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Geoforum xxx (2004) xxxxxx www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Environmental policy reform on north-eastern Brazils agricultural frontier

Christian Brannstrom
Department of Geography, Texas A&M University, 815 Eller O&M Building, 3147 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-3147, USA Received 11 August 2003; received in revised form 2 May 2004

Abstract The expansion of modern agriculture in developing countries presents numerous challenges for environmental policy makers. Environmental policies for agriculture in north-eastern Brazils soybean belt are analyzed, with emphasis on the role of a non-state actor in leading policy reforms. An organization representing large farmers is leading policy reforms to reduce the environmental impacts of modern agriculture. By contrast, state agencies are relatively weak and ineective. The analysis situates this question conceptually in literatures stressing the political and structural causes of corporate environmentalism and literatures explaining the increasingly strong role of non-state actors in environmental governance. The case study focuses on the content of reforms, reasons why the non-state actor is so prominent, and the implications of policy reforms. State agencies face major challenges in environmentagriculture policy debates in places where environmental subsidies are unlikely, environmental information is poor, and organized private interests are inuential. 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Keywords: Agriculture; Environment; Savanna; Policy; Brazil

1. Introduction Agricultural systems dependent on petroleum, chemicals, and large areas of land damage the environment by destroying native ora and fauna, polluting water, and degrading soil. With global cereal production expected to double by 2050, the policy challenges of reducing or eliminating the harmful environmental eects of agriculture are numerous and complex (Tilman et al., 2002). Toward this end, scholars have estimated the externalities of modern agriculture (Pretty et al., 2001) and argued persuasively for part of the OECDs US$283billion in agricultural subsidies (1999) to be directed to sustainable farming practices (Tilman et al., 2002, p. 675) in the form of agri-environmental policy. For Potter (1998, p. 103), these policies indicate a

E-mail address: cbrannst@geog.tamu.edu (C. Brannstrom). 0016-7185/$ - see front matter 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.06.002

profound public reassessment of farmers and the relationship between agriculture and the environment. Others note the deep crisis of industrial agriculture, which is perceived as a detached, oversubsidized and unattractive sector in the eyes of most of the public, as well as many policy-makers (Marsden et al., 2001, p. 75). As the policy debate on modern agriculture develops in North America and Europe, in other world regions, where policy challenges are no less complex or dicult, neither the terms of debate nor the key actors is known. Brazilian agriculture, for example, is set to exceed a 125million-ton grain (mainly soybeans and maize) and cotton harvest, while outpacing average US soybean yield and leading world production in sugarcane, citrus, and coee. However, agriculture in Brazil faces a series of environmental challenges, especially in the areas of biotechnology, organic crops, carbon dioxide emissions, and bio-fuels, in addition to traditional concerns for soil

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MA PI TO MT GO MG MS SP Savanna (Cerrado) Soybean area (1999)

0 600 km

BA

PR

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Fig. 1. Distribution of Brazilian soybean production (1999) and ry, savanna (Cerrado) vegetation (data from Fearnside, 2001; The s (GO), 2000). Abbreviations indicate states of Bahia (BA), Goia Maranha o (MA), Mato Grosso (MT), Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), (PR), Piau (PI), Rio Grande do Sul (RS), Minas Gerais (MG), Parana Sa o Paulo (SP), and Tocantins (TO).

conservation, agro-chemical use, and suitable crop varieties. State agencies and non-state actors are increasingly demanding an end to deforestation, less agrochemical pollution, and reduced biomass burning. Although these concerns may form part of nationallevel debates (May, 1999; Neder, 1996), the locus of cutting-edge environmental policies often is at sub-national scales, within Brazilian states or municipalities (Ames and Keck, 1997; Brannstrom, 2001; Guivant, 2002; Fearnside, 2003; Jepson, 2002; Keck, 2002; Lemos, 1998; Lemos, 2003; May et al., 2002; Nepstad et al., 2002; Tendler, 1997). This paper explores environmental policy reforms in western Bahia state, a region of modern agriculture prominent in Brazils expanding soybean belt (Fig. 1). 1 In this region, a powerful non-state actor, the farmer group Associac a o de Agricultores e Irrigantes do Oeste da Bahia (AIBA), is leading environmental policy reforms, overshadowing state agencies and other non-state actors. Why has a non-state actor taken a leadership role? What are the broader implications of non-state leadership in environmental policy reforms for agriculture? These closely related research questions are situated at the intersection of two literatures in envi1 Following several authors (Pretty et al., 2001; Tilman et al., 2002), the term modern agriculture is used here to describe systems capable of producing high yields, but reliant on fossil fuels and notorious for many negative environmental and human health eects.

ronmental politics and policy sciences: the greening of corporations and the inuence of non-state actors in environmental public policies. The research is based on qualitative semi-structured interviews of key actors during April 2001, JulyAugust 2001, and July 2002. Informants were asked to explain and justify policies, evaluate other agencies or actors, and explain the regions environmental problems. Interviews were supplemented by analysis of newsletters and unpublished documents, which are cited as fully as possible to aid future researchers; however, informants are referred to by their institutional position rather than by name. The paper begins by situating the research problem in literatures on the greening of corporations and the growth of non-state actors in environmental public policies. I then describe relevant aspects of the study region, where modern agriculture has existed only during the past two decades. This is followed by sections outlining the actors and organizations involved in policy formulation and their main initiatives, focusing on the environmental policies of one private agricultural organization. These policies include voluntary restrictions on conversion of native savanna (cerrado) vegetation to agriculture, establishment of a recycling center for agro-chemical containers, and active participation in water resources governance and research. By contrast, state agencies have developed weak initiatives and suffered from poor coordination. One state agency, the rio Pu blico), is highPublic Attorneys Oce (Ministe lighted as a potentially strong actor but ultimately relies on other agencies for information. The discussion raises three broader implications from the case study: the limits (and opportunities) of policy reform in regions plagued by poor environmental information; how private groups may thrive in cases of extreme power imbalances among actors; and the contradictions of private-sector leadership with regard to forming public policies.

2. Non-state actors in environmental policy reforms The case of a non-state actor leading environmental policy reforms in agriculture may be better understood by situating the issue at the intersection of two literatures: the greening of industries and the growth of non-state actors in environmental public policies. Policies to reduce the negative environmental impacts of agriculture may be placed into three categories (Pretty et al., 2001, pp. 270274). Regulatory schemes, often based on command-control models, prohibit or mandate land-use practices by setting standards for agrochemical use, imposing farm-based habitat protection, and regulating practices such as burning of crop residues. States also may initiate advisory schemes that create codes or standards that farmers follow voluntarily. These policies are most eective when farmers work in

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groups organized for tasks such as conservation tillage or use of irrigation water (Pretty and Ward, 2001). Finally, economic instruments (taxes, grants, and loans) encourage farmers to reduce the use of chemical inputs, abandon damaging land uses or marginal lands, and adopt conservation practices. 2 In the European Union, agricultural multifunctionality recognizes that the sector produces rural landscapes, biodiversity, employment, and the overall viability of rural areas that should be protected from the full eects of trade liberalization (Potter and Burney, 2002, p. 35; Hollander, 2004). Many of these policies could be described as greening, but the literature on environmental governance is focused on large industrial corporations, not agriculture, that adopt environmental policies, pollution controls, or similar strategies. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development has been especially vocal in publicizing corporate greening while simultaneously arguing for self-regulation rather than top-down command-control policies (Schmidheiny, 1992; Holliday et al., 2002). Andrews (1998, pp. 183 184) has surveyed several types of environmental selfregulatory schemes for industries, including sectoral guidelines and covenants developed by trade associations that most approximate the case study in this paper. But Andrews (1998, p. 195) cautions that self-regulation is not a promising strategy for improving the [environmental] performance of relatively unorganized or politically powerful and recalcitrant sectors such as agriculture. A useful approach to agricultural greening may be obtained from a critical survey of corporate environmentalism in developing countries that warns against the excessively simple characterization of both greening and greenwash. For Utting (2002, p. 285), corporate environmentalism is more than simply greenwash or accommodation strategy, or a defensive reaction to civil society pressure. From this critique emerges the suggestion that scholars focus on the political and structural factors encouraging corporate environmentalism. Prominent among the political aspects
There are numerous Brazilian examples of each of these policy types. Command-control policies are represented in a 1965 law required rural landholdings in the savanna (cerrado) region to maintain native vegetation on 20% of area (Legal Reserve) and ecologically sensitive areas (Permanent Protection) such as river courses. Recent changes provisionally increased the Legal Reserve to 35% of farm area and created provisions whereby several landowners could create a single Legal Reserve that would satisfy individual obligations. A successful voluntary initiative is the case of farmer organizations that have disseminated no-tillage technologies (Smith et al., 1999; Landers et al., 2003). Economic instruments do not include environment-based payments to Brazilian farmers; but the new ecological sales tax in Brazil has positively inuenced the establishment of conservation areas in agricultural landscapes (May et al., 2002).
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are the pressures that state agencies and civil society organizations apply to corporations. Structural factors include the phenomenon whereby consumers in export markets pressure corporations to adopt environmental policies. Further points emerging from the political structural approach include the need to characterize the content of corporate environmentalism and the geographical scale of the environmental initiatives (Utting, 2002, pp. 278288). Brazilian pulp and steel industries have been analyzed by from a similar structuralpolitical approach that emphasizes how rm respond dierently to pressures applied by export markets (Barton, 2000; Carrere, 2002; Dalcomuni, 2000). Although Uttings comments have very little to say about agricultural organizations, his approach may be brought to bear on the analysis of AIBAs relationships not only to state agencies and non-state actors, but also to its export markets. A second literature follows on this theme, highlighting the interactions between non-state actors and state agencies in policymaking. In a recent paper, Hajer (2003, p. 175) argued that policy analysis must reect the fact that state power has weakened, non-state actors have increased in strength, and, overall, there are no clear rules and norms according to which politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon. Hajer (2003, p. 176) believes that this institutional void encourages actors to negotiate new institutional rules, develop new norms of appropriate behavior and devise new conceptions of legitimate political interventions in what he calls deliberative policymaking. Prominent in Hajers view of policymaking is how the deliberative process creates new spatial boundaries or policy territories, even though they may not be recognized formally by states. Hajers specic point on the institutional void as the new terrain of policymaking helps focus analysis on how non-state actors are changing the nature of policymaking. With reference only to South American cases, numerous scholars have noted the inuence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in setting agendas and framing issues in environmental policy debates for biotechnology (Jepson, 2002; Guivant, 2002), the Hidrovia project (Hochstetler, 2002), industrial pollution reduction (Lemos, 1998), the Brazilian Amazon (Fearnside, 2003; Rodrigues, 2000), agricultural technology (Bebbington, 1996), forestry (Silva, 1997, 1999), and opposition to dam construction (Rothman, 2001). Numerous transnational advocacy coalitions have formed between local and international NGOs to leverage policy reform from central governments (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Keck, 1998; Hochstetler, 2002). As important as NGOs are, other actors in the institutional void that Hajer describes also merit attention. Although environmental NGOs were strongly inuential shaping new institutions linked to the North

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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Liverman et al., 1999), market actors such as large corporations beneting from trade liberalization have strongly increased in inuence as NGO interest has declined (Sanchez, 2002). The networks formed between state technicians and non-state actors (mainly NGOs), are as important to understanding water policy in Sa o Paulo city as they are industrial pollution control in nearby Cubata o (Keck, 2002; Lemos, 1998). Finally, the state itself has not become irrelevant, even in policies for decentralization. As Tendler (1997) has argued, the suc , north-eastern cess of decentralization reforms in Ceara Brazil, relied on the strong role of the state government; a similar argument has been made for early phases of Brazils water policy decentralization (Brannstrom, 2004). Returning to the research question driving this paper, we may now understand the environmental policies of a private agricultural organization as well outside European multifunctionality debates, yet certainly a part of the greening trend reported among industries. Also, the role of business organizations operating in the institutional void has not yet been explored fully in Latin America, especially in the agricultural sector. Far more analysis has been directed to NGOs in environmental policy making than other non-state actors, such as business organizations. The idea that business

interests are limited to transnational corporations and local business (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, pp. 103 129) excludes a vast and complex range of non-state actors.

3. Environment and agriculture in western Bahia state, Brazil Western Bahia (approximately 120,000 km2) is the leading region of an expanding agricultural frontier in north-eastern Brazil (Fig. 2). Modern farming, based primarily on soybean cultivation, has transformed the savanna (Cerrado) of not only western Bahia, but also and Maranha the southern areas of neighboring Piau o states (Warnken, 1999; USDA, 2003). Government policies for land acquisition, low interest rates, and supply of suitable soybean cultivars attracted farmers from southern Brazil (Kaimowitz and Smith, 2001; Smith et al., 1998). During the last 20 years, farmers converted approximately 1.35 million hectares of savanna into farmland, allocated primarily to soybean (850,000 ha), maize (180,000 ha), cotton (141,000 ha), and irrigated coee (13,000 ha) (Carneiro, 2003; AIBA, 2003e, p. 5). Large farms are dominant. Although they account for only 4.7% of the regions farms, operations larger than 500

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Municipality Microcatchment project (EBDA) Hydroelectricity plant Stream-gauge site (m3/s) Central-pivot irrigation All-weather road Agrochemical recycling plant

Fig. 2. The Grande River Valley (32,200 km2) (data from SRH, 1993; AIBA, 1991; eld work, 2001, 2002).

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ha claim 77% of western Bahias owner-occupied farmland (IBGE, 2003). Journalistic accounts suggest that US farmers, taking advantage of the low cost of land, are purchasing soybean farms in western Bahia (Romero, 2002). Recently the region received major investment in a poultry processing plant (Carneiro, 2002) located in western Bahias main city, Barreiras (population 115,000), to take advantage of abundant grain. Since 1980 Barreiras attracted southern migrants, suppliers of agricultural inputs, and poor migrants from rural north-eastern Brazil, often in an uneasy context of rapid urbanization, limited upward mobility, and uneven distribution of amenities (Haesbaert, 1997). Some agronomists claim that western Bahia is the worst region in the Brazilian savanna for soybean production, because of very low presence of clay in soils and frequent growing-season drought (author interview, EMBRAPA ocial, 11 April 2001, Planaltina). Agricultural ocials quip that the regions soils only provide the physical support for cropsall necessary nutrients must be imported and distributed on elds. Indeed, soybean yields are lower than other regions, and farms normally must exceed 500 ha; 1000 ha is the standard area for modern farms. However, the low cost of land, high solar insolation, at topography, and proximity to population centers in north-eastern Brazil make western Bahia lucrative for agricultural production. Prime farmland is in the uplands or Chapada o, an area of approximately 24,600 km2 in the far west, where elevation reaches 1000 m above sea level. There, precipitation may reach 1600 mm annually (concentrated in the NovemberApril rainy season), with rainfall decreasing rapidly to the east. Topography is at between streams and soils (Oxisols) are well-drained but very low in nutrients and high in aluminum (Romano and Garcia, 1998; Simpson, 1998; SRH, 1993). In the Grande River Valley (Fig. 2), modern agriculture is located in the western third, with central-pivot irrigation concentrated along major rivers to take advantage of stream water. Against this regional environmental background, several challenges for policy may be outlined. First, excessive clearing of native savanna has been observed, especially in the Chapada o, where elevation is highest and precipitation most reliable. Native savanna vegetation found on the Chapada os wide (2530 km) interuves has been nearly completely removed. Savanna destruction probably continues at a rate of 8% annually, or approximately 50,00060,000 ha, and at least onefourth of all farms in the productive uplands are virtually 100 percent cleared for agriculture or pasture, in violation of federal law (author interview, IBAMA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). Replacement of savanna with cropland probably has reduced the amount of rainfall reaching groundwater, and thus higher peak stream

ows in the wet season and lower ows during the dry season are reported anecdotally (author interviews, SRH ocial #1, 27 July 2001, Salvador; IBAMA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). Savanna clearing is thought to reduce signicantly groundwater recharge in the region (Pimentel et al., 1999); however, these studies have not been peer reviewed, nor are they based on eld data. Similarly, no published, peer-reviewed studies on the related issues of animal or plant extinction and land-cover change exist. Second, most irrigation in western Bahia uses surface water, but critics allege that use is excessive, with stream ow diminishing markedly as a result. As with savanna removal, there is no peer-reviewed study of this problem. What is known is that irrigated crops are most demanding of water during the dry season, when river levels are relatively low. At present, approximately 600 central-pivots are in operationa dramatic increase from 35 in 1989 and 182 in 1991 (AIBA, 1991; author interview, SPA ocial, 16 April 2001, Barreiras). 3 Critics assert that this has reduced river volume; consequently, the state water agency (SRH; see below) has closed several rivers to irrigation licenses (author interview, SRH ocial #2, 25 July 2002, Salvador). Farmers, in turn, have begun drilling for groundwater, taking advantage of vague licensing procedures and poor regulation. Groundwater use would allow farmers to locate irrigated elds on atter land away from streams and avoid reliance on stream water. Water ocials predict increasing irrigation demand for groundwater, warning that groundwater pumping will cause unknown impacts on streams (author interview, SRH ocial #4, 30 July 2001, Salvador). Third, agriculture may threaten soil resources. The regions Oxisols naturally have very low presence of clay-sized particles, and are easily degraded by conventional soil preparation practices that leave soil exposed during much of the MayOctober dry season. The Brazilian governments agricultural research enterprise (EMBRAPA) has issued guidelines that would severely restrict the area of annual crops in western Bahia, warning of desertication risk because organic matter and clay content rapidly decline under mechanized cultivation (Spera et al., 1999, pp. 2224). Loss of organic matter is a key factor in decline of agricultural productivity and encourages soil erosion by wind and water (Silva et al., 1994). One agricultural ocial has reported dramatic decline in yield in Chapada o locations farmed for only 20 years (author interview, EBDA ocial, 31 August 2001).
Irrigation is a notoriously intensive use of water. One centralpivot irrigating 100 ha consumes between 7000 and 8000 cubic meters of water daily; this is enough to supply approximately 42,000 urban inhabitants in Bahia (author interviews, SRH ocial #2, 25 July 2002, Salvador, and SRH ocial #3, 25 July 2002, Salvador).
3

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4. Actors and organizations What state and non-state actors and organizations are in position to develop policies that would reduce or eliminate the impact of agriculture on western Bahias environment? Several state agencies have potential and actual policy roles (Table 1). First, the states water ncia de Recursos H dricos; SRH) agency (Superintende has responsibility for licensing and monitoring the regions surface and groundwater, eventually establishing taris for water use. The SRH recently beneted from a US$85 million project supported by the World Bank. Part of the funds have been used to build natural resource centers in various municipalities, including Barreiras, that house its decentralized oce and Bahias environmental agency (Centro de Recursos Ambientais; CRA). The CRA licenses construction projects, dams, and irrigation schemes, in addition to managing the regions sole protected area in the Rio de Janeiro River Valley (350,000 ha) (Fig. 2). 4 Sharing responsibility with the CRA is the federal environmental agency (Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Nat veis; IBAMA), which, until recently, had urais Renova a very weak presence in the region. IBAMA is responsible for authorizing savanna removal and ghting illegal animal and wood tracking. Agricultural policies are divided among three agencies. Bahias agricultural extension agency (Empresa cola; EBDA), attends Baiana de Desenvolvimento Agr to small farmers but is implementing a soil conservation program that will reach the regions modern farms in the Chapada o (Fig. 2). The more powerful agribusiness ncia de Pol tica de Agronego cio; agency (Superintende SPA) coordinates private investment and subsidies to targeted crops, such as cotton and coee. The weakest of the three agricultural agencies is the states forestry service (Departamento de Desenvolvimento Florestal; DDF). Although responsible for authorizing savanna clearance, the DDF did not even have an oce in western Bahia until August 2001. Finally, the states Public rio Pu blico) responds to variAttorneys Oce (Ministe ous citizen complaints, including environmental damage, and may initiate legal action against alleged environmental crimes reported by the SRH, CRA, DDF, or IBAMA. The most inuential non-state actor in environmental policy is AIBA, a powerful association of approximately 1200 irrigation and dryland farmers. Since the early 1990s, AIBA has lobbied state and federal governments for improved infrastructure, increased subsidies, restructured farm debt, reductions in the value-added tax on
4 Until January 2003, the SRH and CRA were subordinated to dierent secretariats. The DDF, formerly within the agriculture secretariat, was moved to the new environment secretariat, which also has the SRH and CRA.

diesel fuel, and reduced environmental licensing fees. Its board of directors include presidents of several other important non-state agencies, such as a private research institute, marketing board, and cooperative. Overall, AIBA claims to represent modern farming interests in a region of 1.35 million hectares of farmland producing four million tons of crops and requiring at least R$1.5billion (US$500 million) in annual investment for crop production (Santa Cruz Filho, 2002). In 1999 AIBA established an environmental oce led by an agronomist who has developed policies to reduce negative impacts of agriculture on western Bahias water, soil, and vegetation. AIBA overshadows the regions poorly developed civil society network, which is led by a NGO (Amigos da Natureza; AMINA), led by nine directors based in Barreiras. Although lacking sta or rented accommodation, AMINAs leaders have developed a vocal environmental critique of the regions agriculture, occasionally echoed by political elites, that questions the entire idea of modern farming in western Bahia.

5. Greening agriculture or greenwashing crisis? AIBA, western Bahias powerful non-state organization, launched its environmental policies in 1999. Although its initiatives may be interpreted as responses to state command-control policies, such as the federal Legal Reserve requirement of 20% native savanna area on farms, its policies also may be understood as advisory-institutional, in that they encourage farmers to practice better environmental management and improve resource governance. Three sets of policies are especially salient. First, AIBA has proposed a land-occupation and savanna conservation policy (AIBA, 2001b, 2002b). This policy has several components, but among the most signicant are plans for new farms to conserve native vegetation and to make existing farms compliant with the 20% Legal Reserve requirement. Signicantly, AIBA proposed working through new municipal councils, recently established as a decentralization policy of the states environmental agency (CRA). Future farmland would have native vegetation distributed in swathes throughout the property, while farms with no Legal Reserve would receive unspecied incentives to plant native savanna species; both initiatives would have to be approved by state agencies. In addition, AIBA would lead long-term planning, working with state agencies to implement much needed research and monitoring of climate, land cover, stream ow, and soil erosion. Key elements of long-term planning include establishment of a nursery producing savanna seedlings (inaugurated in June 2003) and a cartographic division that would assist

Table 1 Actors and organizations in environmental policy for modern agriculture in western Bahia state, Brazil Name ncia de Recursos H dricos Superintende Acronym SRH Type Bahia water-resources agency Field Issue water licenses for irrigation Assess and collect fees for irrigation water use Surface and groundwater research with AIBA Management of protected area Issue environmental licenses for irrigation and dams Monitor landowner compliance with 20% Legal Reserve and Permanent Protection area Authorize deforestation Microcatchment soil conservation program Promote investment in agriculture Coordinate state subsidies for coee and cotton Same as IBAMA Land-conversion controls Recycling center for agro-chemical containers Water-resources governance and research Discourse: agriculture as disaster in western Bahia Investigate citizen complaints with cooperation of state agencies C. Brannstrom / Geoforum xxx (2004) xxxxxx

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Centro de Recursos Ambientais Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos veis Recursos Naturais Renova cola Empresa Baiana de Desenvolvimento Agr ncia de Pol tica de Agronego cio Superintende Departamento de Desenvolvimento Florestal Associac a o de Agricultores e Irrigantes do Oeste da Bahia Amigos da Natureza rio Pu blico Ministe

CRA IBAMA EBDA SPA DDF AIBA

Bahia environmental agency Federal environmental agency Bahia agricultural development agency Bahia agribusiness agency Bahia forestry agency Western Bahia farmer organization

AMINA

Western Bahia NGO Public Attorneys Oce

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farmers in planning Legal Reserve areas and presenting documents to state agencies for approval. A further step took place in August 2003 when AIBA sponsored a seminar on legal and practical aspects of their Legal Reserve policy. Toward this initiative, AIBA already has funded a reconnaissance of soil erosion. Although lacking in scientic rigor, the study recognizes that the regions land-occupation model must be changed because land clearance left minimal native vegetation to serve as windbreaks, habitat for fauna, and control of soil erosion (Lopes, 2001). AIBA has justied its nursery by admitting that many properties in the region lacked the 20% Legal Reserve of savanna, recognizing that legislation obliges reforestation, and then claiming that farmers have not yet reforested Legal Reserve areas because they lacked seedlings for planting (AIBA, 2003b, p. 10). In public discussion of the absence of Legal Reserve on many farms, AIBA tried to shield non-compliant farmers by arguing that in earlier times environmental issues were relegated to secondary concern and farmers were not required to comply with existing legislation (AIBA, 2003c, p. 11). A second environmental policy AIBA has implemented is construction of a recycling center for agrochemical containers, known as Campo Limpo or Clean Field, which began operation in July 2001 (Fig. 2). Federal law passed in 2000 established protocols for mandatory recycling of used agro-chemical containers, which previously were discarded, buried, or burned. AIBA anticipated the federal mandate by establishing an alliance with state agencies to obtain funding, while retaining management responsibility for the facility. Signicantly, the recycling center was one of Brazils rst to receive empty agro-chemical containers. By September 2003 the center had processed one million containers. AIBAs third policy intervention is in waterresources management, where it has pursued two separate activities. First, AIBA helped fund a study of the aquifer beneath western Bahias modern farms. Joining forces with the states water agency (SRH), AIBAs funding and logistical support were essential for necessary eld work that would monitor the aquifers characteristics. The study will be the rst to provide basic data, which is essential for the state to license deep-well irrigation (author interviews, SRH ocial #4, 30 July 2001, Salvador, and SRH ocial #2, 25 July 2002, Salvador). A second policy in AIBAs water initiative is to shape debate in participatory forums as a representative of the irrigated agriculture sector. Although AIBA sits on a national-level committee that is charged with developing a water-tari scheme for industrial and agricultural users, it has been more inuential in state-level policy debates. Recently, AIBA aimed public criticism at the

state water agency (SRH), which in January 2002 excluded non-state actors from the state water council that would develop water tari protocols. 5 Armed with the fact that western Bahia accounts for approximately 70% of the states licensed water volume (author interview, SRH ocial #3, 25 July 2002, Salvador), AIBA questioned the constitutional basis of exclusion, arguing that it was contradictory to federal water law, and opposed the idea that water taris would be another tax, even threatening to lead mass refusal to pay. In AIBAs view, water taris should be reinvested in the river basin from which they originated, rather than pay for sewage projects in Salvador, the distant state capital (AIBA, 2002a; author interviews, AIBA ocial, 20 July 2001 and 29 July 2002, Barreiras). For proper water management, AIBA demands the formation of a stakeholder committee for the Grande River Valley, over which, presumably, it would exert signicant authority. A stakeholder committee has long been one of AIBAs demands (AIBA, 1991), but SRH ocials are reluctant to cede power to a decentralized authority that would set water taris. 6 When asked whether AIBA inuenced the SRHs policies, a high-ranking advisor to the agencys director exclaimed AIBA is policy! (author interview, SRH ocial #3, 25 July 2002). To justify its environmental policies, AIBA stressed market demands. AIBAs understanding of environmental problems stresses how, in the late 1990s, their directors became concerned that the organization was too focused on crop commercialization while the world was demanding quality in agricultural production (author interview, AIBA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). In its newsletters, AIBA warns farmers that in the near future they will face marketing diculties if they are not in compliance with Brazils environmental laws (AIBA, 2001b, 2002b). A simple environmental argument also justies their policies: changes are necessary to correct the distortions of land occupation that is obviously incompatible with environmental equilibrium (AIBA, 2001b). However, suspicions that AIBA is merely interested in greenwashing the destructive eects of modern agricultureand, in particular, an assault on the regions remaining savannaare well founded. AIBAs ocers and supporters readily admit that western Bahia still oers huge area for agricultural expansion. The present 1.35 million hectares are just the beginning, as there are 3 million hectares of savanna left to clear (Santa Cruz Filho, 2002; author interviews, AIBA ocial, 16 April 2001, Barreiras, and SPA ocial, 16 April 2001, Barreiras). Recently AIBA predicted an expansion of
5 In January 2003 AIBAs president was named to Bahias water council as a representative of farmers using irrigation. 6 For further discussion of Bahias water-management decentralization, see Brannstrom (2004) and Brannstrom et al. (in press).

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cropland to 2.05 million hectares by 2008 (AIBA, 2003e, p. 5). AIBAs own promotional materials proclaim that it participated directly in the extraordinary transformation of the then-infertile lands of Bahias savannas into innitely productive agricultural elds (AIBA, 2001a). Thus, its environmental policies would soften environmental opposition to further expansion of agriculture. AIBA has quickly become the dominant actor in western Bahias institutional void. Their policies conform well to Uttings (2002) idea of how political and structural factors inuence business environmentalism. AIBAs environmental agenda is partially a result of concern for marketing of its agricultural output. AIBA has supported the creation of a new policy territory, the Grande River Valley (Fig. 2), in opposition to the Bahias water agency (SRH). Using its knowledge of federal legislation, AIBA is using this new territory to bring its inuence to bear more directly on water managementespecially setting water tarisin conict with the SRH. AIBAs past research (AIBA, 1991; Lopes, 2001) and future monitoring policies represent make inroads into the states traditional role in producing policy-relevant information. This quest for information is intended to keep AIBA at the forefront of policy debates. Political factors are also important in determining AIBAs environmental policies. 7 As I discuss below, there are strong criticisms against farming in western Bahia. AIBAs policies for land occupation and reforestation not only accept federal mandates that require 20% of farmland in Legal Reserve, but they also respond to heated national-level debates on the requirement of Legal Reserves on private property (Brannstrom, 2001, pp. 13481349). 8 But AIBA wants to comply on its own terms, making it clear that its members are not at fault, and setting terms of the regions reforestation policy. Similar to other agricultural organizations in Brazil, AIBA believes that eventually its members will be called to account by government or consumers for neglecting Legal Reserve obligations. Overall, AIBA sets the terms for the regional policy debate, challenged only by critics

who argue that the environmental damage of agriculture is grossly understated.

6. Exposing environmental crisis If AIBA advances the idea that its policies can avoid future crisis, then AIBAs main opponents emphasize the severe present environmental crisis. Some arguments go so far as to charge that modern agriculture in western Bahia is a colossal error, because of the poor t between the regions environmental characteristics and cultivation practices. Consequently, attempts at management simply delay crisis. While AIBA admits that environmental problems resulted from initially poor regulation and guidance, its opponents either question the entire agricultural project that transformed western Bahia, or allege that regional policies are inadequate. In accepting that an environmental problem exists, however, two distinct views have emerged. First, critics allege that savanna clearing and soil erosion have caused an environmental disaster for western Bahia. Annual cropland in the region was an experiment that never should have taken place because of the regions fragile environment. State institutions are blamed for encouraging agricultural settlement (author interview, AMINA representative, 31 July 2001, Barreiras). Proof or evidence of a disaster include peer-reviewed studies of how agriculture causes substantial decline in soil organic matter (Silva et al., 1994) and how soils may lose clay-sized particles, becoming desertied (Spera et al., 1999, pp. 2224), in addition to anecdotal reports of yield crashes. The disaster interpretation is most closely associated with AMINA, the regions main NGO for environmental issues. 9 Although some key actors dismissed AMINA as irrelevant, poorly informed, and unwilling to carry out environmental projects, others praised its petitions that initiated judicial investigations into alleged environmental crimes (see below). AMINA itself is divided on the issue of whether to participate in municipal politics or remain independent (author interviews, CRA ocial, 25 July 2001, Barreiras; ocial of Public Attorneys Ofce, 23 August 2001, Barreiras; AMINA representative, 31 July 2001, Barreiras; SPA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras; AIBA ocial, 16 April 2001, Barreiras; IBAMA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). Some critics have developed a cultural explanation, blaming the thousands of southern Brazilian farmers who migrated to western Bahia, often antagonizing
Adherents to the disaster idea attach some of their claims on Geraldo Rocha (1940), who allegedly warned that western Bahias rivers were essential to the health of the Sa o Francisco River. Yet Rochas writings are strongly supportive of irrigation in the Sa o Francisco River Valley.
9

In addition to its environmental policies, AIBA has developed a social program. In parallel with Brazils anti-hunger policies, AIBA initiated a four-year anti-hunger campaign in January 2003. Its More Life initiative aims to distribute annually three million kilograms of donated rice, beans, and other foods collected from western Bahias farmers among 100,000 families in Bahia (AIBA, 2003a). And, shortly after detention of two of AIBAs members on charges of enslaving workers, AIBA held a seminar on agricultural labor relations to confront the negative image of the region portrayed internationally (AIBA, 2003d). 8 Chase (2003, p. 46) describes how an agricultural cooperative in s state argued for reducing the legal requirement in the 1965 forest Goia code.

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native residents (Haesbaert, 1997). Arguing that migrants are never friends of nature, this position singles chos 10 for havout southern farmers known as Gau ing devastated the regions best agricultural lands, after they wiped out forests in their southern Brazilian homelands (author interview, IBAMA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). The cultural argument supports jokes such cho but also can be as Conserve nature, kill a Gau turned against north-eastern Brazilians. An ocial of Luis Eduardo Magalha es, a new municipality carved from Barreiras (Fig. 2), who is related by marriage to chos to establish modern agriculture one of the rst Gau in the region, argued that native Bahian residents incorrectly blame southern farmers for having caused reduction in stream discharge. In fact, he argued that most damage to streams results from urbanization of stream banks well downstream of agricultural areas, in Barreiras (author interview, municipal ocial, 23 July 2001, Luis Eduardo Magalha es). 11 A second view, promoted by AIBA and its supporters, such as the states agribusiness agency (SPA), presents a dierent understanding of the regions recent past. After an initial period of neglect, farmers and policy makers are beginning to transform the present situation into sustainable development. In the early 1980s, farmers had no guidance or regulation by state environmental authorities, which encouraged disorganized land occupation (AIBA, 2002a,b, p. 2). The adventurers, farmers who truly exploited the environment, have since moved to other frontiers, while those who remained have a growing environmental concern and respond well to AIBAs initiatives (author interview, AIBA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). In part, the regions soils are a signicant part of the environmental problem. The razor-thin dierence between agricultural production and environmental aggression is practically nil, turning the smallest farming mistake into fatal error. This situation was worsened because the state failed to defend public patrimony and allowed farmers to clear vast stretches of savanna (author interview, SPA ocial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). While arguing that it is public knowledge that western Bahias agriculture is not suited to the natural conditions, especially soil and water resources, an IBAMA ocial claims that there is still time to undo errors previously committed, in part by establishing a large national park in the region and changing cultural attitudes , 2000). (Bo

7. Side-lined state agencies? While the non-state actor AIBA has taken the leading role in developing environmental policies for modern agriculture, what policies have state agencies promoted? State agencies have weak command-control policies. They pursue neither advisory initiatives nor oer economic incentives. Leading critics of western Bahias environmental crisis argue that state agencies have failed to enforce Brazils existing environmental laws. In response, they have petitioned the Public Attorneys Oce with allegations of infractions of environmental laws (author interview, AMINA representative, 31 July , 2000). Two lawsuits reveal benets 2001, Barreiras; Bo and limitations of using the Public Attorneys Oce for advancing environmental policy. In one case, the Public Attorneys Oce received an anonymous complaint in December 1998 alleging that stretches of the Cachorros Stream, a tributary of the Grande (Fig. 2), had ceased owing because of excessive irrigation and omission by the states environmental agencies. The Barreiras Public Attorneys Oce found that irrigation had begun without proper licensing from the state. In addition, the local geomorphology encouraged the stream to ow exclusively underground during the dry season (Promotoria de Justic a de Barreiras, 2000a). The second case began with another anonymous complaint, in September 1999, alleging that 60 farms in western Bahia had implemented illegal central-pivot irrigationwith full acquiescence of state agencies (Promotoria de Justic a de Barreiras, 2000b, p. 17). Although neither case has been resolved, both reveal the contradictory nature of the Public Attorney as an instrument for advancing environmental policy. On the one hand, the Public Attorney is a robust state agency. It is relatively independent from municipal and state politics and is staed by relatively well paid attorneys committed to the Public Attorneys oce as an institution of Brazilian democracy. Although initial allegations are necessarily narrow, investigation may broaden the subsequent charges considerably. Farmers under investigation were found to lack Legal Reserve areas in savanna and licensing of irrigation projects; this gave the cases momentum and encouraged landowners to reach settlement with the prosecutor (Promotoria de Justic a de Barreiras, 2000a,b). On the other hand, the Public Attorneys Oce is weak in that its investigations rely on other state agencies for information. In Barreiras, there are no resources for an independent investigation, so the Public Attorney must request information from the SRH and CRA, whose responses are tardy and incomplete. Both cases suered from lack of progress because of personal battles of responsibility between state agencies and generalized foot-dragging (author interview, Public Attorneys Oce ocial, 23 August 2001, Barreiras).

cho refers to a native of Brazils southernmost The noun Gau state, Rio Grande do Sul. In north-eastern Brazil (and, indeed, outside cho is used to describe natives of of southern Brazil), however, Gau any of the three southern states. 11 chos have a negative environmental image, yet they were Gau leaders in the spread of zero-tillage in Brazil (Landers et al., 2003, p. 80).

10

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The nature of bureaucratic conict is apparent in considering the case of the Cachorros Stream. Both water and environment agencies identied problems and causes precisely outside their institutional mandate. Ocials from the environment agency (CRA) reported that western Bahias considerable water resources were close to collapse because of poorly regulated use (Promotoria de Justic a de Barreiras, 2000a, p. 61). The water agency (SRH), however, condently asserted that properly authorized center-pivot irrigation systems do not degrade the environment. Instead, they blamed the CRA and forest service (DDF) for permitting illegal clearing of savanna and riparian vegetation. In their view, dryland agriculture, subsidized by the Bahian government, was the real culprit in reducing the water in the regions streams. The visible degradation of the Cachorros River resulted not from irrigation, according to the SRH, but from inappropriate and poor soil management and the destruction of riparian vegetation, similar to what has happened in all of western Bahias rivers (Promotoria de Justic a de Barreiras, 2000a, p. 165, 138). If water and environment agencies blame each other, what is their own record? In spite of material support in form of a US$85 million project, the SRH faces considerable problems in licensing stream water use because basic hydrological data are extremely poor, with only a handful of stream gauges in the entire meas Valley (6000 km2), a Grande (Fig. 2). In the Fe tributary of the Grande, the SRH over-licensed irrigation water to some 200 central-pivots, causing reduced ow that forced a downstream hydroelectricity plant to shut turbines during the dry season. Eventually, the conict was resolved by order of the state governor (Genz and Cardoso, 1998). In addition, Bahias, 1995 water reforms required the SRH to know the volume of rivers to issue water licenses. Confronted with poor hydrological data, the SRH developed an equation for interpolation (Santana et al., 2001). But ocials acknowledge that the quality of the initial data encouraged over-estimated stream ow at excessively small cartographic scale (large area). For example, a relatively small over-estimation of stream ow in Barreiras, on the Grande River, at 1:250,000 scale could mean that dozens of upstream central-pivot irrigation might be cancelled for over-using water (author interview, SRH ocial #2, 25 July 2002, Salvador). The SRH also has delayed the formation of stakeholder committees. SRH ocials in the Barreiras oce admitted that the headquarters in Salvador provided little support for committee formation, and was hostile to the very idea of committees (author interviews, SRH ocial #5, 28 August 2001, Barreiras; SRH ocial #6, 30 July 2002, Barreiras). Overall, the SRHs policies are reduced to identifying water users and issuing licenses, preparing the way for the collection of water taris

a necessary source of funding after the World Bank funds are spent. Western Bahias other state agencies are largely ineffectual in developing policies to regulate or monitor the environmental impacts of agriculture. The environment agency (CRA), for example, is charged with managing a 350,000 ha protected area in the Rio de Janeiro Valley with four sta who have other responsibilities elsewhere in the region. Established ten years ago, the protected area was due to receive a planning document in 2002, but CRA sta have no data on how much of the protected area is savanna and how much is agriculture. Management is reduced to keeping the Rio de Janeiros existing farms (which include that of AIBAs president) in environmental compliance and seeking partners who will pay for infrastructure in the protected area (author interviews, CRA ocial, 25 July 2001, Barreiras, and 31 July 2002, Barreiras). The CRA also has transferred environmental licensing to the municipal government as part of its most recent decentralization policy; central-pivot schemes now would be licensed by municipal ocials, and municipalities would collect fees (author interview, Barreiras environmental ocial, 31 July 2002, Barreiras). Overall, the CRAs environmental policies are reduced to occasional monitoring of the protected area and licensing of projects. 12 Even weaker is the states forestry agency (DDF), which had no ocials in western Bahia until July 2001. One year later, its ocials had received some operational funds from a federal project for the San Francisco River Valley, but were only beginning to survey the deforested upper reaches of the region. Ocials asserted that the DDF was obtaining satellite remote sensing data to determine farms devoid of the 20% Legal Reserve requirement, but in July 2002 the agency had not yet determined which farms were not in compliance (author interviews, DDF ocial #1, 30 August 2001, Barreiras, and DDF ocial #2, 29 July 2002). Finally, Brazils federal environmental agency (IBAMA) has an extremely poor regional reputation for regulating agricultural land uses. Charges of corruption and incompetence abound, and its own ocials complain that until July 2002 only three technicians (who frequently did not have access to transport for eld visits) covered a massive jurisdiction of approximately 120,000 km2 (author interviews, IBAMA ocial, 20 July 2001 and 30 July 2002, Barreiras; AMINA representative, 31 July 2001, Barreiras; DDF ocial #1, 30 August 2001, Barreiras).

Oliveira (2002) assessed the creation of protected areas in Bahia as part of the CRAs decentralization policies; he did not focus on management.

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8. Discussion Three broader lessons and insights may be drawn from the case of environmental policy debates for agriculture in western Bahia. First is the dilemma of policy reform in the context of both poor environmental information and an institutional void. As Hajer (2003, p. 186) argues, knowledge deliberation is now a regular part of policymaking; yet environmental data and assessment in agricultural landscapes are still essential for policy interventions (Viglizzo et al., 2003, p. 170). The case of western Bahia shows how a non-state actor plays a key role in knowledge deliberation about facts that guide its policies. An important aspect of the deliberative process is the divergence in explanations about environmental problems; moreover, fragmentary existing information encourages divergent views among actors. But AIBA has capitalized on this deliberative process by making a quick study of soil erosion and then proposing its own solutions as the natural leader in the ensuing policy debates. This is possible, in part, because of AIBAs support among large farmers who facilitate the logistics of approved eld research. The fact that state agencies lack stream ow data and land cover dataindeed, they have been remiss in serving the public interest in this regardopens a wide eld in the deliberative policy process for AIBA to monitor variables and initiate debates when their interests are at stake. AIBA already has deployed this strategy with regard to irrigation and soil erosion surveys (AIBA, 1991; Lopes, 2001). There is every indication that present and future research is motivated by a similar desire. For example, the lack of data on the extent of non-compliance with Legal Reserve requirements allows AIBA to admit that many farms are in violation, then quickly move to propose a framework that farmers might follow. In the meantime, quantitative data on savanna destruction is not available to set more precise terms for the reforestation debate. This deliberative knowledge process suggests a dilemma for technicians and scientists conducting research in the region: their research relies on cooperation with AIBA, yet AIBA will make every attempt to use their ndings to further its own class-based interests. Second, the case study points to the issue of power imbalances among actors in deliberative environmental policy making. One the one hand, mechanized, largescale farmers, who are well integrated into national and global commodity markets, support a strong private organization, AIBA. On the other hand, weak state agencies are unable to implement their own poorly articulated and reductionist policies. In spite of decentralization policies, for example, neither the water (SRH) nor environmental agency (CRA) motivates sta to conduct the many eld visits necessary in such a large region. Although several studies have pointed to authoritarian state behavior in environmental policies (Peluso, 1993;

Robbins, 1998), this case shows how a non-state actor is setting the terms of the debate, with most state agencies following its lead. Similar non-state actors in other contexts should come under careful scrutiny. As Barton (1997) indicated in his study of Chilean salmon sheries, the state initially pursued a middle road between industry self-regulation and command-control strategies. But the industrys rapid growth since the early 1980s resulted in the state adapting to industrial change in a reactive rather than proactive manner (Barton, 1997, p. 324). In western Bahia, state agencies only respond to the AIBAs initiatives. Only considerable investment in human and physical resources will reverse the observed trend among state agencies. The power of non-state actors raises a third dilemma: does the class-based nature of AIBAs environmental policy agenda inevitably conict with the public interest of state agencies? If state agencies exclude AIBA, they might pursue ineectual policies that lead to inevitable conict with the targeted users of resources, the farmers who are the de facto managers (Tilman et al., 2002, p. 676) of western Bahias land and water resources. However, if state agencies support AIBA, they may legitimize its green marketing strategy designed to benet AIBAs members. Thus, we return to the question of whether AIBA is greening agriculture or greenwashing crisis. With poor environmental data at present, it is impossible to know. Indeed, following Uttings (2002) argument, analysis of political and structural factors encouraging or limiting environmental reforms is preferred to quick categorization. These political and structural factors are moderately strong and show no signs of weakening. AIBA aims to reverse the publicized claims that agriculture is an environmental disaster for western Bahia. The organization is similarly focused on the idea that a green policy will help its agricultural marketing. But in the institutional void of policymaking, weak state agencies are in a bind. To address the regions environmental issues, they must be careful to pursue policies that do not encourage mass resistance among the regions farmers, yet one also expects that they will pursue a truly public policy, rather than rubber-stamping AIBAs initiatives. Although state agencies may have their own biases, they will face special challenges as they engage with AIBAs policy initiatives. Certainly, organized business interestsnot just transnational corporations or local business (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, pp. 103129)are signicant actors in environmental policy debates, and their policies should attract close scrutiny before the full implications of their initiatives become evident. In Brazil, scholarly research on the pulp and steel industries has indicated wide variation in corporate environmentalism (Barton, 2000; Carrere, 2002; Dalcomuni, 2000); further research on agriculture greening may reveal similarly broad adoption of environmental policies.

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9. Conclusion Modern agriculture in developing countries such as Brazil will be the focus of increasingly sophisticated environmental policy debates, just as in North America and Europe. However, these debates probably will occur without the possibility of environment-based subsidies supporting multifunctionality. If the case of western Bahia is instructive, non-state actors such as groups representing economic sectors will play an increasingly important role in creating and implementing environmental policies, perhaps well ahead of state agencies. This may be especially true in agriculture, where command-control models fare poorly (Pretty et al., 2001, p. 271). Thus, state agencies will face a profound dilemma. Will they cooperate with class-based organizations, such as AIBA, and potentially undermine their public mandate by supporting a greenwashing marketing campaign? Or, will they remain aloof from business interests, isolated in relatively weak institutions bent on implementing ineectual policies? The contradiction presented in the case of western Bahia is that, apparently, the most holistic environmental policies are being developed by a private organization, perhaps for ultimate greenwashing objectives of relatively well-o farmers. If state agencies and grassroots activists ignore private initiatives, they may be doomed to irrelevance. But to support a non-state actor is also to be aligned to a particular economic interest that, ultimately, is intent on expanding agricultural land uses.

Acknowledgement Research for this paper was supported by the Watermark Project with funding from the Hewlett Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation, and grants from the Hewlett Foundation and Central Research Fund (University of London) to the Institute of Latin American Studies (London, UK), where I was aliated while all eld work was carried out. During eld work I also beneted from my status as Associate Researcher at the lia, Instituto Sociedade, Populac a o e Natureza in Bras DF. Rebecca Abers and Margaret Keck supported research logistics. The paper beneted from comments on previous drafts by three anonymous reviewers, Jody Emel, and Wendy Jepson.

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