TABLE OF CONTENTS I.

II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. Executive Summary Introduction Methods of Out-of-Country Voting Overview of Practices and Issues Eligibility and Registration of External Voters Outreach to External Voters and Voter Turnout Host Country Cooperation Remote Electronic Voting Costs of Out-of-Country Voting Observation of Out-of-Country Voting Principal Findings and Recommendations Follow-up Annexes Agenda of the Workshop List of Participants

 ACRONYMS CoE DRE EAD EMB EU IOM MFA MoU OCV OSCE UN USD Council of Europe Direct recording electronic (voting machines) Electoral Assistance Division (United Nations) Election management body European Union International Organization for Migration Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of understanding Out-of-country voting Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe United Nations United States dollar

FOREWORD The United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) supports Member States in their efforts to conduct credible and peaceful elections. Working primarily through the provision of technical assistance, our aim is to strengthen the capacity of national institutions and other election stakeholders, including through the facilitation of exchanges between electoral practitioners around the world. As part of these activities, we seek to identify new trends and future challenges in electoral administration and build on comparative experience to provide useful guidance for the development of improved electoral processes. The world today is a global village in which population mobility is expanding exponentially. As migration increases, a growing number of countries are seeking to introduce external voting mechanisms to enfranchise citizens living abroad. At present, decisions on whether and how to facilitate external voting remain country and case specific, with many different approaches being adopted. Design and implementation of external voting systems also raise sensitive political issues, pose important questions relating to representation and legitimacy and can be complex and costly to administer. To discuss these issues, EAD organized a workshop on Out of Country Voting (OCV) in Bucharest, Romania, on 7-8 June 2010 in cooperation with the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, together with the support of the Government of Romania. The meeting brought together practitioners and experts to exchange information, experiences, and lessons learned in the field of OCV. This report aims to capture the fruitful discussion and recommendations that emerged, which, it is hoped will help to strengthen the capacity of electoral management bodies to manage external voting operations.

We would like to thank the Government of Romania whose generous contribution made this endeavour possible, as well as our partners from the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, for their gracious support. We would also like to express our gratitude to all participants for their valuable contributions, as well as International IDEA for kindly providing copies of its Handbook Voting from Abroad. Our special thanks go to colleagues in the United Nations Development Programme Office in Romania whose dedicated work was essential to the organisation of the workshop.

Craig Jenness Director, Electoral Assistance Division Department of Political Affairs

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Bucharest Out-of-Country Voting (OCV) Workshop brought together 40 experts and practitioners from a large number of countries as well as regional and international organizations for two days of intensive discussions aimed at exchanging information, experiences, and lessons learned in the field of OCV. The workshop did not adopt formal recommendations on OCV but a general consensus emerged among participants in regard to a number of good practices, which are set out at the end of this report. 2. OCV is widely recognized and implemented as a means to enhance the standards of universal and equal suffrage, by extending the franchise to citizens outside the country. Over 100 countries have some form of OCV. Many of these states have large populations abroad, sufficient to swing the results of an election. Some countries have created special seats in parliament to represent voters abroad. Decisions on whether to implement OCV encompass a range of considerations, some of which may be overtly political. 3. Many different systems and procedures exist for OCV, from postal voting and voting in embassies to remote electronic voting. Each system has its benefits and its disadvantages. Participants agreed that since national circumstances vary greatly, there is no single best formula for OCV. There are, however, common denominators in all systems, among them the desire to make voting available to the largest possible number of eligible external electors, and to do so in a manner that is reliable, secure and cost effective. The credibility of OCV systems depends on the level of public confidence in their accuracy and integrity. 4. In designing OCV systems it is important to take a number of factors into account. The size of the diaspora is important, but so is its nature, for example, whether out-of-country voters are predominantly long-time legal residents in the host country, undocumented migrants or refugees. Another important consideration is whether the geographical distribution of the diaspora is concentrated in a few countries or widely dispersed. Some OCV systems are designed to accommodate all voters

resident abroad, while others only make the vote available in countries with large diaspora populations. 5. OCV systems pose a special challenge for the accuracy of voter lists, both among out-of-country voters and for the overall quality of the national lists. Different systems can be used to try to ensure that voters abroad are registered, but the success of these systems depends on a range of circumstances, including the numbers, locations and level of interest of voters abroad. Ensuring that voters are not simultaneously registered both at home and abroad also poses a challenge. In countries where the accuracy of the voter lists is already in question, adding voters abroad to the equation can further damage confidence in the lists. 6. Voter education can be particularly important for voters abroad since they may not have easy access to information on developments at home or on election issues or procedures. It is therefore beneficial to develop specific public outreach campaigns for voters abroad, to help ensure their informed participation in electoral events. Voter education campaigns should relate to both voter registration and voting. Public outreach campaigns have been an effective way to increase the participation of voters abroad. 7. Another important consideration in designing OCV systems is relations with the host country. The extent to which host countries are willing to cooperate or provide assistance in OCV operations conducted on their territory can be an important determinant of which systems are viable and effective in different countries. Some host countries make substantial efforts to facilitate OCV, for example by lending equipment or providing space for polling stations. National and host country regulations on campaigning abroad can pose another set of challenges for OCV, particularly if there is any conflict between the two. 8. The use of new technologies poses both promise and challenges for expanding OCV. Remote electronic voting, using personal computers or telephones, could make OCV far easier and more accessible to voters. Many countries are testing or taking steps to implement remote electronic voting. There are still major concerns, however, about the security of voting over the Internet and the vulnerability of remote electronic voting

systems to hacking. A number of possible technical solutions to these problems are being explored. Most countries have concluded that for the moment, the risks of remote electronic voting outweigh the benefits. 9. The costs of OCV can vary greatly depending on the number of voters involved, the system used and other circumstances. This can become an important consideration for many countries, especially if the cost per voter of OCV is far greater than for domestic voters. Increasing the level of expenditure on OCV has not always resulted in a proportionate increase in participation among voters abroad. 10. Organized election observation of OCV also involves a number of challenges, since some types of OCV do not lend themselves easily to standard methods of observation. The costs and logistical difficulties of observing OCV can be substantial. Nevertheless, with government cooperation, it is possible for observers to monitor and assess many aspects of OCV. II. INTRODUCTION 11. The Workshop on Out of Country Voting was organized by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) in cooperation with the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, with the support of the Government of Romania. The workshops discussions were aimed at developing a set of good practices and lessons learned, based on the experiences of various countries and practitioners. There was no attempt to provide prescriptive solutions or conclusions, in recognition that circumstances vary greatly among countries and that the best approach for one country may not be the most appropriate for another. Participants were encouraged to acknowledge problems and challenges in regard to OCV and to suggest effective approaches and policies for dealing with these issues. 12. Approximately 40 participants attended the workshop, including representatives from 15 countries. Most participants were experts working for national electoral management bodies (EMB). In addition, representatives of six regional or global organizations attended the workshop. A list of participants is included in the annexes.

13. The workshop was divided into six sessions devoted to specific topics. Each session opened with an introductory presentation aimed at encouraging discussion of different practices and case studies. A moderator structured the discussion and presented a summary at the end of each session. The rapporteur concluded each days discussions by presenting the main findings of the sessions. The annotated agenda can be found in the annexes. 14. The length of the workshop did not permit a full discussion of all aspects of OCV. This report therefore draws also on sources beyond the discussions at the workshop to elaborate on certain issues; footnotes indicate where this is the case. The workshop did not formally adopt recommendations, although a variety of recommendations, suggestions and good practices were put forward by various participants. There was, however, a general consensus on a number of issues and good practices which are described in this report and set out more succinctly below under Principal Findings and Recommendations (Chapter XI). III. METHODS OF OUT-OF-COUNTRY VOTING 15. Although there is no international standard that specifically requires states to implement systems of OCV, international standards do require universal and equal suffrage.1 An underlying assumption of the discussions, therefore, was that OCV is valuable because it promotes these standards by extending the franchise and the opportunity for political participation to citizens who are outside the country. 16. Over 100 countries around the world currently allow some form of external voting.2 The systems adopted and the details of their implementation vary greatly. There are four principal models of OCV:3 Personal or in-person voting, in which the voter casts his or her ballot in person at an embassy, consulate or specially established polling place abroad;
1. These standards can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25; and other documents. 2. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, page 3. 3. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/va/voting-from-abroad.

 Postal voting, in which the voter completes a paper ballot and submits it by mail; Proxy voting, in which a citizen designates a proxy who is in country to cast his or her ballot; Remote electronic voting, in which the voter uses a computer, mobile telephone or other electronic device to vote from abroad without visiting a polling station. Each of these methods can have advantages and disadvantages. Some countries offer external voters a choice of more than one method. 17. Of the four methods of OCV, only in-person voting, which is conducted in a controlled environment supervised by polling staff, can guarantee the secrecy and security of the ballot. However, in-person OCV raises a number of other issues and challenges. One difficulty with personal voting as a method of OCV is that it may be available only where the country has embassies or consulates. For example, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia establishes polling stations in its 53 diplomatic missions and Moldova uses its 33 embassies and consulates for OCV. Likewise, in recent elections, Indonesia organized personal OCV in 107 countries, Romania in 93 countries and Senegal in 34 countries. While this type of effort may cover many citizens abroad, it can also leave significant gaps. Even in countries where polling stations are established, voters may live too far from the capital city or other polling station locations for voting to be a practical option. If OCV is limited to voting in embassies (a single location in a country), this may result in long lines for external voters. If polling stations are staffed by embassy personnel, some voters may doubt the impartiality of the persons conducting the process. In addition, political refugees or other voters who distrust a government may be reluctant to appear at their countrys diplomatic mission. Undocumented migrants may also fear that appearing at an embassy to vote could threaten their continued residence in the country. For all these reasons, it is not unusual for communities abroad to advocate methods other than personal voting. 18. Postal voting, which is widely used for OCV, avoids the disadvantages of personal voting at embassies, but can pose its own challenges. It can be quite expensive to distribute ballots and other polling

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material abroad for OCV. For some countries, the short time between the nomination of candidates and election day makes it impossible to print and distribute ballots abroad in time for them to be returned by election day. The unreliability of the postal systems in some countries can pose an obstacle for OCV. Postal votes are also more susceptible than in-person votes to family voting and to other types of pressure or intimidation, or to vote-buying. Last-minute changes to ballots or voting rules can also have disproportionate effect on postal voters abroad, for example, if they have already mailed in their ballots. 19. Proxy voting is not as widely used as personal or postal voting, but it is used or offered as an option to voters abroad by a number of countries. It can be one of the simplest forms of OCV to organize, since voting takes place in person and in-country, and proxies normally cast ballots at the same domestic polling station that the voter would have used. It is much cheaper to implement than other systems of OCV. Proxy voting does, however, compromise the secrecy of the ballot and raises the possibility that the proxy may not vote in the manner desired by person being represented. 20. Remote electronic voting is a relatively new development which has resulted from advances in technology. It raises a number of complex issues, which are discussed in Chapter VIII. IV. OVERVIEW OF PRACTICES AND ISSUES 21. Almost all the countries represented in the workshop have adopted OCV programs, yet they did so under different circumstances and have chosen different approaches. The main reasons why many countries have opted for OCV programs is the size of their populations abroad and their desire to enable those citizens to participate in elections. 22. Political factors often play a key role in national decisions whether to allow OCV. A number of countries first introduced OCV in order to enable military personnel abroad to vote. In other instances, the decision resulted from pressure from citizens abroad to be able to participate in elections. In Senegal, for example, the inclusiveness of the OCV exercise seems to have been the outcome of pressure from opposition parties and

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diaspora associations. Some political parties support OCV because they believe diaspora voters will support them; other parties may oppose OCV for the same reason.4 For countries that have large numbers of voters abroad, the political weight of external votes can often be sufficient to influence or even to determine the outcome of an election. For example, 11.5 million Mexican eligible voters are reportedly outside the country, while other countries also have a large number of citizens temporarily or permanently residing abroad (e.g., France: 2.1 million; Indonesia: 5 million; Romania: 2 million; Russian Federation: 1.7 million; Spain: 1.3 million). OCV turnout, however, is commonly lower than in-country turnout.5 23. A number of countries have set aside special seats in their parliaments sometimes called extraterritorial seats to represent voters abroad. In 2008, Romania established seats in the parliament to represent voters abroad: 4 seats in the Assembly and 2 seats in the Senate. France is in the process of expanding its system of extraterritorial seats to include seats in the Assembly as well as the Senate. A report of February 2009 by Spains Council of State6 raised the possibility of creating extraterritorial seats. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has adopted legislation to create extraterritorial seats. Establishing extraterritorial seats can simplify elements of OCV and improve representation for voters abroad. However, extraterritorial seats also pose many challenges, most notably that their creation often requires constitutional changes. 24. While the size of the diaspora may be the most important determinant of whether to allow OCV, many other factors must be considered in designing an effective system. For example, national authorities need to consider the social and economic status of the diaspora (e.g., temporary residents, undocumented migrants or long-established diaspora) and its geographical distribution as key factors in organizing OCV. Mexico considers that with its extremely large diaspora heavily concentrated in

4. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network provides a number of examples in which political considerations influenced the decision to allow OCV. http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/va/votingfrom-abroad. 5. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, pages 30-33. 6. http://www.consejo-estado.es/pdf/REGIMEN-ELECTORAL.pdf

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one country (USA) and widely dispersed within this country, the most appropriate system in terms of costs and outreach to external voters is postal voting rather than personal voting. On the other hand, Indonesia, which has a large and widely dispersed diaspora, experienced serious difficulties with postal voting. Both countries concluded that a key factor in the effectiveness of postal OCV is the reliability of the postal services both in the host countries and in-country. 25. If a state decides to implement OCV, it will normally require new legislation and regulations to establish the necessary legal framework and procedures. The legislation should take into account a range of organizational and logistical variables. For example, will OCV apply only to national elections, or also to local elections? (European Union countries also have to contend with OCV for elections to the European Parliament, which adds another dimension to relations between countries holding elections and countries hosting OCV.) Does the country use a proportional system in which all citizens can use the same ballot, or must there be multiple ballots depending on external voters constituency at home? Which citizens will be eligible to vote and how will they be registered? Which OCV method is likely to be used by the greatest number of voters? Which method is the most cost effective? The answers to these questions and others can help shape key decisions on OCV. 26. Another issue for states to consider is which body will organize OCV. Depending on the system chosen, the EMB or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) might be the most appropriate body. If the MFA is involved, it is critical to establish sound cooperation and a clear division of responsibilities between the MFA and the EMB. In countries such as Spain and France, where the Ministry of Interior is responsible for organizing elections, it is important to establish cooperation and division of responsibilities between that ministry and the MFA. 27. A subsidiary issue for countries using personal voting for OCV is the composition of the polling station staff abroad. Under the laws of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the polling stations abroad cannot be staffed with personnel from either the MFA or the Ministry of Interior but only by other civil servants. For Romanian and Moldovan OCV, the polling station president must be from the MFA and the other members

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from political parties or representatives of the national communities abroad. Senegals electoral proceedures stipulate that at least one member of each polling station must be from the EMB. The perception of the residents abroad of the impartiality or acceptably representative nature of the polling station staff is important because it is likely to have an impact on voter turnout, as well as acceptance of the results. 28. Participants in the workshop pointed out that even seemingly simple issues such as time differences can have a significant impact on OCV operations. One timing challenge relates to influences on voters abroad from the release of exit polls or other polling data, either publicly or by phone or through websites and blogs. To tackle this issue, the Romanian EMB is examining the option of implementing OCV one day in advance in some countries where the time difference is considerable. Other countries (e.g., Moldova) are considering whether OCV should take place over two days. Another timing problem some countries face with OCV is delayed receipt of postal ballots, which can lead to delays in counting and announcing results. On the other hand, if completed postal ballots must be received by the EMB before election day, this can considerably shorten the time available for printing and distributing ballots. 29. Citizens interest in OCV depends on many factors, including the type of elections and the nature of their political systems. In some countries, presidential or parliamentary elections trigger high interest among external voters, while in decentralized systems the focus may be on municipal and local elections. In several European Union (EU) countries elections for the European Parliament do not generate a high turnout for OCV since, according to some participants, many voters perceive Brussels as remote and do not clearly see the influence it could have on their lives. In other cases, the lack of interest in OCV could be the result of a perceived limited competition or lack of knowledge of candidates or political events at home. 30. Most of the countries represented at the workshop are considering or are already undertaking reviews of their OCV legislative framework. Romania, for example, is considering creating a more inclusive OCV program by 2012, by incorporating alternative voting methods, including Internet or postal voting, in addition to personal voting. For the Romanian

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presidential elections of November and December 2009, the 294 polling stations opened in 93 countries represented only one per cent of the total number of polling stations, although the approximately 2 million external voters amounted to ten per cent of total eligible voters. 31. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have played central roles in providing technical assistance in organizing OCV in post-conflict situations (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, East Timor, Iraq, Sudan).

V. ELIGIBILITY AND REGISTRATION OF EXTERNAL VOTERS

32. As a general matter, if a state offers OCV, the principles of universality and equality suggest that it should be available to all persons who would meet the qualifications of voting in-country, such as age and citizenship requirements. Nonetheless, for practical and other reasons, states take many different approaches to determining who is eligible to vote from abroad. For example, states that use in-person voting for OCV may effectively limit eligibility to residents of countries where the state has embassies. There are often additional requirements for external voters, the most common of which are length of stay requirements. Such requirements can be designed in two ways. One approach is placing a limit on the length of time that citizens can remain abroad and still be entitled to an external vote (e.g., Australia: six years; Canada: five years). A different approach sets a minimum amount of time that an individual must be abroad in order to be entitled to an external vote (e.g. Italy, Mozambique, Spain, Senegal).7 Students, businessmen or other categories of citizens residing abroad temporarily can be disenfranchised under this type of system. 33. Some countries base their decisions on whether to offer OCV in a given country on estimates of the size of the diaspora in that country (although in many cases, according to the experts at the workshop,
7. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, pages 18-20.

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these estimates may not be accurate). Other states require a minimum number of registered voters in a particular location in order to establish a polling station there (e.g. 200 for Senegal). 34. A number of countries limit external voting to diplomats, military personnel, or other government employees officially assigned to posts abroad. Some countries permit OCV only for certain types of elections, for example, national but not local elections. In contrast, some states where voting is compulsory provide exemptions for voters who are abroad on election day (e.g., Australia). 35. Registration of external voters poses a number of challenges for the accuracy of the voter lists at home and abroad. Maintaining updated and accurate voter lists is difficult in any circumstances, but is far more so for voters abroad, especially in cases of high emigration or high mobility of eligible voters abroad. In many countries, emigrants and other citizens outside the country remain on the voter lists at home. While this may be technically correct as long as they maintain their citizenship and would qualify to vote if they returned home, the presence of large numbers of absent voters on domestic voter lists can open a system to manipulation and can sometimes lead to charges of fraud. Since many countries do not keep accurate records of emigrants or migrant workers abroad, it can be impossible to ensure that voter lists reflect their absence. Although it was noted for instance that it is an obligation for Spanish citizens abroad to register at the Consulate after residing in a foreign country for one year; they are then automatically included in the OCV electoral census (CERA)8. 36. Most countries that permit voting abroad require a separate registration process and produce separate voter lists for such voters. In such cases, it is important to ensure that individuals do not appear on both the domestic and out-of-country voter lists, in order to prevent double voting. If a countrys electoral system includes constituencies, external voters may also have to provide evidence of residence in or other ties to a particular constituency in order to register. In Spain, for example, which has a highly decentralized system and allows OCV for all elections including regional and municipal elections, voters must establish that they
8. http://www.ine.es/en/oficina_censo/cifras_electores_en.htm

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have a connection with the political life of the region for which they want to vote9. In most countries, external voters are required to register prior to election day; in these cases registration could constitute a technical disenfranchisement of those external voters who began their out-ofcountry stay after the registration cut-off date. Citizens abroad may also find it difficult to obtain the up-to-date identification papers sometimes needed to register to vote. As a mitigating measure, Moldovas EMB allowed residents abroad to vote in 2009 even if their documents proving identity and nationality were expired. 37. Eligibility and registration requirements for external voters can be particularly sensitive in regard to refugees. Some domestic actors may fear that enfranchising refugees could disadvantage their political parties at the polls or that voting in refugee camps could be manipulated. Host countries may be resistant to introducing political issues into refugee camps. Registering refugees as voters can be expensive and can pose special difficulties since many refugees do not have identity papers. Nonetheless, in post-conflict situations, providing for external voting by refugees can be an important step in building peace and national reconciliation. 38. Participants in the workshop provided many examples of the challenges of voter registration for OCV. One common challenge is that eligible voters simply do not register. For example, most of the estimated 5 million Indonesians abroad have not registered to vote, while only 450,000 of an estimated 2.5 million Turks living abroad have registered with diplomatic and consular missions. Most of Senegalese undocumented migrants purposely remain without any identification papers (sans papiers) in order to avoid being returned to their country of origin. The Senegalese example highlights the challenge that many expatriates may lack appropriate documents to prove their eligibility to vote. 39. The examples of Senegal and Mexico, presented in the workshop, show two very different approaches to the registration of external voters. On the one hand, Senegal very actively seeks to facilitate registration, including for undocumented migrants, by setting up Electoral
9. It should be noted that it is highly probable that the Spanish Electoral Act (LO 5/1985) will be modified in 2011 in a way that OCV will no longer be possible at municipal elections.

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Administrative Commissions abroad to identify locations with a high density of Senegalese, issue national identity cards for undocumented migrants and create the conditions for them to register and vote. On the other hand, the Mexican Federal Institute for Elections adopts a more passive approach, asking the external voters to register under specific, rather limited conditions. This has contributed to a low OCV turnout. Indonesia has a complex framework for OCV registration, resulting in low participation. 40. Often, undocumented migrants abroad do not register because they do not trust that their personal information will not be shared with the host country or used for other purposes, threatening their continued stay in the country (see also Chapter VII). Although the legality of a persons residence abroad should not affect his or her right to vote in national elections, undocumented migrants are often reluctant to take part in elections. 41. Currently, countries use a wide variety of registration systems for voters abroad. In some countries, for example, external voters remain on a centralized national voter list. Other countries require out-of-country voters to register at an embassy or consulate. Federal or decentralized countries may have more than one registration system in place for external voters. The mechanics of registering out-of-country voters can be particularly complex when they must be assigned to internal constituencies or when they are entitled to vote in national elections but not in local elections. In addition, because of the difficulties of accurately registering citizens abroad, some countries that use state-initiated registration systems at home (in which the state is responsible for automatically registering all eligible voters), use voter-initiated registration systems abroad (in which the individual voter is expected to take the initiative to register). More voters are likely to register if the registration systems used are simple and easily accessible. Outreach campaigns aimed at registering voters abroad can also help boost registration figures. 42. Various practices were mentioned by workshop participants in regard to the possibility for citizens abroad to verify their registration status. Senegal publishes the voter lists for OCV on line. Turkey also makes the lists available on line, but due to concerns over personal data

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protection, the information is accessible only by the person concerned. Romanian lists are available at the polling station only and only to the person concerned. Moldova has recently adopted a similar regulation. VI. OUTREACH TO EXTERNAL VOTERS AND VOTER TURNOUT

43. Participants in the workshop agreed that effective public information campaigns aimed at external voters are crucial to ensuring that eligible voters are aware of eligibility criteria and have the opportunity to register and to cast their ballots. Because of the specificities of external voter registration and voting, special or modified voter education materials generally need to be prepared for external voters. Since external voters may be widely dispersed among and within foreign countries, careful design and planning is needed to ensure that outreach campaigns are broad enough to reach external voters in many locations. 44. Mexico was cited as an example of a country making a significant attempt to reach out to a massive diaspora (11.5 million eligible voters) that is highly concentrated in one country (99 per cent in the United States) but also widely dispersed within that country. For the 2006 presidential election, Mexico used a complex system of OCV registration and postal voting requiring both good organization and tremendous logistical efforts over an extended period of time, aimed at motivating and informing voters. Nevertheless, the OCV turnout did not reflect the level of effort invested: 4.2 million external voters procured the Election Identification Card needed to vote, but only 32,632, spread over 71 countries, actually cast ballots. Workshop participants pointed out that such gaps are not unusual and that it is a significant challenge to find ways to ensure that citizens abroad make use of their right to vote. 45. IOMs experience in organizing OCV in post conflict countries has shown that effective information campaigns for external voters can be essential for voter mobilization and turnout, especially in cases where there are large refugee populations. 46. Regulations concerning electoral campaigning abroad are usually scarce or non-existent. Not all national political parties have the interest

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or resources necessary to undertake campaigns abroad. Therefore, an additional difficulty in the organization of OCV is that of guaranteeing a level playing field among contenders. In some countries, EMBs distribute campaign materials abroad in order to alleviate the problem.10 Mexico dealt with the issue by prohibiting any electoral campaigning abroad in 2006. Bangladesh prohibits political parties from establishing any offices or branches abroad.11 Another potential problem in campaigning abroad is the position of the host country, which may not welcome foreign political activity on its territory (see also Chapter VII, below). Canada, for example, prohibits political campaigning for foreign elections. External voters may also face restrictions on contributing to political campaigns at home; many countries prohibit political parties or candidates from receiving contributions from abroad. VII. HOST COUNTRY COOPERATION 47. There are no international standards to guide host governments on how to approach the issue of external voting on their territories.12 As a result, host countries have adopted a wide variety of approaches to external voting, from providing active assistant to imposing prohibitions. 48. Host country cooperation may not be needed for certain types of OCV, for example, proxy voting, postal voting or remote electronic voting. Voting in diplomatic missions by small numbers of people may also be possible without host government cooperation. However, host country cooperation is required for most types of personal voting, and may be required for other types of electoral activity, such as public information activities or political campaigning. It has become common for countries seeking host country cooperation in OCV to negotiate a host country agreement (often in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MoU)) setting out the parameters of OCV and roles and responsibilities of different actors. Host country agreements generally make clear that the host country will not interfere with the voting process or the secrecy of the vote. At the same time, agreements usually stipulate that the OCV exercise will respect the host countrys legislation.
10. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, page 122. 11. Elections in Bangladesh 2006-2009, Transforming Failure into Success, UNDP, 2010, page 78. 12. Ibid., page 138.

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49. Since developing host country agreements involves diplomatic negotiations, the MFAs of the two countries are usually involved in the process, in addition to the EMB. In some cases agreements might be signed with international organizations that will assist in conducting elections abroad. For example, the IOM has been contracted to implement the in-person OCV for a number of states in post-conflict situations. 50. Workshop participants discussed a number of examples of how host countries have dealt with OCV. Senegal and Italy, for example, extend generous assistance to OCV operations conducted on their territories, by providing locations free of charge, lending non-secure electoral materials such as voting booths and generally facilitating the implementation of electoral activities, in accordance with host country agreements. On the other hand, it was mentioned that countries that do not hold their own elections may be extremely reluctant to host other countries OCV operations since doing so could trigger internal political reactions. Permitting voting by refugees from neighboring countries can sometimes be regarded by host countries as particularly sensitive. If host countries impose prohibitions on OCV or decline to facilitate the process, then inperson voting may not be practical as an OCV method for that country. 51. The practice of opening polling stations outside diplomatic and consular premises has been used by countries such as Romania, Senegal and Turkey to facilitate and increase participation by external voters. The Moldovan EMB is considering opening polling stations outside diplomatic premises for the first time for the next electoral exercise, for the same reasons. Opening such polling stations requires the consent of the host country, usually obtained through a host country agreement. 52. The Senegalese expert at the workshop described his countrys experience with OCV since 1993, noting that more than three quarters of Senegalese polling stations abroad are opened outside of its diplomatic missions.

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He pointed out that the quality of the bilateral relationship can affect the host countrys decision on whether to authorize OCV operations and the conclusion of an MoU.13 In another example, Turkey and Iraq based their cooperation on OCV on the principle of reciprocity. Mexicos experience shows that good relationships with municipalities and cities as well as with the host national government are also key to running smooth OCV operations. 53. The immigration status in the host country of citizens residing abroad should not be relevant in determining their eligibility to vote through OCV in their country of origin. In some instances, host country agreements have specified that an individuals right to an external vote will not affect that persons legal status in the host country. This was the case, for example, for some of the host country agreements for the Iraqi elections of 2005.14 Nevertheless, participation rates among undocumented migrants tend to be low, since many such individuals are concerned that the information provided for voter registration could become available to the host country or fear that host country officials could identify them during the voting process and take action against them. 54. Several workshop participants pointed out the importance of physical security as an issue for OCV, especially when polling is conducted in locations outside the premises of embassies or consulates. Host governments may have particular concerns about security issues in connection with personal OCV on their territories. This may be an issue in particular for OCV in conflict or post-conflict situations. Security is a matter that should be addressed in the host country agreement. It is generally most effective if the host government agrees to provide security for OCV polling places (including diplomatic missions), polling workers and voters, usually through local police forces.15 Private companies can also be hired to provide security.

13. Senegal experienced difficulties in organizing external voting in one neighboring country where its citizens resided in considerable numbers and were dispersed within the host country. The restrictions ended after a regime change in the neighboring country, when the new government permitted the establishment of supplementary OCV polling stations outside the Senegalese Embassy. 14. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, page 145. 15. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/va/voting-from-abroad.

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Participants agreed that a properly organized security framework can help prevent political tensions in the country of origin from spilling over into the host countries. VIII. REMOTE ELECTRONIC VOTING 55. Remote electronic voting refers to systems in which voters cast their votes from outside a polling station using electronic means such as a telephone or a computer connected to the Internet. It thus differs from standard electronic voting, which is usually conducted under supervised conditions in a polling station using direct recording electronic (DRE) machines. DRE voting machines are usually either touch screen computers or optical readers that scan and count paper ballots. Normally, DRE machines are not connected to the Internet, which provides a level of security not yet available for remote electronic voting. 56. At present, very few countries use remote electronic voting, although a number have conducted or are planning tests and pilot projects. Most countries have concluded that for the moment, the risks of remote electronic voting outweigh the benefits. Many are hopeful, however, that the issues of concern can be overcome as technology improves. While remote electronic voting is especially relevant for external voters who do not have access to polling stations, some countries also foresee eventually making it available to domestic voters. 57. The use of new technologies such as remote electronic voting presents both challenges and promises. The concept is attractive primarily because it would make voting easier and more accessible for much of the electorate. It could be of particular benefit to out-of-country voters, many of whom reside far from diplomatic missions or in countries with unreliable postal systems. Remote electronic voting thus has the potential to increase greatly the participation of voters abroad. It could reduce the cost of OCV over the long term, although it might involve significant startup costs. Remote electronic voting could also provide a solution to timing problems that have sometimes complicated OCV, since electronic voting is instantaneous and would not result in delays in sending out ballots or transmitting votes. In many countries, the number of young people voting is declining, and some election officials believe that introducing

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remote electronic voting for the general population would increase their participation, both at home and as voters abroad. 58. Despite its potential benefits, remote electronic voting also poses a number of concerns that have not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of most countries. The most important of these are security concerns, which apply to remote electronic voting in general, whether by voters in country or abroad. Because remote electronic voting would be carried out over the Internet, many EMBs and experts have expressed concerns about the secrecy of votes and fear that computer systems could be broken into and manipulated by hackers. Remote electronic voting would not produce a verifiable paper trail, making a standard recount impossible. Some types of remote electronic voting, such as voting by telephone, might not be able to easily handle complex voting systems, such as preference voting. Remote electronic voting could also raise concerns about double-voting, unless effective measures are in place to prevent individuals from voting both remotely and in person. Other concerns about remote electronic voting are similar to concerns to electronic voting in general, in regard to security, verifiability, reliability, voter confidence and expense. In addition, remote electronic voting could also share some of the disadvantages of postal voting, in terms of being susceptible to family voting or other types of intimidation, or to vote-buying. Some EMBs have argued that since not everyone has access to the Internet, remote electronic voting could be used to supplement paper ballots, but could not replace them. Some countries see OCV as an appropriate test case for remote electronic voting (e.g. France, Russia), while others take the position that they could not introduce remote electronic voting for OCV unless they could also make it available for domestic voters (e.g. Switzerland).16 59. A number of technical solutions have been proposed to deal with the security and other concerns associated with remote electronic voting. For example, individual voter codes, electronic signatures, and compartmentalization of personal data from voting data could help alleviate concerns over ballot secrecy. Encryption of data could help prevent hacking.

16. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, pages 219, 222.

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Sending ballots as images rather than data could allow voters to verify their vote and might provide an electronic paper trail for a possible recount. To prevent double voting, systems could be developed to ensure remote voters are marked immediately in an electronic voter register as their votes are cast. Many of these proposed solutions are promising, although some might present new problems or require significant expense. 60. Notwithstanding the risks of remote electronic voting, many countries are taking steps to test or to implement these procedures. In 2007, Estonia became the first country to permit electronic voting by all voters at home or abroad in a national election. Just 3.4 per cent of voters chose to vote by this method. In 2009, Estonia made Internet voting available for European Parliament elections and for local elections. The number of voters using Internet voting increased to 6.5 per cent for the former and 9.5 per cent for the latter,17 suggesting that voters are warming to the system. 61. Several practitioners at the workshop commented on their own countries plans in regard to remote electronic voting. The Russian Federation is considering implementing Internet voting and voting by mobile phone for OCV, as well as for in-country voting. Voting by telephone may be particularly promising, since a reported 95 per cent of Russians are GSM users.18 France also hopes to introduce remote electronic voting.19 In both France and the Russian Federation, the vote would be enabled by a special personal code allowing the voter to connect to a central server. In the French case, the voter will be able to verify if the vote has been cast correctly in order to increase voter confidence. Tests are under way in both countries to identify and deal with the various concerns about remote electronic voting.

17. Estonian National Electoral Committee, http://www.vvk.ee/index.php?id=11178. 18. The expert from the Russian Federation reiterated that young voters seem to be particularly attracted to remote electronic voting, which could serve as an incentive for them to be more involved in the public life. 19. Since 2003, France has allowed remote external OCV for elections of the Conseil suprieur des Franais de ltranger, and since 2004 for the Assemble des Franais de ltranger, two bodies that represent citizens abroad.

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The Indonesian expert commented that remote electronic voting could be appropriate for a presidential election or other elections with limited numbers of candidates, but could prove technically difficult to implement in complex, multi-constituencies systems with large numbers of candidates and political parties, as is the case for Indonesias legislative elections. The parliament of Moldova adopted a law in 2008 providing for the implementation of Internet voting by 2013; however, there are still reservations among some election officials concerning the potential for manipulation of remote electronic voting technologies. 62. A number of other countries and jurisdictions have conducted tests or pilot projects on remote electronic voting and have concluded that for the moment, it does not provide the necessary levels of confidence and security. The United Kingdom, for example, undertook five pilot projects in 2007 on remote voting via telephone and computer. The Electoral Commission concluded that although there were no significant security incidents or fraud reported, there was an unnecessarily high level of risk associated with all the pilots and that the security, quality assurance, and transparency of the processes was not sufficient.20 The Australian Election Commission has concluded that the introduction of Internet voting is not feasible at this time due to a variety of security, technical, financial, access and equity issues.21 The United States planned to implement remote electronic voting for military and other overseas personnel in 2004, however the program was shut down before it was used when a review group reported that the Internet was not sufficiently secure for voting.22 Following the meeting, in October 2010, the Board of Elections of Washington, DC issued an open invitation to hackers to try to find vulnerabilities in a pilot system to allow DC voters abroad to cast ballots over the Internet; it took just 36 hours for hackers from the University of Michigan to gain control of the system and fix the result.23

20. Electronic voting May 2007 electoral pilot schemes, UK Electoral Commission, August 2007, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_ file/0008/13220/Electronicvotingsummarypaper_27194-20114__E__N__S__W__.pdf. 21. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, pages 220. 22. Ibid., page 222. 23. Voting Test Falls Victim to Hackers, The New York Times, October 9, 2010, page A12.

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63. The Council of Europe (CoE) has studied and made recommendations on electronic voting (which also apply to remote electronic voting for OCV), which to date are the only internationally agreed benchmarks to assess and evaluate electronic voting systems. Some of the CoE benchmarks with particular relevance to remote electronic voting include:24 Unless remote electronic voting is universally accessible, it should not be the only means available for voting; Remote electronic voting systems should be designed to ensure that no voter who uses the system can also cast a second vote in person or by a different method; The system must protect the secrecy of the ballot; The system should provide the possibility of a recount; The system should verify to voters that they have established a connection to the official server and should confirm to them that their ballot has been cast and registered. The CoE recommendations also set out a large number of technical standards for remote electronic voting. 64. The introduction of remote electronic voting for OCV can also affect other aspects of the voting process, such as voter registration. If remote electronic voting is introduced, electoral authorities need to ensure that the new voting procedure is compatible with the registration procedure, both to ensure the broadest possible participation and to prevent double voting. For example, a computerized voter register can greatly simplify remote electronic voting. 65. Participants in the workshop generally stressed the importance of building public confidence as an element of introducing remote electronic voting. This requires not only finding effective practical solutions to concerns about such voting, but also robust public information campaigns
24. Legal, Operational and Technical Standards for E-Voting Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of 30 September 2004, www.coe.int/t/dgap/democracy/activities/ggis/E-voting/.

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to build public understanding, trust and acceptance of the new system. If doubts exist about the honesty and integrity of a system that uses traditional paper ballots, then switching to any kind of electronic voting can be a further blow to stakeholder confidence in the system, since electronic voting is less transparent and far more difficult to verify than voting by paper ballot. IX. COSTS OF OUT-OF-COUNTRY VOTING 66. A significant practical issue surrounding OCV is its cost. OCV may entail substantial overall costs beyond domestic voting, while the cost per voter is also often appreciably higher for OCV than for domestic elections. Cost is therefore a significant factor to be considered as states decide whether and how to implement OCV. 67. The cost of OCV includes all of the normal expenses associated with elections, such as printing of ballots, procurement of supplies and equipment, and personnel. However, depending on the OCV system, it may also result in many other expenses. For example, establishing polling stations abroad requires set-up and personnel costs. If the polling stations are outside of embassies, this often requires renting space. Travel expenses can be significant if EMB or other officials must visit OCV sites. Communications with external voting sites can also be expensive. Transporting ballots and polling materials to locations abroad also entails costs. In some circumstances, security arrangements for OCV can be extremely costly. Using postal voting can be much less expensive than inperson voting, but there are still additional costs, such as sending external voters their absentee ballots by mail. Whatever system of OCV is used, special voter information and outreach campaigns and publications can be a significant expense. If a new voter registration system needs to be established in order to implement OCV, this can be one of the most expensive aspects of OCV. 68. Costs of elections can be extremely difficult to calculate and compare because many different bodies are involved (e.g., the EMB, the police, the judiciary, other government ministries) and because countries calculate their costs in different ways. By one rule of thumb, the cost per voter for domestic elections in established democracies is often between

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USD 1 and USD 3 per elector, rising to about USD 5 per elector in countries with less history of democratic elections, and to USD 10 or much more per elector in post-conflict situations.25 All of these costs are low compared to the possible costs of per elector of OCV. 69. Taking the most extreme cases, the highest recorded costs for an OCV exercise were for the Iraqi elections of early 2005, which cost an estimated USD 92 million, or over USD 300 per external vote. The 1999 Timor Leste OCV cost about USD 1 million, or about USD 161 per voter. In the Afghanistan elections of 2004, OCV cost about USD 24 million, with costs per vote in the range of USD 20-32.26 All of these were postconflict elections, which are generally far more expensive than elections in peacetime, and the international community contributed much of the necessary funding. 70. Some participants at the workshop provided information about the costs of OCV in their countries. Spains expenditures for OCV by postal voting during its last election amounted to Euros 1.4 million. Mexico spent USD 23 million for its OCV program in 2006, but only 32,632 external voters actually cast ballots. The cost of the effort thus came to about USD 700 per vote.27 Indonesia, in contrast, spent an overall USD 9 million for postal and in-person voting, which produced 340,000 external votes more than ten times the turnout of Mexico for less than half the total expenditure.28 Workshop participants from Bulgaria, France, El Salvador, Indonesia, Moldova, Romania, Spain, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reported a similar disconnect between the high organizational and mobilization costs of OCV compared to the OCV voter turnout.29 Participants in the workshop highlighted the link between the level of voter participation in OCV and the quality of public
25. ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/core/crb/crb03. 26. Figures are from Voting from Abroad, The International Idea Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, page 119 and may not be strictly comparable, since different countries use different methods to calculate costs. 27. Mexicos EMB, the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) assessed that if the personal voting method was used instead of postal voting, the cost would have been much higher, rising from USD 23 million to USD 600 million. 28. Indonesia organized OCV in 117 countries. The turnout for the last OCV was 20 per cent, i.e., 340,000 votes. 29. In Romania, the highest OCV participation in December 2009 was 148,000 votes cast in 294 polling stations, of an estimated 2 million potential voters. France registered a turnout of 23 per cent in 140 polling stations abroad for the last presidential elections.

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information campaigns, which can be a significant part of OCV expenses. For example, OCV turnout in Moldovas elections increased from 12,000 in 2005 to 18,000 in 2009 after the EMB issued and disseminated abroad an information booklet on OCV as part of an outreach campaign to voters abroad. Participants agreed, however, that inefficiencies in reaching out to external voters were not the only factor responsible for low turnouts. 71. The participants acknowledged that cost cannot be the only criterion to assess OCV systems. Measuring success should also take into account the breadth of voter registration, the extent of voter turnout, the quality of information and awareness campaigns, the level of confidence in the election administration and other factors. X. OBSERVATION OF OUT OF COUNTRY VOTING 72. Election observation is now widely recognized as an activity that can deter fraud, improve the quality of elections, and increase public confidence in election processes. Observation is usually carried out by international organizations or by non-partisan domestic observers.30 Observation of OCV can have the same types of positive impact, particularly for countries where the external vote can swing the results of an election or where domestic stakeholders fear that external votes could be manipulated to influence election results. 73. OCV can pose some special challenges for election observation. In theory, personal voting at special polling stations abroad can be observed in much the same way as at domestic polling stations. A number of countries have legislation or regulations specifically permitting observation of voting that takes place in their embassies or consulates. Some domestic observer groups or international organizations have been able to take advantage of these rules to organize OCV observation of certain election processes. For example, the OSCE organized observation of external voting in 26 countries for the Bosnia and Herzegovina elections of 1996.31 For the Iraq elections of 2005, interested states with the support of the United
30. The most widely accepted principles and methodology for international election observation can be found in the Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation, signed in 2005 by dozens of international organizations, including the United Nations, http://www.ndi.org/files/1923_ declaration_102705_0.pdf. 31. Voting from Abroad, The International IDEA Handbook, International IDEA, 2007, page 209.

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Nations established the International Mission for Iraqi Elections, which observed Iraqi OCV in 15 countries.32 In general, however, observation of OCV is far more complicated to organize and more expensive than observation in a single country, particularly if external voters are widely dispersed. 74. Some types of OCV do not lend themselves to effective observation. For example, it is not possible to observe postal voting or remote electronic voting. However, even with postal voting it may be possible for observers to monitor the vote count and tabulation at counting centers abroad or in the home country. Moreover, a central principle of effective observation is that observers should assess the overall, long-term electoral process, not just the voting process on election day.33 Even where observers cannot be present in polling stations on election day, observation of the OCV process can encompass an assessment of the legal framework, the process of voter registration, any efforts at public information or voter education, and the level of confidence in OCV by political parties and other stakeholders at home. XI. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 75. The workshop did not reach formal conclusions or adopt official recommendations. However, a general consensus did emerge among the participants on a number of key points in regard to OCV that might be considered as basic guidelines or best practices. These are set out briefly in the paragraphs below. These findings and recommendations would be worth further discussion, elaboration and development for the benefit of states seeking to introduce or improve methods of OCV: OCV contributes to achieving the principles of universal and equal suffrage for all citizens. Developing and implementing effective systems of OCV can therefore enhance the overall quality of elections by expanding participation and providing access to the political system for increased numbers of citizens.

32. International Mission for Iraqi Elections, www.imie.ca. 33. Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation, page 3.

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OCV can also reinforce the links between states and citizens abroad. States that have not implemented systems of OCV should consider doing so, and states that already have such systems should consider how they can be made more universal and effective.

There is no single best method of OCV. Circumstances vary widely among states in terms of the number and status of their citizens abroad, where they reside and how dispersed they are. The ease of access to embassies, the reliability of local postal systems and the availability of Internet connections in the host countries are other factors that impact the effectiveness of OCV systems. The type of voting system used at home and the timing of domestic elections are also factors that can affect the appropriateness of different OCV systems. States should carefully consider the benefits and challenges of different types of OCV systems when designing their own process, with a view to making the franchise as widely available as possible. In many cases it might be beneficial to make more than one system available to voters. A fundamental aspect of the design of OCV is how it relates to the broader election system. Such issues as whether electors abroad have their own representatives in parliament and whether they are allowed to vote in local as well as national elections are important considerations. Any legal limits placed on the eligibility of voters abroad must also be incorporated into the mechanics of the OCV system. When designing OCV systems, states should consider how the specificities of their election systems might be affected by OCV and which OCV systems might be best suited to accommodate these. A critical element in the success of any OCV method is that it enjoys the confidence of key election stakeholders, including voters, candidates, political parties and election administrators. This requires, for example, that the system be transparent and that it include sufficient measures to ensure the accuracy the voter lists and the integrity of the vote counting process. The OCV system should have safeguards to prevent double voting

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or other types of manipulation. In introducing or modifying systems of OCV, it is crucial that states take steps to build public confidence in the process by promoting transparency and demonstrating the integrity of the process. As with other election procedures, a key step in creating confidence can be achieving consensus among political parties at home on the system and procedures to be used for OCV. Credible elections depend upon a well informed electorate. This is true for OCV as well as in-country voting. Informing voters means ensuring that both external and internal voters understand the principles and the mechanics of OCV. It also means ensuring that external voters have access to sufficient information about the substance of the election to enable them to make an informed choice. Wide-reaching and effective voter education and public information campaigns should be designed and implemented as a key element of OCV systems. As with elections in general, voter registration can be one of the most difficult, expensive and complex aspects of OCV. Accurate voter registers are important to build public confidence, avoid confusion on election day and prevent fraud. Registration for OCV can entail significant additional challenges for election administrators in ensuring that external voters are registered and that they are not registered twice. Voter registration systems for OCV should be carefully designed to ensure that the maximum number of external voters can be registered through a simple procedure and to prevent double registration. Voter education can be an important tool to assist in the registration of voters abroad. Relations with host countries can pose a number of challenges to OCV. While postal voting, voting in embassies by limited numbers of electors, and remote electronic voting may not necessarily require host country cooperation, many aspects of OCV might require approval or cooperation by host country national or local authorities. Some host countries have been particularly forthcoming in providing cooperation, assistance

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and material support for OCV within their territories. In the interests of promoting democratic elections and international cooperation, host countries should consider how they can best facilitate and support OCV activities on their territories, including ensuring security, providing assistance, and refraining from imposing restrictions or limitations. Regional and other international organizations could consider developing a set of good practices or guidelines to assist host countries in facilitating and supporting OCV. Remote electronic voting is an attractive concept for OCV that is being tested by an increasing number of countries. However, at this stage most countries considering remote electronic voting have concluded that it still poses unacceptable risks, in particular in not providing sufficient guarantees for security against hackers, secrecy of the ballots, and general transparency of the system. Remote electronic voting could also pose a challenge in preventing double voting. States considering remote electronic voting as a form of OCV should give careful attention especially to security issues to protect the integrity of the voting process, in view of the lack of success to date in developing systems that are immune from hacking. Any system of remote electronic voting should be subject to tests and pilot projects before being widely implemented. OCV can entail substantial costs, depending on the extent of the electorate abroad and the system of OCV established. In different circumstances, postal voting or in-person voting in embassies may prove to be more cost effective. Providing more than one method of OCV can add significantly to the costs. Whatever voting system is used, the costs for voter registration and public information may be high. In many instances, OCV has produced low voter turnout and a relatively high cost per vote, raising the dilemma of how to reconcile the principle of providing full enfranchisement to voters abroad with the high costs it may entail. States may wish to assess the costs of various methods of OCV as one factor in determining which OCV system(s) is most appropriate for their national circumstances.

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 Election observers can enhance public confidence in the electoral process, including OCV. Observing OCV, however, can pose a number of significant obstacles for international or domestic monitoring groups. States should consider how they can facilitate observation of OCV, including such measures as providing observers access to embassies or other locations where OCV may take place and ensuring that observers have access to domestic counting centers for votes cast by external voters. XII. FOLLOW-UP 76. Romania announced it would present a summary of the workshop and its findings at the High Level Democracy Meeting of the Community of Democracies Working Group on Regional Cooperation taking place in Kracow on 2-4 July 2010. 77. The Romanian Permanent Electoral Authority indicated that it planned to consider the main findings of the workshop at the end of the summer, as part of internal discussions on the possible adoption of amendments to the Electoral Law, including the regulations relating to OCV. 78. Most participants expressed an interest in presenting the final report and the findings of the workshop in their own country. 79. UN EAD announced that it planned to publish a report of the workshop in order to ensure that the experiences, ideas and recommendations emerging from the discussion are widely available. 80. In addition, EAD indicated that it would hold consultations with United Nations Member States to discuss the possibility of introducing language that could reflect the workshops recommendations on OCV in the next biennial General Assembly resolution on Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization.

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XIII. ANNEXES Annotated Agenda of the Workshop List of Participants

ANNOTATED AGENDA

As global population mobility increases, a growing number of countries are seeking to enhance the enfranchisement of immigrant populations and diasporas by introducing external voting mechanisms for their citizens living abroad. At present, the decision as to whether and how to facilitate external voting remains country and case specific; many different approaches have been adopted. Furthermore, the design and implementation of an external voting system raises sensitive political issues, poses important questions relating to representation and legitimacy and is complex to administer. In this context, the workshop on Out of Country Voting aims at offering a forum for practitioners and experts to share their experiences with Out-of-Country Voting (OCV); examine the full range of approaches and methods for OCV and reflect on the challenges involved in organizing external voting. The workshop is also an opportunity to promote dialogue and enhance cooperation between electoral authorities.

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 Monday 7th June 08:30 Registration 09:30 Opening and Welcome Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dumitriu United Nations Electoral Assistance Division, Mr. Martinez Valdes Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, Mr. Opri

10:30 Coffee Break 11:00 Session One: Overview of OCV practice and issues This session will start with an overview of the range of existing out of country voting (OCV) provisions and procedures as well as the common challenges related to their implementation. It will provide the opportunity for participants to indicate the key achievements and significant challenges they are facing in the organization of OCV in their respective countries. Key issues to consider include: What method of OCV is in use? Is OCV used for some elections and not for others? Is OCV considered a success by election stakeholders and the wider public? What improvements have been made to OCV over the years? Presenter: Kovacs Moderator: Valdes 13:00 Lunch break Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, Mr. UN Electoral Assistance Division, Mr. Martinez

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14:30 Session Two: Eligibility and Registration of External Voters This session will provide participants with the opportunity to consider who should be eligible for OCV and how they should be registered to vote. Those eligible may include economic migrants, including undocumented migrants, and conflict-forced migrants. The session will also review how external voters are apportioned in different systems, either through integration into internal districts or through special representation. Participants will be able to outline the approaches that are taken in their respective countries to these issues, indicate whether they are working and have public support and offer any lessons learnt that could be of benefit to other participants. Key issues to consider include: Should all citizens living outside the country be eligible, or should this right be restricted in some way? If restrictions are to be put in place, what should these be based on? What are the most effective registration procedures to use? Are there any registration procedures (postal/in person/in country) that have restricted eligibility in practice? Are there specific challenges for registering undocumented migrants or conflict-forced migrants? What are the advantages and disadvantages of internal integration and the establishment of extra-territorial districts? Presenter: Moderator: Popescu 16:00 Coffee Break 16:30 Session Three: Outreach to potential external voters and turnout This session will look at ways in which different countries have reached out to potential external voters, including undocumented migrants Spain, Ms. Lopez Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, Mr.

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and conflict-forced migrants, to encourage them to register and vote. Building on this knowledge, participants will seek to identify what can be considered to be good practice in this area. Key issues to consider include: What type of registration and voting arrangements best facilitate external voter participation? What means of conducting voter education and providing electoral information abroad have proved to be most successful? What means of facilitating and/or regulating campaign activity abroad have proved to be most successful? What are the key challenges that need to be overcome in this area of outreach? Presenter: Moderator: Mexico, Mr. Andrade OSCE/ODIHR, Ms. Schmidt

18:00 Conclusions The Rapporteur will give an overview of the key findings and conclusions from the discussions throughout the three sessions of the first day. 18:30 Close Tuesday 8th June 09:00 Session Four: Host country cooperation This session will consider the issue of host country cooperation for OCV, looking in particular at positive examples of cooperation as well as situations in which problems might have arisen. Participants will be asked to reflect on the issue from the point of view of being a country reaching out to others to request assistance, and from the point of view of a country providing assistance as host countries. The session may include discussion on host country cooperation in relation to undocumented migrants and conflict-forced migrants.

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Key issues to consider include: What are the key issues that need to be addressed when reaching out to another country to provide assistance in OCV? What legal arrangements need to be put in place to facilitate voting in a host country? What are the challenges of host-country cooperation in relation to undocumented migrants and conflict-forced migrants? What are the key problems that have arisen in the area of host country cooperation and how have these been addressed? What are the key improvements that can be made to ensure that this aspect of OCV works better in the future? Presenter: Moderator: Senegal, Mr. Ndiaye IOM, Ms. Marzatico

11:00 Coffee Break 11:30 Session Five: E-voting This session will consider the issue of electronic voting as an OCV method. E-voting was implemented both internally and externally by Estonia in 2007 and has been tested by a number of other countries. With reference to these experiences, the session will examine the advantages and disadvantages of using electronic voting for OCV and ask whether it is a method that should be encouraged. Key issues to consider include: How effective has external e-voting been where it has been used so far? How easy to use and popular has e-voting been with external voters? What are the main benefits of introducing e-voting for OCV? What are the main challenges to be addressed when introducing e-voting for OCV? Are there any problems attached to using e-voting only for OCV and not for internal voting as well?

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 What risks are there to secrecy of the ballot? Have these been successfully overcome in countries that have adopted e-voting for OCV? Presenter: Moderator: France, Mr. Courtade International IDEA, Mr. Wolf

13:00 Lunch Break 14:30 Session Six: Advantages and Disadvantages of OCV methods This session will provide participants with the possibility to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of OCV methods, with specific reference to the examples provided during the previous sessions. Methods that may be discussed include personal voting (in embassies or elsewhere), external polls, postal voting, proxy voting and electronic voting. Participants will be able to question each other about the various methods with a view to identifying key conclusions about what is working well, and what is working less well. Particular emphasis will be placed on identifying methods that have encouraged high turnout among external voters. Key issues to consider include: What is the impact of the extent of a countrys diplomatic network on its capacity to implement OCV? How is the external voting population targeted and provided for? What are the key challenges to be faced in the establishment of external polling centers? What impact does the quality of the postal system have on OCV, particularly in terms of reach and cost? What are the benefits and challenges of providing extended timeframes for external voting? Which OCV methods are the most cost-effective? Are any methods particularly relevant for undocumented migrants or conflict-forced migrants? Do different methods provide varying security/secrecy guarantees?

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 Which methods have been most successful at encouraging high turnout? Presenter: Moderator: 16:30 Coffee Break 17:00 Conclusions The Rapporteur will give an overview of the key findings and conclusions from the second days sessions, as well as overall conclusions and outcome of the workshop. Closing remarks: Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Baconschi UN Electoral Assistance Division, Mr. Martinez Valdes Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, Mr. Opri 18:00 Close Indonesia, Mr. Aziz ACEEEO, Mr. Rdi

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Workshop on Out of Country Voting Bucharest,7-8 June 2010 Liste of Participants COUNTRY Armenia Azerbaijan Bulgaria INSTITUTION Central Election Commission Central Election Commission NAME Ms. Dianna Mirzoyan Mr. Samir Maharramov Mr. Maria Musorlieva Central Election Commission Mr. Alexander Ouroumov Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Jos Manuel Castillo Elections Office, Ministry of Interior Mr. Pascal Courtade Central Election Commission Mr. Abdul Aziz Ahmad Mr. Aleksandar Novakoski Mr. Virgilio Andrade Mr. Eugeniu Stirbu Mr. Nicolae Girbu Mr. Iurie Ciocan Mr. Corneliu Pasat Mr. Vasily Volkov Mr. Sergei Pushkov Mr. Cheikh Alioune Ndiaye H.E. Mr. Lee KWANG JAE Ms. Ana Cristina Lopez Mr. Mehmet Krtl Mr. Octavian Opris Mr. Marian Muhulet Ms. Ana Maria Patru Mr. Bogdan Popescu Mr. Tiberiu Csaba Kovacs Mr. Cristian Leahu Mr. Teodor Baconschi Mr. Petru Dumitriu Ms. Ioana Costache Ms. Claudia-Monica Alexandru Ms. Roxana Sima Mr. Gyula Rdi Mr. Tibor Vaszi TITLE Leading Specialist Deputy Head of Secretariat Commission Member Commission Member Director Deputy Chief Commissioner President Electoral Councillor Chairman Commission Member Commission Secretary Senior Adviser Commission Member Leading Consultant - Federal Center for Information Technologies Head of Logistics Division Ambassador to Romania Head of Electoral Cooperation Unit Council Member President Vice-President Vice-President Head of Foreign Relations Office Secretary General Director Minister of Foreign Affairs Director General for Multilateral Affairs Diplomatic Counsellor Third Secretary, Assistance for Development Division Counsellor to the Minister Expert Program Director Policy Officer Technical Manager - Electoral Processes Head of Elections Support Unit Senior Election Adviser Resident Representative Program Associate for Democratic Governance Senior Officer Rapporteur

El Salvador France Indonesia former Yugoslav State Election Commission Republic of Macedonia Mexico Instituto Federal Electoral Republic of Moldova

Central Election Commission

Russian Federation Senegal South Korea Spain Turkey

Central Election Commission Ministry of Interior Embassy in Romania Ministry of Interior High Council of Elections

Romania

Permanent Electoral Commission

Romania

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ACEEEO European Union International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance International Organisation for Migration (IOM) OSCE United Nations Development Programme United Nations United Nations

Association of European Election Officials Justice, Freedom and Security DG Citizenship Unit

Design of Democratic Institutions and Mr. Peter Wolf Processes Elections Support Unit Ms. Francesca Marzatico

Office for Democratic Institutions and Ms Nicola Schmidt Human Rights (ODIHR) Ms. Yesim Oruc Office in Romania Ms. Ana Stoica Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) Mr. Martinez Valdes Consultancy Mr. Filon Morar

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