Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain CARPIO MORALES, J.

: Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and (ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Held: The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper

management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO Facts: Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the JapanPhilippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions. Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making. Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA - that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. Issues: Procedural Issues: 1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress? 2. Whether the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that occurred. Substantive Issues: 1. Whether the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information. 2. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto (whether they are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege). 3. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process. 4. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege. 5. Whether the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege on time. Dispositive: Petition dismissed. Held/Ratio: (Procedural) 1. YES. The right of people to information on matters of public concern is a public right by its very nature so petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result. It is enough that they are part of the general public who possess the right. Since in the present position is anchored on the right of information and the petitioners are suing in their capacity as citizens, citizen-groups, petitioner-members of the House of Rep, their standing to file the present suit is grounded on jurisprudence. 2. NOT ENTIRELY. The Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties, public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by th e President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the full text thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. (Substantive) 1. YES. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern and public interest both embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the

privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making. 2. YES. The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, wherein petitioners were seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court held that applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosi ng these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. The Court also stressed that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional prov isions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. The Court also addressed the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by saying: We are aware that behind the dissent of th e Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our peoples right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof. 3. NO. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. However, the information must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. 4. NO. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. [E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests, taking into account factors such as the relevance of the evidence, the availability of other evidence, the seriousness of the litigation, the role of the government, and the possibility of future timidity by gov ernment employees. In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and sufficient showing of need. The arguments they proff er to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard stated in the decided cases. There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement. Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published. 5. NO. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials out of respect for their office until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege. SEPARATE OPINION AZCUNA, J. (fully agrees with J. Punos dissent) The equally important and fundamental power and duty of the Congress - its informing function of investigating for the purpose of enlightening the electorate has been forgotten. This informing function should actually be preferred to its legislative function. This should be more compelling in our polity because of our Constituti ons focus on transparency, accountability and the right of people to know the facts of governance. Transparency is in fact the prevalent trend and non-disclosure is the diminishing exception. The underlying reason being the recognition of the fundamental human right of a citizen to take part in governance. The President, therefore, to show that a particular exception obtains in every case where the privilege is claimed. Moreover, Executive Secretary Ermita did not really invoke the privilege but merely said that at the time of the request with the negotiations ongoing, it was difficult to provide all the papers relative to the proposed Treaty. Now that the negotiations are over, with the proposed treaty signed and submitted to Senate, there would be no more difficulty in complying with the reduced request of giving copies of the starting offers of Philippines and Japan. SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION TINGA, J. If the petitioner in the case had been the Senate of the Philippines, I will vote for the disclosure of the documents, however the reason for the position would not be based on the right to information, but rather, on the right of the Senate to fully exercise its constituent function of ratifying treaties.

PUNO, J. The Executive as the custodian of records of negotiations of treaties and other international agreements has the discretion to classify information as confidential in accordance with applicable laws and not let it become part of the public record. But when the executive is haled by the court to enforce a constitutional right to this information, it is the courts task in each particular case to balance the executives need for secrecy in treaty negotiations with the constitutional right to information. Transparency and opacity are not either-or propositions in the conduct of international trade agreement negotiations, rather the degree of confidentiality needed in a negotiation is a point in a continuum where complete disclosure and absolute secrecy are on opposite ends. The Court should balance the need for secrecy of the Executive and the demand for information by the legislature or the public in order to safeguard against disclosure of information prejudicial to the public interest and to uphold the fundamental principle enunciated in Senate vs. Ermita that a claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. We elevated the right to information to constitutional stature not without reason. In a democracy, debateby the people directly or through their representatives in Congress is a discussion of and by the informed and not an exchange of surpluses of ignorance. In the arena of economic governance, the right to debate and participate in exercised not as an end in itself. Especially for the powerless whose sword and shield against abuse is their voice, the exercise of the right is not merely rhetoric. It is a fight from the gut satisfy basic human needs and lead a humane life. SABIO VS. GORDON Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers On February 20, 2006, Senator MD Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the a nomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Sen Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt. HELD: It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine inArnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Article III, Section 7 The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. VALMONTE VS BELMONTE Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties. Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as

Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. Legaspi v. CSC G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 Cortes, J. Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Issue: whether or not Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed must be grant ed on the basis of his right to information Held: Yes. Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law. These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one. Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are subject to limitations as may be provided by law (Art. III, S ec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Issue: whether or not petitioner has legal personality to bring the mandamus suit

Held: Yes. The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. Issue: whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern Held: The above question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]). But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioners right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. The nam es of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about ones civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioners request is, therefore, neither u nusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. Ma. Carmen G. Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Manuel L. Morato et al Petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. Her request was denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions partake the nature of conscience votes and are private and personal. (MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTCRB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents. G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991) Petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. Her request was denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions partake the nature of conscience votes and are private and personal. A board resolution was also issued declaring as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. The Court found the respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006 Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring O bservance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declara tion as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices

including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. Tanada vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)

TITLE: Tanada v Tuvera CITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27

FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some priv ate or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved. The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise provided. HELD: Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect Bantay vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007 FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07 -0724 under date April

3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos. In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to. In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007. While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections. ISSUE: 1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. 2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and 3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees. HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, 1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No . 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. ) 2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz: Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names. It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election 3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The peoples ri ght to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 1037-CJ October 28, 1981 MARTIN LANTACO, SR., ESTEBAN DEL BARRIO, ROSALITO ALAMAG and BORROMEO VITALIANO, complainants, vs. CITY JUDGE FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.: This is a verified letter-complaint dated August 7, 1975 addressed to the President of the Philippines (by lst Indorsement, dated August 25, 1975, this case was referred by the Office of the President to this Court, pursuant to Section 7, Article X of the Constitution), by jeepney drivers Martin Lantaco, Sr., Esteban del Barrio, Rosalito Alamag and Borromeo Vitaliano, all residents of Pasay City, against City Judge Francisco R. Llamas of the Pasay City Court for "Backsliding and Grave Abuse of Discretion." On January 8, 1975, an investigating special counsel of the City Fiscal's Office of Pasay City, filed Criminal Cases Nos. 95647, 95648, 95649 and 95650, all for estafa against Ricardo Paredes, an officer of the PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for "non-remittance of SSS contribution premiums." These cases were assigned to respondent. After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss all the criminal cases on the ground that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution opposed the motion. According to the complainants, the respondent set the promulgation of his decision on July 22, 1975, postponed to July 30, 1975 and again to July 31, 1975, when at about 9:45 in the morning, upon respondent's instruction, his clerk of court read the dispositive portion thereof acquitting the accused of all four estafa cases on the ground of reasonable doubt. According to the herein complainants: After the reading of (the) Decision a recess was made by Judge Llamas and we requested Judge Llamas to furnish us a copy of said Decision. Judge Llamas told us that there are no more copy and we told Judge Llamas if there is no more copy we would like to xerox the original and Judge Llamas told us that xerox copy are not permitted and Judge Llamas instructed one of the employees in his office a- steno-typist to type another copy for us and that the typist told us to come back on Monday, August 4, which we did, but, the steno-typist failed to furnish us the copy as agreed by us and told us again to come back next day, August 5. The next morning we went back of the office of Judge Llamas, same we failed to get copy of the Decision. On August 6, 1975 at 11:00 A.M. one of the complainants, Esteban del Barrio and Ceferino F. Ginete, the President or our labor union went to Judge Llamas to secure copy of said decision to (sic) the same person the steno-typist. The stenotypist went inside the room of Judge Llamas and a few minutes the typist went back to us and informed us that he could not type the Decision because the folder is at the house of Judge Llamas and when Mr. Ginete inquire why the said folder of the complainants are at the house of Judge Llamas, the typist reply the Judge making "CORRECTION." Mr. Ginete wonder why a correction is being made when the decision has already been rendered anti why the delay in furnishing us copy, WHY? This Court required the respondent to comment on the complaint by 2nd Indorsement dated September 16, 1975. This Court also sent by registered mails a follow-up letter dated October 23, 1975 and a tracer letter dated November 25, 1975. The Bureau of Posts in a certification dated November 26, 1975 certified that these follow-up letters were delivered to and received by the office of the respondent. Finally, on March 8, 1976 this Court received respondent's comment dated December 3, 1975. His brief comment: The four related criminal accusations against Mr. Ricardo Paredes, were validly and properly decided by this Court. The motion to dismiss after the prosecution's case was rested, was resolved and said resolution of acquittal is the very decision in this case which was validly promulgated in the presence of the accused, the prosecuting fiscal and Mr. Severino Ginete and all the complaining parties. The records of the decision show that the accused assisted by counsel signed the same on said date and copies thereafter furnished counsel for the accused and the prosecuting fiscal. Respondent also averred: It is respectfully submitted that on the details of the proceedings and the evidence presented, no better answer could be made by the undersigned except by submitting a copy of said decision promulgated July 31, 1975 and marked as Annex "A" of this comment. In the same breath, the matter of the advisability as suggested that this finding by this Court be reviewed by the Military may best be answered by a thorough reading of the decision. After a careful examination of the records before this Court, We found that respondent committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to give the complainants a copy of his decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 95647-95650. The complainants were understandably interested in securing a copy of the decision as they were the complaining witnesses in these four criminal cases. The request was made during office hours. It was relayed personally to the respondent. The decision in question was already promulgated. Copies were already furnished the counsel for the prosecution and the defense. It was already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. And if there was "no more copy," the complainants were amenable to have a xerox copy of the original on file, copies of which, as part of court records, are allowed to be given to interested parties upon request, duly certified as a true copy of the original on file. What aggravates the situation, as seen from the sequence of events narrated by the complainants which were never denied or rebutted by the respondent, is that respondent, without just cause, denied complainants access to public records and gave the complainants the run-around, which is oppressive as it is arbitrary. In Baldoza vs. Honorable Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano (A.M. No. 112-MJ, May 5, 1976), WE emphasized the importance of access to public records. predicated as it is on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern in which the public has a legitimate interest. While the public officers in custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which such records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit such access, inspection, examination or copying. Continuing, said this Court: The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law (Article IV, Section 6, New Constitution). The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision- making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. (87 Harvard Law Review 1505) [Baldoza vs. Hon. Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, A.M. No. 112-MJ, May 5, 1976]. The herein complainants prayed that respondent's decision be reviewed "to obviate any miscarriage of justice considering the adverse effects to the thousands of jeepney drivers and to prevent the other jeepney operators in using (sic) the Decision ... for their own benefits." The respondent commented that "no better answer could be made ... except by submitting a copy of the decision" and the complaint "may best be answered by a thorough reading of the decision."

OUR "review" in administrative cases of this nature as defined in Vda. de Zabala vs. Pamaran (A.C. No. 200-J, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 430, 433), is limited to the text of the decision and respondent's articulations on the law and the evidence submitted. WE do not review the decision to reverse it or to set it aside as if it were brought to this Court on regular appeal; for this is beyond the objective of an administrative proceedings to protect the public service, to secure the faithful and efficient performance of official functions, and to rid the public service of incompetent, corrupt and unworthy public servants. WE have carefully read, examined and analyzed the decision submitted by the respondent. WE found that in sustaining the motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after the prosecution rested its case, respondent committed several errors bordering on gross ignorance of the law. 1. Respondent erred in concluding that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused, despite repeated demands, refused and still refuses to remit the alleged collected premium contributions and that "if no demand was ever made ... then a criminal prosecution for estafa ... could not prosper." The uniform allegation in all the four informations for estafa that "the accused, despite repeated demands, refused and still refuses to remit ...," need not anymore be proved by the prosecution; because the Social Security Act of 1954 (R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 1792, No. 2658 and No. 3839, and further amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 24, 65 and 177), makes it the duty of the employer to remit the contributions without need of any demand therefor by the employee. Section 22(a), (b), (c) and (d) of said Act, governing "Remittance of Contributions" requires as a legal obligation of every employer to remit within the first seven (7) days of the month the contributions of the employee and the employer to the Social Security System, failing which invites the imposition of a penalty of three percent (3%). With this mandate of the law, demand on the part of the employee before the employer remits these contributions to the SSS is not a condition precedent for such remittance. The Social Security System can collect such contributions in the same manner as taxes are made collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code (Sec. 22[b], Social Security Act). Thus: SEC. 22. Remittance of contributions The contributions imposed in the proceeding sections shall be remitted to the SSS within the first seven days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment, and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three per cent per month from the date the contribution fans due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective employers : Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contributions so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer. (b) The contributions payable under this Act in cases where an employer refuses or neglects to pay the same shall be collected by the System in the same manner as taxes are made collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended Failure or refusal of the employer to pay or remit the contributions herein prescribed shall not prejudice the right of the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage. xxx xxx xxx (e) For purposes of this section, any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all the monthly contributions due and payable may within six (6) months from approval of this amendatory act remit said contributions to the SSS and submit the corresponding collection lists therefor without incurring the prescribed three per cent penalty. In case the employer fails to remit to the SSS the said contributions within the six months grace period, the penalty of three per cent shall be imposed from the time the contributions first became due as provided in paragraph (a) of this section. Provided, however, That the Administrator, may in meritorious cases, allow employers who have submitted a payment plan, on or before April 19 1973, to pay their contributions due and payable up to December 31, 1973 without incurring the prescribed three per cent penalty. As amended by Rep. Act No. 2658, and by Pres. Decrees Nos. 24 and 177). To prove remittance, the employer can submit his records thereon or a certification from the SSS as to the fact of remittance of the contributions. II. Respondent likewise erred in concluding that, in connection with the daily deductions of P 0.50 as SSS premium contributions, "this Court is not convinced and could not reasonably believe that there was a forced daily deductions or exaction of P0. 50." Section 18 of the Social Security Act governing employees' contribution, provides that ... the employer shall deduct and withhold from such employee's monthly salary, wage, compensation or earnings the employee's contribution in an amount corresponding to his salary, wage, compensation or earnings during the month in accordance with the following schedule effective on January 1, 1973 ... ." With this legal obligation placed on the employer's shoulder, respondent's reasonable belief that "there was or could be no forced daily deductions or exaction of P 0.50" would have no legal basis and support. III. Respondent again cried in finding "that from the existing relationship between the accused as owner of the utility jeepneys and all the complainants, there is categorically demonstrated no employer-employee relationship in contemplation of the Social Security Act of 1954, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 24, 65 and 177. In other words, if by law there exists no such relationship, then the herein accused truly is not even obligated to collect such amounts; neither is he under obligation to make remittance payments." For, as early as March 23, 1956, in National Labor Union vs. Benedicto Dinglasan (L-7945), this Court already ruled that there is employeremployee relation between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement, and enunciated: The main question to determine is whether there exists a relationship of employer-employee between the drivers of the jeeps and the owner thereof. The findings contained in the first order are not disputed by both parties except the last to which the respondent took exception. But in the resolution setting aside the order of 16 February 1954 the Court of Industrial Relations in banc did not state that such finding is not supported by evidence. It merely declares that there is no employer-employee relation between respondent, Benedicto Dinglasan, and the driver complainants in this case. If the findings to which the respondent took exception is unsupported by the evidence, a pronouncement to that effect would have been made by the Court in banc. In the absence of such pronouncement we are not at liberty to ignore or disregard said finding. The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations with respect to question of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record shall be conclusive. Taking into consideration the findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations we find it difficult to uphold the conclusion of the Court set forth in its resolution of 23 June 1954. The drivers did not invest a single centavo in the business and the respondent is the exclusive owner of the jeeps. The management of the business is in the respondent's hands. For even if the drivers of the jeeps take material possession of the jeeps, still the respondent as owner thereof and holder of a certificate of public convenience is entitled to exercise, as he does and under the law he must, supervision over the drivers by seeing to it that they follow the route prescribed by the Public Service Commission and the rules and regulations promulgated by it as regards their operation. And when they pass by the gasoline

station of the respondent checking by his employees on the water tank, oil and tire pressure is done. The only features that would make the relationship of lessor and lessee between the respondent and the drivers, members of the union, as contended by the respondent, are the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but their compensation is the excess of the total amount of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the respondent, the owner of the jeeps, and the fact that the gasoline burned by the jeeps is for the account of the drivers. These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer-employee, because the estimated earnings for fares must be over and above the amount they agreed to pay to the respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps. Not having any interest in the business because they did not invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not participate in the management thereof, their service as drivers of the jeeps being their only contribution to the business, the relationship of lessor and lessee cannot be sustained [In the matter of the Park Floral Company, etc., 19 NLRB 403; Radley et al. vs. Commonwealth, 161 SW (2d) 417; Jones vs. Goodson et al., 121 Fed. Rep. (2d) 176; Mitchel vs. Gibbson et al., 172 Fed. Rep. (2d) 970]. In the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot make bad use thereof, for he would be responsible for damages to the lessor should he do so. In this case there is a supervision and a sort of control that the owner of the jeeps exercises over the drivers. It is an attempt by ingenious scheme to withdraw the relationship between the owner of the jeeps and the drivers thereof from the operation of the labor laws enacted to promote industrial peace. (98 Phil. 650, 651-53). On April 30, 1963, this Court reiterated this doctrine in Magboo, et al. vs. Bernardo (L-16790, 7 SCRA 952) and stated: Appellant assails said decision, assigning three errors which boil down to the question of whether or not an employeremployee relationship exists between a jeepney-owner and a driver under a "boundary system" arrangement. Appellant contends that the relationship is essentially that of lessor and lessee. A similar contention has been rejected by this Court in several cases. In National Labor Union v. Dinglasan, 52 O.B., No. 4, 1933, it was held that the features which characterize the boundary system namely, the fact that the driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the receipt of fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the jeepowner and that the gasoline consumed by the jeep is for the account of the driver are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. The ruling was subsequently cited and applied inDoce v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-9417, December 22, 1958, which involved the liability of a bus owner for injury compensation to a conductor working under the boundary system. (7 SCRA 953-54). Indeed, considering that about nineteen (19) years before July 31, 1975, when respondent rendered his decision in the four estafa cases, it was a settled doctrine that an employer-employee relationship exists between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement, of which rule respondent was obviously ignorant (Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court, and in line with Municipal Board of Manila vs. Agustin, 65 Phil. 144). Respondent mistakenly relied on the cases of Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals and Shriro (37 SCRA 579) and Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Jockey Club (30 SCRA 210), which have no bearing on or relevance to the issue posed in the estafa cases filed by the complainants and heard by him. The Shriro and the Manila Jockey Club cases did not involve or resolve the relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers in any manner whatsoever. The Shriro case concerned the relationship of "commission sales agents" and Shriro (Philippines) Inc., the exclusive distributor of "Regal" sewing machine. The Manila Jockey Club, Inc. case concerned jockeys who are connected with the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. and the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. Since an employer-employee relationship subsists between the jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement, SSS coverage "shall be compulsory" (Sec. 9, Social Security Act), the SSS's deduction would follow as a matter of law (Sec. 18, supra), and the accused in the four estafa cases, without previous demand by the jeepney drivers, is under legal obligation to remit the driver's contribution to the SSS. Decisions of the Supreme Court need not be proved as they are matters of judicial notice (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rev. Rules of Court; V Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 38-39). Ignorance of the law excuses no one (Art. 3, New Civil Code) and judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution are part of the legal system (Art. 8, New Civil Code). In the light of the above discussion, respondent gravely erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss the estafa cases by conveniently relying on the accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain conviction, for conviction can only rest upon the strength of the prosecution evidence (Duran vs. Court of Appeals, L-39758, May 7, 1976, citing People vs. Barrera, 82 Phil. 391), and, as a consequence, material and moral damages had been inflicted on the numerous complaining drivers whose rights to refile the criminal cases for estafa against the accused are now foreclosed by the rule on double jeopardy. In recapitulation, We find that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of the Social Security Act of 1954, as amended, particularly the sections governing SSS compulsory coverage, employer-employee contributions, deduction of SSS's contributions, and remittance of SSS contributions; and of the settled jurisprudence that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system arrangement is that of employer and employee. Or, if respondent was aware of them, he deliberately refrained from applying them, which can never be excused (Quizon, et al. vs. Judge Jose G. Baltazar, Jr., A.C. No. 532-MJ, July 25, 1975) and "is hardly to be condoned" (Fernando, J., concurring opinion, Quizon, et al. vs. Judge Baltazar, Jr., supra). WE, moreover, find that respondent repeatedly ignored this Court's directive to file his comment on the instant complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of our 2nd Indorsement of September 16, 1975, necessitating the sending of two tracer letters dated October 23, 1975 and November 25, 1975. His comment came only on March 8, 1976. His failure to submit the required comment within the period fixed is disrespect to the Court as well as aggravated the delay in the speedy and orderly disposition of this administrative complaint. (cf. Medina, etc., et al. vs. Hon. Valdellon; etc., et al., L- 38810, March 25, 1975; Atienza vs. Perez, etc., A.M. No. P- 216, July 9, 1974) WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS IS HEREBY DISMISSED AS CITY JUDGE OF PASAY CITY WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT PRIVILEGES AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES. SO ORDERED. Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Abelardo Subido vs. Roman Ozaeta and Mariano Villanueva Categories: Information Disclosure

This case, decided before the right to information was included in the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution, involved a request by the editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, for the Register of Deeds of Manila to furnish him a list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with said Register of Deeds, but which request was denied. (ABELARDO SUBIDO, Editor, The Manila Post, petitioner, vs. ROMAN OZAETA, Secretary of Justice, and MARIANO VILLANUEVA, Register of Deeds of City of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-1631. February 27, 1948.) This case, decided before the right to information was included in the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution, involved a request by the editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, for the Register of Deeds of Manila to furnish him a list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with said Register of Deeds, but which request was denied. In resolving the petition for mandamus, the Court based its ruling on its interpretation of a statutory regulation which provides that "All records relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office" The Court said that the power to make regulations does not carry with it the power to prohibit. The regulations which the Register of Deeds is empowered to promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured, and the like. GONZALES VS. NARVASA G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue ofExecutive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43 HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining anypersonal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case s ince, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to proposeamendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen. Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise aconstitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation. Gonzales v NarvasaG.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000Facts:On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit frompassing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled through amandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officialsholding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipientsof luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer.Ratio Decidendi:The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner didnot in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they stillfall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does notpresent to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are inimmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted fromCongress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of itstaxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCRs creation. Thepetitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest.With regards to the petitioners request of disclosure t o public information, the Court upheld thatcitizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceedinginvolves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by themere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent ExecutiveSecretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested