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Harmonious Construction It is cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are in conflict

with each other such that both of them cannot stand, they should, if possible, be so interpreted that effect can be given to both, and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort. This is what is known as a rule of harmonious construction. The fundamental rule of interpretation is the same whether one construes the provisions of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, namely that the court will have to find out the expressed intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as the case may be. ut if two constructions are possible, then the court must adopt that which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well!established provisions of the existing law nugatory. Thus every statute has to be construed as a whole and the construction given should be harmonious one. It is the duty of the court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act, but it is not certainly duty of the court to stretch the words used by the legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act. As already said, the statute must be read as a whole and every provision in the statute must be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. All the provisions of a statute are to be read together and given effect to and conflicting provisions must be read harmoniously so as to make the provisions workable. All parts of the Act must be in harmony with the statutory intent and in this order reference to other parts of the section is necessary to ensure absence of conflict." #uch a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. It is the duty of the courts to avoid $a head on clash$ between two sections of the same Act. Two sections are inconsistent when they cannot stand together at the same time since one!provision conflicts directly with the command or power of the other provision.

Therefore the rule of construction fixed that whenever it is possible to do so to construe provisions that appear in conflict so that they harmonise because it cannot be assumed that Parliament shall give with one hand and take away with the other. In Venkataraman Daunt v. State of Mysore, the trustee of the appellant temple filed a suit for a declaration that the appellant was a denominational temple and that section % of the Temple Entry Act was void as repugnant to Article &'(b) of the Constitution. *nder the Article a religious denomination had the right to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion. It was contended by the appellant that Article &'(b) is not sub+ect to and controlled by a law made under Article &,(&)(b) of the Constitution, which protects the right to enter a temple for purposes of worship. Article &,(&)(b) reads- $.othing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the #tate from making any law (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of /indu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of the /indus.$ #ection % of the 0adras Temple 1ntry Act was, therefore, within protection of this Article. 2n the other hand Article &'(b) provides that every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to establish and to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The contention of the appellants therefore was that the right to manage conferred under Article &'(b) give them right to regulate entry to the temple. The #upreme Court held that the contention of the appellant ignores the true nature of the power of the #tate conferred by Article &,(&)(') to make law as regards the right conferred on all classes and sections of /indus to enter into a public temple, and on the un3ualified terms of that Article, the right must be available whether it is sought to be exercised against an individual or against a denomination. If the contention of the appellant is accepted then Article &,(&)(b) will become wholly nugatory in its application to denominational temples, though the language of the Article includes them. The language of the Article being plain and unambiguous, the intention of the legislature can be gathered only from the words actually used in the statute and in a court of law what is unexpressed has the same value as what is unintended. The Court observed-

$In the present case the wider scope as regards the religious matter conferred on the denominated temples namely to manage the affairs of the temple, provided the power of the #tate to regulate entry to the /indu temples which one is of narrower in scope, therefore from the wider scope i.e. Article &'(b) the power of the #tate conferred on it by virtue of Article &,(&)(b) should substrate for giving full effect to both the provisions. /armonising in that way, Article &'(b) must be read sub+ect to provisions of Article (&,) (&)(b), meaning thereby right to manage all affairs of the denominated temple is with the management of the temple, but right to regulate entry in /indu temple of any description is conferred on the #tate. In order, therefore, to avoid any apparent conflict or clash between the provisions of the statute, expressions used therein should be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the ob+ect of the statute. The right in the matter of religious affairs of every religious denomination is sub+ect to a law made by #tate providing for social welfare or throwing open of /indu religious institutions of public character to all classes of /indus. Thus the principle of harmonious construction for its application re3uires the following four steps(a) That both the provisions which are conflicting or are repugnant to each other must be read as a whole with reference to the entire enactment in 3uestion. (b) 4ive full effect to both of them and then detracts the conflict. (c) 2ut of the two conflicting provisions choose wider and narrow scope of these two separately and, (d) 5rom the wider provision subtract the narrow and see the conse3uence. If the conse3uence is as reasonable as to harmonise both the provisions and gives their full effect separately, no further in3uiry is re3uired, but read it in such substation. 6hile doing such harmonisation one thing must be kept in mind that the entire enactment is the product of the same author, i.e., the 7egislature and it is certainly supposed that the legislature while enacting the provisions of a statute was fully alert about the situation which entered to cover and therefore all provisions enacted re3uires to be given their full effect in scope.

Again, the #upreme Court resolved the apparent conflict between Article 89(8)(a) and 89:(%) of the Constitution by giving a harmonious construction to the effect that the right of freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 89(8)(a) is to be read as sub+ect to powers, privileges and immunities of a /ouse of the 7egislature under Article 89:(%). In M.S.M. Sharma v. S.K. Siniza, the petitioner!editor of a newspaper published a speech made in the #tate legislature without destructing the expunged parts of it as directed by the #peaker. /e was asked to show cause why appropriate action should not be taken against him for breach of privilege of the /ouse. In a petition it was contended that the proposed action was in violation of his fundamental right of freedom of speech. ;ismissing the petition the #upreme Court held that the powers, privileges and immunities of the /ouse of 7egislature are not sub+ect to Article 89(8)(a). oth these provisions must be reconciled. Article 89(8)(a) which is more general must yield to Article 89:(%). The same rule applied in KM. Natzazvati v. State of Bombay, where Article 8'8 was held sub+ect to Article 8:& of the Constitution. In this case the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for life by the /igh Court. 2n the same day the 4overnor of the #tate passed an order suspending the sentence under Article 8'8. The applicant"s special leave petition was dismissed by the #upreme Court holding that the petition could not be listed for hearing unless he surrendered to his sentence as re3uired by Article 8:&(8) and the rules of #upreme Court under Article 8:, of the Constitution. #imilar result was reached in interpreting sections :<8 and :&' of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 8=9=. The #upreme Court observed that section :&' is as unfettered by other provisions of the Code as section :<8 with this difference that powers under section :&' can only be exercised by an appellate court pending an appeal. 6hen both the provisions are thus unfettered, they have to be harmoni>ed so that there may be no conflict between them. It is well settled principle of interpretation that one section, which is 1x!facie in conflict with another, merely, provides an exception from the general rule contained in the other. /owever, where the words of the statute are clear they must of course be allowed, but where alternative constructions are e3ually open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to regulate, and that alternative must be re+ected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or

confusion. This principle was applied by the #upreme Court while construing section 8,8 of the Civil Procedure Code, 89<=. In am Chan! Sons Su"ar Mi##s $t!. v. Kanaiya 7al hargava, it was held that the

inherent power of a court under section 8,8 C.P.C. is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code. That power cannot be exercised if such exercise is inconsistent with or comes into conflict with any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon court by other provisions of the Code. The inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code specifically. An interesting 3uestion relating to a conflict between sections 8?(8) and 8=(8), e3ually mandatory provisions of the Industrial ;ispute Act, 89:? arose in Sirsi#k $t!. v. %overnment of &n!hra 'ra!esh. #ection 8?(8) of the Act re3uires the 4overnment to publish every award of a labour tribunal within thirty days of its receipt and by sub! section (&) of section 8? the award becomes final on its publication. #ection 8=(8) of the Act provides that a settlement between employer and workman shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. In a case where settlement was aimed at after receipt of the award of the tribunal but before its publication, the 3uestion was whether the 4overnment still re3uired publishing the award under section 8?(8) of the Act. 7ord ;unedin in (hitney v. Commissioner of In#an! evenue observed that If two constructions of a statute are possible, one of which would make it intra vires and the other ultra vires, the court must lean to that construction which would make the operation of the section intra vires. The reason is that no intention can be imputed to the legislature that it would exceed its own +urisdiction." In interpreting a provision which at once is a charging as well as a remedial provision and whose main ob+ect is to plug leakage and prevent evasion of tax, a construction which would defeat its purpose, and, in effect, obliterate it from the statute book, should be eschewed. If more than one construction is possible, that which preserves its workability and efficacy is to be preferred to the one, which would render it sterile, or redundant.

In Nokes v. Doncaster &ma#"amate! Co##ieries $t! . @iscount #imon 7.C. stated- $if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.$ In K. an"anatha e!!iar v. State of Kera#a, while dealing with the provisions of

Prevention of 5ood Adulteration Act, 89,: and Aules made thereunder, the #upreme Court observed- The Prevention of 5ood Adulteration Act is of wide application and millions of small traders have to comply with the provisions of the Act and the Aules. If the ob+ect underlying the Act can be achieved, without disorgani>ing the trade, by giving a reasonable interpretation to the Act and its Aules, it is courts duty to do so. In %ursahni Sai"a# v. Commissioner of Income )a* interpreting sub!section (=) of section 8=A of the Income Tax Act, 89&& which in substance says that in calculating the amount of interest of the machinery the method of calculation laid down in sub!section (') shall be applied. The #upreme Court said that the proper way to deal with such a provision is to give it an interpretation which makes the law workable. In Shanti 'rasa! +ain v. Director of ,nforcement , section :(8) of the 5oreign 1xchange Aegulations Act, 89?% was in 3uestion. The #upreme Court held that the intention of the legislature was plainly to prohibit all transactions in foreign exchange by persons who are residents of India whether such transaction take place during their actual residence in India or during their so+ourn in foreign parts. To hold that the prohibition under the Act does not extend to acts done outside India by the $residents of India$ must inevitably lead to large!scale evasions of the Act resulting in its ob+ect being defeated. A construction, which leads to such a result, must be avoided. In -nion of In!ia v. a.!hani %rains an! 'i""ery ,*chan"e $t!.," held- 6here the

court is concerned with the 3uestion whether it is legally competent to vest a particular

power in a statutory body, the proper rule of interpretation would be that unless the nature of the power is such as is incompatible with the purpose for which the body is created, or unless the particular power is contra!indicated by any specific provision of the enactment bringing the body into existence, any power which would further the provisions of the Act could be legally conferred on it. In construing the provisions of a statute courts should be slow to adopt a construction that tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffectiveB an attempt must always be made so as to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute and to make the whole of it effective and operative. In Commissioner of Income )a* v. )e.a Sin"h , the contention was unless conditions of notice under section && was satisfied, penalty under section &= for failure to comply with section 8=A(%) of the Income Tax Act, 89&& cannot be imposed. The #upreme Court observed that if the said contention accepted, the result would be to make section 8=A(9) (b) nugatory. The Court held that on the principle of lit res magis valeat quam pereat such a construction that makes the provisions of the Act nugatory couldn"t be accepted. In &vtar Sin"h v. State of 'un.ab, the accused contended that his conviction for theft of electricity under section %9 of the 1lectricity Act, 898< and section %?= of the Indian Penal Code, 8='< was illegal because proceedings against him were not initiated by any one mentioned in section ,< of the Act of 898<. The #upreme Court held- Though electricity is not movable property within the meaning of section %?=, IPC, yet by a legal fiction created by section %9 of the Indian 1lectricity Act, 898<, dishonest abstraction of it should be deemed to be an offence of theft and punishable tinder section %?9, I.P.C. and section %9 of the said Act. The prosecution in cases of theft of electricity, however, has to be launched only at the instance of a person named in section ,< of the 1lectricity Act. In Corporation of Calcutta v. 7iberty Cit>ema,: the corporation was entitled to recover "licence fee" from the respondent annually which was later on enhanced. It was challenged on the ground that no service is being rendered to the respondent in lieu of "fee" and hence the recovery is unlawful. Interpreting the provisions ut res magis quartz pereat, the #upreme Court held- $It was clear that the expression $fee$ used in section

,:= of the Calcutta 0unicipal Corporation Act must mean "a tax". This interpretation alone paves the way for a smooth working of the system for the Act is passed. In -maya# &ehi v. $anni &chii the Privy Council dealing with the expression $all property$ in /indu 6omen"s Aight to Property Act, 89%?, held that $property$ here means $property other than the agricultural land$ since agricultural land was a #tate sub+ect. Thus it is recogni>ed principle of construction that general words and phrases however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense, must usually be construed as being limited to the actual ob+ect of the Act. In a statute where alternative constructions are possible the court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which statute has been enacted rather than the one which would put hindrance in its way. If however, no sensible meaning can be given to a word or phrase, or if it would defeat the real ob+ect of the enactment, it may, or rather it should, be eliminated. The above particular instances clearly show that the courts, by means of the maxim ut res maxis valeat pant pereat, avoided interpretation which would leave any part of the relevant statute to be without effect, and not narrowed enactments designed to prevent tax evasions, criminal offences, and also saved enactments from becoming them nugatory or non!operative.

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