European Journal of Social Psychology Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.

29, 825832 (1999)

Short Note Minority inuence and optimal problem solving

ROBIN MARTIN* and MILES HEWSTONE Cardi University, UK
Abstract An analogous thinking task was used to test Nemeth's ConvergentDivergent theory of majority and minority inuence. Participants read a (base) problem and one of three solutions (one of which is considered the `best' solution). They then generated solutions to a second (target) problem which shared similar structural features to the rst problem. Due to the similarities between problems, the solution given to the rst problem can be used as an analogy in solving the second. In contrast to Nemeth's theory, when the solution to the base problem was endorsed by a numerical majority there was not an increase in analogy-transfer in solving the target problem. However, in support of Nemeth's theory, when the base solution was supported by a numerical minority then the participants were more likely to generate the `best' solution to the target problem regardless of which base solution they were given. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION According to Nemeth's (1986, 1995) ConvergentDivergent Theory of majority and minority inuence, individuals nd a dissenting majority surprising and stressful, as it places the individual in a minority position. This leads to a narrowing of attention and convergent thinking whereby individuals focus upon the majority's message to the neglect of other issues. Exposure to a numerical minority, by contrast, is less stressful because this places the individual in the majority and this allows individuals to engage in divergent thinking that involves consideration of a range of issues related to the
*Correspondence to: Dr Robin Martin, School of Psychology, Cardi University, PO Box 901, Cardi CF1 3YG, UK. e-mail: MartinR@cardi.ac.uk Contract/grant sponsor: Economic and Social Research Council. Contract/grant sponsor number: R000236149.

CCC 00462772/99/05082508$17.50 Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 1 October 1997 Accepted 8 February 1999

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minority position. As a result of divergent thinking, Nemeth argues that a minority can cause individuals to generate new, novel and better judgements. On the basis of these dierent thinking styles, a majority should increase majority-response following while a minority, by instigating a wider consideration of the issues, can lead to improved judgements and performance. A growing body of evidence supports Nemeth's hypotheses. For example, studies have shown that exposure to a dissenting minority leads to the generation of more creative and novel judgements compared to exposure to a dissenting majority ( for example, Mucchi-Faina, Maass & Volpato, 1991; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983; see also Martin, 1996). Also, when exposed to a dissenting majority, individuals tend to adopt the majority proposal or strategy. However, whereas exposure to a dissenting minority leads to the use of multiple strategies in solving problems, a dissenting majority leads individuals to focus on the majority-endorsed rez, 1996; Legrenzi, Butera, strategy ( for example, Butera, Mugny, Legrenzi & Pe rez, 1991; Nemeth & Kwan, 1987; Peterson & Nemeth, 1996). Finally, Mugny & Pe minorities encourage divergent thinking involving issue-relevant thinking while majorities lead to message-relevant thinking ( for example, De Dreu & De Vries, 1993; Trost, Maass & Kenrick, 1992). Notwithstanding the important contribution of the above studies in supporting Nemeth's hypotheses, it should be noted that most of the problem-solving studies have used cognitive tasks which rely upon attention and selection (such as the stroop test or detecting anagrams). Presumably these tasks were chosen because it is possible to identify an objectively correct response according to which participants' performance can be assessed. However, there is a need to extend this research to more complex thinking tasks, which require considerable cognitive eort. The present study tests Nemeth's theory in a paradigm where successful performance depends upon the use of analogous thinking which is believed to be an important process in creativity. Gick and Holyoak (1983) consider that the `. . . essence of analogical thinking is the transfer of knowledge from one situation to another by the process of mapping nding a set of one-to-one correspondences (often incomplete) between aspects of one body of information and aspects of another' ( p. 2). Koestler (1964) notes that many scientic discoveries and inventions resulted from noticing novel connections between dierent domains. For example, major theoretical advances have been made of the circulatory system, the internal structure of the atom and the movement of gases by drawing upon analogies of, respectively, the operation of a hydraulic pump, the motion of planets and the collision of billiard balls. Therefore, analogical thinking is a potentially interesting process when considering social inuence. The typical analogous thinking study involves participants rst reading a (base) problem and a solution to that problem. Following this, the participants are given a (target) problem and asked to generate their own solution to that problem. The base and target problems are similar in structure but dier in context. When participants do not read the base problem and solution, few people generate good solutions to the target problem. However, if participants read the base problem and solution, they often use that solution as an analogy for solving the target problem. The detection of the analogy depends upon individuals actively analysing the solution to the base problem and using that as an analogy for solving the target problem (see Novick, 1988; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994).
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The problem used in this study was developed by Gick and Holyoak (1980). The base problem concerns a general who has to attack a fort. The fort has several roads leading to it that are mined such that they explode when a large group of troops travels along them. Participants then read one of a range of possible solutions to the base problem ( for example, divide forces into small groups and send them up dierent roads, so as not to explode bombs, they then converge on the fort with increased impact and destroy it). The target problem concerns a doctor who is treating a patient who has a tumour with radiation. The doctor has two types of rays at his or her disposal; one strong ray that kills the tumour but also the surrounding tissues and one weak ray that does not harm the tissues but has little impact upon the tumour. The structural details of the two problems are similar and it is possible to use the solution to the base ( fort) problem as an analogy in solving the target (radiation) problem ( for example, based on the solution above, the solution to the target problem would be to direct the weak rays at dierent angles to the tumour, so as not to damage the surrounding tissues, so that the rays overlap on the tumour with increased intensity and destroy it). While there are a range of potential solutions to the base problem, and therefore analogies in solving the target problem, one of these solutions is considered the best (in fact, it is the example given above). Applying this paradigm to majority and minority inuence a number of hypotheses can be proposed based upon Nemeth's theory.1 When the solution to the base problem is endorsed by a majority, Nemeth would predict that individuals should focus upon that solution and use that as an analogy in solving the target problem. In contrast, when the solution to the base problem is endorsed by a minority, individuals should be more likely to consider a range of potential solutions, other than that given, and be more likely to generate the best solution to the target problem, irrespective of which solution to the base problem is given. In short, Nemeth would predict more following of the given analogy when endorsed by a majority, but generation of the best solution to the target problem when the solution to the base problem is supported by a minority (irrespective of which base solution the minority supported).

METHOD Participants and Design The participants were 50 male and 103 female students at a college of further education in South Wales. Mean age was 23.3 years (SD 9.23). The design was a 3 (source: majority versus minority versus control) 3 (solution: attack-dispersion versus open-supply versus tunnel) between-subjects with participants being randomly assigned into one of 9 cells (17 participants per cell). Participants were tested in groups varying in size from 8 to 20.

It should be acknowledged that other theoretical perspectives of majority and minority inuence make predictions concerning the level of message processing in each source condition (such as Objective Consensus Approach, Mackie, 1987; Conversion Theory, Moscovici, 1980). However, since these theories do not link increased message processing with increased task performance they are not considered further. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 825832 (1999)

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Materials The problems and solutions employed were developed by Gick and Holyoak (1980). The base problem concerns a general trying to attack a fort that has several roads leading to it but each road is mined such that they explode when large numbers of people travel on them. There are many potential solutions to the base ( fort) problem that provide analogies for the target (radiation) problem and three have been tested. The rst solution, termed attack-dispersion,2 proposes dividing the army into smaller units so that they can travel up each road, without causing explosions, and they then converge on the fort to destroy it. The attack-dispersion analogy leads to the `best' solution to the target (radiation) problem; namely, attacking the tumour from several angles with low-intensity rays to converge on the tumour with increased intensity to kill it. The analogy from the base to target problems draws upon the following stages; dividing ones' forces (rays) into smaller units (low-intensity rays) to travel along dierent routes (aim rays at dierent angles) so as not to explode mines (aect healthy tissues) and converge on fort (tumour) to defeat enemy (kill tumour). Two other solutions to the base problem can also be identied and, while adequate, are not considered to be as eective as the attack-dispersion solution. The rst is termed opensupply where the general assumes that the fort would keep one road unmined for the supply of goods and once found he or she could send his or her forces down that open road to attack the fort (applied to the radiation problem, the solution would be to look for a way to get to the tumour through an already existing opening, such as mouth, gut). The third solution is termed tunnel where the general digs a tunnel under the mined roads to attack the fort (applied to the radiation problem the solution would be to cut an opening through the surrounding tissues to get direct access to the tumour and then use high-intensity rays). The attack-dispersion solution was identied as the best out of the three proposals from pre-testing conducted by Gick and Holyoak (1980). To conrm the superiority of the attack-dispersion solution to the present sample, 20 participants from the same institution used in the main study were asked to judge the best solution to the radiation problem from a range of six solutions which included the above three (the six solutions were the same as those used in Gick & Holyoak's pre-testing). Eighteen out of the 20 participants identied the attack-dispersion as the best solution. The two participants who did not rate the attack-dispersion as the best solution judged it to be in the top three best solutions. Furthermore, three general nurses from a local hospital, who each have experience of dealing with patients with tumours, judged the three solutions as being eective but the attack-dispersion as the most appropriate as it was non-invasive. Thus both consensus and expert opinion show that the attackdispersion is the best solution to the radiation problem. Procedure Participants were informed that the study concerned problem solving and that they would be required to think of solutions to a particular problem. First, they read the
In latter papers the term for the attack-dispersion solution has been changed to `convergence' to highlight the fact that the rays converge on the target (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Given the potential confusion over the solution name (convergence) and Nemeth's term of `convergent thinking', the original term for the solution is used. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 825832 (1999)
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base problem and were informed that previous research had shown that two types of solutions were favoured, one is favoured by 82 per cent and the other by 18 per cent of the population. They then read one of the three solutions and were told it was supported by either the majority or the minority. In the control condition, the survey was not mentioned and they were told that the solution they were to read was one potential solution to the problem. Participants then read the target problem and were given approximately 10 minutes to write as many solutions to the problem as they wished. At the end of the study the participants were asked to indicate their best solution to the problem.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The total number of proposals generated by each participant was analysed with a 3 (source: majority versus minority versus control) 3 (solution to base problem: attack-dispersion versus open-supply versus tunnel) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). The only signicant nding was a main eect for source, F(2,142) 3.97, p 5 0.02, with a Tukey HSD test showing the majority condition (M 2.12) resulted in more proposals than the control condition (M 1.62). There was no dierence between the minority condition (M 1.82) and the other two conditions. The next stage was to categorise the `best' proposal identied by the participants into three groups; (1) the best solution that is, attack-dispersion, (2) an analogy of the solution given to the base problem (tunnel or open-supply), and (3) another solution that is, not (1) or (2). This categorisation was carried out by two raters who were blind to participants' condition. The raters agreed on 92 per cent of occasions and discussed any dierences until agreement had been reached. The raters also judged whether the participants had identied their `best' solution out of those that they generated. The raters agreed that every participant had indeed identied their best solution. It was not possible to do an analysis using the full factorial design because the proposals of those in the attack-dispersion condition can only be categorised into two groups, attack-dispersion or other solution. The distribution of preferred proposals in the attack-dispersion condition is shown in Table 1. According to Nemeth, when the base solution was supported by the majority more participants should show analogy transfer to the target problem. From Table 1, it can be seen that this hypothesis was not supported. Participants were no more likely to use the attack-dispersion solution to the target (radiation) problem than those in the minority or control conditions, w2(2) 0.16. The results for the open-supply and tunnel conditions were combined and the pattern of proposals to the target problem is shown in Table 2. Overall, the distribution of responses is signicant, w2(4) 11.5, p 5 0.03. In the control condition, 35 per cent of participants showed analogy transfer by using the solution to the base problem as an analogy for solving the target problem and this number is similar to previous studies. Consistent with the results for the attack-dispersion condition, and contrary to Nemeth's theory, a majority did not encourage analogy transfer as the proportion of proposals that were analogies of the base-problem solution did not dier from the minority or control conditions, w2(2) 1.56.
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Table 1. Distribution of proposals in the attack dispersion condition Proposed solution to target problem Attack-dispersion `best solution' Other Majority (n 17) Minority (n 17) Control (n 17) 8 (47) 9 (53) 9 (53) 9 (53) 8 (47) 8 (47)

Note: Row percentages in parentheses are rounded.

Table 2. Distribution of proposals in the open-supply and tunnel conditions Proposed solution to target problem Attack-dispersion Analogy of base `best' solution solution Other Majority (n 34) Minority (n 34) Control (n 34) 2 (6) 11 (32) 5 (15) 7 (21) 8 (24) 12 (35) 25 (73) 15 (44) 17 (50)

Note: Row percentages in parentheses are rounded.

The lack of support showing that majority convergence should lead to greater analogy transfer may be linked to the level of processing required by the task. Unlike previous studies examining Nemeth's hypotheses which have typically used low-level cognitive tasks, this study involved analogical thinking which requires a lot of cognitive eort. Analogical thinking requires individuals to recognise surface similarities between the base and target problems and only when this is achieved, can the solution to the former be used as an analogy for a solution to the latter. It is possible, that participants in the majority condition, converged their thinking on the majority's response and did not detect the surface similarities between the two problems. If the link between the base and target problem is not made, then solutions to the latter may be of poorer quality than if such a link has been made. Although we are unable to test this hypothesis within the current data, it is interesting to note that participants in the majority condition raised the most `other' solutions which were typically of low quality. Turning to the generation of the best solution, it can be seen from Table 2 that participants who read the minority-endorsed proposal were more likely to generate the best solution (32 per cent) than when the same base solution was supported by either the majority (6 per cent) or the no-support control condition (15 per cent), w2(2) 7.00, p 5 0.03. Consistent with Nemeth's theory, minority status caused more participants to generate the best solution to the problem than when the same base problem was supported by a majority. In short, the minority led to better performance, as judged by the generation of the best solution, than did the majority.
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It is interesting that over 55 per cent of participants generated proposals other than those of attack-dispersion, open-supply or tunnel. Although there was no dierence in the percentage of `other' proposals between the source conditions, w2(2) 2.95, it should be noted that those in the majority condition generated the greatest number of other proposals. It is possible that those in the majority condition did not identify their `best' proposal as their preferred choice or that they generated many original solutions which did not fall into one of the categories. To check this hypothesis, two judges rated every participant's proposals in terms of their originality while two nurses, with experience of dealing with patients with tumours, rated each proposal in terms of its medical eectiveness. Ratings were made on 9-point scales and because of the signicant correlation between raters (r 0.44, p 5 0.001 and r 0.43, p 5 0.001 for originality and medical eectiveness respectively) the average scores were used.3 Each of these ratings was analysed using a 3 (source: majority versus minority versus control) 2 (solution to base problem: open-supply versus tunnel) between-subjects ANOVA. No signicant eects were found for either measure.4 Thus there was no dierence in the originality or medical eectiveness of the proposals in the `other' category between the experimental conditions. To conclude, this study provides the rst test of Nemeth's theory on a complex analogical thinking task. According to Nemeth, a majority should lead participants to actively analyse its proposal and therefore be more likely to use this as an analogy in solving future problems. The results do not support this hypothesis as the majority did not lead to greater analogy transfer. The reason for this may be linked to the higher level of cognitive processing required by the participants in this study compared to previous research. For minority inuence, Nemeth proposes that individuals engage in divergent thinking which involves considering a range of issues associated with the minority position. By considering a range of issues, individual should be more likely to recognise a variety of potential solutions to the target problem and this can increase performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, a minority led participants to generate the best solution to the target problem when they had not been given it for the base problem. Therefore, exposure to a minority can lead to better performance on a problem-solving task than exposure to a majority.

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The pattern of ndings was very similar when using each judge's ratings. The same pattern of results was found while controlling for the total number of proposals generated. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 825832 (1999)

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Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 825832 (1999)