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conviction is obviously a direct instruction by Judicial Watchs Ruffley to Taitz to publish
what Judicial Watchs Ruffley falsely told Taitz. In addition, an email from Ruffley to her
superiors at Judicial Watch talks about celebrating Klaymans having left. Ruffley also testified
that she thinks of Klayman morbidly. Ruffley Deposition at 51. Specifically Ruffley
maliciously wrote, Gee whiz, its been just 9 years since [Plaintiff] left [Judicial Watch].
Should there be a 10-year anniversary on 9/23? <grin> [sic]. Importantly, this malicious
correspondence between Ruffley and her Judicial Watch superiors was only provided to Plaintiff
after Plaintiff filed a motion to compel a computer expert to search for obviously withheld emails
and other documents during document production. In any event, the publication is libel per se,
and actual malice need not be shown. See Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, Inc., 66 So. 2d
495, 497 (Fla. 1953); Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973).
Third, as set forth in Plaintiffs opposition, Judicial Watch miscites and mischaracterizes
the cases which it relies on to assert the substantial truth doctrine. Plaintiffs Opp. To Defs Mo.
For Summ. Judgment at pgs. 15-19. Regrettably this Surreply is necessary as Judicial Watch
once again misrepresents the facts and holdings of these cases. In any event, this is an issue for
the jury to decide, not the trial judge, as the cases show where a jury has been requested, as is
true here.
When a plaintiff requests a jury trial, it is not generally for the district court to decide
whether a statement is defamatory or not. It is only when the court can say that the publication
is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in
any defamatory sense that it can rule as a matter of law, that it was not libelous. Levy v.
American Mut. Ins. Co., 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C. 1964) (Emphasis added); Weyrich v. New
Republic, Inc., 235 F.3d 617, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2001). [I]f the language is capable of two
Case 1:13-cv-20610-CMA Document 103 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/31/2014 Page 2 of 3
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meanings, one actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to determine which of the two
meanings would be attributed to it by persons of ordinary understanding under the
circumstances. Levy, 196 A.2d at 476 (Emphasis added). [A] jury must determine whether
these impressions were actually conveyed, whether they were false, and whether the letters
were motivated by actual malice. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 525 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); see also Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 449 (3d Cir.
1987) (if the language at issue is capable of both a defamatory and a nondefamatory meaning,
there exists a question of fact for the jury.). Defendant Judicial Watch conspicuously omits this
law in its Amended Reply Brief.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Klayman respectfully moves for leave to file this Surreply to
correct misstatements of fact and law as set forth in Defendant Judicial Watchs Amended Reply
Brief.
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Judicial Watch does not consent to this motion.
Dated: March 31, 2014
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Larry Klayman
LARRY KLAYMAN
2520 Coral Way, Suite 2027
Miami, FL 33145
(310) 595-0800
leklayman@gmail.com
Plaintiff Pro Se
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Plaintiff Larry Klayman apologizes to this Court for some filing errors that have occurred
recently. There has been illness in the office and Plaintiff travels frequently. Accordingly, we
thank the Court for its patience.
Case 1:13-cv-20610-CMA Document 103 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/31/2014 Page 3 of 3