Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, )
et al., Plaintiffs, ) Civ. Act. No. 07-cv-11446-NG
)
v. )
)
JOEL TENENBAUM, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Plaintiffs respectfully request leave to file a short reply in support of their Motion for
Entry of Judgment and Permanent Injunction (Doc. No. 13). Defendant’s Opposition (Doc.
No. 14) raises numerous arguments that do not respond in any way to the substance of Plaintiffs’
Motion and are premature since no judgment has been entered. Therefore, Plaintiffs seek leave
to file a reply (attached as Exhibit A) in order to briefly address multiple issues raised in
Defendant’s Opposition.
Plaintiffs have conferred with counsel for Defendant regarding this Motion for Leave.
By their attorneys,
Daniel J. Cloherty
DWYER & COLLORA, LLP
600 Atlantic Avenue - 12th Floor
Boston, MA 02210-2211
Telephone: (617) 371-1000
Facsimile: (617) 371-1037
dcloherty@dwyercollora.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this document filed through the ECF system will be sent
electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)
and paper copies will be sent to those indicated as non-registered participants on October 16,
2009.
s/ Eve G. Burton
3
Case 1:07-cv-11446-NG Document 17-2 Filed 10/16/2009 Page 1 of 11
EXHIBIT A
Case 1:07-cv-11446-NG Document 17-2 Filed 10/16/2009 Page 2 of 11
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, )
et al., Plaintiffs, ) Civ. Act. No. 07-cv-11446-NG
)
v. )
)
JOEL TENENBAUM, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment (“Motion”) is a simple one. Plaintiffs seek
entry of judgment based on the jury’s July 31, 2009 verdict and on Plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief under section 502 of the Copyright Act. (Doc. No. 13.)
Rule 58 requires the prompt entry of judgment upon a jury verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(b)(2). Here, the amount of the jury’s verdict is undisputed. The only question, therefore, is
Defendant’s Opposition (Doc. No. 14) to Plaintiffs’ Motion focuses primarily on issues
that have nothing to do with the relief requested by Plaintiffs. Specifically, Defendant spends the
majority of his Opposition arguing about perceived errors made by the Court, which, Defendant
contends, require a new trial. While Plaintiffs vehemently disagree with Defendant’s arguments
for a new trial, those arguments are not properly before the Court because (1) the arguments go
far beyond the scope of Plaintiffs’ Motion, and (2) the Court has not yet entered judgment. The
Court’s September 15, 2009 Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time gave
Defendant additional time to “file his objection to plaintiffs’ motion for entry of judgment by
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October 5, 2009,” not to raise additional issues that are more properly addressed in post-
judgment motions. Defendant’s post-trial motions should not be addressed before the Court has
entered its judgment based on the jury’s verdict and on Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction.
By seeking to raise post-trial arguments before any judgment has been entered,
Defendant apparently seeks to litigate his post-trial arguments twice. Defendant states as much
in footnote 2 of his Opposition, where he warns of his intention to raise these and other issues in
a subsequent motion once judgment enters. Defendant’s approach is both improper and
inefficient. Plaintiffs will rebut each and every one of Defendant’s arguments for post-trial
relief—because such arguments are factually inaccurate, legally without merit, or both—but
Plaintiffs should not be required to do so twice, and should not be required to do so before the
Therefore, Plaintiffs will not address Defendant’s post-trial arguments at this time, but
will instead limit their reply to the issue at hand—namely, the scope of the injunction to be
entered as part of the judgment. Once judgment enters, Defendant may raise his colorable post-
Motion and in the proposed language of the injunction, Plaintiffs ask that Defendant be enjoined
from committing copyright infringement or acting in concert with others in committing copyright
infringement, both actions which the law prohibits anyhow. The requested injunction is neither
unusual nor unwarranted. Contrary to Defendant’s contention, Plaintiffs are not seeking to limit
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or prevent Defendant or his counsel from discussing this case or the perceived policy issues
Plaintiffs are also seeking an injunction that Defendant destroy the infringing recordings
that, to date, he has refused to destroy. While Defendant’s counsel claims Defendant now has
lawful copies of the 30 recordings on which a verdict was rendered, the evidence at trial
established that Defendant has thousands of infringing recordings. Moreover, whether or not he
has now acquired the recordings lawfully, he needs to destroy the unlawful copies. Defendant’s
implicit argument that his post-trial conduct somehow cleanses his pre-trial infringement, is
simply wrong. Defendant should not benefit from his copyright infringement and should be
required to destroy all copies of the sound recordings that he obtained illegally. Such an
injunction is essential to the protection of Plaintiffs’ rights and imposes no burden on Defendant.
See 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (“As party of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the
destruction . . . of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used in violation of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights, and of all . . . tapes . . or other articles by means of which
such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.”); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v.
Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 546 (4th Cir. N.C. 2007) (“In the garden variety piracy case, such
orders [for destruction of the infringing materials] are routinely issued.”); BMG Music v. Roma's
Record Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87588 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2009) (“Although, forfeiture
and the ordered destruction of infringing works is within the court's discretion, such relief is
In his Opposition, Defendant does not cite a single instance where a court has denied an
injunction under circumstances like those presented in this case. Nor could he. The evidence at
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trial showed that Defendant engaged in massive infringement for years, both uploading and
continued to engage in copyright infringement after repeated warnings that his conduct was
illegal and that he should stop. Defendant continued to infringe during the course of this lawsuit
and stated under oath that, even today, he does not regret his infringement. Post trial, Defendant
has made it clear that he has no intention of satisfying any portion of the jury’s verdict against
him. A broad injunction enjoining Defendant from engaging in continued online copyright
Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs’ injunction request does not “fit” the four factor
test of CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2008), has no merit. Plaintiffs’ Motion
Irreparable Harm
First, Defendant’s Opposition does not challenge the unbroken line of authority in the
First Circuit holding that, in a copyright case, irreparable harm is presumed once infringement
has been established. See Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d
600, 611 (1st Cir. 1988) (once infringement has been established, irreparable harm is presumed
in copyright infringement actions); United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36, 51 n.5
(1st Cir. 2001) (“when Congress decides to make available the remedy of injunction for
violations of a statute’s substantive provisions, irreparable injury is presumed to flow from such
violations.”); see also Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. TD Banknorth, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 77,
87 (D. Mass. 2008) (“In the context of trademark litigation, irreparable harm is generally
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Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs offered no proof of any “real harm” is simply
wrong. Plaintiffs presented substantial evidence at trial regarding the difficulty of measuring
damages from P2P copyright infringement due to the fact that online “piracy typically takes
place behind closed doors and beyond the watchful eyes of a copyright holder.” Warner Bros.
Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. 06-cv-51, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65765, *10 (W.D. Tex. July 17,
2006); see also Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (“[D]ifficulties [in calculating damages in copyright cases] have led to the presumption
that copyright and trademark infringement cause irreparable injury, i.e. injury for which damages
are not an adequate remedy.”) MediaSentry’s Chris Connelly testified that the very nature of
KaZaA is to allow anonymous file sharing and, as a result, to prevent copyright holders from
being able to record or even monitor every act of infringement over the P2P network.
and downloaded thousands of copyrighted songs on multiple peer-to-peer platforms for years,
even during the course of the lawsuit, resulting in a viral form of copyright infringement. See
also Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 331-32 (the distribution of digital works via the Internet “is
exponential rather than linear,” and “threatens to produce virtually unstoppable infringement of
copyright.”). Plaintiffs’ witnesses, including Wade Leak, JoAn Cho and Silda Palerm, testified
at trial and demonstrated to the jury that many of the sound recordings from Defendant’s
computer and KaZaA shared folder were exact replicas of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted sound
recordings. The sound recordings illegally obtained by Defendant, and his distribution of these
sound recordings to other peer-to-peer users, compete directly with Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works
and result in significant losses in sales of the legitimate works. See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v.
RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting injunction where infringing
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works cause irreparable harm to sales of legitimate works). Plaintiffs’ fact and expert witnesses
also testified to the substantial harm caused by the massive distribution of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted
sound recordings over peer-to-peer networks such as KaZaA, including lost revenues, layoffs,
and a diminished capability to identify and promote new talent. The harm from Defendant’s
Second, Defendant’s contentions that a monetary judgment would be sufficient, and that
Plaintiffs seek an injunction only out of vengeance, likewise have no merit. To begin with,
Defendant has stated repeatedly that he has no intention of satisfying any judgment against him
and that he intends to file for bankruptcy protection. (See Nate Anderson, “Team Tenenbaum to
fight on for those ‘RIAA has screwed over,’” ArsTechnica, August 9, 2009 (available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/08/charlie-nesson-still-fights-for-those-riaa-has-
screwed-over.ars) (“Tenenbaum has a plan for dealing with the damages. If Nesson’s work fails
to get him off the hook, ‘I declare bankruptcy.’”)). Thus, Plaintiffs may not recover anything
from a monetary judgment. Accordingly, a monetary judgment alone does not provide an
adequate remedy for Defendant’s years of illegal conduct. Moreover, Defendant admitted at trial
to repeatedly lying to Plaintiffs and to this Court about his illegal conduct. Without an
injunction, there is no assurance that he will not continue his infringement and the resulting harm
to Plaintiffs.
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Balance of Hardships
Third, Defendant’s bald assertion that Plaintiffs would suffer no hardship in the absence
of an injunction has no basis in fact or law. As the court explained in UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Blake, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46414, at *7-8 (E.D.N.C. June 26, 2007):
By contrast, Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction seeks nothing more than an order compelling
Defendant to obey the law. The injunction makes clear to Defendant what precisely that
means in the context of peer-to-peer file sharing. There can be no harm from requiring
infringement. The injunction Plaintiffs seek does not prevent Defendant from doing
Public Interest
Fourth, the public interest would clearly be served by the issuance of Plaintiffs’
requested injunction because the public has an interest in the enforcement of federal
sought by arguing that the public interest would be served by allowing Defendant and his
counsel to “speak[] out” on the issues. Plaintiffs, however, are not trying to stifle any
debate Defendant wishes to engage in and the proposed injunction does not seek to limit
his First Amendment right to complain, lobby, or blog about anything he likes.
Plaintiffs’ injunction merely requires Defendant to follow the law and, as the First Circuit
explained in Concrete Machinery Co., 843 F.2d at 612, “it is virtually axiomatic that the
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public interest can only be served by upholding copyright protections.” See Coquico, Inc.
v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76570, *16 (D.P.R. Oct. 11, 2007) (“The
public interest rarely is a genuine issue if the copyright owner has established a likelihood
of success since the public interest is generally served by upholding copyrights and
preventing the misappropriation of the skills, creative energies, and resources which are
CONCLUSION
The jury reached its verdict over two and a half months ago, on July 31, 2009. Rule 58
requires judgment to enter promptly upon a jury’s verdict. Too much time has already passed.
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court immediately enter Judgment in this case to include a
monetary judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and injunctive relief as requested in the
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By their attorneys,
Daniel J. Cloherty
DWYER & COLLORA, LLP
600 Atlantic Avenue - 12th Floor
Boston, MA 02210-2211
Telephone: (617) 371-1000
Facsimile: (617) 371-1037
dcloherty@dwyercollora.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this document filed through the ECF system will be sent
electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)
and paper copies will be sent to those indicated as non-registered participants on October 16,
2009.
s/ Eve G. Burton
10
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