investigate e$pressions in so far as they indicate meaningsbut rather the matter should be understood in the way we described. Ibn 1ina critici2ed attempts to introduce linguistic concerns into the sub9ect matter of logic. In al-"ad&hal, Ibn 1ina labels as /stupid/ those who say that /the sub9ect matter

of logic is speculation concerning e$pressions in so far as they signify meanings )ma'ani./. 7owever, Ibn 1ina does not deny that the logician is sometimes or even often re uired to consider linguistic matters' his o08ection is to the inclusion of language as an essential constituent of the su08ect matter of logic. !he logician is only incidentally concerned with language because of the constraints of human thought and the practical e$igencies of learning and communication. /if logic could be learned through pure thought so that meanings alone could be attended to in it, then it would dispense entirely with e$pressions/' but since this is not in fact possible, /the art of logic is compelled to have some of its parts come to consider the states of e$pressions/ )al-"adh&al, in Anawati et al 15+-B ---6.. For I0n 'ina3 then3 logic is a .urely rational art whose .ur.ose is entirely ca.tured 0y its goal of leading the mind from the !nown to the un!nown? only accidentally and secondarily can it 0e considered a linguistic art. As 1abra says, Avicenna seems to hold that the properties constituting the sub9ect matter of logic would be inconceivable without the e$ercise of a particular function of language )1abra )158,. *H4.. 7owever, Ibn 1ina and al-3arabi were concerned to distinguish logic from grammar as many Arabic grammarians - whose linguistic theories were developed to a high degree of comple$ity and sophistication - were contemptuous of the philosophers for importing 4ree& logic, which they saw as a foreign linguistic tradition, into the Arabic milieu. !his attitude toward 4ree& logic is epitomi2ed in a famous debate reported to have ta&en place in =aghdad in 56- between the grammarian Abu 1a/id al1irafi and Abu =ishr "atta, a 1yriac (hristian who translated some of Aristotle/s wor&s into Arabic and is purported to have been one of al-3arabi/s teachers. AbL =ishr argued that spea&ers of Arabic need to learn 4ree& logic. 3or him Gogic comes ahead of 4rammarB 4/he logician has no need of grammar3 whereas the grammarian does need logic. For logic en7uires into the meaning3 whereas grammar en7uires into the e5.ression. If3 therefore3 the logician deals with the e5.ression3 it is accidental3 and it is li!ewise accidental if the grammarian deals with the meaning. =ow3 the meaning is more e5alted than the e5.ression3 and the e5.ression hum0ler than the meaning4.

!he e$tant account of the debate is heavily biased towards al-1irafi, who attac&s logical formalism and denies the ability of logic to act as a measure of reasoning over and above the innate capacities of the intellect itself. 7is principal claims are that philosophical logic is nothing but 4ree& grammar warmed over, that it is ine$tricably tied to the idiom of the 4ree& language and that it has nothing to offer spea&ers of another language such as Arabic. Dahya ibn /Adi, ma&es his case for the independence of logic from grammar based upon the differences 0etween the grammar of a .articular nation and the universal science of logic. 7e argues that the sub9ect matter of grammar is mere e$pressions )al0al#a/., which it studies from the limited perspective of their correct articulation and vocali2ation according to Arabic conventions. !he grammarian is especially concerned with language as an oral phenomenon' the logician alone is properly concerned with /e$pressions in so far as they signify meanings/ )al0al#a/ al0 dalla 'ala al0ma'ani. )"a ala fi tabyin, in Mndress 15*8B 188.. !o support this claim, Dahya points out that changing grammatical inflections do not affect the basic signification of a wordB if in one sentence a word occurs in the nominative case, with the appropriate vocali2ation, its signification remains unchanged when it is used in another sentence in the accusative case and with a different vocal ending.

&oncluding )emar!s
We have seen that the 4ree& syllogism underwent a variety of modifications in the "edieval Islamic environment. !he involvement of analogical reasoning with syllogistics was an attempt to aid the process of legal reasoning, but it was the a priori metaphysical assumptions which de marcate thin&ers most forcefully. AI-3iiriibi/s successfully raised the strength of analogy to that of a first order syllogism thereby insisting that the 'il8a must e$ist along with a 9udgment in all inferences. Inevitably, al-3arabi/s departure from the a priori interpretation of the :ur/an attracted much adversity from literalists. It is to al-3arabi that thin&ers such as al-4ha2ali and Ibn !aymiyya owe their whole point of departure. In his article, <4ha2aI/i/s Attitude to the 1ecular 1ciences and Gogic<, "ichael "armura has statedB !he matter of the syllogism involves the epistemological status of its premises' the form, the rules for valid inference. !o ta&e the formal aspect first, the philosopher/s logic is the more comprehensive as it includes, for e$ample, the Aristotelian figures which, prior to 4ha2ali, were not included in na/ar It also included a more precise formulation of analogical reasoning which, for e$ample, Alfarabi reduced to the first Aristotelian figure and which, probably following him, 4ha2ali urged his fellow theologians to adopt. AI-4ha2al/i could not deny, at least at the level of social and legal disputation, the auspicious utility of the syllogism, replete with its probable analogies. It is only at the meta.hysical level 1causality2 where al#Gha(aI9i 0ecomes uncomforta0le with the encroachment of the Gree! tools 1logic2 u.on the *uslim te5ts. If scri.tures conflict with the 4findings4 of the syllogism3 then 1unli!e with Aume and his aversion to religion2 the 'cri.tures are to 0e assigned meta.horical readings. /he dissonance .roduced 0y religion and logic is diffused3 and the syllogism can remain a welcome addendum to the legal am0iguities .ondered 0y the 8urists. With Ibn !aymiyya we saw that all legitimate definitions proceed from the :ur/an when legal andAor e$istential conceptions are being formed. 7is attac& on causality and modal logic, employed mainly by philosophers )but also by theologians. places him in a-causal agnostic position where the e$plication of metaphysics is concerned. %ne could almost assume that, in relation to logic, analogy and syllogistic proofs, the words of ;avid 7ume could be supplanted into the pen of Ibn !aymiyya who resisted all such logical attempts at a definitive metaphysical reconstructionB

6ut can a conclusion3 with any .ro.riety3 0e transferred from .arts to the wholeG Does not the great dis.ro.ortion 0ar all com.arison and inference from o0serving the growth of a hairG &an we learn anything concerning the generation of a manG @ould the manner of a leaf9s 0lowing3 even though .erfectly !nown3 afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a treeG And elsewhereB If we see a house, (leanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have e$perienced to proceed from that species of cause. =ut surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. !he dissimilitude is so stri&ing that the utmost you can here pretend to is. Ibn !aymiyya would undoubtedly agree with much of this, but would re9ect 7ume/s s&eptical ethos by maintaining revealed :ur/anic foundations. Indeed, he would ta&e literally 7ume/s ambiguous statement, <Let us fi5 our attention out of ourselves as much as .ossi0le: Let us chase our imagination to the heavens3 or to the utmost limits of the universe4. 7owever, it would not be adverse to state that Ibn !aymiyya was also a s&eptic, <a sceptic who was saved by religion<, but nevertheless a s&eptic. !hus his bid to uestion identity goes only so far. In the face of outright s&epticism, then, comes outright faith. !here remained the tas& of determining the proper limits and applications of syllogism so as to define and categori2e the term qiyiis )a method of inference.. !hese discussions were the result of the theologically motivated defense of the concept of divine omnipotence that solely actuated e$istence, events, miracles and their causal lin&s. It follows, then, that !heologians did not accept the doctrine of natural causation where phenomenal acts proceeded from a thing's uiddity. In their view (ausal efficacy resided solely with 4od/s divine will and contingent atoms and accidents were created e9 nihilo !hus, no causal uniformity in nature was inherently possible 3or "uslims 4ree& logic was initially a means to defend metaphysical doctrines but the scope of logic was e$panded to 9urisprudence and language. All of this was attem.ted under the 7uestiona0le notion that logic could remain doctrinally neutral and3 at the same time3 could 0e used to the advantage and defense of religion. Eventually3 the su..osed neutrality of logic was vehemently called into 7uestion.

!he use of analogy formed part of the :ur/anically derived 8uridical system. &om.lications arose once the syllogism was introduced. 1uddenly, meta.hysical assum.tions were uestioned' this gave rise to the ambiguous relationship between analogy and the syllogism especially when attempting to define qiyas A variety of arguments surrounds this term and its translation into <analogy<B :5iyiis thus cannot be given the fi$ed definition of analogy. Instead, it should be regarded as a relative term whose definition and structure vary from one 9urist to another.< 5iyiis, denotes a way of inferring something from another, and is derived from the logical sciences which embrace both the syllogism and analogy. !he concern here is to determine the central method by which 9uridical qiyas was endowed with <a wider definition as to include formal arguments<.