NOLASCO vs ENRILE Facts: A Petition for mandamus to compel respondents to comply with the Order to release CYNTHIA NOLASCO,

Willie TOLENTINO and Mila AGUILAR issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No.223466 for Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents, which respondents have refuse to do on the ground that they are in custody under Presidential Detention Action (PDA). Since she had been taken in to custody only on August 6, 1984, she was not legally arraigned in both cases. In the rebellion case, arraignment was held on October 28, 1978 without her presence. Pleas of "not guilty" were entered for her by the military commission. Trial was held in absentia, insofar as she was concerned. Issue: Whether arraignment in absentia is valid Held: The rulings at bar in the subversion case are fully applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the rebellion case, i.e. her arraignment in absentia was null and void; 15 consequently, "the military commission had lost jurisdiction to try her as of January 12, 1981 (date of effectivity of G.O. No. 69 which phased out military commissions") and "a new complaint or information should be filed against her before the civil courts; 16 and that "in the light of the attendant facts, particularly, that AGUILAR was still not arraigned in the[Rebellion] case as of January 12, 1981, that [Special Military Commission No. 1 17 had lost jurisdiction to try AGUILAR in the Rebellion case when she was brought before the tribunal on August 16, 1984 to appear before the ongoing trial of the other defendants. Moreover, with the lifting of Martial Law on January 17, 1981, Military Commissions were dissolved and they could no longer try civilians.

Garcia v Domingo 52 SCRA 143 (1973) Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the respondent judge Garcia. The complaint was under the premise that such act is in violation of the right to hold a public trial. Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to the principle of right to a public trial. Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and there is no showing that the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding.

Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada

Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada 360 SCRA 248 A.M. No 01-4-03-Sc June 29, 2001 Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court. Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attenti on and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.

Go vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 397, 1993 Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying petitioners Petition and affirming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1992 and June 26, 1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26305. 1 The CA Decision and Resolution upheld the following: (1) respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayos Order dated September 4, 1991 which denied petitioners Motion for Recusation; and (2) respondent judges Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioners Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila. Issue: Rule on Impartiality Held: The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." This right is a derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. The rule on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process. "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites." The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the peoples faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of justice.

Gutierrez vs. Santos Facts: Petitioner Gutierrez filed a motion for the reconsideration but the respondent Judge denied said motion in his order of August 11, 1959 where the following is stated: "While it is true that presiding judge was not counsel for the petitioner, yet in his letter dated June 1, 1949, attached to the record, as then a private law practitioner and as counsel for Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman, he informed the then Secretary of Interior that the streams and rivers, intended to be leased at public auction by the municipal counsel of Macabebe, Pampanga, in its Resolution No. 26, were private and not public. In his same letter, the presiding judge even stated that copies of Resolution No. 26 were furnished the persons mentioned therein, one of them being Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner because the streams and rivers subject of the instant petition were among those to be leased. In other words, the interests of Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman were identical to the interests of the herein petitioner Ricardo Gutierrez, so much so that whatever may be the resolution of the Secretary of the Interior then would benefit the interests of the said petitioner. Under these circumstances, the presiding judge believes that he has no other recourse but to disqualify himself from sitting in this case." Issue: Whether or not the case of the respondent Judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers Held: we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because ". . . However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in that process.." . . (Ann. Cas. 1917A, p. 1235)

PEOPLE vs LAYA Facts: Soledad Castro and Crisologo Abines were charged with the crime of grave coercion in an information filed by Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel R. Potot on 15 January 1980 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 15 (Criminal Case AR-645). The crime was allegedly committed as follows: "That on the 29th day of December, 1978, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, in the Barangay of Looc, Municipality of Santander, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and helping one another, without authority of law and by means of violence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prevent the spouses Leoncio Wenceslao and Valena B. Wenceslao and their laborers from fencing a piece of land owned by the Wenceslaos, the fencing not being prohibited by law. In violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code." Upon arraignment on 13 February 1980, Castro and Abines pleaded "not guilty." Issue: Whether the 2-months' delay of the trial from 25 March 1980 to May 1980 violated the constitutional right to speedy trial of Castro and Abines. Held: The right to a speedy trial is defined as that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. Whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. The right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived. A claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied. Herein, the manner the prosecution handled a simple case of coercion is deplorable.

TATAD vs SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

PEOPLE vs JARDIN Facts: The criminal prosecutions originated from a lettercomplaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts. - PI 1 : accused moved to postpone 4 times, and failed to appear everytime. - PI was nevertheless conducted. And the six criminal informations were filed in CFI. - AR 1 : accused moved to postpone 4 time, never appeared; counsel asked for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. Court granted motion. - PI 2 : accused moved to postpone many times , failed still to appear. When he finally appeared with his counsel, they asked for 15 days to file memorandum. The memorandum was never filed, so the investigating fiscal filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set. - The court transferred the case to new branch of CFI Quezon without acting on manifestation. Arraignment date was set. - AR 2 : more postponements at instance of accused ; moved for reinvestigation again. Court granted. - PI 3 : reset because no show. Counsel then asked for 5 days to file written sworn statement of accused as defense. No statement was submitted so the records of the case were returned to court. A date was set for arraignment. - AR 3 : accused asked for postponement . - Arraignment finally happened on Sept 8, 1970. Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY and asked for trial to be postponed. On postponed date, accused asked for another postponement. - Oct 1970, accused and counsel were at trial; but no one appeared for prosecution, except for a state witness. Counsel moved (orally) for dismissal, invoking accused right to a speedy trial. Court granted motion and dismissed the cases. ISSUES

1. WON accused can invoke right to speedy trial HELD 1. NO - The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. - The right to a speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. - The delays in the prosecution of the offenses were all caused by the accused so he cannot invoke constitutional right to speedy trial. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial

PEOPLE vs TEE See case digest here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/158697944/People-v-Modesto-Tee-Digest

ERAP vs SANDIGANBAYAN See case digest here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/42611640/Erap-vs-Sandiganbayan-GR-148560-digest

Borja vs. Mendoza See case digest here: http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/borja-vs-mendoza-77-scra-422-gr-nol.html

PEOPLE vs ALCALDE Facts: