Philosophy Study, ISSN 2159-5313 December 2013, Vol. 3, No.

12, 1071-1087

D
Gerhard Chr. Bukow
University of Magdeburg

DA VID

PUBLISHING

Extended Cognition as a Case of Bottomless Theory Building

Extended cognition is the thesis that vehicles realizing cognitive systems can possibly extend beyond traditional boundaries of brain, skin, or skull. It is a popular thesis because of its counterintuitive consequence that coupled systems of vehicles of very different entities could form a realizer of one cognitive systems. Popular examples consist of human-handy-systems or human-notebook-systems, and it is a thesis that could non-dogmatically decide what individuates the realizers of cognitive systems. But the thesis is in need for individuation-criteria: How could we individuate a coupled system of different systems of vehicles? We inspect some of the usually handled candidates for individuation-criteria and argue that in principal there will be no successful candidate due to methodological problems. We aim to show this by using a cookbook theory of extended cognition and add different types of candidates. No candidate is non-arbitrary or non-intrinsic, which leads the proponent to the forced selection between arbitrary or intrinsic candidates. We argue that without criteria, the talk about extended cognition is a bottomless pit that should only serve as an example for bottomless theory-building. Keywords: extended cognition, cognitive system, coupled system, individuation-criteria

1. Intuitions about Realization of Cognition Need Scientific Advice

Ask yourself whether there are other cognitive beings in the world (cognizers): beings that are cognitive or fulfill cognitive tasks? At least some philosophers hold the thesis that our human intuition tells us that there are cognizers out in the worldor, more generally, that there is the phenomenon of cognition in the world. They accept cognition as a given phenomenon in the sense that we do not need to prove that there is cognition. So, this essay does not question this intuitionfor the sake of argument, let us assume that there are cognizers in the world. But whatever cognition is, by this intuition about the existence of a phenomenon, nothing is told us about how the phenomenon is realized in all cases. Why is this a problem for the debate? It is a problem because typical answers are based on intuition pumps (this means they are not based on legitimated arguments). Just consider these two pumps just for illustrative purposes of introduction. Look at that old man around there using his notebook to memorize his daysis cognition (i.e., memorizing) realized by the old man or by the old man plus his notebook? Prima facie, by taking away the notebook the old man has lost his memory, so we should talk about cognition realized by the coupled system consisting of an old man plus his notebook. Something is wrong with this argument: There is no direct argument or proof and it is not necessary to agree with this argument (for any reasons of ontology or epistemology). It is based on your charity and if your charity differs from mine nothing could force you to

Gerhard Chr. Bukow, M.A., Research Associate, Institute of Philosophy, University of Magdeburg, Germany; main research fields: Philosophy of Cognition, Philosophy of Science; Rationality, and Agent Theory. Email: bukow@ovgu.de.

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agree with me. This is a well-known intuition pumpand because it is an intuition pump, some philosophers also agree that our intuition needs philosophical and scientific advice. However, the traditionalists cannot give this answer with guarantee (i.e., with the strength necessity). Just consider this intuition pump: Well, look out at the world: first, look what the man on the street says about the location of thought. The man on the street may say: thoughts are in the head or have you ever seen them? Second, look what scientists say: thoughts are in the brain or at least realized by the brain, because by our experiments we investigate into the structure of thought, which is somehow connected to the structure of the brain. This is similar to the saying of the man on the street and it is connected to modern research programs of neurology. But this traditional answer is also based on an intuition pump. It pumps thoughts into your head by considering daily psychology without giving any guarantee that any cognition is necessarily realized in the head. You may choose any other internals of any other entitybrain, head, body, or else. Internalism does not provide any argument of necessity favoring this or that entity. Let us restate the views shortly. With respect to realization, some philosophers hold the traditional internalistic view that the individual systems in the internals brain, body, or skull determine the material limits of the vehicles realizing individual cognitive systems. Extended cognition is the externalistic view that the vehicles of cognitive systems extend beyond brain, body, or skull. The traditional answer is called the internalistic view because it locates realization of cognition into the internals of the brain or head (or any other closed entity like human body). The non-traditional answer is called the externalistic view, because it locates the realization of cognition not just into the internals of a specified entity. But the two intuition pumps cannot give any guarantee, which means that neither the externalistic view nor the internalistic view can give an argument based on necessity how cognition is realized. For this lack of guarantee (necessity), both groups of philosophers (and other scientists) may agree that intuition needs advice by philosophy or other science. We may call a view grounded on advice that it is not just only a view but a serious thesis. But what argument can force us to agree that man plus notebook realize cognition? What argument can force us to choose just the brain as the realizer of cognition? Some may argue that we need criteria that are based on properties of systems realizing cognition. If we want to demarcate systems realizing cognition from other systems then these realizer-systems must have this extrinsic or that intrinsic property. Other may argue that it is the successful use of the thesis in the sciences and the successful use of this or that thesis may decide between this or that thesis. After all, extended cognition could be at least a successful heuristics of science. However, we argue in detail that no strategy of finding an extrinsic or intrinsic property or using extended cognition as a heuristic is successful. The structure of the problems the extended cognition-theorist is opposed to lets us conclude that extended cognition is a case of bottomless theorizing. In this essay, we first give a specification of the extended cognition-thesis, because this thesis is often confounded with other hypotheses about what and about how cognizers should think (see Section 1.1). We then consider some methodological aspects about the debate. This discussion puts our argument into a specified frame that is especially concerned with the type of arguments used in the debate. If you have asked yourself while reading Section 1 and Section 1.1 what proving the extended cognition-thesis (or its internalistic opponent) means, then the subsection 1.2 is of interest for you. After providing this methodological basis, we present an overview of our argument (see Section 1.3). Then we will discuss in detail whether there are intrinsic or extrinsic properties of systems realizing cognitive systems. Because of the richness of additional theses in the debate, our discussion is based on the use of skeletons of theories introduced in Section 2, which we call

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cookbook theories. Then we discuss in more detail on two examples handled in the extended cognition-debate (see Section 3) which are based on the externalists intuition pump introduced in Section 1. This paves the way for a detailed discussion about the main problems and suggestive solutions in Section 4, which includes a discussion of finding intrinsic or extrinsic properties individuating systems realizing cognition. Subsequently, we formulate our argument as a horn for the extended cognition-thesis in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6 that extended cognition is a case of bottomless theorizing.

1.1. The Pure Extended Cognition-Thesis and Its Popular Consequences

A commonly used picture in the debate speaks about the systems realizing cognition as vehicles. These vehicles realize thought in a way that has to be specified. Thus, the extended cognition-thesis we deal with wants to be a grounded thesis about the individuation of systems of vehicles of cognition. It does not say anything about the semantics of cognition, or what cognizers think, or how they should think in terms of norms. So let us clarify the thesis again. Extended cognition in its pure form just is a thesis about the individuation of coupled systems of vehicles of cognition. It should not be confused with extended mind or semantic externalism. This constraint of pureness does not prove the thesis to be uninteresting. In the opposite, the thesis is claimed to be interesting if we would find marks or criteria that prevent every cognitive system being coupled with every other cognitive system by extensions pervading the whole world. From the perspective of preventing dogmatism, the consequence of extended cognition should be welcomed, because then it is an open question whether the traditional view about realization is the right one or even the only one (though possibly the right one). This means that we should only accept the traditional view if we can give individuation-criteria or marks that prove this view to be the right one. These criteria or marks must prove that brain, body, or skull really give us the material limits of the vehicles of cognition. Thus, it is an open question whether the traditional internalistic view is right, or whether we should revise the traditional individuation-criteria while accepting the consequence that cognitive systems may be extended. Without question, the consequences of proving such a thesis would be popular: not individuals like closed bodies but coupled systems extending over several bodies could realize cognition. Finding appropriate criteria, one could hypothesize that even technical artifacts could be (perhaps additional) realizers of my cognition. Though we do not want to speculate about the reasons for the counterintuitive power of this consequence, for a better understanding these two reasons could help. First, in some sense, the extended cognition thesis can violate a principle of closedness that says that whatever is coupled or building up a system is connected within a closed space without having parts existing not in this space. This closedness with respect to spacetime, for example, is commonly used to individuate individual human bodies: an individual body is marked by generating such a closed space that whatever parts of the body are connected, they are connected within this space. For short, all my parts belong to me and there is no part that is mine but not connected to me within the regions of space-time occupied by my body. Such a principle might be adapted to individuate other systems, for example systems of vehicles of cognition. Second, if we want to decide whether some vehicles form one or many systems, we may not have intuitive criteria to count for the one or the other decision. For example, is it acceptable to say that we could outsource cognitive tasks in the sense that an external computer would memorize or revise our beliefs? If so, do we have legitimated criteria to argue that brain and computer-processors form a coupled vehicle of cognition or that this is not the case?

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The popularity of the thesis is documented by the many different publications exploring its consequences, interactions with other hypotheses as well as criticism. The thesis has gained increasing attention during the last 20 years, starting in the 1990s until today in 2013. There are endless reviews about the arguments and consequences of extended cognition (just to cite Rupert (2004) that works out some challenges and literature for the hypothesis). One of the main consequences and interactions of the thesis seems to be the link between extended systems and streams of situated cognition or embodied cognition. The main idea behind this link is that both hypotheses share the burden of proving the extension of the realizers of cognition beyond the traditional internalistic view (see 1.2 for a discussion about proving such a hypothesis). This has been explored, for example, in Wilson and Clark (2009). Of course, there is also criticism to the hypothesis which is mainly based on criticizing the inference from coupled extended systems to the constitution of a cognitive system. This criticism has been developed by Adams and Aizawa (2001; 2010) and has influenced the debate strongly. However, our work does not rest on any specific literature as we intend to give a minimalistic cookbook for developing the extended cognition-hypothesis in Section 2. We think that this cookbook is in accord with the main proponents and main criticism of the debate, especially with respect to Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Adams and Aizawa (2001; 2010). For this reason, we do not intend to give a review or exegesis about the existing literature about the extended mind-hypothesis that is based on these main actors. Instead, our essay is concerned with (1) the problem of what it does mean to show or prove the hypothesis; and (2) with the problems of showing the hypothesis with the help of different individuation-criteria. To sum up, the popularity of the thesis seems to be mainly driven by its consequences. If the thesis just could be shown, or if the thesis just could be proven to be right or legitimatedthen there would be all these counterintuitive and interesting consequences. However, what does this vocabulary of showing, proving, legitimating or else mean in this debate? Is it indeed possible to give something like a proof of necessity of extended cognition, or are there other grades of strength of argument that are intended by proponents of extended cognition? To understand what strength of argument proponents do intendand what follows for them by our argumentwe discuss this issue shortly now.

1.2. What Does Proving the Extended Cognition-Thesis Mean?

If you consider the strength of argumentation from the viewpoint of logic, then there are different types and grades of strengths of arguments: arguments can have strength of necessity, arguments can have the strength of impossibility or possibility, and arguments can be constructible or not. Arguments of necessity consist of a conclusion following necessarily from premises in all worlds, e.g., by a logical inference like Modus Ponens. Arguments of possibility consist of a conclusion following possibly from premises in some worlds. If an argument is constructible, then there is a legitimated way to construct a proof for a specific hypothesis, e.g., by a theorem prover using a legitimated logic with its inferences like Modus Ponens. If an argument is not constructible, then there is in principal no proof for a specific hypothesis, for example in case of undecidable problemsand this deficit of constructability can be proven. But are such characterizations of strength of argument apt for the debate in extended cognition? Do these theorists really handle with proofs, logical inferences or else? We doubt that these characterizations are aptbut for what reason? First, they are fairly traditional characterizations. Let us think first that extended cognition would be an empirical hypothesis about the realizers

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of cognition in our actual world. However, then it is an important problem whether such a logical classification of strength can be applied to empirical hypotheses. The problem is that it is an open question whether the world inherently is logically organized such that the extended cognition thesis could be (and if so: would be) a true conclusion of some true premises. No proponent of extended cognitionor opponenthas given an argument based on logical necessity in the sense that the concluded thesis is a necessary truth about our world. Of course, nobody has shown that the world is logically organized such that our true conclusions about the world must follow logic. Or, in a weaker sense, nobody has shown that successful science is logically organized such that an intended conclusion follows logically from a true set of basic sentences. This was a typical assumption of the Vienna Circle. For example, Carnap (1931) argued this way in his essay Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaftwhich was not successful in the sense that the Vienna Circle has provided us with a fixed set of basic truths about the world that enables us to conclude other truths. For this reason, proponents of extended cognition either provide us with a successful Vienna Circle-argument which has extended cognition-thesis as its conclusion, or they provide us with another argument. Perhaps, one could argue in the view of this deficit, theorists of extended cognition should argue with the help of empirical arguments, for example experiments. But what experiment should the theorist use for his arguments? If there is a consensus in philosophy of science concerning the significance (or probative force) of experiments, then it is the argument that there is no experimentum crucisno decisive experiment showing the truth of the extended cognition-hypothesis. However, we do not know any experiment that has been conducted and guided by the thesis of extended cognitionwhich would be more decisive than adopting a post hoc-hypothesis. Instead of such traditional considerations about truth-preserving logic of argument or decisive experiments, the debate about extended cognition has lived mostly by arguments of plausibility, charity, and intuition pumps. These arguments are used to develop criteria how to individuate systems realizing cognition (especially how to individuate them in contrast to systems not realizing cognition). But these individuation-criteria should not be based only on intuitionbecause it can be realized that intuition seems to fail at least in some cases where we need advice (consider the examples given above) or that different people have different intuitions concerning the same case. One can see this difficulty for example with respect to the question whether man plus notebook form a coupled system realizing cognition or not. For this reason, philosophers and other scientists have called for stronger argumentsi.e., arguments stronger than just so-stories about intuitions or plausibility. However, these stronger arguments are not logical proofs or facts of reality or experiments. Instead, these arguments do rely on using markers for individuation-criteria. The idea is that giving non-arbitrary individuation-criteria of extended systems provides the proponent with a solid base for arguing for extended cognition. It is this middle-ground that makes the arguments interesting for the debateand which makes the debate interesting for a discussion of what proponents of extended cognition can show by using them. Some candidates for arguments are introduced in Section 4.1-4.3: These arguments for specific individuation-criteria are based on extrinsic properties, roles, and finally intrinsic properties. We are afraid that proponents of extended cognition drift into a realm of bottomless theorizing, because their arguments on individuation-criteria cannot show what they are intended for while respecting the quest for non-arbitrary strong arguments. We now give an overview about our argument (see

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Section 1.3) arousing our fears and then discuss it in detail based on the introduction of a skeleton of a theory about extended cognition in Section 2.

1.3. An Overview about the Argument of This Essay

The aim of the extended cognition thesis is to provide an interesting thesis about actual or possible extended systems realizing cognition. Because the thesis cannot be shown directly in a logical or experimental sense, it has to rely on a middle-ground of arguments. Thus, it relies on finding legitimated criteria individuating extended systems realizing cognition. We argue that the debate about the extended cognition thesis has a serious methodological problem in giving such legitimated criteria or marks. The problem is to find a non-arbitrary way to legitimate the chosen individuation-criteria that is not based on intuition or charity (too weak), or logics (the failed Vienna-Circle-argument) or experiments (no experimentum crucis). We argue that there are at least three candidates for such an argument showing extended cognition with the help of individuating such systems. The first candidate uses extrinsic markers of individuation, for example the reliability of coupling of systems. It could be argued that extended systems realizing cognition require for reliable coupling between the different subsystems such that finally an extended system can be established. One might be tempted to say: Well, if these systems are coupled reliably to x%, then these systems do form an extended system. But we argue that the debate does not give a non-arbitrary way to diagnose reliable coupling to x%further that there is in principle no favored way of diagnosing reliability. This argument of reliability might be misunderstood by some philosophers, because reliability is not an inherent property of the extended systemit is an arbitrarily fixed measure based on a procedure scientists have agreed on. There is no definitive measure of x%even not in the weak sense of a heuristic. One might use roles to individuate extended systems realizing cognition. For example, one could argue for functional roles or causal roles. But we argue that there is no stop-criteron for causal roles in the sense that we do not have a hard criterion that prevents extended systems from extended to the whole world. With respect to functional roles, we argue in a similar way that there is no way to show that system A fulfills no function for system B (where B could be the whole world). If extended systems should be individuated by functional roles, one just cannot prevent A from fulfilling functions for all other systems in the world. In both cases, extended systems individuated by roles could extend into the whole world. But it is not an interesting case that by this unfortunate argument of individuation by role every system could extend into the whole world. Extended cognition based on this unfortunate individuation just is a misfortune and not a powerful thesis. There is no reason why one should favor extended cognition compared to other theses about systems fading through the whole world. Finally, one could argue for using an intrinsic property of extended systems realizing cognition to individuate these extended systems. For example, one could argue for a mark of the cognitive. But with respect to this suggestion, there exists strong criticism by Adams and Aizawa (2001; 2010) well known in this debate. Let us sum up: Either these criteria are based on extrinsic markers or roles of coupled systems, which are regularly arbitrarily chosen and developed or which are even not developed by scientists at all. Or they are based on intrinsic markers or properties, which are regularly criticized. Now let us formulate a horn stabbing the proponent of extended cognition. Aim of the debate: Find a non-arbitrary argument for extended cognition without relying on: (1) intuition or charity (too weak); (2) logic in the sense of the Vienna-Circle (failed); or (3) an experimentum crucis

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(consensus about non-existence of such an experiment). Extrinsic Horn: If one argues for extrinsic reliability or roles, then one must concede the arbitrariness of establishing reliability or stopping extend systems. Intrinsic Horn: If one argues for an intrinsic mark of the cognitive, then well-known criticism by Adams and Aizawa is effective. Changing from the extrinsic horn to the intrinsic horn due to criticism requires for some knowledge nobody seems to have by argument or intuitionthat is knowledge about intrinsic properties of the realizers of cognition. Changing from the intrinsic horn to the extrinsic horn due to criticism requires for some knowledge nobody seems to havethat is knowledge about a non-arbitrary way of establishing reliability or a stop-criterion. Because in the last years a whole bunch of several different theories about extended cognition have been developed, we discuss some problematic examples with the help of a cookbook of theories of extended cognition in the first part of the work. This cookbook provides a minimalistic framework which can be decorated by specified theses about criteria of individuation. The debate seems to be very alive because of the arbitrariness of these criteria, which we will show in the third and fourth part. Then, we sum up our criticism by two horns for the debate in the fifth part and discuss the consequences for the debate in the sixth part.

2. A Minimalistic Cookbook for Theories of Extended Cognition Based on the Individuation of Extended Systems
There are many theories of extended cognition. Some are confused with other theories, while others have specific additional assumptions. For this reason, first, we propose the following cookbook theory based on five assumptions: Cookbook theory of extended cognition: (1) There is the phenomenon of cognition instanced in the form of cognitive systems; (2) There are vehicles of cognition that realize the cognitive systems; (3) There are individuation-criteria for vehicles; (4) Coupled systems of individuated vehicles individuate a cognitive system; (5) There are individuation-criteria for coupled systems of vehicles of cognition that realize cognitive systems. We think that this cookbook is in accord with the main proponents of the hypothesis, namely Clark and Chalmers (1998), and we also think that it is in accord with its main criticism, namely Adams and Aizawa (2001; 2010). For this reason, we do not intend to make further exegesis of literature based on these actors in the debate. The first assumption says that there is cognition anddespite other possibilitiescognition is realized in the form of cognitive systems. We know by intuition or insight somehow that there is cognition. There may be other forms how cognition could be realizedfor example atomic cognizers without inner structure, or whatever. However, here we propose the systematic character of cognition. This may be due to the thesis that whatever cognition is, some potential candidates for realization are conceptualized as systemssystems of nerve cells, for example. This connects the first assumption to the second one. There may also be other reasons for the commitment to systems, but we will not discuss them here.

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The second assumption says that there are vehicles that realize cognition. This assumption is due to the established distinction between the content of cognition and what realizes cognition (the vehicles). This distinction constraints us to the discussion of vehicles and not of extended mind, content, semantic externalism, or something else. So whatever these vehicles are, they have to be individuated. Several candidates exist for such individuation: for example causal role, functional role, material property, etc.. We will not discuss them here, but we will discuss how systems of vehicles may be individuated. This has to be discussed because the fourth assumption states that cognitive systems are individuated by systems of (individuated) vehicles. If a vehicle system is not extended, then its corresponding cognitive system is individuated by one system of vehicles, for example the system we find in nerve cells. However, if a vehicle system is extended, then the corresponding cognitive system is individuated by more than one system of vehicles. These systems have to be coupled somehow. Fifth and finally, we assume that the individuation of such coupled systems of vehicles is done by criteria we have to find. Under which conditions do we have reason to argue that there is an extended system literally consisting of several coupled systems? This means that a cognitive system is finally individuated by (possibly coupled) system(s) of vehicles. Then, there are three conceptually possible outcomes: Possible outcomes of the extended cognition debate if there are individuation-criteria: (1) The traditional view has it right and the found criteria show that principally only non-extended systems can exist and to them the criteria can be applied; (2) Both the traditional view and extended cognition have it half right, and the found criteria show that principally both extended and non-extended systems can exist. But to the best of our empirical sciences only extended (or only non-extended) systems exist; (3) The traditional view has it wrong: The found criteria can be applied to (all) existing cognitive systems and they exclude principally the traditional view. We will decide later on whether we are in a position to decide what outcome we have to choose. But now let us discuss the aspect of minimalism in this theory. This minimalistic theory is minimalistic in the sense that it only describes structural parts of the extended cognition theory. One could also state the theory in a neutral way for any other phenomenon X realized in the form of Y by some vehicles: The neutral statement of the cookbook theory: (1) There is the phenomenon X instanced in the form of Y; (2) There are vehicles of X that realize Y; (3) There are individuation-criteria for vehicles; (4) Coupled systems of individuated vehicles individuate Y; (5) There are individuation-criteria for coupled systems of vehicles of X that realize Y. Whatever X and Y arein the end, one needs individuation-criteria for the coupled systems mentioned in Section 5. These criteria are not packed into the theory axiomatically and they are not logical consequences of the theory! Whatever we will do to get them, we must add them to the theory by scientific discourse (e.g., heuristics, experiments, and properties) or we must argue that the world already is constituted such that there are worldly properties of coupled systems. Then, we must add something in a background theory, whereas our cookbook theory is built upon this background theory. Let us see now by the help of two examples how one could decorate such a minimalistic theory.

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3. Two Examples Commonly Handled in the Extended Cognition Debate

One of the most famous examples used to support the thesis of extended cognition is Clark and Chalmers (1998) notebook argument. In their paper, they create a twin earth thought experiment in which we have our two protagonists Inga and Otto. Both Inga and Otto want to visit the MOMA that is located in the 53th Street. In order to get there, Inga thinks about the location of the museum and then, after finding the needed belief about the MOMA being located in the 53th Street, she starts her journey and arrives at the desired destination a couple of hours later. Otto on the other hand suffers from Alzheimers disease and needs to rely on a notebook that he always carries around with him. In order to get to the MOMA, Otto needs to look up the necessary information in his notebook that, according to Clark and Chalmers, takes the same functional role than the long term memory has for Inga. After using his notebook, he now takes departure and also arrives at the MOMA successfully. In another possible world, maybe Otto noted the wrong information in his notebook, and for example, will find himself in the 51th Street, and so misses his appointment. So, now, what has happened here? We have agents like Inga and Otto that are capable of instantiating cognitive processes. This presupposes that in some way there are cognitive processes out there in the world. Inga is a vehicle of cognition and Otto is a vehicle of cognition. In Ingas case, in order to get to the museum, she only needs her own cognitive resources to succeed in the given task. She just uses her memory to get access to a certain belief. Otto in the other hand cannot rely on his memory, and in order to find the museum, he outsources so to speak his beliefs onto another medium, and couples with it. Now, it is the coupled system, Otto and the notebook, and only Otto and the notebook, that is the supervenience basis for the cognitive processes that are going on in order to find the MOMA. Clark and Chalmers choose reliability and their famous parity principle1 to individuate the Otto notebook system and the cognitive process that is carried on this vehicle is individuated by the functional role of the notebook, in this case, (long term) memory. Another famous example is the usage of pen and paper when performing calculations. When someone is using pen and paper to calculate, vehicle externalists claim that the person2 performing the calculation outsources cognitive burdens into the external world. The person calculating does not have to remember all the digits in his head, he has not constantly remind himself at which step of the calculation he is at the moment because he, the pen and the paper form a coupled system that carries out the calculation. The coupled system consisting out of the human and the pen is the vehicle of the cognitive processes that do the calculation. In this sense, it is not the person that is doing the calculation, but only the coupled system that is performing it.3 So again, there we have the phenomenon of cognition, instantiated by a certain individual, and now this individual forms a coupled system that is now the carrier of the cognition that is going on in order to calculate the given problem. The cognitive processes extend out into the pen and the paper. The mentioned system in individuated with certain criteria, again, the reliability and the parity principle shall do the trick. This phenomenon of cognition is individuated functionally, because it is claimed that pen and paper have the same functional role than my working memory when I perform the calculations in my head.

4. Problems and Three Suggestive Solutions

Let us ask more generally: What types of individuation-criteria could be applied to determine and individuate coupled systems as they are suggested exemplarily in the third section? If these criteria do not exist as clear cut-criteria, is it useful to think about extended cognition just as a heuristic and not in its literal sense?

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Let us start with reliability as an often handled extrinsic criterion for determining the coupling of two systems. The following table 1 gives an overview about types of individuation-criteria and examples used in the text.
Table 1 Types of Individuation-Criteria and Corresponding Examples Type of criteria Extrinsic Role Intrinsic Example Reliability Functional role Mark of the cognitive

4.1. Reliability as Individuation-Criteria of Coupled Systems

For introduction, think about the example of calculator. The example argued that the coupling between calculator and human (or its brain) is reliable and for this reason we should think about man plus calculator being an extended system realizing cognition. The main proponents of the extended cognition-thesis argued for reliability, too in Clark and Chalmers (1998): the real moral of the portability intuition is that for coupled systems to be relevant to the core of cognition, reliable coupling is required (11). However, we do not know from the armchair whether this coupling is reliable but must determine it empirically. Given a definition of reliability, experiments, or structural analysis must reveal whether the focused coupling between calculator and human (or its brain) is reliable. Reliability is an extrinsic criterion: it is not defined intrinsically as a property of an entity, but as a property of the trustworthiness of (scientific) measurement. If we want to test for coupling in terms of reliability, then we have to design experiments testing on interaction between the systems and say something about the reproducibility of the experiments. One can see that coupling in terms of reliability in terms of reproducibility of interaction experiments is a derived and extrinsic property of a highly specified experimental apparatus. It is not an investigation into intrinsic properties of the vehicle of a cognitive system. The main consequence of using reliability as a marker for coupling is that there may be very different coupled systems relative to the reliability-predicate we have chosen. For example, the following list shows two different coupled systems relative to two different reliability-predicates. One could say, without going into technical details, that one reliability-predicate is stronger than the other one. Stronger predicates sort out more candidates for reliable coupling than weaker predicates. Subsystems: A, B, C: Reliably coupled system with respect to reliability-predicate R1: A, B; Reliably coupled system with respect to reliability-predicate R2: A, B, C. Here, the problems for reliability as a criterion of coupling do start. The main problem is: If we have different candidates for reliably coupled systems, we have different candidates for individuation of cognitive systems. This would be no problem if we could decide which reliability-predicate (and the corresponding couplings) we should choose. The argument is that whatever experimental procedure and value we use for testing for reliability, counting a coupling reliable is always arbitrarybecause it is relative to an arbitrarily chosen experimental procedure we used for testing for reliable. Saying that a coupling is 80% reliable then has no worth. The argument can be developed in the following way: Construct a cookbook theory of extended cognition with an additional reliability-predicate and see the problem of choosing a reliability-predicate.

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Argument for the arbitrariness of the reliability-predicate: (1) Assume the cookbook theory of extended cognition; (2) Give a definition of reliability with an operationalization (e.g., reproducibility as an operationalization); (3) Choose an experimental procedure to test for reliability based on interaction between systems (because reliability is relative to this experimental procedure); (4) Choose a value x%, i.e., that the experimental procedure is reproducible in x% of all series of experiments. A proponent of extended cognition should give decision procedures for Section 3 and Section 4. These criteria or procedures should say why one should choose these experimental procedures and values and not the other ones. Otherwise, the proponent cannot select a clear cut set of coupled systems of vehicles that realize a certain cognitive system. However, what could be a decision procedure for choosing experimental procedures that serve to establish the judgment of reliable coupling? Take the discarded example of the man-calculator-coupling. A usual story of extended cognition would say that the coupling is reliable if the calculator gives (probably) right answers, is highly visible and accessible to this man, be it via conscious or unconscious access. As a result, the man outsources some calculation and uses the numerical result without doing any calculation or knowing what is going on inside the artifact. Well, but this is a just so-storyit does not say how we can establish the judgment of reliability. One must say what kinds of experiments he would use and why. To see the point, consider that we would tell you that it is enough to give the example of adding: If I can use the calculator reliably for additions like 3 + 4 and it answers right then this just is enough to say that the coupled system of vehicles consisting of man and calculator is reliable. Of course, this is not enoughwhat about other arithmetic, what about different environmental conditions, what about error and deception? You may add several other experiments. By every added experiment, your judgment of reliability could be changed. Possibly, you will have infinitely many combinations of series of experiments and for this reason infinitely many reliability-predicates. Worse, you will have infinitely many different candidates for individuating cognitive systems by reliable coupling. Where do you stop? Here, you may say that with respect to Section 4, there will be some point like 60% reliable, 70% reliable or whatever. How would youas a proponent of extended cognitiondecide what numerical value should signal that we have enough? We guess that the proponent of extended cognition cannot give such a decision procedure that selects on out of many reliability-predicates. But, one may hastily argue, this is the realm of scientific discourse: New sciences will bring us new agreements about what is reliable and what is not. However, if you argue this way, you may question the status of assumption 1 (that there is the phenomenon of cognition), for two reasons: First, how is it that you know reliably about at least some cognitive systems that let you state this assumption? You will have to legitimate assumption 1 by choosing a reliability-predicate, if you want to legitimate it scientifically. This may not be the same procedure or the same predicatebut it may be a procedure and a predicate. Otherwise, you must rely on extra-scientific resources like oracles, pre-theoretic intuition, native insights, or something else. But then it is hard to see how these resources could be adopted to scientifically grounded criteria we are searching for and why they should be a mark for science. Second, of course science may bring new arguments and new values. But science is not arbitrary (or one has to argue for this conception of science)and choosing a predicate or value is not arbitrary, too. Whatever new values science will bring on, the values will have non-arbitrary

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legitimations. Then, you may ask: So, dear proponent of extended-cognition, what is your non-arbitrary legitimation for this or that value? There will be silence. So maybe there is a need for other types of criteria.

4.2. Roles as Individuation-Criteria of Coupled Systems

Another suggestion is that we should use roles for individuation, for example causal or functional roles systems fulfill for other systems. If system A has a role for system B and vice versa, then A and B should be seen as coupled. It is a question of granularity, whether you choose causal role or functional role. Accepting the analysis of Cummins, there are usually much more functional roles than causal roles, because the same causal role can be subsumed under many different functional rolesthough it can be subsumed non-arbitrarily via role-analysis. This suggestion may result from an analysis of the functional talk in examples like the calculator-example. Whatever the calculator may be, it does not matterwhat matters is that the calculator fulfills his role for the human using it. If it fulfills its role, then there is a coupling. But using roles for individuation is problematical for the substance of extended cognition. Let us discuss this in detail.

4.3. Causal Roles as Individuation-Criteria of Coupled Systems

One system has a causal role for another system and vice versa, for this reason the systems are (causally) coupled. If so, then they may be called coupled and build an extended vehicle system individuation a cognitive system. Is this a good idea? If extended cognition simply is a thesis about causal roles, then extended cognition degenerates to a simple theory about causality. But, in a realistic sense, everything could be connected causally with everything in the universe directly or indirectly; there is no island in the sense of closed causal systems (though those islands could be simulated to a specific degree). But then extended cognition is just an inflationary thesis about causal connections pervading the whole world. If the proponent relies on indirect connections, then the thesis might be inflationary. But relying on direct connections is no solutionsince it is hard to explain how direct causal connections do exist between the calculator and the brain, for example. Direct connections in a literal sense are merely simplistic textbook examplesthey are not able to support a thesis about complex, extended coupled systems. Otherwise, we would be pleased to get to know this theory of causation or that explanation that can say: Well, X and Y are coupled via this causal chain, but then the causal chain stops here. Note, that the introduction of the notion significant in the sense of significant causal influence provides no help: If we state that only systems should be named coupled if they are causally connected to a significant degree, then we must give a procedure that decides what this degree is. Maybe you say that this degree is determined by the used measurement apparatus. But then we should ask, why use this and no other apparatus with another degree? Whatever you do, there will be no criterion based on causal role.

4.4. Functional Roles as Individuation-Criteria of Coupled Systems

Functional role analysis as a source for individuation criterion could be derived from functional talk in certain examples handled in the extended cognition debate. Some system has a functional role for another system and vice versafor this reason, the systems could be named coupled. What about this idea? If functional roles are analyzed by (or as) causal roles, then the criticism above will appear. If functional roles are meant as genuine functional roles that cannot be derived or analyzed by just causal analysis, then it is an important question how they could be analyzed experimentally or empirically at all. And if so, there are two tasks that have to be done constructively: Positively, one has to show that one system has a functional role for another system and vice versa. But from this argument it does not follow that this is the only coupling or at

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least a non-inflationary coupling. Negatively, one has to show that one system does not have a functional role for another system, and vice versa. We have no clue how this could be shown constructively in the following sense: there is an argument that shows: for this or that reason, this system at hand does not fulfill functional roles for at least these other systems at hand here. Because one cannot apply something like a tertium non datur on functional roles in the way that fulfilling one functional role prevents the system from fulfilling any other functional role. But if there is no stop-argument, then the thesis gets inflationary and any system could fulfill a certain functional role for any other systemyou cannot exclude this. Otherwise, you may argue for using the ceteris paribus-condition. But this is a non-constructive condition that cannot show the negative-partit just assumes it. But should we base realistic theses just on assumptions? The extended cognition-thesis has its popularity because of its more or less direct showing of counterintuitive examples. So, why it is not in the need to show that by directly showing something the opposite is not the case? Exactly this is the problem of finding demarcation-or stop-criteria. You cannot solve it by the assumption that it is solved by the ceteris paribus-condition. A weaker position of functional roles for individuation bases on the idea that we can only numerically individuate systems by their cores of functional roles. Perhaps we cannot give a clear cut demarcation for fully determined individual systems that stop here or there. But step by step of functional role-analysis, we could find out that there are systems that regularly have a critical core of identical or similar functional rolesneglecting all the other possible but varying roles. Then, one could at least numerate these cores and say that coupling relies on complementing cores in the following sense: If there is a system i with a core c1 consisting of functional roles r1, then there is another system j with a core c2 consisting of functional roles r2such that out of r1 and r2 one could construct pairs of roles (ri of r1, rj of r2) such that ri and rj complement each other. Complementing means the condition of fulfillment a functional role: ri complements r jiff ri implies that for fulfilling ri the system must be coupled with a system having rj, vice versa. One could argue: Of course, this needs further explanation, but this may be the task for the functional role-theorist. We are just interested in using such a notion as a marker for coupling. But determining coupling by cores is not done easily. What counts as a core of functional roles and what does not count as part of the core? What predicate of identity or similarity do we use to say that two cores are identical or similar? Why are we necessarily able to neglect roles that are not within the core? These questions will enforce the same discussion as for the predicate of reliability as long as one cannot give decision procedures to decide between different answers. But what procedure should decide in principle whether we should use these or those criteria of similarity? What procedure should decide about the degree of similarity? Necessarily, every answer to these questions will be based on some arbitrarinesswhich cannot be allowed if extended cognition is taken as a realistic claim. A third and weakest option of using roles for individuation may be the following one: Maybe one could argue that we should give up the reflexity-property of role-relations between coupled systems and only use irreflexive relations. But then the same argument follows from above. How could we determine irreflexive relations between two systems? And if so, how could we exclude irreflexive relations between systems without inspecting all systems? Only questions, no answers. Let us sum up: If extrinsic criteria should be used for individuating extended cognitive systems in a literal and realistic sense, then there must be clear cut decision procedures or other arguments that determine how

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exactly we can determine candidates of coupled systems of vehicles for individuating certain cognitive systems. We doubt that these criteria will exist for the principal reasons named above. Without procedures for determining the choosing in Section 3 and 4, the proponent of extended cognition will always have problems of finding a definite set of coupled systems. Otherwise, we would be pleased to get to know such extrinsic criteria and deliver this as a task for the scientific community. So maybe we need intrinsic criteria instead of inspecting experimental procedures applied to systems or inspecting roles of systems. A last position is based on the idea that we should use intrinsic properties as criteria for individuating (coupled) systems of vehicles of cognitive systems. One such criterion could be something like a is cognitive-property, which is named mark of the cognitive in the debate. Such criteria will rely on metaphysical assumptions about the structure or properties of the world in the sense that this structure or that propertygiven by the worldsolves our problem of individuation. One of the most famous critics of the extended cognition thesis is Kenneth Aizawa. Together with Frederik Adams, they created a series of papers that attacked the thesis on the grounds that in order to claim that cognition can be extended into the world, into notebooks, pencils and even other human beings, one has to clearly define what cognition then is. One has at least to be able to demarcate cognitive from non-cognitive processes, if such a thing as cognition really exists (Adams and Aizawa 2001). This of course is a problem for the extended cognition community, because as we have seen with the other criteria for individuating coupled systems, this just so-approach (i.e., giving thumb criteria) is not only unscientific; it leads to all those dead ends we have shown above. Now, in order to get rid of this need and spell out a clear cut demarcation line for the phenomenon of cognition, the vehicle externalist has come up with the following solution: We do not need to give a clear cut definition of what the so called mark of the cognitive is, because the internalists (i.e., the traditional view) do not know it either! It is unfair to load the whole burden of defining these boundaries on the shoulders of the externalist, because the internalists are in the same position as we are. If the preceding chapters of this paper are right, then we claim that this is not the case anymore. If all the other criteria for individuation of coupled systems fail, the last stand for the vehicle externalist are the boundaries the phenomenon of cognition itself drawing around the coupled system that carries it. The extended cognition thesis then needs a very strong metaphysical assumption about the existence of cognition in the world, and a very good explanation about the structures of this obscure entity that intrinsically holds coupled systems together, after the external properties failed to do so. In order to make the individuation criteria for coupled systems cleared cut, one then has to give clear cut demarcation criteria for a mark of the cognitive, exactly as Aizawa and Adams demanded in many of their papers. To be able to give those necessary and sufficient properties that demarcate cognitive from non-cognitive processes, the vehicle externalist has to come up with a scientific and precise description to explain his almost obscure ontology of a certain something called cognition extending into something like a pencil or a notebook without falling back into using functional roles or arbitrary criteria like reliability, without sacrificing important relations like systematicity, and without giving up a naturalistic description of those phenomenon. A very hard task as it seems to us, because of the individuating power this metaphysical entity has to have in order to save the thesis of extended cognition from arbitrariness while keeping it from degenerating into an unscientific, almost ghost-like entity that infuses certain objects with cognitive processes, and others not.

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4.5. Extended Cognition as a Heuristic

After some criticisms, a proponent of extended cognition might concede that it would be not a good idea to read the thesis literally or realistically. Maybe we should be more careful and just use it as an interesting heuristic and weaken the criteria. But this cannot be the case: Even an interesting heuristic must provide a non-arbitrary constraint on the set of possible candidates of coupled systems so that there will not be inflationary many systems. The heuristic is still in the need of criteria. However, the above mentioned candidates are no candidates for this interpretation. Perhaps, one could live with the idea that there will be many different sets of candidates for individuation with different but arbitrary legitimations that exclude each other. But even finitely many (and not infinitely many) different candidates for individuation are too many. Then extended cognition neither can be used empirically and fruitfully because of a lack of constraint of candidates, nor can it be used in a principal way to show something about the three possible outcomes of the debate mentioned above in Section 2. Finally, it is not the case that extended cognition as a heuristic can simply adopt an interesting notion of coupling coming up from empirical sciences. If this would be done, it would not make extended cognition being a successful empirical theory or heuristic. In the opposite, another theory would have done what extended cognition just has assumed. It is not at all guaranteed that this is a theory that is compatible with extended cognition. Adopting a notion from an incompatible theory (e.g., incompatible with respect to background assumptions) is not advisable.

5. Two Horns and a Methodological Problem for Extended Cognition

Let us sum up our criticism in the form of two horns as we already did in Section 1.3: Either the extended cognition-proponent wants to use extrinsic criteriathen there will be arbitrariness, rule of thumb and just so-stories. This is neither acceptable for a realistic thesis nor for a heuristic. Or the extended cognition wants to use intrinsic criteria like a mark of the cognitivethen well-known criticism by Adams and Aizawa (2001; 2010) stabs the proponent. Now let us use the cookbook theory to show the pointlessness of circumventing the horns. Assume that the cookbook theory is embedded into some background theory. If you want to circumvent these horns, you either have to add an arbitrarily chosen criterion axiomatically to the cookbook theory to just state that this is the right criterion. Or you have to find a metaphysical background theory that makes your chosen criterion just right, even if it implies methodologically arbitrariness. The following Table 2 lists these options.
Table 2 Ostensible Options of Circumventing the Horns Case 1 Fixed background theory Cookbook theory Axiomatically added criterion Case 2 Changed background theory Cookbook theory Added criterion Criterion follows from changed background theory

In the first case, you have to question if you solve the problem constructively or if you just assume that it can be solved by choosing arbitrarily a criterion and take it as an axiom. You just put into the theory what the theory needs. In the second case, you do not solve the problem but make the world just so that the problem is

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solved. In the best, you solve that problem in a world where you may already know what the right criterion is. But this does not seem to be our world. Both cases are no solutions for the problem itself. The problems of finding scientifically legitimated individuation-criteria for coupled systems are complemented by another methodological problem underlying assumption 1: we may be able to realize a certain phenomenon like cognition at first only by intuition and only in some cases, so goes the assumption. But gluing together scientific advice in form of legitimated individuation-criteria and intuition to solve some border cases is methodologically difficult, because there is no method how to glue them together. And if intuition is sometimes wrong with respect to so called border casesthe reason for the popularity of the extended cognition thesiswhy should intuition be right in other cases? Must we believe that we are just right here and just wrong there? Who does know this and why does he know this? If one could answer this, surely intuition could be handled as an objective mark. But, there is no known argument that intuition of the phenomenon of cognition is an objective mark for developing scientific criteria of individuation of coupled systems. In the opposite, it is argued that we err by intuition and need advice by finding individuation-criteria. And if intuition would be a good heuristic, why would we need other advice by science that is handled in the debate of extended cognition? As we have seen, currently there is no such advice in a realistic or heuristic sense that could complement intuitionsbe they right or wrong. So, the claim of having both an objective and erroneous insight into a phenomenon is dubious. Even if our scientific advisory criteria could reproduce our supposed objective insights, this is no guarantee for their validity in case of the unsolved border cases. But this seems to be bottomless theorizing.

6. Extended Cognition as a Case of Bottomless Theory-Building

Let us go back to the point that extended cognition is welcomed from the perspective of preventing dogmatism. We argued that if the debate had developed individuation-criteria, extended cognition could serve to decide between three possible outcomes: (1) The traditional view has it right and the found criteria show that principally only non-extended systems can exist and to them the criteria can be applied; (2) Both the traditional view and extended cognition have it half right, and the found criteria show that principally both extended and non-extended systems can exist. But to the best of our empirical sciences only extended (or only non-extended) systems exist; (3) The traditional view has it wrong: the found criteria can be applied to (all) existing cognitive systems and they exclude principally the traditional view. This decision would be based on criteria that let extended cognition being an interesting thesis and not an inflationary thesis. However, this is not the case at all. One can see that theories of extended cognition either just assume criteria (like reliability or role) and avoids spelling out their productionor just rely on some metaphysical resort that there will be an intrinsic mark. Both horns will not lead to a decision between the mentioned outcomes and they will not guide or adapt to empirical research. For this reason, extended cognition is a good candidate of bottomless theory-building. There could be infinitely many papers about extended cognition and its counterintuitive consequences if one just had criteria individuating extended systems realizing cognition. Or there could be infinitely many papers about arbitrarily chosen parameters like x% reliability means coupling. Or there could be infinitely many papers about using extended cognition as a heuristicif one just had criteria reducing non-arbitrarily the set of individuation

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candidates of cognitive systems to just one set. Or there could be infinitely many papers telling just so-stories about calculators, notebooks, and people. But none of them makes extended cognition being an interesting thesis, as the proponent has claimed. The reason can be found in the structure of generating criteria needed to ground or complement the structure of extended cognition-theories. As a result, extended cognition without criteria is neither interesting as a specific thesis nor is it interesting from the point of preventing dogmatism. Instead, it is bottomless.

Notes
1. Parity principle: if, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process (Chalmers and Clark 1998). 2. Neither Clark and Chalmers nor our essay is constrained to a specific theory of person. If one thinks this would be a deficit, then one has to explain how such a constraint will make a contribution to the extended cognition-thesis. 3. This goes so far as to vehicle externalists claiming that, e.g., Einstein did not find the theory of relativity on his own, but the coupled system consisting out of Einstein and his pens and papers.

Works Cited
Adams, Fred, and Kenneth Aizawa. The Bounds of Cognition. Singapore: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2010. ---. The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2001): 43-64. Carnap, Rudolf. Die Physikalische Sprache Als Universalsprache Der Wissenschaft. Erkenntnis 2.1 (1931): 432-65. Clark, Andy. Microcognition. A Bradford Book. 2nd ed. 1991. Clark, Andy, and Chalmers, David. The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1998): 7-19. Rupert, Ryan. Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101.8 (2004): 389-428. Wilson, Robert Anton, and Arnold Clark. How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take its Course. The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Ed. Murat Aydede and Philip Robbins. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. 55-77.