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FIRST DIVISION

MARIANO, ESTRELLA, RAMON, MA. DULCE, CARMEL, and STELLA MARIS, all surnamed NAJARRO, Petitioners, G.R. No. 142627

- versus -

JARSON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOSE P. MABUGAT and ELISEO C. GALANG, Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x JARSON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND JOSE P. MABUGAT, Petitioners, - versus -

G.R. No. 172750 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: January 28, 2008

MARIANO, ESTRELLA, RAMON, MA. DULCE, CARMEL, and STELLA MARIS, all surnamed NAJARRO, Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the following: (I) in G.R. No. 142627, the Resolutions[1] dated September 10, 1999 and February 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60680; and (II) in G.R. No. 172750, the Resolutions[2] dated March 17, 2006 and May 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60680.

G.R. No. 142627 Spouses Mariano and Estrella Najarro (spouses Najarro), petitioners, are the registered owners of a residential building constructed on Lot 1394-C of the Banilad Friar Lands located on V. Sotto Street, Cebu City. The other petitioners, Ramon, Ma. Dulce, Carmel, and Stella Maris, all surnamed Najarro, are the legitimate children of spouses Najarro. They are the registered co-owners of Lot 1394-C. Except Ma. Dulce, all of them together with their respective spouses and children, reside in the residential building of spouses Najarro. Respondent Jarson Development Corporation (JDC), on the other hand, is a corporation registered and existing under Philippine laws. It is engaged in the business, among others, of acquiring and managing real estate, buildings and other structures. Among JDCs various projects is the development of Richmond Plaza, a 12-story commercial building located at Lot 1394-B, also of the Banilad Friar Lands, adjacent to Lot 1394-C owned by petitioners. Jose P. Mabugat and Engineer Eliseo C. Galang, respondents, are the project designer and the project engineer, respectively, of the Richmond Plaza project.

Sometime in November 1993, respondent JDC started excavation and construction works on the Richmond Plaza project. However, during the excavation, slippages or cave-ins of soil occurred on Lot 1394-C causing massive cracks on the wall and floor of petitioners residential building. It became unsafe for human habitation. Hence, petitioners left the same. Sometime in February, 1994, a conciliation meeting was held between petitioners and respondent Mabugat. During this meeting, he assured petitioners that JDC will repair their building and restore the foundation of the soil that cavedin and pay damages in case of any defect in the construction of their building. On March 1, 1994, respondent Mabugat wrote petitioners stating that the wet and loose condition of their soil was the cause of the damage to their properties. JDC refused to pay. Meanwhile, the Office of the Building Official issued a Stop-Work Order to respondents because their on-going excavation works violated the Building Code and greatly affected the safety of the adjacent residents, including petitioners. Respondents, however, continuously refused to comply with the said Order. On May 26, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Cebu City, a petition for injunction with damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 60680. Before the start of the hearing on July 1, 1994, the parties agreed to dispense with the issue of injunction in view of respondents undertaking to reconstruct petitioners damaged residential building and to completely restore the foundation of the soil that caved-in to its original condition. On July 11, 1994, the trial court issued an Order reflecting the agreement between the parties, pertinent portions of which read:

xxx Before the start of the hearing of the urgent motions on July 1, 1994, the Court inquired from the parties why the Memorandum of Agreement, copy of which was attached to their motions, was not pushed through or not signed, and it was during the exchange of words between the parties and counsels that they have finally agreed to dispense with the issue on the injunction, leaving the issue on damages alone to be litigated between the parties in the instant action, because they have arrived at certain agreements, thus: the respondents shall restore the damaged building or residence of the petitioners by preparing the necessary plans, specifications and bills of materials, and to submit the same to the Office of the Building Official of Cebu City for the issuance of a permit and to secure the necessary Certificate of Occupancy, all at the expense of the respondents. A copy of the plans, specifications and bills of materials shall be furnished the petitioners who may make the necessary suggestions thereabout to the Office of the Building Official. That the respondents and/or the contractor of the building hired by the respondents to construct and/or reconstruct the damaged residential building of the petitioners should restore the foundation or the soil which caved-in during the start of the construction and/or excavation of the respondents building, Richmond Plaza, which is only about six (6) meters from the petitioners residence, and the soil/foundation should be filled up and restored to its original condition and in accordance with the standard requirements. That respondents bind themselves jointly and severally to pay the petitioners for any damage in case of any defect in the construction of petitioners residence and or the collapse or any damage thereof as a result and by reason of the foundation or condition of the soil. By virtue of the foregoing agreements, the issue on the injunction has been dispensed with, correspondingly, the temporary restraining order was deemed lifted. Compliance with the foregoing agreement is hereby enjoined.

On October 19, 1994, after the pre-trial conference, the trial court issued a pre-trial Order stating that:
During the hearing of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the parties agreed to dispense with the issue on injunction, hence, the only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages in accordance with their complaint and the defendants in accordance with their counterclaim.

On August 28, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for execution of the July 11, 1994 Order. However, it was denied by the trial court in its Order of November 23, 1995 on the ground that the motion should be resolved when the case shall be decided. The court conducted trial to determine only the issue of damages. Thereafter, it rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants by ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P500,000.00 as moral damages, the sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, the sum of P5,000.00 as litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit. The counterclaim is hereby dismissed. Further, the defendants are hereby ordered to do and perform all at the expense of defendants, the following: i. To complete the restoration of the foundation of the soil which caved-in to its original condition and in accordance with the standard requirements; ii. Prepare the plans, specifications and bills of material for the restoration of the damaged residential building of the plaintiffs; iii. Submit said plans, specifications and bills of materials to the Office of the Building Official of Cebu City; iv. Secure the necessary permit from the Office of the Building Official of Cebu City as well as the necessary Certificate of Occupancy; and v. Construct and/or reconstruct the damaged residential building of the plaintiffs in accordance with the approved plans, specifications and bills of materials.

On appeal by respondents, the Court of Appeals,[3] on February 17, 2005, rendered its Decision affirming the trial courts Decision with modification in the sense that the award of moral damages is reduced to P300,000.00 from P500,000.00.

On April 30, 1999, while the appeal was still pending in the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed a motion for execution pending appeal. On September 10, 1999, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, ratiocinating as follows:
Appellees pray for the issuance of an execution pending appeal on the grounds that appellants have succeeded in delaying the appeal, that both appellees are of advanced age and suffering from debilitating diseases, and that the appellants have disposed of some of their properties, thus, threatening the judgment on appeal to be ineffectual.

As records would show, the herein contested decision, inter-alia, orders the payment of moral damages together with attorneys fees wherein execution pending appeal are not allowed (Engineering Construction Inc. v. NPC, 163 SCRA 9 [1988]; Valencia v. CA, 184 SCRA 561 [1990]; Echauz v. CA, 199 SCRA 381 [1991]; RCPI v. Lantin, [985] ). The said High Court:

xxx The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners act will have to be determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral damages and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.

Accordingly, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal dated April 28, 1999 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. We rule that the petition has become moot as shown by the following events: On December 12, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Entry of Finality of Judgment. Respondents filed their Opposition thereto alleging that they and their counsel did not receive a copy of the February 17, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals. On March 17, 2006, the appellate court rendered a Resolution granting petitioners Motion for Entry of Finality of Judgment and declaring that its Decision dated February 17, 2005 has become final and executory and ordering that such judgment be entered in the book of entries of judgments. G.R. No. 172750 In this case, JDC and Jose P. Mabugat, petitioners, assail the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated March 17, 2006 declaring that its Decision dated February 17, 2005 has become final and executory. They contend that they did not receive a copy of the Decision, hence, it did not attain finality as against them. However, the Court of Appeals found that copies of the Notice of Judgment and its Decision were sent through registered mail to petitioners counsel at M.B. Mahinay Bldg. (3rd Floor), F. Sotto St., Cebu City. Said counsel received the same. The latter admitted that through inadvertence, he did not file with the Court of Appeals a formal notice of his change of address. The Court of Appeals, in granting respondents Motion for Entry of Finality of Judgment, held:
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

Sec. 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box. xxx Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule or alleges scandalous or indecent matters therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Clearly, it is the duty of the counsel to promptly inform the court of a change of his address. The contention of defendants-appellants counsel that his failure to inform the Court of his change of address was due to the fault of his legal secretary in not including the instant case in the inventory of his cases is a lame excuse and deserves no consideration. It has to be stressed that it devolves upon every counsel to take full responsibility in supervising the work in his office with respect to all the cases he handles and he should not delegate this responsibility to his legal secretary. x x x Sad to say, the negligence of defendants-appellants counsel in failing to inform the Court of his change of address which resulted to his non-receipt of Our Decision when the same was served to him in his old address, which is the address of record when the said judgment was promulgated, binds defendantsappellants. xxx The service of our Decision to defendants-appellants counsel at his address of record on March 2, 2005 was valid. It follows that the reglementary period of fifteen days within which the defendants-appellants may file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court on Our Decision shall be counted from such date or defendants-appellants had only until March 17, 2005 to file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Apparently, when plaintiffs-appellees filed the motion for entry of finality of judgment on December 12, 2005, Our Decision had already attained finality as no motion for reconsideration or petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court was ever filed by defendants-appellants within the reglementary period, or on or before March 17, 2005. xxx

Suffice it to state at this point that the Court of Appeals did not err in granting petitioners motion. They and their counsel are deemed to have received

a copy of its Decision. Indeed, the latters failure to file with the Court of Appeals a notice of change of address is fatal to petitioners case. WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 142627, we DENY the petition filed by Mariano Najarro, et al., the same being MOOT. In G.R. No. 172750, we DENY the petition filed by Jarson Development Corporation and Jose Mabugat and AFFIRM the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,Cebu City dated March 17, 2006 and May 5, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60680. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (now Presiding Justice) and concurred in by Associate Justice Salome A. Montoya (retired) and Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino (retired). Rollo, pp. 43-46. Penned by Executive Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap (retired). Id., pp. 51-57. In Cebu City.

[2]

[3]

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 149576

Present: PUNO, J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

- versus -

CORONA, AZCUNA and GARCIA, JJ.

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

August 8, 2006

x------------------------------------------x

DECISION CORONA, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision[1] and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name

and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606. During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in default,[2]predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,[3]it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect. On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics motion.[4] It found respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its evidence.

Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari[5] seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent

contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to crossexamination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts after the filing of the answer[6] and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement.[7] Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him.[8] This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.[9] By adoptive admission, a third persons statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:

(a)

expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;[10]

(b) (c)

hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;[11] utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;[12]

(d)

replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make[13] or

(e)

reads and signs a written statement made by another.[14]

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its implications, as follows:

1.

While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a signature.

2.

While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This was similar to addressing an authorization letter to whom it may concern such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.

3.

Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment[15] and memorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.

Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.[16] Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer[17] but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons,[18] something the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant

to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another as long as it conformed to his draft. We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.[19]

The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals[20] is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.[21] In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is hereby REINSTATED.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

[1]

[2] [3]

Penned by Associate Justice Bennie A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (now retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 35-43. Id., pp. 62-64. SEC. 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his new address which should not be a post office box. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect . However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended to delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.

[4] [5] [6]

[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

Resolution dated February 19, 1999 in Civil Case No. 96-1144; rollo, pp. 65-69. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52948. These circumstances included Atty. Garlitos knowledge that somebody signed the answer for him yet allowed its filing in court; he did not protest the signing of the answer by another person; he admitted that he was the one who drafted the answer and he did not disown its contents; after the filing of the answer, he continued to represent respondent in Civil Case No. 96-1144. Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. V, 1999 edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 371. Id. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 03 April 2001, 356 SCRA 108. Section 797 on Evidence, 29A AmJur 2d 174 citing United States v. Costanzo, (CA2 NY) 581 F2d 28. Id. citing United States v. Weaver, (CA8 Ark) 565 F2d 129. Id. citing United States v. Di Giovanni, (CA2 NY) 544 F2d 642. Id. citing United States v. King, (CA2 NY) 56 F2d 122. Id. citing United States v. Johnson, (CA8 Mo) 529 F2d 581.

[15]

[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]

A transcript of the proceedings of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing was even attached to the comment as an annex. See note 3 supra. Ruben E. Agpalo, LEGAL ETHICS, 6th edition (1997), pp. 236-237. U.S v. Ney, 8 Phil. 146 (1967). Trimica, Inc. v. Polaris Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. L-29887, 28 October 1974, 60 SCRA 321. 327 Phil. 780 (1996). Social Security System v. Chaves, G.R. No. 151259, 13 October 2004, 440 SCRA 269.

THIRD DIVISION SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, G.R. No. 152579

Present: - versus YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ.

MILDRED R. SANTOS, in her official capacity as President of, and/or ASBT INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE, INC., LORD NELSON SANTOS, DANILO BALCITA, NICSON CRUZ, PEPITO MANGLICMOT, and ALLAN ARANES, Respondents.

Promulgated: August 4, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[2] dated December 10, 2001 and the Resolution[3] dated March 12, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65068 entitled ASBT International Management Service Incorporated v. National

Labor Relations Commission, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Incorporated, Lord Nelson Santos, et al. The antecedents are as follows: On December 5, 1995, private respondents Lord Nelson Santos, Danilo Balcita, Nicson Cruz, Pepito Manglicmot, and Allan Aranes (Santos, et al.) were recruited by petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (Sameer) as aluminum products manufacturer operators for Ensure Company Ltd. of Taiwan (Ensure), under a one-year employment contract with a basic monthly salary of NT$14,800.00. Santos, et al. were deployed and were able to work for Ensure. However, they were repatriated even prior to the expiration of their contracts. Consequently, in July and August 1996, Santos, et al. filed complaints against Sameer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, and unauthorized salary deductions. On November 3, 1997, Sameer filed a third party complaint against private respondent ASBT International Management Service, Inc. (ASBT). It claimed that the latter should be liable for all the contractual obligations of Ensure since Sameers accreditation was transferred to ASBT on June 9, 1997. On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,[4] disposing as follows
WHEREFORE, premises considered, SAMEER is hereby ordered to pay the complainants:

1. The amount of NT$156,120.00 to LORD NELSON SANTOS covering the underpayment of monthly salaries for the period of five (5) months, salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract and refund of the unauthorized salary deduction, Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000.00) Pesos as refund of the placement fee and guaranty fee less Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as refund for the cost of his plane ticket;

2. The amount of NT$154,560.00 to DANILO BALCITA covering the underpayment of monthly salaries for the period of six (6) months, salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract and refund of the unauthorized salary deduction, Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000.00) Pesos as refund of the placement fee and guaranty fee less Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as refund for the cost of his plane ticket; 3. The amount of NT$174,048.00 to EMMANUEL DEMILLO covering the underpayment of monthly salaries for the period of four (4) months, salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract and refund of the unauthorized salary deduction, Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000.00) Pesos as refund of the placement fee and guaranty fee less Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as refund for the cost of his plane ticket; 4. The amount of NT$172,560.00 to NICZON CRUZ covering the underpayment of monthly salaries for the period of four (4) months, salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract and refund of the unauthorized salary deduction, Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000.00) Pesos as refund for the placement fee and guaranty fee less Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as refund for the cost of his plane ticket; 5. The amount of NT$152,560.00 to PEPITO MANGLICMOT covering the underpayment of monthly salaries for the period of four (4) months, salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract and refund of the unauthorized salary deduction, Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000.00) Pesos as refund of the placement fee and guaranty fee less Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as refund for the cost of his plane ticket; 6. The amount of NT$65,280.00 to DANIEL DUMLAO covering the underpayment of monthly salaries for the period of four (4) months, salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract and refund of the unauthorized salary deduction, Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000.00) Pesos as refund of the placement fee and guaranty fee less Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as refund for the cost of his plane ticket; 7. The amount of NT$156,120.00 to ALLAN ARANES covering the underpayment of monthly salaries for the period of four (4) months, salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract and refund of the unauthorized salary deduction, Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000.00) Pesos as refund of the placement fee and guaranty fee less Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as refund for the cost of his plane ticket; 8. The amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos each as moral damages;

9. Attorneys fees and litigation expenses equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. SO ORDERED.[5]

Dissatisfied, Sameer appealed to the NLRC alleging, among others, that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to decide the thirdparty complaint, to its damage and prejudice, insisting that it should have been absolved of any and all liabilities pertaining to the claims of Santos, et al. On January 24, 2001, the NLRC promulgated its Decision,[6] the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered absolving SAMEER Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. from its liabilities in view of the transfer of accreditation to ASBT Management Services, Inc. and ordering the latter to pay the following: 1. Danilo Balcita P44,640.00 P19,880.00 representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract representing refund of his placement fee

2. Nicson Cruz P44,640.00 P19,880.00 representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract representing refund of his placement fee

3. Pepito Manglicmot P44,640.00 P19,980.00 representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract representing refund of his placement fee

4. Lord Nelson Santos

P44,640.00 P19,880.00

representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract representing refund of his placement fee

All other claims are dismissed for want of legal and factual basis. SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved, ASBT moved for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the motion for lack of merit. ASBT elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, in a Resolution[8] dated June 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed ASBTs petition on the ground that the attached Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Mildred R. Santos as President of ASBT without any proof of authority to sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings. ASBT filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2001 Resolution, submitting therewith the necessary board resolution authorizing corporate president Mildred R. Santos to represent ASBT before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the motion and reinstated the petition. In its December 10, 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of ASBT. The decretal portion of the Decision reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the public respondent NLRC are SET ASIDE. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay the following to: 1. Danilo Balcita a). P44,640.00, representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract; b). P19,880.00, representing refund of his placement. 2. Nicson Cruz a). P44,640.00, representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract; b). P19,880.00, representing refund of his placement fee.

3. Pepito Manglicmot a). P44,640.00, representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract; b). P19,880,00, representing refund of his placement fee. 4. Lord Nelson Santos a). P44,640.00, representing his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract; b). P19,880.00, representing refund of his placement fee. All other claims are DISMISSED for want of legal and factual basis. SO ORDERED.[9]

In ruling against Sameer, the Court of Appeals considered the following factual circumstances: (1) Sameer admitted that it hired and deployed Santos, et al. for and in behalf of Ensure for work in Taiwan; (2) Sameer received the placement fees for the processing of the documents of Santos, et al., without any showing that said fees inured to the benefit of ASBT in any way; (3) Santos, et al. were repatriated in 1996, prior to the supposed transfer of Sameers accreditation to ASBT on June 9, 1997; (4) the August 1, 1997 letter from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) presented by Sameer pronouncing the transfer of accreditation of Yuan Fu Co. Ltd. to ASBT, upon Sameers representation that Yuan Fu Co. Ltd. and Ensure were one and the same entity, indicated that such accreditation of ASBT had been cancelled; and (5) Sameer failed to present substantial proof that Ensure changed its business name to Yuan Fu. Sameer, thus, moved to reconsider the December 10, 2001 Decision; but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its March 12, 2002 Resolution. Hence, this petition. The petition should be denied for utter want of merit. First. Sameer contends that both the June 6, 2001 Petition and the July 5, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration filed by ASBT before the Court of Appeals were signed by Mildred Santos, as corporate president, who is not a member of the Bar. As such, Sameer argues that both the Petition and the Motion for Reconsideration should be considered unsigned pleadings which produce no legal

effect, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. We disagree. Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court ay, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)

Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the party to the case or the counsel representing that party. In this case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion for reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate president, Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBTs Board of Directors to represent the company in prosecuting this case. Therefore, the said pleadings cannot be considered unsigned and without any legal effect. Second. Sameer also submits that ASBT violated the prohibition against forum shopping. It claims that the transfer of CA-G.R. SP No. 65068 from the Seventh Division of the Court of Appealswhich initially denied due course and dismissed the petition then reinstated the same (upon proof that Mildred R. Santos as duly authorized) in the Former Fourth Division, which gave due course to and granted the petitionwas actually an act of forum shopping. Sameer posits that the grant of ASBTs July 5, 2001 motion for reconsideration by the Seventh Division, which reinstated the dismissed petition, in effect gave rise to a new petition.

The argument is sadly misplaced. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[10] There is forum shopping where the elements oflitis pendentia are present, namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[11] It is expressly prohibited by this Court because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt.[12] In this case, there is clearly no forum shopping committed by ASBT. The July 5, 2001 motion it filed praying for reconsideration of the June 19, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition on the technical ground of lack of proof of the authority of ASBT President Mildred R. Santos to bind the corporation in its appeal, is simply what it is, a motion for reconsideration. Sameer cannot insist that it be treated as a new petition just to make it fit the definition of forum shopping in an attempt to evade liability to pay the amounts awarded to Santos, et al. Nor was Sameer correct when it asseverated that the Seventh Division, that initially dismissed then reinstated ASBTs petition, and the Former Fourth Division, that rendered the questioned Decision and Resolution in favor of ASBT, can be considered as different fora within the ambit of the prohibition. They are mere divisions of one and the same Court of Appeals. And as explained by the appellate court, what actually happened was that after the Seventh Division issued its June 19, 2001 Resolution dismissing the case for failure of ASBT to show that Mildred R. Santos was authorized to sign and bind the corporation in the proceedings, ASBT complied and submitted the requisite proof of authority. The Seventh Division then issued a Resolution on August 14, 2001 reinstating the petition. After an internal reorganization, it was the Fourth

Division which promulgated a decision on December 10, 2001. ASBT never filed a second petition. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed December 10, 2001 Decision and the March 12, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos (deceased) with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased) and Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired), concurring; rollo, pp. 8-25. [2] Id. at 34-43. [3] Id. at 30-32. [4] Id. at. 53-62. [5] Id. at. 60-62. [6] Id. at 64-86. [7] Id. at 84-85. [8] Id. at 45. [9] Id. at 42-43. [10] Philippine Islands Corporation for Tourism Development, Inc. v. Victorias Milling Company, Inc. , G.R. No. 167674, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 561, 569. [11] Tegimenta Chemical Phils. v. Buensalida, G.R. No. 176466, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 670, 679. [12] Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768, 782.

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