You are on page 1of 50

Research Paper: Information Security Technologies

by Benjamin Tomhave November 10, 2004

Prepared for: Professor Dave Carothers E !E 21" The #eor$e %ashin$ton &niversity

This paper or presentation is my o'n 'or() *ny assistan+e , re+eived in its preparation is a+(no'-ed$ed 'ithin the paper or presentation, in a++ordan+e 'ith a+ademi+ pra+ti+e) ,f , .sed data, ideas, 'ords, dia$rams, pi+t.res, or other information from any so.r+e, , have +ited the so.r+es f.--y and +omp-ete-y in footnotes and bib-io$raphy entries) This in+-.des so.r+es 'hi+h , have /.oted or paraphrased) 0.rthermore, , +ertify that this paper or presentation 'as prepared by me spe+ifi+a--y for this +-ass and has not been s.bmitted, in 'ho-e or in part, to any other +-ass in this &niversity or e-se'here, or .sed for any p.rpose other than satisfyin$ the re/.irements of this +-ass, e1+ept that , am a--o'ed to s.bmit the paper or presentation to a professiona- p.b-i+ation, peer revie'ed jo.rna-, or professiona- +onferen+e) ,n addin$ my name fo--o'in$ the 'ord 2!i$nat.re2, , intend that this +ertifi+ation 'i-- have the same a.thority and a.thenti+ity as a do+.ment e1e+.ted 'ith my hand3'ritten si$nat.re) !i$nat.re 44444Benjamin 5) Tomhave444444444444444444444444

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 1

Research Paper: Information Security Technologies


by Benjamin 5) Tomhave

Abstract The fo--o'in$ resear+h paper provides ana-ysis of thirteen 819: information se+.rity te+hno-o$y topi+s, arran$ed in ten 810: $ro.ps, that are either +ommon-y fo.nd or emer$in$ 'ithin the information se+.rity ind.stry) These topi+s in+-.de: *++ess Controana$ement, *ntivir.s, *.dit Data ;ed.+tion, 0ire'a--s, ,ntr.sion Dete+tion !ystems 8,D!:, ,ntr.sion Prevention !ystems 8,P!:, *noma-y Dete+tion !ystems 8*D!:, Event Corre-ation !ystems 8EC!:, Net'or( appin$, Pass'ord Cra+(in$, P.b-i+ <ey ,nfrastr.+t.re, =irt.a- Private Net'or(, and =.-nerabi-ity !+annin$ !ystems) ,D!, ,P!, *D! and EC! are $ro.ped to$ether .nder one +ommon headin$ 8,ntr.sion Dete+tion and *na-ysis !ystems: d.e to their +ommona-ity and interdependen+e) This paper provides basi+ overvie' information abo.t ea+h te+hno-o$y, b.t primari-y fo+.ses on ana-y>in$ ea+h te+hno-o$y 'ithin the modern information se+.rity and b.siness +onte1t, -oo(in$ at ho' it meets b.siness needs 'hi-e addressin$ Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity as a Co.ntermeas.re that Dete+ts, Corre+ts and6or Prote+ts)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 2

Table of Contents ,),NT;?D&CT,?N *ND ?=E;=,E% ?0 *PP;?*C@))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 4 ,,)*CCE!! C?NT;?5 *N*#E ENT))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) A *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))A B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))7 ,,,)*NT,=,;&!))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) B *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))11 B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))11 ,=)*&D,T D*T* ;ED&CT,?N)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 19 *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))19 B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))14 =)0,;E%*55! ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 1A *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))17 B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))17 =,),NT;&!,?N DETECT,?N *ND *N*5C!,! !C!TE !)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 1" *),ntr.sion Dete+tion !ystems 8,D!: ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))1B 1)B.siness *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 21 2)!e+.rity *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 22 B),ntr.sion Prevention !ystems 8,P!:))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))29 1)B.siness *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 24 2)!e+.rity *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 2A C)Event Corre-ation !ystems 8EC!:)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 2A 1)B.siness *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 27 2)!e+.rity *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 27 D)*noma-y Dete+tion !ystems 8*D!: ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 27 1)B.siness *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 2B 2)!e+.rity *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 90 =,,)NET%?;< *PP,N#)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 90 *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))91 B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))92 =,,,)P*!!%?;D C;*C<,N#)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 99 *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))9A B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))9D ,E)P&B5,C <EC ,N0;*!T;&CT&;E))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 9D *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))9" B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))40 E)=,;T&*5 P;,=*TE NET%?;<!))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 41 *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))49 B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))49 E,)=&5NE;*B,5,TC !C*NN,N# !C!TE !)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 44 *)B.siness *na-ysis)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))4D B)!e+.rity *na-ysis))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))4D ;E0E;ENCE!)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) 4"

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 9

Research Paper: Information Security Technologies


by Benjamin 5) Tomhave ,),NT;?D&CT,?N *ND ?=E;=,E% ?0 *PP;?*C@

This resear+h paper introd.+es and ana-y>es ten 810: information se+.rity te+hno-o$ies) Ea+h of the fo--o'in$ se+tions fo+.ses on a spe+ifi+ te+hno-o$y and adheres to the fo--o'in$ $enera- format: o Te+hno-o$y ?vervie': * hi$h3-eve- introd.+tion to the te+hno-o$y) o B.siness *na-ysis: *n eva-.ation of the .sef.-ness, +ost, +omp-e1ity, and .ti-ity of the te+hno-o$y in the modern b.siness environment) o !e+.rity *na-ysis: The se+.rity te+hno-o$y is 'ei$hed a$ainst the tenets of Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity as 'e-- as eva-.atin$ its ro-e as a +o.ntermeas.re 8dete+t, +orre+t, prote+t:)

The ten se+.rity te+hno-o$ies addressed in this paper are: 1) *++ess Contro2) *ntivir.s 9) *.dit Data ;ed.+tion 4) 0ire'a--s A) ,ntr.sion Dete+tion and *na-ysis !ystems D) Net'or( appin$ ana$ement

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 4

7) Pass'ord Cra+(in$ ") P.b-i+ <ey ,nfrastr.+t.re B) =irt.a- Private Net'or(s 10) =.-nerabi-ity !+annin$ !ystems

,,)*CCE!! C?NT;?5

*N*#E ENT

*++ess +ontro- mana$ement 8*C : systems p.-- to$ether identity, a.thenti+ation and a.thori>ation to restri+t 'hat reso.r+es a .ser may a++ess and in 'hat manner that a++ess may o++.r 8read, 'rite, e1e+.te, modify, et+):) *C so-.tions may be based on a n.mber andatory *++ess provides an

of se+.rity mode-s, in+-.din$ Dis+retionary *++ess Contro- 8D*C:,

Contro- 8 *C:, and ;o-e3Based *++ess Contro- 8;B*C:) * standard *C

interfa+e thro.$h 'hi+h a .ser 'i-- se-f3identify, fo--o'ed by a me+hanism for +ha--en$in$ and +onfirmin$ that identity, and then a method for $rantin$ ri$hts, or a++ess to information, based on the non3rep.diated a.thenti+ation of the .ser) *++ess +ontro- is at the heart of information se+.rity and is the f.ndamenta- premise .pon 'hi+h the ind.stry is based1) %itho.t a++ess +ontro- mana$ement, there 'o.-d no method thro.$h 'hi+h to provide se+.rity for systems and data)

*)B.siness *na-ysis *++ess +ontro- mana$ement systems provide the fo.ndation for information se+.rity 'ithin the b.siness environment) ,ts .sef.-ness is e1tensive, 'ith the primary f.n+tions
1

Ben ;ot+h(e, Access Control Systems & Methodology 8Ne' Cor(: !e+.rityDo+s)+om, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.ritydo+s)+om6$o6DBF ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 A

bein$ to +-assify data systems a++ordin$ to va-.e and a--o+ate prote+tion me+hanisms in a++ordan+e 'ith the va-.e of the reso.r+e) *++ordin$ to Tipton and <ra.se, GHtheI essen+e of a++ess +ontro- is that permissions are assi$ned to individ.a-s or system obje+ts, 'hi+h are a.thori>ed to a++ess spe+ifi+ reso.r+es)G2

The imp-ementation of *C

systems +an ran$e in +ost from minor to e1treme,

dependin$ on the va-.e of the reso.r+e bein$ prote+ted) The .nder-yin$ se+.rity modeapp-ied a-so impa+ts ho' e1pensive and +omp-e1 the so-.tion may be) *C so-.tions

are perhaps the most important se+.rity te+hno-o$y that +an be dep-oyed, ahead of a-other +o.ntermeas.res, be+a.se of its inherent p.rpose to +ontro- a++ess to data and systems) The .ti-ity of the *C systems, ho'ever, is -imit-ess .nder the ass.mption

that a b.siness has reso.r+es of va-.e that re/.ire prote+tin$)

Dis+retionary *++ess Contro- systems are very +ommon and are $enera--y +ost3effe+tive for most environments) ost operatin$ systems today 3 ran$in$ from %indo's to &N,E andatory *++ess

to 5in.1 and beyond 3 ma(e .se of a D*C mode- of a++ess +ontro-)

Contro- systems tend to be more +omp-e1 and +ost-y in performan+e and maintenan+e) *C systems re/.ire a m.+h stron$er systemati+ adheren+e to the pre+epts of a++ess +ontro- and +an th.s +ha--en$e administrative reso.r+es and +onfo.nd a++ess to data as re/.ired by the b.siness) ,mp-ementation of *C re/.ires proper foresi$ht and p-annin$

to avoid diffi+.-ties in the -on$ termF an effort that is often a +ost-y en$ineerin$ effort fro'ned .pon by the b.siness) 0ina--y, ;o-e3Based *++ess Contro- systems are

@aro-d 0) Tipton and i+(i <ra.se, J,K,nformation !e+.rity 8Bo+a ;aton: *.erba+h, 2000:, p1)

ana$ement @andboo(, 4th EditionJ,K

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 D

in+reasin$ in pop.-arity and are predi+ted to savin$ +ompanies mi--ions of do--ars in the +omin$ years)9

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis *n a++ess +ontro- mana$ement system has the potentia- for impa+tin$ a-- three tenets of information se+.rity 8Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity:) The primary ro-e of an *C so-.tion is to prote+t the +onfidentia-ity of a reso.r+e by restri+tin$ a++ess to the so-.tion 'i-- +ontro- the attrib.tes of the a++ess, s.+h as system may

reso.r+e) *dditiona--y, an *C

read, 'rite and e1e+.te) 0or e1amp-e, in the +ase of a data fi-e, an *C

$rant a .ser read a++ess, b.t deny a++ess to 'rite or modify the data 'ithin the fi-e)

&nder a D*C mode-, a++ess +ontro-s are mana$ed dire+t-y by the reso.r+e o'ner) ,n a *C mode-, the system di+tates 'hat -eve- of a++ess may be $ranted to a reso.r+e) 0ina--y, ;B*C assi$ns a++ess based on the ri$hts of a $ro.p 8or ro-e: 'ithin the system) *-- .sers 'ho share a $iven ro-e have the same a++ess) This approa+h +ontrasts to D*C 'here ea+h .ser may have a .ni/.e set of ri$hts) *C is simi-ar to ;B*C in terms of

.sin$ a ro-e3based approa+hed based on -abe-in$) @o'ever, the inner operations of a *C vary distin+t-y from an ;B*CF dis+.ssion of 'hi+h e1+eeds the s+ope of this do+.ment)

*++ess +ontro- mana$ement systems hin$e on the proper identifi+ation of s.bje+ts tryin$ to a++ess obje+ts) The pro+ess of positive-y identifyin$ a s.bje+t is +a--ed a.thenti+ation)
9

Nationa- ,nstit.te of !tandards and Te+hno-o$y, J,KN,!T P-annin$ ;eport 0231: E+onomi+ ,mpa+t *ssessment of N,!TLs ;o-e3Based *++ess Contro- 8;B*C: Pro$ramJ,K 8%ashin$ton: N,!T, 2002, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66+sr+)nist)$ov6rba+6rba+3impa+t3s.mmary)do+F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 7

The a.thenti+ation pro+ess .s.a--y o++.rs 'hen a s.bje+t se-f3identifies and then responds to a systemati+ +ha--en$e of the identity) This +ha--en$e is based on 'hat yo. (no', 'hat yo. have or 'ho yo. are) * pass'ord is an e1amp-e of somethin$ that yo. may (no', and is +.rrent-y the most +ommon method of provin$ identity) * to(en is an e1amp-e of somethin$ that yo. have, and biometri+s is an e1amp-e of 'ho yo. are) Biometri+s is a method of identifi+ation based on the physi+a- +hara+teristi+s of a h.man bein$, s.+h as a fin$erprint, iris s+an or retina- s+an) Biometri+s, tho.$h ho-din$

si$nifi+ant promise as part of an a++ess +ontro- mana$ement system, a-so has si$nifi+ant dra'ba+(s, s.+h as to a++eptabi-ity to .sers, re-iabi-ity and resistan+e to +o.nterfeitin$)4

The f.t.re of a++ess +ontro- mana$ement systems appears to be in the dire+tion of m.-ti3 fa+tor a.thenti+ation, oftentimes ma(in$ .se of pass'ords in +ombination 'ith to(ens or biometri+s) Beyond the +.rrent trend, it seems -i(e-y that pass'ords 'i-- event.a--y be rendered +omp-ete-y obso-ete in favor of some form of to(en or biometri+ be+omin$ the first, if not on-y, form of a.thenti+ation) !pe+ifi+a--y, .se of n.meri+ or data to(ens is on the in+rease and proje+ted to +ontin.e $ainin$ in pop.-arity and a++eptan+e) ajor

internationa- ,nternet !ervi+e Provider *meri+a ?n-ine has re+ent-y anno.n+ed the avai-abi-ity of n.meri+ to(ens for .sers as a se+ond fa+tor for a.thenti+ation) *dditiona--y, as p.b-i+ (ey infrastr.+t.re so-.tions 8see !e+tion ,E be-o': mat.re and $ain in preva-en+e, the .se of data to(ens 'i-- in+rease in importan+e) 0or e1amp-e, a ban( 'i-- be ab-e to iss.e a &!B3based data to(en to a +.stomer) ?n the data to(en 'i-be the +.stomer2s .ni/.e identifier in the form of a di$ita- +ertifi+ate) This +ertifi+ate 'i--

Dona-d ;) ;i+hards, GBiometri+ ,dentifi+ation,G in J,K,nformation !e+.rity ana$ement @andboo(, 4th EditionJ,K, ed) @aro-d 0) Tipton and i+(i <ra.se 8Bo+a ;aton: *.erba+h, 2000:, pB)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 "

be mana$ed thro.$h a +entra- Certifi+ate *.thority and 'i-- be .sed both for a.thenti+ation and for en+ryptin$ and di$ita--y si$nin$ +omm.ni+ation and transa+tions)

Th.s, a++ess +ontro- mana$ement 'i-- not on-y +ontin.e its +entra- ro-e 'ithin information se+.rity, b.t it 'i-- a-so $ro' in s+ope, addin$ more e1tensive +apabi-ities for positive-y impa+tin$ +onfidentia-ity and inte$rity) *dditiona--y, besides prote+tin$

reso.r+es, it may a-so in+-.de e1tended +apabi-ities that 'i-- a--o' for easier dete+tion of atta+(s and possib-y even a.tomati+ methods for +orre+tin$ vio-ations of inte$rity)

,,,)*NT,=,;&!

The first +omp.ter vir.s +redited 'ith bein$ fo.nd Gin the 'i-dG is be-ieved to be a pro$ram +a--ed GE-( C-onerG that tar$eted *pp-e D?! 9)9)A The term Gvir.sG may

a+t.a--y have ori$inated in the 1B70s in s+ien+e fi+tion -iterat.reD, tho.$h as a +on+ept it has -i(e-y been aro.nd sin+e the 1BD0s) Traditiona--y, GHaI vir.s is simp-y a +omp.ter pro$ram that is intentiona--y 'ritten to atta+h itse-f to other pro$rams or dis( boot se+tors and rep-i+ate 'henever those pro$rams are e1e+.ted or those infe+ted dis(s are a++essed)G7 ,n the modern +onte1t, this traditiona- form of ma-i+io.s +ode, or ma-'are, is -ess +ommon) ,nstead, it is far more +ommon to see variations on this ori$ina- theme in the form of G'ormsG and GTrojan horsesG that infe+t a +omp.ter system either thro.$h dire+t e1e+.tion or thro.$h some form of net'or(3based rep-i+ation method) ,n the
A

%i(ipedia, Computer virus 8!t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6Comp.ter4vir.sF ,nternet) D %i(ipedia, Computer virus 8!t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6Comp.ter4vir.sF ,nternet) 7 Bob <anish, An Overview of Computer Viruses and Antivirus Software 8&n(no'n: <anish, 1BBD, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')hi+om)net6Moedip.s6vir.s92)htm-F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 B

modern +onte1t, hybrid ma-'are pro$rams typi+a--y rep-i+ate thro.$h 'orm3-i(e behavio.r that preys on v.-nerabi-ities in operatin$ systems or thro.$h so+ia- en$ineerin$ atta+(s, and then set.p ba+(doors via the Trojan horse me+hanism) This ba+(door +an then a--o' the atta+(er to remote-y a++ess and +ontro- an infe+ted system, a--o'in$ for the perpetration of other i--i+it a+tivities, s.+h as sendin$ !P* or .sin$ the +ompromised

system as a pro1y, or re-ay, thro.$h 'hi+h remote a++ess +an be $ained to other'ise3 prote+ted reso.r+es)

*ntivir.s soft'are has been aro.nd for at -east the past 1031A years, tho.$h no referen+es 'ere fo.nd that indi+ated a spe+ifi+ date 'hen s.+h pro$rams 'ere first made avai-ab-e) *ntivir.s soft'are 'as deve-oped to dete+t the presen+e, and event.a--y the attempted infe+tion, of a system by ma-'are) There are $enera--y t'o types of antivir.s s+annin$ soft'are: si$nat.re3based and he.risti+) !i$nat.re3based s+annin$ re-ies on a database of (no'n ma-'are si$nat.res) ,t m.st be .pdated on a re$.-ar basis in order to ens.re a +.rrent database of (no'n ma-'are) *++ordin$ to eBC=#, an ,T !e+.rity +ompany, a he.risti+ s+anner G-oo(s at +hara+teristi+s of a fi-e, s.+h as si>e or ar+hite+t.re, as 'e-- as behaviors of its +ode to determine the -i(e-ihood of an infe+tion)G" The do'nside to he.risti+ s+anners is that they often $enerate res.-ts that misidentify soft'are as bein$ ma-'are 8a)()a) Gfa-se positivesG:)

The most pop.-ar operatin$ system, in terms of p.re n.mbers, is

i+rosoft %indo's) *s

s.+h, it is a-so the most tar$eted p-atform by ma-'are) There are severa- +ompanies 'ho provide *= soft'are for %indo's) There are a-so versions of *= soft'are for other
"

eBC=# ,T !e+.rity, Heuristic Scanning - Where to e!t" 8Te-3*viv: eBC=#, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')eb+v$)+om6arti+-es)phpNidO2D4F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 10

p-atforms, -i(e

a+ ?!, &N,E and 5in.1) @o'ever, there are very fe' +ases of ma-'are

for those p-atforms, d.e in part to their distin+t differen+es from %indo's)

*)B.siness *na-ysis ,n the modern a$e of +omp.tin$, antivir.s 8*=: soft'are is very ine1pensive, very +ommon, $enera--y easy to dep-oy, and oftentimes re-ative-y easy to maintain 8easier than pat+hin$ operatin$ systems and app-i+ations, b.t sti-- more +ha--en$in$ than bein$ f.--y se-f3+ontained:) 0.rthermore, the preva-en+e and avai-abi-ity of antivir.s as a very basi+ +o.ntermeas.re is s.+h that a -e$a- ar$.ment +o.-d be s.++essf.--y made that the fai-.re of a b.siness to imp-ement *= soft'are thro.$ho.t the or$ani>ation +o.-d be deemed an a+t of ne$-i$en+e) *s s.+h, the .ti-ity and .sef.-ness of *= soft'are is very obvio.s, both from the standpoint of minimi>in$ the threat of ma-'are and from -imitin$ -e$a-iabi-ity res.-tin$ from a ma-'are infe+tion)

*= soft'are itse-f is $enera--y not +omp-e1)

ost *= pa+(a$es re-y primari-y on The

si$nat.re3based s+annin$ 'ith minor he.risti+ s+annin$ +apabi-ities inte$rated)

soft'are is .s.a--y simp-e to insta-- and is +onfi$.red by defa.-t to a.tomati+a--y .pdate the .nder-yin$ s+annin$ en$ine and the si$nat.re database on a re$.-ar basis from the ,nternet)

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis %hereas b.sinesses are e1pe+ted to insta-- and maintain antivir.s soft'are on most, if not a--, systems as a matter of -imitin$ -e$a- -iabi-ity, the effe+tiveness of *= soft'are

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 11

diminishes ea+h day) The *= ind.stry has $enera--y rea+hed a p-atea. in the -ast five years and has not made any major advan+es in the abi-ity to dete+t and prevent ma-'are infe+tion) 0.rthermore, the $ro'th in pop.-arity of the ,nternet has +a.sed the +omp.tin$ 'or-d to be+ome hi$h-y inter+onne+ted, -eadin$ to the deve-opment of so3+a--ed G>ero3day e1p-oits)G These e1p-oits +orrespond to v.-nerabi-ities that are re-eased on the same day in 'hi+h the e1p-oit itse-f is re-eased) ,n the 'orst3+ase s+enario, a major or$ani>ation -i(e i+rosoft 'i-- anno.n+e the presen+e of a v.-nerabi-ity in their pop.-ar %indo's

operatin$ system mid3day, and by that evenin$ a 'orm 'i-- be +ir+.-atin$ on the ,nternet that is a+tive-y -oo(in$ for v.-nerab-e systems and attemptin$ to infe+t them thro.$h this ne' v.-nerabi-ity) !ad-y, s.+h events have happened in re+ent history, and oftentimes before a pat+h is even avai-ab-e to fi1 the v.-nerabi-ity and before *= si$nat.res have been deve-oped and re-eased)

The p.rpose of *= is to dete+t, prote+t and +orre+t) !pe+ifi+a--y, antivir.s soft'are is desi$ned to dete+t ma-'are infe+tions, b.t it is a-so ab-e to prote+t a$ainst an a+tive infe+tion attempt, and it is a-so often ab-e to +orre+t by disinfe+tin$ a system, dependin$ on the +hara+teristi+s of the ma-'are) 0rom the standpoint of Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity, *= soft'are primari-y addresses ,nte$rity) The $oa- of *= soft'are is to prote+t the ,nte$rity of the operatin$ system, app-i+ation or data) *dditiona--y, it has a se+ondary benefit of ens.rin$ the avai-abi-ity of an obje+t by dete+tin$, prote+tin$ or +orre+tin$ ma-'are infe+tions) Confidentia-ity may a-so be prote+ted indire+t-y for

ma-'are that may +a.se data to be sent o.t random-y, s.+h as %ord do+.ments as atta+hments, for'ardin$ emai-s, et+)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 12

,=)*&D,T D*T* ;ED&CT,?NB

*.dit Data ;ed.+tion is an emer$in$ fie-d of st.dy in information se+.rity) The *.dit Data ;ed.+tion #ro.p, part of the C?*!T 5aboratory at P.rd.e &niversity in the Center for Ed.+ation and ;esear+h in ,nformation *ss.ran+e and !e+.rity 8CE;,*!:, appears to be a -eader in innovative resear+h and thin(in$ on the s.bje+t) The prob-em bein$ addressed re-ates to the amo.nt of a.dit data +reated, o.t of ne+essity, by +riti+a- systems) These +riti+a- systems often $enerate +opio.s amo.nts of a.dit -o$s, 'hi+h are often diffi+.-t to po.r thro.$h for si$ns of ma-feasan+e) The $oa-s of a.dit data red.+tion systems are to +ontrib.te to mis.se and anoma-y dete+tion) These types of systems are dis+.ssed f.rther in !e+tion =,)

*)B.siness *na-ysis *.dit data red.+tion 8*D;: 'i-- in+reasin$-y be+ome a .sef.- and ne+essary part of the information se+.rity so-.tion too-set) B.sinesses are in+reasin$-y in.ndated 'ith a.dit -o$s $enerated by a-- +riti+a- systems) The advent of federa- re$.-ations that re/.ire thoro.$h -o$$in$, s.+h as 'ithin Pfinan+ia--y si$nifi+ant systems,Q 'i-- f.rther +ontrib.te to this trend) *s a res.-t, in order to ma1imi>e the va-.e of these a.dit -o$s 'ith an eye to'ard red.+in$ ris( to the overa-- b.siness, it 'i-- be+ome in+reasin$-y ne+essary to +ondense these ra' -o$s into a more .sef.- format)

P.rd.e &niversity, C#$%AS& Audit 'rail $eduction (roup 8%est 5afayette: CE;,*!, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')+erias)p.rd.e)ed.6abo.t6history6+oast6proje+ts6a.dit3trai-s3 red.+e)phpNo.tp.tOprintab-eF ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 19

Today, a.dit data red.+tion systems are sti-- ear-y in a+ademi+ and +ommer+iadeve-opment) !o-.tions tend to be re-ative-y +omp-e1 and +ost-y) @o'ever, it seems very -i(e-y that these systems 'i-- improve over time and de+rease in +omp-e1ity) ,n the end, 'e 'i-- -i(e-y see -ar$e a.dit data repositories b.i-t, based on data 'areho.sin$ +on+epts that then -evera$e data minin$ te+hni/.es for reportin$ and ana-ysis) These data feeds 'i-- then be p.mped into systems that estab-ish a base-ine for performan+e and have b.i-t3in artifi+ia- inte--i$en+e that +an dete+t anoma-o.s behavio.r indi+ative of a an instan+e of mis.se or ab.se, f-a$$in$ and es+a-atin$ the event a++ordin$-y)

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis The p.rpose of an a.dit data red.+tion system is to red.+e the overa-- +ost and +omp-e1ity asso+iated 'ith +ombinin$ a.dit -o$s into one -o+ation and interfa+e) These systems may have dire+t or indire+t impa+t on the Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity or *vai-abi-ity of data or systems, dependin$ on the so.r+e of the -o$s and the type of mis.se or ab.se dete+ted) ,n $enera-, *D; systems are a +o.ntermeas.re desi$ned to better dete+t instan+es of mis.se or ab.se) *s the systems mat.re and f.rther inte$rate 'ith intr.sion dete+tion and ana-ysis systems, the +apabi-ity 'i-- a-so emer$e to ta(e prote+tive and +orre+tive a+tions) 0or e1amp-e, intr.sion dete+tion and prevention

systems 8as 'i-- be dis+.ssed be-o': a-ready have the +apabi-ity to rea+t dynami+a--y and in rea-3time to dete+ted threats) &sin$ a.dit data red.+tion systems to a++.rate-y dete+t mis.se or ab.se in rea-3time ho-ds the promise of inte$ratin$ 'ith these a+tive response systems and th.s e1tend its +o.ntermeas.re +apabi-ities)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 14

=)0,;E%*55!10 11 12

19 14

* fire'a-- is defined as a G+omponent or set of +omponents that restri+ts a++ess bet'een a prote+ted net'or( and the ,nternet, or bet'een other sets of net'or(s)G 1A 0ire'a--s are net'or( se+.rity reso.r+es that are defined to +ontro- the f-o' of data bet'een t'o or more net'or(s) 0rom a hi$h3-eve- perspe+tive, they +an serve as a +ho(e3point, desi$ned to restri+t, or +ho(e, the f-o' of net'or( traffi+, or as a $ate'ay that performs f.rther pro+essin$ on the traffi+ beyond simp-e +ho(in$ restri+tions) *++ordin$ to R'i+(y, et a-, fire'a--s +an $enera--y be p-a+ed into t'o +ate$ories: Pa+(et 0i-ters or Pro1ies) Per dis+.ssion in E !E 21", these +ate$ories +an be broadened to in+-.de +ir+.it3-eve$ate'ays and statef.- inspe+tion devi+es) B-andin$1D adds a third +ate$ory of hybrid or +omp-e1 $ate'ays to R'i+(yLs initia- pair)

,n rea-ity, the B-andin$ definition is probab-y the most +orre+t in that fire'a--s either perform as a pa+(et fi-ter, a pro1y, or as some +ombination of the t'o) ?ther types of fire'a-- simp-y e1pand .pon those ori$ina- base types) 0or e1amp-e, most pro1ies today have additiona- +apabi-ities to perform +ontent mana$ement at the app-i+ation -eve-, dete+tin$ inappropriate or .na++eptab-e +ontent, s.+h as thro.$h a 'eb or mai- session)

10

an., )irewall *asics 8&n(no'n: !e+.rityDo+s)+om, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.ritydo+s)+om6-ibrary62419F ,nternet) 11 E-i>abeth D) R'i+(y and others, *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000:) 12 !imson #arfin(e- and #ene !pafford, -ractical .ni! & %nternet Security+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 1BBD:) 19 5e+t.re notes from E !E 21", ta(en 20 ?+tober 2004) 14 P.rd.e &niversity, )irewalls 8%est 5afayette: CE;,*!, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')+erias)p.rd.e)ed.6abo.t6history6+oast4reso.r+es6fire'a--s6F ,nternet) 1A E-i>abeth D) R'i+(y and others, *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000:, p102) 1D !teven 0) B-andin$, G!e+.red Conne+tions to E1terna- Net'or(s,G in J,K,nformation !e+.rity ana$ement @andboo(, 4th EditionJ,K, ed) @aro-d 0) Tipton and i+(i <ra.se 8Bo+a ;aton: *.erba+h, 2000:, pAB3D1)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 1A

*-so, many fire'a--s provide +apabi-ities -i(e Net'or( *ddress Trans-ation 8N*T: that provide a -o$i+a- separation bet'een net'or(s by +han$in$ the .nder-yin$ n.mberin$ s+heme 8,P addressin$:) N*T is an important feat.re be+a.se it a--o's or$ani>ations to inter+onne+t their reso.r+es interna--y .sin$ ,P address spa+e that is reserved for interna.se by ;0C 1B1") This reserved spa+e is not ro.tab-e on the ,nternet, and th.s is not dire+t-y a++essib-e to atta+(ers o.tside the fire'a-- performin$ the N*T)

* s.rvey of vario.s vendor 'eb sites, s.+h as Cis+o, Che+(point, Net!+reen, Cyber#.ard, B-.eCoat and !e+.re Comp.tin$, ref-e+ts the rea-ity that most fire'a--s are no' hybrids) This notion is f.rther reinfor+ed 'hen readin$ thro.$h the 0ire'a-- Criteria v4)117 for ,C!* 5absL 0ire'a-- Certifi+ation pro$ram) No fire'a-- +an re+eive a

+ertifi+ation today 'itho.t bein$ a'are of state, th.s ma(in$ it a statef.- inspe+tion fire'a--) @o'ever, basi+ fire'a--s, -i(e those so-d by Cis+o, Che+(point and Net!+reen, are essentia--y j.st pa+(et fi-terin$, 'ith the additiona- +apabi-ities of tra+(in$ the state of a net'or( session) Che+(point e1tends this base desi$n f.rther by a-so providin$ some app-i+ation3spe+ifi+ pro1y +omponents) Cyber#.ard, B-.eCoat and !e+.re Comp.tin$, on the other hand, prod.+e fire'a--s that are primari-y pro1ies) *$ain, ho'ever, be+a.se of their adheren+e to the ,C!* +riteria, they a-so are a'are of state, at -east to some de$ree, and th.s are ab-e to perform basi+ pa+(et fi-terin$ f.n+tions, too) Therefore, today, it is probab-y safe to say that there is on-y one (ind of fire'a--, and that is a hybrid or +omp-e1 $ate'ay)

17

http:66''')i+sa-abs)+om6htm-6+omm.nities6fire'a--s6+ertifi+ation6+riteria6+riteria44)1)shtm-

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 1D

*)B.siness *na-ysis The +ost of a fire'a-- today is minima-, and is $reat-y o.t'ei$hed by the vast .ti-ity it serves) 0ire'a--s need not be e1pensive so-.tions, b.t +an be based on $eneri+ +omp.ter +omponents that ma(e .se of free, open3so.r+e operatin$ systems and soft'are) 0.rthermore, these simp-e so-.tions do not re/.ire e1tensive and e1pensive hard'are, b.t +an oftentimes simp-y in+-.de a pro+essor, memory and a stora$e devi+e 8-i(e a CD3 ;? :) ,f the se+.rity re/.irements for an environment are stri+ter, then there are a-so many +ommer+ia--y viab-e so-.tions that ran$e in pri+e and +apabi-ity) !evera- vendors se-- fire'a--s of varyin$ types that +an hand-e a variety of net'or( se+.rity needs) %hether those needs be for app-i+ation pro1ies, or red.ndant pa+(et fi-terin$ 'ith a.tomati+ fai-over and re+overy +apabi-ities, or 'eb pro1ies 'ith +ontent mana$ement +apabi-ities to prote+t end3.sers a$ainst the ha>ards of .nsafe 'eb bro'sin$, the on-y -imitation today is in the si>e of the b.d$et)

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis G0ire'a--s are po'erf.- too-s, b.t they sho.-d never be .sed instead of other se+.rity meas.res) They sho.-d on-y be .sed in addition to s.+h meas.res)G 1" The primary ro-e of a fire'a--, in the traditiona- sense, is to prote+t a$ainst .na.thori>ed a++ess of reso.r+es via the net'or( as part of a Pdefense in depthQ so-.tion) This ro-e serves to ens.re the inte$rity of data and systems 'hi-e a-so -imitin$ the avai-abi-ity of those reso.r+es to ma-feasants) Despite a-- the advan+es in fire'a-- te+hno-o$y over the past 20 years, the f.ndamenta- ro-e of the fire'a-- has not +han$ed) %hat has +han$ed is the
1"

!imson #arfin(e- and #ene !pafford, -ractical .ni! & %nternet Security+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 1BBD:, pD97)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 17

abi-ity to inte$rate fire'a--s 'ith other te+hno-o$ies, s.+h as intr.sion dete+tion and ana-ysis systems) !.+h inte$ration +an -ead to providin$ an a+tive response +apabi-ity that b-o+(s a++ess to dete+ted atta+(ers in a rea-3time manner) 0.rthermore, in addition to servin$ in a prote+tin$ ro-e, the a.dit and a+tivity -o$s prod.+ed by a fire'a-- +an be .sed for dete+tin$ atta+(s, 'hi+h +an in t.rn res.-t in the initiation of +orre+tive a+tions, as has a-ready been mentioned)

0ire'a--s, today, serve as a basi+ b.i-din$ b-o+( 'ithin se+.rity infrastr.+t.res) *t the same time, as /.oted above, they are not the Psi-ver b.--etQ of information se+.rity) ,mp-ementation of a fire'a-- is no $.arantee of se+.rity and sho.-d be +ombined 'ith the other se+.rity te+hno-o$ies des+ribed 'ithin this paper)

=,),NT;&!,?N DETECT,?N *ND *N*5C!,! !C!TE !

The +on+ept of intr.sion dete+tion has been aro.nd sin+e 1B"0)1B ,n its most essentiaform, intr.sion dete+tion is desi$ned to dete+t mis.se or ab.se of net'or( or system reso.r+es and report that o++.rren+e) This dete+tion o++.rs as a res.-t of identifyin$ behavio.r based on anoma-ies or si$nat.res) The most +ommon form of intr.sion

dete+tion system 8,D!: today re-ies on si$nat.re3based dete+tion)

The se+.rity ind.stry has $reat-y e1panded intr.sion dete+tion over the past years to in+orporate severa- advan+ed +on+epts) Beyond basi+ dete+tion and a-ertin$, most

systems today bi-- themse-ves as havin$ Gintr.sion preventionG +apabi-itiesF other'ise


1B

Pa.- ,nne--a, 'he #volution of %ntrusion /etection Systems 8&n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2001, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s61A14F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 1"

(no'n as a+tive response) The +on+ept of intr.sion prevention is that an a+tivity +an be dete+ted re-iab-y and then stopped, either at the host or net'or( -eve-, by the dete+tin$ system) 0rom the net'or( perspe+tive, this response +o.-d be as simp-e as dete+tin$ an ab.sive TCP3based net'or( +onne+tion and iss.in$ a TCP ;eset 8;!T: pa+(et to both the so.r+e and destination hosts, for$in$ the ,P header information to impersonate ea+h side)

*dditiona--y, si$nifi+ant advan+es have been made in the areas of event +orre-ation and anoma-y dete+tion) Event +orre-ation is an approa+h 'herein m.-tip-e a-erts that may appear disparate are ab-e to be -in(ed to$ether based on +ommon +riteria, s.+h as time or method or tar$et, and res.-t in an es+a-ated a-ert, if not a +oordinated a.tomati+ response) *noma-y dete+tion is simi-ar to event +orre-ation, tho.$h its primary ro-e is to s+ientifi+a--y determine a base-ine for performan+e, s.+h as a+ross a net'or( or $ro.p of hosts, and then $enerate a-erts 'hen performan+e deviates si$nifi+ant-y from that base-ine)

The fo--o'in$ se+tions dis+.ss ea+h of these te+hno-o$ies, providin$ an overvie' and then a respe+tive b.siness and se+.rity ana-ysis)

A0,ntr.sion

Dete+tion !ystems 8,D!: ,1

,ntr.sion dete+tion systems are typi+a--y +-assified a++ordin$ to their primary method of dete+tion: net'or(3based, host3based, hybrid, or net'or(3node) Net'or(3based dete+tion
20

Pa.- ,nne--a, 'he #volution of %ntrusion /etection Systems 8&n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2001, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s61A14F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 1B

+apt.res pa+(ets dire+t-y off the net'or(, 'hi-e host3based dete+tion resides on a host and +apt.res data as it f-o's into and o.t of that host) @ybrid systems a$$re$ate the

+apabi-ities of net'or(3based and host3based systems 'hereas net'or(3node systems try to f.n+tion -i(e a net'or(3based system 'hi-e residin$ on a host)

Today, ,D! has be$.n to mat.re to the point 'here most systems +an be operated as a hybrid, if the b.siness desires) The main approa+h .sed, s.+h as thro.$h the open3so.r+e prod.+t !nort, is to +ond.+t net'or(3 and6or host3based s+annin$ .sin$ a si$nat.re set and then a$$re$ate a-erts to a sin$-e host for mana$ement of those a-erts) ore advan+ed

systems have additiona- +apabi-ities, as 'i-- be dis+.ssed in the fo--o'in$ se+tions, s.+h as intr.sion prevention, anoma-y dete+tion, and event +orre-ation)

,ntr.sion dete+tion systems, as a 'ho-e, have a +o.p-e (ey -imitations) 0irst, they are typi+a--y -imited in the same 'ay that antivir.s is -imited in that s.++essf.- dete+tion is based on havin$ a $ood si$nat.re that mat+hes (no'n bad traffi+) %ith net'or(

dete+tion, this si$nat.re -imitation is parti+.-ar-y +ha--en$in$ be+a.se too -itera- of a strin$ +an res.-t in a dete+tion fai-.re) 0.rthermore, ,D! are -imited by ho' m.+h net'or( traffi+ they +an pro+ess in a $iven period of time) 0or e1amp-e, most ,D! today 'i-- +-aim to be ab-e to monitor 1#bps of traffi+ in rea-3time, tho.$h a+t.a- testin$, s.+h as in the ,D! 5ab at ,C!* 5abs, has proven that these prod.+ts are a+t.a--y often performin$ at m.+h -ess than 1#bps) Even 'orse, ba+(bone net'or( providers are often r.nnin$ at m.+h hi$her speeds than 1#bps, s.+h as over ?C34" or ?C31B2 net'or(s, 'hi+h are 2)4"" #bps and B)BA2 #bps, respe+tive-y) This means that the needs and

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 20

e1pe+tations for performan+e and thro.$hp.t are very hi$h and not reasonab-y bein$ met by +ommer+ia- prod.+tions)

,n addition to bein$ -imited by si$nat.res and performan+e, most ,D! a-so in+-.de mana$ement +on+erns 'ith respe+t to the n.mber of si$nat.res bein$ mana$ed and the n.mber of a-erts bein$ $enerated) 0r.strations arisin$ from these many -imitations have -ed to advan+es in mana$ement of the base ,D!, and 'i-- be dis+.ssed in the *noma-y Dete+tion !ystems and Event Corre-ation !ystems se+tions be-o')

1)B.siness *na-ysis ,ntr.sion dete+tion systems are sti-- mat.rin$ as a prod.+t) *dvan+es in event +orre-ation, anoma-y dete+tion and a+tive response have made their .se m.+h more appea-in$) @o'ever, the +ost of dep-oyment and mana$ement is sti-- a-most at a brea(3even point 'ith the benefits derived) Net'or(s that are parti+.-ar-y mat.re and +-ean have a m.+h $reater -i(e-ihood of reapin$ -ar$e benefits from an enhan+ed ,D! dep-oyment, 'hereas net'or(s that are not 'e--3desi$ned and that are poor-y mana$ed 'i-- have a very diffi+.-t time t.nin$ si$nat.res to their environment and estab-ishin$ performan+e base-ines)

S.a-ity ,D! soft'are is free thro.$h open3so.r+e initiatives s.+h as !nort) Than(s to !nort, a-- a +ompany rea--y needs is a reasonab-y si>ed PC 'ith one or more hi$h3speed net'or( +ards and the (no'3ho' to insta-- and mana$e the prod.+t on a +ompatib-e operatin$ system, 'hi+h may a-so be free) @o'ever, the open3so.r+e mana$ement too-s that are avai-ab-e for .se 'ith !nort, s.+h as *C,D and !nortCenter, -eave m.+h to be desired and often for+e +ompanies to'ard +ommer+ia- so-.tions) Benjamin 5) Tomhave 126762004 21

ost +ommer+ia- so-.tions sti-- tend to be rather e1pensive and re/.ire +onsiderab-e trainin$) ?ne interestin$ deve-opment is the inte$ration of intr.sion dete+tion so-.tions 'ith fire'a-- prod.+ts, s.+h as has been done by Cis+o, Che+(point and Net!+reen) *s 'i-- be dis+.ssed in the fo--o'in$ se+tion on intr.sion prevention systems 8,P!:, this advan+e has a--o'ed ,D! to evo-ve to in+-.de a+tive response +apabi-ities, parti+.-ar-y from the net'or( perspe+tive)

?vera-- ,D! has va-.e for most or$ani>ations that have their net'or( in $ood 'or(in$ order) @o'ever, .nderstaffed and poor-y ar+hite+ted environments 'i-- -i(e-y see ,D! as an .na++eptab-e hass-e and +ost) 0or those or$ani>ations, there are a-ternative so-.tions) !evera- se+.rity +ompanies are in the mar(et providin$ o.tso.r+ed insta--ation, maintenan+e and monitorin$ of ,D! so-.tions) These Gmana$ed se+.rity so-.tionsG

providers may be benefi+ia- for or$ani>ations that 'ant the benefits of an ,D!, even in a -imited +apa+ity, b.t that +annot afford to imp-ement and mana$e the ,D! themse-ves)

2)!e+.rity *na-ysis The ori$ina- ro-e of ,D! 'as to dete+t threats on net'or(s and hosts) This ro-e has evo-ved to in+-.de a+tive response +apabi-ities that a--o' it to prote+t reso.r+es and +orre+t mis.se or ab.se on net'or(s or hosts) ,D! +an today serve in a ro-e that impa+ts Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity, dependin$ on the si$nat.re set dep-oyed, the effe+tiveness of a-ert mana$ement, and 'hether or not an a+tive response +apabi-ity e1ists)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 22

*0,ntr.sion

Prevention !ystems 8,P!:,2

,ntr.sion prevention systems, or ,P!, are often defined as Gany devi+e 8hard'are or soft'are: that has the abi-ity to dete+t atta+(s, both (no'n and .n(no'n, and prevent the atta+( from bein$ s.++essf.-)G ,, ,P! have $ro'n from a desire to +ombine the deep3 inspe+tion +apabi-ities of ,D! 'ith the b-o+(in$ +apabi-ities of fire'a--s) These b-o+(in$ +apabi-ities, often referred to as a+tive response, a--o's the dete+tion of a po-i+y vio-ation to be trans-ated in rea-3time into a po-i+y3based a+tion desi$ned to impede or stop the vio-ation)

There are a fe' variations on ,P!, b.t the most +ommon is the in-ine net'or(3based system) *nother variation of ,P! are the so3+a--ed G5ayer 7 s'it+hesG that have mat.red to in+-.de Do! and DDo! dete+tion and miti$ation based on an a'areness of traffi+ at the app-i+ation -ayer of the ?!, mode-) *-so, host3based app-i+ation fire'a--s have been inte$rated 'ith ,D! +apabi-ities to a--o' for app-i+ation3spe+ifi+ a+tive response +apabi-ities based on a $enera- po-i+y instead of a si$nat.re set) @ybrid s'it+h so-.tions are net'or(3based, b.t operate simi-ar to the app-i+ation fire'a--s)

*-- of these types of ,P! have t'o thin$s in +ommon: they $enerate an a-ert, based either on a si$nat.re or a po-i+y, and they initiate a response, as has been pro$rammed into the system) These a-erts may o++.r as the res.-t of a si$nat.re mat+h or a vio-ation of a
21

Nei- Desai, %ntrusion -revention Systems& the e!t Step in the #volution of %/S 8&n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s61D70F ,nternet) 22 Nei- Desai, %ntrusion -revention Systems& the e!t Step in the #volution of %/S 8&n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s61D70F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 29

se+.rity po-i+y set.p spe+ifi+ for an app-i+ation, and the response may ran$e from +ho(in$ the f-o' of traffi+ to terminatin$ or b-o+(in$ the offendin$ traffi+ a-to$ether)

There are a +o.p-e (ey -imitations to ,P!, as e1ist for ,D!) Those -imitations in+-.de a++.rate dete+tion, the abi-ity to hand-e the f.-- thro.$hp.t of a net'or(, and the abi-ity to $enerate the response +orre+t-y and in a time-y manner) The thro.$hp.t iss.e has been dis+.ssed above) The matter of a++.ra+y be+omes in+reasin$-y important 'hen

dis+.ssin$ an a+tive, a.tomated response to a dete+ted event) ,f proper and a--o'ed traffi+ is in+orre+t-y dete+ted by a si$nat.re or as a po-i+y vio-ation, that traffi+ may be inappropriate-y s.bje+ted to the a+tive response) ,n parti+.-ar, (no'n $ood traffi+ may be terminated or b-o+(ed, res.-tin$ in a ne$ative impa+t to the b.siness) *s for $eneratin$ the response +orre+t-y in a time-y manner, this -imitation pertains to the abi-ity of the ,P! to not on-y dete+t +orre+t-y, b.t to se-e+t the +orre+t response based on a po-i+y, and then be ab-e to iss.e that response 'hi-e the offense is sti-- o++.rrin$) Choosin$ the proper response +an be+ome +ha--en$in$ 'hen dea-in$ 'ith a.tomated es+a-ations)

1)B.siness *na-ysis ost ,D! systems today in+-.de some manner of ,P! +apabi-ities) #iven a 'e--3defined set of si$nat.res or po-i+ies, it ma(es sense to dep-oy an ,D! 'ith ,P! +apabi-ities, parti+.-ar-y on the perimeter of yo.r net'or(, and in front of hi$h-y va-.ab-e assets) The +ost of these systems is +omparab-e to that dis+.ssed above in the ,D! B.siness *na-ysis 8=,)*)1:) &-timate-y, s.++essf.- dep-oyment and ret.rn on investment 'i-- re-ate dire+t-y to ho' 'e-- the net'or( is ar+hite+ted, ho' 'e-- the so-.tion is mana$ed, and ho' m.+h tho.$ht has $one into the overa-- se+.rity mana$ement of the or$ani>ation) Benjamin 5) Tomhave 126762004 24

2)!e+.rity *na-ysis ,P! e1pands the basi+ dete+tion +apabi-ities of ,D! to in+-.de definite +orre+tive +apabi-ities) These +orre+tive +apabi-ities have the re-ated benefit of prote+tin$ reso.r+es based on se+.rity po-i+ies) These +apabi-ities 'or( to$ether to prote+t the

Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity of systems and data)

C0Event

Corre-ation !ystems 8EC!:,3

Event Corre-ation !ystems b.i-d on the s.++esses of ,ntr.sion Dete+tion !ystems by providin$ a better me+hanism for a$$re$atin$, mana$in$ and +orre-atin$ ,D! events, s.+h as are $enerated thro.$h si$nat.re dete+tions or po-i+y vio-ations) EC! $oes beyond simp-y p.--in$ to$ether event -o$s from ,D!, ho'ever) EC! a--o's for the a$$re$ation of -o$ data from m.-tip-e so.r+es, in+-.din$ fire'a--s, hosts, app-i+ations, and of +o.rse ,D!) ost EC! so-.tions serve a d.a- ro-e as a data 'areho.se for -o$s and by providin$

a data minin$ interfa+e 8man.a- and a.tomated: to ma(e .se of the data stored in the 'areho.se)

The primary benefit of the Event Corre-ation !ystem is in its abi-ity to +orre-ate events from m.-tip-e systems and $enerate smart a-erts, a-on$ 'ith the +apabi-ity to es+a-ate a-erts, based on that +orre-ation) Event Corre-ation !ystems are .s.a--y +omprised of

29

;.sse-- <ay, #vent Correlation 8&n(no'n: C? P&TE;%?;5D, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')+omp.ter'or-d)+om6net'or(in$topi+s6net'or(in$6mana$ement6story60,10"01,"99BD,00)htm-F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 2A

severa- (ey a+tivities: Compression, Co.ntin$, !.ppression, #enera-i>ation and Time3 based +orre-ation) These a+tivities are best defined by <ay,4: Compression ta(es m.-tip-e o++.rren+es of the same event, e1amines them for d.p-i+ate information, removes red.ndan+ies and reports them as a sin$-e event) !o 1,000 Gro.te fai-edG a-erts be+ome a sin$-e a-ert that says Gro.te fai-ed 1,000 times)G

Counting reports a spe+ified n.mber of simi-ar events as one) This differs from +ompression in that it doesn2t j.st ta--y the same event and that there2s a thresho-d to tri$$er a report)

Suppression asso+iates priorities 'ith a-arms and -ets the system s.ppress an a-arm for a -o'er3priority event if a hi$her3priority event has o++.rred)

Generalization asso+iates a-arms 'ith some hi$her3-eve- events, 'hi+h are 'hat2s reported) This +an be .sef.- for +orre-atin$ events invo-vin$ m.-tip-e ports on the same s'it+h or ro.ter in the event that it fai-s) Co. don2t need to see ea+h spe+ifi+ fai-.re if yo. +an determine that the entire .nit has prob-ems)

Time-based correlation +an be he-pf.- estab-ishin$ +a.sa-ity 33 for instan+e, tra+in$ a +onne+tivity prob-em to a fai-ed pie+e of hard'are) ?ften more
24

;.sse-- <ay, #vent Correlation 8&n(no'n: C? P&TE;%?;5D, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')+omp.ter'or-d)+om6net'or(in$topi+s6net'or(in$6mana$ement6story60,10"01,"99BD,00)htm-F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 2D

information +an be $-eaned by +orre-atin$ events that have spe+ifi+ time3based re-ationships) !ome prob-ems +an be determined on-y thro.$h s.+h tempora+orre-ation)

1)B.siness *na-ysis EC! is the so-.tion that is most desirab-e and has the potentia- for the bi$$est ret.rn on investment) @o'ever, imp-ementation of s.+h a system has proven to be very

+ha--en$in$ for vendors) *s a res.-t, these systems tend to be very e1pensive and not terrib-y re-iab-e) ,nstead, the *noma-y Dete+tion approa+h, as dis+.ssed be-o', has been +on+eived and is be$innin$ to re+eive in+reased mar(et share) ,n the f.t.re, it is hoped that EC! 'i-- mat.re to the point 'here it +an be inte$rated to ro.nd3o.t the ,ntr.sion Dete+tion and *na-ysis !ystem)

2)!e+.rity *na-ysis The primary f.n+tion of EC! is to better dete+t events 'ithin the enterprise) ?n+e re-iab-e dete+tion o++.rs, then other +apabi-ities, s.+h as a+tive response, +an be deve-oped 'ith it) &nti- that time, ho'ever, this so-.tion is primari-y aimed at prote+tin$ the ,nte$rity of systems and data as a res.-t of dete+tin$ a+tive threats a$ainst them)

/0*noma-y Dete+tion

!ystems 8*D!:,5 ,6

2A

Christina Cip Ch.n$, Anomaly /etection in /ata7ase Systems 8Davis: &C Davis Comp.ter !e+.rity 5aboratory, 1BBB, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66se+-ab)+s).+davis)ed.6proje+ts6anoma-y)htm-F ,nternet) 2D ;oy *) a1ion and <ymie )C) Tan, *enchmar8ing Anomaly-*ased /etection Systems 8Pittsb.r$h: Carne$ie e--on &niversity, 2000, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66'''3 2)+s)+m.)ed.6afs6+s)+m.)ed.6.ser6ma1ion6'''6p.bs6ma1iontan00)pdfF ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 27

*noma-y Dete+tion !ystems are an e1tension of ,ntr.sion Dete+tion !ystems 8or Dete+tion !ystems, as defined by Ch.n$:) Per

is.se

a1ion and <ymie, PHanoma-yI dete+tion

is a (ey e-ement of intr.sion dete+tion and other dete+tion systems in 'hi+h pert.rbations of norma- behavior s.$$est the presen+e of intentiona--y or .nintentiona--y ind.+ed atta+(s, fa.-ts, defe+ts, et+)Q
,9

This type of dete+tion is based -ar$e-y on the r.-es of

probabi-ity and predi+tab-e, ta(in$ into +onsideration -o$ data from m.-tip-e so.r+es 8m.+h as is done in EC!:, b.t app-yin$ theories of predi+tabi-ity to these -o$s and a.tomati+a--y $eneratin$ a best $.ess as to 'hether or not a mis.se, or ab.se, is o++.rrin$) ,n its basest form, *D! $enerates a base-ine for performan+e and then

monitors for behavio.r that deviates from that base-ine) ,n its more advan+ed, optimi>ed form, *D! dynami+a--y +a-+.-ates the +.rrent performan+e based on a$$re$ate -o$ data and determines 'hether or not the +.rrent -eve- of performan+e is deviant from e1pe+ted -eve-s)

*s o.t-ined in

a1ion and <ymie, one of the (ey +ha--en$es to *D! is in performan+e)

* -ar$e n.mber of +a-+.-ations m.st be performed on the f-y to determine 'hether or not the a$$re$ate -o$s +an be +orre-ated and 'ei$hted in s.+h a manner as to predi+t an instan+e of mis.se) a1ion and <ymie theori>ed that the type and so.r+e of data .sed by

an *D! +o.-d have an impa+t on its performan+e) This theory 'as proven thro.$h their e1perimentation, indi+atin$, then, that *D! is s.bje+t to performan+e variation, dependin$ on data and so.r+e fa+tors) &nfort.nate-y, performan+e varian+e is not

27

;oy *) a1ion and <ymie )C) Tan, *enchmar8ing Anomaly-*ased /etection Systems 8Pittsb.r$h: Carne$ie e--on &niversity, 2000, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66'''3 2)+s)+m.)ed.6afs6+s)+m.)ed.6.ser6ma1ion6'''6p.bs6ma1iontan00)pdfF ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 2"

somethin$ $enera--y appre+iated by b.sinesses and +o.-d stand to -imit its adoption 'ithin +orporate se+.rity environments)

1)B.siness *na-ysis *noma-y dete+tion systems are an emer$in$ so-.tion re-ated in part to intr.sion 8or mis.se: dete+tion systems and event +orre-ation systems) This rea-ity as an emer$in$ te+hno-o$y -imits the n.mber of +ommer+ia- so-.tions avai-ab-e and in+reases the +ost of dep-oyment) !ome or$ani>ations have $one so far as to deve-op r.dimentary *D! so-.tions in3ho.se in order to defer +ommer+ia- e1penses) @o'ever, the overa-- va-.e of these systems is -imited by the primitive ro.tines performed)

&-timate-y, *D! and EC! represent the idea- so-.tions that 'i-- ma1imi>e ret.rn on investment for dete+tion of threats 'ithin a se+.rity infrastr.+t.re) ?n+e so-.tions be$in to mat.re, +ompetition emer$es, and pri+es be$in to drop, 'e 'i-- -i(e-y see a 'ide adoption of these types of so-.tions) &nti- that time, on-y the -ar$est or$ani>ations, 'ith the ne+essary reso.r+es to imp-ement s.+h a so-.tion, 'i-- -i(e-y see the .ti-ity of *D! or EC!) !ma-- and medi.m si>ed or$ani>ations 'i-- -i(e-y need to be +ontent 'ith basi+ ,D! and ,P! +apabi-ities for the foreseeab-e f.t.re, bannin$ a major brea(thro.$h in performan+e and re-iabi-ity that +an red.+e the overa-- tota- +ost of o'nership 'hi-e ma1imi>in$ the va-.e) ,nte$ration of these so-.tions 'ith a+tive response +apabi-ities and fire'a--s 'i-- +ontin.e to mat.re as the +ore prod.+ts themse-ves mat.re)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 2B

2)!e+.rity *na-ysis *D! are primari-y desi$ned to dete+t threats to the or$ani>ation) This dete+t +apabi-ity may be e1panded in the f.t.re to in+-.de prote+t and +orre+t +apabi-ities, b.t on-y after the prod.+t has mat.red f.rther) The $enera- $oa- of *D!, as is tr.e 'ith most intr.sion dete+tion re-ated so-.tions, is to primari-y ens.re ,nte$rity, 'ith se+ondary $oa-s of ens.rin$ *vai-abi-ity and Confidentia-ity) Dete+tion +an be .sed .niversa--y to ens.re a-three aspe+ts of the C,* approa+h)

=,,)NET%?;<

*PP,N#

Net'or( mappin$ is defined as Pthe st.dy of the physi+a- +onne+tivity of the ,nternet)G2" ,n its most +ommon form, net'or( mappin$ is .sed to do+.ment the -ayo.t of a -o+a- area net'or( 85*N: as part of an overa-- se+.rity assessment) This .se is a form of

inte--i$en+e $atherin$ and oftentimes pre+edes the a+t.a- assessment of tar$eted systems)

Net'or( mappin$ has evo-ved over the years from the simp-e performan+e of PP,N#Q or PC?NNECTQ attempts to more e1tensive and s.bversive 8or P/.ietQ: methods of dete+tion) Today, the most pop.-ar too- for performin$ net'or( mappin$ is the open3 so.r+e too- Nmap)2B Nmap is +apab-e of testin$ for the presen+e of nodes on a net'or( based on a variety of dete+tion te+hni/.es, in+-.din$ the .se of ,nternet Proto+o- 8,P:, Transmission Contro- Proto+o- 8TCP: and &niversa- Data$ram Proto+o- 8&DP:) Ea+h of these proto+o-s has a .ni/.e f-avor, and th.s +an $enerate varyin$ res.-ts) 0.rthermore,
2"

%i(ipedia, etwor8 Mapping 8!t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6Net'or(4 appin$F ,nternet) 2B 0yodor, map Security Scanner 8&n(no'n: ,nse+.re)or$, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')inse+.re)or$6nmap6inde1)htm-F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 90

Nmap has additiona- +apabi-ities for s.bvertin$ net'or( se+.rity devi+es -i(e fire'a--s and intr.sion dete+tion systems) ,t +an ta(e as inp.t a host name, an ,P address, a ran$e of ,P addresses, or a net'or( or s.bnet'or() ,t may a-so ta(e +onfi$.rab-e parameters of Pd.mmyQ so.r+e addresses to he-p +amo.f-a$e to net'or( sensors 'hat it is tryin$ to do)

The $oa- of net'or( mappin$ is to determine 'o.-d nodes are a+tive on a net'or() This basi+ determination +an be deve-oped f.rther to identify ho' far a'ay the nodes are from the s+annin$ host) ?peratin$ system identifi+ation may a-so be performed by too-s -i(e Nmap, tho.$h this f.n+tiona-ity is an e1tension of net'or( mappin$ and not +ore to its +apabi-ities)

*)B.siness *na-ysis Net'or( mappin$ is a +heap and va-.ab-e too- for revie'in$ the e1isten+e of nodes on a net'or() ;.nnin$ a net'or( mappin$ too- on a re$.-ar basis and +omparin$ its res.-ts +an assist an or$ani>ation in ens.rin$ that no nodes are bein$ added to the net'or( 'itho.t proper a.thori>ation) !in+e the most pop.-ar too-, Nmap, is free and has been ported to many operatin$ systems, in+-.din$ 5in.1, &N,E, %indo's and on-y rea- +osts are in terms of performan+e and pro+essin$) a+ ?!, the

There are a +o.p-e potentia- ris(s and -imitations for net'or( mappin$) 0irst, some app-i+ations and systems do not respond 'e-- to probes from net'or( mappin$ too-s) ainframes, for e1amp-e, have been (no'n to respond poor-y to ra' net'or( so+(et re/.ests) Th.s, net'or( mappin$ +o.-d +a.se instabi-ity in a mainframe, or at -east

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 91

$enerate a -ar$e n.mber of a-erts) *dditiona--y, net'or( mappin$ +an be -imited by +ertain types of net'or( and fire'a-- r.-es) %hereas net'or( mappin$ .sed to be ab-e to +ir+.mvent fire'a--s .sin$ vario.s pa+(et manip.-ation te+hni/.es, most fire'a--s today are a'are of state and th.s effe+tive-y b-o+( +ir+.mvention) *dditiona--y, intr.sion dete+tion systems, 'hi+h may a-so be +ir+.mvented, have the +apabi-ity today to be t.ned so as to more optima--y dete+t the o++.rren+e of net'or( mappin$)

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis Net'or( mappin$ is a form of dete+tion, from the standpoint that it dete+ts nodes on a net'or(, 'hi+h +an in t.rn be .sed to determine 'hether or not a $iven node is a.thori>ed to be on the net'or() Net'or( mappin$ may a-so be +onstr.ed as a form of prote+tion, sin+e the a+tions that derive from +omparin$ net'or( mappin$ data sets +o.-d res.-t in remova- of .na.thori>ed nodes from the net'or()

0rom the standpoint of Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity, net'or( mappin$ primari-y serves the $oa- of ens.rin$ the ,nte$rity of the net'or() ,t may a-so be .sed to verify that +ertain nodes remain avai-ab-e on a net'or() Net'or( mappin$ does not have any impa+t on Confidentia-ity, .n-ess one 'ere to spin the impa+t a-on$ the fo--o'in$ -ine: a node, s.+h as an ,D! sensor, is p-a+ed on the net'or( and +onfi$.red so as not to be dete+tab-e by net'or( mappin$F ho'ever, a mis+onfi$.ration res.-ts in +a.sin$ the sensor to respond to net'or( mappin$ re/.ests, revea-in$ its -o+ation, and possib-y its identityF th.s, net'or( mappin$ +an ens.re the +onfidentia-ity of PhiddenQ net'or( nodes)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 92

=,,,)P*!!%?;D C;*C<,N#

*++ordin$ to %i(ipedia, GHpass'ordI +ra+(in$ is the pro+ess of re+overin$ se+ret pass'ords stored in a +omp.ter system)G90 Pass'ord +ra+(in$ may serve to re+over a -ost pass'ord or to +ompromise an .n(no'n pass'ord for the p.rposes of $ainin$ .na.thori>ed a++ess to a system or data) *dditiona--y, pass'ord +ra+(in$ may be .sed as a preventative meas.re to ens.re that stron$ pass'ords are bein$ .sed by system .sers)

ost pass'ords today are maintained as a hashed, rather than en+rypted, va-.e) @ashin$ means ta(in$ a pass'ord strin$ and .sin$ it as an inp.t for an a-$orithm that res.-ts in an o.tp.t that does not resemb-e the ori$ina- inp.t) &n-i(e en+ryption, hashin$ on-y 'or(s one 'ay and +annot be de+rypted) @ashin$ pass'ords before storin$ them is far more effi+ient than en+ryptin$ and de+ryptin$ pass'ords on the f-y) Th.s, 'hen a .ser

attempts to -o$in, their s.bmitted pass'ord is hashed, and the hashed va-.e is +ompared 'ith the hashed va-.e stored on the system) #iven an e1a+t hash mat+h, the -o$in is approved and the .ser is +onsidered a.thenti+ated)

The best +ommer+ia- .se of pass'ord +ra+(in$ is as a preventative meas.re, ens.rin$ that .sers are +hoosin$ hi$h /.a-ity 8or stron$: pass'ords) *++ordin$ to Tsta(e, ma(er of the pop.-ar -0pht+ra+( pass'ord +ra+(in$ .ti-ity, Ge1perts from !*N!, ind.stry, $overnment, and a+ademia +ite 'ea( pass'ords as one of the most +riti+a- se+.rity threats

90

%i(ipedia, -assword crac8ing 8!t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6Pass'ord4+ra+(in$F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 99

to net'or(s)G91

,n the +.rrent +onte1t, pass'ords are the primary method for

a.thenti+ation, despite the avai-abi-ity of better so-.tions, as des+ribed in !e+tion ,, above) Th.s, prote+tion of pass'ords and ens.rin$ stron$ pass'ords a$ainst simp-e atta+(s is of the .tmost importan+e)

Pass'ords are typi+a--y s.bje+ted to a +ombination of t'o (inds of atta+(s: br.te3for+e and di+tionary 8or 'ord3-ist:) Br.te3for+e atta+(s attempt to iterate thro.$h every possib-e pass'ord option avai-ab-e, either dire+t-y attemptin$ to the test pass'ord a$ainst the system, or in the +ase of a +apt.red pass'ord fi-e, +omparin$ the hashed or en+rypted test pass'ord a$ainst the hashed or en+rypted va-.e in the fi-e) ,n a di+tionary atta+(, a -ist of +ommon pass'ords, oftentimes +onsistin$ of re$.-ar 'ords, is /.i+(-y r.n thro.$h and app-ied in a simi-ar manner as 'ith the br.te3for+e atta+()

Di+tionary atta+(s are oftentimes very effe+tive .n-ess systems re/.ire .sers to +hoose stron$ pass'ords) 0or e1amp-e, the maintainers of the pop.-ar open3so.r+e pass'ord +ra+(in$ too- Uohn the ;ipper se-- +o--e+tions of 'ord -ists on CD) The CDs in+-.de 'ord -ists for more than 20 h.man -an$.a$es, p-.s +ommon and defa.-t pass'ords and .ni/.e 'ords for a-- +ombined -an$.a$es) 0or aro.nd VA0 an individ.a- 'antin$ to e1e+.te a massive di+tionary3based atta+( +o.-d have a++ess to over D00 B of 'ord -ist data)92 The ready avai-abi-ity of s.+h data sets for .se in di+tionary atta+(s means that, .n-ess a stron$ pass'ord is se-e+ted, it is very -i(e-y that the pass'ord +an be +ra+(ed in a

91

Tsta(e, :sta8e ;C 5 8Cambrid$e: Tsta(e, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')atsta(e)+om6prod.+ts6-+6F ,nternet) 92 ?pen'a-- Proje+t, <ohn the $ipper password crac8er 8 os+o': ?pen'a--, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')open'a--)+om6john6F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 94

reasonab-e amo.nt of time) This is espe+ia--y tr.e of pass'ords that are based on h.man3 readab-e 'ords)

* stron$ pass'ord is most often defined as a strin$ of ei$ht 8": or more +hara+ters that mi1 .pper3 and -o'er3+ase -etters, n.mbers and spe+ia- +hara+ters) !tron$ pass'ords do not resemb-e 'ords, and are best 'hen $enerated at random)99 ?ne s.$$ested approa+h is pi+(in$ a passphrase and either .sin$ the passphrase in its entirety or pi+(in$ the -eadin$ -etters from ea+h 'ord in the phrase and s.bstit.tin$ n.mbers and spe+ia- +hara+ters for some of the -etters) Certain pass'ord hashin$ a-$orithms prod.+e stron$er hash va-.es 'ith -on$er pass'ords 'hi-e others prod.+e stron$er hash va-.es based on in+reased +omp-e1ity of the pass'ord)

,n addition to re/.irin$ .sers to +hoose stron$ pass'ords, it is a-so in+.mbent .pon system administrators to re/.ire that pass'ords be +han$ed fre/.ent-y) Conventiona'isdom indi+ates that no pass'ord sho.-d have a -ifetime $reater than B0 days, and for hi$h-y +riti+a- systems the -ifetime sho.-d be 90 days or -ess) ?ne e1+eption to this r.-e invo-ves t'o3fa+tor a.thenti+ation 'here a pass'ord is +o.p-ed 'ith a stron$er a.thenti+ation method, s.+h as to(ens or biometri+s)

*)B.siness *na-ysis Pass'ords ho-d a preva-ent p-a+e 'ithin the se+.rity infrastr.+t.re thro.$ho.t most, if not a--, or$ani>ations) &nti- pass'ords are rep-a+ed by stron$er forms of a.thenti+ation,
99

*) C-iff, -assword Crac8ers - #nsuring the Security of =our -assword 8&n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2001, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s611B2F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 9A

s.+h as to(ens or biometri+s, it is abso-.te-y ne+essary that the .se of stron$ pass'ords be enfor+ed) Therefore, the benefit of b.yin$ 'ord -ists and pass'ord +ra+(in$ soft'are and r.nnin$ them re$.-ar-y, parti+.-ar-y on (ey systems, $reat-y o.t'ei$hs the +osts) ?ne do'nside is 'here +entra-i>ed a.thenti+ation has not been imp-emented) ,n those +ases, 'hi-e it is -i(e-y that .sers 'i-- .se the same pass'ord a+ross m.-tip-e systems, the +ost in time of r.nnin$ pass'ord +ra+(in$ a$ainst a-- systems be+omes +ha--en$in$) Th.s, in addition to pass'ord +ra+(in$, it is a-so .sef.- to imp-ement a +entra-i>ed a.thenti+ation system that res.-ts in fe'er pass'ord fi-es to test)

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis Pass'ord +ra+(in$ is primari-y a prote+tive +o.ntermeas.re) ,t is desi$ned to ens.re that pass'ords .sed in vario.s a.thenti+ation me+hanisms are stron$ eno.$h to prevent +as.adi+tionary3based atta+(s) ,t is ass.med, ho'ever, that a br.te3for+e atta+( +an be 100W s.++essf.- $iven eno.$h time) *s s.+h, it is vita--y import to +ombine pass'ord +ra+(in$ 'ith stri+t systemati+ re/.irements for stron$ pass'ords and re$.-ar pass'ord rotation) Pass'ord +ra+(in$ he-ps ens.re the Confidentia-ity and ,nte$rity of data and systems by proppin$3.p the a.thenti+ation system)

,E)P&B5,C <EC ,N0;*!T;&CT&;E94

94

The fo--o'in$ $enera- reso.r+es are avai-ab-e, b.t not /.oted in this paper : severa- P<, -in(s: http:66''')p(i3pa$e)or$6 more P<, do+s: http:66''')open$ro.p)or$6p.b-i+6te+h6se+.rity6p(i6 1A0B %# http:66''')ietf)or$6htm-)+harters6p(i13+harter)htm 0edera- P<, !teerin$ Committee: http:66''')+io)$ov6fp(is+6 P<, and the 5a': http:66''')p(i-a')+om6

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 9D

P.b-i+ <ey ,nfrastr.+t.re 'as on+e tho.$ht to be the si-ver b.--et for so-vin$ se+.rity and priva+y on the ,nternet, as 'e-- as providin$ a frame'or( for se+.re b.siness transa+tions a+ross shared net'or( reso.r+es) The rea-ity is that P<, is +omp-e1, e1pensive, and very diffi+.-t to imp-ement 'e--) C-ar(e has $one so far as to +-aim, 'ith si$nifi+ant proof, that P<, 'i-- remain a fai-.re and offers a-ternatives that see( to improve or s.pp-ant the +.rrent E)A0B standard for P<,) G,ts (ey defi+ien+ies are its inherent-y hierar+hi+a- and a.thoritarian nat.re, its .nreasonab-e pres.mptions abo.t the se+.rity of private (eys, a ran$e of other te+hni+a- and imp-ementation defe+ts, +onf.sions abo.t 'hat it is that a +ertifi+ate a+t.a--y provides ass.ran+e abo.t, and its inherent priva+y3invasiveness)G9A

*++ordin$ to %i(ipedia, a P.b-i+ <ey ,nfrastr.+t.re is Gan arran$ement, .s.a--y +arried o.t by soft'are at a +entra- -o+ation to$ether 'ith other +oordinated soft'are at distrib.ted -o+ations, 'hi+h provides for third party 8often termed a tr.sted third party: vettin$ of and vo.+hin$ for .ser identities and for bindin$ of p.b-i+ (eys to .sers 8typi+a--y in +ertifi+ates: and vi+e versa)G9D The most +ommon form of P<, today is !e+.re !o+(et 5ayer 8!!5: +ertifi+ates .sed thro.$h the ,nternet for se+.rin$ 'eb bro'sin$ sessions) Companies s.+h as =eri!i$n and Tha'te ma(e avai-ab-e servers on the ,nternet thro.$h 'hi+h another or$ani>ation2s !!5 +ertifi+ate +an be verified by a +-ient 'eb bro'ser as bein$ a.thenti+ and non3revo(ed)

9A

;o$er C-ar(e, Conventional -u7lic >ey %nfrastructure& An Artefact %ll-)itted to the eeds of the %nformation Society 8Canberra : C-ar(e, 2000, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')an.)ed.)a.6peop-e6;o$er)C-ar(e6,,6P<, is0it)htm-F ,nternet) 9D %i(ipedia, -u7lic 8ey infrastructure 8!t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6P.b-i+4(ey4infrastr.+t.reF ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 97

,n more +omp-e1 s+enarios, P<, +an be dep-oyed interna--y to an or$ani>ation for vario.s p.rposes, s.+h as se+.re interna- +omm.ni+ation, providin$ en+ryption servi+es to data and systems, di$ita--y si$nin$ +ode, and providin$ en+ryption materia-s a--o'in$ .sers to di$ita--y si$n +omm.ni+ation) Typi+a--y, tho.$h, enterprise P<, so-.tions are provided primari-y as part of an a.thenti+ation system to better prove and se+.re an individ.a-Ls identity)

%i(ipedia provides a de+ent overvie' of P<, and its history)

97

*dditiona--y, the

Nationa- ,nstit.te of !tandards and Te+hno-o$y 8N,!T: has stepped3.p to provide p.b-i+ -eadership for dep-oyment and s.pport of P<, in federa- environments, as 'e-- as to he-p steer the deve-opment and standardi>ation of asso+iated te+hno-o$ies)9"

*)B.siness *na-ysis P<, has histori+a--y been +onsidered a pipedream that 'i-- never +ome to fr.ition) Considerab-e +riti+ism has been -evied a$ainst it d.e to the asso+iated +ost and +omp-e1ity) The major dep-oyments of P<, today seem to fo+.s aro.nd s.pportin$ !!5 for ,nternet transa+tions) @o'ever, P<, has fina--y be$.n to evo-ve and mat.re, to the point 'here other -ar$e or$ani>ations have de+ided to insta-- enterprise so-.tions) 0or e1amp-e, *?5 no' has its o'n p.b-i+ P<, that it +an .se for the p.rposes of $eneratin$ !!5 +ertifi+ates, amon$ other thin$s) Proof of this dep-oyment +an be fo.nd by

revie'in$ the root +ertifi+ates iss.ed 'ith a-- major bro'sers)

97

%i(ipedia, -u7lic 8ey infrastructure 8!t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6P.b-i+4(ey4infrastr.+t.reF ,nternet) 9" Nationa- ,nstit.te of !tandards and Te+hno-o$y, %S' ->% -rogram 8%ashin$ton: N,!T, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66+sr+)nist)$ov6p(i6F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 9"

The .se of P<, for enhan+in$ a.thenti+ation and identifi+ation is a -a.dab-e $oa-, b.t one that is very e1pensive in a+hievin$) This $oa- +o.-d a-so be a+hieved thro.$h .se of +heaper a.thenti+ation systems +ombined 'ith other a.thenti+ation methods, s.+h as to(ens or biometri+s) Th.s, the .ti-ity of a P<, for the avera$e or$ani>ation appears to be minima-, and the +ost is $enera--y very prohibitive)

The types of +ompanies that 'o.-d benefit from dep-oyin$ their o'n P<, in+-.de -ar$e ,nternet +ompanies that not on-y +ond.+t a -ot of b.siness a+ross the ,nternet, b.t that provide b.siness servi+es to other or$ani>ations a+ross the ,nternet) *dditiona--y, -ar$e soft'are deve-opment +ompanies may benefit from imp-ementin$ a P<, in order to si$n +ode and app-i+ations to he-p ass.re the inte$rity of their prod.+ts and inte--e+t.aproperty) 0edera- a$en+ies and finan+ia- servi+es +ompanies may a-so benefit from dep-oyin$ some form of P<, in order to estab-ish a net'or( of tr.st .pon 'hi+h +.stomers and +iti>ens +an re-y)

,n the end, ho'ever, the e1treme +ost of s.++essf.--y imp-ementin$ a P<, so-.tion $enera--y o.t'ei$hs most of the benefits that may be derived) ,n the +ase of sma-- or medi.m si>ed soft'are deve-opment +ompanies, it may in fa+t be +heaper to re-y on +ode si$nin$ from a tr.sted third party rather than to +ond.+t the +ode si$nin$ 'ith an in3ho.se P<,)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 9B

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis The main ro-e of P<, as a +o.ntermeas.re is to prote+t a$ainst atta+( and +ompromise) %hether it be inte$rated into an a.thenti+ation system or part of a +ode si$nin$ system, the overa-- $oa- is to ens.re ,nte$rity) *dditiona--y, P<, +an serve in a +apa+ity of ens.rin$ that Confidentia-ity of data thro.$h tr.sted en+ryption me+hanisms that -evera$e tr.sted en+ryption materia-s) P<, may, ho'ever, have a ne$ative affe+t on the

*vai-abi-ity of data or systems) ,f the P<, fai-s, the asso+iated materia-s or me+hanisms may not f.n+tion proper-y to de+rypt data, or to a--o' for proper a.thenti+ation to o++.r) !in+e a se+.re system 'i-- Pfai- safe,Q fai-.re of the P<, sho.-d fai- to a +-osed state that disa--o's a++ess, b.t in t.rn impa+tin$ *vai-abi-ity)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 40

E)=,;T&*5 P;,=*TE

NET%?;<!9B

* =irt.a- Private Net'or( 8=PN: is a private +omm.ni+ations net'or( that ma(es .se of p.b-i+ net'or(s, oftentimes for +omm.ni+ation bet'een different or$ani>ations)40 * =PN is not inherent-y se+.re, tho.$h in its most +ommon in+arnation it does .ti-i>e en+ryption to ens.re the +onfidentia-ity of data transmitted) The =PN is often seen as a +heaper so-.tion for dep-oyin$ a private net'or( than private -eased3-ines)41 42 They often serve to prote+t and ens.re the inte$rity of +omm.ni+ations49 and may a-so prote+t the +onfidentia-ity of those +omm.ni+ations 'hen .ti-i>in$ en+ryption)

*side from the +ost fa+tor, =PNs have t'o main advanta$es: they may provide overa-en+ryption for +omm.ni+ations and they a--o' the .se of proto+o-s that are other'ise diffi+.-t to se+.re)
44

,n +ontrast, R'i+(ey sites the t'o main disadvanta$es of =PNs

bein$ the re-ian+e on Gdan$ero.sG p.b-i+ net'or(s and e1tendin$ the net'or( that is bein$ prote+ted)4A

There are three types of =PNs avai-ab-e today: dedi+ated, !!5 and opport.nisti+) Dedi+ated =PNs, either in a $ate'ay3to3$ate'ay or +-ient3to3$ate'ay +onfi$.ration,
9B

*bo.t)+om has severa- -in(s on =PNs that may be 'orth revie'in$) http:66+ompnet'or(in$)abo.t)+om6od6vpn6 40 %i(ipedia, Virtual private networ8 8!t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6=irt.a-4private4net'or(F ,nternet) 41 E-i>abeth D) R'i+(y and others, *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000:, p104) 42 ;obert os(o'it>, What %s A Virtual -rivate etwor8" 8&n(no'n: C P, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')net'or(+omp.tin$)+om6B0A6B0A+o-mos(o'it>)htm-F ,nternet) 49 E-i>abeth D) R'i+(y and others, *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000:, p11B) 44 E-i>abeth D) R'i+(y and others, *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000:, p120) 4A E-i>abeth D) R'i+(y and others, *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000:, p121)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 41

appear to +.rrent-y be the most prominent dep-oyment)

@o'ever, !!5 =PNs are

in+reasin$ in pop.-arity, servin$ as a -i$ht'ei$ht, p-atform3independent +-ient3to3$ate'ay prote+tion me+hanism) *dditiona--y, the +on+ept of opport.nisti+ en+ryption, as .sed 'ith =PNs, 'as first posited in 2001 by the 0ree!6%*N proje+t, 'ho2s mission 'as to provide free standards3based =PN soft'are .nder an open3so.r+e initiative) The +on+ept of opport.nisti+ en+ryption 8?E: hin$ed on the notion that a =PN did not need to be in an G.pG state at a-- times, b.t rather on-y needed to be a+tivated 'hen +omm.ni+ation 'as o++.rrin$) Th.s, $ate'ays a+ross the ,nternet +o.-d be +onfi$.red to s.pport en+ryption on an as3needed basis and 'o.-d on-y have to set.p the =PN 'hen a +onne+tion from6thro.$h an ?E3a'are $ate'ay 'as initiated) This mode- is simi-ar to the traditiona.se of !!5 on the ,nternet, e1+ept that instead of simp-y en+ryptin$ the traffi+ at the app-i+ation -ayer, the en+ryption 'as a+t.a--y o++.rrin$ at the net'or( and6or transport -ayer, and a-- happenin$ transparent to the end3.ser)4D The $oa- of imp-ementin$

opport.nisti+ en+ryption 'ithin free ,P!EC3based =PNs 'as to transparent-y en+rypt a-,nternet traffi+)

ost virt.a- private net'or(s today ma(e .se of ,P!EC en+ryption) ,P!EC provides net'or(3-eve- se+.rity for the ,nternet Proto+o- 8,P: and is an e1tension of the ori$ina,Pv4 standard) ,P!EC ma(es .se of the mana$ement and se+.rity proto+o-

,!*< P6?a(-ey and has the benefit of prote+tin$ a$ainst man3in3the3midd-e atta+(s

4D

@enry !pen+er and D) @.$h ;ede-meier, Opportunistic #ncryption 8&n(no'n: 0rees'an)or$, 2001, a++ess 07 November 2001:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')frees'an)or$6frees'an4trees6frees'an3 1)B16do+6opport.nism)spe+F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 42

d.rin$ +onne+tion set.p) ,P!EC in+-.des a n.mber of other feat.res, s.+h as bein$ .sab-e by t.nne-in$ proto+o-s) 47

*)B.siness *na-ysis =irt.a- private net'or(s have a -e$itimate .se in the b.siness environment, espe+ia--y 'hen .sed in a se+.re manner, -evera$in$ avai-ab-e en+ryption options) #iven the

$ro'in$ preva-en+e and avai-abi-ity of +heap ,nternet a++ess, a =PN +an be .sed to se+.re-y and re-iab-y rep-a+e more e1pensive -eased -ines) This rep-a+ement is

parti+.-ar-y ni+e in environments 'here the data bein$ transmitted is sensitive, b.t 'here interr.ption of +onne+tivity 'i-- not represent a major disr.ption to the b.siness)

any hard'are and soft'are so-.tions are avai-ab-e today, 'ith +osts ran$in$ from free 80ree!6%*N: to e1pensive 8dedi+ated hard'are3based so-.tions tar$etin$ hi$h thro.$hp.t:) ost ine1pensive net'or(in$ e/.ipment, s.+h as the 5in(sys and Net$ear

-ines of home .ser se+.rity devi+es, no' s.pport ,P!EC3based =PNs)

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis The basi+ $oa- of a =irt.a- Private Net'or( is to ens.re the inte$rity of the +onne+tion and +omm.ni+ations) 4" %hen en+ryption is added, the $oa- of preservin$ +onfidentia-ity may a-so be a+hieved) ?ne do'nside to =PNs is that they tend to be b.i-t on +omp-e1

47

;obert os(o'it>, What %s A Virtual -rivate etwor8" 8&n(no'n: C P, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')net'or(+omp.tin$)+om6B0A6B0A+o-mos(o'it>)htm-F ,nternet) 4" E-i>abeth D) R'i+(y and others, *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition 8Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000:, p11B)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 49

systems and are prone to easy disr.ption, red.+in$ the overa-- avai-abi-ity of data and +omm.ni+ations)

0rom the perspe+tive of +o.ntermeas.res, the =PN primari-y serves to prote+t data, tho.$h it may a-so dynami+a--y +orre+t) ,f -o$$in$ is enab-ed and monitored, then atta+(s a$ainst the =PN may a-so res.-t in meetin$ the need of dete+tion, tho.$h that 'o.-d be an+i--ary)

E,)=&5NE;*B,5,TC !C*NN,N# !C!TE !

=.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ is the Ga.tomated pro+ess of proa+tive-y identifyin$ v.-nerabi-ities of +omp.tin$ systems in a net'or( in order to determine if and 'here a system +an be e1p-oited and6or threatened)G4B =.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ typi+a--y re-ies on a handf.- of too-s that identify hosts and then pro+eed to test them for (no'n 'ea(nesses) The a.tomated s+annin$ pro+ess sho.-d in+-.de three hi$h3-eve- steps: re+eivin$ a.thority to s+an, determinin$ the s+ope of the pro$ram, and estab-ishin$ a se+.rity base-ine 8based on the n.mber of v.-nerabi-ities fo.nd per n.mber of hosts s+anned:)A0 *dditiona--y, a $ood v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ pro$ram 'i-- se+.re-y mana$e the res.-ts of the s+ans and 'i-have a proven p-an and pro+ess in p-a+e for remediation of v.-nerabi-ities that are .n+overed) =.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ sho.-d o++.r as part of an overa-- ris( mana$ement frame'or(, not as a standa-one se+.rity +o.ntermeas.re)
4B

%ebopedia, vulnera7ility scanning 8Darien: U.pitermedia, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66''')'ebopedia)+om6TE; 6=6v.-nerabi-ity4s+annin$)htm-F ,nternet) A0 Christopher Coo(, Managing etwor8 Vulnera7ilities in a /O#? SA #nvironment 8<ansas City: D?E, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66+io)doe)$ov6Conferen+es6!e+.rity6Presentations6Coo(C)ppsF ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 44

The most pop.-ar v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ too- avai-ab-e today is a-so free, open3so.r+e soft'are) Ness.sA1 has be+ome the de fa+to too- for v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ over the past five 8A: years, rep-a+in$ +ommer+ia- too-s -i(e CyberCop !+anner 8dis+ontin.ed:, ,!! !e+.rity !+anner, and eEye ;etina) =.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ has been aro.nd sin+e the -ate "0s or ear-y B0s, pioneered by Dan 0armer, +o3a.thor of the C?P!A2 se+.rity too-) ?ri$ina--y, v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ 'as host3based in nat.re, as C?P! and T,#E; 'ere, b.t event.a--y e1panded to in+-.de net'or(3based s+annin$) There are sti-- host3based s+anners avai-ab-e, s.+h as the Center for ,nternet !e+.rity2s ben+hmar( se+.rity too-A9) ore often, tho.$h, v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ today is net'or(3based)

Chapp-e provides a ni+e overvie' of the Ness.s s+anner and 'hy itLs preferab-e to its +ompetition: GThe Ness.s too- 'or(s a -itt-e different-y than other s+anners) ;ather than p.rportin$ to offer a sin$-e, a--3en+ompassin$ v.-nerabi-ity database that $ets .pdated re$.-ar-y, Ness.s s.pports the Ness.s *tta+( !+riptin$ 5an$.a$e 8N*!5:, 'hi+h a--o's se+.rity professiona-s to .se a simp-e -an$.a$e to des+ribe individ.a- atta+(s) Ness.s administrators then simp-y in+-.de the N*!5 des+riptions of a-- desired v.-nerabi-ities to deve-op their o'n +.stomi>ed s+ans)GA4

A1 A2

http:66''')ness.s)or$6 http:66''')fish)+om6+ops6overvie')htmA9 http:66''')+ise+.rity)+om6 A4 i(e Chapp-e, Vulnera7ility scanning with essus 8&n(no'n: Te+hTar$et)+om, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004:F avai-ab-e from http:66sear+hse+.rity)te+htar$et)+om6tip60,2"B4"9,sid144$+iB9"271,00)htm-Ntra+(ON5320F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 4A

*)B.siness *na-ysis *s 'as the +ase 'ith pass'ord +ra+(in$ in !e+tion =,,, above, v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ is a very +heap and .sef.- pra+ti+e) %hen +ond.+ted re$.-ar-y and +aref.--y, the .se of an a.tomated v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ too- +an provide +onsiderab-e information abo.t the overa-- ris( -ands+ape of te+hno-o$ies thro.$ho.t an enterprise) =.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ is parti+.-ar-y important for ens.rin$ that ,nternet3a++essib-e reso.r+es are proper-y se+.red before dep-oyment, and to ens.re that they remain se+.re after dep-oyment)

Be+a.se the most +ommon too-s for +ond.+tin$ v.-nerabi-ity s+ans is free, open3so.r+e soft'are, there is very -itt-e reason not to ma(e .se of it) 0.rthermore, the insta--ation and operation of a too- -i(e Ness.s does not re/.ire m.+h te+hni+a- a+.men) ore

important-y, the information that +an be $athered from the assessment +an be inva-.ab-e) ?peration of a basi+ v.-nerabi-ity s+anner is not +omp-e1) a(in$ matters even better,

too-s -i(e Ness.s are thoro.$h-y do+.mented on the ,nternet and +an often be fo.nd in pre3pa+(a$ed bootab-e environments)

B)!e+.rity *na-ysis =.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ +an +ontrib.te to +o.ntermeas.res in a-- three areas of prote+t, dete+t and +orre+t) The primary ro-e of the s+annin$ is to dete+t v.-nerabi-ities in systems, b.t 'hen .sed proper-y it 'i-- a-so +ontrib.te to prote+tin$ reso.r+es from bein$ dep-oyed inse+.re-y and by providin$ ade/.ate information to a--o' system administrators to +orre+t v.-nerabi-ities)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 4D

0rom the standpoint of Confidentia-ity, ,nte$rity and *vai-abi-ity, v.-nerabi-ity s+annin$ most affe+ts the ,nte$rity of systems, tho.$h there may be an+i--ary benefits to Confidentia-ity and *vai-abi-ity) ,n dete+tin$ and reso-vin$ 'ea(nesses in a system, the inte$rity of the system +an be ass.red) 0.rthermore, ens.rin$ the inte$rity of a system 'i-- he-p prevent the system from be+omin$ +ompromised, res.-tin$ in a -oss of +onfidentia-ity, or from bein$ over-y s.s+eptib-e to atta+(s that may res.-t in denyin$ the avai-abi-ity of the system or asso+iated app-i+ation)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 47

R ! R "C S 1) Tsta(e) :sta8e ;C 5) Cambrid$e: Tsta(e, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')atsta(e)+om6prod.+ts6-+6F ,nternet) 2) B-andin$, !teven 0) G!e+.red Conne+tions to E1terna- Net'or(s,G in %nformation Security Management Hand7oo8+ 4th #dition, ed) @aro-d 0) Tipton and i+(i <ra.se) Bo+a ;aton: *.erba+h, 2000) 9) Chapp-e, i(e) Vulnera7ility scanning with essus) &n(no'n: Te+hTar$et)+om, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66sear+hse+.rity)te+htar$et)+om6tip60,2"B4"9,sid144$+iB9"271,00)htm-Ntra+(ON5 320F ,nternet) 4) C-ar(e, ;o$er) Conventional -u7lic >ey %nfrastructure& An Artefact %ll-)itted to the eeds of the %nformation Society) Canberra : C-ar(e, 2000, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')an.)ed.)a.6peop-e6;o$er)C-ar(e6,,6P<, is0it)htm-F ,nternet) A) C-iff, *) -assword Crac8ers - #nsuring the Security of =our -assword) &n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2001, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s611B2F ,nternet) D) Coo(, Christopher) Managing etwor8 Vulnera7ilities in a /O#? SA #nvironment) <ansas City: D?E, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66+io)doe)$ov6Conferen+es6!e+.rity6Presentations6Coo(C)ppsF ,nternet) 7) Desai, Nei-) %ntrusion -revention Systems& the e!t Step in the #volution of %/S) &n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s61D70F ,nternet) ") eBC=# ,T !e+.rity) Heuristic Scanning - Where to e!t") Te-3*viv: eBC=#, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')eb+v$)+om6arti+-es)phpNidO2D4F ,nternet) B) 0yodor) map Security Scanner) &n(no'n: ,nse+.re)or$, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')inse+.re)or$6nmap6inde1)htm-F ,nternet) 10) #arfin(e-, !imson and #ene !pafford, -ractical . %@ & %nternet Security+ ,nd #dition) Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 1BBD) 11) ,nne--a, Pa.-) 'he #volution of %ntrusion /etection Systems) &n(no'n: !e+.rity0o+.s)+om, 2001, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.rityfo+.s)+om6info+.s61A14F ,nternet)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 4"

12) <anish, Bob) An Overview of Computer Viruses and Antivirus Software) &n(no'n: <anish, 1BBD, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')hi+om)net6Moedip.s6vir.s92)htm-F ,nternet) 19) <ay, ;.sse--) #vent Correlation) &n(no'n: C? P&TE;%?;5D, 2009, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')+omp.ter'or-d)+om6net'or(in$topi+s6net'or(in$6mana$ement6story60,1 0"01,"99BD,00)htm-F ,nternet) 14) 1A) an.) )irewall *asics) &n(no'n: !e+.rityDo+s)+om, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.ritydo+s)+om6-ibrary62419F ,nternet) a1ion, ;oy *) and <ymie )C) Tan) *enchmar8ing Anomaly-*ased /etection Systems) Pittsb.r$h: Carne$ie e--on &niversity, 2000, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66'''3 2)+s)+m.)ed.6afs6+s)+m.)ed.6.ser6ma1ion6'''6p.bs6ma1iontan00)pdfF ,nternet) os(o'it>, ;obert) What %s A Virtual -rivate etwor8") &n(no'n: C P, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')net'or(+omp.tin$)+om6B0A6B0A+o-mos(o'it>)htm-F ,nternet)

1D)

17) Nationa- ,nstit.te of !tandards and Te+hno-o$y) %S' ->% -rogram) %ashin$ton: N,!T, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66+sr+)nist)$ov6p(i6F ,nternet) 1") Nationa- ,nstit.te of !tandards and Te+hno-o$y) %S' -lanning $eport 1,-2& #conomic %mpact Assessment of %S'As $ole-*ased Access Control B$*ACC -rogram) %ashin$ton: N,!T, 2002, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66+sr+)nist)$ov6rba+6rba+3impa+t3s.mmary)do+F ,nternet) 1B) ?pen'a-- Proje+t) <ohn the $ipper password crac8er) os+o': ?pen'a--, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')open'a--)+om6john6F ,nternet) 20) P.rd.e &niversity) C#$%AS& Audit 'rail $eduction (roup) %est 5afayette: CE;,*!, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')+erias)p.rd.e)ed.6abo.t6history6+oast6proje+ts6a.dit3trai-s3 red.+e)phpNo.tp.tOprintab-eF ,nternet) 21) P.rd.e &niversity) )irewalls) %est 5afayette: CE;,*!, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')+erias)p.rd.e)ed.6abo.t6history6+oast4reso.r+es6fire'a--s6F ,nternet) 22) ;i+hards, Dona-d ;) GBiometri+ ,dentifi+ation,G in J,K,nformation !e+.rity ana$ement @andboo(, 4th EditionJ,K, ed) @aro-d 0) Tipton and i+(i <ra.se) Bo+a ;aton: *.erba+h, 2000)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 4B

29) ;ot+h(e, Ben) Access Control Systems & Methodology) Ne' Cor(: !e+.rityDo+s)+om, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')se+.ritydo+s)+om6$o6DBF ,nternet) 24) !pen+er, @enry and D) @.$h ;ede-meier, Opportunistic #ncryption) &n(no'n: 0rees'an)or$, 2001, a++ess 07 November 2001F avai-ab-e from http:66''')frees'an)or$6frees'an4trees6frees'an31)B16do+6opport.nism)spe+F ,nternet) 2A) Tipton, @aro-d 0) and i+(i <ra.se) %nformation Security Management Hand7oo8+ 4th #dition) Bo+a ;aton: *.erba+h, 2000) 2D) %ebopedia) vulnera7ility scanning) Darien: U.pitermedia, .ndated, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66''')'ebopedia)+om6TE; 6=6v.-nerabi-ity4s+annin$)htm-F ,nternet) 27) %i(ipedia) Anti-virus software) !t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6*nti3vira-4soft'areF ,nternet) 2") %i(ipedia) Computer virus) !t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6Comp.ter4vir.sF ,nternet) 2B) %i(ipedia) etwor8 Mapping) !t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6Net'or(4 appin$F ,nternet) 90) %i(ipedia) -assword crac8ing) !t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6Pass'ord4+ra+(in$F ,nternet) 91) %i(ipedia) -u7lic 8ey infrastructure) !t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6P.b-i+4(ey4infrastr.+t.reF ,nternet) 92) %i(ipedia) Virtual private networ8) !t) Petersb.r$: %i(ipedia, 2004, a++essed 0D November 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66en)'i(ipedia)or$6'i(i6=irt.a-4private4net'or(F ,nternet) 99) Cip Ch.n$, Christina) Anomaly /etection in /ata7ase Systems) Davis: &C Davis Comp.ter !e+.rity 5aboratory, 1BBB, a++essed 12 ?+tober 2004F avai-ab-e from http:66se+-ab)+s).+davis)ed.6proje+ts6anoma-y)htm-F ,nternet) 94) R'i+(y, E-i>abeth D), !) Cooper and D) B) Chapman) *uilding %nternet )irewalls+ ,nd #dition) Cambrid$e: ?2;ei--y, 2000)

Benjamin 5) Tomhave

126762004 A0

You might also like