THEODOR CONRAD AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

AESTHETICS

Gabriele Scaramuzza

T h a t the lstituto Banff s h o u l d have p r o m o t e d this c o n v e n t i o n on p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a i aesthetics is not o n l y p e r f e c t l y in k e e p i n g with the t r a d i t i o n s o f an institution w h i c h since its i n c e p t i o n has p r i o r i t i s e d a e s t h e t i c s as a field o f i n t e r v e n t i o n ; it is a l s o p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the p h i l o s p h e r f r o m w h o m the Institute takes its name. N o t o n l y was Banff, as is well k n o w n , a m o n g the first to s t i m u l a t e interest in H u s s e r l ' s t h o u g h t in Italy; ~ he w a s also the first to e x p l o i t the p o s s i b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y to aesthetics. P e r s o n a l l y , I r e c a l l that it was in B a n f f ' s writings that I l e a r n e d o f the e x i s t e n c e o f W a l d e m a r C o n r a d and M o r i t z G e i g e r for the first time, 2 and it w a s that w h i c h s t i m u l a t e d m e to l e a r n m o r e about them) A s early as 1924, Banff r e f e r r e d to G e i g e r ' s Beitrage zur Phanomenologie des iisthetischen Genusses, in a f o o t n o t e to "I1 p r i n c i p i o t r a s c e n d e n t a l e d e l l ' a u t o n o m i a d e l l ' A r t e , " with r e s p e c t to ' T i n t e r e s s e e la c o n t e m p l a z i o n e estetica. ''4 S u b s e q u e n t l y , he c o n t i n u e d to r e f e r b r i e f l y to C o n r a d a n d G e i g e r ; h o w e v e r the m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t r e f e r e n c e is c o n t a i n e d in Motivi dell'estetica contemporanea,

J "Seit einiger Zeit habe ich gesucht in ltalien die ph~inomenologische Philosophic bekannt zu machen," writes Banff on 18 January 1925 in a letter to Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Munich, Bayerische Staatshibliothek - class. Conrad-Martiusiana C II). 2 These two names together, and alone, among early practitioners of phenomenological aesthetics; presumably because some of their writings had already been published in Husserl's well-known, prestigious Jahrbuch j~r Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung and Dessoir' s Zeitschrift fiir ,4sthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft. Conrad and Geiger were moreover near contemporaries of Banff, who for his own part (as is indirectly witnessed by the letter just mentioned) was certainly closer to the Munich and GSttingen schools' phase of phenomenology than to the "Heideggerian" kind (if we are to follow the distinction made by [Apel 1955-57], 54-76). 3 Here in Italy these were anything but famous names. It would be some time before any other Italian noted having read these authors: Estetica. Teoria dell'oggetto artistico evidenziato by Elisa Oberti (which contains references to Conrad and Geiger) was published in Milan in 1962; no work on them was done by any of Banff's direct pupils. 4 See the republished edition of "I1 principio trascendentale dell'autonomia dell'arte" in [Banff 1988], 174.

Axiomathes, Nos. 1-2, 1998, pp. 93-103.

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published in 1938. 5 In this work Banfi criticised the two scholars, who in his view were unable to go beyond the bounds which restricted the research of Kunstwissenschafi. This research did indeed produce results that were "unsagbar reich," but which nonetheless found "ihre Grenze" in their inability to justify that which they presupposed, namely "das Eigent/.imliche der Idee der Kunst, soweit sie einigend und kontinuierlich ist. Und die ph~inomenologischen Untersuchungen (Conrad), die gerade solche Voraussetzung klarmachen wollen, indem sic die reine kfinstlerisch-~isthetische Objektivit/it oder Subjektivitat analysieren, bleiben notwendigerweise bei einer Reihe von Bestimmungen stehen, die ohne Z u s a m m e n h a n g und darum abstrakt sind. ''6 At first glance, the criticism may appear somewhat hasty (especially if referred to the whole body of research in question, which includes the vast studies of Geiger and Ingarden). It also appears affected by the neo-Kantian partiality which was never far from Banfi's thought. Banfi was quick to note certain objectivist inclinations c o m m o n to the science of art and to the early exponents of aesthetic phenomenology. Rather his reservations appear to betray an incomplete appreciation of the results of the two scholars' research, inasmuch as he passes over their premises of method and seems to equate their highly analytical procedures with a kind of empiricism lacking a centre. Yet it was precisely the search for a nucleus around which the results of aesthetic research could coagulate that was the focus of so much effort on the part of early phenomenologists (and not only Banff).

By way o f corroboration, I should like m y s e l f to give some consideration to a m e m b e r of the phenomenological circle in Munich who has received relatively little study: Theodor c o n r a d ; 7 m y choice is determined by his 5 Now in [Banff 1988], 60. 6 Quoted from p. 124 of the German translation of the essay: "Motive und Probleme der zeitgen6ssischen Asthetik," Die Tatwelt, XV/3 (Sept. 1939, 120-127) and 4 (Dec. 1939 / Jan. 1940, 157-164); Geiger's name no longer appeared; other names which had similarly disappeared despite being cited in the Italian original included Simmel, Cohen, Cassirer, Bergson, Dessoir, Utitz, Cohn, Sch6nberg, Berg, Mann, Kandinsky, Lukhcs, Gide, Dos Passos (all Jews or exponents of entartete KunsO. 7 At the University of Munich Theodor Conrad (I 881-1969) studied physics and mathematics (the latter also at Heidelberg). Above all, at Munich Conrad fell under the influence of his uncle Theodor Lipps in psychology and philosophy. He was a member of the Psychologischer Verein, indeed he was its leader for the summer semester of I906 and the winter semester of 1906/1907 (when he fell ill and was replaced by Geiger). In February-March 1906 he lectured to the society on the subject of "Lehre vom Begriff;" on 11 May 1906 he read a paper on "Problemstellung in

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s y m p t o m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t to tackling the p r o b l e m o f providing a centre a r o u n d which to organise aesthetic discourse. First o f all, Conrad held certain traits in c o m m o n with the scholars w h o adhered to the first version o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a ] aesthetics. It is w e l l - k n o w n that a primary characteristic o f M u n i c h - s c h o o l aesthetics is its derivation f r o m the t h o u g h t o f T h e o d o r Lipps and its familiarity with the world o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l research. Onto these origins were subsequently grafted the reading o f the Logische Untersuchungen and direct k n o w l e d g e o f Husser], together with the anti-psycho]ogistica] notions that this implied. This f o r m o f aesthetics thus developed in the ambit o f an open dialogue with the theorists o f Einfiihlung (on the functioning o f this in aesthetics, a subject w h i c h A. Fischer and Daubert d e v e l o p e d as m u c h as did Geiger), and also in the context o f a c o m m o n , "realistic" interpretation o f H u s s e r l ' s thought, preferring the method o f Wesensanalyse to that o f Intentionalanalyse w h i c h Husserl propounded. 8 T h e lively cultural life o f M u n i c h during the period was an equally strong formative influence, 9 in particular the figure o f A d o l f Hildebrand, whose influence in the city was almost universally felt. A first c o m m o n concern o f a]] these scholars was the p r o b l e m o f the scope o f the brief o f aesthetics; in their view, p h e n o m e n o l o g y could play a decisive role in just this area, clarifying the methods and kinds o f situations which f o r m e d the proper ambit o f aesthetics. In such a context the focus for research was, at least in principle, the issue o f the aesthetic object; the peculiarity o f this was traced, not so m u c h to its typical structure, 1 as to the characteristic values o f which it is the bearer. I~

der Asthetik," and on 20 February 1908 another on "'Lipps: Denken, FOhlen, Wollen." He was a member of the Munich phenomenological circle and in 1907 spent a semester with Husserl, becoming his temporary assistant during 1909; in Grttingen he took part in debates at the local phenomenological society. For information on him, see H. L. Van Breda, Geleitwortto ]Conrad 1968], VII-XII; [Spiegelberg 1984], 234. Theodor Conrad should not be confused with Waldemar Conrad, who was not a member of the Mtinchener Kreis and whose chosen methods and subject matter were closer to Husserl's research in the period. s ]Av6-Lallemant 1975a], 24. On this subject, see also [Conrad-Martius 1959], 175-184. Among the "Nachl~lsse der M~Inchener Ph~anomenologen," there are papers by Conrad on his reading of phenomenology, as well as on Lipps and his recollections of the Mtinchener Kreis (see [Av~-Lallemant 1975b], 160-170); he also wrote an important essay in this context, ]Conrad 1911], 51-76. 9 See [Schuhmann 1997]. to This was later to be made an object of study by the "GOttinger" W. Conrad and Ingarden. ~t In effect the "Mt~fichener" devoted their efforts principally to reflections on the aesthetic approach (and the part played in it by empathy, enjoyment, assessment, with their respective backgrounds). All of them (Th. Conrad and Fischer no less than Geiger) showed a highly developed sensitivity to the question of values.

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The question of the object brings with it that of the objectivity of values and structures, their inter-subjective significative and cognitive meaning (beyond every form o f scepticism or aesthetic relativism). All this falls within the dimensions of the aesthetic-artistic world, which in turn cannot be governed by the terms available to natural sciences, nor expressed by the language of psychology, nor pinned down by any historicist contextualisation; 12 while it may, on the other hand, be adequately outlined by phenomenology. The Munich scholars nonetheless shared a c o m m o n conviction that phenomenology should not take up the whole space o f philosophical and aesthetic research, but rather that it represented one moment of itJ 3 The same could well be said of Banff, albeit in a different context: he saw phenomenology as a phase, though an indispensable one, of research which must be conducted following the transcendental method. For our phenomenologists, not every aspect of the complex and wideranging reality of aesthetics can be tackled with the phenomenological method: there are problems which still pertain to other and particular sciences (first and foremost psychology), or whose foundation demands referral to metaphysics.

3 Returning to Theodor Conrad, the task which he set himself was in the first place to delimit the problematical ambit and mission of aesthetics, as is indeed revealed in the title of his dissertation) 4 The first step which served this purpose was to make an explicit denunciation of the confusion which reigned in aesthetic studies;15 in this he was joined by Fischer and Geiger. The phenomenological method ought indeed to be of assistance in discerning how the ambit o f aesthetics differs f r o m other ambits, as well as in highlighting internal differences within aesthetics itself. H o w e v e r the term t2 Early phenomenological aesthetics "fi~hrte zur Verneinung der kausalen Auffassung der Dichtung und der Kunst als eines historischen und sozialen Produkt und zur Konzentration auf das Werk selbst in seiner immanenten Bedeutung, ohne Bezug zu dem Urheher des Werks und zur konkreten historischen Zeit seiner Entstehung" ([Chvatik 1987], 202) ~3 It is no coincidence that Husserl should have affirmed that "Geiger ist nur 1/4 Ph~inomenologe" in a letter to Ingarden ([Husserl 1968], 23). Volkelt actually held that Geiger's researches represented nothing more than a particularly refined form of "empirisch-psycologische Analyse" ([Volkelt 1917], note to p. 400). 14 Definition und Forschungsgehalt der Asthetik, disputed on 21.12.1908 at the University of Munich (where it was presented by Th. Lipps); later published (with a dedication to his mother) at Bergzabern in 1909 (abbreviated as DF). 55 "Es ist ja heute kaum ang~ngig, schon yon der .~.sthetik zu reden als yon der einen, eindeutig bestimmten Wissenschaft" (DF 5).

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p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l is used with caution here and its proper area o f application is still held to be o n l y partial: Conrad sees p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a fledgling science and one which can p e r f o r m no m o r e than a propaedeutical role, so far as aesthetics is concerned. He himself presented his research as only a r o u g h outline o f aesthetics in the strict sense - w h i c h should then develop into a b r o a d p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f values and their object roots (a p h e n o m e n o l o g y for which, h o w e v e r , he does no more than sketch a general programme). P h e n o m e n o l o g y makes it possible to eliminate dangerous c o n f u s i o n and introduce subtle distinctions which may be put to the task o f bringing out the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f aesthetics as a discipline; first and foremost, they p r o v e that it c a n n o t be reduced to any form o f p s y c h o l o g y , t6 Its specific contents are not p s y c h i c data, nor can they thus be placed within the ambit of p s y c h o l o g y . 17 Certainly f r o m a general point o f view the term aesthetics m a y also c o n c e r n such behaviour as creation, evaluation, e n j o y m e n t ; with respect to this broad definition C o n r a d himself recognized that "unsere G e b i e t s b e s t i m m u n g der Asthetik sei zu eng" (DF 65). This might be too restrictive, but C o n r a d holds that it w o u l d be improper to extend its bounds too far, allowing it to refer to the most disparate situations in the w a y that it is e m p l o y e d in e v e r y d a y use. T o c o n s i d e r aesthetics as the theory o f that which is c o m m o n l y called aesthetic is too vagne by far.

If w e view aesthetics in the f o r m which it has progressively taken through history, the first thing which strikes us is that this is not an unequivocal science: 16 Either in Fechner's, or in Lipps' form, for whom a symphony, for example, must always and reductively remain a "Geschichte eines inneren Lebens" ([Lipps 1908], 365). 17"Denn die zuvor zu erforschenden komplexen Ph~inomene, in die sowohl das Erlebnis (z.B. der erlebte Genuss) als auch der betreffende ~sthetische Wert, als auch ferner der Werttr~iger (das wertvolle Objekt, das da genossen wird) eingehen, sind weder als diese Gesamtkomplexe noch allen ihren Bestandteilen nach etwas Psychisches und fallen daher auch - v o n den in sie eingehenden Erlebnissen abgesehen - nicht in den Bereich der Psychologie" (DF 63-64). Moreover, even if these were psychic events, this would not of itself allow phenomenological consideration of them to be confused with a psychological approach: "Und wir k(3nnen in Parenthese hinzuf~igen: auch soweit es sich nur um die psychischen Bestandteile in diesen komplexen Ph~inomene handelt, wtirde unsere Forderung, zuerst Ph~nomenologie zu treiben, nicht mit der Forderung der Psychologen tibereinstimmen; denn die Ph~inomenologie des Psychischen ist etwas anderes, als die deskriptive Psychologie; sie ist auch keine Wesenslehre des Psychischen und noch viel weniger nattirlich erkl~'ende Psychologie; sie ist mit einem Wort [iberhaupt keine der verschiedenen psychologischen Disciplinen, sondern eine diesen vorgelagerte Wissenschaft eigener Art" (DF 64).

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it has been defined on occasion as the theory of the beautiful, or of art, or of both together (DF 5). Thus, in the first place, it is restrictive to define aesthetics as the "'Lehre von der Kunst oder Philosophie der Kunst" (DF 11). The main reason for this is that the aesthetic also exists in nature, or at least outside the world of the arts - and with it there is a world of values which cannot be treated exclusively by an artistic and theoretical approach. Furthermore, we may perceive various levels o f theoretical reflection on art, of which aesthetics is but one; it needs to be more clearly characterised as compared to, say, art history or the technical disciplines o f the individual arts, as Aloys Fischer was to make clear, j8 It is equally limiting to define aesthetics as the theory of the beautiful, even if we include the various forms this m a y take (sublime, tragic, comic, etc.), t9 Other aesthetic questions can and must be raised; other categories of aesthetic assessment exist, and they cannot all be forcibly kept within the channel defined by the alternatives of the beautiful and the ugly. 2 In consequence it goes without saying that even a connotation o f aesthetics as the theory of the beautiful and of art together is ambiguous. The definitions we have just considered are thus partial, where they are not misleading. All these definitions are found wanting in that "sie versuchen, etwas zu leisten, was nicht geleistet werden kann: Die Ri.ickfi.ihrung des Begriffes 'Asthetik' bezw. '~sthetisch' auf andere Begriffe; hier auf den Beg-rift 'sch6n,' dort auf den Begriff ' K u n s t ' oder gar auf beide zugleich" (DF 18). There exist, on the other hand, final concepts which cannot be reduced to others, cannot defined in the usual sense of the term: supreme points of view which are not subject to higher points of view - among such are the concepts of ethics, logic and, indeed, aesthetics. But how can this concept be defined precisely? W e speak of aesthetic j u d g e m e n t and enjoyment, of aesthetic creation, of aesthetic objects, of aesthetic culture. But does there really exist a definition of "aesthetic" which m a y be unequivocally referred to all these different ambits? In particular, two mutually irreducible meanings o f the term are put forward: one referred to value (under which c o m e aesthetic culture and the object inasmuch as it possesses aesthetic value) and one referred to behaviour (aesthetic creation, ~sCf. [Fischer 191 I]. 19Unless we intend by the beautiful all things in general which have aesthetic value; but this would be a source of ambiguity and would not afford scope to express the internal differences within the world of aesthetic appraisability (DF 16-17). 2o "'Die Frage nach der SchOnheit ist ja auch nicht die einzige iisthetische Frage, die etwa angesichts eines Gem~ildesaufgeworfen werden kann" (DF 14). Other predicates may play a role in aesthetic judgement, such as "gut, trefflich, minderwertig, schlecht, gek~instelt, innerlich unwahr, echt, innerlich wahr, urspr~inglich, derb, grob, ordin~ir, trivial, feinsinnig, vornehm, gew~ihlt" (DF 14).

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e n j o y m e n t and evaluation). C o n r a d holds, however, that o n l y the first o f these two m e a n i n g s is appropriate, the o n e by which aesthetic b e c o m e s s y n o n y m o u s with "~isthetisch wertvoll," or e v e n with "~isthetisch b e d e u t s a m " ( D F 37); for him, the second m e a n i n g is merely an application of this. T h e a m b i t of aesthetics thus finds its o w n u n i f y i n g centre in the m o m e n t o f aesthetic value, which is b o r n e by objects a n d towards which the b e h a v i o u r o f c r e a t i o n and e n j o y m e n t 2~ is i n t e n t i o n a l l y directed. "Die ,~sthetik ist somit e i n e W e r t w i s s e n s c h a f t , ''22 a science o f value, for Th. C o n r a d , no less than for F i s c h e r , 23 Geiger, 24 and W. C o n r a d . 2s In this respect there are, h o w e v e r , a n u m b e r o f points w h i c h n e e d clarifying. In the first place: the term value should not be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y in its positive, but also in Its negative sense. T h e ambit o f aesthetics i n c l u d e s the u g l y as well as the beautiful, by the same title: thus e v a l u a t i o n s are m a d e w i t h i n a vast a m b i t o f which the positive and n e g a t i v e are only the e x t r e m e poles. 26 M o r e o v e r , we may add that a m u l t i p l i c i t y of values e n t e r into play here: 27 d i f f e r e n t types of values, b u t also different quantities, intensities, shades o f the s a m e v a l u e (Wertt~ne28). In the second place, contrary to the p s y c h o l o g i s t s ' view, it is not the act of e v a l u a t i o n which is at the centre o f aesthetic attention, but aesthetic v a l u e itself. 2t DF 36; from which indeed they derive the right to be termed aesthetic: enjoyment is aesthetic only insofar as it occurs in the presence of things that are aesthetic. Geiger seems to take a different view, when he pursues his intent to establish the peculiarity of aesthetic enjoyment, whatever its reference - if any - to the object (Cf. the opening of the Beitrage zur Phiinomenologie des iisthetischen Genusses). 22 DF 49. The same is true for Husserl: "Die ~,sthetik gehrrt Husserl zufolge in die Axiologie" ([Schuhmann and Scaramuzza 1990], 169). 23 Zur Bestimmung des iisthetischen Gegenstandes (Ein Kapitel aus: "'Untersuchungen fiber den iisthetischen Wert") is the title of the dissertation published by Fischer in Munich in 1907, in which the problem of the aesthetic object is considered in the light of the values which it holds. In a later essay he wrote of aesthetics "als eine Ph~inomenologie des reinen Schrnheitswert" ([Fischer 1911], 121). 24 For Geiger, too, aesthetics remains a Wertwissenschaft; "In Wahrheit hat man niemals noch eine wertfreie .~.sthetik geschrieben" - is his view ([Geiger 1976], 121, and 273-74; an important chapter, the fifth, is dedicated to the question of aesthetic value). 25 At the centre of aesthetics are "~isthetisches Werten" and their objects: Cf. [Conrad 1916], 4. 26 "Dabei ist der Terminus 'Wert' nicht im Sinne bloss positiven Wertes gefasst, sondern in einem Sinne, der gegeniiber der in jedem bestimmten Wertpr~idikate liegenden Positivitat oder Negativit~it neutral ist; so dass also unter diesen Wertbegriff sowohl Wert im Sinne positiven Wertes, wie Unwert d. h. negativer Wert f'fillt.Danach geh6rt also das H~isslicheebensowohl zum Bereich der ,~sthetik wie das Sch6ne" (DF 49). 27 First and foremost a sphere of values referred to the schrn-hfisslich dichotomy (which includes value predicates such as nett, hi.ibsch, herrlich, wunderbar), and a group referred instead to the gut-schlecht dichotomy (with predicates such as trefflich, vorzi.iglich, mangelhaft, mittelm/issig). 28 Cf. DF 55-56.

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In evaluation, the accent falls on that which objectively qualifies it as aesthetic: the aesthetic tout court, as a c o n c e p t implied by all the realities to w h i c h it is referred. This, we know, belongs to the area o f facts o f value (Gebiet d e r Werttatsachen). But this value does not so m u c h indicate an essential quality o f the object (realities which are qualified as aesthetic are not limited to this); 29 rather it constitutes a w a y o f considering the object, a point o f view o f it, in fact a "Wertgesichtspunkt" (and there are naturally many possible evaluative points o f view on artistic and aesthetic realities). The question initially p o s e d by C o n r a d m a y thus be a n s w e r e d as follows: the ambit o f aesthetics can be unified u n d e r the heading o f an evaluative-aesthetic point o f view.

5
T o consider "aesthetic" as a point o f view does not h o w e v e r signify m a k i n g s o m e t h i n g subjective o f it, 3 or merely p s y c h o l o g i c a l - p e r h a p s arbitrarily still applicable to reality. T h e values which it brings into play possess objectivity, both in the sense that they are placed in a dimension which transcends the b e h a v i o u r correlated to them, and (correlatively) in the sense that they c o r r e s p o n d to particular object m o m e n t s . Values are not reducible to the quality o f objects and indeed maintain an objective correlative, at w h i c h is by no means indifferent to them, given that "die ~isthetischen Werte den Objekten nicht ganz unvermittelt und zuf~illig z u k o m m e n . Es zeigt sich, dass die W e r t e in den Objekten und ihren B e s c h a f f e n h e i t e n 'begriindet' sind" ( D F 50). 32 Not all things m a y be c o n s i d e r e d 29 The term "aesthetic" may only delimit the ambit of the aesthetic where it is taken on "'in seiner Funktion als Hinsicht oder Gesichtspunkt" (DF 42-43); a point of view which serves for "Orientierung in einem Tatsachengebiet" (DF 43). "Das Wort ~isthetisch ist der Name fiar eine bestimmte Hinsicht oder Richtung, nicht fiir eine Eigenschaft" (DF 41). The same holds true for "~isthetisch wertvoll," which means "in der durch das Wort ~isthetisch gekennzeichneten Richtung wertvoll; oder: in ~.sthetischer Hinsicht wertvoll" (DF 41-42). 30 Cf. DF 46-49. 31 Aesthetics has its centre in a point of view, which however draws its own conditions of possibility from aspects of the object which make it susceptible to aesthetic evaluation. This itself is again a way (in line with the dominant tendencie~ in early phenomenological aesthetics) of prioritising the object of our attention, albeit insofar as it is submitted to an evaluative-aesthetic point of view. In this sense, in the paper presented to the Psychologischer Verein, Conrad already spoke of aesthetic as "etwas am Gegenstande" (quoted in [Schuhmann and Scaramuzza 1990], 175 n. 24; and p. 169). 32 And again: "in einem vorgegebenen Tatsachengebiet nicht jeder beliebige Gesichtspunkt zur Orientierung innerhalb dieses Gebietes benutzt werden kann" (DF 43). Moreover, the choice

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in an aesthetic light, or are liable to aesthetic appraisal; there m a y be incompatibility between realty and points of view. It remains true, however, that the unity of the world of aesthetic objects does not consist in a common essence of theirs, but only in their common liability to an evaluative-aesthetic point of view. This liability, however, is rooted in aspects and sides of the objects which make them commensurable with aesthetic perspectives; there are also realities, or rather aspects and sides of them, which are refractory to such perspectives. 33 Indeed, research on objects may itself take precedence 34 over research into value: it is necessary to recognise those traits of the objects which make them susceptible to aesthetic evaluation: "die ,~sthetik nach den im Gegenstand liegenden 'Bedingungen' ~isthetiscer Werte zu forschen hat," so that "sic die allgemeinen Wesenszusammenhiinge zwischen Gegenstiinden und deren wertbebingenden Eigenttimlichkeiten einerseits und den betreffenden ~ t h e t i s c h e n Werten andereseits zu erforschen hat" (DF 50-51). To this, however, Conrad devotes no m o r e than a few remarks by way of example in the closing passages of his dissertation. The subject-object relationship which takes shape here is certainly complex, and cannot be reduced to straightforward simplifications; it is anything but unilateral. There are many essential links, not only "zwischen einzelnen Objektseigentiimlichkeiten und einzelnen Werten," but also between "Werte und Wertntiancen" and "die Art und die innere Struktur des ganzen Objektszusammenhanges'" (DF 59). The argument is not, however, focused on discussion of the vast number of cases which might arise from individual events, or of the conditions variously produced by these which make an aesthetic judgement possible. Rather the task is to identify the structural conditions, the system of "allgemeinere Wesensgesetlichkeiten" (DF 54), the more general essential legalities within the different levels of the world of objects, 35 in which lies their liability to aesthetic judgement, whether positive or negative. between possible points of view of an object is not unlimited: "sic ist keine Wahl zwischen

beliebigen Gesichtspunkten tiberhaupt. Sondern sie ist selbst eine objektiv bedingte, durch die Eigenart der Objekte vorgeschriebene" (DF 48). 33 Cf. DF 44-45. Lipps also considers which traits make an object susceptible to aesthetic
appraisal, but in a context in which the accent falls, in the final analysis, on the evaluating subjectivity (Cf. [Lipps 1908]). 34 "Man sieht daher leicht, dass da nochumfassende Untersuchungen auf der Objektseite vorangehen m0ssen" (DF 56). "Voruntersuchungen" are the investigations that an "eigentliche ~isthetische Aufgabe" carries out in respect of "Wesenszusammenhiinge zwischen ~thetischen Werten und Objekten" (DF 58). 35 Conrad does no more than cite by way of example some of the available criteria by which the world of objects may be subdivided, with regard to their capacity as vectors of aesthetic values: their artificiality or naturalness, their various functions (expressive, representative in the

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6
In the end, however, this all amounts to no more than a programme. We cannot avoid feeling somewhat disappointed with Conrad's work. Its results do not seem so remote from the views of Lipps, and confirm certain of Banfi's impressions which, though we have noted their inadequacy overall, perhaps in Conrad's case are not so far from the mark. One issue in particular which appears to receive insufficient consideration is that of what nexus there may be (excepting those of extrinsic juxtaposition) between object and point o f view. Every decision on aesthetics seems to rebound back and forth between the two terms, emphasising alternately either the evaluative moment or the priority of research on the object. The objectivism o f early phenomenologists (conveyed in their virtually ignoring key issues in Husserl such as intentionality and a non-psychological conception of subjectivity) thus leaves problematically open-ended something which, for Daubert and Fischer, too, was of decisive importance: the question of the relationship between subject and object in aesthetic experience. We may add that Conrad himself described his research as founded on a basis which was still "ph~inomenologisch ziemlich primitiv" (DF 67), to be placed on the level of mere "Voruntersuchungen fiJr die eigentliche ~isthetische Aufgabe" (DF 58). He felt that there was much more to be done in the field of phenomenological research before the dream of "Asthetik als Wissenschaft" (DF 67) could be more precisely delineated. In his view, his own task consisted essentially only in tracing a methodical, but preliminary outline of phenomenological aesthetics in its fullest sense. 36

References
[Apel 1955-57] K.-O. Apel, "Die beiden Phasen der Ph~inomenologie in ihrer Auswirkung auf das philosophische Vorvers~indnis von Sprache und Dichtung in der Gegenwart," Zeitschrift fiir f(sthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 1955-57 (3). [Avr-Lallemant 1975a] E. Avr-Lallemant, "Die Antithese Freiburg-M/inchen in der Geschichte der Ph~inomenologie," in H. Kuhn, E. Avr-Lallemant

imitative or reproductive sense); the particular relations which develop within them between representation and the represented, and between means of figuration and objects; the moments of composition, the traits which order elements: conditions of unity, harmony, contrasts, subordination and coordination of parts, degree of finishing, ecc. (Cf. DF 57 ft.). 36 "'durch einige erst den Weg s~iubernde Scheidungen und Kliirungen einer sp~iteren ausgef'tihrtenPhKnomenologieder in Betracht kommenden Tatsaehengebiet vorzuarbeiten" (DF 68).

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103

and R. Gladiator, eds., Die Miinchener Ph~'nomenologie, Vortriige des internationalen Kongresses in Mfinchen 13.-18. April 1971, The Hague 1975. [Av6-Lallemant 1975b] E. Av~-Lallemant, Die Nachldsse der Miinchener Phiinomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek, Wiesbaden 1975. [Banff 1988] A. Banfi, Vita dell'arte. Scritti di estetica e filosofia dell'arte, Reggio Emilia 1988. [Chvatik 1987] K. Chvatik, Mensch und Struktur. Kapitel arts der neostrukturalen ,4sthetik und Poetik, Frankfurt/M. 1987. [Conrad 1911] W. Conrad, "Uber Wahrnehmung und Vorstellung (Ein Wesensvergleich)," Miinchener philosophische Abhandhmgen. Theodor Lipps zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet, Leipzig 1911. [Conrad 1916] W. Conrad, "Die wissenschaftliche und die ~isthetische Geisteshaltung," Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 1916 (159/2). [Conrad 1968] W. Conrad, Zur Wesenslehre des pshychischen Lebens und Erlebens, The Hague, 1968. [Conrad-Martius 1959] H. Conrad-Martius, "Die transzendentale und die ontologische Ph/~nomenologie," in Edmund Husserl 1859-1959, The Hague 1959. [Fischer 1911] A. Fischer, "Asthetik und Kunstwissenschaft," in Miinchener philosophische Abhandlungen. Theodor Lipps zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet, Leipzig 1911. [Geiger 1976] Geiger, Die Bedeutung der Kunst. Zugi~nge zu einer materialen Wertiisthetik, edited by K. Berger and W. Henckmann, Fink, Munich, 1976. [Husserl 1968] E. Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, The Hague 1968. [Lipps 1908] Th. Lipps, ",~sthetik," Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I, 6, 1908. [Schuhmann 1997] K. Schuhmann, "Philosophy and Art in Munich around the Turn of the Century," in R. Poli, ed., In itinere. European Cities and the Birth of Modern Scientific Philosophy, special issue of Poznat~ Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 1997, vol. 54, 35-51. [Schuhmann and Scaramuzza 1990] K. Schuhmann and G. Scaramuzza, "Ein Husserlmanuskript fiber ~,sthetik," Husserl Studies, 1990 (7/3). [Spiegelberg 1984] H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction, third edition with the collaboration of K. Schuhmann, The Hague 1984. [Volkelt 1917] Volkelt, "Objektive Asthetik," Zeitschr~ fiir Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 1917 (12).

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