G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004 VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 22, 2001 Decision and the February 15, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - GR CR No. 15673. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is hereby AFFIRMED with modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED. The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Antecedents The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows: [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended[,] together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00. Contrary to law. Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and] Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon. The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows: Prosecutions evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendozas] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00 x x x. In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court, as follows: All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge[.] [He said] that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land. Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was] instituted [as such] by Teresitas father. He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita [DangalanMendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita

[Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowners share of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his complaint. Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge. On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the CA]. In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA sustained the trial courts assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendozas land. Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court were amply satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees. The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was presented to show the latters participation in the offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioners admission, which did not constitute any of the exceptions to this provision. It thus acquitted him. As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code as amended, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, this Petition. Issues Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: I Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is admissible in evidence against him. II Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or media representatives is admissible in evidence against the author because what a man says against himself[,] if voluntary, is believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not (U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912). III Whether or not x x x the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses x x x that x x x petitioner Bon admitted his guilt to them should be given high credence by the courts of justice considering that x x x many people who are being quoted in media today x x x have been found to be x x x lying. In other words, how much probity should we give a lying witness? IV Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the prosecution witnesses, [whether or not] x x x the same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him? Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses. The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue: Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 thereof, only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth may be raised. A reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner actually raised questions of fact -- the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Nonetheless, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion and

after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to take cognizance of and decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the interest of the proper administration of justice. In the main, petitioner contends that Lascanos and Dangalans separate testimonies regarding his alleged extrajudicial admission constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also argues that his supposed admission should not have been admitted, because it had been taken without the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already regarded as a suspect. We disagree. Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows: Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay. In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own perception. Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto ruled that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalans testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted. The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes, from which we quote: "Atty. Fajardo: Q Did you reach the land in question? A Yes, sir. Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do? A We were able to see the cut trees. Q And were you able to see who cut the trees? A We were not able to see. Q And how many trees were cut? A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long time. Q What kind of trees were cut according to you? A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw. Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do? A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he took the liberty of cutting those trees. Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean when he said that he took [the] liberty of cutting those trees? A He caused the cutting of the trees. Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone? A I was with the barangay tanod. Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at that time? A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi. Moreover, a partys verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, [t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true. The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him. Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial investigation and, certainly, not to police authorities. Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. We have ruled previously that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary manner. Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which -- with the assistance of the barangay tanods -- was conducted by the owners brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial investigation. Consequently,

the guarantees of Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner. Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. In the present case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced solely from his admission, but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Second Issue: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified. Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court, as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CAs findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence. Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended, provides: SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents. Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees. It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements concur: 1. There is more than one circumstance. 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. 3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances: x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay [t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-in-law, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not under custodial investigation. The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioners culpability: x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and his son[,] x x x Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees. A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, and the CENROs computation of the value of the timber

generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged. Correct Penalty We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the differing penalties imposed by the appellate and the trial courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The CA, however, increased the penalty to imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, provides that any violation thereof shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of Revised Penal Code. This amendment -- which eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code -- has already been interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute distinct offenses that are now independent of the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under these articles. Both the trial court and the CA found that the value of the lumber was P12,000. Under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the statutory penalty should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, however, reduces the sentence to an indeterminate penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court and the CA are within the allowable range. In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty it imposed was more in accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the accused. Hence, we adopt the trial courts indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165448 July 27, 2009 ERNESTO AQUINO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision2 and 24 September 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. The Antecedent Facts On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp. On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut. Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions: 2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee; 3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an appropriate place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and development of the planted seedlings; 4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and 5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws and regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations. This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as soon as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.4 On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges were P11,833.25. An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 7055 (PD 705) was filed against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law.6lawphil Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present. Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner was in possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten. Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed petitioners instructions. Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.

Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the trees in petitioners presence. Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other men. The Decision of the Trial Court In its 26 May 1994 Decision,7 the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and forest charges on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the costs. The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government. On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their provisional liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper receipt therefor. SO ORDERED. The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit. Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision. The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is deleted. No costs. SO ORDERED. The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear of Santiago because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so. The Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not covered by the permit. The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders as to which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the petition before this Court. The Issue The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705. The Ruling of this Court The petition has merit. The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.10 For questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants.11 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.12 In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705. Section 68 of PD 705 provides:

Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit: (1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.13 The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them. Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705. Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. Costs de officio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000 FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents. For review is the decision. dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin. The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows: On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows: "1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas. 2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. ". Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENRPENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.. Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Mis sc On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.. On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.. In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.. Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992.. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court. Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court.. In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition.. On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the

guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277.. Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis.. Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim that private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another.. Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings.. Their petition was found without merit. Rtc spped Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:. (1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; (2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND (3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE. In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are: (1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis. (2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State. We will now resolve both issues. The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states: Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Codeslx mis The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor. The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows: Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the

confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.] Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows: Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.] Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Slxs c Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances. Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.. In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs Return, and wait for the judges instructions on the proper procedure to be observed. Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further: ". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...". Scslx On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State? Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent.. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.

The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States consent. Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss.. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. Mesm ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003 ALFREDO Y. CHU, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Ninth Judicial Region, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, respondent. The Case This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion filed by Alfredo Y. Chu (complainant) against Judge Camilo E. Tamin (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur (Branch 23). The Facts Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer Michael F. dela Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that complainant was in possession of forest products of dubious origin in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), as amended. On the same day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainants fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. On the strength of the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value of P183,790. On 22 September 1999, complainant obtained from Branch 23 a copy of the complete records of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 364, as certified by Branch Clerk of Court Ma. Asuncion Pabatao-Lumapas (Clerk of Court Lumapas). On 24 September 1999, complainant again obtained, for the second time, a copy of the complete records of the case, also certified by Clerk of Court Lumapas. These certified copies did not contain any transcript of respondent judges examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, complainant filed this administrative complaint. Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge issued four search warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat lumber worth more than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact conducted such examination but the record of the deposition was misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence. In response to the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of this Court to comment on the complaint, respondent judge, in his Second Indorsement (Indorsement) dated 16 December 1999, denied complainants allegations. Respondent judge asserted that at around 1:15 p.m. of 9 September 1999, he personally examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), allegedly a witness of CENRO dela Cruz, before issuing the warrant in question. He claimed that a transcript of the examination was included in the records of Search Warrant No. 364. However, he forwarded the records to the OCA on 30 September 1999 in connection with his request for the transfer of the case to the RTC, Branch 24, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur (Branch 24). In lieu of the original copy, respondent judge attached to his Indorsement an alleged computer printout of the transcript, claiming that the time and date of its encoding was verifiable in the computer files in his office. Due to the conflicting factual allegations of the parties, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur to: (1) verify from Branch 23 whether respondent judge examined any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364; and (2) secure from Clerk of Court Lumapas her explanation on the apparent discrepancy between the copy of the records of Search Warrant No. 364, as forwarded by respondent judge to the OCA and as obtained by complainant. In his Report, dated 30 July 2001, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas (Executive Judge Villegas) stated that he verified the records of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch 23. He found on page 5 of the records a copy of the transcript of the examination conducted by respondent judge on one Reynaldo Cuaresma. He attached in his report the explanations of respondent judge and Clerk of Court Lumapas. In his explanation, dated 11 July 2001, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No. 364. He explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript of the examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to complainant on 22 September 1999 failed, through pure inadvertence, to recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that time, the pages of the records were not yet physically paged. He claimed that the pages were numbered only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the following week. He further asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch 24, however, refused to accept the referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the records to the OCA with

a request for their transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to respondent judge as their proper custodian. Clerk of Court Lumapas affirmed respondent judges claims and defenses in her explanation dated 11 July 2001. In the Resolution of 10 September 2001, the Court referred this case to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. OCAs Findings and Conclusions In its Report dated 10 December 2002, the OCA found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended the imposition of a P5,000 fine. The Report reads in part: Respondent judge stands firm on his claim that he conducted searching questions on Reynaldo Charesma [sic]. We find this claim highly suspect. First, the respondent judge [initially] failed to produce a copy of the transcript of the searching questions allegedly made on September 9, 1999 and append the same to the record of the case. x x x x The transcript of the searching questions was, in fact, produced [only] after the filing of the instant complaint. Further, it was noted that during the hearing of [complainants motion to quash Search Warrant] Nos. 281, 282, 283 and 28[4] taken on 21 January 1999 at 9:30 a.m.[,] respondent judge apparently believes that searching questions need not be in writing. This is borne by the following exchange during the said hearing: Atty. R. Rambuyong [Counsel for complainant Alfredo Chu]: In other words Your Honor, they would not admit that the accused received copies? Court: Is there a rule that the searching question must be in writing? Atty. R. Rambuyong: From the Case of HATA versus BAYONA, Your Honor, the Supreme Court has required. As a matter of fact, I cited that in my supplemental motion and the Court said that, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses is not enough. There must be the deposition in writing, and under oath of the complainants and his witnesses; and searching questions should be propounded by the examining Judge. As a matter of fact, there have been several decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that mere ceremonial searching questions and answers reiterating the contents of the affidavits will not be sufficient compliance [there] with. x x x x. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that respondent judge either did not conduct the required searching questions, or if he did, he did not put it in writing. Thus, respondent judge erred because Section 5, Rule 126, [of the ] Rules of Court specifically [requires such] x x x. This is a basic legal precept which all judges are expected to be conversant with. Th[e] Court has often impressed upon judges that as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the public and legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply to a given case. In this case, respondent judge failed to observe an elementary rule which amount[s] to ignorance of the law, thereby subjecting him to disciplinary action. (Emphasis in the original) The Ruling of the Court The report of the OCA is well-taken. Section 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (Emphasis supplied) This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals, reiterated the requirements of Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants, which judges must strictly observe, as follows: Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. (Emphasis supplied) Respondent judge explained that in issuing Search Warrant No. 364, he complied with the rule that he must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses. Respondent judge stated, however, that the certified copies of the records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of his examination because the clerical staff in his office who prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so. This explanation fails to persuade us.

Respondent judges own Clerk of Court certified twice, first on 22 September 1999 and later on 24 September 1999, that the 29-page copy of the records obtained by complainant constitutes the entire record of the matter. This renders improbable respondent judges claim that the transcript already formed part of the records but the legal researcher in his office inadvertently missed it in preparing the copy obtained by complainant on 22 September 1999. The alleged legal researcher, who presumably also prepared the second certified copy, could not have committed the same mistake, twice in a row, within two days of each other. Curiously, in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999, respondent judge did not point to his legal researchers negligence as the cause for the discrepancy. Neither did respondent judge state that the pages of the contents of the folder of Search Warrant No. 364 were unnumbered when complainant requested for copies. What he stated in his Indorsement was that the records contained a copy of the transcript but the same was already forwarded to the OCA. If, as respondent judge claims, he personally examined a certain Cuaresma as the witness of CENRO dela Cruz, he should have secured the affidavit of Cuaresma. Respondent judge should also have secured the affidavit of the unnamed legal researcher who allegedly prepared the copies of the records obtained by complainant. Respondent judge failed to secure their affidavits to corroborate his claims. Lastly, respondent judge should have shown Executive Judge Villegas, during the latters investigation, the magnetic (hard disk) copy of the transcript allegedly stored in his office computer. These omissions bolster complainants claim and correspondingly weaken respondent judges defense. As it is, other than respondent judges bare claim that he examined a certain Cuaresma, the only proof on record in his favor is an unsigned computer printout of the alleged record of the examination. Considering that any one can easily create and print out such document, it does not suffice to exculpate respondent judge from administrative liability. We uphold the OCAs findings that respondent judge, who had earlier professed ignorance of the rule in question, failed either to examine any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to reduce the examination in writing. His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court on search warrant issuance, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Specifically, respondent judge failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that: Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. Rule 3.01 A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence. What was said in a case, similarly involving gross ignorance of basic rules, bears repeating here: [A judge] is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be studious of and conversant with basic legal principles. He owes [it] to the dignity of the court he sits in, to the legal profession he belongs, and to the public who depends on him, to know the law which he is called upon to x x x apply. Not only that, there would be on the part of the litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration of justice if there be a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp [of] legal principles. On the Penalty to be Imposed As recommended by the OCA, respondent judge should be fined P5,000. On 26 June 2003, in Gregorio Limpot Lumapas v. Judge Camilo Tamin, this Court dismissed respondent judge from the service for disobedience to an order issued by a superior court, as well as for gross ignorance of the law x x x with forfeiture of all benefits due him except for accrued leave credits. Thus, the fine of P5,000 should be deducted from respondent judges accrued leave benefits. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a fine of P5,000 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008 LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (RET.), COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RESPONDENT. PER CURIAM: This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City. On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).[1] On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and consignees: Container Van No. Shipper Consignee NCLU - 2000492-22GI IEAU - 2521845-2210 NOLU - 2000682-22GI INBU - 3125757-BB2210 NCLU - 20001591-22GI GSTU - 339074-US2210 CRXU - 2167567 NCLU - 2001570-22GI Polaris Chua Polaris Chua Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez Polaris Chua Polaris Chua Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez

The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc. On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest products. In an affidavit dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.'s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans. On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the adjudication. In a resolution dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government. In a complaint dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products. In a motion to quash the writ of replevin, the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside: (1) Edma's bond was insufficient; (2) the forest products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-interest; (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal

document; (5) nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time; (6) the forest products were already considered abandoned; (7) the forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper; (9) courts could not take cognizance of cases pending before the DENR; (10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (11) the DENR was the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a motion to dismiss ad cautelam[10] dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the complaint for replevin and damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and (4) Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest products. In an order[11] dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit. Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-complaint[12] dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that: During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest partiality in favor of x x x Edma. DENR's counsel was lambasted, cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as "SHUT UP" and "THAT'S BALONEY." x x x x

Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. x x x x

[Judge Paderanga's] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit, issuing the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law. In its 1st Indorsement dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed Judge Paderanga to comment on the affidavitcomplaint. In his comment dated 6 September 2005, Judge Paderanga stated that he exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin and that he could not delve into the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they were related to a case pending before him. In its Report dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3) used inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary; and that he be fined P30,000. In its Resolution dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Judge Paderanga manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Since Gen. Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court considered him to have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006 Resolution. The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's natural resources. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned. In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.

Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. (Emphasis ours) In Dy v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court held that: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours) In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,[23] the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency -- not the courts. In Paat, the Court held that: Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. x x x x

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. (Emphasis ours) Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR's Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan-- a case with a similar set of facts as the instant case -- the Court held that: The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action." x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. (Emphasis ours) In Paat, the Court held that: [T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a

court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Emphasis ours) Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin: Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours) Judge Paderanga's acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao, the Court held that: Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. x x x x

Respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis ours) Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.[29] The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright. In Espaol v. Toledo-Mupas, the Court held that: Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption. When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court: "We x x x find respondent's intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh inappropriate in court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for."[31] Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that Judge Paderanga was impatient, discourteous, and undignified in court: Atty. Luego: Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is... Judge Paderanga: xxxx Atty. Luego: Judge Paderanga: Atty. Luego: I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to... Ready to what? Proceed. Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your Honor, on the I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]

grounds, first and foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor, with all due respect of [sic] this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin dated March 29, 2005 was improper, Your Honor, for the reasons that the lumber, subject matter of this case, were apprehended in accordance with... Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is your proof? Is that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your seizure receipt? Under the rules... Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules. What does [sic] the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it does not need any seizure receipt? You look at your rules. You point out the rules. You take out your rules and then you point out. Do you have the rules?

Atty. Luego: Judge Paderanga:

xxxx Atty. Luego: Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the apprehension, Your Honor, there was no claimant. Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt? But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic] appeared.

Judge Paderanga: Atty. Luego: xxxx Atty. Luego: Judge Paderanga: Atty. Luego: xxxx Atty. Luego: xxxx Atty. Luego: Judge Paderanga:

According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no... Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you taking it from? From the shipping company, Your Honor.

Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the ownership of that lumber.

But the shipping company, Your Honor,... Shut up. That's baloney. You are seizing it from nobody. Then how can you seize it from the shipping company. Are you not? You are a lawyer. Who is in possession of the property? The shipping company. Why did you not issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company? But the... May I continue, Your Honor?

Atty. Luego: xxxx Judge Paderanga:

Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did not issue a seizure receipt here. Well, I'm telling you you should have issued [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company.

xxxx Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. You should know how to write pleadings. You write the pleadings the way it should be, not the way you think it should be. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

Atty. Luego:

Judge Paderanga:

You are an officer of the court. You should be careful with your language. You say that I am wrong. It's you who are [sic] wrong because you do not read the law.

xxxx Judge Paderanga: xxxx Judge Paderanga: Atty. Luego: Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]? Yes, in this case, Your Honor. Then you are representing them. They are your clients. What kind of a lawyer are you?[32] Then you read the law. How dare you say that the Court is wrong.

xxxx Atty. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of Appeals [case] that the Court should not interfere, Your Honor. No.

Judge Paderanga: xxxx Judge Paderanga: Atty. Tiamson: xxxx Atty. Tiamson:

The problem with you people is you do not use your heads. We use our heads, your Honor.

Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our heads, your Honor.[33] (Emphasis ours) Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language.[34] They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their court.[35] In Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas,[36] the Court held that: A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people's faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. x x x x

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary. Judge Paderanga's refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin, repeated interruption of the lawyers, and utterance of "shut up," "that's baloney," "how dare you say that the court is wrong," "what kind of a lawyer are

you?," and "the problem with you people is you do not use your heads" are undignified and very unbecoming a judge. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,[37] the Court already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for repeatedly saying "shut up," being arrogant, and declaring that he had "absolute power" in court. He has not changed. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[38] Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.[39] The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga's third offense. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,[40] the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,[41] the Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits. In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga's arrogance, incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge. Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him one[42] for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the other[43] for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.[44] WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997 EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime." On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican, Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads: "That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated. CONTRARY TO LAW." At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law. On September 24, 1991, the lower court, guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an Order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that: "Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber." The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues. The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law. Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another.

Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section. Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52. On June 10, 1992, the lower court issued the herein questioned Order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products. Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products." The petition is devoid of merit. Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides: "SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found." (Underscoring supplied.) Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held: "The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,' which reads: (aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus." Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following: "WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos; WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations; WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x" To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of

the law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said: "Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., x x x Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x. If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful authority." The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. As this Court said: "x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari." In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts. Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash. With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider, this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law. The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing

rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008 SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. The Case This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section 68,3 Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705),4 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied admission of petitioner's motion for reconsideration.5 The Facts Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.6 The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998,7 Royo summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife.8 On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calix's permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber. On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber,9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter.10 Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207). During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time, that he had no part in the tree-cutting. The Ruling of the Trial Court In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor.12 The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor.13 The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court. On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling, sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the penalty to be imposed on [petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial court imposed.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not admit his motion for having been filed late.15 Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER. II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED. III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED. [IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.16

In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that (1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed the complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. The Issues The petition raises the following issues:17 1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and 2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit. The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over Criminal Case No. 2207 We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals,18 non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases.19 However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter , not committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint. If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court . (Emphasis supplied)

We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80 refers to "reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in their presence."22 Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.24 Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private Property Without Permit Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License . - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in

the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed timber or other forest products from a private land28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing] timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether petitioner "cut x x x timber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit.29 We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings. On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.30 Petitioner does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public officials who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to mention that the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in the Mayod Property. We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest product" (which circuitously includes "timber.")31 Does the narra tree in question constitute "timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus: The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads: (aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we.36 x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." 37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber. 38 Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into "several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111 board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated in the apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced in evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled log left in the Mayod Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8 meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus: Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x. Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: 1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be. 2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos. 3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. 4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos. 5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos. 6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos. 7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable. 8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family. The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111 board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution relied on Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are his "estimates" based on "prevailing local price." 41 This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact.42 In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. 43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here, the accused was charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's evidence for the lumber's value consisted of an estimate made by the apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46 Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum. SO ORDERED.