"Elenchus, Epode", and Magic: Socrates as Silenus Author(s): Elizabeth Belfiore Source: Phoenix, Vol. 34, No.

2 (Summer, 1980), pp. 128-137 Published by: Classical Association of Canada Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1087871 . Accessed: 19/03/2013 22:32
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Classical Association of Canada is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phoenix.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC: SOCRATES AS SILENUS

ELIZABETH BELFIORE PLATO oftenuses the vocabulary of magic (for example, goes,goeteia, and theircognates),spells (epodai), and drugs(pharmaka) to conkelesis, demnan enemy.Thus, the sophistis called a deceitful magicianat Sophist 234c, 235a, 241b, and in the Republic the imitatoris called a magician (598d, 602d) who enchants (601b, 607c-d). Physical pleasure is condemned as mere magic at Phaedo 81b, Philebus 44c, and Republic584a. Yet Socrates himself is compared with a magician (Meno 80b) who enchants people (Symposium215c-d); the mythat the end of the Phaedo is said to be an epode(114d); knowledge at Republic is called a pharmakon 595b and an epode at Republic 608a.1 These applications of the termiare morecomprehensible ifwe nologyof magic to Socratesand philosophy realize that Plato is sometimes deliberately opposing philosophy to deceitful magic,establishinga sortof "counter-magic."As Jacquelinede Romillyputs it: "Whereas the magic of the sophistsaimed at producing of all illusions. illusion,Socrates' magic restson the obstinatedestruction It is the magic of implacable truth..... It is therefore one magic against another,the one taking the former's place, but with opposite aims and and disarms deceitfulmagic in a numberof means." Philosophyopposes defined in is this a kindof "counter-magic." and sense veryclearly areas, A comparisonof the definition of deceptive magic in Republic III with Plato's statementsabout the "magic" of philosophy can help us to attain a betterunderstanding of how detailed and deliberatethis oppositionis. Socrates definesmagic,goeteia,in the course of describingsome tests
1For furtherreferencesand discussion of these topics I have found the following studies most helpful: A. Dies, "La Transposition Platonicienne," in Autour de Platon (Paris 1927); P. Boyanc6, Le Culte des Muses chez les Philosophes Grecs (Paris 1936): hereafterBoyance; L. Edelstein, "The Function of the Myth in Plato's Philosophy," fournal of the History of Ideas 10 (1949) 463-481: hereafterEdelstein; E. R. Dodds, "Plato, the Irrational Soul and the Inherited Conglomerate," in The Greeksand the Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951): hereafterDodds; W. Burkert,"Goes. Zum griechischen'Schamanismus'," RhMus 105 (1962) 36-55; J. Derrida, "La Pharmacie de Platon," Tel Quel 32 (1968) 3-48, 33 (1968) 18-58: hereafterDerrida I and II; P. Lain Entralgo, "The Platonic Rationalization of the Charm," in L. J. Rather and J. M. Sharp, eds. and trans., The TherapyoftheWord in Classical Antiquity(New Haven 1970), also published separately in German: Hermes 86 (1958) 298-323, and in Spanish: Archivo Iberoamericanode Historia de la Medicina 10 (1958) 133-160: hereafterLain Entralgo; in AncientGreece(Cambridge, Mass. 1975): hereafter J. de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric Romilly. See also D. Hitchcock, "The Role of the Myth and Its Relation to Rational Argumentin Plato's Dialogues," Diss. Claremont Graduate School, 1973. 2Romilly36-37. A similar point is made by Edelstein (475) and Derrida (11.21). 128 PHOENIx, Vol. 34 (1980) 2.

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ELENCHUS,

EPODE,

AND MAGIC

129

whichof the young people of the ideal city are least likely to determine the opinionthat one should do what is best forthe to cast out and forget He city (412e). explains that we cast opinion out of our minds either willingly(hekousios),when we learn better and get rid of false opinion, or unwillingly (akousios), when we lose true opinion. This is because we are deprivedof evils willingly and of good things But to have unwillingly. a false opinion is evil and to have a true opinion is good (413a). We should note that akousios is used here in the peculiarlyPlatonic sense, even ifwe accordingto whichwe are deprivedof good thingsunwillingly wantto be deprivedof them,not knowingthem to be good.3 Afterthis explanation,Socrates describesthreeways in whichpeople are deprived of the truth(413b-c): robbery(klope), force(bia), and magic unwillingly or argument (goeteia).Those robbed are those whom time makes forget (logos) persuades, and those forced are those made to change their opinions by pain (b6'vY,aXyqrGcv). Finally, Socrates says that "those bewitched,as I think,you also would say are those who change their because theyare enchantedby pleasureor because theyare opinioneither terrified by some fear" (413c1-3): TobsAv yo/TEvOEvras, 4ycAat, K&v aUi cs i olt av Je rt Etvat rcaoa 'i 46 60ov 'br ?OV^Sf caLrs waotv it' KrtkrtOE'rE l5all7-es.4 This passage gives us a definition of magic: (1) The aim of magic is to changeour opinions,drivingout trueopinionand givingus falseopinion. us by means of the emotions of pleasure (hedone)and (2) Magic affects fear (phobos). (3) Because magic drives out true opinion it compels its victims,that is, makes themact unwillingly (akousios). The passage also tellsus that the man who is best able to resistmagic is mostharmoniousand the best guard of himself, and that (dysgoeteutos) he is most usefulto himselfand to the city (413e). Since we later learn that this guardian is a philosopher,we see that Plato is deliberately to thoseofmagic. settingout to oppose the aims and means ofphilosophy Plato does not say in this passage what kind of magic he has in mind. However, it is reasonable to suppose that he is not directingsuch a serious attack against the cruder formsof magic, such as placing wax in crossroads,6 but against the magic of the sophistsand poets he figures condemnslater in the Republic.Throughoutthe Republic,Plato attacks as the opponents of philosophythose who persuade the multitudeby appealing to the emotionsand appetitesratherthan to reason and truth. In RepublicVI he attacks the "educators and sophists" (492d6), among
*See Adam on Republic 412e and 382a, and below, 136 and note 22. 'Adam, on Republic 413c, gives some examples in the Laws of tests forresistance to forceand magic. However, the distinctionin Republic III betweenforceas causing pain, and magic as causingfear is probably more rhetoricalthan philosophical. At least, it is clear in Republic X that pain falls within the province of the magic of poetry (below, 130), and many passages, e.g., Laws 633c9-dl, link pain with fear. 5Mentioned at Laws 933b.

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

130

PHOENIX

whom he includes politicians, painters, musicians, and poets (493d), who know nothingabout the truthbut instead have learned the passions and desires of the multitude and how to please or anger it (493a-c). These sophists who want to please the crowd necessarilyblame philosophy (494a). In RepublicVIII tragedyis blamed forpraisingthe tyrant and fordrawingregimestowards democracies and tyrannies(568a-d), is associated withthe desiresand appetites. and in RepublicIX the tyrant The "terriblemagicians(magoi) and tyrantmakers" producea tyrant by erosin him (572e-573a). The tyrantis ruledby eros,physical implanting pleasures, thus enjoying only a phantasma of true pleasure, a sort of magic (584a) whichPlato compareswithshadow-painting (586b-c). The attack on the opponent of philosophyculminatesin Republic X, wherePlato condemnsthe poet as a magician (598d, 602d) who makes pleasure and pain rule in the city instead of law and the best argument (607a-b) and tries to please the multitude(604e-605a).6 Plato explains that poetry imitates those who display excessive grief (605c-606c), excessive laughter (606c), or lust, anger, and "all the desiresand pains and pleasures in the soul" (606d) and that it produces and increases theseemotionalexcessesin us (605b, 606d). It is significant that the love ofpoetryis called erosat 607e5. Plato explicitly contraststheseemotional excesses with the restrainedgriefor pleasure of the "reasonable man" who feelsemotionsbut nevertheless uses reason to controlthem (603e604d). In him rule "reason and law," whichbid us resistpain, instead of that "drawing" (helkon, a word oftenused of magical spells) us towards pain (604a10-bl).7 The pleasure and pain by means of which the poetus are excessive emotions which are not merely nonmagician affects rational,as are all emotions,but anti-rational, having the powerto make reason "let down its guard" (606a8). The poet-magicianof RepublicX, like the magicianofRepublicIII, drivesout trueopinion,makingus take the illusion for the reality (598c, 602b, 602c, 603b, and passim). In Republic X Plato also contrasts the magician's emotionalmeans with and harmonywith the simple argument.He compares meter,rhythm, colors of painting (chromata),and says that without these the mere wordsof poetrycannotenchantus (601a-b).8
'Gerald Else, "The Structureand Date of Book 10 of Plato's Republic," AbhHeidelberg1972, argues convincinglythat we should connect the poet and painter of Republic X with the painter and sophist of the Sophist,all of whom are called magicians. In both dialogues, Plato is attacking the same enemy: the deceitfulmagic of rhetoric. 71 wish to thank the anonymous refereeof Phoenix for calling my attention to this passage. See also Phdr. 238al fora similar use of helko. 8This passage should be compared with Gorgias 465b-c, where "cosmetology" is said to give a veneerof alien beauty, partly by means of color. Though Plato does not use the wordpharmakon in these passages, it is commonlyused of the colorsused by painters (for example in Cratylus424e and 434b, Republic 420c). See P. M. Schuhl, Platon etL'Art de son temps(Paris 1952) 22 and Derrida 11.34-35.

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ELENCHUS,

EPODE,

AND MAGIC

131

A comparisonof Plato's descriptionof magic in Republic III and X with Gorgias' descriptionof the magic of rhetoricand poetry in the Encomiumof Helen' also gives much support to the view that Plato is attackingthe sophistsand poets in our passage in Republic III. Gorgias of magic whichcompelspeople to change their calls speech,logos,a form means of opinionsby pleasureand pain. Divine spells (epodai) charmand persuade by means of magic, goeteia(10), and speech can drug and bewitch the soul (14). The person who persuades, says Gorgias, exercizes compulsion,while the personpersuaded is compelled (12). Speech comes with the opinionand changes it by means of magic (10). It can together take away pain and bring pleasure (10) but it can also cause "fearful and much-weeping shuddering pity" (9)10 or pain and fear(14). Gorgias gives an account of pleasure and pain very much like Plato's. Poetry, a formof speech, produces pleasure which helps to change the opinions, producingerrorsand deceptionsof the soul (10), and pleasure is associated witheros(18-19). Gorgiascomparesthe pain and fearcaused by the logoswith fearful sightswhich cause men to fleein panic beforethereis actual danger,and so to "neglectthat whichis judged to be noble by the law and the good whichcomes fromvictory" (16). Fear is anti-rational, for it "extinguishesand drives out law" (17). Gorgias' account of the magicof the logosis thus substantiallythe same as Plato's account of the aims and means of magic in the Republic." Plato's enemythemagician,then,is a seriousand dangerousadversary. The philosopher attackshimin the verythreeareas coveredby the definitionin RepublicIII. Philosophy(1) drivesout falseopinion,attackingthe aim of magic, and (2) it enables us to resist the power of pleasure and In this way, fear,preventingthe means of magic frombeing effective. (3) it does not compel, but on the contraryenables us to act without compulsion. Philosophydrivesout falseopinionveryoftenby meansof theelenchus, whichdoes not teach any positivedoctrines or impartany actual informabut instead the soul of the worst kind of ignorance,the tion, purifies beliefthat one knowswhat one doesn't know.These points are discussed in the Sophist(229b ff.)wherethe elenchus is definedas a kind of educaVorsokr.7 B11. 9Diels-Kranz, a discussion ofpityand fear(phobos and eleos)in Gorgias, Plato, and Aristotle 1oFor see H. Flashar,"Die Medizinischen derLehrevon der Wirkung derDichGrundlagen 84 (1956) 12-48; W. Schadewaldt, tungin der Griechischen "Furcht Poetik,"Hermes und Mitleid?,"Hermes83 (1955) 129-171; M. Pohlenz,"Furchtund Mitleid?Ein Hermes 84 (1956) 49-74. Nachwort," "For a goodaccount ofGorgias'psychological theories see C. P. Segal,"Gorgiasand thePsychology oftheLogos," HSCP 66 (1962) 99-155.On Gorgias' ideas aboutrhetoric as magic see Romilly 3-22 and also herarticle et le pouvoir de la po6sie," 7HS "Gorgias 93 (1973) 155-162.

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

132

PHOENIX

tion. Those who practice the elenchusquestion people about thingsthey claim to know until they contradict themselves.This instruction,or makes those who undergo it angry with themselvesand purification, others.The Eleatic Strangercomparesthosewho practice towards gentle it withdoctors:"Doctors of thebody believethat the body cannotbenefit fromthe nourishment broughtto it until one casts out the obstructions withinit. These othersbelieve the same thingabout the soul, that it will never profitfromthe learning brought to it until by cross-examining thus removingthe (elenchon)one shames the person cross-examined, which are obstructions to and opinions learning renderinghim pure, that he knows those know he does and not more."'2 thinking things only The elenchus,then, affectsthe reason, though it does not impart information or offer It is instruction in the negative counter-arguments. sense of removal of false belief. Nevertheless,it has the very positive effectof preparingthe soul to receive learning.The comparisonwith medicineis interesting. True medicine,Plato again tells us at Republic in of the obstacles to health,such as overconsists the removal 426a-b, of all sorts, while drugs and spells are useless until these indulgences obstacles are removed.Health is not somethingput into the body by a drugalien to it. This is exactlyhow Plato describesthe healthycondition of the rational part of the soul (phronesis)in Republic VII. The other virtuesare not in the soul until theyare put thereby practiceand habit, but the power of exercizingphronesisis always in the soul. The true teacherdoes not put knowledgeinto the soul like sight into blind eyes, but instead removesthe obstacles to the properfunctioning ofphronesis, it around" to thelight.'3Similarly, in theSophistpassage quoted "turning restoresthe reason to its natural,healthycondition above, the elenchus ratherthan givingit a "drug" forwisdom. But the elenchus does not affect the reason alone. Our Sophistpassage says that it makes people ashamed and angrywith themselves.It thus arouses certain emotionswhich are the allies of reason.'4 Accordingto
12Sophist 230c-d, Cf. Theaetetus210c. The Sophist passage is usually taken to be a descriptionof the methodof Socrates and his followers. See, forexample, F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge(London 1935) 177-183; V. Goldschmidt,Les Dialogues de Platon (Paris 1963) 29-31; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought(London 1935) 241-242. For other views see A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and His Work' (New York 1952) 380-381; J. Burnet,GreekPhilosophy,Thales to Plato (London 1914) 224; G. B. Kerferd, "Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry," C9 N.s. 4 (1954). I agree with F. Oscanyan that the passage is "a perfect description of Socratic dialectics:" "On Six Definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221c-231e," Philosophical Forum 4 (1972-1973) 254. "'Republic 518b-519a. Cf. Timaeus 89a-d and Derrida 11.32 ff.on artificialremedies (pharmaka) as opposed to natural methods of curing. 14P. W. Gooch, "'Vice is Ignorance': The Interpretation of Sophist 226a-231b," Phoenix 25 (1971) 130, makes the point that cross-examination deals with the "irrational aspects of the soul" at least indirectly,by "bringing the irrational parts into a right relationshipby pointingout inconsistenciesto the rational part."

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC

133

the account given in the Republic,anger with oneselfis situated in the which sometimesmakes war against the desires when these try thumos, to forcesomeone contraryto reason, but which never becomes the ally of the desires against the reason (440b). We find a similar distinction between emotion allied with reason and emotion that works against reason at Laws 646e ff. There are, says the Athenian,two kindsof fear. One is the fearof evil whenwe expect it to befallus; the otheris fearof a deserved evil reputation,i.e., shame, aischune. This latter kind of fear actually opposes our otherpains and fearsand our greatestpleasures. It contributes to fearlessness of the enemyand to a fearof disgrace before The shame and angerwithoneselfthat the elenchus friends.15 stirsup are thus the opposite of the fearproduced by the deceitfulmagician,which opposes and overcomesthe reason. The elenchus is theopposite ofmagic in still anotherway. The deceitful works magician by affecting only his victims,while Socrates' "magic" affectshimselfas well. Thus, after Meno compares Socrates with the electricray of the sea, Socrates repliesthat he is a ray that stings itself as well as others(Meno 80c). And in the Euthyphro Socrates says that he makes bothhis own and others'arguments move around,but that he has deliberatelyuses his skill to make his victims act against their will, Socrates uses his skill against his own will and makes his "victims" able to act willingly. We can now betterunderstandthe serious intentionbehind the irony in those passages in which the people who experience the Socratic elenchus compareit withmagic. Plato is at once attackinghis enemyand showing how philosophyis a kind of "counter-magic." Meno says to Socrates, "You are bewitchingand druggingand simply spellbinding he is now unable to speak: "I have oftenmade many speeches about virtuebeforemanypeople, and I spoke verywell,as it seemedto me. But now I am not at all able to say even what it is." Anywhere but in Athens, he concludes,Socrates mightbe arrestedas a magician (80b). Meno is comparing the elenchus with a definite kind of magic, spellbinding unable to speak, (katadesis),in whicha victimagainst his will is rendered oftenbecause he knows a truth that will harm the spellbinder.In this case, however,Meno is able but unwillingto speak because he realizes that he doesn't know the truth."'
15Cf.Republic 465a-b and Euthyphro12b-c for a similardistinctionbetween6Rosfear of some evil such as bodily harm, and albt's, shame of wrongdoing. "eCf. Gorgias 482e, where Callicles accuses Socrates of binding and gagging Polus; Laches 194b, where Laches says he is not able to say what he knows; Republic 350d and 358b-c, where Thrasymachus blushes and is said to have been charmed like a snake. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeksand TheirGods (London 1950) 270-274, gives some exambES E Kalt apALa77lEL me" (yo'qre Ka ~7aTExvco Ets, 80a). This is because KaT7aror

this skill against his own will

(aiKWV dMl oTO46S, lid).

While the magician

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

134

PHOENIX

In another well-knownpassage, Alcibiades compares Socrates with the satyr Marsyas, whose flutetunes enchanted people. We who hear Socrates,says Alcibiades, are "amazed and possessed." Alcibiades' heart leaps and tears flowfromhis eyes more than if he were a participantin the Corybanticrites.His soul is troubledand criesout as thoughhe were a slave, and, moreover, Socrates is the only man who can make him feel shame. He admits,just as Meno did, that he does not knowthe rightway to live. He has to escape from Socrates holdinghis ears as thoughfroma of as soon he as is out earshothe returns to his former Siren,yet opinions In M. as this Linforth has correctly I. 215a-216c). (Symposium passage, shown, Socrates is being compared not with a deceitfulmagician who in a catharticrite who uses spells to produces fearbut with an officiator cast out the fearwhichis already presentas a disease. The first stage of this cure consistsin allowingthe fearto be consciouslyperceivedso that those who suffer from it will realize that they need a cure.'7These catharticritesare thusin manyways similarto the Socraticelenchus. Socrates first makes someone with false beliefsrealize his condition.This realization is accompanied by strongemotion: shame and anger with oneself (or with Socrates if the process backfires).The "disease" can then be expelled.As we shall see next,Plato oftenshows Socrates helpingpeople to cast out fearas well as false belief. When the vocabulary of magic is used for this second purpose, it is often associated with the epode,which differs in several ways fromthe When they are associated with magic, the elenchus, a catharsis elenchus. of the reason, is usually seen as directedagainst magic's aim of driving out trueopinion,whilethe philosophicalepodeis mostoften.conceived as blockingthe means by which magic works: the use of the emotions to overcomereason. In many passages, whetherthe vocabulary of magic is used or not, the epode differs radically fromthe elenchus,forit has an emotionalappeal, as explicitly opposed to a rationalappeal. For example, at Laws 903a10-b2 a distinction is made between the arguments(logoi) that attempt to convince the atheist and the epode he will need in addition. In contrastto the elenchus whichis dangerousforyoungpeople (Republic538d-539d), the epodeis usefulin the trainingof childrenwho cannot yet reason. In the second book of theLaws the musical training of young people is said to provide an epode forthe soul so that it will feel pleasure,pain, love, and hate in concord with reason and law, beforeit is able to reason (653b, 659d-e). In the Republic,musical training of the
ples of katadesis that allow us to connect Meno's description of the effects of the elenchuswith this particular kind of magic. A typical katadesissays, forexample, "may his tongue and his soul become lead that he may not be able to speak or act, and pierce thou his tongue and his soul" (272). Rites in Plato (Berkeley 1946) 140-144. 17TheCorybantic

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC

135

young is described in much the same way: music seeps into the inner part of the soul and makes it love and praise the good and hate evil, beforethe youngpersonis able to reason (401d-402a). The mythat the end of the Phaedo is also said to be an epodethat adults can use to inspire themselveswith the courage to despise bodily pleasure (114d-e). Here fromrational argument, forSocrates says that again, it is distinguished no reasonable man would affirm that the myth is the literal truth. At othertimes,argument itselfmay be called an epode,but in thesepassages the emotionaleffect of argumentis what is stressed.Thus, in a passage in the Phaedo that uses the vocabulary of magic, Socrates says that though the existenceof the soul after death has already been proved, Cebes and Simmias are afraidlike childrenwho fear that the wind will scatterthe soul whensomeonedies. Cebes agrees: "Perhaps thereis in us also a child who fearssuch things.Try to persuade him notto feardeath as thoughit were a bogey-man."Socrates replies,"You must say a spell (epaidein) over him everyday until you charmaway his fears."He sugwill provide this charm (Phaedo 77d-78a). Here it gests that dialectic"8 would seem that the emotional effect of repetition is the effective ingredientofthecharm.Again,at the end ofthe Crito(54d), Socratessays that the words of the Laws ringin his ears, like the flutesCorybantesthink theyhear, and actually preventhim from listeningto the otherside.'9 It is truethat in the Charmides (157a-c) "noble words" are called an epode, and no particularemphasisis placed on the emotional,as opposed to the This is, however,unusual.20 Most oftenPlato has two rational, effects. distinctweapons that may be used against the deceitfulmagician: one that purifiesthe rational element,drivingout false belief (the elenchus or a processsimilarto it that will "turn around" the reason to its proper objects, as Republic 518e describesit) and another procedure that will the emotionsso that they will be in haractively train and strengthen with the reason mony (the epode,the myth,musical education).2' If philosophysucceeds in drivingout falsebeliefand in enablingus to resistthe anti-rational emotionsofpleasureand fear, it succeedsin freeing
'8R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo (London 1955) ad loc. gives this interpretation of the passage. "9This passage was called to my attentionby Charles Young. 20Dodds (226, note 20) says that in the Charmidesthe epode is a Socratic cross-examination. The bes t account of thisunusual passage is that given by T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology(Toronto 1970 [Phoenix Supp. Vol. 3]) 4-10. Robinson says that the "noble words" have both an intellectual and a moral effect (7), and that in the Charmides"the selfis ... thewholeman (156e7-8), of whichbody is an integraland inalienable part" (8). The psychological theories of the Charmides thus differradically from those of the Phaedo and Republic. 21For some good discussions of the emotional effectsof the epode and the myth in Plato see Boyanc6 155 ff., Dodds 212 and note 20, Edelstein 473 ff.,Lain Entralgo 118 ff.

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

136

PHOENIX

us from compulsion,not,of course in the usual sense of allowingus to do what seemsgood to us, but in the Platonic sense of allowingus to do what is actually forour good.22The philosopherwho can do this has greater skillthan the deceitful magicianwhomhe overcomes.And he may appear in that he has thetechne to be a sortof"counter-magician" claimed falsely over the the and by Gorgias: power opinions emotions.23 The contrastbetweenthe deceitfulmagician and Socrates the "counter-magician"is brought out most clearly in a little parable in the of the magical effects his description Immediatelyfollowing Symposium. Socrates has on his hearers (215-216) Alcibiades tells how, under the influenceof Socrates' spells, the "mania and Bacchic frenzyof the philosopher" (218b), he tried to seduce Socrates (216-222). Alcibiades reportsthat Socrates told him jokingly that in tryingto exchange his own beauty forSocrates' he mightbe tryingto exchange mere opinion (doxa) fortruth,bronze forgold (218e). Just as the deceitfulmagician uses our emotionsto get us to take the illusionforthe reality,Alcibiades uses pleasure,eros,to tryto make Socrates tradegold forbronze.But this sort of magic has no effect on the philosopher.Not only does Alcibiades fail to seduce Socrates, thoughhe spends the nightin his bed, Socrates "seduces" Alcibiades into love of virtue,so that he ends by "admiring and courage" (219d4-5). (agamenon) this man's nature and self-control It is significant that agamenosis the verywordused of the philosopher's love of truthat Republic500c6. The storyshows clearlyhow philosophyopposes a rationallove of the good to the enslaving and anti-rationaleros associated with magic. It also shows how Socrates ultimatelyleads us beyond magic of any kind. AlcibiadescomparesSocrates Throughoutthissectionof the Symposium, with a little statue of a Silenus with a flutein its hand, which can be of the gods inside (215a-b, 216c-217a, 221dopened up to reveal figures 222a). Socrates' words,as we have seen, enchant and possess people like the flutetunesof the satyrMarsyas (215b-c). But the fluteis only part of the outer casing; Socrates' words only appear to be like magic, since they are equally powerfuland appear to the ignorantto have similar effects. Inside, ifone takes the troubleto look, are the "divine images of
22SeeGorgias468d-e. 23Aninterestingparallel to our contrast between the philosopher and the magician is that drawn by Morton Smith between the "divine man," who works "miracles by his does not need rituals or spells," and the "magiindwellingdivine power and therefore cian," who merelygives orders to a spirit: 7esus theMagician (San Francisco 1978) 74. See also the distinctiondrawn between the "hero," who worksby his own power,and the "saint," who is the vehicle of divine will, in M. Hadas and M. Smith, Heroes and Gods (New York 1965) 12. Hadas and Smith see Plato's Socrates as the model fora particular kind of benevolent hero (17-18, 49-56) but do not explicitly contrast him with the magician.

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ELENCHUS, EPODE, AND MAGIC

137

virtue" (216e-217a, 222a). If one sees these,one realizes, as Alcibiades is only a deception, does, that Socrates' outer casing of magician-seducer that Socrates only appears to be a magicianand seduceruntilwe open up his arguments.Then we understandthat he is not the seducer but the beloved, whom the lover of virtue followsof his own freewill (222a-b). And here we reach the limitsof a metaphor.24
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
of Phoenix and ProfessorCharles Young for 24I wish to thank the anonymousreferees theirvaluable criticismsof an earlier version of this paper.

This content downloaded from 128.228.173.41 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 22:32:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions