Burma 1978: The Thirtieth Year of Independence Author(s): William L. Scully and Frank N.

Trager Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1978: Part II (Feb., 1979), pp. 147-156 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643781 . Accessed: 15/08/2013 11:13
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BURMA1978: THETHIRTIETH YEAROF INDEPENDENCE William L. Scully and Frank N. Trager

AMONG THE COUNTRIES in Asia that regained political freedom from a colonial power in the nationalist aftermath of World War II, Burma is among those few that, on the whole, have fared poorly. Burma is basically a moderately well-endowed country. The largely literate population of approximately 33 million should be able to enjoy their reasonably rich resource base of land, water, and mineral wealth. The population growth rate is a comparatively moderate 2.2% per annum. For better or worse, in good times and bad, Burma, a centralized, in part federalized republic, has had only two sets of leaders since independence in 1948-the one civilian, 1948-1962 and the other military, 1962 to the present-both stemming from the same anticolonial, nationalist struggle for independence. These favorable factors-proportionate, ample resources; moderate density and growth of population; relatively high literacy rate; continuity of leadership; ethnic diversity within a dominant, homogeneous, Buddhist culture; pursuit of what has been rightfully called "its own version of economic nationalism with almost total singlemindedness;"I proper membership in the United Nations, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank; and careful avoidance since shortly after independence of any international political alignment-should have made Burma what many Burmese have called their country: The Happy Golden Land. Gold here represents not only the precious metal with which the Burmese adorn their many religious shrines but also the hundreds of miles of ripening golden-hued rice spreading across 1 Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, Southeast Asian Affairs 1977 (Singapore, 1977), p. 34.

147 f 1979 by the Regents of the University of California 0004-4687/79/020 147 + 10$00.50

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the extraordinary river deltas at harvest time. For Burma was onceit no longer is-the predominant rice exporter among the other exporting rice-bowl countries of mainland Southeast Asia. This once potential Camelot is now, at best, a legend of the past. There is no single explanation for this unwanted, indeed originally unpredicted (unpredictable?) failure. All the elements which will appear briefly in the following annual account have occurred in one combination or another in previous years. The older of the authors has lived, worked in, and visited Burma scores of times since 1950; the younger since the early 1970s. Our investigations and our perceptions, however variant in sympathies and friendships, do not otherwise vary. What we continue to find is that (1) leadership, though benefitting from continuity, does not add "cubits" to its stature or its country's stature, and has not provided for democratic succession; (2) resources are developed but not better developed; (3) economic nationalism, whatever it is called, does not provide material or spiritual gain to or for the people nor does it prevent "stagflation" from occurring within the economy; (4) honest nonalignment-even forms of international isolationism-does not bring domestic peace and tranquility; (5) political intervention and externally promoted insurgency-mostly from the communist states-add high and continuous costs in lives and treasure to maintaining the ship of state afloat during attacks that began and have never stopped since the third month of independence in 1948. And so it goes. Let us look at these factors at work during 1978. Domestic Politics Between January 1 and 15, 1978, some 16 million eligible voters, according to official sources, participated in the election of 464 members of the constitutionally highest organ of state power, the Pyithu Hluttaw (People's Congress or Assembly), as well as the selection of over 178,000 members of the People's Council chosen at State, Division, Ward, Township and Village-tract levels. Concurrently, 250 members of the Central Committee of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), the sole legal party, were also elected. By early March, following the first session of the Pyithu Hluttaw, a new Council of State, Council of Ministers, and other state organs, as well as the budget estimates, were approved. As expected, General Ne Win retained the position of President of the State and Chairman of the Council of State, while General San Yu remained as Secretary of the Council of State, and U Maung Maung Kha as Prime Minister. The election of the BSPP Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and other organs of state power discloses the recurrent and preponderant influence of the military in Burmese political life. According to one estimate, more than 80 serving military officers and about as many, if not more, retired military personnel serve on the

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BURMA TABLE 1: Council of Ministers U Maung Maung Kha (retired colonel) U Tun Tin General Kyaw Htin Col. Sein Lwin U Ye Goung Col. Tint Swe Dr. Khin Maung Win Col. Maung Cho Col. Khin Maung Gyi Col. Sein Tun U Mahn San Myat Shwe Brig.-Gen. Myint Maung U Mya Maung Brig.-Gen. Hla Tun Col. Khin Ohn Col. Win Maung Col. Than Tin Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister (as of October 25) & Minister for Planning & Finance Minister for Defense Minister for Home and Religious Affairs Minister for Agriculture and Forests Minister for Industry (1) Minister for Education Minister for Industry (2) Minister for Trade (as of October 25) Minister for Co-operatives Minister for Social Welfare and Labour Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Information & Culture Minister for Construction Minister for Transport & Communications Minister for Health Minister for Mines

149

SOURCE: The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), March 4, 1978.

new Central Committee.2 Further evidence of this military preponderance can be seen in the newly elected Council of Ministers (see Table 1). Other prominent state positions are likewise held by military figures, as for example the Chairmanship of the Council of People's Justices as well as that of the Council of People's Attorneys. Paramount among the deliberations of these newly-elected bodies has been the subject of administrative discipline and personal responsibility. In late February, the BSPP Central Committee, obviously responding to recent and past allegations of corruption among high party and state officials, directed that all its members declare their family assets, their cash and real estate holdings, and business interests. This declaration similarly applies to about 300 party executive committee members throughout the country. In a corresponding move, a motion to make property declarations mandatory on all elected members of the government from the Council of State down to all levels of the People's Councils was also adopted during the first meeting of the new Pyithu Hluttaw.3 During the second session, which commenced on October 13, further disciplinary control was exercised in the passing of a Resignation and Replacement Bill.
2 M. C. Tun, "The military line holds firm," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), January 27, 1978, p. 28. 3 In this regard, one should note that U Hla Aye, Burmese Trade Minister, had been suspended pending investigation into alleged irregularities involving a deliberate understatement of the price of a house he recently sold. More seriously, it was alleged that when Hla Aye recently purchased rivercraft for the Ministry he incurred extra costs by buying through a private firm rather than through the manufacturers. See FEER, July 21, 1978, p. 5.

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Insurgency and Other Instabilities As always when discussing the political atmosphere within Burma the ever-recurring issue of insurgency is of paramount importance. The principal rebellious and destructive force has been and continues to be the Peking-backed Burma Communist Party (BCP), which operates primarily in the northeast sector of the Shan State. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has always justified its support for the BCP on the ground that it was and is a matter between the communist parties of China and Burma, and does not affect government-to-government relations between Peking and Rangoon. Since his seizure of power in 1962, President Ne Win has, on numerous occasions, visited Peking hoping to convince the Chinese to reduce if not desist in their support for the BCP. Speculation had it that on the occasion of the visit of Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping to Rangoon in late January 1978 Ne Win once again pressed his case. However, the general consensus among observers was that nothing of a substantive nature was accomplished. In early March 1978, one report indicated that the BCP again appeared poised to launch a major military offensive against two towns in northeast Burma-Kunlong, which lies on the west bank of the Salween River, and Hsenwi, located fifty miles west. This offensive appeared designed to give the BCP not only a secure foothold west of the Salween but more importantly a "setting off point for operations into the Irrawaddy River plain, the heartland of the country."4 Final corroborating evidence was given in late March when the Rangoon authorities announced publicly that BCP forces, during February and March, had entered Kunlong and Tang-yan, a town southeast of Lashio, in the Northeast Command area bordering China. Official Burmese estimates counted more than 800 rebels dead, while Tatmadaw (Burmese) forces suffered 135 men dead, with a further 229 wounded and 124 missing.5 Apparently, as a result of the Army's successful operation, BCP forces retreated to the eastern bank of the Salween, considered by most to be a "secure" BCP stronghold. In mid-June 1978 various reports and rumors from Peking, Bangkok, and Hongkong were cautiously being analyzed for possible signs of an impending breakthrough in the insurgent problem. Some observers pointed to the high-level military talks being conducted in early June between a 10-man Burmese delegation, led by Defence Minister Kyaw Htin, and a Chinese delegation, which included Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the PRC State Council, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister for National Defence, and Wu Hsiu4 Frank Hennessy, "Peking Comfort for Rebels," FEER, March 3, 1978, p. 20. Some observers saw Teng's visit as a courtesy acknowledgement of Ne Win's visit to Democratic Kampuchea in November 1977. 5 The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), March 27, 1978.

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chaung, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff. Considering that the stated aim of the meeting was to further "the close paukphaw relations between the two countries,"6 there is no doubt that the BCP insurgency was a prominent issue of discussion. At the same time, according to reports from Bangkok, the BCP had now parted company with its traditional ally, the Shan State Army (SSA). It appears that the BCP, in an attempt to take full administrative control of the "liberated" areas of the northeast, was antagonizing SSA leaders and other segments of the population, most specifically the powerful Burmese monks. Finally, reports out of Hongkong indicated that the Chinese were on the verge of cutting their links with the BCP.7 The above-mentioned factors must obviously be viewed within the wider context of the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute as it relates to Southeast Asia, and most particularly to Vietnam. Since Vietnam's open conflict with the PRC in May 1978 and its admission into the Soviet Bloc organization COMECON on June 29 there has been very little doubt about its increasingly intimate ties with the Soviet Union; these ties were further solidified by signing of a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on November 3, 1978. The wooing of noncommunist states in Southeast Asia by Vietnam in 1978 is a further indication of Hanoi's attempt to garner support for its position vis-a-vis the PRC. The courtship of Burma by Hanoi is a case in point. On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Burmese independence, Nhan Dan, the official newspaper of Vietnam, stated:
Burma pursues a policy of positive neutrality and is opposed to imperialism, old and neo-colonialism and racism. It has established economic and cultural relations with the socialist and developing countries and supports the forces of genuine peace, independence and neutrality in Southeast Asia.8

Furthermore, in June 1978 Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister, Vo Dong Giang, invited the UN Mission chiefs of Burma, Laos, and ASEAN nations to put forward a proposal for a zone of peace, independence, and neutrality. It is within this context that the reports emanating from Peking, Bangkok, and Hongkong concerning the BCP must be viewed. Whether or not the above-mentioned factors would indicate a definitive shift in PRC policy towards the BCP is difficult to say at this time. It should be noted, however, that this seemingly is the conclusion reached by Moscow. In mid-June 1978, Pravda accused the Chinese of sowing discord among various ethnic groups in Burma and of trying to force Burma "to follow policies favorable to Peking."9
6 The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), June 7, 1978. 7 "A Breakthrough for Burma?," ASIA WEEK, June 23, 1978, p. 15. 8 "The Wooing Has Begun," ASIA WEEK, January 20, 1978, p. 14. 9 "A Breakthrough for Burma?," ASIA WEEK, June 23, 1978, p. 16.

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Problems in the Arakan From the early days of the British Raj the border area between the Bengali Muslim society of Chittagong/Dacca (Bangladesh) and the Buddhist Arakanese at Akyab and the Naaf River Estuary has been, and continues to be, the locus of a law-and-order and illegal immigration problem. Either the Bengali Muslim population seeks better times in the Arakan or the Burmese Arakanese seek political relief across the border in what is now Bangladesh. At this writing, it would appear that hard times in Bangladesh substantially increased the Muslim population of the Arakan and led to new measures of immigration and alien control from Rangoon. Beginning in 1977, the Burmese government initiated a Kyats 140 million (US$20 million) project, code-named the Naga Min (Dragon King) operation, to update its demographic information in Arakan, Chin, and Kachin states and in Mandalay and Sagaing divisions. More specifically, this was an attempt by the Immigration and Manpower Department in Rangoon to register all residents, classify them categorically as either Burmese citizens or foreigners, register them, and issue them with certificates of registration. Reportedly the operation began in the Kachin and Shan states in May 1977, followed by surprise checks in parts of Rangoon and the Mon state in the south. The operation reached Arakan in February 1978 when sections of Akyab township came under scrutiny. On February 11, 1978 it appears that some 200 immigration officers, having been dispatched from Rangoon, entered the Muslim areas of Akyab. One estimate claims that some 1734 persons were arrested that evening and moved into an improvised detention center. Less than a week later an opposing demonstration was reportedly forcibly suppressed, resulting in widespread panic among the Muslim populace.10 As the operation was extended forward north of Akyab, the Muslim population was seen to move increasingly hindwards to the Naaf River Estuary. During the next several months, prior to a Burmese naval and army blockade along the river in late May, it was unofficially estimated that some 200,000 refugees had crossed the border into Bangladesh and were encamped in makeshift centers relatively near the Burmese border. The principal refugee camp was at Cox Bazaar, a beach resort some 95 miles southeast of Chittagong."- Responding to the problem and most particularly to the intolerable conditions within the camps, the UN launched a six-month contingency assistance program.
10 William Mattern, "Burma's Brand of Apartheid," FEER, July 14, 1978, p. 31. This, however, conflicts with an earlier report in Far Eastern Economic Review (May 26, 1978) which stated that all went well when the urban population was checked. Trouble erupted when officials moved into some 66 villages in late March (p. 30). 11 Eleven other camps, some at Gundhum, Nhila, and Whaikyaung, were hastily set up along the sixty mile road south of Cox Bazaar.

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With the situation becoming more unbearable as each day passed and fearing that a major religious clash might ensue involving some of the Islamic nations of the Middle East, Foreign Secretary Tobaraq Husain of Bangladesh led a delegation to Burma in early June. On July 9, 1978 an agreement on repatriation was finally reached between Burma and Bangladesh. In essence the agreement provided that Burma would repatriate the refugees in various stages. During the first stage repatriation was to be extended to all those with National Registration certificates.12The remaining, including those without papers but who could provide evidence of residency, were to be returned at a later date. Eleven staging camps were to be set up and the return of the refugees was scheduled to commence on August 30, 1978. Early reports, however, indicated that the repatriation program was not working well. The small number of returnees was considered attributable not only to a certain degree of bureaucratic mismanagement within the reception and transit camps, but also to a prevalent fear among the Muslim population that the Burmese authorities were intent upon eliminating them in the Arakan. This fear, real or imaginary, is in part attributable to the still unconfirmed reports of brutality and atrocities waged against the Muslim population during the early stages of the evacuation. The Rohingya Patriotic Front, on the one hand, accused Rangoon of "religious persecution, racial discrimination and systematic apartheid,"1'3while, on the other hand, Rangoon retorted that the refugees were victims of their own self-induced panic.'4 Was it panic or was it systematic apartheid and terror? We concur with William Mattern that the answer most probably lies somewhere between these two contradictory claims.'5 In a related development, two high treason trials, one of which involved a conspiracy to create a separate Arakanese state and government, were formally concluded in late February 1978. The defendants were all found guilty of treason. The alleged leader of the plot, U Htein Lin, a former township unit BSPP chairman in Arakan until 1975, and Mahn Ngwe Aung, a Karen national, received the death sentence, while the three remaining defendants received terms ranging from life imprisonment to ten years at hard labor.

12 Some observers say that 100,000 have registration cards, while others put the figure much lower. See FEER, July 21, 1978, p. 20. The situation is further complicated in that the refugees claim that neither registration cards nor foreign registration cards have been issued since 1962. See FEER, July 14, 1978, pp. 30-32. 13 FEER, November 3, 1978, p. 32. 14 The Working People's Daily (Rangoon) for July 12, 1978 stated: "The present immigration problem arose not because of any religious or social discrimination but because of the instigation of unsavoury elements who were against the collection of data being carried out for the purpose of implementing the social system." See also Forward (Rangoon), XVI:ll (August 1978), pp. 10-11 and 14-15 for further Burmese views. 15 William Mattern, "Burma's Brand of Apartheid," p. 30.

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The War on Opium

The latest Burmese antidrug offensive, code-named Operation Mohein (Thunderbolt) IV, began on April 12, 1978. Essentially an assault upon opium refining camps, the main target appears to have been the Loi Lem area, about 50 miles due south of Mong Hsat, which hugs the Thai-Burmese border. From all indications it would appear that this military offensive went well.'6 More significant, however, has been the growing cooperation between the Thai and the Burmese in the control of the drug traffic. Prior to his visit to Burma in May 1978, General Kriangsak Chamand, Prime Minister of Thailand, issued orders demanding that certain groups and organizations leave Thai territory. Among those excluded were the Karenni Independence Army, the Palaung National Liberation Organization, the Lahu National United Party, the Kokang State Forces, and the forces of the opium warlord, Khun Sa. Furthermore, Thai-Burmese cooperation was strengthened with the announcement that both countries would activate their Joint Border Committee and open channels for a regular exchange of information on narcotics. Economy In last year's survey article we cautiously expressed the possibility that the "new flexibility" in investment matters may finally get Burma on the way to a more effective economic performance.17Although complete economic data for 1978 are not yet available, there have been some continuing, small signs of improvement in the current and previous year of the Second Four Year Plan. In February 1978, various governments and institutions concerned with development assistance to Burma met in Paris under the chairmanship of the World Bank. Among those in attendance were representatives of Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Finland, the Asian Development Bank, the Commission of the European Communities, OECD, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Development Program. The Burmese delegation was headed by U Tun Tin, Minister for Planning and Finance. In his initial report he set forth the government's main economic objectives, strategies, and plans as outlined in
16 The Working People's Daily (Rangoon) of May 23, 1978 claims that 10,312 acres of poppy was destroyed between December 10, 1977 and April 30, 1978. On October 25, 1978 The Working People's Daily claimed that more than 10,000 acres of poppy were destroyed in the Shan State. It was further stated that Burmese military forces flushed out some 500 insurgents of the Shan State Revolutionary Army, the Shan United Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the KMT, Wa, Lahu and Kokang rebels. 17 Trager and Scully, "Burma in 1977," Asian Survey, XVIII:2 (February 1978), pp. 143-147.

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BURMA 155 Burma's Five-Year Development Program (1977-1978 to 1981-1982). According to Tun Tin's analysis, the policies and measures taken by the government over the past several years have begun to show positive results: overall production and exports have expanded, the budgetary position has improved, and inflation has subsided somewhat. The government will continue to increase the level of its investment, particularly in agriculture, forestry, mining, and transport; improve its pricing policies, thus generating greater production incentives; stimulate exports and liberalize imports; enhance the efficiency of its State enterprises; and promote fiscal and monetary stability. Furthermore, special measures were to be introduced for the purpose of enlarging the absorptive capacity of the public sector for new investments as well as support, both technical and financial, to cooperatives and private enterprises. The government needed external capital and technical assistance in its efforts to accelerate the country's economic development and was hopeful that the international community would respond positively to the program it had proposed. The group welcomed the statement and endorsed the government's program to increase the level of its investment by no less than 20% per year under the Five-Year Plan. Finally, the government was assured that in this effort the various members of the group would be responsive to Burma's needs for external capital and technical assistance.18 In this respect, it should be noted that Burma, with the assistance of the World Bank, has been conducting a series of feasibility surveys to choose projects in the agricultural, transport, power, and industrial sectors to speed up economic development in the 1980s. These feasibility studies are incorporated within one omnibus measure called the Burma Umbrella Programme, and are financed by a US$2.5 million technical assistance grant from the United Nations Development Programme. Other noteworthy developments include: (1) an agreement signed between the Petro Chemical and National Gas Industries Corporation and the Mitsubishi Company of Japan for the construction of an oil refinery capable of processing 25,000 barrels of crude oil daily; (2) Myanma Oil Corporation has finalized a US$10 million syndicated loan with a group of banks headed by Chase Manhattan Asia Limited and Wardley Limited for the purpose of purchasing four onshore oil drilling rigs; (3) a Czech assistance loan of US$140 million to increase production of tractors, tires, and diesel injection pumps and nozzles to enable Burma to boost production of engines and parts for Zwe tractors by 96%; and (4) a US$24 million venture has been proposed to update Burma's telecommunications network. US$21 million will be allocated for domestic purposes. Since more than half of Burma's annual foreign exchange derives
18 Since the establishment of the Aid Group in November 1976, commitments by member nations had amounted to over US$200 million.

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from its rice exports, it is essential to review the 1977-1978 crop harvest as well as the projected estimates for 1978-1979. The 1977-1978 crop harvest, estimated by government sources at 454 million baskets (approximately 9.2 million metric tons), appeared to be the smallest since Unofficial observers, however, claim that the harvest was 1974X1975.19 considerably less than officially reported, possibly as low as 8.7 million metric tons.20The 1977-1978 state procurement program, some observers believe, may have netted less than 120 million baskets, perhaps as little as 100 million.21 This setback was caused by a variety of factors: an extensive drought in the north, floods in the main surplus area in the south, smuggling, and the fixed price policy of the government. The effect on Burma's rice export earnings this past year are estimated to be only US$70 million compared to US$105.7 million for the previous
year.22

Both official and unofficial sources suggest that the 1978-1979 crop will be healthy. According to official estimates, the crop should yield 480 million baskets of paddy, or approximately 10 million metric tons. Of this the state paddy procurement target has been set at 168 million baskets-35% of the total harvest-compared with 160.7 million during the past year. Possibly as a response to a critical World Bank Study completed in 1977, an Australian consulting consortium will help improve the crop yields of the country. This four-year project will cost an estimated US$11 million. Financing will be by the Burmese government, with support from the United Nations Development Programme through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
19 Asia Research Bulletin, Section IV-Commodities and Primary Industries, 8:3 (August 31, 1978), p. 476. The figure for 1974-1975 was 8.4 million metric tons. 20 Ibid. See also FEER, October 27, 1978, where the harvest was considered to be possibly 8.9 million metric tons (p. 56). 21 FEER, October 27, 1978, p. 56. 22 Asia Research Bulletin, Section IV-Commodities and Primary Industries, 8:3 (August 31, 1978), p. 476.

WILLIAM L. SCULLY is Research Associate Professor, National Security Education Program, and Senior Research Analyst, Burma Research Project, New York University. FRANK N. TRAGER is Professor of International Affairs and Director of the National Security Education Program and Burma Research Project, New York University.

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