Economic Management Journal

December 2013, Volume 2, Issue 5, PP.202-207

Game Analysis of Accounting Information

Disclosure of Listed Companies and the
Government Regulation
Xiaoming Yan
Business School East China University of politic and Law, Shanghai 200042, China
Email: ym1967@21cn.com

Abstract
Based on the prevailing distortion of accounting information disclosure of listed companies in China, this paper constructed a
signaling game model between listed company and medium and small investors about accounting information disclosure. Through
the refined Bayesian equilibrium of the game model, it is that if the government supervision is absent on accounting information
disclosure of listed companies, there is pooling equilibrium that financial status of listed company is no matter good or bad, that is
to say, the listed company will disclose good accounting information, and thus investors can choose investment strategy. So the
strict oversight and regulation taken by government regulators are required on the listed companies accounting information
disclosure in terms of the following three aspects to effectively solve the pooling equilibrium of accounting information disclosure
of listed companies: First is to increase the odds of false accounting information disclosure of listed companies; then the
aggravation of fraud penalties Y on listed companies due to their false accounting information; finally, the rise of compensation X
for victims of false accounting information. After the government regulation, when penalties Y and compensation X are
sufficiently large, B 1 + E 1 C < X and I 1 -B 2 -C F < Y + X . The signaling game of accounting information disclosure
of listed companies shows separating equilibrium that listed companies with high return will disclose high rate return accounting
information, then outside investors invest; otherwise, not.
Keywords: Signaling Game; Pooling Equilibrium; Separating Equilibrium; Government Regulation

200042

, ,
,

YX
YXB 1 + E 1 C < X
I 1 -B 2 -C F < Y + X ,
, , ,

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PT
ST

2
2.1
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)N=[1,2]1
2
1 =[ 1 2 ] = 1

= 2
P { = 1 }= P{ = 2 } =1- [01]
(5)M={S 0 S 1 } m=S 1
m=S 0

= 1 m= S 1
(6) C F
(7) si(i=12)
A ={YN} a=Y a= N
(8) C
(9) Bi( i= 12) B 1 B 2
B 1 > B 2
(10) Ei(i=12) E 1
E 2 E 1 > E 2
(11) Ii(i= 12)
I= I(m) I 1
I 2 I 1 > I 2
(12) 0

2.2
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 i (i= 12)
(1)
u 1 ( 1 S 1 Y) = I 1 - B 1
u 2 ( 1 S 1 Y) = B 1 + E 1 - C > 0

(2)
u 2 ( 1 S 1 N ) =0
0 u 2 ( 1 S 1 N) = 0
(3)

I 1 B 2
C F
u 1 ( 2 S 1 Y) = I 1 - B 2 - C F
u 2 ( 2 S 1 Y) = B 2 + E 2 - C < 0

(4)
u 1 ( 2 S 1 N ) = - C F
u 2 ( 2 S 1 N) = 0
(5)
u 1 ( 2 S 0 Y) = I 2 - B 2

u 2 ( 2 S 0 Y) = B 2 + E 2 - C < 0

(6)
u 1 ( 2 S 0 N ) = 0u 2 ( 2 S 0 N) = 0

1-

2 ()

S 1

1-

Y
N

S 0

S 1 ()

N
Y
Y

(I 1 -B 1 ,B 1 +E 1 -C) (0,0) (I 1 -B 2 -C F ,B 2 +E 2 -C) (-C F ,0)

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(I 2 -B 2 ,B 2 +E 2 -C) (0,0)

2
P( 1 S 1 )= P( 2 S 1 )=1-

Y N
( B1 E1 C ) ( B2 E2 C )(1 ) 0
B2 E2 C

a S 1 )=Y
B1 B2 E1 E2
0 a(S 1 )=N

B2 E2 C 0 a(s 0 )=N

I 1 -B 2 -C F 0

a(s 1 )=Y m( i )=S 1

= (i=1,2)

0 a(s 1 )=N
-C F 0
a(s 1 )=N m( 1 )=S 1 m( 2 )=S 0
=1
0 , B1 + E1 - C < 0

a(s 1 )=Ym( i )=S 1 = (i=1,2)

F C G

Y X
Y+XX Y I 1 -B 2 -C F Y - X 0 ; B 1 + E 1 C X 0
()
P( 1 S1)= P( 2 S1)=1-

Y N
( B1 E1 C ) ( B2 E2 X C )(1 ) 0

B2 E2 C
a(s 1 )=Y
B1 B2 E1 E2 X
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 a(s 1 )=Y
B2 E2 C 0 a(s 0 )=N

I 1 -B 2 -C F Y - X <0

a(s 1 )=Ya(s 0 )=Nm( 1 )=S 1 m( 2 )=S 0 =1

0 a(s 1 )=N B2 E2 C 0 a(s 0 )=N

-C F - Y 0

a(s 1 )=Na(s 0 )=Nm( 1 )=S 1 m( 2 )=S 0 =1

0 B1 + E1 C- X 0 .

a(s 1 )=Ya(s 0 )=Nm( 1 )=S 1 m( 2 )=S 0 =1

Y X

Y
X

1-

S 1

2 ()

S 1 ()

S 0

1-

(I 2 -B 2 ,B 2 +E 2 -CF-C G ) (0,0, F-C G )

(I 1 -B 1 ,B 1 +E 1 -CF-C G )(0,0F-C G )(I 1 -B 2 -C F - Y

X ,B 2 +E 2 -C+ X ,F-C G + Y )
(-C F - Y ,0,F-C G + Y )

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Y
XB 1 + E 1 C < X I 1 -B 2 -C F < Y + X
2
Y X

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[3] Zhang zong xin yang fei yuan qin hai: Enhencing Disclosure Quality of Listed Companies Could Improve Corporate Performance?
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[6] Spence, A. M , Market Signaling, Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press23, 1974
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1967-Email: ym1967@21cn.com

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