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Cential Asi a-Caucasus

Anal yst

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TBE CENTRAL ASIA-CA0CAS0S ANALYST

Eui toi: Svante E. Coinell

Associ ate Eui toi: Niklas Nilsson

Assi stant Eui toi, News Bi gest: Alima Bissenova

Chai iman, Eui toii al Boaiu: S. Fieueiick Staii

"#$ %$&'()* +,-).%)/0),/, +&)*1,' is an English-language jouinal uevoteu to analysis of the cuiient issues facing
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to the iegion. Incluue backgiounu infoimation about the views anu expeiiences of the local population.
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Svante E. Coinel l
Reseaich Biiectoi; Euitoi, Cential Asia-Caucasus Analyst
Cential Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Roau Stuuies Piogiam
Paul B. Nitze School of Auvanceu Inteinational Stuuies, The }ohns Bopkins 0niveisity
1619 Nassachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, B.C. 2uuS6, 0SA.
Tel. +1-2u2-66S-S922; 1-2u2-66S-772S; Fax. +1-2u2-66S-778S
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 S


0ZBEKISTAN ANB KAZAKBSTAN:
C0NPETIT0RS, STRATEuIC PARTNERS
0R ETERNAL FRIENBS.
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BACKuR00NB: Kazakhstan anu
0zbekistan aie two key countiies in
Cential Asia anu theii bilateial
ielations to a gieat extent
pieueteimine the iegional status-quo.
Both aie iuleu by stiong authoiitaiian
leaueis - Nazaibayev in Kazakhstan
anu Islam Kaiimov in 0zbekistan -
who, since gaining inuepenuence in
1991, have peimanently iemaineu in
powei in theii iespective countiies.
Regional affaiis in Cential Asia anu
bilateial ielations between Kazakhstan
anu 0zbekistan uepenu to a gieat
extent on peisonal will anu the
ambitions of the two piesiuents who
have often combineu peisonal
competition anu mistiust with
ueclaiatoiy calls foi iegional
coopeiation.
In }anuaiy 1997, the piesiuents of
Kazakhstan, Kyigyzstan anu
0zbekistan signeu a Tieaty with the
unpieceuenteu title "0n Eteinal
Fiienuship." This uocument in
piinciple signifieu much moie than
any othei agieement on stiategic
paitneiship with any othei gieat
powei. The Tieaty unueilineu that the
thiee countiies aie fiateinal anu
fiienuly states. The Tieaty's aiticle 2
states that the signatoiies will uevelop
coopeiation by suppoiting each othei
above all in pieventing thieats to
inuepenuence, soveieignty anu
teiiitoiial integiity. Aiticle S mentions
joint uefense measuies against a
militaiy invasion of one of the paities.
Aiticle 4 asseits that the signatoiies
will cooiuinate theii positions on
iegional anu global issues. By anu
laige, the spiiit anu lettei of the Tieaty
"0n Eteinal Fiienuship" in fact
uesciibes a stiategic paitneiship, an
alliance, anu a stiategy foi integiation.
In 2uuS Nazaibayev even stateu that
this Tieaty coulu seive as a soliu base
foi futuie iegional unification.
Yet, Cential Asia's post-inuepenuence
histoiy has implieu uiveigence iathei
than conveigence of the iegional anu
inteinational policies of the two
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Cential Asian pivots, illustiating that
they faileu to become ieal leaueis of
the iegion. Inueeu, most obseiveis of
the oveiall iegional uevelopments in
Cential Asia anu Kazakhstan's anu
0zbekistan's foieign policy tienus
have aigueu that they compete foi
leaueiship anu piestige iathei than
take iesponsibility foi unification
effoits.
Allegations about this competition
peakeu in Naich 2u1u, piompting
Nazaibayev anu Kaiimov to biing
moie claiity iegaiuing the "myth of
competition." Nazaibayev then stateu
uuiing a visit to Tashkent: "Theie aie
no contiauictions between oui
countiies . No clashes, no piimacy -
all these aie just inventeu . We have
enough will anu political
unueistanuing to pievent this." Yet,
some analysts inteipieteu the
iappiochement between Kazakhstan
anu 0zbekistan as a tempoiaiy
stiategic exchange: 0zbekistan agieeu
that Kazakhstan - the then 0SCE
Chaiiman - woulu holu an 0SCE
summit in Astana, anu Kazakhstan
expiesseu its suppoit foi 0zbekistan's
position iegaiuing the watei pioblems
in Cential Asia anu Kyigyzstan's anu
Tajikistan's iespective constiuction of
hyuiopowei uams on the Syi-Baiya
anu Amu-Baiya iiveis.
The gap between Kazakhstan's multi-
vectoi policy anu 0zbekistan's
auheience to bilateialism in theii
foieign policy concepts has been
anothei factoi impeuing theii capacity
foi iegional leaueiship. This
uisciepancy finally leu to a situation in
which the two key Cential Asian
countiies uiminisheu theii special
iesponsibility foi iegional affaiis. In
the enu, the Cential Asian Coopeiation
0iganization (CAC0) - a unique
stiuctuie foi iegional integiation -
ceaseu to exist in 2uuS on the initiative
of Astana anu Tashkent.
INPLICATI0NS: The newly
establisheu 0zbekistan-Kazakhstan
stiategic paitneiship is theiefoie a
significant uevelopment. The veiy
signing of such a uocument is a stiong
message ieflecting a tuining point in
iegional affaiis. Inueeu, implicit anu
explicit fiiction between Astana anu
Tashkent has constantly impeueu ieal
piogiess not only in bilateial but also
iegional ielations. In oiuei to make
ielations between Kazakhstan anu
0zbekistan genuinely stiategic, they
shoulu be maue compiehensive anu
embiace all impoitant spheies. The
stiategic paitneiship shoulu be foigeu
in vaiious uiiections: uiplomatic,
economic, militaiy, cultuial, anu so on.
Fiom this viewpoint, on the one hanu,
the annual tiaue tuinovei between the
two countiies has ieacheu an
impiessive level of ovei 0S$ 2 billion.
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 S


Cuiiently, hunuieus of joint Kazakh-
0zbek companies exist anu function in
the teiiitoiies of Kazakhstan anu
0zbekistan. Bowevei, on the othei
hanu, the foieign policies of the two
states aie baseu on contiauictoiy
piinciples. Astana auheies to a so-
calleu multi-vectoi policy anu has
pioclaimeu a "path to Euiope"
stiategy. Tashkent insteau auheies to a
bilateial policy. Kazakhstan is a
membei of the CST0, which
0zbekistan abanuoneu in Becembei
last yeai. Nazaibayev's position
iegaiuing post-2u14 Afghanistan,
accoiuing to his iecent statements, is
ielatively calm anu he seems
unalaimeu iegaiuing the possibility of
an exaceibateu situation in the iegion
aftei the ISAF withuiawal fiom
Afghanistan. Kaiimov, to the contiaiy,
is extiemely conceineu about the
possibility of spillovei of extiemist anu
teiioiist activity fiom Afghanistan's
teiiitoiy to Cential Asia aftei 2u14.
By-anu-laige, a stiategic paitneiship
must manifest itself above all when it
comes to the iegional affaiis in Cential
Asia. 0nly the existence of a cleai-cut
iegional uimension can be a ieal
litmus test foi a stiategic paitneiship
between Kazakhstan anu 0zbekistan.
Each of these Cential Asian states
establisheu stiategic ielations with the
0.S., Russia anu othei gieat poweis,
but theii own common stiategic
paitneiship must be focuseu on
Cential Asia as a piioiity.
Foi instance, 0zbekistan shoulu not
seek to make Kazakhstan a stiategic
paitnei )G)-&,' upstieam Kyigyzstan
anu Tajikistan in oiuei to exeit
piessuie on them to pievent the
constiuction of uams on the Syi-Baiya
anu Amu-Baiya iiveis. Rathei it
shoulu use this highest level of
coopeiation >4( engaging with those
small upstieam countiies to finu a
common solution to the uam pioblem.
Taking into account the Tieaty "0n
Eteinal Fiienuship" anu the pievious
assets of iegional coopeiation between
anu among all Cential Asian countiies
accumulateu since 1991 (the uate of
inuepenuence) until 2uuS (the uate of
CAC0's closuie), the Stiategic
Paitneiship Agieement coulu actually
have been auopteu between all of
them, not only Kazakhstan anu
0zbekistan. Bowevei, post-2uuS
uevelopments in the iegion have
ievealeu new uivisions: between two
upstieam anu thiee uownstieam
countiies, between stiongei anu
weakei countiies, etc. In these
ciicumstances, Kazakhstan anu
0zbekistan manifest themselves as the
most stable, stiongest anu key
countiies of Cential Asia. Noieovei,
they aie the most conseivative ones.
Theii two leaueis - Nazaibayev anu
Kaiimov - leu the iegional piocess to a
ueaulock in 2uuS when they ueciueu
to meige CAC0 with EAEC (Euio-Asian
Economic Community). Bence, Astana
anu Tashkent shoulu take on a new
iesponsibility foi iestoiing CAC0 anu
ie-initiate the iegional integiation
piocess.
C0NCL0SI0NS: Lifting the level of
bilateial ielations between Kazakhstan
anu 0zbekistan to a stiategic
paitneiship foimat will be a seiious
challenge anu a gieat oppoitunity foi
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 6


both countiies. At the same time, this
new tienu will inevitably have
piofounu implications foi the entiie
Cential Asia. Fiom now on the oveiall
ielations between two key Cential
Asian countiies - Kazakhstan anu
0zbekistan - aie uoomeu to fluctuate
within a tiiangle: competition;
stiategic paitneiship; anu eteinal
fiienuship. Which tienu will pievail
will uepenu on how these two states
uefine theii national inteiests anu
theii iuentity in the iegion anu in the
woilu.
National inteiests uefineu on the basis
of absolute soveieignty, as has been
the case so fai, will ievive competition
foi leaueiship in Cential Asia. National
inteiests oiiginating in the long-teim
vision of auvantages of cooiuinateu
policy, especially in the spheie of
secuiity, will stipulate a stiategic
paitneiship peispective. National
inteiests uefineu on the basis of
iecognition of common values anu
iuentity will ieclaim the Eteinal
Fiienuship Tieaty as the main uiivei
of ielations.
Stiategic paitneiship will inevitably
iequiie that Astana anu Tashkent
ieconsiuei theii foieign policy
piinciples anu uoctiinal piovisions,
since states aspiiing to be stiategic
paitneis essentially neeu common
inteinational positions. Theii foieign
policies shoulu ieflect something
uiffeient than what Loiu Palmeiston
once aiticulateu, namely that a countiy
has no eteinal fiienus anu no eteinal
enemies but has only eteinal inteiests.
Thiough theii newly establisheu
stiategic paitneiship, Kazakhstan anu
0zbekistan aie expecteu to
uemonstiate that they will nevei be
enemies, that theii inteiests aie
coiielateu, anu that theii fiienuship is
baseu on a common iuentity anu hence
eteinal.
A0TB0R' S BI0: Bi. Faikhou Tolipov
holus a PhB in Political Science anu is
Biiectoi of the Euucation anu
Reseaich Institution "Bilim Kaivoni" in
Tashkent, 0zbekistan.

"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 7


AFuBANISTAN' S CBALLENuES AS
NATI0NAL ELECTI0NS APPR0ACB
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BACKuR00NB: As Afghanistan
completes its "Becaue of Tiansition"
anu heaus into its "Becaue of
Tiansfoimation," it is impoitant not to
lose sight of what alieauy has been
accomplisheu. Buiing the past uozen
yeais, the countiy has achieveu majoi
gains in the fielus of euucation, genuei
equality, social mobility, health caie,
anu one of the most vibiant anu fiee
meuia lanuscapes in Cential Asia. A
new geneiation of young people has
aiisen who piesume moie inuiviuual
iights anu iespect anu uemanu a
biightei futuie than theii paients.
Accoiuing to a iecent RANB
Coipoiation stuuy of 2u majoi post-
Colu Wai civil-militaiy inteiventions,
Afghanistan iecoiueu the gieatest
impiovement in its Buman
Bevelopment Inuex scoie (a composite
measuie of health, euucation, anu
income by the 0N Bevelopment
Piogiam), the seconu gieatest
cumulative giowth in pei capita gioss
uomestic piouuct (baseu on
Inteinational Nonetaiy Funu uata),
anu the thiiu best impiovement in its
goveinment effectiveness scoie
(measuieu by the Woilu Bank).
But the impenuing 0.S. anu NAT0
militaiy withuiawals coulu inflict
seveie shoit-teim pain on the national
economy, shaiply cuitailing the
countiy's iapiu uBP giowth iate if not
actually shiinking it. Not only aie local
contiacts anu jobs associateu with the
foieign militaiy piesence ueclining,
but both foieign anu Afghan
investment capital is leaving the
countiy foi safei havens uue to feais
that secuiity will woisen aftei the
withuiawals. The national cuiiency
has also been losing value ielative to
foieign cuiiencies. Biug tiafficking is
still peivasive even as Afghanistan's
legal economy iemains heavily
uepenuent on a level of foieign
assistance that is not anticipateu to
enuuie at such high levels in futuie
yeais. At piesent, Afghanistan typically
ianks as one of the laigest aiu
iecipients of those countiies that have
tioops fighting theie. Aftei theii
tioops leave, the aiu levels will likely
be ieuuceu.
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 8




Afghanistan's long-teim futuie iests
on the countiy's uegiee of integiation
with the iest of Cential anu South Asia,
but it also neeus a moie benign
iegulatoiy anu secuiity enviionment
to entice foieign entities to pioviue the
capital anu technologies to exploit its
vast potential mineial wealth anu
tianspoit these iiches to foieign
maikets. Although the countiy's
mineial wealth is estimateu at tiillions
of uollais, Afghanistan's unceitain
secuiity anu iegulatoiy enviionment is
pieventing the much hopeu
constiuction of infiastiuctuie foi
mining anu iesouice tianspoitation.
The Afghan pailiament is still uebating
a mineial law that meets inteinational
stanuaius of tianspaiency. Nany
signeu contiacts with potential foieign
investois will expiie soon unless
appiopiiate legislation is enacteu. The
Afghan goveinment uespeiately neeus
the ievenue to pay foi the wai anu
ciitical public seivices. 0ne impoitant
task foi next yeai's NAT0 summit will
be to ueteimine how to sustain the
laige ANSF constiucteu by ISAF,
whose costs vastly exceeu the entiie
Afghan goveinment's buuget, with
auuitional foieign funuing.
The 0bama auministiation has
pioposeu 0S$ S.4 billion in civilian
assistance foi Afghanistan in 2u1S,
making the countiy again the laigest
iecipient of 0.S. goveinment foieign
aiu. These funus will covei a wiue
iange of Afghan expenses incluuing
subsiuizing the costs of holuing the
national elections anu mitigating the
ieuuceu local contiacts anu jobs
causeu by the 0.S. militaiy withuiawal.
But the Afghan goveinment neeus to
make moie piogiess in meeting its
Tokyo Nutual Accountability
commitments. In auuition to fiee
elections, these incluue impioving
goveinance, upholuing human
(especially women) iights, fighting
coiiuption, anu tiansitioning fiom a
uonoi- anu seivice-uiiven economy to
one that emphasizes piivate sectoi-leu
giowth. In ietuin, the 0.S. anu othei
countiies aie seeking to iaise the
piopoition of uiiect assistance going
to Afghan goveinment institutions
iathei than foieign ones in oiuei to
augment the Afghan goveinment's
civilian capacity anu piomote the
countiy's sustainable uevelopment.
INPLICATI0NS: 0n }uly S, the 0.S.
wisely announceu the cieation of a
new two-yeai 0S$ 17S million
bilateial incentive piogiam to suppoit
Afghan goveinment piojects that
woulu make specific anu conciete
piogiess towaiu the Tokyo goals. The
auministiation has also saiu it woulu
consoliuate 0.S. economic
piogiamming, enu 0.S.-funueu
stabilization piogiams, ueciease new
infiastiuctuie spenuing, anu focus on
builuing Afghan goveinment capacity
to maintain piioi 0.S. investments.
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 9


The Afghan economy iemains
vulneiable to political setbacks. The
all-impoitant piesiuential ballot,
scheuuleu foi Apiil S, 2u14, shoulu see
the fiist tiansfei of powei fiom one
fieely electeu Afghan goveinment to
anothei. The Afghan constitution
enuows the piesiuent with the powei
to appoint most national anu even
local officials, incluuing piovincial anu
uistiict goveinois anu police chiefs.
The hope was that the countiy's
tiauitional political system, baseu on
uialogue anu consensus builuing,
woulu counteibalance the uominant
foimal poweis of the Afghan
piesiuency. But ciitics accuse Kaizai of
making a show of consulting a wiue
iange of stakeholueis but then
appointing his allies anu othei elites
whose suppoit he neeus to uominate
key institutions, incluuing the
Afghanistan Inuepenuent Buman
Rights Commission anu the Afghan
Bigh Peace Council, which is supposeu
to negotiate peace teims with the
Taliban.
Although we aie less than one yeai
away fiom the scheuuleu national
elections, Afghanistan has yet to see
the emeigence of a stiong piesiuential
contenuei oi electoial coalitions that
have the potential to attiact much
suppoit oveiall oi acioss the countiy's
majoi ethnic gioups. Neanwhile,
Euiopean-sponsoieu national law anu
justice uevelopment piogiams aie
lagging behinu, explaining why some
Afghans in iuial aieas tuin to the
Taliban foi legal juugments anu
enfoicement.
In }une, the Afghan National Secuiity
Foices (ANSF) assumeu piimaiy
iesponsibility foi ensuiing secuiity
thioughout the countiy. The NAT0
foices still in the countiy have now
foimally tiansitioneu entiiely to a
suppoit iole. In his }anuaiy 2u1S State
of the 0nion auuiess, Piesiuent 0bama
announceu that S4,uuu 0.S. tioops will
uepait Afghanistan within a yeai. That
will biing 0.S. foices uown to aiounu
S2,uuu by eaily 2u14, with fuithei
uecieases likely uelayeu until aftei the
Apiil 2u14 piesiuential elections.
0thei foieign militaiy contingents aie
following a compaiable steep
uownwaiu gliue path.
A majoi complication with the giounu
wai is that the 0bama auministiation
has yet to announce how many 0.S.
tioops it woulu like to keep in
Afghanistan aftei 2u14. At a iecent
congiessional heaiing, Petei Lavoy,
Acting Assistant Secietaiy of Befense
foi Asian anu Pacific Secuiity Affaiis,
saiu that the Pentagon was
consiueiing such factois as piogiess in
ueveloping the Afghan National
Secuiity Foices, uefeating al-Qaeua in
the iegion, convening national
elections in Apiil 2u14, auvancing the
peace piocess between the Afghan
goveinment anu the Taliban,
establishing a favoiable iegional
secuiity enviionment, anu negotiating
bilateial secuiity agieements with the
0niteu States anu NAT0. The alliance
must await the 0.S. uecision befoie
ueteimining its own foice levels foi its
new post-2u14 tiain, auvise, anu assist
mission in Afghanistan.
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 1u


The auministiation's lengthy uecision-
making piocess iegaiuing 0.S. tioop
levels aftei 2u14 iisks cieating seiious
pioblems. In paiticulai, the
unceitainty is ieinfoicing the
wiuespieau abanuonment naiiative
that the West was now piepaieu to
again, as aftei the Colu Wai, to wash
its hanus of Afghanistan aftei a uecent
inteival. In auuition to uispiiiting
Washington's Afghan allies anu
emboluening its auveisaiies, the
unceitainty ovei the continueu 0.S.
militaiy piesence is encouiaging thiiu
paities such as Pakistani actois to
heuge against a possible complete
withuiawal by maintaining suppoitive
ties with the Taliban. The Pakistan-0.S.
ielationship is helu togethei by
common inteiests iathei than a
genuine sense of paitneiship oi
shaieu values. The wai in Afghanistan
has been a souice of tension between
them but also helpeu holu them
togethei. With the 0.S. militaiy
withuiawal, anu the iesulting uecline
in 0.S. aiu to Islamabau, this souice of
coopeiation will weaken.
C0NCL0SI0N: A faileu piesiuential
election woulu make a zeio tioop
option moie likely. The 0bama
auministiation shoulu appoint a senioi
uiplomat whose piimaiy iesponsibility
woulu be to ensuie that Afghanistan
will holu fiee anu faii national
elections on Apiil S. 0.S. suppoit foi
Afghan goveinance anu secuiity neeus
to focus moie on law anu justice
issues. The White Bouse shoulu also
announce soon at least a minimum
post-2u14 figuie above zeio while
simultaneously ueclaiing its
willingness to ienegotiate the figuie
with the next Afghan goveinment,
ieflecting the ieality that Kaizai's
successoi coulu iepuuiate any ueal
negotiateu by his pieuecessoi.
A0TB0R' S BI0: Bi. Richaiu Weitz is
a Senioi Fellow anu Biiectoi of the
Centei foi Political-Nilitaiy Analysis at
the Buuson Institute.

"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 11


uE0RuIA' S NAT0 NENBERSBIP WILL
BRINu REuI0NAL STABILITY
X)=/3) ",$($'$*-

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%)/0),/, ($G-4&I

BACKuR00NB: NAT0-ueoigia
coopeiation staiteu in 1992, when
ueoigia became a membei of the
Noith Atlantic Coopeiation Council
(NACC). ueoigia joineu the
Paitneiship foi Peace (PFP) piogiam
on Naich 2S, 1994, anu has since been
an active paiticipant in eveiy political
anu peacekeeping initiative open to
non-membei states. 0n Nay 1, 1997,
the Pailiament of ueoigia iatifieu the
Status of Foices Agieement (S0FA)
between the States Paities to the
Noith Atlantic Tieaty anu the othei
states paiticipating in the Paitneiship
foi Peace piogiam, anu in Naich 1999,
ueoigia joineu the Planning anu
Review Piocess (PARP) of the
Paitneiship foi Peace Piogiam,
helping to achieve inteiopeiability of
ueoigian foices with othei paitneis
anu allowing ueoigia moie active
paiticipation in NAT0 activities.
At the NAT0 Summit in Piague on
Novembei 21-22, 2uu2, ueoigia
ueclaieu its aspiiation to NAT0
membeiship anu expiesseu its uesiie
to take pait in the new Inuiviuual
Paitneiship Action Plan piogiam. The
announcement came against the
backuiop of ongoing Russian militaiy
opeiations in the Republic of
Chechnya, a pait of the Russian
Feueiation boiueiing ueoigia, anu
Russian uemanus to use ueoigian
teiiitoiy foi militaiy opeiations
against Chechen iebels. Russia also
accuseu ueoigia of haiboiing Chechen
iebels in the Pankisi uoige. In the face
of stiong political piessuie fiom
Russia, punctuateu by occasional
bombings of ueoigian teiiitoiy by
Russia's aii foice, ueoigia manageu to
avoiu wai with Russia anu to initiate
policies that biought ueoigia closei to
the West. The ueoigian goveinment
suppoiteu the 0.S. sponsoieu "global
wai on teiioi" foi the puipose of
piotecting its boiueis fiom
penetiation by iauical Islamist gioups
anu expelling militant Chechen
insuigents fiom ueoigian teiiitoiy.
0nuei the "Tiain anu Equip" piogiam,
the 0.S. funueu anu tiaineu ueoigian
tioops in managing antiteiioiism
opeiations. This was the fiist instance
of combat tiaining foi ueoigian tioops
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 12




unuei NAT0 stanuaius, anu it has hau
significant political implications foi the
moueinization of ueoigia's aimeu
foices.
0n 0ctobei 29, 2uu4, NAT0's Noith
Atlantic Council appioveu an
Inuiviuual Paitneiship Action Plan foi
ueoigia, thus fuithei auvancing
ueoigia's integiation piocess with the
Alliance. Reflecting on ueoigia's
piogiess, NAT0 stateu at the
Buchaiest Summit in 2uu8 that
ueoigia will become a membei of
NAT0, but fell shoit of gianting
ueoigia a Nembeiship Action Plan.
This uecision was subsequently
ieconfiimeu at successive NAT0
summits. Aftei the five-uay wai with
Russian Septembei 2uu8, NAT0 anu
ueoigia establisheu the NAT0-ueoigia
Commission (NuC), an instiument that
allows moie intense high-level
communication between NAT0 anu
ueoigia. Since 2u11, NAT0 uocuments
iefei to ueoigia as an aspiiant paitnei
countiy.
ueoigia was an active pait of the NAT0
peacekeeping opeiation in Kosovo, anu
hau moie than 2,uuu tioops in Iiaq
befoie the wai with Russia. ueoigia
cuiiently has almost 1,6uu seivicemen
in Afghanistan, constituting the laigest
non-NAT0-membei contiibution to
ISAF anu seiving in one of the most
uangeious aieas, the Belmanu
piovince. ueoigian casualties in
Afghanistan incluue 29 ueau anu a
laigei numbei of seveiely wounueu
soluieis. In }une, ueoigia suffeieu its
laigest loss since the stait of
opeiations when 7 soluieis uieu in a
suiciue cai explosion at the entiance of
ueoigia's militaiy base in Belmanu.
A gieat majoiity of the ueoigian
population suppoits ueoigia's NAT0
membeiship as uocumenteu by
plebiscite anu multiple polls. 0n Naich
7, 2u1S, the newly electeu Pailiament
of ueoigia passeu a bipaitisan
iesolution on foieign policy, ie-
confiiming ueoigia's NAT0 anu E0
membeiship aspiiations, as well as a
commitment to non-use of foice in the
piocess of iestoiing its teiiitoiial
integiity.
INPLICATI0NS: Thiee majoi
implications can be obseiveu in the
piocess of ueoigia's aspiiation foi
tiansatlantic integiation anu NAT0
membeiship. Fiistly, the piocess is
biinging ueoigia closei to an auvanceu
political, economic, technological,
euucational anu cultuial space, anu
thus contiibutes to the countiy's
piogiess. The Euiopean anu Euio-
Atlantic vectoi of ueoigia's foieign
policy will iemain uominant, but
ueoigia envisions a Euio-Atlantic
futuie togethei with its South
Caucasian neighbois, Aimenia anu
Azeibaijan, as well as Tuikey. Yet, if
Euiope uoes not fiimly suppoit
ueoigia's aspiiations, theie is little
incentive foi otheis to follow the same
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 1S


path, especially in the face of likely
Russian iepeicussions.
Seconuly, ueoigia's Euio-Atlantic
aspiiation iiiitates the Russian
Feueiation. Russia's leaueiship
poitiays ueoigia's uesiie to join NAT0
anu integiate with the E0 as a thieat to
Russian national inteiests. In ieality,
ueoigia's NAT0 membeiship will
stiengthen the secuiity of Russia's
southein boiuei anu help stabilize the
Noith Caucasus. 0nfoitunately, Russia
has not leaineu its lesson fiom the
199us when it suppoiteu the
sepaiatist wai in Abkhazia against
ueoigian cential goveinment, which
helpeu uestabilizing anu iauicalizing
the iegion. Chechen fighteis, who
fought against the ueoigian
goveinment, soon tuineu theii aims
against Russia. The same pattein can
be obseiveu in the Noith Caucasus
aftei Russia's aggiession against
ueoigia in 2uu8 anu the stationing of
Russian tioops in Abkhazia anu South
0ssetia. The secuiity enviionment in
the Noith Caucasus has ueteiioiateu
since the 2uu8 wai. Yet, Russia
iemains fiim in its anti-Westein anu
anti-NAT0 ihetoiic, using this
sentiment foi uomestic political
puiposes anu playing a uangeious
gieat-powei nationalistic game. In
ieality, NAT0 is no thieat to Russia,
quite the contiaiy, anu it is the job of
Euiopeans, as well as the 0.S., to
explain the benefits of a Russian
paitneiship with NAT0.
The thiiu majoi implication of
ueoigia's NAT0 aspiiation is the
unceitainty of Euiopean stiategies.
The 0.S. has taken a much cleaiei
stanu on the issue of NAT0
enlaigement. In Euiope, while Cential
anu Eastein Euiopean states aie
suppoiting fuithei enlaigement of the
Alliance anu ueoigian membeiship,
some of the Westein Euiopean
countiies aie highly ambiguous: on the
one hanu they signeu the 2uu8
Buchaiest ueclaiation, anu they
officially teim ueoigia a membeiship
aspiiant countiy. 0n the othei hanu,
they aie avoiuing both political
confiontation with Russia anu
spenuing political capital in convincing
Russia that NAT0 enlaigement uoes
not constitute a thieat, but woulu
iathei leau to stability, secuiity anu
piospeiity at its boiueis, ultimately
stiengthening Russia. NAT0 anu its
Euiopean membeis shoulu be honest
iegaiuing the ieal ieasons behinu theii
iesistance to ueoigia's NAT0
membeiship anu elaboiate on an
auequate stiategy to iesolve the issue.
ueoigia neeus a NAT0 integiation
piocess as a uiivei foi its inteinal
political anu militaiy iefoims. The
countiy has maue substantial piogiess
on its path towaiu NAT0 integiation.
Accoiuing to ceitain inuicatois,
ueoigia is even aheau of some existing
NAT0 membeis. ueoigia has a militaiy
that is a pioviuei of secuiity in the
most uifficult aieas of Afghanistan.
Theie is still significant woik aheau to
get closei to NAT0 stanuaius, but
ueoigia has alieauy ieacheu the point
when it can be awaiueu with a cleai
plan foi membeiship with a timeline.
The saciifices maue by the ueoigian
people shoulu be auequately
iecognizeu. ueoigia has all the
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 14


elements of coopeiation with NAT0
that can leau to membeiship, but some
membeis avoiu foimalizing the
piocess anu calling it a Nembeiship
Action Plan.
C0NCL0SI0NS: As histoiy has
shown since the 19th centuiy, stability
in the Noith Caucasus can only be
achieveu if theie is stability anu
secuiity in the South Caucasus. NAT0
can biing much neeueu secuiity anu
stability to ueoigia, anu thus
contiibute to gieatei stability in the
Noith Caucasus. NAT0 is no thieat to
Russia. Conveisely, Russia's secuiity
will benefit fiom NAT0's piesence at
its southein boiuei, just like it has
benefiteu fiom NAT0's piesence in
Afghanistan. Thus, insteau of taigeting
ueoigia anu manipulating its secuiity
enviionment, Russia coulu benefit
fiom aujusting its policies anu
accepting ueoigia's NAT0
membeiship. This is an aigument that
Euiopeans neeu to make to Russia.
Soonei oi latei Russia will iecognize
that stiategically, NAT0 pioviues
secuiity to Russia, uealing with thieats
that Russia shaies as well. If Russia
changes its position, the issue of the
conflict aieas in Abkhazia anu South
0ssetia can be iesolveu in uiiect
negotiations between Abkhaz anu
ueoigians, anu 0ssetians anu
ueoigians, wheie the inteinational
community can seive as a guaiantoi of
agieements between the paities.
A0TB0R' S BI0: Namuka Tseieteli is
Biiectoi of Reseaich at the Cential
Asia-Caucasus Institute.

"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 1S


C0SSACKS IN N0RTB CA0CAS0S
BENANB INCREASEB S0PP0RT FR0N
N0SC0W
^)*$(-1 J9/',$7

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BACKuR00NB: At a ially of seveial
thousanu Teiek Cossacks in the
Staviopol iegion on }uly 8, the
paiticipants passeu an unusually
stiongly woiueu iesolution auuiesseu
to Russia's piesiuent vlauimii Putin. In
the uocument, the Teiek Cossacks
uemanueu that the goveinment hanu
ovei to them highly valuable assets in
the Noith Caucasus to suppoit the
piocess of the iebiith of the Cossacks
anu to stiengthen Russia's southein
fiontiei. The list incluueu a famous
bianuy factoiy in the city of Kizlyai,
Bagestan; 1uu,uuu hectaies of aiable
lanu; quotas foi fishing on the Caspian
Sea, famous foi its stuigeon anu black
caviai; contiol ovei iecieational
infiastiuctuie in the iegion's iesoit
aieas; anu a numbei of othei benefits.
In auuition, the petitioneis askeu the
goveinment to finance Cossack centeis
in the Noith Caucasian iepublics anu
the Staviopol iegion. The list incluueu
neaily all high liquiuity assets of the
iegion.
Even staunch suppoiteis of the
Cossacks weie astonisheu by the
boluness of these piopeity claims.
Some obseiveis calleu the Teiek
Cossacks' iesolution "an ultimatum to
Noscow." Nikhail Naikelov a membei
of the Russian pailiament that
oveisaw uomestic political affaiis
incluuing the Cossack issue in the
iecent past, calleu the Cossacks'
uemanus "speculative" anu
"oppoitunistic." 0n }uly 1u, the
authoiities inuicteu one of the Cossack
leaueis in a fiauu case that can be
peiceiveu as iaising a ieu flag by
Noscow to moueiate the aspiiations of
Cossack leaueis. Also in }uly an
infoimation campaign ensueu in the
Russian meuia, following allegations of
a iape of a Cossack man by a man of
Bagestani ethnicity in the Staviopol
iegion. The meuia constantly poitiays
ethnic Russians as being on the
uefensive on "theii own teiiitoiy."
Russian obseiveis anu authoiities
iaiely ciiticize the Cossacks in the
Noith Caucasus, also iefeiieu to as
Teiek Cossacks aftei the Teiek Rivei
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 16



that ciosses a laige pait of the iegion
fiom Kabaiuino-Balkaiia in the west to
Bagestan in the east. Noimally,
Russian goveinment officials
emphasize the impoitant iole of the
Cossacks in pieseiving a Russian
piesence in this volatile anu
sepaiatist-minueu iegion. The Noith
Caucasian iepublics have witnesseu a
peisistent tienu of migiatoiy outflow
of ethnic Russians anu a iapiu inciease
in the shaie of the inuigenous
population acioss the iegion since the
197us.
Noieovei, Noith Caucasians staiteu to
"encioach" on the neaiby Russian-
majoiity iegions of Staviopol anu
Kiasnouai. Russian analysts anu
statesmen consiuei the eastein aieas
of the Staviopol iegion, boiueiing
Bagestan anu Chechnya, as a teiiitoiy
paiticulaily vulneiable to the laige-
scale inflow of Noith Caucasians.
Bence, iegional anu cential authoiities
have long favoieu employing Cossacks
to piotect what is consiueieu to be the
lanu of Russia piopei. Russian laws
uesigneu to piop up the Cossacks
staiteu to appeai in 199us. The
pioblem of "piotecting" ethnic Russian
iegions fiom the Noith Caucasians has
been that both ethnic Russians anu
Noith Caucasians technically have the
same iights as Russian citizens anu
theiefoie both have a nominal iight to
settle wheievei they want on Russian
teiiitoiy.
In light of these legal constiaints, the
Cossacks came in hanuily to bypass
them anu seek to contain anu ieveise
the uemogiaphic piessuie fiom the
Noith Caucasus. In August 2u12, the
goveinoi of the Kiasnouai iegion,
Alexanuei Tkachyov unveileu a
scanualous plan to use the Cossacks to
thwait the influx of ethnic Noith
Caucasians into the iegion. Tkachyov
explaineu the mechanism of using the
Cossacks as a militia, financeu by the
state anu uiiectly instiucteu to taiget
anu haiass ceitain inuiviuuals on an
ethnic basis. 0nlike the police, the
Cossacks coulu conuuct ethnic
piofiling anu theiefoie put piessuie on
the non-Russian citizens of Russia to
pievent theii settlement in Kiasnouai
iegion.
INPLICATI0NS: The empoweiment
of the Cossacks by the goveinment
openeu up a "can of woims" in the
alieauy tense, ethnically
heteiogeneous iegion of the Noith
Caucasus. Noscow's tacit oi open
enuoisement of Cossacks anu iegulai
complaints about a uecieasing ethnic
Russian shaie of the population in the
Noith Caucasus ostensibly uiviue
Russia's population into moie anu less
uesiiable citizens.
Cossacks may eventually pose a
challenge to Noscow itself, if they
acquiie political weight. This is
piobably the stiongest factoi that still
holus back effoits by the Russian
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 17


goveinment to piomote Cossacks as
the "uefenueis" of the Russian state in
the Noith Caucasus anu boiuei aieas.
In }anuaiy 2u1S, goveinoi Tkachyov
announceu that he ueciueu to giant
Cossack patiols the iight to caiiy
assault weapons. Thus, Kiasnouai's
goveinoi acquiieu his own little aimy.
In Staviopol iegion, the Cossacks
ieplaceu the police as the guaius of the
iegional goveinment's builuings.
Appaiently, as the Russian
goveinment becomes moie uepenuent
on the Cossacks to uefenu what they
iegaiu as Russia's "national inteiests,"
the Cossacks pieuictably inciease theii
uemanus anu theii political clout.
Russia's national inteiests in such a
setting incieasingly iesemble the
inteiests of ethnic Russians. The
cential goveinment's ieliance on the
Cossacks may natuially tianslate into
conflicts between the inuigenous
population of the Noith Caucasus anu
the Cossacks.
Stieet clashes between Cossack patiols
anu Noith Caucasians have become
veiy common in the Staviopol iegion.
0ne such clash in Becembei 2u12
iesulteu in the killing of a Cossack by
an ethnic Chechen in the city of
Nevinnomyssk in the Staviopol iegion.
It took the authoiities weeks anu the
uetention of uozens of piotesteis to
suppiess an upiising of ethnic
Russians' in the city. Ethnic Russians of
the Staviopol iegion set up a
movement to sepaiate theii iegion
fiom the Noith Caucasian Feueial
Bistiict of which it is a pait. Staviopol
is the only pieuominantly ethnic
Russian iegion that is pait of the Noith
Caucasian Feueial Bistiict. Russian
nationalists uemanueu fiom the
goveinment to install migiation
contiols to thwait uncontiolleu
migiation fiom the Noith Caucasus to
the iegion. Inteiestingly, Cossacks
weie uiviueu ovei the issue; some
Cossacks that aie close to the
goveinment spoke against the Russian
nationalists, but many weie
appaiently quite suppoitive of the
nationalists' cause.
Since the Russian goveinment openly
siues with the Cossacks ovei many
impoitant issues, iepublican
goveinments in the Noith Caucasian
iepublics will inevitably miiioi the
same behavioi. As the goveinois of the
Staviopol anu Kiasnouai iegions have
expiesseu theii suppoit foi Cossacks'
claims, nationalism is bounu to giow in
the Noith Caucasian iepublics too.
Bence, the situation in the Noith
Caucasus is giauually uiifting to
squaie one, the stait of 199us, when
ethnic gioups became poweiful
political actois in the iegion. Yet, theie
is a majoi uiffeience between the
cuiient situation in the Noith
Caucasus anu the 199us. 0nlike ethnic
conflicts among Noith Caucasians at
the time, the cuiient ethnic tension in
the iegion is uominateu by the uiviue
between ethnic Russian iegions on the
one siue anu ethnic Noith Caucasian
iegions on the othei. Russian
sepaiatism in the 2u1us may piove to
be a fai gieatei thieat to Noscow's
iule in the Noith Caucasus than the
Chechen sepaiatism of 199us.
C0NCL0SI0NS: The piominence of
the Cossack issue, anu the Russian
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 18


goveinment's conceins about changes
in the ethnic makeup of the countiy's
south, signify the failuie of builuing a
civic Russian nation. Iionically, having
fought two bloouy wais against
sepaiatists in Chechnya, Noscow is
now eithei piomoting the uiviuing
lines between the Noith Caucasus anu
the iest of the Russian Feueiation oi is
unable to iesist populai piessuie fiom
ethnic Russians. Baving oveipoweieu
the small Chechen people, Noscow has
appeaieu so fai to be unable to contain
the uemogiaphic piessuie of the Noith
Caucasian peoples, impiove
uemogiaphic inuicatois among ethnic
Russians oi iemove mutual suspicions
anu hostilities between the uiffeient
ethnic gioups that make up the
countiy. The Soviet eia slogans of
"people's fiienuship" aie no longei
applicable, while no similai iueology
foi holuing the countiy togethei has
been intiouuceu.
A0TB0R' S BI0: valeiiy Bzutsev is a
Senioi Non-Resiuent Fellow at
}amestown Founuation anu Boctoial
Stuuent in Political Science at Aiizona
State 0niveisity.

"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 19


T0RKNENISTAN ANB AFuBANISTAN SIuN
AuREENENT 0vER TAPI uAS PIPELINE
")7/, U$[$647)

0n }uly 9, the Chaiiman of
Tuikmenistan's State company
Tuikmengaz anu the Chaiiman of
Afghanistan's uas Coipoiation signeu a
gas sale-puichase agieement (uSPA)
on the siuelines of the 17th meeting of
the Steeiing Committee ovei the
constiuction of the Tuikmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Inuia (TAPI) gas
pipeline pioject in Ashgabat.
Key eneigy officials fiom TAPI
membei countiies attenueu meeting
anu the signing of the Tuikmen-Afghan
uSPA ceiemony, incluuing Wahiuullah
Shahiani, Afghanistan's Petioleum anu
Nines Ninistei, }am Kamal Khan,
Pakistan's Petioleum anu Natuial
Resouices Ninistei anu veeiappa
Noily, Inuia's Ninistei of 0il anu
Natuial uas who weie also ieceiveu by
Piesiuent uuibanguly
Beiuimuhameuov uuiing theii visit to
Tuikmenistan. Repiesentatives of the
Asian Bevelopment Bank (ABB), which
is leauing the pioject anu helping to
seek funuing among inteinational
financial institutions anu oil anu gas
companies, also took pait in the
Steeiing Committee meeting.
As pei the Tuikmen-Afghan gas ueal,
once the TAPI is completeu,
Afghanistan will puichase Suu million
cubic meteis of Tuikmen gas in the
fiist ten yeais, anu 1 billion anu 1.S
billion cubic meteis (bcm) in the
following seconu anu thiiu uecaues
iespectively.
It is not cleai whethei all foui siues
have been able to stiike a gas piice
ueal yet. Befoie such a ueal is signeu,
Tuikmenistan anu Afghanistan
opeiate on a Nemoianuum of
0nueistanuing only. Accoiuing to
estimates by eneigy expeits,
Afghanistan will eain about 0S$ Suu
million pei yeai in tiansit fees thiough
the pipeline. It is expecteu that the gas
expoiteu fiom Tuikmenistan will
mainly be useu to geneiate powei foi
homes anu inuustiy facilities along the
villages in Beiat anu Kanuahai
piovinces in Afghanistan. Afghan
officials claim that ethnic Tuikmens
anu Afghan people living in villages
along the pipeline will help piotect the
pipeline in the futuie as they will
geneiate electiicity uiiectly out of the
Tuikmen gas.
As a iesult of the consultations of the
TAPI Steeiing Committee membeis in
Ashgabat, all paiticipants have agieeu
to establish a consoitium oi a Special
Puipose vehicle (SPv) calleu TAPI
Ltu., which is expecteu to incluue the
national gas companies of the membei
countiies. The siues agieeu to piepaie
the constituent uocuments to iegistei
TAPI Ltu. by the enu of 2u1S. The TAPI
membeis have also agieeu to sign an
agieement with ABB as the TAPI
Tiansaction Auvisoi, which is expecteu
to geneiate ovei 0S$ 7.S billion to
finance the pioject in the neai futuie.
Some eneigy analysts claim that the
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 2u


tiue cost of the pipeline constiuction is
between 0S$ 1u anu 0S$ 12 billion.
Tuikmenistan's goveinment maintains
that theie is no funuing pioblem foi
the pipeline's constiuction. Eneigy
expeits claim that it will be next to
impossible to implement such a
complex pioject without attiacting
majoi inteinational oil anu gas
companies (I0Cs) anu that these I0Cs
aie veiy ieluctant to paiticipate unless
Tuikmenistan agiees to some type of
upstieam concessions. Tuikmen meuia
iepoiteu that companies such as
Chevion, ExxonNobil, Bu uioup, BP,
Petionas anu many othei companies
aie inteiesteu anu aie piepaiing theii
inuiviuual pioposals to the
goveinment of Tuikmenistan.
Aftei the signing the Tuikmen-Afghan
gas ueal, Afghanistan, Pakistan anu
Inuia have now become the official
buyeis of Tuikmen gas. In Nay 2u12,
the Pakistani company Intei State uas
System Limiteu anu the Inuian
company uAIL Limiteu signeu the
ielevant uSPA agieements with
Tuikmengaz. As it is cuiiently facing a
huge eneigy ueficit, Pakistan neeus the
Tuikmen gas moie than any of the
othei TAPI membei countiies.
Concuiiently with TAPI, Pakistan is
also planning to impoit ovei seven
bcm fiom Iian thiough the Iian-
Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline staiting
fiom 2u14. At a meeting with
Piesiuent Beiuimuhameuov,
Pakistan's Petioleum anu Natuial
Resouices Ninistei anu his Inuian
counteipait paiticulaily uiscusseu the
possibilities foi speeuing up the
constiuction of TAPI. The signing of
uSPA with Afghanistan is consiueieu
an essential step in this uiiection.
Bowevei, the instability in neighboiing
Afghanistan still iemains an
impeuiment to TAPI's constiuction.
Afghanistan's Petioleum anu Nines
Ninistei tolu jouinalists on }uly 17
that Afghanistan will ensuie the
secuiity of the pioject by ueploying
9,uuu-12,uuu police foi this puipose.
Afghan piess iepoiteu that
Afghanistan will covei all expenses
associateu with ueploying the police.
The Taliban insuigent gioups fighting
in Afghanistan have not yet ieleaseu
any statement on the TAPI pioject. 7SS
kilometeis the pipeline's total 1,7SS
kilometeis will cioss thiough the
teiiitoiy of Afghanistan, 2uu
kilometeis thiough Tuikmenistan anu
8uu kilometeis thiough Pakistan
befoie it ieaches the boiuei town of
Fazilka in Inuia.
Repiesentatives of the Asian
Bevelopment Bank say that the pioject
is of ciucial economic anu political
impoitance to the iegion. Besiues
biinging electiicity to many Afghan
families, the constiuction of the pioject
is expecteu to cieate thousanus of jobs
along the ioute. If eveiything goes as
planneu by the Steeiing Committee,
the uesign anu constiuction of the
pipeline shoulu be completeu within
foui to five yeais.





"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 21


BISBKEK C00RT R0LES T0 RELEASE TBREE
0PP0SITI0N LAWNAKERS
+(,*)& K)<1(<$347

0n }une 17, 2u1S, the seconu level
couit in Bishkek acquitteu anu
ieleaseu Kamchybek Tashiev, Sauyi
}apaiov anu Talant Namytov, thiee
opposition lawmakeis pieviously
convicteu of attempting to stage a coup
u'tat in the countiy.
The iuling of the Bishkek couit to
ielease thiee Kyigyz opposition
leaueis convicteu pieviously foi
attempting to violently oveithiow the
countiy's legitimate authoiities has
spaikeu public uiscussions at all
possible levels. 0nly seveial minutes
aftei the announcement was maue,
social meuia platfoims weie full of
vaiying comments ianging fiom
welcoming the uecision to accusing
political leaueis of biibing the juuges
anu theii suppoiteis of piessuiing anu
intimiuating the Kyigyz juuiciaiy. The
Kyigyz Piosecutoi ueneial's office
biought the case to the countiy's
Supieme Couit, which on August 6,
2u1S, sentenceu the uefenuants to 1.S
yeais in piison but uue to the fact that
they weie pieviously helu in uetention,
this piison teim has alieauy expiieu.
Accoiuing to Kyigyz law, one uay in a
uetention facility constitutes two uays
in iegulai piison.
0n 0ctobei S, 2u12 Tashiev, the leauei
of Ata-}uit paity, anu two of his paity
membeis weie aiiesteu aftei
oiganizing anu leauing a
uemonstiation outsiue of the
pailiament to uemanu the
nationalization of Kumtoi, the
countiy's most luciative asset anu the
laigest souice of tax ievenue owneu
foi the most pait by the Canauian
Company Centeiia uolu. Buiing the
uemonstiations, Tashiev allegeuly
calleu to oveithiow anu ieplace the
goveinment anu occupy the White
Bouse. Along with his suppoiteis, he
climbeu ovei the White Bouse fence.
Latei, Tashiev claimeu he was just
tiying to get to his woik.
The Couit pioceeuings lasteu foi
almost nine months, with some ciicles
claiming that this piolongation tuineu
the politicians into maityis, with theii
suppoiteis even willing anu intenuing
to establish a monument in theii
honoi. Accoiuing to Kyigyz political
analyst Naiat Kazakpayev, Tashiev can
now use his piison expeiience to
stiengthen his opposition cieuentials
anu become the majoi political foice
against the piesiuent. Be also noteu
that uue to the aiiest, Tashiev's
electoiate giew in numbeis anu the
iuling elite uiu not win anything fiom
the piocess.
Theie is no single opinion among the
countiy's political elite anu expeits to
link the iecent couit uecision to
ielease the opposition leaueis to the
iiots that bioke out last month again
ovei the fate of the golu mining
company iesulting in a numbei of
injuiies. The goveinment manageu to
appease the uemonstiatois by
piomising them to invest moie into
theii local infiastiuctuie anu to
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 22


impiove oiuinaiy people's lives. The
uniest escalateu anu quickly spieau
into the Southein pait of the countiy
as well, wheie the Ata-}uit Paity
enjoys significant suppoit. 0n Nay S1,
Ata-}uit Paity suppoiteis weie even
able to seize the local }alal-Abau main
auministiation builuing anu appointeu
theii own so calleu "people's
goveinoi," who was latei aiiesteu anu
ieleaseu uue to a blockage of the ioau
connecting the southein anu noithein
paits of the Kyigyz Republic.
Kenjebek Bokoyev, a membei of
pailiament fiom the Republic paity,
fiimly believes that the iecent couit
uecision was politically motivateu. Be
noteu that the uecision was taken in
light of the uemonstiations anu with
the objective of ensuiing stability in
the countiy. Some peiceive this
uecision to be a sign of the weakness of
the iuling elite, which fiom the
beginning uiu not have a cleai iuea of
how to hanule the case. Bow much the
cential authoiities hau to feai these
uemonstiations iemains uncleai, with
the countiy's piesiuent still making
claims in fiont of Tashiev suppoiteis
that he hau no contiol ovei the couit's
veiuict. Neanwhile, uuiing the fiist
piess confeience aftei his ielease,
Tashiev extenueu his giatituue to
Piesiuent Atambayev foi his suppoit
anu foi ensuiing the iule of law in the
countiy.
Local expeits anu analysts aie also
uiviueu in theii opinions ovei the
expecteu changes in the countiy's
political enviionment uue to this
ielease. Some expect incieaseu
stability while otheis anticipate
anothei season of political tuimoil.
0ne thing iemains cleai; the uigent
neeu to achieve political consensus by
all the paities involveu in oiuei to
pievent fuithei uestabilization, which
this time coulu put the question of
statehoou into jeopaiuy. This
consensus will uepenu on the civic
iesponsibility of the political foices.


uE0RuIA' S EC0N0NY ST0PS uR0WINu
P3) ?)&),#-)

0n }une 28, the ueoigian state
statistics office (ueostat) announceu a
u peicent giowth of the countiy's ieal
uBP in Nay. The economic slowuown
staiteu in 2u12 Q4, accounting foi a
2.9 peicent inciease in }anuaiy, 2.1
peicent in Febiuaiy anu u.2 peicent in
Naich of 2u1S. Piioi to ueostat's
iepoit, the Euiopean Bank foi
Reconstiuction anu Bevelopment
(EBRB) anu the Inteinational
Nonetaiy funu (INF) uowngiaueu
theii 2u1S giowth foiecasts foi
ueoigia's economy fiom S peicent to S
peicent anu fiom 6 peicent to 4
peicent, iespectively.
In its latest Regional Economic
Piospects iepoit, EBRB suggesteu that
the lack of investment flows plus post-
election political unceitainty leu to a
slowuown of the economy since the
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 2S


enu of 2u12. The iepoit assesseu the
iestoiation of ueoigian-Russian tiaue
optimistically, assuming that the move
woulu contiibute to an augmentation
of ueoigia's expoits ovei time.
The INF mission's iepoit examines the
ieasons anu implications of the
ueceleiation at a moie funuamental
level. It says that fiom 2u1u to the fiist
half of 2u12, the economy has been
giowing iapiuly at an aveiage iate of 7
peicent but staiteu to slow in 2u12 QS,
ieuucing the uBP giowth to 4 peicent
in 2u1S, but coulu iecovei to aiounu 6
peicent fiom next yeai onwaius.
The iepoit explains that uneasy
piocuiement pioceuuies anu financial
uifficulties in the constiuction sectoi
have ieuuceu goveinment spenuing
anu public consumption ieflecteu in a
consequent uecline of the inflation
iate, uomestic uemanu as well as foou
anu eneigy piices. As a iesult, in 2u1S
the ievenue has been ieuuceu by
almost 1 peicent of uBP anu is now in
neeu of a consistent monetaiy anu
fiscal policy plus impioveu claiity ovei
economic policies to ieveit the
economic iecoveiy piospects.
INF suppoits the National Bank of
ueoigia's (NBu) initiative to issue
goveinment tieasuiy bills anu
ueposits to encouiage long teim Laii
lenuing by banks anu make it easiei
foi them to access NBu funuing.
Bowevei, at the same time, the iepoit
suggests a ieuuction of the ieal
inteiest iate to stimulate cieuit giowth
that has fallen fiom Su peicent in 2u11
to 12 peicent in 2u1S. The othei
measuies pioposeu by the INF
mission incluue a piuuent ue-
uollaiization policy anu enlaigement
of the financial system thiough
auvancing the pension funus.
The iepoit signals an uigent necessity
in loweiing the cuiient account ueficit
which iemains one of the highest in
the iegion, aveiaging 11.S peicent of
uBP fiom 2u1u to 2u12. 0nless it is
limiteu to 6.S peicent, the countiy's
vulneiability to speculative capital oi
exteinal exchange iate shocks will be
extiemely high, given the fact that
ueoigia's gioss exteinal uebt has
ieacheu 8u peicent of uBP, the
uocument says.
In auuition, the mission ciiticizes
seveial steps taken by the new
goveinment leu by Piime Ninistei
Biuzina Ivanishvili. Among them aie
the piematuie announcements of
some policy initiatives such as the
newly auopteu Laboi Coue anu the
ieuuction of electiicity taiiffs that
loweieu the piofits of electiicity
uistiibution companies anu incieaseu
public unceitainty ovei the teims of
agieement ieacheu with them. The
INF mission assumes that the shift
may tiiggei conceins among potential
investois anu pievent theii entiy into
the eneigy sectoi.
Fuithei, the iepoit inuiiectly
questions the viability of vaiious
investment funus, such as the
Agiicultuial Bevelopment Funu anu
the Piivate Equity Funu, initiateu by
the goveinment. "While the intention
seems goou, the potential size of these
funus, unceitainty ovei theii scope,
anu possible piefeiential tieatment
coulu, inauveitently, uiscouiage
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 24


investment by otheis," the iepoit
says.
Piesiuent Nikheil Saakashvili insisteu
in a televiseu statement on }une 29
that the economic giowth figuies fiom
Nay uepicteu a "uisastious" state of
ueoigia's economy anu blameu the
goveinment foi faileu social-economic
policies. "Now it is time foi |PN
Ivanishvili] to make a laige-scale
investment of his own money into
ueoigia's economy," he saiu.
In iesponse Ivanishvili ueclaieu on
}uly S that the capital of a co-
investment funu woulu stait
opeiating in a few months, which
coulu amount to 0S$ 6 billion
incluuing a contiibution of 0S$ 1
billion fiom the PN peisonally. "Theie
will not be any pioblems with money
... the main obstacle is the lack of
piojects," he saiu
Wheieas a laige flow of investment is
instiumental in iealizing ueoigia's
economic potential, the countiy's
economy uisplays some peculiai
featuies. The majoi uiivei of ueoigia's
economy has been iising consumption
iathei than giowing piouuction
capacity. The total amount of piivate
anu public consumption ieaches 9u
peicent of ueoigia's uBP. In tuin, the
giowth of consumption has mostly
been encouiageu thiough piivate
ieimbuisement pioviueu by
emigiants. The amount of such
tiansfeis ieaches moie than 0S$ 1
billion annually.
This coulu be a ieason foi ueoigia's
inability ovei the last uecaue to
tianslate its economic giowth into
incieaseu employment. 0fficially, the
unemployment iate ieaches 1S-1S
peicent. Bowevei, accoiuing to polls
conuucteu by local anu foieign Nu0s,
7u peicent of the iesponuents
consiuei themselves to be
unemployeu.
In fact, uue to theii insufficient
income, self-employeu peisons who
constitute aiounu 6u peicent of the
laboi foice uo not ueem themselves
employeu. Noieovei, although S4
peicent of the laboi foice woiks in the
agiaiian sectoi, it contiibutes only 8
peicent of uBP.
Thus, a laige cash injection into the
economy will not in itself guaiantee
economic giowth. Insteau, ueoigia
neeus to conuuct a pioficient
uiagnosis of its scanty piouuction
capacity anu uevelop a moie piecise
vision foi how to uevelop sectois
wheie it has a compaiative auvantage.
Such an appioach, combineu with a
cautious fiscal anu monetaiy policy, is
neeueu if the announceu laige-scale
investment is to yielu tangible iesults
foi ueoigia's economy, anu if it is
ieally intenueu to piouuce
commeicial iathei than political
piofits.



"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 2S


N0LB0vAN 0NB0BSNAN 0NBER FIRE AFTER
C0NTR0vERSIAL SPEECB IN ARNENIA
X-&) X/()547)

A uiplomatic scanual has evolveu
aiounu a comment maue by Noluova's
0mbuusman at an inteinational
confeience in Yeievan, accusing
Aimenia of committing an act of
"genociue" against Azeiis uuiing the
Nagoino-Kaiabakh wai. The fact that
the chaiges weie put foiwaiu in
Aimenia's National Assembly was
consiueieu uisiespectful to the host
countiy anu causeu calls foi the
0mbuusman's iesignation.
Noluova's 0mbuusman Auielia
uiigoiiu aiiiveu in Yeievan to
paiticipate in the Pan-Euiopean
Confeience on Euiopean stanuaius of
the iule of law anu limits of the
authoiities' uiscietion in the membei-
states of the Council of Euiope. In hei
speech on iespect foi human iights in
aieas of fiozen conflicts on }uly 4, she
calleu Aimenia an "aggiessoi" that
"occupieu 2u peicent of Azeibaijan's
teiiitoiy" anu caiiieu out an "ethnic
puige towaius the Azeibaijani
population in both Aimenia anu the
occupieu teiiitoiies," followeu by a
"genociue act in the Azeibaijani town
of Khojaly in Febiuaiy, 1992."
uiigoiiu's speech, ie-publisheu by
Bay.az on }uly 8 fiom hei Facebook
page, ieaus that ".the aggiession of
Aimenia against Azeibaijan became
the biggest impeuiment to
uevelopment in the South Caucasus
iegion anu its integiation to Euiope."
Such a "uiplomatic" mistake coulu cost
uiigoiiu hei post. The speakei of the
Noluovan pailiament Igoi Koiman
tolu jouinalists in Chisinau that "the
statement of Auielia uiigoiiu is an
inaumissible, seiious mistake. By no
means can a pailiamentaiian auvocate
allow such a statement that uamages
the image of Noluova." Be stiesseu
that uiigoiiu's statement uoes not
ieflect the official position of Chisinau
anu that Noluova neeus to builu
constiuctive ielations with both
Aimenian anu Azeibaijan.
At a news confeience upon hei ietuin
to Noluova, uiigoiiu stateu that hei
speech was baseu on the iesolutions of
the 0N Secuiity Council ielateu to the
Nagoino-Kaiabakh conflict anu that
she "uiu not want to huit anyone's
feelings . my aim was to uiaw
attention to violations of human iights
in conflict zones to pievent similai
events in the futuie."
Aimenian politicians pioviueu the
stoiy with a new uimension by
claiming that uiigoiiu was seiving the
inteiests of Azeibaijan. "To be iealistic,
we can say that she has been biibeu,"
Kiio Nanoyan, a iepiesentative of the
Aimenian Revolutionaiy Feueiation
fiom the Bashnaktsutyun Paity, tolu
Aysoi.am on }uly 9. In an inteiview
with Panoiama.am on }uly S, the vice-
Speakei of Aimenia's National
Assembly Eimine Nagualyan saiu the
iuea of the Noluovan 0mbuusman's
speech "was actually inteiesting as
Aimenians sitting in the pailiament
eithei hau to biing a counteiblow anu
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 26


look intoleiant anu unuemociatic in
fiont of the inteinational community
oi they hau to keep silent, leaving
absolutely uiity conuemnations
without iesponse. In both cases, the
authois of the iuea coulu feel satisfieu."
Immeuiately aftei uiigoiiu's speech in
pailiament, Nagualyan ietoiteu by
saying that she believeu uiigoiiu
aiiiveu in Aimenia with "a uelibeiate
puipose" anu stiesseu that hei speech
was given accoiuing to "an oiuei anu,
moieovei, it was paiu."
uiigoiiu also conuemneu Nagualyan as
the issue escalateu. In an inteiview to
1news.az, uiigoiiu saiu that "The vice-
speakei of the Aimenian pailiament
actually tiiggeieu this whole scanual at
the inteinational confeience anu
staiteu the tantium fiist ... If Aimenia
claims that it is a countiy, a ueveloping
uemociacy, anu welcomes the fieeuom
of speech anu expiession, the officials
of this countiy shoulu not have
escalateu the situation." uiigoiiu
uenieu all allegations that she woulu
have been biibeu by Azeibaijan: "This
is a lie. Such actions of Aimenia aie
nothing but a cheap PR maneuvei."
uiigoiiu saiu she was not alloweu by
Aimenian authoiities to go to the
aiipoit togethei with the iest of the
Noluovan uelegation: ".4u minutes
befoie the flight, the uiivei of the cai,
sent by the oiganizeis of the
confeience, saiu that he woulu not
allow me in . I stayeu in the hotel anu
began to contact the Ninistiy of
Foieign Affaiis of Noluova eveiy Su
minutes . Some people weie
attempting to get to me, but the hotel
staff iestiicteu the access . the
woikeis of the hotel ensuieu my
safety." Accoiuing to uiigoiiu, the
Aimenian authoiities uemanueu that
she apologize publicly foi hei speech,
but she iefuseu to uo so. She left the
hotel accompanieu by iepiesentatives
of the Embassies of ueoigia anu
Romania.
The scanual was pickeu up by
Azeibaijani officials who geneially
piaiseu the "biave" statement of the
Noluovan iepiesentative. Elnui
Aslanov, Chief of the Piesiuential
Auministiation's Political Analysis anu
Infoimation Piovision Bepaitment,
saiu that "The ieaction of the
Aimenian siue to the faii statement of
the Noluovan Pailiamentaiy Auvocate
on the Khojaly genociue, the
peisecution anu piessuie on Auielia
uiigoiiu in Yeievan showeu the
Aimenian goveinment's teiioiism
policy," accoiuing to Azeibaijan's APA
agency.
Aslanov calleu on Euiopean
institutions to expiess theii positions
on the issue: "If any citizen's iights aie
violateu in anothei countiy, membeis
of the Euiopean Pailiament shoulu
iesponu to the issue. The Euiopean
Pailiament shoulu uemonstiate its
suppoit foi the piotection of human
iights anu not puisue a policy of
uouble stanuaius."
The Executive Secietaiy of the iuling
Yeni Azeibaijan Paity Ali Ahmauov
calleu uiigoiiu's speech a "veiy biave"
step. "Fiist of all, it is a moial victoiy
foi uiigoiiu. It is a victoiy of couiage
anu justice. The act of the Noluovan
0mbuusman shoulu be an example foi
iepiesentatives of inteinational
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 1 )-2-*% 3456 27


oiganizations, who aie useu to voice
statements in Baku that woulu be
favoieu by Azeibaijanis anu speak the
language of Aimenians in Yeievan. We
must stop this piactice, which
complicates the piocess of settlement
|of the Nagoino-Kaiabakh conflict]",
Ahmauov saiu. Be auueu the 0SCE
Ninsk uioup co-chaiis in paiticulai
shoulu follow uiigoiiu's example.
Neanwhile, the Aimenian Biaspoia in
Noluova uemanueu uiigoiiu's
iesignation befoie hei pailiamentaiy
manuate foimally expiies in thiee
months, but the Noluovan
Pailiament's Commission on Buman
Rights uiu not come to this conclusion
aftei uiscussing the issue.
The issue uiu not affect Aimenian
Piesiuent Seizh Saigsyan's visit to
Chisinau on }uly 11, when the siues
stiesseu the "impoitance of closei
coopeiation" anu signeu two
inteigoveinmental agieements.


Central Asia-Caucasus
Analyst

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THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing
Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is
the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the
Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or
submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published
in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports
published in The Analyst, described below.
The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and
trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have
a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does
affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news
from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources.
Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also
must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event.
Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since
Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of
information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The
Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues.
The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to
reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of
the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the
correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field
report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted
article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears
giving reference to the contracted articles first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines:
Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather
than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete
examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows:
KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses.
BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to
the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population.
IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable,
implications for the local peoples future.
CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the
implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid
structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analysts pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential
writers, please send your CV to: <scornell@jhu.edu> and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell
Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University
1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA.
Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 12 )-3-*% 1425 3

NORTH CAUCASIAN FIGHTERS JOIN
SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Emil Souleimanov

In mid-July, the Chechen Republics President Ramzan Kadyrov admitted that
Chechens have taken part in the Syria civil war on the side of the Free Syrian
Army (FSA), allegations that he categorically denied one year ago.
Simultaneously, the formal leader of the Caucasus Emirate Doku Umarov reversed
his stance on the participation of Chechens in Syria. Umarov has earlier appealed
to Chechen and North Caucasian youth to refrain from joining the Syria jihad and
instead fight the infidels in their native land, but has now expressed his support
for North Caucasian jihadists going to Syria, with the ultimate goal for them to
return and join the insurgency upon their return from the Middle East.

BACKGROUND: The statements of
both rival leaders suggest that the
participation of Chechens, as well as
other North Caucasians, in the Syrian
civil war has gained momentum in recent
months, a fact that many foreign
observers have increasingly pointed out.
According to some estimates, hundreds
of North Caucasians along with natives
of Central Asian republics, particularly
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and to a lesser
extent the Volga-Ural region and
Azerbaijan have been fighting on Syrian
battlefields, with Chechens and
Dagestanis in the numerical lead.
Recently, Andrei Konin, the head of the
FSBs regional branch, admitted that
about 200 residents of Dagestan are
currently in Syria, most of which are
fighting alongside the rebels. The actual
number of Chechens is likely even
higher. The majority of post-Soviet
Muslims recruited to the Syrian jihad
come from their respective native
countries. However, due to strict
surveillance and a threat of collective
punishment for insurgents and their
family members imposed by the pro-
Moscow Chechen authorities as part of
the highly controversial
counterinsurgency policy within the
republic, the majority of Chechen
fighters stem either from among the
ethnic Chechen community in northern
Georgia, Chechen diaspora groups in
Europe (particularly Norway, France,
Austria, and Poland), or Chechen
students of Islamic theology in the
Middle Eastern countries.
The increasing numbers of North
Caucasian fighters have been paralleled
by a growing inflow into Syria of
mujahedeen from across the Islamic
world, not least from Arab countries and
Turkey. This illustrates the increasing
appeal of the Syria jihad, whilst
multiplying reports of inhuman treatment
of innocent people at the hands of the
Assad forces and pro-regime militia has
caught the imagination of pious Sunni
Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia.
Accordingly, anger toward the Putin
regimes blatant support of the
Assadites along with the brutal
counterinsurgency practices in the North
Caucasus seems to play a leading role
among the North Caucasian volunteers
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 12 )-3-*% 1425 4

who decide to join the Free Syrian Army
(FSA).
Post-Soviet insurgents usually form
distinct groups fighting on their own with
leaders stemming from their native areas,
and the extent of cooperation with the
FSA varies significantly from group to
group. As a rule, North Caucasian
volunteers are inclined to acting on their
own, showing relatively little
subordination to the FSAs divided
leadership, even some of their units have
recently started to merge with the FSAs
unified battalions. This is the case of the
recently formed Jaish al-Muhajireen
corps, which is composed of the mostly
Arab Hattab and Jaish brigades and the
mostly Chechen Muhajireen Brigade.
On average, the North Caucasian fighters
are regarded as more professional,
experienced and well-equipped than
Syrian fighters. They have earned a
reputation as fierce warriors and hence
enjoy respect among the international
network of jihadi fighters, even though
their involvement has sometimes sparked
controversy among the local population.
IMPLICATIONS: According to some
local sources, a quite effective network
of Salafi activists has recently been
established in Russia with the aim of
coordinating the recruitment of North
Caucasian, Central Asian, and Tatar
fighters to Syrian battlefields. They are
increasingly adopting a virtual mode of
operation. In this regard, a Russian media
outlet has recently alleged that Salman
Bulgar, also known as Ayrat Vahitov, an
ethnic Tatar originally from Naberezhnie
Chelny in Tatarstan who is himself a
Salafi with military experience from the
Afghanistan war, is considered one of the
recruitment officers in charge of
headhunting through internet resources,
running a Facebook profile and several
other virtual resources as a sort of
recruitment department. Yet sources
believe that some sort of
recommendation is still needed for the
application to be taken seriously by the
recruitment officers. In order to
prevent Russian agents from infiltrating
the recruitment process as well as fraud,
the potential recruits usually need some
previous experience with membership in
Salafi communities and thus a
recommendation from the leaders of
those communities. However, other
sources assert that such activities cannot
take place without at least surveillance
by the Russian secret services.
Indeed, at the time being, the Russian
authorities appear to avoid impeding the
process of recruitment, although
according to some sources, they routinely
monitor the activities of the Salafi
activists in the Internet and elsewhere. It
seems that their major aim is to allow for
would-be Jihadists to travel from Russia
in relatively large numbers to ensure they
do not join the ongoing insurgency in the
North Caucasus or the Volga-Ural area,
which would aggravate the security of
the forthcoming Olympics in Sochi.
Albeit enabling the transfer of young
Russia-based Jihadists to Syria possibly
suits Moscows interests in the short
term, this will potentially create a serious
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 12 )-3-*% 1425 5

problem for Russian authorities after the
civil war in Syria is over and the
jihadists, trained in guerilla warfare, will
seek to return to their homeland in
Russias predominantly Muslim areas
with the ultimate aim of continuing the
jihad. It will hence be crucial for Russian
authorities to either prevent their return
to Russia or imprison them on arrival. On
the other hand, a part of the jihadists are
likely to die on Syrian battlefields, which
could be another explanation for
Moscows relaxed attitude towards the
engagement of North Caucasians in the
conflict. Russian authorities have
seemingly concluded that the
outmigration of jihadists from the
country will reduce the vitality of the
domestic insurgency.
Some sources claim that experienced
jihadists are likely to travel also to areas
like Afghanistan and Iraq in an effort to
carry out Jihad. This could help
destabilizing West-supported regimes in
both countries and constitute a relative
blow to U.S. interests, which might also
suit Moscows agenda of weakening U.S.
positions in those key areas. The fact that
the Russian secret services routinely
record the identities of Russian citizens
traveling abroad is crucial for effectively
hampering their return to Russia.
CONCLUSIONS: The involvement of
North Caucasian fighters in the Syrian
war is also sponsored by Persian Gulf
countries. Moscows concerted efforts to
disable international support for the
Sunni insurgents, its material support for
the Assad regime, and the growing
number of Iran-backed and Moscow-
approved Shia fighters in the war have
infuriated the sheikhs who have become
eager to provide solid support for the
North Caucasus insurgency, centered on
logistical issues. Salafi activists obtain
financial resources from Gulf countries,
most notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
that enable the fighters to travel to
Turkey and then cross the Turkish-Syrian
border to join the ranks the FSA. Money
is usually transported from Istanbul to
Moscow, Rostov-na-Donu, Kazan and
some other Russian cities through a
network of agents, some of whom pose
as Turkish or Russian businessmen.
Given the deterioration of relations
between certain Gulf countries and
Russia, the forces of the Caucasus
Emirate might in the foreseeable future
enjoy solid financial support and
possibly also a safe haven from the
sheikhs. Along with the hundreds of
experienced fighters that will soon seek
to return to the North Caucasus, this
might pose a serious threat to Moscows
interests in the region in general, and
Russias internal security in particular.
AUTHORS BIO: Emil Souleimanov is
Associate Professor with the Department
of Russian and East European Studies,
Charles University in Prague, Czech
Republic. He is the author
of Understanding Ethnopolitical
Conflict: Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia Wars
Reconsidered (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, forthcoming 2013) and An
Endless War: The Russian-Chechen
Conflict in Perspective (Frankfurt am
Main: Peter Lang, 2007).


"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 12 )-3-*% 1425 6

RUSSIA PRESSURES ARMENIA TO JOIN
CUSTOMS UNION
Stephen Blank

The centerpiece of current Russian foreign policy is integrating as many post-
Soviet states as possible in what will ultimately be a Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU). The first step of this process is to join a Customs Union and Russia is
bringing enormous pressure to bear upon Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and
now Armenia to join. It is being made clear to these states that if they join the EEU
or what Moscow calls EURASEC, they will not be able to join other trade
organizations, e.g. those inherent in the EUs Eastern Partnership. While most
publicity has focused on Ukraine, recent Russian policy towards Armenia is no
less revealing of Moscows tactics and goals.

BACKGROUND: Armenia has recently
announced that drawing closer to the EU
and signing an Association Agreement
with Brussels are its main priorities.
Once Armenia made that announcement
Moscow drew up its heavy artillery.
Even though EU Commissioner for
Enlargement and the European
Neighborhood, Stefan Fule, stated that
this Association Agreement would not
affect Armenias deep cooperation with
Russia who has a military base and
extensive military deployment in
Armenia and controls its energy policy,
Moscow announced its opposition to that
integration with Europe. Vyacheslav
Kovalenko, Russias former Ambassador
to Armenia, warned that Armenia would
get few tangible benefits from the
agreement with the EU while risking
alienating Russia because the
Association Agreement would preclude
Armenias entry into the Eurasian
Economic Community and its Customs
Union. Signing the agreement with
Brussels would place boundaries
between Russia and Armenia and lead to
the withering of the current allied
relations.
Meanwhile Gazprom simultaneously
announced its intention to acquire all the
shares in the majority-owned Armenian
natural gas distribution company rather
than simply retain its 80 percent holding
of those shares as is presently the case
and extinguish any leverage that
Armenia might have as a result. As part
of its demands for Armenian entry into
the Customs Union, Moscow announced
plans for a 60 percent gas price rise. It
settled for an 18 percent rise but even
that might become excessively onerous
for Armenia which almost totally
depends on Russian energy.
Yet, Russias support is crucial if
Armenia wants to hold onto Nagorno-
Karabakh, where Russia has also,
through arms sales to both Armenia and
Azerbaijan, demonstrated that it plays
both sides against the middle to
perpetuate that conflict and its ensuing
leverage in the Caucasus. Not
surprisingly, Armenias political
opposition has strongly denounced
Russias pressure on Armenia and the
potential giveaway of Armenias
remaining stake in its gas distribution
network. It should also be clear to
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 12 )-3-*% 1425 7


outside observers that Moscow has
sought to bring similar pressures upon
Kyiv to give up control of its distribution
network to Russia in return for
membership in the Customs Union. Such
a deal, even if it briefly led to lower gas
prices (and experience shows that this
does not, in fact, happen) would also
mean the effective renunciation of
Ukraines (and Armenias)
independence. Such tactics clearly
explain these states resistance to Russia
and Gazprom, albeit with varying
degrees of success. These tactics also
show the similarity across geography of
Moscows tactical use of energy to
blackmail states it believes should be in
its thrall.
IMPLICATIONS: Moscows two
abiding goals are to integrate the entire
post-Soviet space under its domination
and as part of that larger multi-
dimensional process, ensure that it is the
only security manager in the Caucasus.
Not only is it now using energy
blackmail against Armenia; it has
consistently tried to maintain the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at a
simmering level by providing large-scale
military assistance to both Armenia and
Azerbaijan to ensure its domination of
any processes connected with conflict
resolution there. But Russias Caucasus
games do not end there. Leaving aside its
determination to enforce an amputation
of Georgias territorial integrity and
sovereignty upon Tbilisi, it is projecting
its power against Azerbaijan as well even
if Azerbaijan has announced on June 28
that Azerbaijani gas will go to Europe
through the Trans-Adriatic pipeline and
not through Gazprom.
Despite Bakus June 28 announcement,
apparently fearing Russian intervention
in the October 2013 presidential
elections, Azerbaijan made unbelievable
promises to Rosneft about having it
explore for oil in Azerbaijan, on land and
in the Caspian Sea. When Moscow
hosted a summit for countries exporting
gas and did not invite Baku it thus sent
an unmistakable signal that was
understood along with its ability and past
willingness to interfere in Azerbaijans
domestic politics at a sensitive time.
Bakus moves show the power residing
in Russian energy firms that goes beyond
the Russian Federations borders. But it
also reflects the Azerbaijani reaction to
Moscows more or less unveiled fist
displayed in the Caucasus.
Although the EU has stated its support
for Armenias efforts to broaden its
foreign policy, something more is needed
if Armenia is to be able to stand up to
Russian pressure. We must understand
what will ensue if Yerevan cannot do so.
Becoming ever more dependent upon
Russia, Armenia will then be unable to
move on its own accord either to break
the impasse on Nagorno-Karabakh
peacefully with Azerbaijan or to
effectuate much needed domestic
democratizing economic and political
reforms. This means continued
backwardness, authoritarian governance,
and dependence upon Russia as both a
protector and model. At the same time
"#$%&'( )*+',"'-.'*-* )$'(/*%0 12 )-3-*% 1425 8

the state of high tension around Nagorno-
Karabakh with both sides rearming and
constant skirmishes occurring will
continue. And further conflict could then
break out, especially if there is no
movement towards resolution. Only
Russia benefits from both this tension
and the potential of actual conflict.
Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia gains
anything from it. If anything, their
economic-political development and
freely chosen integration into Europe is
impeded by such trends. In domestic
politics, the preservation of Putin-like
regimes throughout may be seen as a
boon to Russia but actually this
represents a major and ongoing threat to
peace for everyone, including those
regimes.
The Caucasus then becomes not just a
hotbed of potential regional conflicts and
of stagnant regimes that could easily give
rise to major domestic upheavals given
the widespread demonstrations against
governments in Greece, Turkey, Egypt,
Syria, and potentially other nearby
countries. It also remains one of the most
militarized areas of the world because of
the very large and continuing Russian
buildup here since 2008 which has not
enhanced security but rather Russian
domination. Indeed, Russian domination
of any region in the CIS immediately
lowers the level of security enjoyed by
the local governments there, hardly a
situation that any of them could want. In
view of the repercussions of the
Georgian-Russian war of 2008 that
spread far beyond Georgia, the prospect
of renewed strife and instability in the
Caucasus is not one that should be
viewed with complacency and/or
equanimity.
CONCLUSIONS: Until now, the United
States and Europe have essentially
pursued a policy of neglect in the
Caucasus, all of whose implications are
malign as we can see from local trends in
the security of the South Caucasus. More
recently, in her confirmation testimony to
be Assistant Secretary of State for
Europe and Eurasia, Victoria Nuland
inveighed against the policy of doing
nothing to resolve the frozen conflicts
not just Nagorno-Karabakh that
continue around the Black Sea to include
Georgias conflicts and Moldova. One
hopes that these remarks are not just
rhetoric and actually betoken an
American realization that allowing
Russian domination of the Caucasus and
taking a hands off policy towards the
areas conflicts a policy that is really
two sides of the same coin undermines
regional security, makes conflict all the
more likely, impedes democratization as
well as the integration of local
governments into Europe and thus
contradicts the national interests not only
of these states but also of the U.S.
In this regard, Russias unceasing
employment of the tactics of energy
blackmail and its attempt to force all of
its neighbors into an economic and
ultimately political union neither benefits
them, nor the West. Worse yet Moscows
tactics would force all of its neighbors
into accepting long-term backwardness
and dependence upon a criminalized an
increasingly economically incapable
Russia.
The practical question is whether the
West will step up and expose Russian
economic and political machinations for
what they are and thus counter them or
let another opportunity slip. As the
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history of the CIS over the last few years
should remind us, opportunities to bolster
the standing of the new post-Soviet
states, once surrendered or lost, cannot
be regained and then both they and the
West pay the price for that malign
neglect.
AUTHORS BIO: Stephen Blank is
Professor at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College. The
views expressed here do not represent
those of the U.S. Army, Defense
Department, or the U.S. Government.

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SHOULD KYRGYZSTAN SEARCH FOR
INVESTORS AT HOME?
Rafis Abazov and Talaibek Koichumanov

The Kyrgyz government has announced new initiatives aiming to attract foreign direct
investments (FDIs) into the Kyrgyz national economy. The country needs significant
resources to deal with chronic mass unemployment especially high among rural youth
as well as widespread poverty and an aging manufacturing infrastructure. Yet, the
experience of some developing countries, such as Bangladesh, India and China, suggests
that help might be much closer than politicians think: in the so-called Bamboo Capitalism,
diaspora-sponsored business development. According to various estimates, the rapidly
growing Kyrgyz diaspora and domestic Kyrgyz businesses keep between US$ 1 and US$ 3
billion in foreign accounts, properties, businesses and equities. Can Kyrgyzstan utilize this
unique opportunity to revive its national economy?

BACKGROUND: Kyrgyz government
officials have announced a number of
measures to attract FDIs into its
struggling economy. For the last 35
years the national economy has been
experiencing very tough times due to the
impact of the global financial crisis and
increasing competition in the region for
investments. The impact has been felt in
such diverse sectors as tourism and the
garment industry. The country
experienced an almost 20 percent decline
in FDIs from US$ 438 million in 2010 to
US$ 391 in 2011 (World Bank est.). It
needs to at least double the inflow of
investments and technologies in order to
achieve the necessary level of economic
growth to create jobs for its growing
population and to meet the demand for
spending on national programs. The
budget situation is so tight that
government officials in Bishkek have
been discussing the possibility of
shutting down several ministries.
The economic difficulties and dim
prospect of positive economic change are
putting a huge pressure on the population
to migrate. Indeed Kyrgyzstan has
emerged as one of the top migrant-
sending countries in the CIS zone along
with neighboring Tajikistan. Estimates
vary but experts put the numbers
anywhere between 300,000 and one
million people; an additional 80,000 to
120,000 people are involved each year in
seasonal migration. In fact an entire
generation of school and university
graduates sees their future outside of
their own country, regularly filling
foreign-language schools across a
linguistic spectrum ranging from Russian
and English to Korean and Japanese
and often citing a future career abroad as
their first choice in school essays.
Migration is a very controversial topic in
Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, a
significant number of educated and
highly-skilled young professionals have
left or are leaving the country. On the
other hand, these migrants have begun
contributing to the economic
development of Kyrgyzstan in a very
different way by sending home
remittances. According to World Bank
estimates, remittances in Kyrgyzstan
reached US$ 1379.3 million or 28
percent of the countrys GDP in 2010, up
from US$ 112.7 million in 2003.
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Migrants began sending remittances
home during the 1990s, but over the last
few years the country has experienced a
steep rise in remittances through both
legal banking transfers and informal
channels similar to havala informal
money transfer services popular in South
Asia and the Middle East.
IMPLICATIONS: Already for several
years the government of Kyrgyzstan has
been struggling to keep budget and
financial stimulus tools balanced. Many
developing countries use a variety of
public policy and economic tools to
increase their competitiveness and
stimulate economic activities to jump-
start national economies. Unfortunately
Kyrgyzstan is still at the bottom of the
Global Competitiveness Index,
remaining in 126th place (out of 142) in
20112012.
And yet a visitor would be surprised to
see that the country is seemingly
booming. The capital Bishkek and
several large urban centers are
experiencing construction and consumer
booms. Construction companies are
completing new business offices,
apartment buildings, private houses and
large country residences (dachas), and
the streets are full of expensive cars
including large SUVs and limousines
imported directly from the U.S.
At the center of these activities are
vigorous private, family-funded small
entrepreneurs what some economists
call Bamboo Capitalists because like
bamboo they are small, flexible and
numerous.
However, a careful economic analysis
would reveal that most of the economic
activities are limited to consumption and
consumption-servicing sectors and are
financed almost entirely by the inflow of
remittances. Much of the construction
work is funded by private individuals and
is limited largely to housing, including
luxury housing.
The retail sector in the country is also
experiencing a mini-boom, with prices in
the major stores such as Tsum and Beta-
Mall catching up with prices in energy-
rich capitals such as Astana, Baku and
Moscow. Businessmen and women
complain that they have no choice but to
invest in short-term consumer markets,
as they are not sure about the security of
long-term investments in manufacturing
and agriculture. Experts inside and
outside the country hotly debate the
impact of all these remittances on the
economic development of Kyrgyzstan.
Some argue that the large-scale
remittances have a significant distorting
effect on receiving countries as they
exclusively stimulate consumption.
Others argue that there is also a
significant positive impact on the
economic dynamics through stimulating
domestic consumption as well as
contributing to the growth of the service
sector and creating jobs.
CONCLUSIONS: Extended-family
Bamboo businesses, funded by
relatives through remittances, have been
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increasingly talking about the
deterioration of the business environment
and increasing risks and red tape. For
example, Kyrgyzstan declined from 41st
position in 2010 to 69th position in 2013
in the World Banks Doing Business
Ranking. Some businesses have been
closed or have downsized their activities
and even started investing in other
countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that Kyrgyz entrepreneurs have begun
investing in neighboring Kazakhstan,
Russia and even such distant places as
the Baltic States and the Czech Republic.
The classic case of sustainable economic
development for developing and least-
developed countries is about using the
right combination of financial and policy
tools to stimulate a positive and dynamic
business environment. The government
of Kyrgyzstan should prioritize core
sectors and provide legal protection and
more transparent taxation initiatives for
diaspora investors and treat them as
foreign investors. It should also consider
a greater use of free economic zones, not
only to attract foreign direct investments
but also investments from the Kyrgyz
diaspora. Representatives of the Kyrgyz
government do maintain contacts with
the Kyrgyz community in various
countries, but fail to work systematically
on business and investment issues with
them. The government also needs to
develop the national strategy to support
and stimulate the development of the
SME sector and family businesses, and to
find financial and other stimuli to direct
remittances from pure consumption to
investment inflow reaching SMEs and
bringing know-how from successful
diaspora businesses in foreign countries.
AUTHORS BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD,
is a visiting professor at Al Farabi
Kazakh National University and a
director of Global Classroom Program.
He also teaches at SIPA, Columbia
University, NY. He is author most
recently of The Role of Think Tanks in
the Policy-Making Process in
Kazakhstan (2011). Talaibek
Koichumanov, PhD, is Head of the
Secretariat of Investment council under
the Kyrgyz government. He is author of
ten books on economic development in
Kyrgyzstan, including Kyrgyzstan: The
Path Forward (2005). He is a former
Minister of Economy and Minister of
Finance of Kyrgyzstan.

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THE DOHA PROCESS AND
AFGHANISTANS FUTURE
Naveed Ahmad

The Taliban finally have an address, far from their power base in Afghanistan. The
place, commonly referred to as the Taliban Embassy by Doha taxi drivers, is
receiving mixed reactions. After its opening on June 18, Pakistan welcomed the
decision; India expressed caution that the office may confer legitimacy to the
terrorist group while China found the development as encouraging and positive
progress. Afghan President Hamid Karzai continues to stall the tripartite talks
besides putting on hold a fourth round of negotiations on the status-of-forces
agreement (SOFA) with the U.S.

BACKGROUND: Not every
commander and foot soldier of the
Taliban militia is ready to accept
negotiations with the U.S. or its allied
Karzai regime, although this may change
whenever the negotiations begin and
more information trickles down the ranks
of the Taliban. The first formal round of
negotiations among the U.S.,
Afghanistans High Peace Council and
the Taliban may not result in a
breakthrough.
The Talibans interest in a negotiated
settlement can be gauged from the fact
that its Supreme Commander Mulla
Omar has appointed none other than his
brother-in-law and spokesman Mulla
Mohammad Omar Tayyab Agha as top
negotiator in the Qatari capital. The
militias former ambassador in Saudi
Arabia Maulvi Shahabuddin Dilawar,
alongside some key commanders, forms
a multi-faceted negotiation team. The
entourage has been in Qatar since
January 3, 2012, holding several rounds
of talks with U.S. delegations, without
any major breakthrough. Meanwhile,
their wives have enjoyed the time in
cosmopolitan Doha malls and restaurants
while their children attended modern
schools and colleges.
Since U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton coined the term good Taliban,
negotiators and diplomats have had
scores of rollercoaster rides. For the
U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, the
primary goal was to defeat and disable
the militia, a disastrous failure across the
country including the Afghan capital.
U.S. commanders then requested troop
reinforcements in the so-called surge and
zoned the countrys troubled regions
based on insurgent groups. This did win
partial success but at a slow speed and a
high price. Exhausting all other options,
the U.S. chose to do the right thing. The
Taliban are now recognized as legitimate
stakeholders. By actively engaging
Pakistans Chief of Army Staff General
Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry could gain what Clinton
failed to achieve owing to a catastrophic
decline in relations between Islamabad
and Washington.
A confident Taliban team has now added
leverage particularly after Afghan
President Karzais outbursts against the
U.S. administration, NATO and Pakistan.
Mulla Omars men have already tested
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the patience of U.S. and Qatar by
hoisting their white flag and branding the
office as the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. The symbols were removed
on the request of Qatars government.
The Taliban may be following the outline
of a draft reconciliation agreement
prepared in 1996 during Benazir Bhuttos
government in Pakistan. Islamabad was a
go-between then as well but short-sighted
U.S. policies underestimated the militias
resilience besides miscalculating the
strength of warlords allied with
Washington.
The content of the negotiations reveals
that the Taliban had limited connection
with al-Qaeda while Osama bin Laden
was invited to Kabul from Khartoum by
none other than President Burhanuddin
Rabbani. The Taliban supreme leader had
even agreed to hand over bin Laden to
any neutral Muslim country such as
Turkey. The talks broke down as the U.S.
refused the offer and later opted to
fruitlessly fire cruise missiles. The
angered Taliban embraced Shaikh
Osama bin Laden and adopted a hard line
posture. Engaging the Taliban, again
with the help of Pakistan, the U.S.
demands are no different from what the
militia was offering 16 years ago.
IMPLICATIONS: The softening U.S.
position vis--vis the Taliban can be a
game-changer, even more so with
Pakistan onboard. The Afghan High
Peace Council (HPC), led by Salahuddin
Rabbani, has proven functional despite
the brutal murder of its chairman,
Burhanuddin Rabbani. While the U.S.,
the Taliban and the HPC are set to
engage with more contentious issues,
President Hamid Karzai is getting
increasingly isolated. With his second
and final presidential term ending next
year, Karzai has been desperate to
preserve the political office in his
vicinity. Intensive negotiations with
likely but temporary hiccups imply an
uncertain future for Hamid Karzai, who
has no supporters in Islamabad a much
bigger problem for Washington than for
New Delhi.
On the negotiating table, the U.S. will
push the Taliban to reject al-Qaeda,
accept an effective ceasefire in the wake
of a security handover, and to respect and
participate in the political process. The
Taliban, on the other hand, find the
existing political, bureaucratic and
military setup discriminatory against the
majority Pashtun population. The militia
will push for a greater role for the
marginalized ethnic segment.
The Taliban are eager to have five
Guantanamo prisoners released, i.e.
Mulla Fazal Akhund, Khairullah
Khairkhwa Noorullah Noori, Abdul Haq
Waseeq and Mohammad Nabi in
exchange for U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl
who has been in their custody since
2009. In a symbolic move, U.S. President
Obama has re-initiated the process for
closing Guantanamo. Pakistani media
reports that Islamabad has also facilitated
low profile interaction between the non-
Pashtun Northern Alliance and the
Taliban to strengthen the trust of all
stakeholders including the U.S.
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Once a serious bone of contention, the
Talibans Haqqani chapter is no longer
an irritant in Pakistan-U.S. relations but a
partner in the Doha peace talks, a
development that annoys President
Hamid Karzai as well as his ally New
Delhi. Pakistan will have to release more
Taliban prisoners on Afghanistans
request of as gesture of goodwill.
Islamabad has already freed 26 Afghan
prisoners belonging to the militia.
The opening of a Taliban office followed
by initial statements from both sides has
already started to benefit Pakistan.
Islamabad experiences reduced pressure
to carry out a military operation in the
restive semi-autonomous Waziristan
region. Instead, its army chief General
Kiani has called upon the internally
displaced persons to return home. With
the financial assistance of the United
Arab Emirates, a 50 kilometer road
linking its the regions two key cities,
Wana and Angoor Adda, has been
inaugurated while other healthcare and
education projects near completion.
Moreover, a smooth transition of power
in Afghanistan will help Pakistan tackle
its extremist problem in the tribal areas,
where Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has
safe havens and sympathizers.
The table is set for negotiations but the
real task of hammering out a power-
sharing formula has yet to be worked out.
Afghan President Karzai seems the most
uncertain variable, owing to his
insecurity with regard to a possible role
for Mulla Omar or his rival Abdullah
Abdullah. With Saudi Arabia and Qatar
being guarantors of the negotiations,
Pakistan and the Taliban have little
incentive to derail the process.
The sooner the Taliban categorically
distances itself from al-Qaeda, denounces
global terrorism and announces a
ceasefire, the greater the prospects for an
Afghan-led transition. The U.S. may
have to be patient in the wake of hardline
guerrilla attacks against its soldiers and
material for some time. The
reconciliation process has yet to take
roots and Pakistan, Afghanistan, the U.S.
and the Taliban must be watchful of any
provocations.
The SOFA will surely test the maturity of
the reconciliation process as other
stakeholders will not accept agreements
between President Karzai and the U.S.
and its allies. The likely presence of
troops in post-2014 Afghanistan is set to
become a tricky and divisive question in
the Doha talks.
CONCLUSIONS: The stalled Doha
process must be speeded up to end the
12-year-old Afghan war by late 2014. A
prolonged delay in resuming the Doha
process is bound to have serious
ramifications for NATOs withdrawal
plans. The U.S. Secretary of State has
already had talks with Afghanistan, India
and Pakistan on this issue. Washington
knows well that a suspension of talks is
advantageous to the Taliban. President
Karzai, however, has been trying to find
leverage over the issue ahead of the April
2014 presidential elections. Afghanistan
may confront a chaotic post-2014 future
unless stakeholders avoid hardline
posturing.
AUTHORS BIO: Naveed Ahmad is an
investigative journalist and academic,
focusing on security, diplomacy and
governance. He is founder of the
Afghanistan 2014 project. He can be
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reached at ideas@ideas360.org; and
Twitter @naveed360.


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TURKMENISTAN AND TURKEY LAUNCH
CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL PORT
Tavus Rejepova

On August 15, the Turkeys Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a
one-day visit to Turkmenistan to promote
Turkmen-Turkish cooperation and
development of the trade and tourism
industry. Alongside the visit, Prime
Minister Erdogan and President
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov
participated in a symbolic
groundbreaking ceremony of the
construction of the new international port
of Turkmenbashi on Turkmenistans
Caspian Sea coast.
A government delegation consisting of
Turkeys Economy Minister Zafer
Caglayan, Minister of Energy and
Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, as well
as representatives of major Turkish
businesses accompanied the Prime
Minister during the visit. Prior to his
arrival in Ankara, Erdogan was quoted as
saying that the volume of projects carried
out by Turkish companies in
Turkmenistan has reached US$ 35 billion
in total.
Turkeys Gap Insaat Company, owned
by Calik Group, was announced as the
general contractor for the design and
construction of the new international port
in Turkmenbashi. Ahmet Calik, owner of
Calik Group presented the sketches and
video slides of the estimated US$ 2
billion international port to President
Berdimuhamedov and Prime Minister
Erdogan. Turkmen media reported that
Gap Insaat was selected out of six other
major companies bidding for the project.
The new international port includes a
construction of ferry, passenger and
container terminals. In addition, the port
complex will have a general loading
terminal and a bulk cargo terminal, as
well as a ship building and repair facility
in accordance with International
Association Classification Societies
regulations. The total area of the seaport
is over 1.2 million square meters. The
new ports territory will also include
several coastal lines for transportation
services, such as 2,200-meter long
highways and 5,300-meter long railway
lines. The passenger terminal is going to
have a port hotel, trade and entertainment
centers as well as the local offices of
state migration and passport control
services. In order to protect the
environment of the Caspian Sea, bio-
treatment equipment will be installed in
each terminal as per the so-called Green
port international standards and
requirements.
The project is expected to be completed
by the end of 2017 and its
implementation is in line with President
Berdimuhamedovs general development
plan of the Turkmenbashi international
seaport and national merchant marine
fleet by 2020. Once completed, the
annual freight turnover at the port is
expected to grow to 25 million tons by
2020, compared to the current estimated
10 million tons. Gap Insaat is planning to
train the local specialists and operators in
how to manage and operate the new port
by international standards. President
Berdimuhamedov authorized the State
Service of Maritime and River Transport
of Turkmenistan to sign a separate
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contract with a German company Inros
Lackner AG for overseeing the progress
of work on the conceptual design and
construction of the Turkmenbashi
seaport.
Prime Minister Erdogans visit follows
Turkish President Abdullah Guls trip to
Turkmenistan on May 29-31 when the
two countries signed 12 bilateral
agreements in the fields of energy,
agriculture, sports and tourism. We
show much interest in modernizing the
Turkmenbashi seaport, Abdullah Gul
was quoted as saying during this visit in
May. Turkey and Turkmenistan had then
struck deals to deliver Turkmen gas to
Europe via Turkey, and also to export
600 million kW/h of Turkmen electricity
to Turkey through Iran annually starting
from July 1, 2013 to July 1, 2016.
Granting such a major project to a
Turkish company is also connected with
President Berdimuhamedovs last visit to
Turkey in August 2012 when he got
closely acquainted with the Turkish port-
construction know-how and service
infrastructure during tours of the ports in
Istanbul and Izmir.
Turkmenistan remains a leading market
for Turkish companies abroad in many
areas including the oil and gas sector,
transport and communications, power
generation, textile industry and
construction of apartment buildings,
plants, roads, bridges and resort areas.
Polimeks, Turkeys leading construction
company in Turkmenistan signed a US$
2.2 billion contract in early 2013 to build
a new modern airport in the capital city
Ashgabat and it is also building a three
phase, US$ 5 billion Olympic sports
complex in Ashgabat to be completed
before the 2017 Asian Indoor and Martial
Art Games. Currently, over 600 Turkish
companies are registered in
Turkmenistan and the trade turnover
between two countries in 2011 reached
over US$ 3.5 billion. Turkish companies
also hope that the Turkmen government
will let them participate in other major
projects such as the construction of the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan
railway.
Following the official ceremony over the
seaport, Berdimuhamedov and Erdogan
gave long speeches stressing that the new
Turkmenbashi seaport on the Caspian
Sea will become an important
transportation link fostering economic
and commercial ties between Asia and
Europe. However, while this project may
seem to be a major investment into the
countrys transportation sector, it will be
difficult to turn it into a busy
transportation hub in the future unless
there a sustainable service infrastructure
is developed on the ground.
















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KAZAKHSTAN BOOSTS ANTITERORIST POLICIES IN
RESPONSE TO GROWING THREATS
Georgiy Voloshin

On August 14, President Nazarbayev
adopted new procedures regarding the
notification of terrorist threats and the
coordination of antiterrorist activities by
competent state bodies. According to
these rules, threats are now divided into
three distinct categories each having its
own color: yellow for potential security
risks identified by law enforcement
authorities, orange for confirmed risks
and red for perpetrated terrorist attacks or
the possibility of repeated attacks. In an
interview to local media, the secretary of
the ruling party NurOtan, Erlan Karin,
said that Kazakhstans leadership had
previously acknowledged serious gaps in
the management of security risks,
including terrorist and extremist
activities.
On the same day, an Astana court
sentenced a group of five persons
accused of terrorism to different prison
terms ranging from five to ten years. As
the prosecution reported, they had
planned to stage bomb attacks directed
against the countrys key political figures
at the inauguration of Astanas new
Opera and Ballet Theater which opened
its doors to the public in late June.
Furthermore, the Palace of Peace and
Concord and the headquarters of the
National Security Committee (NSC) in
the capital could also have become
possible targets. The final goal of the
terrorist group was the destruction of the
current political system and the
establishment of an Islamic state in
Kazakhstan.
Earlier in August, Kazakhstans
Prosecutor Generals Office reported that
at least 75 members of the extremist
organization Tablighi Jamaat had been
identified in the country since the start of
the year. While the list of terrorist
organizations forbidden by Kazakhstani
authorities includes 15 structures,
Tablighi Jamaat has been mostly absent
from the criminal records in recent years
but remains a serious challenge to the
stability of Kazakhstans southern
neighbors, including Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. Despite repeated attempts to
set up regular security cooperation
among the Central Asian republics, each
of the five states mostly prefer to stick to
national measures. While the
forthcoming summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization scheduled for
mid-September is expected to further
boost the regional dimension,
Kazakhstan is already close to finalizing
its national antiterrorist strategy up to
2017.
According to the preliminary version of
this strategic document presented in May
2013 by the General Prosecutors Office,
over US$ 1.3 billion would be spent from
both national and regional budgets for
the financing of antiterrorist policies
including measures aimed to prevent the
spread of religious radicalism. This
strategy is in response to the worsening
statistics in recent years in terms of
combating terrorism and extremist
ideologies. Thus, the number of persons
sentenced to prison terms for their
participation in clandestine terrorist
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organizations increased from 27 in 2008
to 171 last year, whereas those preaching
religious extremism were only 56 in
2008 and almost 170 in 2012. The
government also plans to modernize the
equipment used by law enforcement
officers, spending over 30 percent of the
allotted funds on the purchase of new
technological and physical protection
solutions.
Furthermore, Nazarbayev decreed on
June 24 the establishment of a new
antiterrorist center which thus replaced a
similar structure created back in 1999 for
the purpose of coordinating Kazakhstans
response to terrorism under the authority
of the NSC. Henceforth, the antiterrorist
center will conduct its working meetings
on a regular basis with the participation
of the heads of 23 ministries and
agencies as well as regional governors
and the mayors of Astana and Almaty.
The first such meeting already took place
on July 10 and was chaired by the NSC
head, Nurtay Abykayev. The operation of
this refurbished coordination body will
also be complemented by regional
antiterrorist commissions accountable to
the governors and tasked with the
implementation of the national strategy
and its specific action plans.
While the Kazakhstani government is
increasingly focused on hard security
measures, the eradication of radicalism
also requires a strong social component
in order to tackle the very sources of
insecurity, such as chronic
unemployment or everyday injustices.
The Ministry of Regional Development
established in September 2012 is
officially in charge of spreading the
benefits of Kazakhstans economic
growth powered by oil and gas exports
across the country. However, the recent
economic troubles caused by the
decreasing global demand for some of
the raw materials and diminished tax
revenues have only aggravated wealth
disparities among Kazakhstani provinces.
Likewise, President Nazarbayevs
succession remains a major source of
uncertainty as far as Kazakhstans short-
and medium-term political prospects are
concerned. The potential loss of control
by the center over the regions dominated
by local elites and interest groups could
thus lead to more instability, since the
states capacity to cope effectively with
terrorist risks necessitates a strong
vertical of power and centralized
governance.


ARMENIA FACES TOUGH DECISION OVER
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT
Haroutiun Khachatrian

A peculiar situation has occurred in
Armenia as the opposition and many
non-politicians speak about external
threats that the country may face in the
near future. The issue under discussion is
the EUs Eastern Partnership program.
Armenia is a participant in that program
and talks with EU representatives on an
Association Agreement were
successfully concluded on July 24. This
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means that Armenia can initial its
Association Agreement at the Eastern
Partnership Vilnius summit in
November. Along with Armenia,
Georgia and Moldova can also initial
their agreements, while Ukraine expects
to sign its agreement at Vilnius. Belarus
and Azerbaijan were not involved in
talks at this stage.
In parallel, a customs agreement drafted
by Russia was presented to Armenia.
Previous signatories to this agreement
include Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan,
who are set to establish the Eurasian
Union by 2015. According to former
Russian Ambassador to Armenia
Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Armenias
membership in the Customs Union
excludes any Association Agreement
with the EU. Armenia has rejected its
membership in the Customs Union
saying that it has no common borders
with its current members.
Simultaneously, a public movement has
gained momentum in Armenia, claiming
that an agreement with the EU would
provoke Russia, Armenias most
important ally. Many Russian media
outlets publish articles claiming that
Armenia must not initiate an agreement
with the EU (even a largely economic
one), but there is not a single Russian
official among the authors of these
publications. Even Kovalenko was no
longer Ambassador and occupied the
post of deputy director of the Institute of
Caspian Cooperation at the time of the
interview. To fill this gap, discussion
participants in Armenia, both politicians
and analysts, present other facts that they
believe to be indirect indications of
worsening Armenian-Russian relations.
Firstly, Armenias strategic ally Russia
has recently sold weapons to Azerbaijan
worth over US$ 1 billion. Explanations
that the trade was strictly business, or
that the weapons will not shift the current
regional balance which is in Armenias
favor, are mostly ignored. Secondly,
some Russian officials, including
President Putin, state that Russia will
introduce stricter migration rules the end
of 2015. This will greatly affect
Armenia, whose population gets over one
third of its income from Russia. The fact
that Armenians constitute a minor part of
migrant workers in Russia, and that this
move should hence not be considered as
anti-Armenian is, again, largely ignored.
Thirdly, President Putin recently visited
Baku, while it is yet unknown whether he
will visit Yerevan.
Fourthly, Russian TV correspondents
frequently repeat that Hrachya
Harutyunyan is a citizen of Armenia.
Harutyunyan is suspected of causing a
serious car accident in Russia on July 13
in which 18 people were killed.
Armenian speakers were especially upset
by the fact that Harutyunyan was brought
to the courtroom dressed in slippers and a
womans robe. Some see worsening
Armenian-Russian relations also in this
fact. Fifthly, the exact content of the
Association Agreement is still unknown,
and it is frequently demanded that it is
published, although experts maintain that
a document cannot be publicized before
it is initialized. Sixthly, according to the
critics, the adoption in June of the
Armenian law On the equal rights and
equal opportunities of men and women
is a precondition of the Association
Agreement. According to them, the EU
thus opens the door to alien practices that
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will lead to a breakdown of the
traditional family, such as gay-parades
and same-sex marriages.
Such a position may also harm the
Armenian military service, the critics
say, and call on the government not to
initial the document in Vilnius in order to
maintain a distance to the EU.
Due to the scarcity of news scoops
during summer, this sort of criticism is
being disseminated by almost every
newspaper and has a certain influence on
public opinion, making it more anti-
European. The governing Republican
Party itself seems to have few concerns
about the agreement. Apart from the
partys leader, President Serzh Sargsyan,
who presented his position as early as in
March, the Republican parliament deputy
Samvel Nikoyan also spoke about this
matter on July 25. The position of the
authorities in favor of the Association
Agreement is shared by a number of their
opponents, including the Heritage party,
former foreign minister and current
parliament deputy Alexander
Arzumanian, and former Deputy Defense
Minister Vahan Ishkhanian. The
arguments of the Agreements supporters
can be summarized as follows: it is an
economic document that will allow
Armenia to improve its production in
accordance with European standards and
hence open European markets for
Armenia and vice versa. Armenia will
have the chance to achieve an additional
growth of 2.3 percentage points of its
GDP. This will not affect its cooperation
with Russia and the CIS in the political,
military and economic spheres.
According to the latest statements,
Armenia also hopes that the Agreement
will create new incentives for opening of
the Turkish-Armenian border and for
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.


GIRL TRAVEL BAN PASSED IN KYRGYZSTAN
Aigul Kasymova

On June 12, 2013, the Kyrgyz Parliament
passed legislation restricting girls under
the age of 22 from travelling abroad. In
total, 59 MPs voted in favor of the
legislation and 2 against it. Social
Democratic Party MP Yrgal Kadyralieva
was the initiator of the legislation.
According to Kadyralieva, the legislation
is designed to protect young Kyrgyz girls
from becoming prostitutes and working
in brothels abroad, a problem that has
increased in recent years. The regulation
restricting free movement of girls under
the age of 22 resulted in a widespread
public disapproval in the capital of
Bishkek despite Kadyralievas
intensions, as stated in various public
appearances, to protect the so-called
moral welfare of the Kyrgyz nation.
According to the decree, Kyrgyz girls
under the age of 22 will require parental
permission to travel abroad. The
restriction, however, does not apply to
girls who go abroad to study, get medical
treatment, or employment as long as they
have the necessary supporting
documents. In an interview to kloop.kg,
Kadyralieva defended her initiative by
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stating that she wants to fight human
trafficking and sexual slavery. The MP
noted that the legislation does not violate
the Constitution but is designed to keep
young Kyrgyz girls from travelling to
foreign countries and becoming
prostitutes, since according to
Kadyralieva, being a prostitute is
immoral.
While according to Kyrgyz Constitution,
everyone has the right to free movement,
the MP went on to note the
Constitutions article 20, which states
that to protect the health, safety and
morals of citizens their freedom of
movement may be restricted. The MP
stressed that the legislation does not
prohibit young girls from travelling, but
simply asks the parents to take full
responsibility for their daughters actions
or decision to go abroad and for any
activities they might engage in. If the
parental permission is granted, no
prohibition can apply. In case of parental
absence, a girl will then need written
consent from her relatives. Kadyralieva
concluded by saying that all she wants to
have is a piece of legislation that will
protect the national, social and moral
security of the Kyrgyz nation.
Kadyralieva is calling the resolution
Sapargul. Sapargul was the name of a
young female migrant who was brutally
attacked by the so called Patriot
movement in Russia. The Patriot
movement was comprised of Kyrgyz
migrant men who interrogated their
female compatriots for allegedly having
sexual encounters or relations with
foreign men. Although the MP defends
her legislation by stating that she has the
interest of her people at heart, especially
young girls, critics and activists for
womens rights argue that this legislation
will not change the problems migrant
women face abroad.
The legislation proposed by Kadyralieva,
designed to protect the dignity of
Kyrgyz girls and keep them from
becoming sex slaves raised public debate
on the issue. Following the proposal of
the regulation, activists and youth began
voicing their opinions through social
media outlets. Certain activists argued
that this bill violates not only
Kyrgyzstans Constitution but is also
human rights. Kyrgyzstans Ombudsman
Tursunbek Akun spoke against the
resolution and criticized the MPs
decision to pass it. Others agreed with
the proposed legislation by drawing on
their own personal experiences (this
mainly came from individuals who
worked as migrant workers in Russia)
and stating that the reality of young
Kyrgyz girls engaging in so-called
immoral activities abroad is not only
awful but also brings shame to the
nation. Other supporters of the legislation
used social media to voice their support
for Kadyralieva and her attempt to
preserve the innocence of young girls
and protect them from any abuse they
might encounter abroad. The dispute
over Kadyralievas legislation also
sparked debate on gender equality in
Kyrgyzstan and the right to free
movement. Certain activists began
raising the question of whether womens
safety should come before womens right
to freedom, including freedom of
movement.
The fact that the legislation was passed in
Parliament does raise serious questions
about the extent of the states
interference in the private lives of its
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citizens and reflects the general attitude
towards women in Kyrgyz society.

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