G.R. No.

179674 PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

- versus -

MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES BUREAU DIRECTOR HORACIO C. RAMOS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR SAMUEL T. PARAGAS, REGIONAL PANEL OF ARBITRATORS ATTY. CLARO E. RAMOLETE, JR., ATTY. JOSEPH ESTRELLA and ENGR. RENATO RIMANDO, and MONTAGUE RESOURCES PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to reverse the Resolutions dated 23 February 2007[1] and 6 September 2007[2] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97663. The appellate court, in its assailed Resolution dated 23 February 2007, dismissed the Petition for Review, under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, of herein petitioner Pyro Copper Mining Corporation, for failure of petitioner to attach pertinent and relevant documents thereto.[3] The appellate court, in its other assailed Resolution dated 6 September 2007, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and for failure to show the authority of Atty. Vicente R. Acsay (Atty. Acsay), one of the members of the Board of Directors of petitioner, to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping accompanying the Petition.

Petitioner additionally prays for the setting aside or reversal of the Decision[4] dated 28 December 2006 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) in MAB Case No. 0147-06, which affirmed the Orders dated 14 September 2005[5] and 27 December 2005[6] of the DENR-Panel of Arbitrators, Region 1, San Fernando City, La Union (Panel of Arbitrators), in Case No. 2005-00012-I, dismissing the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent Montague Resources

Philippines Corporation. Ultimately, petitioner seeks the denial of the mining claim and the revocation/cancellation of the Exploration Permit, EXPA No. 21 dated 12 September 2003, of private respondent.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners Application for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), identified as APSA-SF-000089, with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR, Regional Office No. 1, San Fernando City in La Union, for the exploration, development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.

Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. On 12 September 2003, private respondent filed an Application for Exploration Permit[7] with MGB covering the same properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-20001[8] of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators[9] on 30 August 2005 and was received by the latter on 5 September 2005. The case was docketed as Case No. 2005-00012-I. Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the private respondents Application for Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was cancelled per DENR Memorandum Order (DMO) No. 200503[10] issued by the DENR Secretary Michael Defensor on 1 February 2005. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of DMO No. 2005-03, which the DENR Secretary denied in its Decision[11] dated 14 June 2005.[12] On 1 September 2005,[13] the MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent. In an Order dated 14 September 2005, the Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner for the following reasons: (1) the instant pleading was filed out of time; (2) in view of the issuance of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was rendered moot and academic; (3) the Panel of Arbitrators had no authority/jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 of private respondent, the same being lodged with the MGB, the issuing authority; and (4) petitioner failed to include a certification against forum shopping.[14] Petitioner moved for its reconsideration, but the Panel of Arbitrators denied the same in its Order dated 27 December 2005.[15]

Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB the Orders dated 14 September 2005 and 27 December 2005 of the Panel of Arbitrators, docketed as MAB Case No. 0147-06.

Subsequently, in a Decision[16] dated 28 December 2006 in MAB Case No. 0147-06, the MAB dismissed the appeal of petitioner, on the following grounds: (a) the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was filed beyond the reglementary period; and (b) the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner did not include a certification against forum shopping.[17]

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97663.

In a Resolution dated 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said Petition, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,[18]for failure of petitioner to attach thereto some pertinent and relevant documents required under Section 6 of the same Rule.[19]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 February 2007 Resolution, together with the required documents. Private respondent, however, in its Comment,[20]still prayed for the dismissal of the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663 for failure of petitioner to submit Atty. Acsays authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.

Petitioner was given an opportunity to submit Atty. Acsays written authority, but failed to do so. Consequently, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated 6 September 2007, denying for lack of merit the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663.

Hence, this Petition.

The petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts Resolution:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] DEPARTED FROM THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION [A QUO]DESPITE FAITHFUL COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES ON DISCLOSURE AS INCORPORATED IN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION PORTION OF THE MOTION FOR EXTENSION [OF] TIME AND PETITION A QUO.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] DEPARTED FROM THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION A QUODESPITE THE ATTACHMENT AND SUBMISSION OF THE REQUISITE AUTHORITY TO MAKE AND SIGN VERIFICATIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY REQUIRED PLEADINGS.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] REFUSED TO ADJUDICATE THE PETITION A QUO DESPITE THE ATTENDANCE OF A CLEARLY EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER AND PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST INVOLVED AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY FOR A RULING TO PUT AN END TO UNSCRUPULOUS ISSUANCE OF MINING CLAIMS.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS IN THE DENR COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT: (A) THE VERIFIED PROTEST/OPPOSITION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME; (B) THE ISSUANCE OF THE EXPLORATION PERMIT IN FAVOR OF [PRIVATE RESPONDENT] ON [1 SEPTEMBER 2005] AND THE UNILATERAL CANCELLATION OF THE MPSA BY THE DENR-SECRETARY RENDERED THE VERIFIED PROTEST/OPPOSITION MOOT AND ACADEMIC; (C) THE [PANEL OF ARBITRATORS] HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO CANCEL, DENY AND/OR REVOKE THE EXPLORATION PERMIT OF [PRIVATE RESPONDENT]; AND (D) THE VERIFIED PROTEST/OPPOSITION DOES NOT CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.[21]

To resolve the foregoing issues, the Court must address the more specific issues below:

I.

Whether the subsequently attached Minutes of the Special Meeting dated 22 January 2007 of the Board of Directors of petitioner sufficiently granted Atty. Acsay authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping which accompanied the Petition in CAG.R. SP No. 97663.

II.

Whether the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was filed out of time.

III.

Whether the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner filed before the MAB needs to be accompanied by a Certification against Forum Shopping.

IV.

Whether the issuance by the DENR Secretary of DMO No. 2005-03 on 1 February 2005 which cancelled MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner and the issuance by MGB of EP No. 05-001

in favor of private respondent on 1 September 2005 rendered the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner moot and academic.

V.

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent.

The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.

Petitioner maintains that there are special circumstances and basic considerations in support of Atty. Acsays authority to execute and sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping which accompanied its Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663. Firstly, Atty. Acsay is an incorporator, stockholder, member of the board of directors, corporate secretary, and legal counsel of petitioner. Secondly, he was the authorized representative of petitioner in the signing of MPSA No. 153-2000-1. Therefore, Atty. Acsay is the best legally suitable person to make the required sworn disclosures in the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping in the Petition of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663.

Petitioner also contends that the Minutes of the Meeting held on 22 January 2007 by the board of directors of petitioner, bestowing upon Atty. Acsay the authority to make and sign the Verification for the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, must be construed in its entirety. According to the Minutes, Atty. Acsay was granted authority by the board to sign even verifications, which may be required in subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner. The reference in the Minutes to the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review is not meant to be restrictive or qualifying, as to exclude other pleadings.

With the foregoing, petitioner firmly argues that it has substantially complied with the requirements for the execution of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, which accompanied its Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663.

Section 6(d), Rule 43[22] in relation to Section 2, Rule 42[23] of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a petition for review shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping, in which the petitioner

shall attest that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in this Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before this Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom.[24]

For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

The requirement that petitioner should sign the Certification against Forum Shopping applies even to corporations, the Rules of Court making no distinction between natural and juridical persons.[25] A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.[26] The signatory, therefore, in the case of the corporation should be a duly authorized director or officer of the corporation who has knowledge of the matter being certified.[27]

If the petitioner is a corporation, a board resolution authorizing a corporate officer to execute the Certification against Forum Shopping is necessary. A certification not signed by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal.[28]

To recall, the Court of Appeals initially dismissed, in its Resolution dated 23 February 2007, the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663, for failure of petitioner to submit pertinent and relevant documents required under Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto the required documents, except the proof of Atty. Acsays authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping for the Petition. Instead of immediately dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, however, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 8 June 2007, gave petitioner five days from receipt thereof to submit such proof. The petitioner then submitted the Minutes of the Special Meeting held on 22 January 2007 by its board of directors, adopting a Resolution to the following effect:

RESOLVED, that [Atty. Acsay], Director and Corporate Secretary of [herein petitioner] be, as he hereby is, authorized to make and sign the verification of the pleading filed by [petitioner] entitled Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[29]

It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted Resolution of the board of directors of petitioner that the authority granted to Atty. Acsay was to make and sign the pleading entitled Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but not the Petition for Review itself. The wordings of the board Resolution are so explicit that they cannot be interpreted otherwise. There is nothing to justify the argument of petitioner that the authority to sign granted to Atty. Acsay by the said board Resolution extended to all other pleadings subsequent to the Motion for Extension.

Other than the Minutes of the Special Meeting held on 22 January 2007 by the board of directors of petitioner, which the Court deemed unsatisfactory, no other proof of Atty. Acsays purported authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping for the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663 was presented. Absent proof of such authority, then the reasonable conclusion is that there is actually none. Given that a certification not signed by a duly authorized person renders the petition subject to dismissal,[30] the Court of Appeals did not err in finally dismissing in its Resolution dated 6 September 2007 the Petition of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663.

Although the Court has previously relaxed the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping in some instances,[31] it cannot do so here.

From the very beginning, petitioner failed to attach to its Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals the relevant documents required by Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner had two opportunities to comply with the requisites, i.e., when it filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 February 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and when it submitted its compliance with the 8 June 2007 Resolution of the appellate court; yet, petitioner still failed to do so. Petitioner never offered any satisfactory explanation for its stubborn non-compliance with or disregard for the rules of procedure.

It is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random, to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. It must be emphasized that procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may

have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.[32]

II

Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Acsay did have the authority to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping for the Petition for Review of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing said Petition, the Court still cannot grant the prayer of petitioner herein to reverse the actions undertaken by the DENR as regards the cancellation of its MPSA No. 153-2000-1 and the issuance of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.

Petitioner insists that it filed its Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent within the reglementary period. Based on the records of MGB, the Notice of Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was actually posted from 14 July 2005 to 28 July 2005. Applying the 30-day reglementary period, the last date on which to file any adverse claim, protest or opposition to the said application was 27 August 2005, a Saturday. Since 29 August 2005, Monday, was declared a national holiday, the next business day was 30 August 2005, Tuesday. This very well explains why the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner was filed on 30 August 2005. Petitioner further avows that it paid the required legal fees through postal money order. The issuance of the official receipt only after the filing, through registered mail, of its Verified Protest/Opposition, does not erase the fact that the docket fees were paid to and received by the government.

Section 21 of DAO No. 96-40 mandates:

Section 21. Publication/Posting/Radio Announcement of an Exploration Permit Application. - x x x Any adverse claim, protest or opposition shall be filed directly, within thirty (30) calendar days from the last date of publication/posting/radio announcement, with the concerned Regional Office or through any concerned PENRO or CENRO for filing in the concerned Regional Office for purposes of its resolution by the Panel of Arbitrators pursuant to the provisions of the Act and these implementing rules and regulations. x x x.

Considering that the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and MAB are bereft of any provision regarding the computation of time and the manner of filing, the Court may refer to Section 1, Rule 22 and Section 3, Rule 13 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,[33] which state:

Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 3. Manner of filing. - The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, notices of the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent were published in newspapers,[34] announced on the radio,[35] and posted in public places. The posting was done the latest, so we reckon the last possible date petitioner could have validly filed its Verified Petition/Opposition with the Panel of Arbitrators therefrom.

The notices of the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent were posted on the bulletin boards of the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan on 16 to 31 March 2005; Office of the Municipal Mayor of Mabini, Pangasinan on 16 to 31 March 2005; Office of the Pangasinan Provincial Environment and Natural Resources on 17 March 2005 to 2 April 2005; Office of the DENR Provincial Environment and Natural Resources-Pangasinan on 15 March 2005 to 6 April 2005; Office of the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources-Alaminos City on 17 March 2005 to 5 April 2005; Offices of the Punong Barangays of Malimpin, San Pedro, Barlo, San Vicente, and Alilao on 16 to 31 March 2005; and MGB on 14 to 28 July 2005.[36]

Since the notice of the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent was last posted on 28 July 2005, the 30-day reglementary period for filing any adverse claim/protest/opposition thereto ended on 27 August 2005. As petitioner explained, however, 27 August 2005 was a Saturday; and 29 August 2005, Monday, was declared a national holiday,[37] so the next working day was 30 August 2005, Tuesday. Petitioner did send its Verified Protest/Opposition, through registered mail, on 30 August 2005, as evidenced by the Affidavit of Service[38] of even date and Registry Receipts No. 10181; No. 10182; No. 10183; and No. 10184.[39] Nevertheless, the Court still could not consider the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner as having been filed within the reglementary period.

Section 21 of DAO No. 96-40, fixing the 30-day reglementary period for filing any adverse claim/protest/opposition to an application for exploration permit, must be read in relation to Section 204 of DAO No. 96-40, which reads:

Section 204. Substantial Requirements for Adverse Claims, Protest and Oppositions. No adverse claim, protest or opposition involving mining rights shall be accepted for filing unless verified and accompanied by the prescribed docket fee and proof of services to the respondent(s), either personally or by registered mail: Provided, That the requirement for the payment of docket fees shall not be imposed on pauper litigants[;] (Emphasis supplied.)

and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and MAB, which states that:

Section 7. Form and Contents of Adverse Claims, Protest or Opposition. No adverse claim, petition, protest or opposition involving mining rights shall be accepted for filing unless verified and accompanied by the prescribed docket fee and proof of services to the respondent(s), either personally or by registered mail: Provided, That the requirement for the payment of docket fees shall not be imposed on pauper litigants. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 204 of DAO No. 96-40 and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and MAB explicitly require that the adverse claim/protest/opposition be accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee for the same to be accepted for filing.

Upon a careful examination of the records of this case, it appears that the docket fee was paid only on 6 September 2005, as evidenced by Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 7478283 B.[40] Although petitioner avers that it paid the docket fee through postal money order in which case, the date of mailing would be deemed the date of payment such averment is unsubstantiated. The Court finds no evidence to prove that petitioner actually sent the purported postal money order for the payment of the docket fee. Petitioner submits the following evidence to prove payment of the docket fee: (a) a Prudential Bank Check in the amount of P5,020.00 dated 1 September 2005;[41] (b) O.R. No. 7478283 B dated 6 September 2005 issued by MGB Region I, San Fernando City; and (c) several registry return receipts.[42] But these pieces of evidence do not establish at all that the docket fee was paid by postal money order; or indicate the postal money order number and the date said postal money order was sent. Without any evidence to prove otherwise, the Court presumes that the docket fee was paid on the date the receipt for the same was issued, i.e., 6 September 2005.

Based on the foregoing, the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of respondent is deemed filed with the Panel of Arbitrators only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee on 6 September 2005, clearly beyond the reglementary period, which ended on 30 August 2005.

III

The Panel of Arbitrators denied the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner in Case No. 2005-00012-I for another procedural lapse, the lack of a certification against forum shopping.

Petitioner argues that a Verified Protest/Opposition does not require a certification against forum shopping. According to it, Section 204 of DAO No. 96-40 identifies the substantial requirements of a mining adverse claim/ protest/opposition, and a certification against forum shopping is not among them; the Panel of Arbitrators has no power and authority to impose additional requirements for the filing and service of pleadings; the Panel of Arbitrators also does not have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations involving the practice, pleadings, litigation and disposition of cases before it, for the same only belongs to the MAB, pursuant to Section 207 of DAO No. 96-40.

The arguments of petitioner have no merit.

Petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition before the Panel of Arbitrators to oppose the Application for Exploration Permit filed by private respondent with the MGB. The Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner constitutes an initiatory pleading before the Panel of Arbitrators, for which a certification against forum shopping may be required. Truly, DAO No. 96-40 is bereft of any provision requiring that a certification against forum shopping be attached to the adverse claim/protest/opposition. However, Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules on Pleading, Practice and Procedure before the Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB allows the application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court by analogy or in a suppletory manner, in the interest of expeditious justice and whenever practical and convenient; and, according to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief , or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Hence, the requirement by the Panel of Arbitrators and the MAB that a certification against forum shopping be attached to initiatory pleadings filed before them, to ascertain that no similar actions have been filed before other courts, tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies, is not arbitrary or baseless. The lack of such a certification is a ground for the dismissal of the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner.

IV

The Panel of Arbitrators dismissed the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner for a third reason: that the same has become moot and academic, given that the DENR Secretary already issued DMO No. 2005-03 on 1 February 2005 canceling MPSA No. 153-2000-1 and MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent on 1 September 2005.

However, petitioner asserts that MPSA No. 153-2000-1 has not been finally cancelled or revoked, considering the pendency of the legal remedies it availed itself of for DMO No. 2005-03. The issuance of DMO No. 2005-03 by the DENR Secretary, and of EP No. 05-001 by MGB pursuant thereto, should not render the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner moot and academic.

The position of petitioner is untenable.

It must be stressed that the cancellation of MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner by the DENR Secretary in DMO No. 2005-03 is already the subject of separate proceedings. The Court cannot touch upon it in the Petition at bar.

Also worth stressing is that petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent. When the application was approved and the exploration permit issued to private respondent, petitioner had nothing more to protest/oppose. More importantly, with the issuance by MGB of EP No. 05-001 to private respondent, the remedy of petitioner is to seek the cancellation thereof, over which, as subsequently discussed herein, the Panel of Arbitrators would have no jurisdiction. The Panel of Arbitrators cannot simply consider or convert the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for Exploration Permit of private respondent as a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 05-001. Since the Panel of Arbitrators can no longer grant petitioner any actual substantial relief by reason of the foregoing circumstances, then the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner was appropriately dismissed for being moot and academic.

Finally, petitioner posits that Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Sections 202 to 203 of its Implementing Rules vest the Panel of Arbitrators with the jurisdiction to entertain and accept any claim, protest or opposition filed directly with its office. In the discharge thereof, the office and function bestowed upon the Panel of Arbitrators include the power and authority to deny clearances, exclude exploration permits, and not to accept or entertain the same.

The Court disagrees.

Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus:

Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:

a.

Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

b.

Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;

c.

Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and

d.

Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Olympic Mines and Development Corporation v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation[43] citing Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation,[44] this Court made the following pronouncements as regards paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942:

In Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation, et al., this Court speaking through Justice Velasco, specified the kind of disputes that fall under Section 77(a) of the Mining Act:

The phrase disputes involving rights to mining areas refers to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an application for a mineral agreement.

xxxx

[T]he power of the POA to resolve any adverse claim, opposition, or protest relative to mining rights under Section 77 (a) of RA 7942 is confined only to adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights. x x x. Clearly, POAs jurisdiction over disputes involving rights to mining areas has nothing to do with the cancellation of existing mineral agreements. (Emphases supplied.)

xxxx

Parenthetically, the permit referred to in Section 77(b) of the Mining Act pertains to exploration permit, quarry permit, and other mining permits recognized in Chapters IV, VIII, and IX of the Mining Act. An operating agreement, not being among those listed, cannot be considered as a mineral permit under Section 77 (b). (Emphases supplied.)

It is clear from the ruling of the Court in Olympic Mines and Celestial Nickel Mining that the Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing.

As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides:

Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit. The Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration Permit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and for violation(s) of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued. For renewed Exploration Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director shall cause the cancellation of the same.

According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, Director means the Director of the MGB Central Office, while Regional Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same.[45] Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari of petitioner Pyro Copper Mining Corporation is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 23 February 2007 and 6 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97663 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-49109 December 1, 1987 SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

PADILLA, J.: This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to declare Presidential Decree No. 1214 unconstitutional and to enjoin respondent public officials from enforcing it. On 19 October 1978, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court. Petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. (petitioner, for short) is a mining corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short). On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under protest," on 13 October 1978, with a reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court. 1

On 10 October 1978, or three (3) days before filing the disputed mining lease application, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as its own private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte (CFI, for short) in land registration proceedings initiated by third persons, such as, a September 1951 land title application by a certain Gervacio Liwanag, where the Director of Mines opposed the grant of said application because herein petitioner, according to him (Director of Mines), had already located and perfected its mining claims over the area applied for. Petitioner also cites LRC Case No. 240, filed 11 July 1960, by one Antonio Astudillo and decided in 1974 against said applicant, in which, petitioner's mining claims were described as vested property outside the jurisdiction of the Director of Mines. 2 In answer, the respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies. They cite the pendency of petitioner's appeal, with the Office of the President, of the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Natural Resources issued on 2 April 1977 in DNR Case No. 4140, which upheld the decision of the Director of Mines finding that forty four (44) out of petitioner's fifty (50) mining claims were void for lack of valid "tie points" as required under the Philippine Bill of 1902, and that all the mining claims had already been abandoned and cancelled, for petitioner's non-compliance with the legal requirements of the same Phil. Bill of 1902 and Executive Order No. 141. 3 We agree with respondents' contention that it is premature for the Court to now make a finding on the matter of whether petitioner had abandoned its mining claims. Until petitioner's appeal shall have been decided by the Office of the President, where it is pending, petitioner's attempt to seek judicial recognition of the continuing validity of its mining claims, cannot be entertained by the Court. As stated by the Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla inHam v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. 4 applying the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies: "By its own act of appealing from the decision of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, and without waiting for the latter's decision, the defendant cannot complain if the courts do not take action be fore the President has decided its appeal." 5 The decisions of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in applications for land registration filed by third persons covering the area over which petitioner had located and registered its mining claims, as cited by petitioner, are inapplicable. Said decisions merely denied the applications of such third persons for land registration over areas already covered by petitioner's mining claims, for failure to show titles that were registrable under the Torrens system; that was all. While the CFI made a statement in one case declaring that the petitioner's mining claims are its vested property and even patentable at that time, there is nothing in said CFI decision that squarely passed upon the question of whether petitioner had valid, patentable (but still unpatented) mining claims which it had continued to maintain, in compliance with the requirements of applicable laws. This question, which involves a finding of facts, is precisely the issue before the Office of the President in the petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in DNR Case No. 4140 holding that petitioner's mining claims are considered abandoned cancelled for failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Executive Order No. 141. In short, the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, relied upon by petitioner, do not foreclose a proceeding, such as DNR Case No. 4140, to determine whether petitioner's unpatented mining claims have remained valid and subsisting. Respondents further contend that, even assuming arguendo that petitioner's mining claims were valid at the outset, if they are deemed abandoned and cancelled due to non-compliance with the legal requirements for maintaining a perfected mining claim, under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, 6 petitioner has no valid and subsisting claim which could be lost through the implementation of Presidential Decree No. 1214, thus giving it no standing to question the Decree.

Petitioner, on the other hand, would rebut respondents' argument by declaring that it already had a vested right over its mining claims even before Presidential Decree No. 1214, following the rulings in McDaniel v. Apacible 7and Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez. 8 The Court is not impressed that this is so. The cases cited by petitioner, true enough, recognize the right of a locator of a mining claim as a property right. This right, however, is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right, more so, in this case, where petitioner's claims are still unpatented. They can be lost through abandonment or forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal grounds. The statement in McDaniel v. Apacible that "There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral claims in question, or that the claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him," 9 confirms that a valid mining claim may still be lost through abandonment or forfeiture. The petitioner can not successfully plead the ruling in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, supra. In that case, what was in issue was Gold Creek's right to a patent over its mining claim, after compliance with all legal requirements for a patent. In the present case, no application for patent is in issue, although as a holder ofpatentable mining claims petitioner could have applied for one during all these years but inexplicably did not do so. In Gold Creek, no finding of abandonment was ever made against the mining claimant as to deprive it of the initial privilege given by virtue of its location; on the other hand, such a finding has been made in petitioner's case (although the finding among others is on appeal with the President). We now come to the question of whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional. Even assumingarguendo that petitioner was not bound to exhaust administrative remedies on the question of whether or not its mining claims are still subsisting (not abandoned or cancelled before challenging the constitutionality of said Decree, we hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. 10 It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim. Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution which states: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The same constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, which declares:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna. and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. ... WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on 19 October 1978 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002] SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is a petition for review of the March 19, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44693, dismissing the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and the resolution dated August 19, 1998 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels. From 1985 to 1991, thousands of people flocked to Diwalwal to stake their respective claims. Peace and order deteriorated rapidly, with hundreds of people perishing in mine accidents, man-made or otherwise, brought about by

unregulated mining activities. The multifarious problems spawned by the gold rush assumed gargantuan proportions, such that finding a win-win solution became a veritable needle in a haystack. On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area. Marcoppers acquisition of mining rights over Diwalwal under its EP No. 133 was subsequently challenged before this Court in Apex Mining Co., Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et al., where Marcoppers claim was sustained over that of another mining firm, Apex Mining Corporation (Apex). The Court found that Apex did not comply with the procedural requisites for acquiring mining rights within forest reserves. Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control. The statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions. On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. The issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve. Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94 entitled, Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v. Marcopper Mining Corporation. On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner. After publication of the application, the following filed their oppositions: a) MAC Case No. 004(XI) - JB Management Mining Corporation; b) MAC Case No. 005(XI) - Davao United Miners Cooperative; c) MAC Case No. 006(XI) - Balite Integrated Small Scale Miners Cooperative; d) MAC Case No. 007(XI) - Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association, Inc.; e) MAC Case No. 008(XI) - Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines; f) MAC Case No. 009(XI) - Rosendo Villaflor, et al.; g) MAC Case No. 010(XI) - Antonio Dacudao; h) MAC Case No. 011(XI) - Atty. Jose T. Amacio; i) MAC Case No. 012(XI) - Puting-Bato Gold Miners Cooperative; j) MAC Case No. 016(XI) - Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative; and MAC Case No. 97-01(XI) - Romeo Altamera, et al.

k)

In the meantime, on March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the above-enumerated MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases. On April 1, 1997, Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997, authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.

Thus, on May 30, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the DENR Secretary and PMRB-Davao. SEM alleged that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of P60,000.00 worth of gold ore per truckload from SEMs mining claim. Meanwhile, on June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in an Omnibus Resolution as follows: VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the validity of Exploration Permit No. 133 is hereby reiterated and all the adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are DISMISSED. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided, among others, that: 1. The DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x x x On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; that the DENR Secretary unduly usurped and interfered with the jurisdiction of the RPA which had dismissed all adverse claims against SEM in the Consolidated Mines cases; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR. Meanwhile, on January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines cases, setting aside the judgment of the RPA. This MAB decision was then elevated to this Court by way of a consolidated petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 132475 and 132528. On March 19, 1998, the Court of Appeals, through a division of five members voting 3-2, dismissed the petition in CAG.R. SP No. 44693. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 9703 since the same was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a manifestation of the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options, after determining its feasibility through studies. MO 97-03 was only the initial step in the ladder of administrative process and did not, as yet, fix any obligation, legal relationship or right. It was thus premature for petitioner to claim that its constitutionally-protected rights under EP No. 133 have been encroached upon, much less, violated by its issuance. Additionally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioners rights under EP No. 133 are not inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable. Being in the nature of a privilege granted by the State, the permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the Chief Executive when the national interest so requires. The Court of Appeals, however, declined to rule on the validity of the OTPs, reasoning that said issue was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RPA. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, which was denied for lack of merit on August 19, 1998.

Hence this petition, raising the following errors: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR, AND HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE QUESTIONED ACTS OF RESPONDENT DENR SECRETARY WHICH ARE IN VIOLATION OF MINING LAWS AND IN DEROGATION OF PETITIONERS VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE AREA COVERED BY ITS EP NO. 133; II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT AN ACTION ON THE VALIDITY OF ORE TRANSPORT PERMIT (OTP) IS VESTED IN THE REGIONAL PANEL OF ARBITRATORS. In a resolution dated September 11, 2000, the appealed Consolidated Mines cases, docketed as G.R. Nos. 132475 and 132528, were referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. These cases, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 61215 and 61216, are still pending before the Court of Appeals. In the first assigned error, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. On the contrary, petitioner submits, said memorandum order dictated the said recourse and, in effect, granted management or operating agreements as well as provided for profit sharing arrangements to illegal small-scale miners. According to petitioner, MO 97-03 was issued to preempt the resolution of the Consolidated Mines cases. The direct state utilization scheme espoused in the challenged memorandum is nothing but a legal shortcut, designed to divest petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133. We are not persuaded. We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As the Court of Appeals extensively discussed in its decision: x x x under the Memorandum Order, the State still had to study prudently and exhaustively the various options available to it in rationalizing the explosive and ever perilous situation in the area, the debilitating adverse effects of mining in the community and at the same time, preserve and enhance the safety of the mining operations and ensure revenues due to the government from the development of the mineral resources and the exploitation thereof. The government was still in earnest search of better options that would be fair and just to all parties concerned, including, notably, the Petitioner. The direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the area was only one of the options of the State. Indeed, it is too plain to see, x x x that before the State will settle on an option, x x x an extensive and intensive study of all the facets of a direct state exploitation was directed by the Public Respondent DENR Secretary. And even if direct state exploitation was opted by the government, the DENR still had to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the same x x x, in coordination with the other concerned agencies of the government. Consequently, the petition was premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute. At this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would directly take over the mines after studies point to its viability. But until the DENR actually does so and petitioners fears turn into reality, no valid objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory. With respect to the alleged vested rights claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB

decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03. Similarly, there is no merit in petitioners assertion that MO 97-03 sanctions violation of mining laws by allowing illegal miners to enter into mining agreements with the State. Again, whether or not respondent BCMC and the other mining entities it represents are conducting illegal mining activities is a factual matter that has yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated Mines cases. We cannot rightfully conclude at this point that respondent BCMC and the other mining firms are illegitimate mining operators. Otherwise, we would be preempting the resolution of the cases which are still pending before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners reliance on the Apex Mining case to justify its rights under E.P. No. 133 is misplaced. For one, the said case was litigated solely between Marcopper and Apex Mining Corporation and cannot thus be deemed binding and conclusive on respondent BCMC and the other mining entities presently involved. While petitioner may be regarded as Marcoppers successor to EP No. 133 and therefore bound by the judgment rendered in the Apex Mining case, the same cannot be said of respondent BCMC and the other oppositor mining firms, who were not impleaded as parties therein. Neither can the Apex Mining case foreclose any question pertaining to the continuing validity of EP No. 133 on grounds which arose after the judgment in said case was promulgated. While it is true that the Apex Mining case settled the issue of who between Apex and Marcopper validly acquired mining rights over the disputed area by availing of the proper procedural requisites mandated by law, it certainly did not deal with the question raised by the oppositors in the Consolidated Mines cases, i.e. whether EP No. 133 had already expired and remained valid subsequent to its transfer by Marcopper to petitioner. Besides, as clarified in our decision in the Apex Mining case: x x x is conclusive only between the parties with respect to the particular issue herein raised and under the set of circumstances herein prevailing. In no case should the decision be considered as a precedent to resolve or settle claims of persons/entities not parties hereto. Neither is it intended to unsettle rights of persons/entities which have been acquired or which may have accrued upon reliance on laws passed by appropriate agencies. Clearly then, the Apex Mining case did not invest petitioner with any definite right to the Diwalwal mines which it could now set up against respondent BCMC and the other mining groups. Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare. Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically provides: SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. (Underscoring ours) Likewise, Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states: SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. - Mineral Resources are owned by the State and the exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors. (Underscoring ours) Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility. In this regard, petitioners imputation of bad faith on the part of the DENR Secretary when the latter issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. The avowed rationale of the memorandum order is clearly and plainly stated in its whereas clauses. In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, as in this case, he is presumed to have regularly issued the memorandum with a lawful intent and pursuant to his official functions. Given these considerations, petitioners first assigned error is baseless and premised on tentative assumptions. Petitioner cannot claim any absolute right to the Diwalwal mines pending resolution of the Consolidated Mines cases, much less ask us to assume, at this point, that respondent BCMC and the other mining firms are illegal miners. These factual issues are to be properly threshed out in CA G.R. SP Nos. 61215 and 61216, which have yet to be decided by the Court of Appeals. Any objection raised against MO 97-03 is likewise premature at this point, inasmuch as it merely ordered a study of an option which the State is authorized by law to undertake. We see no need to rule on the matter of the OTPs, considering that the grounds invoked by petitioner for invalidating the same are inextricably linked to the issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44693 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987] UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELANIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION, respondents. DECISION GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Before us is a petition which seeks to set aside the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's action for annulment and cancellation of free patents granted to the private respondents on the ground that the petitioner has no personality to file an action for reversion, the lands involved being public in character. On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted the following mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay: "1. lode patent No. V-52 to John Canson, Jr., on mineral claim known as 'Catanduandes'; 2. lode patent No. V-48 to petitioner, on mineral claims known as 'Junior';

3. lode patent No. V-53 to John Canson, Jr., on mineral claims known as 'Oas'; 4. lode patent No. V-46 to petitioner on mineral claim known as 'Ester'; 5. lode patent No. V-51 to Carlos Stilianopulos on mineral claim knon as 'Jovellar'; 6. lode patent No. V-49 to petitioner, in mineral claim known as 'Manila'; 7. lode patent No. V-50 to Carlos Stilianopulos on mineral claim known as 'Polangui'; and 8. lode patent No. V-47 to petitioner on mineral claim known as 'Ligao'; (pp. 5-7, Decision Annex 1, Petition) Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2, 1959. The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner. Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free patents were granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay: "1. Free Patent No. 458143 dated October 3, 1968 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH12195 to appellee Felix Detecio; 2. Free Patent No. 427824 dated November 21, 1968 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH12256 to appelle Melanio Asuncion; 3. Free Patent No. 433318 dated January 10, 1969 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH12198 to appellee Jesus Asuncion; 4. Free Patents No. 422847 dated November 11, 1968 and No. 421947 dated October 28, 1969 and corresponding Certificates of Title Nos. VH-12185 and 12186, respectively, to appellee Maria Bernal; 5. Free Patent No. 408568 dated July 8, 1968 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH-11591 to appellee Gregorio Bolanos; and 6. Free Patent No. 0663 dated March 25, 1974 and the corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH19333 to appellee Bienvenido Asuncion. (Rollo, pp. 200-201) All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents belonging to the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for properties over which original certificates of title had already been issued in its favor be declared null and void.

The Director of Lands, who was impleaded as a formal defendant, filed his answer alleging, among others, that the petitioner has no personality to institute the cancellation proceedings inasmuch as the government is the grantor and not the petitioner, and it should be the grantor who should institute the cancellation proceedings. On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that since the disputed properties form part of disposable land of the public domain, the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and that, therefore, the petitioner lacks personality to institute the annulment proceedings. The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the titles issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which belong to the public domain and that these cannot be the subject of private ownership. According to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead has the authority to insitute an action on behalf of the Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and and for reversion of their homesteads to the Government. In this instant petition, the petitioner raises two issues: a) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain; and b) whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same. With regard to the first issue, the petitioner maintains that since its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15, 1935, the date when the 1935 Constitution took effect, the applicable law is the Philippine Bill of 1902 and that under this Act, a valid location of a mining claim segregates the area from the public domain. (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259). The Solicitor-General, on the other hand, argues that the petitioner's mining patents covered by Torrens Titles were granted only in 1962 by the President of the Philippines, by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the then Constitution, except for public agricultural lands, natural resources which includes all mineral lands, shall not be alienated. (Art. XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution) Therefore, what the mining patents issued in 1962 conveyed to petitioner was only the ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals within the area covered by the petitioner's Torrens Titles but not the ownership of the land where the minerals are found. We rule for the private respondents. The petitioner has been beguiling, less than candid, and inexplicably silent as to material dates in the presentation of its case. Nowhere in the records of this petition is there any mention of a date before November 15, 1935 as to when essential acts regarding its mining claims were executed. It is silent as to when the land was entered, measured, and plotted; when the legal pests and notices were put up; when the claim was registered with the mining recorder; whether or not the annual amount of labor or development; and other requirements under the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed. These may have been complied with but not necessarily before 1935. A mere mention in the Torrens title that the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed is not sufficient. The Philippine Bill provides the procedures for the perfection of mining claims but not the dates when such procedures were undertaken by any prospector or claimant. The same procedures would have to be followed even after the Jones Law of 1916 and the Constitution of 1935 were promulgated, but subject to the restrictions of the fundamental law. The petitioner has failed to state if and when new procedures, different from the 1902 procedures, were provided by law to give a little substance to its case. The petitioner is completely and strangely silent about these vital aspects of its petition. Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the locations of its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15, 1935 when the Government of Commonwealth was inaugurated. In fact neither the original complaint nor the amended one alleged the perfection of petitioner's mining rights prior to November 15, 1935. All that

petitioner offers as evidence of its claims were the original certificates of titles covering mining patents which embodied a uniform "WHEREAS" clause stating that the petitioner "has fully complied with all the conditions, requirements, and provisions of the Act of the United States of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, x x x" In the absence of proof that the petitioner's claims were perfected prior to the 1935 Constitution, the provision of the latter with regard to inalienable lands of the public domain will apply. Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides: "All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface. There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such acquisition outside its purview and scope. Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. (Director of Lands v. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57, 69). In the case at bar, although the original certificates of titles of the petitioner were issued prior to the titles of the private respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the provisions of the Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance prohibited the alienation of mineral lands of the public domain. In the case of Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), this Court ruled that a grantee does not become the owner of a land illegally included in the grant just because title has been issued in his favor: "A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight v. Land Ass., 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; italics supplied). If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)" Moreover, patents and land grants are construed favorably in favor of the Government, and most strongly against the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. (See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146, 156). Hence, as earlier stated, in the absence of proof that the petitioner acquired the right of ownership over the mineral lands prior to the 1935 Constitution, the titles issued in its favor must be construed as conveying only the right to extract and utilize the minerals thereon. The appellate court did not likewise err in concluding that the petitioner has no personality to institute the action below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part

of the inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action for reversion. (See Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946; and Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez, 142 SCRA 252). WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997 ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA, ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN TABANG, PANGANIBAN, ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J. LAYSON, MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASET A., JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B. BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YABANEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON, ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON, BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF PALAWAN, petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN, namely,

VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C. BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND METROPOLITAN, respondents. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., J.: Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order. More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. The following is petitioners summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to the petition: 1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows: Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF. Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City. Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance the following are hereby defined: A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known as APAHAP; B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as HITO-HITO; C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known as DALAG D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use for food and for aquarium purposes. E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the genus Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving.

Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES. Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court. Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating the provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic]. Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed repealed. Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993. SO ORDAINED. xxx 2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows: In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft. The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter. Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein must be held for proper disposition. In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the conduct of the inspection. Please be guided accordingly. xxx 3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER

SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full text of which reads as follows: WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches *sic+ and studies disclose that only five (5) percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a] habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms; WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities; WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years; WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, among others. NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon unanimous decision of all the members present; Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit: ORDINANCE NO. 2 Series of 1993 BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION ASSEMBLED: Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan Waters. Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a] more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. 2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall be liberaly interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit concerned. 3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.

4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the] proper perspective and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is [sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years; Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion of the Court; Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a Section or provision of this Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the other provisions hereof. Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any ordinance inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed. Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication. SO ORDAINED. xxx 4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes A and C hereof thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade; 5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex D; while xerox copies are attached as Annex D to the copies of the petition; 6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex E; Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that: First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit. Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in

lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed. In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition, and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy thereof. In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 *hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells *sic+, within its territory remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate. Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 11223. On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that as claimed by said office in its Manifestation of 28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel. The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition. In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further delay, we dispensed with said comment. After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, on 22 July 1997, and assigned it to the ponente for the writing of the opinion of the Court.

I There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan; and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim who were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 1592 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. All of them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of several marine merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen. The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the ordinances. As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional. It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And , even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not, and could not have , alleged any of such grounds. As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity ... for being unconstitutional. As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions. II Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma:

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land. In Santiago v. Vasquez, this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction. III Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised. It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having been transgressed by the Ordinances. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads: SEC. 2. x x x

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. xxx SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status. Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991 which pertinently provides: SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x (b) The sangguniang bayan may: (1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges .... In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not involve such fishery right. Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to

protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal fisherman, the following exchange between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary session of the Constitutional Commission: MR. RODRIGO: Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes of our people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this be implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so that government officials will know that one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if policeman say that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove that indeed he is one. MR. BENGZON: Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned and this particular question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on Local Governments -- whether we will leave to the local governments or to Congress on how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our Congressmen and our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to implement this mandate. x x x MR. RODRIGO: So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds. MR. BENGZON: Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed, may be existing or will be passed. (underscoring supplied for emphasis). What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran, this Court declared: While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second , the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present

generation, but also for those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment ... The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right: SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied). Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that *p+rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that *a+ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned, Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line. These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed season in any Philippine

water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization, and conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the BFAR. To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment are concerned, must be added the following: 1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters; 2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters; 3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters; 4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters; 5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters; 6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters; 7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and 8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters. These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province. At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier. It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government. The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support systems. They collect, retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter for aquatic organisms. It is said that *e+cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and plant species that will disappear without them. The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of live-fish trade which entails the catching of so-called exotic tropical species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West, but also for the market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable in ever more affluent Asia. These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are immobilized *merely stunned+ and then scooped by hand. The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff . Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore, they are placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide from their system and are ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major markets for live food fish. While the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true for their former home as *a+fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its function as habitat for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle, bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the waves. It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals within three months of repeated application. The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted. As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D. No. 704. The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are concerned. This section provides, however, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon his approval. Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the regional offices of the MAF.

In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987, the BFAR is placed under the Title concerning the Department of Agriculture. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reasons: (1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 insofar that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the LGC. (2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to *p+rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992 CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes,respondents.

NOCON, J.: This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No 29 1 of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said municipality a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution. It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. 2 His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. The issue then boils down on whether petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows: 1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued by the municipality of Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its present location;

2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Virac is not (sic) unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner; 3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is not only in violation of the provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the residents of the neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the New Civil code of the Philippines and may be abated; 4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said warehouse all abaca and copra and other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited under the provisions of Ordinance No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the time this decision becomes final and that henceforth, the petitioner is enjoined from storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs against petitioner. Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo: 1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the Municipal Council, and therefore, constitutional; 2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses. 3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted. We find no merit in the Petition. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. 4 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria. As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952, 6reads: AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT.

Section 1 provides: It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons, entity, corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum, alcohol, crude oil, oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the distance of 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios to avoid great losses of properties inclusive lives by fire accident. Section 2 provides: 7 Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those warehouses now in existence should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the above-described products in Section 1 of this ordinance after a lapse of the time given for the removal of the said warehouses now in existence, same warehouses shall be exempted from the spirit of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance,provided further, that these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be converted into non-inflammable products and materials warehouses. In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government. This was also the observation of the trial court: A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of the elemental rules of syntax. Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and fundamental elements of the English language commonly used throughout the country in such matters. Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes the terms of the ordinance, it is clear that what is prohibited is the construction of warehouses by any person, entity or corporation wherein copra, hemp, gasoline and other inflammable products mentioned in Section 1 may be stored unless at a distance of not less than 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios in order to avoid loss of property and life due to fire. Under Section 2, existing warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles were given one year after the approval of the ordinance within which to remove them but were allowed to remain in operation if they had ceased to store such prohibited articles. The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government. 8 Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or differrent from what was provided in the ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose. As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence

of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First Instance. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER,petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989 ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents. G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989 INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents. G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989 NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.: In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death. Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died. The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive. "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3 The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program: SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4 The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder. G.R. No. 79777 Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation. In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares. Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law. In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. G.R. No. 79310 The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Copetitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides: Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC. The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated. A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court. NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available. Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule. In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the

Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation. On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary. On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because: (1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP; (2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title; (3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and (4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives. G.R. No. 79744 The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents. The petitioner now argues that: (1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines. (2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation. (3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution. The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under

the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power. The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that: Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land. is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic. In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads: The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened. On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization payments. In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts. G.R. No. 78742 The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off

Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree. I Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached. In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12 With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15 The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions. In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In

arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation. For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution. It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that ... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16 The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall. II We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above. The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. 18 That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple

reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress. The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20 The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time. But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.) Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23 III There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said: Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore. Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks: Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared: If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise: In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30 The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses. The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal. One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This brings us now to the power of eminent domain. IV Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused. A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36 The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours. The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so. In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held: Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... . As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us. The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41 It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has

dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us. Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that: Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision. To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school

pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned. xxx In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose. This time, we answer in the affirmative. xxx It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved. This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows: SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner: (1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions: (a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. (c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC; (3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability; (4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features: (a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds; (b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the following: (i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated; (ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private corporations; (iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bonds; (iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid; (v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above; (vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government hospitals; and (viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow. The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that: The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.) In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held: It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.) In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.) Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48 "Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.) It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the

benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance. Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50 On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes,

which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail. The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16. The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus: Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.51 ... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.) In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use,but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him." Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that: If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.) It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly

recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.) it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land." The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected. It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead." In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree. V The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil. By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want

but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream." WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: 1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. 5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.] 192 SCRA 51 LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80). On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81). Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rd Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98). Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119). The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168). On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186187). Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it: (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling. In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ." The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.:-cralaw The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: ARTICLE XIII x x x AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. x x x" Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11). On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming. It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .

Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit. Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83). The petition is impressed with merit. The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).: rd Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]). The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11). The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30). In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted as follows: x x x "Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects. I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618). x x x The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows: x x x "Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21). Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralaw It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343). However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989). Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61293 February 15, 1990 DOMINGO B. MADDUMBA and ANITA C. MADDUMBA, petitioners, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Represented by its Chairman, Board of Trustees, HONORABLE LEONILO OCAMPO, respondent. Vicente P. Leus for petitioners. The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS.

REGALADO, J.: This petition for mandamus seeks to compel respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value as installments payments for a pre-existing obligation. The records disclose that on December 10, 1980, respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties. Included in the properties offered to the public was a house and lot situated at 3377 New Panaderos Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4749 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. Petitioner Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and submitted his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in Philippine currency. The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a down payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a manager's check in the amount of P9,500.00 and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the P9,800.00 proposal bond. Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds were issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland consisting of twenty-six hectares located in Cordon, Isabela acquired by the Government from him under Presidential Decree No. 27. However, the GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down payment "and all future installments." 1 Thereafter, on November 16, 1981, petitioner paid in cash the balance of the required down payment. A "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed by the parties on November 19, 1981, where the petitioner as vendee agreed to pay the vendor GSIS "the balance of the purchase price of SIXTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIVE & 50/100 (P63,705.50) PESOS, Philippine currency, in SIXTY (60) monthly installments of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN & 69/100 (P1,416.69) PESOS, Philippine currency, at twelve (12%) percent interest per annum, compounded monthly, beginning December 1, 1981." 2 The first installment in the amount of P1,416.00 was paid by petitioner on December 3, 1981. When the second monthly installment became due, petitioner sent a letter dated January 5, 1982, to the GSIS Board of Trustees requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his Land Bank bonds commencing in January, 1982 until the exhaustion of the said bonds. 3 Petitioner invoked the provisions of Secton 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251. The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on January 22, 1982, denied petitioner's offer. The board "resolved to reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at maturity. 4 In a letter dated February 12, 1982, petitioner asked the Board of Trustees to reconsider Resolution No. 91. 5Petitioner reiterated his reliance on Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and further supported his position with the

contention that the policy of the GSIS contravenes the ruling in the case of Gonzales, et al. vs. The Government Insurance System, etc., et al. 6 Likng in the case of ewise, petitioner submitted an opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, dated February 12, 1982, wherein it was stated,a inter alia, that "if the GSIS accepts the Land Bank bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same at par or face value. To accept said bonds at a discounted rate would lessen the credibility of the bonds as instruments of indebtedness." 7 In a letter dated May 31, 1982, petitioner was advised by the Manager, Acquired Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was adopted on May 18, 1982 by the GSIS Board of Trustees denying the request of petitioner. Hence, on August 5, 1982, the instant original action for mandamus was filed by petitioner. The issue posed by this petition is whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251 effective July 21, 1973, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value in payment for a residential house and lot purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS. The aforesaid provision of law provides: Sec. 85. Use of Bonds. The bonds issued by the Bank may be used by the holder thereof and shall be accepted for any of the following: xxx xxx xxx 2. Payment for the purchase of shares of stock or assets of government-owned or controlled corporations. Upon offer by the bondholders, the corporation owned or controlled by the Government shall, through its Board of Directors, negotiate with such bondholder with respect to the price and other terms and conditions of the sale. In case there are various bondholders making the offer, the one willing to purchase under the terms and conditions most favorable to the corporation shall be preferred. If no price is acceptable to the corporation, the same shall be determined by the Committee of Appraisers composed of three members, one to be appointed by the corporation, another by the bondholder making the highest or only offer, and the third by the members so chosen. The expense of appraisal shall be borne equally by the corporation and the successful purchaser. Should the Government offer for sale to the public any or all the shares of stock or the assets of any of the Government-owned or controlled corporations, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank shall be preferred, provided that the various bids be equal in every respect in the medium of payment. xxx xxx xxx It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions, a government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is compelled to accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets. As a matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is resisting, however, is its being compelled to accept said bonds at their face value. Respondent, in support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminatingthe original provision that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted 'in the amount of their face value'; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face value will impair the actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death, retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million members, the majority of whom are low salaried government employees and workers." 8 We cannot agree with respondent.

Respondent's arguments disregard the fact that the provisions of Section 85 are primarily designed to cushion the impact of dispossession. Not only would there be inconvenience resulting from dispossession itself, but also from the modes of payment in financing the acquisition of farm lots. Acceptance of Land Bank bonds, instead of money, undoubtedly involves a certain degree of sacrifice for the landowner. This, of course, is in addition to the fact that, in case of expropriation of land covered by land reform, the landowner will seldom get the compensation he desires. Thus, discounting the Land Banks bonds, and thereby reducing their effective value, entails and imposes an additional burden on his part. It is, in fact, in consideration of this sacrifice that we extended the rule on liberality in the interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, then known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, in favor not only of the actual tillers but the landowners as well. Ita semper fiat relatio ut valeat dispositio. The interpretation must always be such that the disposition may prevail. The nature of a Land Bank bond itself fortifies our view that the respondent may be compelled to accept those bonds at their face value. As explained in an earlier case: True, the statute does not explicitly provide that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted at their face value. There can be no question, however, that such is the intendment of the law particularly in the absence of any provision expressly permitting discounting, as differentiated from Republic Act No. 304, or the Backpay Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 800 and 897, which expressly allows it. Land Bank bonds are certificates of indebtedness, approved by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, fully tax-exempt both as to principal and income, and bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum redeemable at the option of the Land Bank at or before maturity, which in no case shall exceed 25 years. They are fully negotiable and unconditionally guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. These bonds are deemed contracts and the obligations resulting therefrom fall within the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, and any impairment thereof may take any encroachment in any respect upon the obligation and cannot be permitted. Thus, the value of these bonds cannot be diminished by any direct or indirect act, particularly, since said bonds are fully guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines. They are issued not in the open market nor for the primary purpose of raising funds or pooling financial resources but in the captive market of landowners and to facilitate the speedy transfer of lands to the tenant-farmers in support of the land reform program of the Government. They are not ordinary commercial paper in that sense subject to discounting (Emphasis supplied). 9 We are aware that the above cited cases primarily involved Section 80 of the law as applied to cases where government financial institutions were compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value for the discharge of existing encumbrances on parcels of land given as security even if not an the lands covered by the mortgage were acquired by the Land Bank under Presidential Decree No. 27. Evidently, however, the variance in the factual setting would not change the very nature of said bonds by reason of which payment of pre-existing obligations to government financial institutions at their face or par value is justified and authorized. It would be hermeneutically unjustified to adopt a tenuous theory which would subject the parity of Land Bank bonds to qualifications and distinctions when the law itself does not so provide. The deed of conditional sale which was executed by the parties herein is subject to the obligation of and guaranteed by the Government under said bonds. Their agreement for the payment of installments in Philippine currency cannot in any way be construed as an alteration, nor should it detract from the essence and compulsion, of said obligation While, in one instance, petitioner offered to pay his future installments in cash, that offer was obviously not voluntarily made but was exacted from him because of the refusal of respondent to accept the Land Bank bonds. That incident should not prevent petitioner from making, and allow respondent to refuse, an alternative mode of payment authorized by law and under the conditions laid down by this Court.

Respondent cannot rely on the deletion by Presidential Decree No. 251 of the provision in Section 85 that the bonds shall be accepted in the amount of their face value, and wrest therefrom an interpretation in support of its thesis. Implied repeals are frowned upon in this jurisdiction. They are not favored in law and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislature is manifest. In the present case, no such intention to effect changes in the law exists nor is it even apparent. On the contrary, it can be said that when amendments were made to Section 85, the legislators were fully aware of the nature of Land Bank bonds, which would necessarily be concordant with the analysis and explanation subsequently made by the Court in the cases hereinbefore cited. If the legislature had really been minded to make changes in the policy on the acceptance value of said bonds, they could have expressly so provided with facility and ease. Thus, although such amendment by deletion was effected in 1973 and the cases which clarified this point were decided in 1986 and 1987 on factual situations subsequent to 1973, this argument now posited by respondent based on such amendment was not taken into account by the Court in laying down its aforequoted doctrinal rulings. Neither can the respondent complain that the acceptance of said bonds at their face value will impair its actuarial solvency. We are constrained to quote from Gonzales again, that "(w)hatever unfavorable results the acceptance may have on its finances, the effects must be deemed to have been intended by Presidential Decree No. 251, particularly, when it provided for the payment in bonds to government lending institutions their 'existing charters to the contrary notwithstanding.' If iniquitous to said institutions, it remains now with the legislative branch to make the necessary revisions if desired. The traditional role assigned to the Judiciary is to implement and not to thwart fundamental policy goals." It is apropos to recall, all this juncture, our reminder in the aforecited case of Philippine National Bank vs. Amores, et al., which applies with equal force to herein respondent and the present case: Suffice it to mention that the petitioner is a government lending institution and as such, it has the obligation to support unequivocably government programs already on stream and not to introduce its own interpretative policies which may thwart such programs or modify them to nothingness. This is specially compelling with regard to land reform, the great venture of the government. The preamble of PD 251 eloquently articulates government intent to implement the state policy of 'diverting landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development' by 'mobilization and harnessing properly all available government resources for the realization of the desired agrarian reform program.' For agrarian reform cannot be fully realized without the intervention of the governmentparticularly in the payment of just compensation. Surely, the tenant by himself does not have and cannot afford the wherewithal to defray the cost of the land tranferred to him. It is only with the full support and active assistance of the government principally through its financial institutions that payment of just compensation to the landowner may be realized. ... (Emphasis supplied). WHEREFORE, the writ of mandamus prayed for is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Government Service Insurance System is ordered to accept the bonds issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at their par or face value. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60269 September 13, 1991 ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SALVADOR PEJO, AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, and JUANA S. VDA. DE PAITAN,respondents. Jose L. Lapak for petitioner.

PARAS, J:p Petitioner challenges in this petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order the validity and constitutionality of Letter of Instructions No. 474 and Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 enforced by the then Minister and the Regional Director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and likewise seeks the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0046145 issued to Domingo Paitan by the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The records show that petitioner Magana is the owner of a parcel of riceland situated in the barrio of Talisay, Camarines Norte. The said riceland was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan, husband of private respondent herein, Juana Vda. de Paitan, under an agricultural leasehold agreement. On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability and failure of Domingo Paitan to do the tilling and cultivation of the riceland due to his long illness; and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties (Rollo, p. 2). On June 2, 1978, the former Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred the case to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as to whether or not it was proper for trial in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316, (Ibid., pp. 10-11), but said office failed to act upon the request for certification, for a period of more than three (3) years. Instead on July 10, 1980, the riceland was placed under the Land Transfer Program by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, which implemented Letter of Instructions No. 474, which placed all tenanted ricelands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas under the Land Transfer Program of the government. The prescribed procedures therein were subsequently undertaken and thereafter, on July 10, 1980, a certificate of Land Transfer was finally awarded in favor of Domingo Paitan. As a consequence thereof, the rentals were no longer paid to Magana but were deposited instead with the Land Bank and credited as amortization payments for the riceland. Apparently aggrieved by this turn of events, Magana took the present recourse. As earlier mentioned, the Court is now asked to resolve the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, and Letter of Instructions No. 474. The petition is devoid of merit. The constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 from which Letter of Instructions No. 474 and Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 are derived, is now well settled (Chavez v. Zobel, 55 SCRA 26 [1974]; Gonzales v. Estrella, 91 SCRA 292 [1979]; Zurbano v. Estrella, 137 SCRA 334, 335 [1985]; Ass. of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 366 [1989]). More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutionality of Letter of Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Conrado Estrella to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/ corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families". It was held that LOI 474 is neither a class legislation nor does it deprive a person of property without due process of law or just compensation (Zurbano v. Estrella, 137 SCRA 333 [1985]). Moreover, LOI 474

was duly published in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1976 and has therefore complied with the publication requirement as held by this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446 [1986]); Assn. of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 369 [1989]). As to the constitutionality of DAR Memo Circular No. 11, it is evident that DAR Memo Circular No. 11 merely implements LOI 474 whose constitutionality has already been established, clarifying for DAR personnel the guidelines set for under said LOI 474 (Rollo, p. 111). Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect (Rizal Empire Ins. Group and/or Corpus, Sergio v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 73140, May 29, 1987). The main thrust of this petition is that the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan without first expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value thereof before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs, is invalid and unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Rollo, p. 4). The issue of the constitutionality of the taking of private property under the CARP Law has already been settled by this Court holding that where the measures under challenge merely prescribe the retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power by the government, but where to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, then there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any branch or official of the government (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 373 [1989]). It must be stressed, however, that the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer (Section 2, P.D. No. 816; Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990). This Court has therefore clarified, that it is only compliance with the prescribed conditions which entitles the farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding a right which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy. At best the farmer/grantee prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding (Ibid.). Under the foregoing principles, a reading of Section 16 (d) of the CARP law will readily show that it does not suffer from arbitrariness which makes it constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, such determination of just compensation by the DAR, as earlier stated is by no means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party for Section 16 (f) clearly provides: "Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation." For obvious reasons, the determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra, pp. 380-382). Indeed, the delay in the preparation of the proper certification by the MAR field office to the Court of Agrarian Relations as to whether or not the case was proper for trial, is unfortunate and the officer concerned is under investigation (Rollo,

pp. 4142). It will, however, be observed that from the outset under P.D. No. 27, the tenant-farmer as of October 21, 1972 has already been deemed in a certain sense, to be the owner of a portion of land, subject of course, to certain conditions (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra p. 390). In fact, it appears that petitioner Magana was not unaware that the land in question previous to the filing of the CAR case on October 20, 1977, had already been identified as subject of land transfer. It also appears that on September 20, 1976 Paitan had already been identified to be cultivating the land to rice as tenant of petitioner and that his landholding was the subject of land tenure survey and was found to be proper for OLT coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 (Rollo, pp. 41-42). In any event, as already discussed, the proceedings herein are merely preliminary and petitioner Magana is not without protection. Should she fail to agree on the price of her land as fixed by the DAR, she can bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction. Likewise, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED without prejudice to petitioner's filing of the proper action for the determination of just compensation in the proper forum. SO ORDERED.

Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000 FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

G.R. No. 134958

January 31, 2001

PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City, respondents. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Before us is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on March 25, 1998 and the order dated August 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43930, a petition for prohibition originally filed with the appellate court to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing DENR Special Order Nos. 31, as amended by 31-A and 31-B, series of 1990, Special Order No. 25, series of 1993 and all other administrative issuances relative thereto, for having been issued without prior legislative authority.1wphi1.nt In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order no. 311 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region". The special task force created thereunder was authorized to accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral and claims within the said area, and after due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles (Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim) in accordance with existing laws.2 On January 15, 1993 the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 253 entitled "Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide" and Department Administrative Order no. 02,4 containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25. In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Also pursuant to the assailed administrative issuances the Heirs of Apeng Carantes filed an application5 for certification of ancestral land claim over a parcel of land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the petitioners. Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been issued by the DENR in favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents issued by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land they applied for, including the portion occupied by herein petitioners. Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the improvements they introduced within the area they actually occupy and if not for the petitioner's timely resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would have been totally evicted therefrom. Hence, this petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing the assailed administrative issuances and from processing the application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes on the ground that the said administrative issuances are void for lack of legal basis. The Court of Appeals6 held that the assailed DENR Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the National Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect "for pre-empting legislative prerogative" but sustained the validity of DENR Special Order No. 25, and its implementing rules (DAO No. 02, series of 1993) by the appellate court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers delegated to the DENR under section 13 of RA 7586, which reads: "Section 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights over Them. Ancestral lands and customary rights and interest arising therefrom shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral lands within protected areas: Provided, that the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent: Provided, however, that

all rules and regulations, whether adversely affecting said communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and hearing to be participated in by members of concerned indigenous community."7 The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review of the appellate court's decision on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Special Order No. 25 and its implementing rules. The petitioners seek to enjoin the respondent DENR from processing the application for certificate of ancestral land claim filed by the Heirs of Carantes. Petitioners contend that in addition to the failure of the DENR to publish the assailed administrative issuances in a newspaper of general circulation prior to its implementation, RA 7586, which provides for the creation of a National Integrated Protected Areas System, does not contain the slightest implication of a grant of authority to the DENR to adjudicate or confer title over lands occupied by indigenous communities. It is contended that the said law only grants DENR administrative and managerial powers over designated national and natural parks called "protected areas" wherein rare and endangered species of plants and animals inhabit.8 The petitioners further allege that the subsequent passage of in 1997 of Republic Act 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, wherein the power to evaluate and issue certificates of ancestral land titles is vested in the National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous People (NCIP) is unmistakable indication of the legislature's withholding of authority from the DENR to confer title over lands occupied by indigenous communities.9 Finally, the petitioners claim that the validity of the questioned DENR special orders cannot be based on the constitutional provisions regarding the protection of cultural communities as the said provisions are policy statements to guide the legislature in the exercise of their lawmaking powers and by themselves are not self-executory. The Solicitor-General filed memorandum in behalf of the respondent DENR praying for the affirmance of the appellate court's decision. The respondent argues that the subject DENR special orders were issued pursuant to the powers granted by RA 7586 to the DENR to protect the socio-economic interests of indigenous peoples. The land occupied by the petitioners is within a "protected area" as defined by the said law and is well within the jurisdiction of the DENR. The respondent likewise claims that the petitioners are estopped from contesting the validity of the DENR administrative issuances considering that their relatives applied for certificates of ancestral land claim (CALC) under the said special orders which applications were, however, denied. The petitioners should not be allowed to challenge the same administrative orders which they themselves previously invoked. The respondents do not contest the ruling of the appellate court as regards the nullity of Special Order no. 31, as amended. The sole issue before us concerns the validity of DENR Special Order no. 25, series of 1993 and its implementing rules DAO no. 02. The petitioners' main contention is that the assailed administrative orders were issued beyond the jurisdiction or power of the DENR secretary under the NIPAS Act of 1992. They seek to enjoin the respondents from processing the application for ancestral land claim filed by the heirs of Carantes because if approved, the petitioners may be evicted from the portion of the land they occupy which overlaps the land applied for by the Carantes heirs. From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground. We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioners' memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land. As the undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners' asserted right to possess the land by reason by the implementation of the questioned administrative issuances. A justiciable controversy has been defined as, "a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest"10 which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.11 Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of

speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot.12Subject to certain well-defined exceptions13 courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity.14 In the case of PACU vs. Secretary of Education15 the petition contesting the validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually operating under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit might be denied them in the future. This Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does not amount to a justiciable controversy. The questioned regulation in the PACU case may be questioned by a private school whose permit to operate has been revoked or one whose application therefor has been denied.16 This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR. The petitioners' allegation that certain documents from the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR or its officers authorized the attempted eviction. Suffice it to say that by the petitioners own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of Carantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as the DENR may or may not approve Carantes' application. Until such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at some future time. Borrowing from the pronouncements of this Court in the PACU case, "They (the petitioners) have suffered no wrong under the terms of the lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain."17 If indeed the heirs of Carantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the petitioners possession thereof even without prior approval by the DENR of the claim of the heirs of Carantes, the case is simply one for forcible entry. Wherefore, for lack of justiciable controversy, the decision of the appellate court is hereby set aside. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 31688 : December 17, 1990.] 192 SCRA 296 DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Second Judicial District and ABRA INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

FERNAN, J.:

The center of controversy in the instant petition for review on Certiorari is a limestone-rich 70-hectare land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectares of which are, according to petitioners, within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity), a duly registered corporation established for the purpose of setting up a cement factory, claims on the other hand, to be the owner in fee simple of the whole 70-hectare area indicated in survey plans PSU-217518, PSU-217519 and PSU-217520 with a total assessed value of P6,724.48. Thus, on September 23, 1965, it filed in the then Court of First Instance of Abra an application for registration in its name of said parcels of land under the Land Registration Act or, in the alternative, under Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 1 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-in-interest had allegedly been in possession thereof since July 26, 1894. 2 The requisite publication and posting of notice having been complied with, the application was set for hearing. Except for the Director of Lands, nobody appeared to oppose the application. Hence, the court issued an order of default against the whole world except the Director of Lands. After the applicant had rested its case, the provincial fiscal, appearing for the Director of Lands, submitted evidence supporting the opposition filed by the Solicitor General to the effect that AIC had no registerable title and that the highly mineralized parcels of land applied for were within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve which had not yet been released as alienable and disposable land pursuant to the Public Land Law. On July 22, 1966, the lower court 3 favorably acted on the application and ordered the registration of the parcels of land under the Land Registration Act. It ruled that although said land was within the forest zone, the opposition of the Director of Lands was not well-taken because the Bureau of Forestry, thru the District Forester of Abra, "offered no objection to exclude the same area from the forest reserve." 4 It found that the parcels of land had been acquired by purchase and AIC's possession thereof, including that of its predecessors-in-interest, had been for forty-nine (49) years. The Director of Lands, through the provincial fiscal, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that except for a 4-hectare area, the land covered by PSU-217518, 217519 and 217520 fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929; that although it had been denuded, it was covered with massive, corraline, tufaceous limestone estimated to yield 200,000,000 metric tons about a fifth of which was suitable for the manufacture of high grade portland cement type and that the limestone, being 250 meters thick, could yield 10,000 bags of cement a day for 1,000 years. 5 He contended that, while the land could be reclassified as mineral land under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, the process of exclusion from the Cordillera Forest Reserve had not yet been undertaken pursuant to Sec. 1826 of Republic Act No. 3092 and therefore it was still part of the forest zone which was inalienable under the 1935 Constitution. AIC having filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration, the lower court denied it on September 28, 1967 holding that the grounds raised therein were relevant and proper only if the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Mines were parties to the case. It added that the motion for intervention filed by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Mines was improper in land registration cases. 6

The Director of Lands filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for having been filed out of time. 7 Hence, on December 22, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decrees Nos. 118198, 118199 and 118200 for the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of AIC. Within one year from the issuance of said decrees or on May 22, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, invoking Section 38 of Act No. 496, filed in the Court of First Instance of Abra a petition for review of the decrees of registration and the lower court's decision of July 22, 1966. The Solicitor General alleged that although the evidence presented by AIC showed that it had purchased from individual owners only a total area of 24 hectares, the application included 46 hectares of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and therefore AIC "employed actual fraud" which misled the court "to error in finding the applicant to have a registerable title over the parcels of land subject of the application." 8 On November 27, 1969, the lower court 9 denied the petition on the ground that if, as alleged by the Solicitor General, then presiding Judge Macario M. Ofilada was mistaken in appreciating the evidence presented, the judicial error was "not synonymous with actual fraud." 10 Without asking for a reconsideration of said order, on February 25, 1970, the Solicitor General, representing the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and the Republic of the Philippines, filed the present petition for review on Certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440.:-cralaw The petition was forthwith given due course by the Court 11 but inasmuch as no action was taken on their prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the petitioners filed a motion reiterating said prayer. Finding the motion meritorious, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the private respondent and its agents and representatives "from further acts of possession and disposition to innocent purchasers for value of the parcels of land involved" in this case. 12 AIC filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on the grounds that it raises "unsubstantial" issues and that it was filed out of time. The motion was denied by the Court 13 but it bears pointing out that AIC's second ground for dismissal, which is premised on its perception that a motion for reconsideration of the order of November 27, 1969 is necessary before the filing of the instant petition, is incorrect. A motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a prerequisite to an appeal, petition for review or a petition for review on Certiorari. 14 The reglementary period for filing the petition for review on Certiorari in the instant case was thirty (30) days from notice of the order or judgment subject of review 15 which period, parenthetically, is now fifteen (15) days pursuant to Section 39 of the Judiciary Act of 1980. 16 Petitioners having been granted a total of sixty (60) days 17 within which to file the petition, the same was timely filed. Petitioners herein contend that the lower court erred in granting the application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that they are within the forest zone. The District Forester's failure to object to the exclusion of the area sought to be registered from the forest reserve was not enough justification for registration because under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the power to exclude an area from the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and not the District Forester or even the Director of Forestry. Petitioners also contend that the lower court erred in denying the petition for review based on actual fraud because under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a decree of registration may be reviewed not only by reason of actual fraud but also for a fatal infirmity of the decision upon which the decree is based, provided no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced. We find the petition to be meritorious. Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated by this Court in Director of Forestry vs. Muoz 18 and consistently adhered to in a long line of cases 19 the more recent of which is Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 20 that forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties. This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions but also in the 1987 Constitution Article XIII of which provides that: "Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal . . . , forests or timber, . . . and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."

Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the land must first be released from its classification as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land in accordance with the certification issued by the Director of Forestry as provided for by Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code. 21 This is because the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and not of the courts. 22 Moreover, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 23 Being the interested party, an applicant for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 24 In this case, AIC asserts that the land in dispute is no longer part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because the communal forest in Bucay, Abra which had been established in 1909 by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-298, had been "cancelled and de-established" by Forestry Administrative Order No. 2-622 dated October 1, 1965 and issued by then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano. 25 AIC therefore tries to impress upon the Court the fact that as there was no longer a forested area, the same area had become alienable more so because its actual occupants, who had been devoting it to agriculture, had relinquished their rights over it in favor of AIC "to give way for greater economic benefits for the people in the locality." 26 It should be emphasized, however, that the classification of the land as forest land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. 27 Hence, the fact that the contested parcels of land have long been denuded and actually contains rich limestone deposits does not in any way affect its present classification as forest land.: nad While it is true that under Section 1839 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, may change the location of a communal forest, such executive action does not amount to a declassification of a forest reserve into an alienable or disposable land. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, 28 it is no less than the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 29 The President shall also declare from time to time what lands are open to disposition or concession. 30 AIC therefore, should prove first of all that the lands it claims for registration are alienable or disposable lands. As it is, AIC has not only failed to prove that it has a registerable title but more important]y, it failed to show that the lands are no longer a part of the public domain. The petitioners therefore validly insisted on the review of the decision ordering the issuance of the decree of registration in view of its patent infirmity. The lower court closed its eyes to a basic doctrine in land registration cases that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public domain nullifies the title. 31 Its decision to order the registration of an inalienable land in favor of AIC under the misconception that it is imperative for the Director of Forestry to object to its exclusion from the forest reserve even in the face of its finding that indeed a sizable portion of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve is involved, cannot be allowed to stay unreversed. It betrays an inherent infirmity which must be corrected.:-cralaw WHEREFORE, the order of November 27, 1969 denying the petition for review under Section 38 of Act No. 496 and the decision of July 22, 1966 insofar as it orders the registration of land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued on April 7, 1970 is hereby made permanent. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127296 January 22, 1998 EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ, NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, J.F. FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power Corporation), respondents.

PUNO, J.: Before us is a petition to affirm the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, which was reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision 1 dated June 20, 1996 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 45466. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on November 15, 1996. 2 The facts show that on June 26, 1969, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 573 3withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of the public domain denominated as follows: Parcel No. 1. Magat River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 2 Chico River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 3 Abulug River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 4 Penaranda River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 5 Angat River-Bustos Dam Forest Reserve Parcel No. 6 Ambayawan River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 7 Umiray River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 8 Kaliwa River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 9 Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve Parcel No. 10 Barit River-Lake Buhi Forest Reserve Parcel No. 11 Jalaur River Forest Reserve They were primarily for use as watershed area. Their development was to be undertaken by the Bureau of Forestry, with the cooperation of, among other government agencies, the National Power Corporation (Napocor). Located in Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna with an area of Twenty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Seven (29,707) square meters, and bearing the following boundaries: North National Power Corporation South Road and Baldomero Halili

West National Power Corporation East National Power Corporation the parcel of land subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit admission, 4 within Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. More than three years after the land was segregated as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, or on January 9, 1973, petitioner Edubigis Gordula, a native of Cavinti, Laguna, filed with the Bureau of Lands, an Application 5 for a Free Patent over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several others also filed free patent applications covering other parcels of land in the area. On February 5, 1973, petitioner Gordula declared the land for taxation purposes in his name as shown in Tax Declaration No. 0429. The Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands referred the free patent applications of petitioner Gordula, Fernandez, and several others to Mr. Ravanal Ravanzo, then the General Manager of the Napocor. Mr. Ravanzo responded through the following letter: October 24, 1973 The Director Regional Lands Office No. IV 757 Gen. Solano St. San Miguel, Manila Sir: This refers to the Free Patent Application[s] of Manuel Fernandez, et al., of Barrio Talaongan, Cavinti, Laguna, which were referred to this Office for clearance it having been found that they are within the Caliraya-Lumot Watershed Reservation under Proclamation No. 573 dated June 26, 1969. Investigation conducted by this Office reveals that applicants have sufficient ground to establish "priority rights" over the areas claimed and that agricultural improvements introduced thereon are not detrimental to the watershed. In view thereof, this Office interpose[s] no objection to the application by the applicants contained in your letter dated October 2, 1973. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) R.R. RAVANZO General Manager On December 10, 1973, petitioner Gordula had the land surveyed; Survey Plan No. F(IV-5) 949-D under his name was approved by the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, Mr. Amundo Munda, a Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, conducted the requisite investigations.

On January 17, 1974, petitioner Gordula's Application for Free Patent was approved. Free Patent No. 693 was issued in his name. On January 30, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued, on the basis of Free Patent No. 693, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 in the name of petitioner Gordula. He declared the land anew for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6498. He paid its real estate taxes from 1975 to 1979. In the meantime, respondent Republic, through the Napocor, contracted the Certeza Surveying Company to survey the area constituting the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. The survey plans were approved by the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands on October 27, 1975. The said survey plans, as well as the Cadastral Map of Talaongan and the Geological Plan of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, show that petitioner Gordula's land is located in the saddle area of the watershed recreation for the hydro-electric reservoir. On January 22, 1979, petitioner Gordula sold the land to petitioner Celso V. Fernandez, Jr. for six thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The Register of Deeds of Laguna cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and issued, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-85445 in the name of petitioner Fernandez, Jr. The latter declared the land for taxation purposes in his name. On March 12, 1979, Fernandez, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the land in favor of petitioner Celso A. Fernandez for six thousand five hundred pesos (P6,500.00). Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-85445 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85594 was issued on March 21, 1979 in the name of petitioner Fernandez. As approved by the Bureau of Lands in Psd-Plan 04-014230, petitioner Fernandez subdivided the land into nine (9) lots. On August 16, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102492 to 102500 in his name covering the nine (9) subdivision lots. On August 29, 1985, he sold the lots to petitioner Nora Ellen Estrellado for twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00). Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102492 to 102500 were cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-103404 to T-103412 were issued to petitioner Estrellado. On October 17, 1986, petitioner Estrellado mortgaged to petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) four 6 (4) of the (9) lots. Another lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 103408, was sold to petitioner J.F. Festejo Company, Inc. to whom was issued, in lieu of the former, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106495. On July 16, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 224 7 vesting in the Napocor "complete jurisdiction, control and regulation" over the "Caliraya-Lumot Watershed Reservation as covered by Proclamation No. 573". On July 26, 1987, Mr. Antonio Aquino, Jr., the Civil Security Officer of the Cavinti reservoir complex, sent a Memorandum to the President of the Napocor informing him of the fences and roads being constructed in the saddle area, more particularly, in the lots sold by petitioner Fernandez to petitioner Estrellado. On July 28, 1987, Mr. A. Coronado, the Manager of the Cavinti reservoir complex, asked petitioner Fernandez to remove all the improvements made in the Estrellado lots. In reply, petitioner Fernandez claimed that the roads being constructed would not adversely affect the reservoir area in case of heavy floods because the Estrellado lots were elevated at a height of around fifty (50) feet.

In view of petitioner Fernandez's, refusal, the Napocor assigned two (2) security guards over the lot. The guards ordered the construction workers to leave their posts and barred their return without permission from the Napocor. On October 18, 1987, petitioner Fernandez, as attorney-in-fact and counsel of petitioner Estrellado, wrote to the President of the Napocor threatening to file a multi-million damage suit if the guards were not removed within fifteen (15) days. On November 18, 1987, respondent Republic, through the Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of Free Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. 8 On January 29, 1988, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). On December 28, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against plaintiff: (1) Dismissing plaintiff's complaint and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case; (2) Ordering National Power Corporation to pay defendant Celso A. Fernandez P300,000.00 as actual damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees; and With costs against the plaintiff. SO ORDERED. 9 Respondent Republic, through the Napocor, elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On June 20, 1996, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled against petitioners. It held, inter alia, viz: The kernel and primal issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not Free Patent No. IV-5 (693) and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 and all derivative titles thereafter issued to the Appellees . . . are null and void. The Appellant avers that the parcel of land covered by the aforesaid Free Patent issued to Gordula is a portion of the vast track of land reserved by former President Marcos as permanent forest under Proclamation No. 573 dated June 26, 196[9] . . . and hence, non-disposable and inalienable, pursuant to Section 88 in relation to Section 83 of Commonwealth Act [No.] 141, as amended. In contrast the Court a quo dismissed Appellant's complaint, in the light of the exclusionary clause in Proclamation No. 573 . . . that the setting up of the permanent forest reserves over the Caliraya-Lumot Watershed area was "subject to private rights" if there be any and the letter-clearance of the then General Manager of [Napocor] . . . dated October 24, 1973, interposing no objection to the Application for a free patent of Manuel Fernandez, et al. xxx xxx xxx We are convinced, beyond cavil, that the parcel of land subject of the Free Patent issued to Gordula on January 17, 1974 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1405 issued on January 30, 1974 . . . as the two (2) parcels of land purportedly purchased by the [Republic] from Perez and Glorioso in 1941, were public disposable and alienable lands before the issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation No. 573, on June 26, 196[9] . . . The property was, however, later reserved, under Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June 26, 196[9]. Since then, the property became nondisposable and inalienable public land. . . .

xxx xxx xxx At the time Gordula filed his application for a Free Patent, on January 9, 1973, the parcel of land . . . was already reserved as a permanent forest under Proclamation No. 573. Since the property was already a forest reservation as of June 26, 196[9], the same could no longer be disposed of or alienated in favor of private individuals . . . . xxx xxx xxx We do not agree with Appellees' and the Court a quo's pose that Gordula's property was exempt from the application of Proclamation No. 573 because, by express provision thereof, the reservation was "subject to private rights, if there be any" . . . . Appellees failed to adduce proof that, as of June 26, 196[9], Gordula had acquired ownership or title to the aforesaid property either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State by operation of law for that matter such as for instance, alienable public land held by a possessor personally, or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed period of thirty (30) years, is converted into private property by mere lapse of period ipso jure . . . . In the present recourse, Gordula, as of 196[9], had been in possession of the property for only [twenty-five (25) years] years since 1944 when he commenced, as can be gleaned from his application . . . for a free patent, possession of the property. The period of Gordula's occupancy after 196[9] should not be tacked to the period from 1944 because by then the property was not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. . . . xxx xxx xxx The Appellees cannot find refuge in the letter of the then General Manager of [Napocor], Ravanal Ravanzo, on October 24, 1973 . . . . In the first place, Ravanzo made no explicit and unequivocal statement, in said letter, that Gordula had priority rights to the property. What he merely declared was that "applicants have sufficient ground to establish priority rights over the areas claimed . . ." . Even if it may be conceded, for the nonce, that indeed, Ravanzo declared that Gordula had priority rights over the property claimed by him, such declaration is irrefragably erroneous. Munda and the Director of Lands erred in recommending the approval of Gordula's application in the same manner that the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in issuing the patent to Gordula. But then, well-settled is the doctrine, enunciated by the Supreme Court, in a catena of cases, that the State cannot be bound and estopped by the errors or mistakes of its agents or officials . . . . The General Manager of the Appellant is not vested with authority to allow the occupancy or acquisition, by private individuals, of such properties, whether still needed by the Appellant or not, reserved by the President of the Philippines for permanent forests. Only the President or [the] Congress, by statutory fiat, can revert the property to the disposable or alienable portion of the public domain. Anent Appellees' plea that they are buyers of the property in good faith, they must harken to the Decision of the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 148 SCRA 480 that: . . . even assuming that the transferees are innocent purchasers for value, their titles to said lands derived from the titles of private respondents which were not validly issued as they cover lands still a part of the public domain, may be cancelled. . . .

We do not agree with Appellees' claim that Appellant's suit was barred by prescription and by the purported indefeasibility of their title. Prescription, basically, does not run against the State. The right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully acquired property is not barred by prescription nor by the perceived indefeasibility of Appellees' title for that matter. . . . 10 Thus states the dispositive portion of the decision of respondent appellate court: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another Decision is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Free Patent No. IV-5-693 and Original Certificate of Title No. P1405 issued under the name of Edubigis Gordula and all derivative titles issued to the Appellees are hereby declared null and void; 2. The parcel of land covered by said titles is hereby declared reverted to the Government under the jurisdiction, control and supervision of the [Napocor] under Executive Order No. 224 of former President Corazon C. Aquino; 3. The Appellees and all those acting for and in their behalf are hereby prohibited from intruding into and disturbing the Appellant of its possession and dominion of the subject property; [and] 4. Appellees' counterclaims are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 11 Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds: FIRST RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS WITHIN THE LANDS BOUGHT BY THE NPC EITHER FROM GERONIMO PEREZ ON MARCH 10, 1941 AND/OR FROM CELERINO GLORIOSO ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1941; SECOND ON [sic] THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF PAGE 19 UP TO PAGE 23, LAST PAGE OF THE DECISION, THE RESPONDENT COURT WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE WHICH RESULTED [IN THE] REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT . . . ; THIRD THE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE IN CONFLICT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE RESPONDENT COURT CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER EDUBIGIS GORDULA HAD ACQUIRED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" ON THE SUBJECT LAND,WHICH IS AN EXCEPTION UNDER PROCLAMATION NO. 573. HENCE, THIS CASE IS A QUESTION OF FACTS AND OF LAW . . . ; FOURTH THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS WITHIN THE AREA OF PROCLAMATION NO. 573. HOWEVER THE RESPONDENT [COURT] GRAVELY ERRED TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT WENT TO THE EXTENT OF DISCUSSING ON [sic] THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND INVESTIGATION RELATIVE

TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE TO PETITIONER EDUBIGIS GORDULA AND AFTERWARD DECLARED THAT GORDULA WHO HAS A TITLE ON THE SUBJECT LAND HAS NOT ACQUIRED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" ON THE LAND DESPITE OF [sic] THE FACT THAT SAID RESPONDENT COURT IS ALREADY PRECLUDED FROM DISCUSSING THE FACTS RELATIVE ON [sic] THE ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, MORE SO ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION IS [sic] AGAINST THE LAW, JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS IS AGAINST THE RULING IN ESPINOSA VS. MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA VS.SINGSON ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL. 440; and FIFTH THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THEN GENERAL MANAGER RAVANZO OF NPC AND UNDERSECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN ISSUING THE PATENT TO PETITIONER GORDULA. THIS IS AGAINST THE RULING IN ESPINOSA VS. MAKALINTAL, 79 PHIL. 134 and ORTUA VS. SINGSON ENCARNACION, 5[9] PHIL. 440. 12 We affirm the Court of Appeals. We start with the proposition that the sovereign people, represented by their lawfully constituted government, have untrammeled dominion over the forests on their native soil. Forest lands, being the self-replenishing, versatile and all-important natural resource that they are, need to be reserved and saved to promote the people's welfare. By their very nature 13 or by executive or statutory fiat, they are outside the commerce of man, unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form, 14 and inconvertible into any character less than of inalienable public domain, regardless of their actual state, for as long as the reservation subsists and is not revoked by a subsequent valid declassification. 15 Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated by this Court in Director of Forestry vs. Munoz and consistently adhered to in a long line of cases the more recent of which is Republic vs. Court Appeals, that forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties. This ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution but also in the 1987 Constitution. 16 Petitioners do not contest the nature of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable and indisposable. Its control was vested in the NAPOCOR under E.O. No. 224. Petitioners, however, contend that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the subject land. We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of the title from the state. 17 The facts show that petitioner Gordula, did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good. Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights", in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant "had occupied and cultivated the property for so may number of years, declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuos, open and unmolested and recognized by the government". 18 Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession

required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the "private rights" recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573. The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands v. Reyes, 19 we held that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to exclude his land from a military or forest reservation must show ". . . by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by [any] . . . means for the acquisition of public lands". In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C. A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession. 20 Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor. 21 The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 22 In the case at bar, petitioners have failed to comply with the mandatory 30-year period of possession. Their 25year possession of the land prior to its reservation as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve cannot be considered compliance with C.A. No. 141, as amended. The Court has no authority to lower this requirement for it cannot amend the law. Next, petitioners contend that their "private rights" have been recognized by the government itself. They point to (1) the letter dated October 24, 1973 of then NAPOCOR General Manager, Ravanal Ravanzo, (2) the action of the Bureau of Lands which after investigation, declared him qualified to acquire the land; and (3) the Free Patent issued on January 17, 1974 by the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, by authority of the President of the Philippines. Petitioners urge that the findings and conclusions of the aforementioned government agencies and/or officers are conclusive and binding upon the courts, as held in the cases of Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion 23 and Espinosa v. Makalintal. 24 The submissions are unconvincing. In the first place, there is nothing in Espinosa v. Makalintal that is relevant to petitioners' claims. On the other hand, our ruling in Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion that "a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts," 25 was made subject to the categorical caveat "in the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake". 26 Undoubtedly, then General Manager Ravanzo erred in holding that petitioner Gordula "ha[d] sufficient ground to establish 'priority rights' over the areas claimed". This error mothered the subsequent error of the Bureau of Lands which culminated in the erroneous grant of a free patent on January 17, 1974. The perpetration of these errors does not have the effect of converting a forest reserve into public alienable land. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.27 To be sure, the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio. 28 Nor can the mistake or error of its officials or agents in this regard be invoked against the government. 29 Finally, the conversion of a forest reserve into public alienable

land, requires no less than a categorical act of declassification by the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 30There is none such in this case. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is HEREBY DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

CONCURRING OPINION TEEHANKEE, C.J.: The judgment of the Court invalidates Presidential Decrees numbered 1669 and 1670 which unilaterally proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog Apog area as expropriated without further recourse, for being violative of the due process and eminent domain provisions of the Constitution in the particulars stated in the opinion ably penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez. This is in line with my concurring and dissenting opinion in the six-to-five decision in J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration wherein the Congress through Republic Act No. 2616 "authorized the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate" comprising about 109 hectares in Quezon City for subdivision into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. I concurred with the tenuous majority's ruling there setting aside the lower court's ruling granting therein petitionerappellee's petition to prohibit respondents-appellees from instituting proceedings for expropriation of the "Tatalon Estate" as specifically authorized by R.A. 2616, with the result that the expropriation proceedings could then be properly filed but subject to such proper and valid objections and defenses to the action as petitioner-owner may raise. I dissented, however, from the majority ruling, insofar as it held that the constitutional power of Congress for the expropriation of lands is well-nigh all embracing and forecloses the courts from inquiring into the necessity for the taking of the property. I noted that "this is the first case where Congress has singled out a particular property for condemnation under the constitutional power conferred upon it. Does this square with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution? Is the explanatory note of the bill later enacted as Republic Act 2616, without any evidence as to a hearing with the affected parties having been given the opportunity to be heard, and citing merely the population increase of Quezon City and the land-for-the-landless program sufficient compliance with these basic constitutional guarantees? Rather, does not the need for a more serious scrutiny as to the power of Congress to single out a particular piece of property for expropriation, acknowledged in the main opinion, call for judicial scrutiny, with all the facts in, as to the need for the expropriation for full opportunity to dispute the legislative appraisal of the matter?" I added that there were prejudicial questions raised which could only be threshed out in trial court proceedings, (and not in the special civil action filed with the Court to set aside the trial court's declaring of unconstitutionality of the questioned Expropriation Act), viz., with therein petitioner maintaing that only 11.68% or less than 39 hectares of its Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (of which the "Tatalon Estate" formed part) remained unsold; that existing contractual rights acquired by vendors and purchasers of subdivided lots should be accorded the appropriate constitutional protection of non-impairment; and that in view of the cardinal principle of eminent domain for payment of just compensation of the market value of the land "respondents may well consider that the objectives of the Act may be accomplished more expeditiously by a direct purchase of the available unsold lots for resale at cost to the remaining bona fide occupants in accordance with the Act's provisions or by extending financial assistance to enable them to purchase directly the unsold lots from petitioner. I do not see anything to be gained by respondents from the institution of expropriation proceedings, when petitioner-owner is actually selling the property in subdivided lots." The judgment at bar now clearly overturns the majority ruling in Tuason that "the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of "expropriation", must be duly recognized, leaving only as "a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow." The Court now clearly rules that such singling out of properties to be expropriated by Presidential Decree as in the case at bar, or by act of the legislature as in Tuason, does not foreclose judicial scrutiny and determination as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal protection, and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. As we hold now expressly in consonance with my abovequoted separate opinion in Tuason: "To enjoin this Court by decree from looking into alleged violations of the due process, equal protection, and eminent domain clauses of the Constitution is impermissible encroachment on its independence and prerogatives." As in

all eminent domain proceedings, the State may not capriciously or arbitrarily single out specific property for condemnation and must show the necessity of the taking for public use. 31 SCRA 413, 506 (1970), The majority judgment with Fernando, ponente, was concurred in by Zaldivar, Sanchez, Barredo and Villamor, JJ. with Makalintal, J. concurring in the result. Concepcion, C.J. and Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ. concurred in my separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Idem, at page 509 Idem, at page 511 Idem, at page 436 Art. III, Bill of Rights, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution Idem, Section 9 Majority Opinion, at page 23

G.R. No. 84647. May 23, 1991] MARIA ALICIA LEUTERIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF BENITO LEUTERIO, respondents. DECISION NARVASA, J.: Petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural daughter of Ana Maglanque and Pablo Leuterio, having been conceived at the time when her parents were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other; that the evidence presented by her before the Probate court after her natural father's death, was adequate basis for a judicial declaration of the compulsory recognition of her status as said Pablo Leuterio's natural child; and that, therefore, she must be deemed to have been legitimated by the marriage of her parents some nine years after her birth. However, neither the Trial Court nor the Court of Appeals accorded credit to the proofs submitted by her to prove that she had indeed been recognized by Pablo Leuterio in his lifetime as his daughter. Indeed, not only did the former pronounce Maria Alicia's evidence as insufficient to establish her cause, "unhesitatingly" rejecting in the process certain documents introduced by Maria Alicia Leuterio as "being forged ** and incompetent ** ," it also declared that "there are facts and circumstances established by the evidence on record which consistently and clearly indicate that the late Pablo Leuterio desisted to acknowledge Maria Alicia Leuterio as his own child with Ana Maglanque." Maria Alicia is now before this Court in a third attempt to persuade acceptance of her theory. The antecedents are largely undisputed. Pablo Leuterio died in San Luis, Pampanga on June 15, 1950, leaving a large estate consisting of several parcels of land in Pampanga. His widow, Ana Maglanque -- who had been one of his domestic servants and later his mistress, and whom he had married a few months before his death, more precisely, on February 25, 1950 -- took possession of his estate and administered it. On July 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for her appointment as guardian of Maria Alicia Leuterio, then 16 years of age, alleged to be the legitimated daughter of said Pablo Leuterio. On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, a brother of Pablo Leuterio of the full blood, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the decedent's intestate estate in the same Court of First Instance of Pampanga, praying for his appointment as administrator. Benito Leuterio's petition pertinently alleged that Pablo Leuterio had died without leaving a will; that he was survived, not only by said Benito Leuterio, but also by: a) the children of Elena Leuterio, deceased, sister of the full blood of the decedent, namely: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) Consolacion Apostol Jose Apostol Patrocinio Apostol Consejo Apostol Luis Apostol Jesus Apostol and Margarito Apostol;

b) Vicente D. Leuterio, the son of Gregoria Leuterio, also deceased, and also a sister of the full blood of Pablo Leuterio; that Pablo Leuterio died a widower; and that the claim of Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of the decedent, that the latter had left a legitimate daughter, supra, was "without foundation in fact and in law."

The petition was opposed by Ana Maglanque and Maria Alicia Leuterio (the latter being represented by the above named Patrocinio Apostol). After hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglanque administratrix of Pablo Leuterio's estate. The event leading directly to the appellate proceedings at bar was the filing in the settlement proceeding by Maria Alicia Leuterio on October 19, 1962 of a pleading entitled "Assertion of Rights," in which she averred that she was the only forced heir of Pablo Leuterio and therefore entitled to succeed to the latter's entire estate, subject only to the rights accorded by law to her mother, Ana Maglanque. In respect of this claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and issues, as regards the celebration and the validity of the marriage of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque; the identity of the decedent's relatives by consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's estate as being "his own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore, his capital;" and that the only issues left for determination were: 1) "whether Vicente Leuterio is the legitimate child of Gregoria Leuterio," and 2) "whether Maria Alicia Leuterio is the legitimated daughter of the late Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglanque **." Maria Alicia Leuterio thereafter filed an "Amended Petition for Confirmation of Acknowledgment and Legitimation," under date of December 4, 1962, in which she claimed that since her birth up to the death of Pablo Leuterio, she "was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the decedent and her mother," and detailed the facts that she considered as "confirming or establishing her possession of said status ** ," including the existence of "indubitable writings ** discovered only a month ago, wherein the decedent expressly acknowledged his being** (her) father **. The first issue was mooted by the withdrawal by Vicente Leuterio of his application as a prospective heir. Hence it was only as regards the second issue that trial was had and evidence presented by the parties. The issue was resolved by the Probate Court adversely to Maria Alicia Leuterio. By Order dated March 10, 1971, the Court dismissed "the petition for confirmation of acknowledgment and legitimation of Maria Alicia Leuterio * * for lack of basis and merit." As already stated, the Probate Court disbelieved Maria Alicia's evidence, after lengthy and extensive analysis thereof, considering it to be largely incompetent, spurious and unpersuasive. Maria Alicia's appeal from this Order of March 10, 1971 to the Court of Appeals met with failure. In a Decision promulgated on November 12, 1986, the Appellate Tribunal affirmed "the appealed order ** in all respects (as) being in full accord with the evidence and the laws." It overruled Maria Alicia's contentions that the Probate Court had erred 1) in rejecting (as spurious) Exhibit D, "which is the certificate of the record of birth of Maria Alicia Leuterio in the Civil Registry of San Luis, Pampanga;" 2) "in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of Gervacio Bagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and who are school teachers at the San Luis Elementary School where appellant Maria Alicia Leuterio was studying;" 3) "in holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in the form of a deposition appears to be in the form of an accommodation;" 4) in not declaring (on the basis of the evidence) that Maria Alicia Leuterio has been in the possession of the status of a natural child before and after the marriage of her parents * * ." The Court of Appeals said in part:

"In this case, the Court is not inclined to conclude that there was an express desire on the part of Pablo to recognize Maria Alicia as his natural child. As previously adverted to, the birth certificate, baptismal certificate and the photographs do not bear the signatures of Pablo expressing his acknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter with Ana Maglanque. Indeed, Maria Alicia is said to have been born, reared and raised in the house of Pablo. Appellees explain this by stating that Ana was a househelp in the house of Pablo. Pablo has no child with his previous wife, and it is not unusual if he looked upon Maria Alicia as if she were his own daughter in or outside his residence. Upon these considerations, the court a quo was correct in rejecting the testimonies of Dar Juan, Paula Punzalan and Gervacio Bagtas, and the deposition of Sotero Baluyut. With respect to Dar Juan, Punzalan and Bagtas, the lower court saw and observed their demeanor in the witness stand and objected to their vital claims. With respect to the testimony of Sotero Baluyut, petitioners admit that he and Pablo were very close friends. "What clinches the case in favor of appellees, to Our mind, is the absolute lack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment of school fees in the name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite the lapse of 9 years from the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his death in 1950. In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits that the Decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it was "clear and patent error" on its part 1) to surmise "that the action of the petitioner for legitimation is based on voluntary recognition," and 2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this case squarely on all fours with the case of Colorado et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985, although the action of herein petitioner is one for compulsory recognition and for legitimation." The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted. It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the Probate Court were aware of the precise nature of the petitioner's recourse: a judicial declaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition as Pablo Leuterio's natural child. The record discloses that the Probate Court went to some lengths to stress the distinction between voluntary and compulsory recognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identify the exact character of the remedy that she was seeking -- whether it be voluntary, or compulsory, recognition -- quoting in this connection, the exchange between the Judge and petitioner's attorney, which culminated in the latter's description of the desired relief as "not voluntary acknowledgment in the sense that the decedent did not execute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe that a public document is one of the evidence of compulsory acknowledgment." It said: "There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is the acknowledgment of a child by the father, made voluntarily; another is the action that should be instituted by the child against the father to compel the latter to acknowledge him as a natural child. The continuous possession of the status of a natural child, tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him. However, the action for this purpose should be brought within the periods of time prescribed in Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article 285 of the new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385)." The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at the time. In fact, it is consistent with the statement of the law attempted by petitioner's own distinguished counsel, citing Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38 Phil., 737, 738, viz.: "The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways: (a) by a voluntary recognition (Art, 131, civ. code); (2) by an involuntary recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action (Art. 135, Civ. Code; Art. 499, Pen. Code). "A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in the record of births; (b) by will; and (c) by any other public instrument. (Art. 131, Civil Code).

"An involuntary recognition of a natural child is made: (a) by an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of the father, justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art. 135, Civ. Code); and (c) by a criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction. (par. 2, art. 449, Pen. Code)." It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to have understood and applied the law to the case. As much is apparent from its declaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 must be precise, express and solemn (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 161), whether voluntary or compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2, Jan. 9, 1967)." Like the Probate Court, whose judgment it affirmed, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence failed to prove either the existence of "an incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity," or the "giving (to) such child (of) the status of a natural child of the father" conformably with Article 135 of the Civil Code of 1889. Hence, there was no factual basis on which to rest a declaration of involuntary recognition by Pablo Leuterio of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter. Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiar doctrine, conclusive on this Court and are not thus subject of review, specially where those findings are the same as those made by the Trial Court. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains in the case at bar. The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article 283 of the present (1950) Civil Code has no retroactive effect. That conclusion was no doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the same Code expressly accords such effect only to voluntary recognition thus by inference excluding compulsory recognition for the causes or under the circumstances enumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all" provision that recognition may be compelled if the child has in his favor "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father." While a contrary view, i.e., in favor of retroactivity, may find support in the excepting clause of Article 2253, also of the Civil Code, which gives effect to rights declared for the first time therein, though arising from acts done or events occurred under prior law provided no vested or acquired rights of the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there is little point in pursuing that question insofar as the resolution of this appeal is concerned. Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected in its entirety -- as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive and spurious -- petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo Leuterio. That rejection forecloses the claim of petitioner to either voluntary or compulsory recognition, be it made under the Civil Code of 1889 which was in force at the time of her asserted birth or, in the case of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article 283 of the present Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the door to "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment, Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence, sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when offered in a court of law, or strip the courts of their function and prerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests. Such evidence here having been found wanting after due assessment as already stated, petitioner's claim was properly denied. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, and the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding that of the Probate Court, is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109490. February 14, 1994] PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDUARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SPOUSES CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, SPOUSES CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, SPOUSES SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA, and LETICIA NOCON CHAN, respondents. DECISION VITUG, J.: This case involves several parcels of land, consisting of approximately 188,524 square meters, covered by various titles of ownership, located at Barrio Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila. On 11 July 1985, Firestone Ceramics, Inc. (Firestone), Boomtown Development Corporation (Boomtown), spouses Cynthia D. Ching and Ching Tiong Keng, spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong, spouses Soledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia, and Leticia Nocon Chan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila, a complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles against Patrocinio E. Margolles, Virginia E. Villongco, Edgardo C. Espinosa, Lucia E. Laperal, Norma E. Espinosa, Teresita E. Casal, Alice E. Sotto, Veronica Gana, and Equitable Banking Corporation. Also included among the defendants were the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. The complaint averred that the parcels of land in question were registered in the names of Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu under Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. A-S-47 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, which was issued pursuant to a decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6625, dated 22 July 1969, rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch II). On 04 February 1976, the property was subdivided by Gonzales and Espiritu into five (5) lots, resulting in the issuance of five (5) transfer certificates of title ("TCT"), to wit: (1) TCT No. S-21870 in the name of Ciriaco Guinto; (2) TCT No. L-21871 in the name of Benito Gonzales, married to Juana Raymundo; (3) TCT No. S-21872 in the name of Emeterio Espiritu, married to Dalmacia Trinidad; (4) TCT No. S-21873 in the name of Juan Dulas, married to Maria Dulas; and (5) TCT No. S-21874 in the name of Juan Dulas, married to Maria Dulas. On 27 February 1976, Juan and Maria Dulas conveyed the land covered by TCT No. S-21873 to Firestone; a new TCT No. S-23802 was thereupon issued to Firestone. On 02 March 1976, the same spouses sold the land covered by TCT No. S-21874 to Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ang Eng Chong in whose favor TCT No. 23801 was then obtained by transferees. On 02 August 1976, Gonzales conveyed the land covered by TCT No. L-21871 to Boomtown, and the latter thereby secured TCT No. S-32032. On 03 August 1976, Emeterio Espiritu sold his land covered by TCT No. S-21872 to Cynthia Ching and Ching Tiong Keng; accordingly, TCT No. S-32031 was issued in the name of the buyers. On 09 December 1976, Ciriaco Guinto conveyed the land covered by TCT No. 21870 to Soledad Yu and Leticia Nocon Chan and, following the transfer, the old title was substituted by TCT No. S-45414.

Months after plaintiffs took possession of the premises, the defendants demanded that the plaintiffs vacate the premises. Claiming ownership, the defendants, on their part, traced their titles from Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 issued to the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Ma. Juliana Carlos on 26 March 1929 pursuant to Decree No. 35183 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406. On 04 April 1956, OCT No. 4216 was cancelled and, in its place, TCT No. 43555 was issued to Lorenzo Gana and Veronica Gana married to Ramon Rodriguez. TCT No. 43555 was itself likewise cancelled (on the same day) and TCT No. 43556 was issued, this time in the name of Veronica Gana alone. On 13 August 1956, Veronica Gana sold the land to Patrocinio Margolles, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 46302. Margolles subdivided the property into seven (7) lots, each lot being covered, respectively, by TCTs No. 379913, No. 379914, No. 379915, No. 379916, No. 379917, No. 379918 and No. 379919. On 03 November 1972, Margolles sold 1/2 interest in the property to Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation and TCTs No. 382176, No. 382177, No. 382178, No. 382179, No. 382180, No. 382181 and No. 382182 were thereupon issued in the names of both Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation and Patrocinio Margolles. On 17 May 1973, Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation reconveyed its interest to the property to Patrocinio Margolles and, again, new TCTs No. 410535, No. 410536, No. 410537, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were issued in the name of the latter. Subsequently, TCTs No. 410536, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 were cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. S-17992 was issued to Peltan Development Corporation. Margolles subdivided the remaining parcels covered by TCTs No. 410535 and No. 410537 into fifteen (15) lots, each of which was titled in her name, i.e., TCTs No. S-16369 up to No. S-16383, inclusive. These titles, except TCTs No. S-16372 and No. S-16373 which were retained in her name, were later cancelled and transferred to her brother and sisters, her co-defendants and co-petitioners in the present case. The transferees Virginia Villongco and Norma Espinosa later mortgaged their own lots to Equitable Banking Corporation. The trial court, after the reception of evidence, rendered judgment, reading, in part: "x x x. Given the facts heretofore established indubitably by the evidence, the Court finds substantial legal basis to sustain plaintiff's ownership of the properties in dispute as clear and convincing proofs have been likewise adduced which proved their predecessors' clean and indefeasible titles and whose acquisition of the litigated areas have been duly recorded under conclusive documents and court records (Exhs. N, O, P, Q, R and Exhs. HHH, III, 0000 to 0000-6, PPPP, QQQQ, RRRR, and SSSS to SSSS-4). x x x. "The defendants, on the other hand, failed to adduce sufficient and satisfactory evidence that would clearly and convincing(ly) establish the validity and authenticity of the original copy of their predecessors OCT No. 4216 (and the owner's duplicate copy) which they exhibited in Court, even as the same actually exist and on file in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. x x x. Besides, the record of Land Registration Case No. 672, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406 (allegedly the basis for the issuance of OCT No. 4216 of Lorenzo Gana, et. al.) was never exhibited in Court, even as a copy of page 3133 of Vo. XXV, No. 144 dated July, 1927 of the Official Gazette was presented to show publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing issued in the case (Exhs. 5 to 5-C). While this piece of evidence, to the mind of the Court, may prove the fact of actual publication of said hearing, the same cannot be accepted as indubitable proof that the initial hearing did, in fact, take place as scheduled and that the subject land registration case was given due course or that trial thereon proceeded and that judgment was thereafter accordingly rendered in favor of the applicants. x x x. In fact it intrigues the Court that while both the purported original and owner's duplicate copies of OCT No. 4216 have been shown to be still in existence and presently kept intact and on file in the Rizal Register of Deeds Office, the original copy of Decree No. 351823 (or just a certified true copy thereof) cannot be produced if it was in fact actually issued sometime in 1929 as claimed by the defendants. Given such liability to show proof of the existence of Decree No. 351823, the logical inference follows that the same was not at all issued much less signed, entered and filed in the then General Land Registration Office as required under Sections 38 to 41 of Act No. 496. Truth to tell, the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Cases on file in the Land Registration Commission (Now NLTDRA) under its 'Remarks' column

on its page 209 does not indicate that such Decree No. 351823 was issued, in glaring contrast to the other entries therein (Exhs. NN and NN-1), although there is inscribed thereto the note 'date OK' belies rather than connote issuance of such decree because if it was indeed actually issued, why was its number not inscribed or indicated particularly in the 'Remarks column as it is true with the rest of the other decrees reflected therein? Besides, a duly certified copy of said decree (if it was in fact issued) was supposed to have been forwarded by the General Land Registration Office to the Rizal Register of Deeds pursuant to the requirement of Section 40 of Act 496 but the fact that no such document exists in the said Registry strongly militates against defendants' assertion that the subject decree was actually issued to Lorenzo J. Gana and Ma. Juliana Carlos. Such decree not having been indubitably shown to have been issued, OCT No. 4216 and all the derivative titles issued in virtue thereof must all be deemed to be null and void ab initio. "But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that OCT No. 4216 is authentic and that the same (together with Decree No. 351823) was regularly issued in due course of the proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 672, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406 consequent to a final and executory judgment rendered thereunder, still the said title remains to be a nullity as the tract of land covered and embraced thereby was still an unclassified land of the public domain when the title was issued in 1929 and that the cadastral court was without jurisdiction to register the land under the Torrens system. x x x. "xxx xxx xxx.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows: 1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT No. 4216 and all the derivative titles issued thereunder, more specifically TCT Nos. 43555, 43556, and the defendants TCT Nos. S-16372, S-16373, S-17189, S-17190, S17191, S-17192, S-17193, S-17194, S-17195, S-17196, S-17197, S-17198, S-17199 and S-17200; and ordering their cancellation by the defendants Land Registration Commission and Register of Deeds; 2) Declaring as null and void ab initio the mortgages executed in favor of defendant Equitable Banking Corporation by defendants Virginia E. Villongco and Norma C. Espinosa covering TCT No. S-17196 and TCT No. 17190, respectively; 3) Quieting plaintiffs' title and ownership over the lands in question covered and embraced by their TCT Nos. S-238102, S-32032, S-32031, S-23801, and S-45414 and ordering defendants and all those claiming any right under them to vacate the same and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs and/or otherwise refrain and desist perpetually from exercising any act of dispossession and encroachment over the subject premises; and, 4) Ordering the defendants (except defendant Land Registration Commission, Register of Deeds and Equitable Banking Corporation) to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit. "IT IS SO ORDERED." Defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which, on 24 March 1993, affirmed the trial court's decision, ratiocinating thus "Plaintiffs-appellees evidence shows that when their predecessors-in-interest, Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu, applied for registration and confirmation of title over their 188,524 square meter lot in Las Pias on February 19, 1969 under LRC No. N-6625, they based their claim of ownership on a possessory information title and/or acquisitive prescription, attaching with their application the plan and technical description of the land, surveyor's certificate approved by the Bureau of Lands, and the tax declaration of the land for the year 1967 in the name of Benito Gonzales. The jurisdictional requirements of publication and sheriff's posting of the notice of initial hearing in the said Land Registration Case were complied with, after which the Court of First Instance of Rizal, acting as land registration court, through Judge Pedro Navarro, issued on May 4, 1969 an order of general default. When Benito Gonzales and Emeterio

Espiritu applied for registration, the land was originally a forest land but declared alienable and disposable on January 3, 1968 by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo Tanco, Jr. in Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141. In the decision of the land registration court dated July 22, 1969, the court held that the applicants satisfied all the conditions essential to a government grant and are thus entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title pursuant to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. On September 25, 1969, the court rendered an order directing the Commissioner of Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration. Consequently, on November 22, 1975, OCT-A-S-47 was issued in the names of Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu. "Significantly, no one filed any opposition to the application for registration of Gonzales and Espiritu notwithstanding the fact that as early as 1956, Patrocinio Margolles, one of the defendants-appellants, had already acquired the same property by purchase from Veronica Gana. "xxx xxx xxx.

"Upon the other hand, the evidence presented by defendants-appellants to prove the genuineness of their titles consists principally of the original of OCT No. 4216 and the corresponding owner's duplicate certificate thereof issued way back in 1929 in the names of Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, how this title came about is not clear. Defendants-appellants failed to submit the records or copies of the decision in LRC No. 672 and decree No. 351823 which, they insist, led to the issuance of OCT No. 4216. What they presented were issues of the Official Gazette in English and Spanish versions showing the publication of the notice of initial hearing in Land Registration Case No. 672. "xxx xxx xxx.

"Nevertheless, this Court cannot ignore the fact that when the land registration court ordered the issuance of decree of registration in favor of Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, which resulted in the registration of their property under OCT 4216, granting that such decree was really issued, the land under controversy was still an unclassified public land. Appellants argue that half of the municipality of Las Pias was declared as alienable and disposable as early as 1928 under LC Map 766, Project 13 but which map was destroyed during World War II. This contention is belied by the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated July 31, 1979 stating that the disputed property located in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias was classified as alienable and disposable land under LC Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Rizal only on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623. "xxx xxx xxx.

"Time and again the Supreme Court held that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government. This is because the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the courts. The absence of classification of the land renders the land as unclassified in consonance with the Regalian doctrine. If the land in question indeed forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the court to register under the Torrens System. Section 48 of the Public Land Act on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless land classified as forest is released as alienable. A positive act, such as, an official proclamation is needed to declassify land which had been classified as forestal and to convert it into alienable or disposable lands for agricultural or other purposes. In Director of Lands vs. Funtillar, the Supreme Court considered the reports of the District Forester and the District Land Officer as adequate proof that the land was no longer classified as forestal. "xxx xxx xxx.

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs. "SO ORDERED."

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. We see merit in the petition. Three basic issues confronted the courts below, now before us for review; viz: (1) Whether or not the genuineness and authenticity of Original Certificate of Title No. A-S-47, against an overlapping Original Certificate of Title No. 4216, was sufficiently established; (2) Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 was issued while the property was still unclassified public land; and (3) Whether or not the claim of the petitioners was correctly barred by laches. The first issue is basically factual. Ordinarily, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to exceptions, such as when there are compelling reasons to justify otherwise, or when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence on record. This case is so illustrative of such exceptional instances. To support their claim that OCT No. 4216 is genuine, the petitioners have submitted, among other things, the following pieces of documentary evidence: (1) The original of OCT No. 4216, as well as the owners duplicate certificates, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal; (2) The publications (in the English and Spanish versions) of the Official Gazette (1927 editions), containing notices of the initial hearing in Land Registration Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), instituted by the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, covering a parcel of land in Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias; (3) The order of then CFI Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, dated 23 March 1961, in LRC Case No. N-2126 (GLRO Record No. N6564), denying the registration of a parcel of land by reason of the certification, dated 26 June 1959, of the Land Registration Commissioner, Antonio N. Noblejas, that a portion of the property covered in this post-war land case had been decreed under Decree No. 351823, issued on 05 March 1929, in the name of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), and while said case covered only a part of the property in dispute, it did show, however, that the decree was, in fact, issued to the spouses Gana and Carlos; (4) The Report, dated 07 June 1983, of the Land Registration Commission's Verification Committee, sustaining the validity of Decree No. 351823 in favor of Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos; (5) Page 209 of the Book of Decrees (Old Book) of the Land Registration Commission, showing that a decree was "okayed" in GLRO Record No. 30406 (LRC Case No. 672), under the entry "Date O.K. for Decree" on "1-22-29" (22 January 1929) and that a decree was issued under the entry "Date Decree Issued" on "3-5-29" (05 March 1929); (6) The certified true microfilm reproduction of plan Psu-49273 covering a parcel of land in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, surveyed for Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1926; (7) The decision of this Court in Guico vs. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415, pointing to the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in LRC Case No. 672 in favor of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos; and (8) The letters of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, stating that the information and documents submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to support an action for cancellation of OCT No. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof.

The above documentary evidence is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside. It is our considered view that the appellate court has committed serious error in refusing to give any probative value to such evidence. All that the private respondents could basically proffer against OCT 4216 are that (1) The title is invalid, fake and spurious, which must have been the work of "some unscrupulous elements" who could have access to "the Registry Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal," that explains petitioners' failure to present a copy of the decision in Land Registration Case No. 672 or Decree No. 351823; and (2) Assuming OCT No. 4216 to have been issued, the same is invalid having been issued on still unclassified land of the public domain. Section 3, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, taken from Section 321 of Act No. 190, states: "Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office." It has been plainly shown that the failure of the petitioners to produce the Decree is due to the burning of the Archives of the Court of First Instance of Rizal during the liberation of Pasig, in consequence of which all pre-war land registration cases in Rizal have been destroyed. The respondents own witness, Eduardo Santos, Jr., has testified that the records of pre-war registration cases are thus incomplete as can be expected. The Certification, dated 02 May 1980, of Reynaldo S. Vergara, Acting Chief of the Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority, states that the pre-war record of LRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No. 030406 for the province of Rizal, is not among the records on file with the Vault Section of the Docket Division since the same must have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war. Certainly, the petitioners cannot be held to account for those lost or destroyed records. The private respondents argue that the petitioners should have asked for the reconstitution of the LRC case and the decree in accordance with Act No. 3110 and Republic Act No. 26, or that they could have opposed, or intervened in, the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-6625 (LRC Record No. N-36579) where OCT No. A-S-47 has been decreed. For failing to do so, the petitioners, it is now contended, should be held bound by the order of default issued by the land registration court. The argument is unacceptable. The petitioners are not covered by the general order of default in LRC Case No. N-6625. Republic Act No. 26 only covers lost or destroyed certificates of title. The original of OCT No. 4216 is not extant; it has, in fact, been presented in evidence. Act No. 3110, on the other hand, applies only to pending judicial proceedings. This Court has heretofore held, thus "The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. x x x. "xxx xxx xxx.

"If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding stage where records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must gain perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it anew,--all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted. "x x x. Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law. x x x. "x x x. (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and suf(f)er the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when all along and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court which has not committed any negligence or fault at all. Furthermore, Section 45 of Act No. 3110, provides that "(n)othing contained in (the) Act shall be construed to repeal or modify the provisions of Section Three Hundred and Twenty One of Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety." Section 321 of Act No. 190 is now Section 3 (aforequoted), Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule." Hence, even if the petitioners have failed to have the records of the LRC case reconstituted, they are not precluded from establishing by other evidence the requisite proof of validity of OCT No. 4216. Quite recently, in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano, said: "x x x. The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified true copy of the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy in court proceedings is an exception to the ordinary rule on secondary evidence; such admissibility is in fact mandated by Section 47 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act). Under the Land Registration Act which was in force at the time OCT No. 351 issued, the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was an official transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respect to the land covered by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal. "Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence of Decree No. 1425 upon which the Ortigas TCTs (Nos. 77652 and 77653) are based. x x x." (Footnotes omitted; underscoring supplied.) The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216, issued in favor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering, as it supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private respondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 4-1141 (1968), implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A. According to them, Las Pias comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which 1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable public lands in 1928, under LC Map No. 766, Project 13, and that "Tindig na Mangga" has not been covered thereby until the reclassification in 1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the petitioners predecessors-in-interest. No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above contention. To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988, of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads: "Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it allegedly covers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cut proof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the Timber Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, dated July 31, 1979, simply states that the tract of land situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las

Pias, Metro Manila containing an area of 197,525 square meters as shown and described on this plan Psu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable or Disposable Block of LC Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Rizal certified as such on January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623. The certification refers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state the relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216 which has an area of 99.6157 hectares. "xxx xxx xxx.

"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation that the land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A & D land only in 1968. But the recommendation is based on the same certification of Mr. de la Rosa of the Bureau of Forest Development which, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague and inconclusive." Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766, Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering that even the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority (NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second World War. In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (a case to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court), the Republic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate of title was issued, the land covered thereby was still within the forest zone. It offered as evidence a land classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961. The Court ruled: x x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps failed to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These x x x are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity x x x." Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968, provides: "1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable or disposable and place the same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration and disposition in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be and to the conditions herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated in the Municipalities of x x x Las Pias, x x x Province of Rizal x x x which are designated and described as alienable or disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968." (Underscoring supplied.) The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, is then amply protected by FAO No. 4-1141; otherwise, certificates of title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified. Finally, the private respondents raise estoppel by laches on the part of the petitioners. Laches is "the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or has declined to assert it. Contrary to private respondents claim that no action was taken by the petitioners until a petition for quieting of title was filed in 1985 by the private respondents themselves, the records would indicate that upon the subdivision of the lots in question by Espiritu and Gonzales, and the subsequent transfers of the same to the private respondents in 1976, a demand was seasonably made by the petitioners for the private respondents to vacate the premises. From the time

OCT No. A-S-47 was issued to the private respondents in 1969 until the demand was made in 1976, only seven (7) years had elapsed. Lastly, it is a settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. The titles of the petitioners, having emanated from an older title, should thus be upheld. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the court a quo are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered UPHOLDING instead the validity of the various titles, aforenumbered, in favor of the petitioners. No costs. SO ORDERED.