Internet Censorship in Thailand

From Wikileaks

Jump to: navigation, search

Thailand in geo-political context

The secret internet censorship lists of Thailand's military junta

Leaks
category:Series/MICT blocklists
Verification status
verified
By
Freedom Against Censorship Thailand, Wikileaks' staff and Patrick Shifley
Media contacts
as per authors
Date
ongoing series, last update Nov 18 2007

The Thai Web-blocking situation is difficult to analyze with any precision for several
reasons. The first is that the censors don’t seem equipped to use sophisticated
techniques; e.g., they couldn’t figure out how to block a single video so instead
blocked the entire YouTube domain. The second is that Web-blocking is
accomplished via a multi-layered technique by several government agencies and
commercial interests. The third reason the situation is difficult to analyze is that
blocking is sporadically enforced, now you see it now you don't. Finally, censorship is
ongoing and the list of blocked Webpages is actively changing. Fortunately for those
interested in studying the situation some dated lists of blocked Websites has been
leaked to Wikileaks by Freedom Against Censorship Thailand (FACT), and are
hosted here. FACT also publishes these lists of their Website and will post more as
they become available.

Despite the fact that Internet censorship has been ruled illegal in Thailand by the
Council of State law-drafting body, Injunctions against sites perceived as having anti-
coup sentiments have also been used directly, see The injunction of thaijustice.com
(Sep 16, 2007). Midnight University, a public online institution, fought their block
following the September 2006 coup d'etat and became the only legal Website in
Thailand, protected by an Administrative Court restraining order against further
blocking.

Currently there are more than 50,000 Websites blocked in Thailand. OpenNet
Initiative, a censorship watchdog partnered at Harvard University, University of
Toronto and Cambridge University has engaged in extensive, independent testing in
Thailand in order to determine the magnitude of Web filtering.

Deborah Kerr in The King and I, banned in Thailand

Contents
[hide]

• 1 Introduction
• 2 Layers of Thai Web-Blocking
o 2.1 Blocking by the Royal Thai Police
o 2.2 Blocking by the MICT
o 2.3 Blocking by CAT
• 3 Recent Instances of Web-Blocking
• 4 Thailand's New Cybercrime Law
o 4.1 Provisions concerning computer users
o 4.2 Provisions concerning ISP's
o 4.3 FACT's legal status
• 5 MICT secret blocklists
o 5.1 Categories within the blocklists
o 5.2 Length of the blocklist
o 5.3 Detailed analysis of the blocklists

Introduction
Thai Web-blocking is the result of a multi-layered approach which is supported by a
new (July 2007) cybercrime law, and can be referenced by several instances of large
web domains blocked entirely.

Layers of Thai Web-Blocking

There are several layers to Thai Web-blocking. The three discussed in this article are
the Royal Thai Police, the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology
(MICT), and the Communications Authority of Thailand (CAT).

Blocking by the Royal Thai Police

The largest layer of Thai Web-blocking is the Royal Thai Police which, when they
last published their data in November 2006, were blocking 32,500 websites.

Blocking by the MICT

A screenshot of what Thai internet users would see when redirected from a prohibited
website.

The MICT was established under the Thak Rak Thai government of billionaire
businessman turned prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, in 2003 with a mandate to
filter Websites. Web censorship started modestly enough but by 2005, Thaksin
announced grandiose plans to block "800,000" Websites. PM Thaksin was deposed by
bloodless military coup d'etat on September 19, 2006. At this time, the 1997 'People's'
Constitution was rescinded. This Constitution guaranteed many civil liberties, human
rights and freedoms included eleven articles prohibiting Internet censorship.
On September 20, 2006, the day following the coup, coup leader General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin, Order No. 5 was to block Websites and appointed MICT the rather
Orwellian "Official Censor of the Military Coup".

The MICT did not block the Internet directly; instead it circulated its daily blocklist to
Thailand’s 54 commercial ISPs to enforce; if one counts private and institutional
ISPs, there are more than 100. These ISPs appear to have blocked sites sporadically
on an "at will" basis. were understandably not terribly thrilled and enthusiastic about
this extra onerous and useless make-work so they got around to blocking when they
damned well felt like it. Thus, a website might be blocked by one ISP but, if you
subscribed to another, the site would still be open. Large periods of no censorship
whatsoever often accompany long weekends.

MICT has changed strategy at least partially, it would seem, to try to prevent the leaks
which enable Freedom Against Censorship Thailand (FACT) to publishing their
secret blocklists and post them internationally to Wikileaks and other free expression
watchdogs. MICT now no longer circulates their blocklist to ISPs but rely for
enforcement on Thailand’s four international Internet gateways: CAT, Telephone
Organization of Thailand (TOT), True Internet and Buddy Broadband, the latter two
both private companies. However, this strategy did not improve MICT’s security:
FACT continues to publish MICT’s current blocklist.

MICT's "green screen of death" is now a historical relic. Computer users attempting to
navigate to a blocked Website now commonly face browser, TCP and network error
screens all of which serve to make the user think the problem is with his or her
computer not with Web censorship. Occasionally, subscribers to the various ISPs will
encounter a notice stating that a Website may have illegal content and has been
referred to the proper authorities for determination.

Blocking by CAT

There was also some direct blocking of unspecified sites by Communications

Authority of Thailand (CAT) which, until recently, was Thailand’s first and only
Internet gateway. CAT is a former Government agency which has been newly-
privatised. CAT still controls the majority of international bandwidth as an
International Internet Gateway (IIG).

Recent Instances of Web-Blocking

An interesting recent case which has received less publicity than MICT’s YouTube
block is the blocking of the Weblog, Saturday Voice. “Saturday” is mostly Thai secret
code for Thaksin supporters but it is also used by anti-coup activists. <saturdayvoice>
wears both those hats.

What is interesting is that Saturday Voice is hosted by Blogspot and, again

demonstrating their lack of finesse, MICT has blocked the entire domain, tens or even
hundreds of thousands of ordinary blogs on Blogspot and Blogger are now
inaccessible in Thailand. On at least one ISP, WordPress suffered the same fate.
The premier government target is, of course, Websites which may bring the Thai
monarchy into disrepute. Thailand has strict lese-majeste laws punishable by up to 15
years in prison which sentences His Majesty, King Bhumibol Adulyadej always
commutes. The offending videos on YouTube fell afoul of this category; as the
creators could not be found, why not just block all YouTube? Of course, the King
himself never accuses anyone of lese-majeste; only Government officials feel
compelled to "defend" the King and speak in his name. This is, of course, one of the
very definition of lese-majeste: presuming to speak for the monarch.

Hundreds of Websites blocked are reviews, quotations, translations and links to a

thoroughly-researched 2006 book, The King Never Smiles, by veteran Asian reporter,
Paul Handley and published by the august Yale University Press. This is a remarkable
book, particularly authored by a foreigner. However, it does not present any news to
educated Thais and foreigners living in Thailand. What Thais find so offensive is that
these private stories would be aired internationally and in English. So the book is
banned under the Printing Act 1941 and through Web censorship.

The third category most affected by blocking are "separatist" or "terrorist" Websites
representing Muslim factions calling for the independence of Thailand's three
Southernmost provinces, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. The most established of these
groups is the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO).

Thailand's New Cybercrime Law

In mid-May 2007, Thailand’s military-appointed assembly ratified a new cybercrime
law by a vote of 119-1. The Computer-Related Crimes Act 2007 was, in fact, the first
law passed by the coup government. All its ‘crimes’ were already enforced by
existing Thai law. Tabled on November 15, 2006 on first reading and proceeding into
a 25-member committee, the law’s early drafts included the death penalty and life
imprisonment but these were dropped to ‘only’ 20 years in the final version. The Act
was promulgated July 15, 2007.

Historically, government has been biding its time to present such a law. Its many
incarnations began in 1997 and was soundly defeated time and again by several
elected parliaments despite raising the spectre of child pornography and Southern
Muslim "terrorist" separatists.

There have been two arrests of unwitting cyberdissidents under the IP tracking
requirements of the new Act. 'Phraya Pichai' and 'Ton Chan' had never heard of the
new cybercrime law. Their comments posted to public Webboards under their
pseudonyms were considered to be lese-majeste. Both arrests were major police raids
conducted in secret and not announced to the press. The two, a man and a woman,
were held for several weeks and offered a deal: for their guilty pleas, they would
receive a sentence of "only" four months (which would probably be suspended).
Following their agreement, both were released on THB 100,000 bail. However, when
they appeared in court, the prosecution declined to pursue the case. In a quirk of Thai
law, both have criminal frecords and may be re-charged up to 10 years.
Many expect further arrests as the Thai government flexes the muscles of the new
Act. It is likely further arrests will occur over pornography and the use of
circumvention software or anonymous proxies which conceal a user's IP address. The
criminalisation of concealing one's IP address actually makes this law the centrepiece
of much more draconian Internet censorship than that in China, Saudi Arabia, Iran or
even Vietnam.

Provisions concerning computer users

Although the cybercrime law never refers to censorship, its provisions have been
drafted in such a way as to criminalize everyday computer users. Computer users can
now be charged for simply viewing any Website hosting content deemed to be
“illegal, offensive or obscene” whether or not it has been blocked by government.

Use of circumvention software or anonymous proxies is considered to be “illegal

instructions” (same legal weight as viruses, for example); concealing one’s IP address
by these or other means carries penalties of two and four years.

Provisions concerning ISP's

Furthermore, all such “illegal content” which transits ISP servers, however
momentarily or inadvertently, with or without the ISP’s knowledge or consent,
prescribes even more severe criminal penalties for the ISP’s.

Even though all Internet censorship is specifically illegal and unConstitutional in

Thailand, the cybercrime law gives a big incentive to ISPs to self-censor so they don’t
end up on the wrong side of the law. We are now not able to figure out who exactly is
censoring what in Thailand, a censorship free-for-all, except for Thai people. In fact,
it is now a common occurrence for a Website to be available to customers of one ISP
while blocked by another.

FACT's legal status

FACT's divulging of secret government documents and posting them internationally

as well as posting of circumvention software and anonymous proxy information is, of
course, in a similar legal situation.

FACT intends to continue to publish the means for the ordinary computer user in
Thailand to free the Internet even though this action may now be considered civil
disobedience under the new law. The Thai taxpayer pays five billion baht a year for
MICT’s operations; the blocklist belongs to the people–we pay for it! Government’s
original plan was to attach this new law to the new Constitution so that if Thai citizens
voted for the Constitution, they were also voting for the cybercrime law; luckily, they
dropped that stipulation!

MICT secret blocklists

The MICT secret blocklists are leaked to the internet via groups like FACT. Analysis
of them shows that they function in part by categorizing websites and that the list is
growing in length.

Categories within the blocklists

The MICT secret blocklists initially separated web pages into 9 different categories.
Categories 1-3 do not appear on the blocklists, and it can be assumed that they are
deemed acceptable by the censors. Categories 4 and 5 appear but it has not been
determined what makes their content offensive.

The largest grouping is, predictably, Category 6, which appears to be pornography of

various persuasions. Pornography is specifically illegal in Thailand. There are
therefore procedures to be followed by the Royal Thai Police, including requests to
Interpol to have the offending content removed in the foreign countries where the
servers are located. The present approach by MICT could not even begin to stop
Internet pornography in Thailand or anywhere else as there are now tens of millions
of distinct websites.

Category 7 appears to consist of anonymous proxy servers, used effectively in China

and many other countries to evade web censorship. This is clearly undemocratic as
public policy and violates both Section 37 of the Constitution and the
Telecommunications Act.

Category 8 appears to consist of websites containing Thai political content with many
focusing on the South, in particular, the Pattani United Liberation Organization which
is not a banned organization in Thailand. Even if it is a banned organization, is it legal
to block PULO’s appeal to the United Nations? This also is clearly undemocratic as
public policy and violates both Section 37 of the Constitution and the
Telecommunications Act.

Category 9 appears to consist of websites which content concerns the Thai monarchy.

Since the 13 October 2006 blocklist the categorization of websites has become more
disorganized. Category 6 is now salted with anonymous proxy servers and Thai
political content in addition to pornography. Category 7 has been salted with websites
with Thai political content on the bloody situation in Southern Thailand. Category 8
still consists primarily of Thai political content but now also contains some
anonymous proxy servers, and websites containing articles about His Majesty King
Bhumibhol. Category 9 now consists of websites with content opposed to Thailand’s
September 19 coup d’etat as well as sites with Thai political content and some
anonymous proxy servers.

Length of the blocklist

The blocklist has also expanded from 1,247 websites in January 2004 to 11,329 in
May 2007. The latest available MICT Excel file shows 17,775 sites blocked in total.
A list of the sizes of the blocklists is included below:

• January 2004 - 1,247

 • May 2006 - 2,328
• October 2006 - 2,475
• January 2007 - 13,435
• March 2007 - 10,885
• April 2007 - 11,239
• May 2007 - 11,329

Detailed analysis of the blocklists

Further detailed analysis of the blocklists can be found at the links below:

• MICT secret blocklist from 16 May 2006

• MICT secret blocklist from 12 Oct 2006
• MICT secret blocklist from 11 Jan 2007
• MICT secret blocklist from 28 May 2007

Retrieved from "https://wikileaks.be/wiki/Internet_Censorship_in_Thailand"

Categories: Analyses | Thailand | Published | Featured anal