HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA Facts: Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty.

Madianda. She disclosed confidential information during that period. However, after the confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer. Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documents and immorality using the disclosures as basis for the charges. Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda? Held: Reprimanded. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the attorney-client privilege rule. However, the seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule of confidentiality. PORMENTO V. PONTEVEDRA(A.C. No. 5128) 31 March 2005The Case : Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with prayer for disbarment Facts: sel between 1964 and 1994. relationship with the respondentextends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations.The rift between complainant and respondent case filed with the RTCof Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento wasforced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to recover the subject property.In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondents advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his(complainants) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainants nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainants nephew

not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full

Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will requirethe attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of interests. Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyers new client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former clients action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for theformer client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel. RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO Atty. Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat industries,Inc. until his appointment as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.Employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint, they alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause. Complainant now charges respondent with the violationsRule 15.03 of CPR and engaging in the private practice of law while working as a govt prosecutor.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR. WON being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor HELD: The Supreme Court finds no conflict of interests when respondent handled preliminary investigation of criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to nonpayment of wages that occurred from April 1 1996 to July 15, 1997.Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. In order to change respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidencemust be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired thru his previous employment. It does not necessarily followthat respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment withcomplainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.As the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved asgovt prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representingconflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactionsthat occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to imposeupon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previouslyhandled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationshiphas terminated. Thus, respondent is NOT guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code. As to the second issue, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in Ra 6718 which constitutes aviolation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.. The respondent here performed acts that are usuallyrendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of theterm practice of law. Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees for legalservices while serving as a govt prosecutor is unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01. JOSEFINA M. ANION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR.,RESPONDENT. Facts:Josefina M. Anion ( complainant ) had previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsanain the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned byher late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated herconfidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainantaccused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing thecivil case.Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of theDeed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsanaasserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez,Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana)and had instigated the complaint for this reason. In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report andRecommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record andRespondent was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion.

The Issue Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests. The Courts Ruling

The SC agreed with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. The SC rules that t he relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued withthe highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/he r lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyerbased on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and

discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound toobserve candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rul e 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time,to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer wouldbe called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through theirconnection or previous employment On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, substantial evidence proved to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule: first , he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second , he impleaded thecomplainant as the defendant in the case; and third , the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale thathe had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; healso accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a propertyin which his legal services had been previously retained. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of theCommission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law. HILADO vs. DAVID 1.Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's deceased husband. 2. Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita file an answer on behalf of the defendant; and Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff.These attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party defendant. 3. Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, et al. who had withdrawn from the case. 4.Attorney Dizon (counsel for plaintiff), in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion .5. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorneys Dizon et al, filed a formal motion with the court TO DISQUALIFY Francisco .6. In his answer, Attorney Francisco alleged that, a real estate broker told him that there was apending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate andthat this woman asked him if he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it the casehim. 7.Atty. Francisco accepted the case. 8.One month after, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about the suit, he wanted to take it away fromAttys. Dizon et al. that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate totell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker. 9.Assad requested Atty. Francisco to handle his case stating that his American lawyer left for theUS leaving the case in the hands of other attorneys. 10 .Atty. Francisco accepted the retainer and entered his appearance.11.The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, dismissed the complaint. He believedand concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client. ISSUE: Is Atty Francisco guilty of representing conflicting interest? YES.

HELD: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature onthe merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at hisoffice; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services. SC agrees with petitioner's counsel that THE RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT BETWEEN ATTORNEY FRANCISCO AND MRS. HILADO ENSUED .In order to constitute attorney and client relation a professional one and not merely one of principal and agent , the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend anaction in court of Justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts andthe like." (Atkinson vs. Howlett) To constitute professional employment it is NOT essential that the client should have employed theattorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is NOT necessary that any retainer should havebeen paid, promised, or charged for; NEITHER IS IT MATERIAL that the attorney consulted did notafterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his businessaffairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view toobtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in suchconsultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established . . ." (JonesCommentaries on Evidence) FORMALITY IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ATTORNEY . Thecontract may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney issought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter ." (HirachBros. & Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party, in litigation, had formerly represented theadverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, THE COURT NEED NOT INQUIRE AS TO HOW MUCH KNOWLEDGE THE ATTORNEY ACQUIRED FROM HIS FORMERCLIN T during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.(Brown vs. Miller )

This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating hisemployment, canot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though,while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client'sdisadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment . (P ierce vs. Palmer ) Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what issaid in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice thecomplainant's cause . And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. SC nevertheless CANNOT SANCTION his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who hadsought and obtained legal advice from his firm SC believes that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient . It had the tendency to bring theprofession, of which he is a distinguished member, " into public disrepute and suspicion and underminethe integrity of justice. " The fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, asheretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. THIS LETTER BINDS AND STOPS HIM IN THE SAME MANNER AND TO THE SAME DEGREE AS IF HE PERSONALLY HAD WRITTEN IT. An information obtained by a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. NAKPIL vs. VALDES [1998] Facts: 1965 Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Baguio(Moran property). For lack of funds, he requested Valdes to purchase theproperty for him. They agreed that Valdes would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until they could buy it back. Valdes obtained 2 loans from a bankwhich he used to purchase and renovate the property and the title was issued inthe name of Valdes. July 8, 1973 Nakpil died and Valdes acted as legal counsel and accountant of the Imelda Nakpil (widow)

Ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedingsbecause Valdes excluded the Moran property from the inventory of the estate. February 13, 1979 Nakpil sought to recover the property by filing an action for reconveyance with damages. During the pendency of the action she filed acase in order to disbar Valdes She charged that Valdes violated theprofessional ethics when: Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property which belongedto the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor Excluded the Moran property from the "inventory of real estateproperties" he prepared for a clientestate and, at the same time,charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded property as aliability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to thesaid property to his family corporation.Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate thatretained him as its counsel and auditor Defense of Valdes He claims that he did not hold the property in trust He denied preparing the list of claims against the estate whichincluded his loans of 65,000 and 75,000 for the purchase andrenovation of the Moran property. He stressed that the list drawn upby his accounting firm merely stated that the loan was in the name of Valdes were applied probably for the purchase of the Moran property.He claims that probably for purchase did not imply consummatedtransaction but a projected acquisition. He adds that he has resignedfrom law and accounting firm as early as 1974 and that it Atty.Cendana who filed the intestate proceedings in court. He denied that there was a conflict of interest when his law firmrepresented the estate in the intestate proceedings while hisaccounting firm served as accountant of the estate and prepared theclaims of creditors of Nakpil and Enorn. 1963 CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. Lower Court heldthat the Moran property was held in trust but found that Nakpil waived her rightover it. CA reversed the ruling of the court. February 18, 1986 (during the pendency of the complaint) OSG found thatthere was no trust agreement over the property and that Valdes was theabsolute owner. OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case. Issue: WON the demeanor of Valdes would warrant his disbarment from the profession?NO, Valdes is suspended from the practice of law for one year with a warning that asimilar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future. Ratio: As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the businesstransaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. Themeasure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealingswith his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealingswhere the parties trade at "arms length. Business transactions between anattorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage istaken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, byvirtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of thecredulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney's favour. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Valdes initially acknowledged and respected the trust nature of theMoran property. His bad faith in transferring the property to his familycorporation is well discussed in this Court's Decision. Respondent's act of excluding the Moran property from the estate which his lawfirm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he shouldhave at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agreeon its ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in theintestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own corporationand concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.Respondent's misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moranproperty is clearly unethical. Respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained byrespondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaimingknowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estate's liabilities.Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility whichprovides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and enjoins him to bemindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the rule,based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverseinterests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. Theproscription against representation of conflicting interests finds applicationwhere the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter andis applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies althoughthe attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith.However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where theparties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosurealone is not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to suchrepresentation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood byhis clients. HECTOR TREAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES[G.R. No. 195002. January 25, 2012.] FACTS:Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo CitY. It was thenmortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended Atty. Hector Treas toElizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title inthe latter's name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her auntMargarita, expenses would be incurred.Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt but the lattermisappropriated and converted it to his own personal use.RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. CA affirmed.ISSUE: jurisdiction of RTC.RULING:There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against thepetitioner's conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides such.When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose, he should promptlyaccount to the client how the money was spent. His failure either to render an accounting or to returnthe money constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upondemand. His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he hasmisappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by theclient.The case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinaryproceedings against petitioner. NEVADA v. CASUGA In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo Casuga. Nevada alleged the following: 1. That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries include diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but despite repeated demands, Casuga never remitted any money nor did he return said jewelries. 2. That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with Nevada (they belong to the same religious sect), Casuga represented himself as the hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was able to enter into a contract of lease with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00; that Casuga notarized said agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never remitted the P90k to Nevada. In his defense, Casuga said: 1. That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later advised Casugas wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casugas wife; that Casuga can sell said jewelries and reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still has possession of said jewelries. 2. That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain Pastor Oh; that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said contract of lease. ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casugas defense. HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following: 1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized representative of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced evidence showing that he was duly authorized either by Edwin or Corazon. He also dialed to adduce evidence proving that he never received the P90k from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga did receive the money. His misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and his mere denial does not overcome the evidence presented against him.

2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is his duty as a lawyer to account for all moneys and property of his client that may come to his possession. This is still applicable even though said property/money did not come to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim that Nevada pawned said jewelries. He never presented receipts. Further, even assuming that Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was still duty bound to return said jewelries upon demand by Nevada. 3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease) in behalf of another person without authorization. His forgery made him an actual party to the contract. In effect he was notarizing a document in which he is party in violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV). 4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga is guilty of Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed that disbarment is too severe a punishment against Casuga. He was suspended for 4 years from the practice of law. His notarial commission was likewise revoked and he is disqualified to be a notary public while serving his suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized: the penalty of disbarment shall be meted out only when the lawyers misconduct borders on the criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.

METROBANK

VS.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

G.R.

No.

86100-03

[1990]

FACTS: Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari as appellate court affirms the decision of the trial court expressing its view that petitioner should pay the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which result into a dismissal. Based upon subsequent dismissal of the said case, private respondents filed a motion to fix its attorneys fees based on quantum meruit, resulting to an exchange between the parties. Petitioners aver that they have paid services of its lawyers in full but the latter contends that partial amounts forwarded to them did not consist of payment. To avoid adverse confrontation, petitioners offered to pay P600,000 in which case respondents refused. Both trial court and appellate court commanded petitioner to pay the amount of P936,000 based on the charging liens of the dismissed civil case against them. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien to satisfy attorneys fees; (2) Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien; (3) Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis. HELD: Court holds that respondent cannot charge a lien due to the dismissal of the civil case. Such enforceability is only applicable to money claims and only to dismissed judgments if there is an applicable law or pre-existing agreement between the parties (7A CJS 756). In addition, the fixing of attorneys fees are determined in a separate civl action. Accordingly, in fixing compensation based on quantum meruit, three conditions are to be considered: (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. Likewise, the Court reiterates the legal professions manifest mandate for public service instead of capital gain. Its aim is to uphold public interest and not profiteering. Court grants petition on a review for certiorari and reverses the decision of inferior courts. Appropriate proceedings may be commenced by respondent to establish attorneys fees. LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentinofor solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged thatrespondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditiouscollection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called themand sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the swornaffidavit of James Grogorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever hislawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, inexchange for a loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached respondents calling card.Respondent, in his defence, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing andcirculation of the said calling card. Issue: Whether the respondent encroached the professional practice of complainant. Held:Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any actdesigned primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from solicitingcases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Suchactuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for

disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read inconnection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corruptmotive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause. This ruleproscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by anattorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure toprotect the community from barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainantpresented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very samepersons coaxed by Labiano and ref erred to respondents office) to prove that respondentindeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits. Through Labianosactions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a morefavourable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violatingRule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of theCourts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants serious sanctionsfor initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thusin this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellianmachinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.Canon 2 : A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenientmanner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicitlegal business ATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, respondent. [A.C.8158. February 24, 2010] FACTS: Complainant, through a mutual acquaintance asked respondent to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by complainants relatives. Respondent accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight (8) months and received Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to be paid when complainant received the certificate of title to the property. Respondent has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the filing of this case. In the Complaint, Position Papers and documentary evidence submitted, complainant claimed that he tried to contact respondent to follow-up on the status of the case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls and text messages to their known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to the respondent. However, he did not receive any return communication. Complainant sought the disbarment of respondent for violations of Rule 16.01, Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case. Complainant argued that he had no intention of reneging from his obligation, as he already had prepared the draft petition, and he failed to file it because it lacked the needed documentary requirements that his clients should have furnished him. The Investigating Commissioner of IBP made a finding negligence on the part of the respondent. This was affirmed by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. ISSUE: Legal Ethics (1) Whether or not the respondents excuse is exculpatory. RULING: Legal Ethics (1) No. Respondents excuse is not exculpatory. He was imposed the (modified) penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law and was ordered to return to the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount is returned. In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge. We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainants evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in proving respondents negligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation. (underscoring provided) In addition to the above finding of negligence, [Court] also [found] respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the money received from the

client. In this case, respondent did not immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from complainant even after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the engagement. ABIERO vs. JUANINO Facts: abiero engaged the services of the respondent as counsel de parte in NLRC NCR OCWcase by ordering the respondents to pay his unpaid wages. ( employer).Complainant tried to follow up the status of the case but Juanino advised him to call later. Thelawyer filed with CA a motion for extension of time to file Petition for Review but Abiero foundout that his lawyer never filed a petition for Review.The respondent delayed the filing of the comment for more than 2 yrs. and despite numerousextensions which were all granted, the 12th extension was even filed one day late.Held: yes, Canons 17&18 and 18.03 which states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. A lawyersduty is to exert best judgement & exercise reasonable & ordinary care or defense on his case. Heis not required to seek prior approval from the labor arbiter before he could file a motion for execution. Failure to appeal in CA despite instructions by the client constitutes inexcusablenegligence. Once he consents to defend the cause of his client, he owes fidelity to such cause andmust at all times be mindful to the trust and confidence reposed in him. It is not enough that alawyer possess the qualification, he must also give adequate attention to his legal work. ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR. CHICO-NAZARIO: January 31, 2006 FACTS :1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriationproceedings against the Zuzuarreguis f or parcels of land belonging tothem situated in Antipolo, Rizal with a total land area of 1, 790, 570.36- The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxasand Santiago N. Pastor- They executed a Letter-Agreement dated April 22, 1983 which indicatedthat the contingent fees that the lawyers will receive at P11 or more persquare meter is thirty percent of the just compensation- The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued and on October 29, 1984,a Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid tothe Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square meterThe NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the lowering of theamount of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws- Pending the resolution of the MFR filed by the NHA, a joint special powerof attorney was executed by the Zuzuarreguis in favor of Attys. Roxas andPastor- On December 10, 1985, a LetterAgreement was executed by andbetween the Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor which fixed the justcompensation due the Zuzuarreguis at P17, and anything in excess of thatshall be the contingent fees of Attys. Roxas and Pastor for their legalservices- Resolution No. 1174 dated December 16, 1985, issued by the NHA,stated that the property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per squaremeter and that it will be paid in NHA Bonds which the yield would bebased on the Central Bank rate at the time of the paymentAs a result of the NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement wasexecuted and it was approved by the Court in a Decision dated December20, 1985.- Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the property of the Zuzuarreguiswas expropriated at a total price of P34, 916, 122. The total amountreleased by the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The difference of P19, 583, 878 is,undoubtedly, the yield of the bonds.- The amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted toP30, 520, 000 in NHA bonds- On August 25, 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counselto Attys. Roxas and Pastor demanding that the latter deliver to theZuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within aperiod of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/orcriminal action- Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered stating that the amount that they goseems huge from the surface but it just actually passed their hands.- On September 29, 1987, a letter was again sent to Attys. Roxas andPastor formally terminating their servicesThe Zuzuarreguis then filed a civil action for Sum of Money andDamages, they demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them- The RTC dismissed the complaint- The Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of Appeal- The Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas and Pastor to return to theplaintiffs the amount of P12, 596, 425, already deducting the reasonableattorneys fees in the amount of P4,4 76,426.275- Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a MFR- The Zuzuarreguis also filed a MFR- The NHA and Pedrosa also filed a MFR- All MFRs were denied for lack of merit- Attys. Roxas and Pastor then filed a petition for certiorari ISSUES 1. WON the letter-agreement executed by the parties should stand as lawbetween them2. WON the contingent fees were reasonable HELD 1. Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons wherebyone binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or torender some service. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-

Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them who sentthe said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming allmatters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely noevidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties.

2. No. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are toreceive contingent fees for their professional services. Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states: a contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject t o the supervision of a court, as to its reasonablenessCanon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility statesthe guidelines by which a lawyer should determine his fees (seeoriginal) - Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only reasonablefees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable (Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. Therefore, the power to determinethe reasonableness of attorneys fees stipulated by the parties is a matterfalling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.- In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which isequal to 44% of the just compensation paid by the NHA to theZuzuarreguis. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in theexpropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44%is undeniably excessive. In the opinion of the Court, 87.17% of the yieldsof the bond should go to the Zuzuarreguis computing from the amounts stipulated in the Letter-Agreement. The remaining amount is what is dueto Attys. Roxas and Pastor. The SC affirms the decision of CA withmodification in the computation of the attorneys contingent fees. QUILBAN V ROBINOL PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989 (sarah cabrera) ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS: The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, sold a land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. In 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc suggested to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with Bernabe Martin asPresident. - But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samaban members. The land was ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price of PI5 per square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to P1 20 per square meter. Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. - In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against Rivera, et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case. - To prosecute the appea in the CAl, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing. - On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. - On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00.

- After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivers. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution bad not yet been issued by the CFI of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all. - On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. AnacIeto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document containing the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol. - On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in a civil case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers. Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor. - Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus, another document labelled the a second consensus" was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor. - Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. - Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel. - Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who recommended: 1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, the sum of P75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol. ISSUES: WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended 2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be disbarred HELD: YES Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the CA had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them. - Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to pro. tect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose-the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners. - The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this is the more credible. And that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P75,000-00. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession

into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life- time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own. 2. NO Reasoning In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, the same is absolutely without merit. Disposition - Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs. - Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. ORCINO v. GASPAR Orcinos husband was murdered and she was zealous in prosecuting the suspects. She hired Atty. Gaspar as her counsel and they agreed to a P20,000.00 attorneys fee which Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did his duty religiously from interviewing witnesses to attending hearings and the preliminary investigation. But on the day bail is to be heard, Atty. Gaspar failed to appear. Bail was granted in favor of the suspects and this enraged Orcino. She then went to Gaspars residence where Gaspar reasoned out that he did not receive a notice of hearing hence his absence. Finding his reason to be insufficient, Orcino demanded the records of the case and advised Gaspar that shell be hiring another lawyer. Gaspar complied and thereafter he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The court did not grant his motion because the same was without Orcinos written consent. Perhaps changing her mind, Orcino refused to give her consent. Gaspar, however, did not attend the subsequent hearings. Orcino then filed an administrative complaint against Gaspar for abandoning the case. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar violated his duties to his client. HELD: Yes. The belligerence of Orcino towards Gaspar is understandable and is attributed to her over zealousness to bring justice to the death of her husband. When she uttered that shes terminating Gaspars services, she did so in a burst of passion. She did not really mean to terminate Gaspar at all as evidenced by her refusal to give consent to Gaspars motion. At any rate, a lawyer cannot unilaterally terminate his legal services to his client. Unlike the other way around where a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship with or without just cause. Atty. Gaspar has no reason to presume that his motion shall be granted by the court. He should have not left Orcino in the cold and should have continued appearing for her until there is a withdrawal of record and a successor placed in his stead. Gaspar was admonished accordingly. He was also directed to return half of what was paid him.