European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.

12, 89-104 (1982)

The effects of dmerential ascribed category membership and norms on minority influence
ANNE MAASS
Florida State University

RUSSELL D. CLARK, Ill

Florida State University

GERALD HABERKORN
East- West Communication Institute

Abstract Investigated how either perceived competency or self-interest-and Zeitgeist affect minority influence, or: how Moscovicis theory does apply to actual social minorities. The self-interest notion predicts that single minorities (deviating only in terms of beliefs) are more influential than double minorities (deviating also in category memberhip) while the competency notion predicts the reverse. Further, either minority is expected to be influential only when the Zeitgeist is in favour of the minority position. In a 2 (prolanti Zeitgeist) x 3 (singleldouble minoritylcontrol) factorial design, 120 conservative male American undergraduatesdiscussed in groups of six-including two either male (single minority) or female (double minority) consistently liberal confederates-one of two issues: abortion (pro-) or death penalry (anti-Zeitgeist). The results support the self-interest notion: double minorities are perceived as having a stronger self-interest and exerted less influence than single minorities. The Zeitgeist hypothesis is confirmed, too. The underlying attributwnal processes and the ecological validity of previous studies are discussed.

INTRODUCTION
Since Sherifs (1936) and Aschs (195 1) early work on conformity, it has become a social psychological truism that individuals tend to yield to a majority position even when that position is clearly incorrect. Conformity became a term nearly equivalent in meaning to social influence. It was only in 1969 that Moscovici and his co-authors pointed out that social influence is by no means limited to a one-directional dependency of the minority on the majority. Reversing the usual conformity paradigm, Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoilx (1 969) demonstrated that a consistent minority is able to exert a remarkable degree of influence even when it is not equipped with such characteristics as power, status, competence, or idiosyncracy credits (Hollander, 1964).
0046-2772/82/010089-16$01.60 0 1982 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 9 December 1980 Revised 3 June 1981

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According to Moscovicis (1976) theory, the key to minority influence is the inference made by the majority during conflict. An initially powerless minority can induce conflict with the majority by insisting on an alternative position. If the minority adopts certain behavioural styles, notably consistent support of the minority position (Moscovici, 1976; Moscovici and Faucheaux, 1972), the majority will perceive the minority as certain, convinced, and competent (Moscovici and Nemeth, 1974). Thus, minority influence is not determined by consistency per se, but rather the specific inferences made by the majority as a function of the minoritys behavioural style. Since Moscovici et al. (1969) original colour perception experiment, the basic minority influence paradigm has successfully been applied to such diverse tasks as jury decision making (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974; Nemeth, Wachtler and Endicott, 1977) and group discussions of a variety of current social problems (e.g. guest workers in Switzerland, Mugny, 1975b; the role of women in contemporary French society, Paicheler, 1976). Numerous variables have been investigated including the number of minority members (Moscovici and Lage, 1976 Nemeth et al., 1977), the relation between minority and majority position (Mugny, 1975b; Paicheler, 1976, 1977, 1979), shifts in minority position (Kiesler and Pallak, 1975; Levine and Ranelli, 1978), nationality and personal bias (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1973), rigidity versus flexibility of argumentation (Mugny, 1975a; Nemeth, Swedlund and Kanki, 1974; Ricateau, 1971), novelty of argumentation (Vinokur and Burnstein, 1978), and consistency across issues (Allen and Wilder, 1978.). At the same time, a number of qualitative differences between majority and minority influence have been discussed (Doms and Van Avermaet, 1980; Moscovici and Lage 1976; Moscovici and Personnaz, 1980; Sorrentino, King and Leo, 1980; Wachtler, 1976), and several studies have attempted to test the theory of minority influence against such competing explanations as dependence (Wolf, 1979) and Hollanders theory of idiosyncracy credits (Chilstrom and Bray, 1979) In stressing the importance of the theory, Moscovici (e.g. Moscovici, 1976; Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972; Moscovici and Nemeth, 1974) has frequently drawn on historical examples to emphasize the applicability of the theory to actual minorities. Yet, in spite of the large number of studies that have been conducted during the past decade, this central question remains unanswered: Can the findings of the minority influence literature be applied to true social minorities such as Blacks, Jews, or guest workers? In considering this question, it is useful to differentiate between single and double minorities (Haberkorn and Maass, 1978). Single minorities may be defined as individuals who deviate from the majority only in terms of their beliefs, such as the anti-war students of the mid 60s. Double minorities, in contrast, differ from the majority not only in terms of their beliefs, but also in terms of ascribed category membership (cf. Jones and McGillis, 1976) or social categorization (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1978). A Black radical, for example, differs from the white American majority both in terms of beliefs and in terms of membership in a salient racial minority. In terms of this distinction, previous minority influence research, with one exception (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1973), has dealt exclusively with single minorities.
Besides consistency, Moscovici (1976) mentioned four additional behavioural types: investment, autonomy, rigidity and fairness of which only rigidity has been investigated in a systematic way (Moscovici and Neve, 1973; Mugny, 1975a; Nemeth, Swedlund and Kanki, 1974).

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In the only study to employ a double minority2, Nemeth and Wachtler (1973) manipulated the ostensible ethnic background (German, Italian, or American) of the minority confederate who consistently voiced a preference for a set of paintings ostensibly of German or Italian origin. The authors reasoned that the confederate would be perceived as more biased when expressing a preference for paintings of his own nationality (double minority) than when he was from the same American background as the majority subjects (single minority). Contrary to this prediction, the confederates were able to influence the majority only when they expressed a preference for the German paintings; the German confederate was also more influential than either the Italian or American confederate in this case. According to the authors post hoc explanation, the double minority status did not evoke an attribution of self-interest, but rather the perception of superior knowledge and competence. This conclusion, however, should be treated with caution for two reasons. First, the attribution of competence was neither manipulated nor was it assessed in the post-experimental questionnaire. Second, unexpected pro-Italian preferences were obtained in the control group which make it difficult to draw consistent conclusions. Although Nemeth and Wachtlers results suggest that single and double minorities exert a differential degree of influence, their study provides little insight into the mediating processes which underlie these differences. One approach to conceptualizing this problem is to consider how some of the variables which relate to the extent of influence by single minorities might apply in the double minority case. In particular, two competing predictions can be made from two potential mediating processes. (a) Nemeth et af. (1977) proposed that with increasing size of the minority (two members or more), the attribution of competence becomes a critical determinant of the amount of minority influence. If one further assumes-as has been suggested by Nemeth and Wachtler (1973) in theirpost hoc explanation-that double minorities will be perceived as more competent if the task is of direct relevance to their minority status, then double minorities can be expected to be more influential than single minorities on such tasks. A Jewish minority for example should be perceived as more competent and hence be more influential than a Gentile minority if the topic is anti-Semitism, but not if the topic is U.S.relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Indirect support for this position is provided by Nemeth and Wachtler (1973), although unequivocal conclusions are precluded due to the limitations discussed above. (b) Drawing on attribution theory and the attitude change literature (e.g. Hovland and Mandell, 1952; Walster, Aronson and Abrahams, 1966), Nemeth and Wachtler (1973) proposed that double minorities will be perceived as having greater self-interest and thus be less influential than single minorities when the task is of direct relevance to the minority status. The results of their study, however, did not confirm this prediction. A second general approach to this problem derives from the work of Paicheler (1976, 1977) who argued that minority influence is mediated by the evolution of
A recent study by Paicheler (1979) included conditions in which a male or female confederate holding a minority view on womens rights confronted a heterogeneous (mixed sex) majority. Since this study did not include a double minority condition as defined above, it is somewhat tangential to the present discussion and will not be presented in detail.

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the Zeitgeist. In her studies, minority influence was facilitated when the norm trend was moving toward the position advocated by the minority. When the Zeitgeist was unfavourable, the communication between majority and minority quickly broke down, and polarization of the original opinions occurred. Although Paicheler does not address the issue of single versus double minorities, it is likely that single minorities will be more influential than double minorities only when the Zeitgeist is favourabie to minority influence. When the Zeitgeist is unfavourable, neither single nor double minorities will be able to move the majority position towards them; if polarization of the majority position occurs, it can even be expected to be stronger for double than for single minorities. The present experiment attempted to test the differential predictions of the approaches discussed above. In order to assess the impact of single versus double minority membership groups of male subjects discussed a critical topic with the minority consisting of either two male (single minority) or two female confederates (double minority). Women were defined as a minority in accordance with a social definition (rather than quantitative; see Van Den Berghe, 1967) of minority as a relatively powerless and identifiable subgroup of society-a definition employed by many governments and the United Nations. The two confederates consistently advocated a point of view which deviated from the opinion held by the other subjects. On one of the issues, the pro-abortion position taken by the minority was favoured by the development of the Zeitgeist. On the second issue, the anti-death penalty position ran counter to the evolution of the Zeitgeist. A number of articles (e.g. Jones and Westoff, 1978) suggest that attitudes towards abortion as well as abortion laws have become increasingly liberal in the United States over the past 30 years. Thus, the development of the Zeitgeist appears to be in favour of a minority arguing for a more liberal abortion law. In contrast, the resumption of executions in the United States after several years of no capital punishment and the increasing public support for capital punishment (Rankin, 1979; Hesselbart, 1980) indicate that a minority arguing against the death penalty will run counter to the evolution of the Zeitgeist. In summary, two competing hypotheses were formulated with respect to the differential impact of double versus single minorities. According to the competency notion, a double minority was expected to be perceived as more competent, and hence be more influential than a single minority when arguing about an issue (abortion) of direct relevance to the minority status. Alternatively, the self-interest notion predicted that the double minority should be perceived as being biased, and thus exert less influence than single minorities in this case. Neither notion predicted a differential effect for double and single minorities when the issue (death penalty) was not related to the minority status. An additional hypothesis was formulated with respect to the conditions which favour or impede minority influence. According to the Zeitgeist notion a minority would be expected to exert the strongest influence when the Zeitgeist is moving towards the direction of the minority (abortion) while minority influence should be minimized when the Zeitgeist is unfavourable to the position advocated by the minority (death penalty).

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METHOD
Subjects

One-hundred twenty male subjects with moderately liberal to strongly conservative attitudes (anti-abortion and pro-death penalty) were selected from a pool of 271 undergraduates on the basis of a 7-point Likert-type attitude scale. Subjects were divided into four subgroups according to their pretest scores. The most liberal subgroup was slightly more liberal than the mean (z-scores between -0.25 and 0) while the other three subgroups ranged on the conservative side of the scale. The latter subjects were grouped into those with z-scores between 0 and 0.3, 0.3 and 0.7, and above 0.7. Subjects on the liberal side of the distribution were excluded if their z-scores ranged below -0.25 in order to assure the necessary discrepancy between the subjects opinion and the minority position and to avoid a coalition formation between the most liberal subjects and the confederates. Thus, the final sample was representative for approximately 70 per cent of the total population. In a 2 (abortion versus death penalty) x 3 (single minority versus double minority versus control group) factorial design, subjects were randomly assigned to four experimental and two control conditions, including five groups per condition. In each group, subjects were matched according to the four subgroups described above. Due to occasional no-shows and substitution with additional subjects the blocking was incomplete in some of the experimental groups.
Pilot study
A 7-point attitude scale with four items per issue was constructed. The first two items assessed the subjects general approval or disapproval of death penalty and abortion and the specific conditions under which they considered abortion and death penalty appropriate. T w o additional questions were asked for each issue (the likelihood of mistaken death warrants, the preventative function of capital punishment; the requirement of the husbands consent on abortion, and the coverage of abortions by Medicaid/Medicare). The questionnaire was pretested on a sample of 31 undergraduates. The internal consistency of the scales yielded 0.85 (Cronbachs Alpha) for the death penalty and 0.81 for the abortion scale. In addition, the pilot study assured that both issues, abortion and death penalty, were rated equally important (X abortion = 2.0, X death penalty = 2.0, t(29) = 0.0, n.s., where 1 = important, 7 = unimportant).

Initial attitude assessment

An initial attitude assessment (N = 271) was conducted in order to select subjects for the main experiment. To assure that the scores were comparable for both issues, the initial attitude scores were transformed to z-scores, item by item. The z-scores for each subject were averaged across items and subjects were selected on the basis of their mean z-scores.

Procedure
Subjects were told that they were participating in a study on human relations investigating the impact of attitudinal differences on group decisions. In the

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experimental conditions subjects were members of a conservative majority while the confederates were consistently putting forward a liberal position.

Experimental conditions
For the pro-Zeitgeist conditions, four subjects and two confederates read four legal bills which were purportedly potential replacements for the present abortion law. The most conservative of the bills would not allow abortions under any circumstances while the most liberal abortion law would not limit abortion during the first three months. In the anti-Zeitgeist conditions, the subjects and two confederates discussed four bills about the death penalty ranging from the most conservative bill which would allow capital punishment for several crimes up to the most liberal bill which rejected capital punishment under all conditions. In half of the pro- and anti-Zeitgeist conditions, subjects were confronted with two male confederates (single minority) while the other half was exposed to two female confederates (double minority). Subjects were asked to discuss the bills for 20 minutes and, if possible, to reach a unanimous decision as to which bill should be accepted. If no consensus was reached the discussion was terminated after 20 minutes. Subjects were then asked to fill out individually an attitude questionnaire on the same topic. After the experiment subjects were carefully debriefed and both the experimental design and the necessity for the deception was explained in detail.

Constitution of control groups

Control subjects were asked to fill out the attitude questionnaire without reading the legal bills and without participating in the group discussion. A set of five nominal control groups was constituted for each topic from among the control subjects using the same criteria as for the experimental groups. Thus, each control group consisted of four randomly assigned subjects-one from each of the four subgroups.

Training of confederates
Three male and three female undergraduates served as the minority in both the pro- (abortion) and anti-Zeitgeist (death penalty) conditions. The confederates were provided with a number of arguments for each topic. In order to assure that these arguments were not unusual or highly sophisticated, the six most frequently listed arguments were selected from a pretest in which undergraduates were asked to give reasons for and against the death penalty and abortion. The six most popular arguments for abortion were disadvantages of being an unwanted child, overpopulation and starvation, free choice of motherhood, danger of poorly performed illegal abortions, stress associated with pregnancy resulting from rape, and costs of child care. The six most popular arguments against capital punishment were legalized murder, possibility of erroneous sentences, lack of payoff for victim, chance for rehabilitation, ineffective method of crime prevention, and discrimination against minority groups. The confederates were instructed to argue for the most liberal bill, and to defend their position consistently without shifting towards the majority position. Following

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Mugnys (1975a) findings, however, confederates were also asked to use their arguments in a flexible rather than repetitious way. That is, the confederates were trained to adapt their argumentation to previous comments of other group members. Further, they were instructed not to dominate the discussion and to leave enough time for other group members to talk.

Dependent measure The single item scores on the post-test attitude questionnaire were transformed into z-scores using the norms from the initial attitude assessment. These z-scores were then averaged in order to obtain a single attitude score for each subject. Attitude change scores were obtained by subtracting the subjectss mean post-test z-score from his mean pretest z-score, with positive scores indicating a change towards the minority position. Manipulation check and attributional measures As in most minority influence studies, the perceived consistency of the minority was assessed by a post-experimental questionnaire. Each subject was asked to rate the consistency of argumentation of each of the other group members on a 7-point scale. This was essential for the present study since, contrary to most other minority influence studies, the minority was represented by both male and female confederates. Thus, it was important to assure that male and female confederates were perceived as equally consistent. Since it was hypothesized that attitude shifts of the majority might be mediated by perceived competence or perceived self-interest, subjects were also asked to rate each of the other group members on a 7-point scale with respect to their competence and self interest. Finally, perceived certainty was included since Moscovici ( e g Moscovici, 1976) claimed in his original formulation of the theory that perceived certainty rather than competency is the critical attribution in minority influence.
RESULTS

Unit of analysis
Since subjects were nested within groups, and groups were nested within treatments, it was necessary to determine first whether individual scores or groups should serve as appropriate unit of analysis. In order to test the significance of the nested group variances, a preliminary hierarchical ANOVA was performed on all groups (including the nominal control groups) which would be included in the final analyses. Groups were not found to reliably add variance to the residual error term (F(24, 90) = 1.23, p = 0.24). Consequently, the between and within group variances were pooled and individual scores were used as unit of analysis throughout the statistical analyses (see Anderson and Ager, 1978).

Attitude change
In order to determine the degree of attitude change as a function of topic, minority status, and discrepancy of opinion, a 2 (abortion versus death penalty) x 3 (single

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minority versus double minority versus control group) x 4 (subgroups) ANOVA was performed3. Subgroups were included in the analysis since Paicheler (1 976, 1977) found that the Zeitgeist had differential effects according to the initial discrepancy of opinion. p < Topic (F(1, 96) = 16.44,p < 0.001), minority status ( F ( 2 , 96) = 6.16, 0.005)and discrepancy of opinion (F(3,96) = 4.56, p < 0.001)revealed reliable main effects accounting for 11, 8 and 9 per cent of the variance, respectively. Subjects were more likely to change their attitude with respect to abortion than with respect to the death penalty, and subjects in both the single and the double minority conditions changed their opinion to a higher degree than did the control subjects (Newman-Keuls, p < 0.05). Additionally, single minorities tended to be more influential than double minorities although this difference failed to reach statistical significance. The interaction between topic and minority status was also sigificant (F(2, 96) = 3 . 9 9 ,< ~ 0.05)accounting for 5 per cent of the variance. As can be seen in Figure 1, a strong shift of attitudes towards the minority position was observed in those conditions in which the confederates argued for a liberal abortion law while the attitude change in the control condition was close to zero. Single minorities (male confederates) were particularly influential on the abortion issue while double minorities (female confederates) had less impact upon the opinion of the majority. A subsequent Newman-Keuls test revealed that subjects in both, the single and the double minority condition changed their opinion to a significantly higher degree than subjects in the control condition (Newman-Keuls, p < 0.05). In addition, single minorities showed a strong but non-significant trend to be more influential than double minorities. When arguing against the death penalty, however, neither minority brought about any attitude change.

1
male conf.

female
conf.

control group

Figure 1. Interaction between minority status and topic (The figure is based on raw scores of attitude change on a 7-point scale with positive scores indicating a change towards the minority position)
3Note that all Fvalues as well as all additional analyses (e.g. Newman-Keuls) are based onz-scores while the means and figures represent raw scores in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results.

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The consensus data nicely paralleled these results. In none of the 10 groups did the majority ever adopt the minority position on the death penalty, whereas they adopted the minority position on abortion half of the time (Fisher Exact test,p = 0.05). Three out of five groups yielded the minority position when single minorities were arguing for a liberal abortion law and two out of five groups agreed with the most liberal abortion law when it was advocated by a double minority. Finally, the greatest amount of attitude change was observed for the most conservative subjects while those subjects whose initial opinion was most similar to < that of the minority were least likely to change their opinion ( F ( 3 , 96) = 4 . 5 6 , ~ 0.001). A subsequent Newman-Keuls test showed that the most liberal subjects (X = 0.03) were significantly less likely to change their opinion than the two most conservative groups ( X = 0.37 and 0.69, respectively; p < 0.05) while all other comparisons were not significant. This pattern of attitude change was not found to interact with either topic ( F ( 3 , 96) = 0.85, n.s.) or minority status (F(6, 96) = 0.87, n.s.). Since the same pattern was also found in the control condition where no group interaction took place, one might conclude that the observed differential susceptibility to minority influence is simply a function of a regression effect.

Manipulation check and attributional measures

Following Anderson and Ager (1 978), preliminary hierarchical ANOVAs were again performed for each rating item in order to determine the appropriate unit of analysis. Since sizeable group effects were obtained for the consistency (main = 0.16; interaction with majority versus minority rating: effect: F( 16, 60) = 1 . 4 4 , ~ F( 16, 60 = 2.5, p = 0.01), competency (interaction with majority versus minority = 0.15), and certainty scores (interaction with majority rating: F(16, 60) = 1 . 5 , ~ versus minority ratings: F( 16, 60) = 2.1, p = 0.02), groups were employed as the unit of analysis for all four measures to facilitate ease of interpretation. Consistency According to Moscovicis theory of minority influence, a consistent behavioural style is the key to the minoritys success. The manipulation check confirmed that the experimental manipulation of consistency was, in fact, effective. A 2 (topic) x 2 (type of minority) x 2 (majority versus minority ratings) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last variable showed that the minorities were rated significantly more consistent (X = 1.93)4than the majority ( X = 2.54; F(1, 16) = 1 1 . 5 7 , ~ < 0.005) while the single and double minorities appeared equally consistent and no differences were observed as a function of topic.

Competency
With reference to the findings of Nemeth and her coworkers (Nemeth et al., 1977; Nemeth and Wachtler, 1973), subjects might infer competency when observing a consistently arguing minority. This hypothesis was not confirmed. A 2 (topic) x 2
4Note that the means represent ratings on a 7-point scale with low scores indicating high consistency, self-interest, and certainty ratings.

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Table 1 . Average rating of the majoritys and the minoritys self interest under conditions of influence from single versus double minorities* Minority status Type of rating Rating of majority Rating of minority Total Single minority (males) 3.23 Double minority (females)
3.01

Total 3.12 2.40

2.82

1.98
2.49

3.02

*This table represents rating o n a 7-point scale with low scores indicating high self interest. Since there were no significant effects for topic, the means were collapsed across topics.

(type of minority) x 2 (majority versus minority) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last variable showed that the minority was not perceived as being more competent than the majority (F(1, 16) = 2.63, p > 0.1) nor did the perceived competence vary as a function of any other variable (topic or type of minority).
Self-interest

Based on the findings of Walster et al. (1966) and Nemeth and Wachtler (1973), we investigated whether the attribution of self-interest might mediate minority influence. The means for this variable are presented in Table 1. A 2 (topic) x 2 (type of minority) x 2 (majority versus minority) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last variable showed that the minority was perceived as having a significantly stronger self-interest than the majority (F(1, 16) = 27.21, p < 0.001). More importantly, the attribution of self-interest was particularly pronounced for double minorities as is demonstrated by the interaction between majority versus minority ratings and type of minority (F(1, 16) = 5.05, p < 0.05). A subsequent Newman-Keuls test showed that the double minorities were perceived as having a stronger self interest than either the single minorities or the majority ( p < 0.05), while the single minorities and the majority were perceived as having the same degree of self-interest.
Certainty

In accordance with Moscovicis original formulation, single and double minorities ( X = 1.75) were perceived as more certain than the majority ( X = 2.27; F(1, 16) = 10.17, p < 0.01) while the minority status and topic did not interact with majority versus minority ratings.

DISCUSSION
The primary question raised in the present study was the generalizability of findings on single minorities to actual minority groups. Two hypotheses were formulated making differential predictions for single versus double minorities under conditions

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of task-relevant minority membership. The competency notion predicted that double minorities would be perceived as more competent and consequently be more influential than single minorities. This prediction was not confirmed for either the perceived competency or attitude change measures. On the contrary, subjects showed a strong but nonsignificant trend to modify their attitudes more when confronted with a single minority than when exposed to a double minority. The obtained results were consistent with the self-interest notion: double minorities were perceived as having a stronger self-interest than both single minorities and naive subjects, and tended to be less influential than the single minority. From the perspective of the majority member, the attributional process can be thought of in the following way: The subject observes a consistent minority which stubbornly defends its position against the majority and infers that the minority must be very certain about its position. In addition, attribution of certainty is heightened by two factors. First, the subject observes the considerable social pressure from the majority trying to reach a consensus. In terms of Kelleys (1971) augmentation principle the subject is provided with a facilitative cause (the perceived certainty) and an inhibitory cause (social pressure), and will therefore judge the facilitative cause for the minoritys deviance even greater than if it alone were present. Second, the attribution of certainty is heightened by the fact that the disagreement with the minority cannot easily be explained as an idiosyncracy (e.g. craziness) of the deviates personality since the minority is not alone but receives the social support from another minority member (Allen, 1975). When confronted with a double minority, however, an additional variable may enter the attribution process: the inferred self-interest of a double minority. Double minorities were perceived as having a stronger self-interest than either single minorities or majorities. This attribution might offer an alternative cause for the minoritys deviance and, thus, allow the majority observers to discount the arguments of the minority (cf. Anderson, 1974). Although the results of the study are consistent with this explanation, the design of the experiment precludes an experimental test of such a discounting effect. Two alternative explanations might account for the finding that double minorities are less influential than single minorities. First, considering that discrimination against women is still a frequent phenomenon in current American society, it is conceivable that double minorities as operationalized in the present study had less impact due to sexist attitudes of the subjects. The post-experimental assessment, however, does not indicate any sexual discrimination; according to the perceptual measures, women minorities were perceived as equally consistent, competent and certain as their male counterparts. Secondly, the differential impact of single versus double minorities can be conceptualized as an expression of the more general phenomenon of social categorization (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1978). In his theory of social categorization, Tajfel has proposed that the grouping of social objects into distinct categories is in itself sufficient cause for intergroup discrimination. Thus, the mere perception of belonging to different social groups is sufficient to induce ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination. Since double minorities were defined as belonging to a distinctly different social category, outgroup discrimination might have occurred for double but not for single minorities who were members of the same social group. This explanation is in line with the finding that double minorities were

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perceived as having greater self-interest independent of whether or not the task was related to their minority status. Considering, however, that no other attributional measure (consistency, competency, certainty) revealed any ingroup favouritism or outgroup discrimination, this explanation should be treated with caution. Only an orthogonal design in which double and single minorities argue both for and against their own interest would allow us to decide whether double minorities are generally less influential because they constitute an outgroup, or whether they will be less influential only when perceived as having a strong self-interest. The second problem addressed in this study is the question why certain minorities in history were highly successful while others were not. With reference to Paicheler (1976, 1977) it has been argued that a minority will be most successful when the development of the norms is favouring the position advocated by the minority. On the other hand, minority influence will be minimized when the Zeitgeist is moving in a direction opposite to the position advocated by the minority. The results confirmed this prediction. Minorities were more influential when arguing for abortion than when arguing against the death penalty. Three alternative explanations could be offered for this finding. First, it could be argued that the subjects might have had a differential degree of commitment or investment in the two topics and that people are less likely to change their opinion with regard to issues that they consider very important. A previously conducted test, however, had indicated that the two issues, abortion and death penalty, were rated as being equally important. Secondly, it might be argued that the minority position was more extreme on the death penalty than on the abortion issue. A number of studies indicate that the extremity of the deviates position decreases the majoritys susceptability to minority influence (e.g. Hensley and Duval, 1976; Nemeth er al., 1974). Since the subjects of the present study were selected on the basis of their z-scores rather than absolute scores, and since the subjects might generally hold more liberal attitudes towards abortion than towards the death penalty, the discrepancy between minority and majority opinion might have been larger on the death penalty issue. The analysis by subgroups, however, did not reveal any impairment of minority influence as a function of extremity of opinion. On the contrary, the more extreme the differences in opinion, the more likely were the subjects to change their opinion. Finally, assuming that attitudes towards abortion are relatively positive in the U.S., it is conceivable that minorities in the positive Zeitgeist condition were perceived as representative of a majority rather than a minority. Considering, however, that only 40 per cent of the population favour abortion under conditions other than rape, incest, and threat to the womans life (National Opinion Research Center, reported in Time, April 6, 1981) such an explanation would be accurate only if subjects would dramatically overestimate the proportion of people favouring abortion. Thus, neither of the three alternative explanations seem very well suited to explain the obtained results. Although the Zeitgeist notion is intuitively appealing, it is, at the present time, a rather abstract concept whose underlying processes are not well understood. Unfortunately, no attempt was made in previous studies (Paicheler, 1976, 1977) to identify the processes which determine the failure of minority influence under unfavourable normative circumstances. In the present study, none of the attributional processes studies (competency, self-interest, and certainty) were able to account for differences between favourable (abortion) and unfavourable norm

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trend conditions (death penalty). One might hypothesize that the meaning of the minoritys behavioural style might vary as a function of the Zeitgeist; the same consistent behavioural style might, for example, be perceived as more rigid as the Zeitgeist becomes less favourable to the minority position. Alternatively, one might argue that the Zeitgeist effect is an expression of a false consensus bias; when the Zeitgeist is in favour of the majority position, subjects might overestimate the prevalence of their own opinion to a higher degree than when the Zeitgeist is in favour of the minority position. It remains for further research to identify the Zeitgeist-related psychological processes which mediate success and failure of an innovative minority. In summary, the results of the present study indicate that minority influence is likely to fail when the Zeitgeist runs counter to the innovation proposed by the minority-be it a single or a double minority. Further, the results suggest that the processes of minority influence are somewhat different when actual minority groups are involved. Double minority status seems to facilitate generation of alternative explanations for the deviates behaviour, particularly the attribution of self-interest, thus decreasing the possibility for minority influence to occur. These findings suggest that the results of minority influence studies with single minorities may overestimate the degree of innovative influence that actual minority groups are able to exert. It remains for further research to investigate whether this observation also holds true for other and possibly more salient minorities such as Blacks or Hispanics in the U.S. or guest workers in North and Middle Europe.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We wish to thank Harold Fletcher for his statistical advice and John C. Brigham, Lee B. Sechrest, and Stephen G. West for their critical comments on previous drafts of this manuscript.

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RkSUME
On a recherche de quelle manikre la compCtence perque, Iinteret personnel impute et le Zeitgeist affectent Iinfluence minoritaire ou: la theorie de Moscovici sapplique-t-elle bien a des minorites sociales rCelles (ou a des experiences sur Iinfluence minoritaire oh il est question de problemes sociaux reels). La notion dinter&tconduit a predire que les minorites simples (divergeant seulement quant aux croyances ou aux opinions) auront plus dinfluence que les minoritPs doubles (divergeant quant aux opinions et a Iappartenance categorielle); la notion de competence conduit, elle, a la prediction inverse. En outre la minorite (simple ou double) devrait avoir plus dinfluence si le Zeitgeist (la tendance dans la population) va dans le sens de la position minoritaire. Cent vingt etudiants americains de sexe masculin, conservateurs, ont kt6 distribues dans un plan factoriel de 2 (pro/anti Zeitgeist) x 3 (minorite simple, double et groupe temoin); les discussions se faisaient en groupes de six comprenant deux compkres liberaux tous les deux de sexe masculin (minorite simple) ou tous les deux de sexe ferninin (minorite double); les comperes argumentaient de manitre consistente (mais flexible) sur deux themes de discussion: Iavortement (pro Zeitgeist) et la peine de mort (anti Zeitgeist). Les resultats sont coherents avec la notion dinteret: les minorites doubles sont considerees comme ayant un int6rCt personnel plus eleve dans le sujet et elles exercent moins dinfluence que les minorites simples (statistiquernent non significatif). Aucune minorite na eu dinfluence lorsque sa position allait contre lopinion gknkrale ce qui confirme Ihypothese du Zeitgeist. On discute les processus dattribution sous-jacents ainsi que la validiti ecologique des recherches precedentes dans le domaine.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Untersuchte, ob eher wahrgenommene Kompetenz oder wahrgenommenes Eigeninteresse und wie dariiberhinaus der Zeitgeist den EinfluB von Minderheiten steuern. Die Autoren

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wollten darnit auch priifen, ob sich Moscovicis Theorie auf wirklich soziale Minderheiten anwenden 1aRt. Wird Eigeninteresse verrnutet, so rnussten einfache Minderheiten einfluareicher afs zweifache sein, wird Kompetenz gesehen,.so miisste das Gegenteil gelten. Einfache Minderheiten weichen nur in den vertretenen Uberzeugungen ab, zweifache gehoren zusatzlich einer anderen sozialen Kategorie an. Zudern erwarteten die Autoren, d& beide Arten von Minderheiten nur dann Mehrheiten beeinflussen, wenn der Zeitgeist sie begiinstigt. In einern 2 (pro-/anti-Zeitgeist) x 3 (einfache/zweifache Minderheit/Kontrollgruppe) -faktoriellen Versuchsplan bildeten 120 gemaigt bis stark konservative mannliche arnerikanische Collegestudenten zu je vieren mit zwei Mitwissern eine Diskussionsgruppe. Die Mitwisser, entweder mannlich (einfache) oder weiblich (zweifache Minderheit), vertraten stets die liberale Position zu den Diskussionsthernen Abtreibung (pro) oder Todesstrafe (anti Zeitgeist). Die Ergebnisse stiitzen die Annahrne, daR der Eindruck des Eigeninteresses wirkt: die Vpn verdachtigen die zweifachen Minderheiten starker des Eigeninteresses. Zudern bewirken einfache Minderheiten starkere Einstellungsanderungen bei den Vpn als z_weifache. Die Ergebnisse bestatigen auch die Zeitgeist-Hypothese. Die Autoren stellen Uberlegungen an, welche Attributionen solchen Prozessen zugrunde liegen und ob friihere Untersuchungen geniigend okologische Validitat besaBen.
Authorss address:

Anne Maass, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, U.S.A.